Mapp v Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga TN Brief Collection
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1962
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Mapp v Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga TN Brief Collection, 1962. dc07c259-ca9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/3364871e-81e5-440f-87d2-4007a28ecf79/mapp-v-board-of-education-of-the-city-of-chattanooga-tn-brief-collection. Accessed December 07, 2025.
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In t h e
Imtefr States (Emtri ni Appeals
F oe t h e S ix t h C ircuit
Nos. 15,038-039 (_ t ■'£ - n
--------------------- ------------------------
J ames J o n ath an M app , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
—v.—
T h e B oard op E ducation op th e C it y op C hattanooga,
H am ilton Co u n ty , T ennessee , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
J am es J on ath an M app , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Cr oss-Appellees,
—v.—
T h e B oard of E ducation of th e C it y op Chattanooga,
H am ilto n Co u n ty , T ennessee, et al.,
Defendants-Cross-Appellants.
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND
PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-APPELLEES
Constance B aker M otley
J ack Greenberg
L eroy D . Clark
10 Columbus Circle
New York 19, New York
A von N. W illiam s , J r .
Z. A lexander L ooby
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
B ruce B oynton
431 East Ninth Street
Chattanooga 2, Tennessee
Attorneys for Appellants
Statement of Questions Involved
on Plaintiffs’ Appeal
1. Whether the court below erred in sustaining the
motion of the defendants-appellees to strike from the
complaint allegations with respect to the assignment of
teachers, principals, and other professional school per
sonnel on the basis of race, and portions of the prayer
of the complaint seeking to enjoin racial personnel as
signments ?
The District Court answered this question “No”. The
Plaintiffs-Appellants contend the answer should be
“Yes”.
2. Whether the court below erred in refusing to require
immediate desegregation of the Chattanooga Technical
Institute, a two-year course beyond the high school level,
and the Kirkman High School, the City’s only technical
high school, both of which are limited to white students.
The District Court answered this question “No” . The
Plaintiffs-Appellants contend the answer should be
“Yes” .
n
Counterstatement of Questions Involved on
Defendants’ Cross-Appeal
1. Whether the court below erred in disapproving that
provision of the Desegregation Plan which provides for
the continued operation of dual school zones throughout
the entire period of transition to single school zones and
disapproving that provision which requires parents to
notify the board of their intention to have their children
continue to attend the segregated school to which they
were previously assigned under the dual zone system or to
attend the desegregated school to which they will be re
assigned under a single zone system?
The District Court answered this question “ No” . The
Plaintiff s-Cross-Appellees contend the answer should
be “ No”.
2. Whether the court below erred in disapproving, on
the record and evidence in this case, that provision of the
Desegregation Plan which permits transfers from desegre
gated schools based wholly upon the race and color of the
majority of the children in the school?
The District Court answered this question “No”. The
Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellees contend the answer should
be “No” .
I l l
INDEX TO BRIEF
PAGE
Statement of Questions Involved on Plaintiffs’ Appeal.. i
Counterstatement of Questions Involved on Defen
dants’ Cross-Appeal __________ ii
Statement of Pacts.......... ....... .......................... .............. 1
A r g u m e n t : D irect A ppeal ...................................... 14
A rgu m en t : Cross A p p e a l ........................................ 23
Co n c l u s io n ............................................................................................ 27
Cases:
T able op A uthorities
Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction of Escambia.
County, Florida, No. 19408 (July 24, 1962) .......... 15
Boson v. Rippy, 285 F. 2d 4 3 ................ ........ ............11, 26
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U. S.
249 .............................................................................. 17
Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United
States, 201 F. 2d 819 ...................................... ..... 14
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 7 .................................21, 25
Edwards v. Kings Mountain Memorial Hospital, 118
F. Supp. 417 .......................................................... 14
Gibson v. The Board of Education of the City of
Nashville, 272 F. 2d 763-766 ......................... 24
Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knoxville,
Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 164 .....................................21, 25
PAGE
Kelly v. Board of Education, 270 F. 2d 209, cert,
denied 361 U. S. 924 ___ ___ ____ ____________ __11,
King v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New
York, 114 F. Supp. 700 ............ ....... ...... .................
Kinnear Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
214 F. 2d 891 ........................ ......... ..........................
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 ..
Maxwell v. County Board of Education of Davidson
County, Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 828 .............................
Northeross v. Board of Education of the City of
Memphis, 302 F. 2d 818 ............... .........................17,
Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961) ....
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 ..............................
Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 ....
State of Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control,
350 U. S. 413 ...................................................... .....
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 .............................
U. S. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 ....
Wilkinson v. Field, 108 F. Supp. 541.........................
25
14
15
19
25
24
24
19
19
20
19
15
15
I n th e
finite (Hxmxt uf Appeals
F oe t h e S ix t h C ircuit
Nos. 15,038-039
J am es J o n ath an M app , et al.,
Plaintiff s-Appellants,
— v .—
T he B oard op E ducation op th e C ity of C hattanooga,
H am ilto n C o u n ty , T ennessee , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
J am es J o n ath an M app , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Cr oss- Appellees,
T he B oard op E ducation op th e C ity op C hattanooga,
H am ilto n C o u n ty , T ennessee, et al.,
Defendants-Cr oss- Appellants.
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND
PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-APPELLEES
Statement of Facts
The present appeals, Nos. 15,038 and 15,039 are from a
final judgment and decree entered in this cause on April
20, 1962 by the United States District Court for the East
ern District of Tennessee, Southern Division (Wilson, D.J.),
approving a Plan of Desegregation of the public schools
in the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee (Sla-SGa).1
The appeal by plaintiffs below (No. 15,038) involves
issues presented by an interlocutory order entered May
1 Unless otherwise indicated citations are to Plaintiffs’ Appendix.
2
16, 1960 sustaining- a motion to strike certain portions of
the complaint, and by the final judgment’s failure to re
quire immediate desegregation of a two-year technical
training course offered in the City of Chattanooga at the
Chattanooga Technical Institute and immediate desegrega
tion of the City’s technical high school, “Kirkman.” (These
plaintiffs-appellants will be referred to hereafter as the
plaintiffs.)
The cross-appeal, No. 15,039, has been taken in this case
by the Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga,
Tennessee (referred to hereafter as defendants) appealing
from that part of the final order which: (1) failed to
approve the plan for continued operation of dual school
zone lines until a system of single zones is established
over a six-year period, and requiring parents to notify
school authorities before a specified date whether their
children will either enroll in the newly desegregated school
to which they are assigned under the single zone plan or
will continue in the segregated school to which they were
previously assigned under the dual zone plan; and (2)
disapproves a provision of the Desegregation Plan which
permits children to transfer from desegregated schools
where the majority of children in the school are of the
opposite race.
The instant brief is in support of the plaintiffs’ first ap
peal (No. 15,038), and is a reply to the defendants’ cross
appeal (15,039). A single appendix accompanies this brief.
There have been two prior appeals in this case, both
taken by the school authorities. The first appeal was taken
by the defendants-appellees on December 2, 1960 following
an order by the court below denying defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, granting plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment, directing defendants to submit a plan
of desegregation before December 20, 1960, and providing
3
for a hearing thereon in the District Court on January 9,
1961. Before that appeal could be heard it was necessary
for defendants to submit their plan of desegregation which
they did on December 20, 1960 and a hearing was held
thereon on January 23, 1961 instead of January 9, 1961.
Following this hearing, the District Court tentatively dis
approved the plan submitted and ordered the defendants
to submit, within 60 days, another plan. An appeal was
taken from this order on February 10, 1961. Before either
appeal could be heard defendants submitted a second plan
on March 23, 1961.
Thereafter, on November 13, 1961, this court affirmed
both judgments of the court below. Mapp v. Bd. of Educa
tion of City of Chattanooga, 295 F. 2d 617 (6th Cir. 1961).
The first plan (87a-93a) submitted December 20, 1960,
provided that in the school year 1962-3 compulsory segre
gation would be abolished in selected schools in Chatta
nooga in grades 1, 2, and 3 (88a). The selected schools
were to be announced by October 1, 1961, permitting an
entire school year to elapse before any desegregation took
place (88a). Thereafter, beginning in 1963, one additional
grade would be desegregated in the selected schools (88a).
After the 1962-63 school year, desegregation was to be
effected in other schools in accordance with plans to be
submitted (89a).
Desegregation was to be effected in these selected schools
by the establishment of a single system of school zones
(89a). The plan provided that in the period of transition
to single zones, children might continue the practice of
attending schools to which they were zoned by the dual
school zone system. These dual school zones were to re
main in existence until single zone lines were in full and
complete operation, although no terminal date had been
fixed (89a).
4
The plan further provided that parents desiring to en
roll their children in desegregated schools should file a
written “ Notice of Intention” with the defendant board
prior to January 1, 1962. Transfers would he granted
to a student from a desegregated school for good cause
shown, good cause being “where the majority of students
in that school or in his class are of a different race.”
Finally, the plan provided for continuance of the “pro
gram of elucidation” commenced by the defendant board
in July 1955 (91a).
The District Court’s judgment of January 27, 1961 was
that the first plan did not meet the requirements of the
Brown decision. However, the court did not then reject
the first plan but gave defendants a right to file an alter
nate plan, within 60 days, and reserved to defendants the
right to a reconsideration of the first plan.
The second plan submitted by defendants on March 23,
1961 was, in essence, a grade a year plan providing for
desegregation in all schools in the first grade in September
1961.
Consequently, on January 5, 1962, following this court’s
affirmance of the two orders of the District Court direct
ing defendants to bring in a plan, and rejecting the first
plan, defendants filed an amendment to the original plan
of December 20, 1960. This amendment is entitled: “ Im
plementation of and Amendments to the Original Chatta
nooga Plan of Desegregation, Submitted to the United
States District Court, Eastern District of Tennessee,
Southern Division, on December 20, 1960” (20a-23a). Ac
cording to this instrument, the first plan had been im
plemented as follows: 1) between April and July 1961
defendants had conducted a complete school census; 2)
the defendant board announced at a special meeting on
5
September 30, 1961 the single school zone lines which
would be in operation in selected schools in the school
year 1962-63; 3) the defendant board also announced the
names of the 16 schools which were to be desegregated
in grades one through three upon the opening of school in
September 1962-63; 4) forms to be used to give the board
written notice of intent to enroll in a new school to which
a pupil might be zoned under the new single zone system
were distributed to all schools; 5) pupils and parents were
notified of these developments; 6) the superintendent and
his staff conducted many meetings to insure full under
standing of the plan and the steps taken to implement
same.
In addition to the foregoing, denominated “ implementa
tion,” the original plan was modified in two respects: 1) a
definite date (September, 1962) was set as the date for
desegregation of six special programs, such as the classes
for the multiple-handicapped, the severely mentally re
tarded, etc. All elementary schools were to be desegre
gated in grades one through four in September 1963 on
the basis of single zones. No further desegregation steps
were outlined, although the first order of the court below
had expressly required defendants to
include vocational training in their plan. A pre-trial con
ference had been previously scheduled for January 5,
1962, the day this implemented and amended plan was
filed. This conference resulted in an order requiring
defendants to amend their plan to provide for desegrega
tion of vocational training within 10 days from the date
of the order.
Thereafter, on January 15, 1962 defendants filed a
document entitled, “Amendment to Original Chattanooga
Plan of Desegregation, Filed December 20, 1960, as
6
Amended January 5, 1962, With Regard to Vocational
Trailing” (24a-26a). By this amendment, defendants com
mitted themselves to a minimum desegregation rate of one
additional grade each year after all elementary schools
are desegregated in grades one through four in Septem
ber 1963-64 school year. The desegregation of each addi
tional grade, beginning with the fifth grade in 1964, was
to take place throughout the system with the result that
all elementary schools would he desegregated in grades
one through six in September 1965. The plan then pro
vided that in September 1966 desegregation would com
mence in junior high school and continue each year there
after through grades seven, eight and nine. Desegregation
of the senior high school, including Kirkman Technical
High School, was to commence in September 1969, con
tinuing a grade-a-year thereafter until the senior class
was desegregated in September 1971. The plan was that
all schools be desegregated nine years after its commence
ment. Attached to this amendment was a report adopted
by the defendant board at its regular meeting on January
10, 1962 at the suggestion of the superintendent. This
report, according to the amendment, “ Summarizes the
historical development of the varied curricula at the four
senior high schools presently operated by the Chattanooga
board, said report revealing that the courses offered at
City High, Howard High, Kirkman Technical Institute,
and Brainerd High varied in a substantial degree for
various reasons only remotely influenced by race” (em
phases added) (25a-26a). In this report the defendant
board contended that vocational education should not be
singled out for special consideration as a part of the
desegregation of Chattanooga’s city schools. Contained
in this report is a chart listing the courses offered in the
four high schools. A study of this chart reveals the defi
ciencies in the technical or vocational program offered
7
Negroes at Howard High, the city’s only Negro high school,
as compared with the technical program offered whites
at Kirkman (33a-38a). This chart also demonstrates the
limited academic programs available to Negroes at Howard
High School as against the broader and more comprehen
sive academic program afforded whites at Brainerd and
Chattanooga high schools.
The original plan, of which the January 15, 1962 docu
ments were amendments also provided that, on or before
a specified date, parents of children who might attend a
desegregated school as a result of the institution of a
system of single zones, were to notify the school author
ities of their intention to enroll their children in the newly
desegregated school (90a). Failing such notification, the
child presumably remained in the segregated school to
which he was zoned under the dual line system. Parents
of children entering school for the first time apparently
had the right to notify the defendant board of their inten
tion to enroll their children in the school in which such
child would be enrolled under the new single zone system
or of their intent to have that child enroll in the segregated
school which he would have been eligible to attend hut for
the elimination of segregation.
As the opinion of the court below points out (69a-70a)
this consent provision appears to relate only to the 16
elementary schools selected for initial desegregation in
September 1962, but this is not clear from a reading of
the plan. However, it now appears that defendants have
abandoned their appeal from that part of the judgment of
the court below which precludes them from requiring any
such notice of intention in the plan, as this ruling is not
argued in their brief. In its opinion, the court ruled with
respect to the notice of intention as follows:
8
The court does expressly disapprove of so much of
the defendants’ proposed admission plan as would re
quire any student or parent to apply for, or consent
to, implementation of desegregation in accordance with
the plan (79a).
Defendants’ notice of cross-appeal filed on May 18, 1962,
states that it is “ limited strictly to paragraphs 9 and 13
of said judgment as same may constitute disapproval of
the admission and transfer provisions of the Chattanooga
Plan of Desegregation as amended, particularly, Sections
IV, ‘The Interim Operation of Present School Zones’ and
VI, ‘Privilege of Transfer’ in original plan filed Decem
ber 20, 1961” .
The brief of defendants on their cross-appeal is devoted
entirely to the validity of the transfer provision as set forth
in Section VI of their plan and which provides as follows:
1. Upon receipt of applications as provided in existing
school board policy, transfer of students in desegregated
schools may be granted when good cause therefor is shown.
2. The following will he regarded as some of the valid
reasons for good cause for transfer:
(a) When a student would otherwise be required to
attend a school where the majority of students in that
school or in his class are of a different race.
(b) When, in the judgment of the board, upon recom
mendation of the superintendent, it is in the best inter
est of the student, and the board policy, to transfer him
from one school to another (90a-91a).
Subparagraph (b) is not in dispute on this appeal.
Although defendants do not discuss the validity of the
notice of intention provision in their brief, they request a
9
reversal of the judgment below to the extent that it dis
approves of “ the admission and transfer provisions” of
their plan. (See Brief for defendants-appellants in No.
15,039, pp. 5-6.)
Defendants’ plan of December 20, 1960, as amended Jan
uary 5 and 15, 1962, was not adopted by the court below.
After a hearing on the merits of defendants’ plan on Feb
ruary 1 and 2, 1962, that court rendered an opinion disap
proving the notice of intention and the transfer provisions.
It approved the plan with the following modifications
(81a-82a):
(1) The desegregation in September of 1962 of the first
three grades in 16 selected elementary schools as designated
by name in the defendants’ First Plan is amended. The fol
lowing special programs will also be desegregated in Sep
tember 1962: Class for multiple handicapped; classes for
orthopedically handicapped children; authorization for the
United Cerebral Palsy Program to be desegregated; classes
for perceptually handicapped; classes for severely mentally
retarded; class for educable mentally retarded at the G.
Bussell Brown School.
(2) The desegregation in September of 1963 of the first
four grades of all elementary schools.
(3) The desegregation in September 1964 of the remain
ing grades in all elementary schools.
(4) The desegregation in September of 1965 of the first
year of all junior high schools.
(5) The desegregation in September of 1966 of the re
maining grades in all junior high schools.
(6) The desegregation in September of 1967 of the first
year in all high schools.
(7) The desegregation in September of 1968 of the re
maining grades in all high schools.
10
(8) The desegregation in September of 1969 of the Chat
tanooga Technical Institute.
(9) The Board of Education may adopt any admission
or transfer plan as may in its judgment be reasonable or
proper for the operation of the Chattanooga Public Schools;
provided, however, that no admission or transfer plan may
be based upon race and have as its primary purpose the
delay or prevention of desegregation in accordance with the
plan herein approved.
(10) The map of the proposed single school zones as
attached to the defendants’ First Plan as amended is ap
proved, with the School Board having the right to modify
zones from time to time in accordance with their general
policies and practices and without regard to purely racial
factors.
(11) Within 60 days after implementing each annual step
of the plan herein approved the School Board shall report
to the Court as to progress under the plan to the date of
the respective report. This cause will be retained within
the jurisdiction of the Court and this order will be subject
to modification from time to time as may appear just and
proper.
(12) This order shall provide only for the minimum rate
of desegregation and defendants shall at all times be vested
with the discretion to proceed with desegregation at an
accelerated rate. Except as herein expressly provided the
defendants shall not be otherwise restrained by this order.
In disapproving the continuance of dual school zone lines,
the provision requiring parents to notify defendants of their
intention or to give consent before a specified date, the
court ruled:
“ The initial provision . . . says in effect that for the
school year beginning in September 1962, students
11
residing within a desegregated school zone who had
formerly been attending a different school, may enroll
in the desegregated school provided that his parents
give consent before a specified time.
#
“ It speaks of ‘single zone’ schools, but then refers to
‘schools desegregated by the School Board’ as though
these were different schools. No school becomes a
single zone school until it is desegregated, and then
only as to the grades desegregated. In short, the pro
vision is not only somewhat confusing, but the Court
is unable to understand the reason for any such pro
vision in the Plan. As was recently held in the case
of Northeross, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
6 Cir., ------ - F. 2d ------ , students ‘cannot be required
to apply for that to which they are entitled as a matter
of right.’ ”
Disapproval of the transfer provision was predicated
upon the testimony of the superintendent as to the resegre
gation effect of a similar provision in the Nashville, Ten
nessee plan (Appendix p. 43a) approved by this court in
Kelly v. Bd. of Education of Nashville, 270 F. 2d 209 (6th
Cir. 1959), cert, den., 361 IT. S. 924, and the Fifth Circuit’s
contrary decision in Boson v. Bippy, 285 F. 2d 43 (5th Cir.
1961). The court below held:
It does appear that a similar transfer provision was
approved by the Court in Kelly v. Board of Education
case. However, the Court in that case held as it did
“ on the evidence before us.”
In the record of the present case there was evidence
by the witness, Dr. Weinstein, that the Nashville trans
fer plan had operated to minimize progress under the
desegregation plan.
The Court.. . disapproves of so much of the transfer
plan proposed by the defendants as permits transfers
12
based only upon students being in a racial minority in
any particular school.
The plaintiffs urged the court below to require immediate
admission of Negroes to the Kirkman High School and to
require the immediate desegregation of a two-year tech
nical course at Chattanooga Technical Institute, but the
court ruled that “ the same reasons which have herein been
held to justify delay in the desegregation of academic
courses in high school would also justify delay in the
desegregation of vocational courses” (80a). Although the
court below found that the Chattanooga Technical Institute
is limited to white students, it permitted this institute to be
desegregated as the next annual step following desegrega
tion of the high schools (80a).
The motion to strike the allegations of the complaint in
this case relating to the assignment of teachers on the basis
of race came before the court below (Darr, D.J.) in May
1960. At that time, the court struck from the complaint
the following:
1. Plaintiffs, and members of their class, are injured
by the policy of assigning teachers, principals and
other school personnel on the basis of race and color
of the children attending a particular school and the
race and color of the person to be assigned. Assign
ment of school personnel on the basis of race and color
is also predicated in the theory that Negro teachers,
Negro principals and other Negro school personnel
are inferior to white teachers, white principals and
other white school personnel and therefore, may not
teach white children.”
2. “Enter a decree enjoining defendants, their agents,
employees and successors from assigning teachers,
principals and other school personnel to the schools
13
of the City of Chattanooga on the basis of the race and
color of the person to be assigned and on the basis of
the race and color of the children attending the school
to which the personnel is to be assigned
3. “ the assignment of teachers, principals and other
school personnel on a nonracial basis,”
The court ruled that these allegations were not material or
pertinent and therefore did not raise a justiciable question
(Appendix pp. 16a-17a). The superintendent testified, how
ever, on his deposition, which was subsequently admitted
into evidence (see Pre-Trial Order), that teachers are
assigned on the basis of race and color; that a Negro with
the title of supervisor assists in the improvement of the
quality of education in Negro schools; that there are no
Negroes in administrative or clerical positions; that there
are two Negro helping teachers assigned to Negro schools
(39a-42a),
The superintendent also testified on the final hearing on
the plan on February 1-2, 1962 that there are no plans for
desegregating teachers (40a).
14
ARGUMENT: DIRECT APPEAL
I
Whether the court below erred in sustaining the motion of
the defendants-appellees to strike from the complaint alle
gations with respect to the assignment of teachers, princi
pals, and other professional school personnel on the basis of
race, and portions of the prayer of the complaint seeking
to enjoin racial personnel assignments?
The District Court answered this question “No.” The
Plaintiffs-Appellants contend the answer should be
“Yes.”
Plaintiffs submit that the Court below erred in granting
Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations of the com
plaint directed towards the non-racial assignment of teach
ers and other school personnel. As a general proposition,
the motion to strike parts of a complaint is not favored and
in most instances will only be successful when attacking
obviously frivolous and prejudicial matter. Edwards v.
Kings Mountain Memorial Hospital, 118 F. Supp. 417;
King v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 114
F. Supp. 700. As this court noted in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F. 2d 819:
Partly because of the practical difficulty of deciding
cases without a factual record it is well established
that the action of striking a pleading should be spar
ingly used by the courts . . . The motion to strike should
be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has
no possible relation to the controversy.
The issue of whether plaintiff’s complaint could properly
request desegregation of the school system (as evidenced
by racial assignment of teachers) presented serious ques-
15
tions of law and fact. A substantial question of law existed
as to plaintiffs’ standing to request relief beyond non-
racial assignment of pupils. An additional, and serious
question of fact, which could only be resolved upon the pres
entation of evidence existed as to plaintiffs’ claim of in
jury to Negro students ensuing from the continuance of a
major vestige of the segregated school system. It is a
generally accepted proposition that the summary nature of
a motion to strike renders it an improper instance for the
settlement of serious questions of law and disputed ques
tions of fact. Wilkinson v. Field, 108 F. Supp. 541; U. 8. v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118. Further, de
fendants can make no showing of prejudicial harm resulting
from a full hearing on the issue of teacher segregation, and
this is a necessary element when a motion to strike is to
be sustained. Kinnear Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refin
ing Co., 214 F. 2d 891, 894. Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
may be seriously prejudiced by the entertainment of such
a motion for their complaint against racial assignment of
teachers may be mooted by their admittance to schools
where they will be taught by white teachers. Therefore
as a threshold matter the granting of defendants’ motion
was improvident.
All of these factors noted above were fully considered
in the Fifth Circuit case of Augustus v. Board of Public
Instruction of Escambia County, Florida, No. 19408 (July
24,1962) in which a portion of a complaint directed towards
racial assignment of teachers was held to be improperly
dismissed under a motion to strike. The Court of Appeals
there stated:
Whether as a question of law or one of fact, we do not
think that a matter of such importance should be de
cided on motion to strike. . . . We hold, therefore, that,
at the then stage of the proceeding, the district court
16
erred in sustaining defendants’ motion to strike the
allegations relating to the assignments of teachers,
principals and other school personnel on the basis of
race.
The posture of this case differs from Augustus in one
important particular. Although the district court sustained
defendants’ motion to strike, testimony of the superintend
ent, at the trial and on deposition, was permitted to be
made a part of this record. This testimony firmly estab
lishes defendants’ policy of assigning teachers and other
school personnel on the basis of race.
Plaintiffs contend that given this state of the record,
this court may upon finding the motion improperly granted,
decide the issue upon the merits. This is an appropriate
remedy, for the evidence relied on is completely supported
by defendants’ own testimony and further establishes that
defendants have no plan or intention to assign teachers on
a non-racial basis at any time in the future. Such a proce
dure is further dictated by the totality of circumstances
attendant on this case: plaintiffs’ initial complaint to de
segregate . the Chattanooga public schools was served in
April, 1960 and as of August, 1962, desegregation has been
achieved in no measure whatsoever. Further, defendants,
who have been fully aware of their obligation since the
Brown decision of 1954 to proceed with all deliberate speed,
have spent five years “ educating the citizenry” while de
segregating not one school in the city. When under court
direction to proceed more concretely toward desegregation
they have authored many dilatory plans whose main effect
was to integrate in the slowest, most piece-meal fashion and
retrogress to resegregation through racial transfer pro
visions. The remedy plaintiffs propose would require
defendants to assume their responsibility to discontinue
the racial assignment of school personnel which further
17
postpones plaintiffs’ full enjoyment of their constitutional
rights.
As regards the grounds upon which this court may find
that teacher segregation is a violation of plaintiffs’ con
stitutional rights, plaintiffs submit that Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483, affirmatively requires
the cessation of segregation in the entire school system.
From the very beginning the Supreme Court approached
these cases as an attack on segregation in the entire educa
tional system as opposed to the right of individual Negro
pupils to be admitted to white schools maintained by states
under the separate but equal doctrine.
This was the very reason for setting these cases down
for re-argument in 1954 after the court’s first pronounce
ment that further enforcement of racial segregation in
public schools is unconstitutional. Upon re-argument,
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U. S. 249,
the court again made clear that what was contemplated in
these cases was a reorganization of the school system on
a non-racial basis.
This court itself recognized the full import of the Brown
case in North-cross v. Board of Education of the City of
Memphis, 302 F. 2d 818, when it stated:
In May 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that “Separate educational facilities are inher
ently unequal,” and that segregation of the races in
separate schools deprived the minority group of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Four
teenth Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483, and further, the first Brown case decided
that separate schools organised on a racial ha-sis are
contrary to the Constitution of the United States.
18
It is a matter of common knowledge that the assignment of
Negro teachers to Negro schools is one of the major ways
in which the educational system is maintained on a segre
gated basis. The harm inflicted on Negro children does not
emanate solely from the fact that they attend school only
with other Negroes, but is generated by the knowledge
that their race is separated as an imputation of inferiority.
If teachers are assigned on the basis of race, then obviously
the policy of segregation continues as a reminder of the
formerly imposed racial discrimination, and the Negro
students have not been relieved of the source of their
harm—a segregated school system. Therefore, the rights
they assert are not solely the rights of the teachers, but
are personal and central to their relief.
Consequently, the rights secured by the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Brown case could not have been so incom
plete as merely to secure the right to attend a “white”
school in a racially segregated system. School authorities
cannot, therefore, be heard to say that they have no duty to
eliminate racial discrimination in the school system and
may continue to operate segregated schools, assign teachers
on the basis of race and, in short, do business as usual.
Teachers are an integral part of the school system and
the mandate to end racial discrimination in the school
system clearly carries with it the duty to end the policy of
assigning teachers on the basis of race.
II
Whether the court below erred in refusing to require
immediate desegregation of the Chattanooga Technical In
stitute, a two-year course beyond the high school level,
and the Kirkman High School, the City’s only technical
high school, both of which are limited to white students.
19
The District Court answered this question “No” . The
Plaintiffs-Appellants contend the answer should be
“Yes” .
The defendants operate two educational institutions,
Kirkman Technical High School and Chattanooga Techni
cal Institute at which only white students may receive tech
nical and vocational training. The Chattanooga Technical
Institute provides two years of advanced training beyond
the high school level. The only institution at which Negroes
may receive any vocational training is Howard High School
which has a combined academic and vocational curriculum.
It is undisputed that there are vocational training courses
given at Kirkman High School which are not available in
the Negro high school.2 There is absolutely no provision
for Negroes to obtain two years of technical training be
yond high school, as provided for whites at the Chattanooga
Technical Institute.
The issue here is fairly simple. As an outgrowth of the
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, it was recog
nized that where the state could not provide equal facilities
however separate, Negroes could not be subjected to dep
rivation of educational opportunities permitted all other
citizens, and immediate admission of Negro plaintiffs to
formerly all-white schools was ordered. Sweatt v. Painter,
339 H. S. 629; Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 H. S.
637; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637.
In the Sweatt case, the State of Texas had opened a law
school for Negroes, which the court, however, found unequal
in staff, library, and curriculum to the University of Texas
Law School which was limited to whites. The court stated:
2 The following courses are given at Kirkman High School and
are not available to Negroes at Howard High School: Machine
Shop, Sheet Metal, Welding, Drafting, Electricity, Commercial
Art, Industrial Chemistry, and Printing.
20
. . . petitioner may claim his full constitutional right:
legal education equivalent to that offered by the State
to students of other races. Such education is not avail
able to him in a separate law school as offered by the
State.
We hold that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four
teenth Amendment requires that petitioner be ad
mitted to the University of Texas Law School.
In all of the above cases, the court refused to permit de
fendants’ promises to equalize facilities in the future to
modify the order for immediate admission. In Sipuel v.
Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the court stated:
“ The state must provide (legal education) for her in
conformity with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as it
does for applicants of any other group” (at p. 631).3
Immediate admission where discrimination had produced
demonstrably unequal facilities was the law prior to the
Brown decision. Brown took on the further task of requir
ing desegregation in public schools even absent a showing
of inferior plant and other educational facilities. A post-
Brown decision, State of Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board
of Control, 350 U. S. 413, is the latest case to apply the
rule of prompt and immediate admission. This case dis
tinguished the second Brown decision of 1955 which re
quired “all deliberate speed” and held the rule of prompt
admission was not modified where the state provides edu
cational training for white persons which was not available
presently in any form to Negroes. Such a holding was not
limited to deprivation of collegiate or graduate school edu-
3 It is to be noted that defendants here, have made no promises
to make the curriculum at the Negro high school equal to that
of the white high school during the deferment of desegregation.
21
cation for Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 7, which concerned
admission to public schools stated:
Of course, in many locations, obedience to the duty of
desegregation would require the immediate general
admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as
students for their appropriate classes, at particular
schools.
This court passed on the identical issue in Goss v. Board
of Education of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 301 F.
2d 164. In that case, the Fulton High School, which was
limited to white students, offered some technical and voca
tional courses which were not available in any Negro high
school. Defendants proposed, as do defendants here, to
reach the desegregation of this school pursuant to a stag
gered desegregation plan for all schools which would have
postponed desegregation of Fulton High School for nine
years. The district court specifically rejected this solution.
On appeal this court stated approvingly:
Judge Taylor wisely withheld approval of the plan
insofar as it denied Negro students the right to take
the technical and vocational courses offered at Fulton
High School. The board should, as he suggested,
present within a reasonable time a plan that would
permit all Negro students who desire and are qualified
to have an opportunity to take the special courses of
this high school (at p. 168).
The court below based its acceptance of deferred desegre
gation for vocational schools on testimony which attempted
to justify the unavailability of various courses on the
ground that employers would not hire Negroes with these
skills. This argument is infirm on several grounds. The
strength of the statement is questionable, since no Negroes
have ever received such training, and consequently the
22
opportunity for refusing them employment has been nil.
Further, Negro students are permanently disabled from
even attempting to break down any racial barriers in em
ployment because at the outset they are deprived of proper
training. Given such training, they might achieve the
gradual breakdown of racial barriers, especially with grow
ing federal controls on racial discrimination in many areas
of private employment.4 In addition to the practical as
pects, it can never be legitimate, in terms of the constitu
tional obligation to provide equal training for all students,
for an educational system to impose racial discrimination
on students as a reflection and reinforcement of supposed
discrimination such students will meet on graduation.
Kirkman High School and Chattanooga Technical Insti
tute, therefore, present a separate and more pressing need
for desegregation and should be dealt with immediately
outside the general plans for desegregation. This source of
social and economic injury to the Negro community war
rants immediate attention.
4 Executive Order 10925 bars private employers who receive
Government contracts from denying employment to qualified per
sons because of race.
23
ARGUMENT: CROSS APPEAL
III
Whether the court erred in disapproving that provision
of the Desegregation Plan which provides for the continued
operation of dual school zones throughout the entire period
of transition to single school zones and in disapproving
that provision which requires parents to notify the board
of their desire to have their children continue to attend
the segregated school to which they were previously as
signed under the dual zone system, or to attend the de
segregated school to which they will be reassigned under
a single zone system?
The District Court answered this question “No”. The
Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellees contend the answer should
be “ No”.
Defendants are appealing from so much of the judgment
below as disapproves their plans:
(1) To continue racial school zone lines during the
period a school proceeded to full integration; and
(2) To require parents to make known their desire by
a specific date, to send their children to a school open
to all races under the newly drawn zone lines.
The plan is in essence one of leaving all children in their
present segregated schools during the “ transition” period
and requiring those who wish the opportunity to go to a
desegregated school to make formal request for such. The
defendants’ plan as such differs little from other school
boards’ attempt to justify the continuance of segregated
schools because a pupil placement law was available
through which Negro parents could request transfer of
their children to white schools. These laws have repeatedly
24
been held not to constitute a reasonable start towards
compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision. North-cross
v. Board of Education of the City of Memphis, 302 F. 2d
818; Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798. As stated in
Gibson v. The Board of Education of the City of Nashville,
272 F. 2d 763-766, plans which require requests for transfer
where racial zone lines are maintained by the school board,
are not “ inconsistent with a continued policy of compulsory
racial segregation.”
Defendants cannot defend their policy by claiming it is
“voluntary” and not compulsory segregation if Negro
parents do not make the request for transfer to a “ desegre
gated” school for Negroes have no more right to request
attendance at solely “Negro” schools than have whites to
request attendance at solely “white” schools. They there
fore cannot permit requests from parents to modify the
obligation of the state to discontinue the maintenance of
“Negro” and “ white” schools. Goss v. Board of Education
of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 164. The
duty to desegregate a school system which the state has
actively segregated, in violation of the constitution, is on
the defendant school board, not the individual plaintiffs.
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300; Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 7. As the court below stated, quoting
from Northcross v. The Board of Education of the City of
Memphis, 302 F. 2d 818, students “ cannot be required to
apply for that to which they are entitled as a matter of
right.”
The court’s decisions in Brown and Cooper established
the right of all children to freedom from state-imposed
educational segregation based on color. They make plain
the state’s duty, not merely to afford an election to be
unsegregated, but to affirmatively cease the organization
of the school system on the basis of race. Nor do the de
cisions contemplate an arrangement perpetuating segre-
25
gation subject to individual application by which desegre
gation can be achieved only in isolated instances. The de
fendants are attempting to shift to the individual a re
sponsibility the constitution imposes on them. Behind this
attempt is a hope that the Negro community will be qui
escent and fail to apply for transfers, thus allowing the
pre-existing pattern of segregation to continue. An evasive
scheme, however ingenious, should not be permitted to
nullify the right of plaintiffs to attend school on a non-
segregated basis. Cooper v. Aaron, supra.
IV
Whether the court below erred in disapproving, on the
record and evidence in this case, that provision of the
Desegregation Plan which permits transfers from desegre
gated schools based wholly upon the race and color of the
majority of the children in the school!
The District Court answered this question “No” . The
Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellees contend the answer should
be “No”.
As a part of defendants’ original plan submitted on
December 20, 1960, they proposed to permit transfer from
desegregated schools when “good cause” was shown. One
reason taken as such good cause occurs:
When a student would otherwise be required to at
tend a school where the majority of students in that
school or in his class are of a different race.
A racial transfer plan identical to this has been approved
by this court on previous occasions. Kelly v. Board of
Education, 270 F. 2d 209, certiorari denied 361 TJ. S. 924.
Maxwell v. County Board of Education of Davidson County,
Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 828; Goss v. Board of Education of
the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 164.
26
Another circuit has disapproved such a plan, Boson v.
Rippy, 285 F. 2d 43, and an application for certiorari in
the Maxwell and Goss cases is pending in the Supreme
Court of the United States for resolution of the conflict
in circuits. Plaintiffs do not abandon their argument that
the transfer plan, to any extent it is availed of by parents,
must work toward re-segregation. The affirmance of the
court below, however, may be had without reference to the
validity of the plan on its face.
In the Goss case, this court sustained the racial trans
fer plan, reasoning that only in its application may it be
violative of constitutional rights. The court forthwith,
however, admonished defendants “ that it cannot use this as
a means to perpetuate segregation” (at page 168). To
insure this rule, responsibility was left to the trial court
to evaluate the transfer provision as an operating mecha
nism :
“The trial judge retains jurisdiction during the transi
tion period and the supervision of this phase of re
organization may be safely left in his hands” 5 (at p.
168).
The court below expressly accepted the standard set by this
court in the Kelly case and prohibited the use of the racial
transfer plan on the basis of evidence before it that the
plan would operate to perpetuate segregation.
It does not appear that a similar transfer provision
was approved by the Court in Kelly v. Board of Edu
cation case. However, the Court in that case held as
it did “ on the evidence before us.”
5 Such delegation is in line with the second Brow n decision
which counseled that district courts which handled desegregation
cases from their inception were best equipped to perform the
judicial function of assaying what constituted good faith imple
mentation of desegregation.
27
In the record of the present case there was evidence
by the witness, Dr. Weinstein, that the Nashville trans
fer plan had operated to minimize progress under the
desegregation plan.
The Court. . . disapproves of so much of the transfer
plan proposed by the defendants as permits transfers
based only upon students being in a racial minority
in any particular school.
The District Court’s order that the racial transfer rule
was not to be a part of the general desegregation plan was
probably a decision that no side mechanism be allowed to
decelerate a rate of integration which was the bare mini
mum of defendants’ obligation. Absent the transfer rule,
the court was assured of total desegregation of the school
system within seven years. Within the area of discretion
the District Court made the decision to remove any factors
which might disrupt the schedule and make progress
toward desegregation more halting and uncertain.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court
below should be reversed as to Appeal No. 15,038 and
affirmed as to Appeal No. 15,039.
Respectfully submitted,
Constance B ak es M otley
J ack G reenberg
L eroy D . Clark
10 Columbus Circle
New York 19, New York
A von N. W illiam s , Jr.
Z. A lexander L ooby
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
B ruce B oynton
431 East Ninth Street
Chattanooga 2, Tennessee
Attorneys for Appellants
I n t h e
United States (iliwrt nt A rea ls
F oe th e S ix t h C ircuit
No. 14,444
J am es J o n ath an M app ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
—versus—
T h e B oard of E ducation of th e C it y of Chattanooga,
H am ilto n C o u n ty , T ennessee, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
appeal from th e u n ited states district court for th e
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, SOUTHERN DIVISION
APPENDIX TO APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Z. A lexander L ooby
A von W illiam s
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville, Tennessee
C onstance B aker M otley
T hurgood M arshall
10 Columbus Circle
New York 19, New York
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
f\2_ ; .* ̂
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INDEX TO APPENDIX
PAGE
Statement of March 31, 1956 ........ ........ ....................... 4b-
Statement of July 9, 1958 ................................................ 8b
Statement of March 7, 1960 ............................................ 10b
Excerpts From Depositions ............................................ 12b
W itnesses :
Pages o f
Original Printed
Record Page
Dr. John Walter Letson
Direct .............................................. 3-37 12b
Recalled
Cross................................................ 105-108 57b
Redirect .......................................... 108-117 60b
William D. Leber
Direct .............................................. 47-76 23b
Cross........................................ 76-87 44b
Redirect .......................................... 87-92 53b
Dean Petersen
Direct ..................................-........... 120-126 64b
Cross .............................................. 126-135 68b
Redirect .......................................... 135-141 75b
Recross .......................................... 141-142 79b
Mrs. Sammie C. Irvine
Direct ....................... -..................... 143-145 80b
Cross ......................... .................... 146 81b
Supplem entary Statement o f October 12, 1955 .......... lb
11
George C. Hudson
Pages o f
Original
Record
Printed
Page
Direct .................... ............... 148-152 82b
Raymond B. Witt
Direct .............................. ............... 153-155 86b
Cross ......................... ............... 155-158 88b
Redirect .................... ............... 159-168 90b
Supplementary Statement of October 12, 1955
October 12, 1955
Chattanooga P ublic S chools
413 East Eighth Street
Chattanooga 3, Tennessee
October 12,1955
S u pplem en tary S tatem en t by th e C hattanooga B oard
of E ducation w it h R eference to th e D ecisions of th e
U nited S tates S uprem e C ourt of M ay 17,1954, and M ay 31,
1955, on th e S u bject of R acial D iscrim ination
in th e P ublic S chools
On July 23 we released a statement of policy concerning
our position with respect to the Supreme Court decisions
on racial discrimination in the public schools. The Board
reaffirms its stated policy. We are interested primarily in
the welfare of all the children in the city schools.
We are in the second phase of our announced procedure,
giving consideration to the selection of members of the
advisory committee who will assist us as we study the
problem and seek a solution. As soon as the committee has
been selected and organized, we will begin public meetings
to counsel with interested Chattanooga citizens seeking
their viewpoints and advice.
It is evident that some people have misunderstood our
original statement of policy. We have had several sugges
tions offered as possible solutions to our problem. For
example, some people have questioned why we did not
adopt a plan similar to that being tried in some southern
cities where certain schools will be designated for each
race and some for both white and Negro children, with
attendance being on an optional basis. We believe our posi
tion is better since it leaves us free to find and accept this
2b
or any solution that might be superior. Moreover we are
in a position to draw from the people of Chattanooga the
answers that they finally believe to be the wisest and best
for this community.
The Supreme Court clearly recognized that each school
board would have its different problems because no two
communities are exactly alike. That also means that if a
problem is different, its solution may necessarily be differ
ent from the solution in another community. That is what
we think the Supreme Court said in its decision.
Once the Court recognized that the problem varied with
each community, it directed each school board to counsel
with the people of its own community in order to determine
exactly what the problem is in that particular community.
Now, as we read the Court’s decision, this means that the
Court recognizes that racial discrimination can end only
when the majority of the citizens are willing for it to end.
That is why we want to secure the view of our fellow citizens
with the aid of the interracial advisory committee, repre
senting our best citizens of varying points of view. We
will welcome interested groups from all over the City to
come and discuss this most serious problem with us and the
advisory committee. We want ideas and suggestions from
everyone; for, as we understand the Supreme Court’s
decision, this is what the Court intended for us to do first.
The Court has placed control of the situation in our
hands as long as we act in good faith, and we intend to act
in good faith at all times. This is of the utmost importance.
It is also important that we be able at all times to prove
our good faith in a court of law. We can decide whether
our community should take a little step or a big one or a
series of little steps over a period of years. But once the
Court decides we are not acting in good faith, the Court
will tell us what to do.
Supplementary Statement of October 12, 1955
3b
We are responsible for the educational opportunities of
all 24,000 children in the City schools. In everything we
do we must always have their welfare in mind. This means
that our obligation to a Negro child is no greater and no
less than our obligation to a white child. In other words,
we do not know the answers, but we do know that we must
not penalize a Negro child in his educational opportunities,
nor must we penalize a white child.
Therefore, we shall in the near future name our inter
racial advisory committee and be ready to begin considera
tion of this question in search for the answers. In the
hearings that will be held we shall not sit formally as a
board of education but as a committee of the whole. Our
regular chairman, even though he has adopted a position
contrary to the policy of the Board, will sit with us and
participate with all the rights and privileges and courtesies
to which he is entitled and which are enjoyed under the law
by any other Board member. We are convinced that every
one will come to realize that it is far better for the Board
of Education to retain the responsibility for arriving at
a decision as to what is best for our children and our com
munity instead of having some drastic action imposed upon
us. The Court itself opened the way for each community
to solve its problem in its own way so long as the effort is
carried on in good faith each step of the way. This we
intend to do.
Chattanooga B oard of E ducation
R. E . B iggers
A lf J. L aw , J r .
W. I). L eber
H arry M ilder
R aymond B. W it t , J r .
M rs. J . B. (S am m ie C.) I rvin e , Secretary
H arry A lle n , Commissioner and Chairman
Supplementary Statement of October 12, 1955
4b
Chattanooga P ublic S chools
413 East Eighth Street
Chattanooga 3, Tennessee
March 31,1956
S tatem en t of M arch 31, 1956, by th e Chattanooga B oard
of E ducation w it h R eference to th e D ecisions of the
U nited S tates S upreme Court of M ay 17,1954, and M ay 31,
1955, on th e S u bject of R acial D iscrim ination
in th e P ublic S chools
Events in the last year have convinced the Chattanooga
Board of Education that the community will not accept any
form of integration within the City schools at any time
within the near future. We, therefore, take this opportunity
to report to the community our decision to postpone any
change in the public schools for a period of at least a few
years probably five years or more. Because of organiza
tional problems confronting the schools now, the decision
could not be longer postponed, and we feel that the public
is entitled to have this information without delay.
We believe this to be in harmony with the spirit of the
two U. S. Supreme Court rulings on the question.
We believe our decision will not harm any child of either
race. We believe this action to be a good faith compliance
with the supreme law of the land.
Following the Supreme Court decision of May, 1955, we
announced, after careful thought and consideration, our
statement of policy regarding the matter of segregation in
the operation of our public school system. As we started
our search for an answer, we said that there would be no
Statem ent o f M arch 3 1 , 1 9 5 6
5b
change in the operation of our schools for the school year
commencing in September, 1955.
We have proceeded in good faith, in line with our an
nounced policy, to seek a solution to our problem. We have
talked with many people; we have studied the law; we have
taken note of plans and developments in other communities ;
we have observed every development; for in our hearts and
in our prayers this problem has been constantly with us.
We have asked every citizen of Chattanooga to help us in
our efforts to find a legal solution which would harm no
child of either race, and we are grateful to those good
citizens who have shared their thinking with us. From the
outset we have realized that the answer must be found in
the hearts of the citizens of our community.
We have said that we will comply with the law. We have
said that this means we will comply with the law as we
understand it as we read the words used by the United
States Supreme Court. As a result of all that has happened
in our community and elsewhere, we are firmly convinced
that any measure of integration within the foreseeable
future would do the community irreparable damage. The
cause of public education has already suffered severe
damage. Hasty action could result in harm to the welfare
of our children to an extent unknown. The quality of all
education at all levels would suffer. No one would gain.
Everyone would lose from too hasty action.
As a Board of Education, our duty is not to make the law
or to say the law is right or wrong. It is our duty to operate
the schools to the best of our ability for the benefit of the
children within the legal framework that binds us. Our
personal feelings have no proper place in the decision to
comply with the law.
Statement of March 31,1956
6b
We do not believe the Court will require us to take a step
that will destroy much of the progress the public schools of
Chattanooga have made during the last 25 years.
We do not believe the Court will require us to take a
step that we believe in good faith would be detrimental to
the well-being of all of our children.
In this dilemma, our primary responsibility is to make
the problem clear to the community. This is what the
Court’s words mean to us. Before any problem can be
solved, the exact nature of the problem must be known
to those who must solve it. Some 150,000 Cliattanoogans are
involved in this problem; and every single one has an
opinion on the problem. Yet events have proven that this
issue is so close to the hearts of all of us that emotions
prevent a discussion of the issue. It has proven impossible
to discuss the question in a calm manner with many people.
Sooner or later our emotions overcome us.
As a result, we have not been able to make the problem
clear to our fellow citizens. Misunderstanding has increased
almost daily. Normal friendly relations have worsened.
Your Board hopes this breathing spell may restore a
spirit of good will to our community, an atmosphere where
free discussion is possible without bitterness and hate. We
feel that such a period is essential if the problem is ever to
be solved without results that none of us would knowingly
seek.
The Court told us to elucidate the problem. To date that
has been impossible. Yet that first step is essential. Were
we to skip the first step of making the problem clear, we
would be violating the Court’s ruling.
During this period of time we will exert every effort to
improve our schools, yet working always within the frame-
Statement of March 31,1956
7b
Statement of March 31,1956
work of the law as we understand it. For the future only
the people of this community and developing circumstances
here and elsewhere can point the way to a fair solution.
Chattanooga B oard of E ducation
R. E. B iggers
A lf J. L aw , J r .
W . D . L eber
H arry M iller
R aym ond B. W it t , Jr.
Mrs. J. B . (S am m ie C .) I rvine , Secretary
H arry A l le n , Commissioner and Chairman
8b
Chattanooga P ublic S chools
Chattanooga, Tennessee
July 9,1958
Every single decision of the Chattanooga Board of Edu
cation is made with one objective in mind—to provide the
best possible education for all of the children in Chat
tanooga.
The decision of the U. S. Supreme Court on the question
of racial discrimination has confronted the community with
a serious decision. Each Chattanooga citizen must accept
his responsibility to help solve this grave problem.
The position of this Board on the question of compliance
with this decision is a matter of public record and needs no
reiteration. In the meantime, public education must go
forward. It must be improved for the benefit of all.
We are in a period of transition and no one knows the
time element. We must move in good faith to continue and
improve public education and to minimize tension. We are
certain education cannot take place in an atmosphere of
tension and bitter conflict.
Your School Board has been and now is attempting to
make the problem clear to the community. All citizens
must know exactly what our problem is before we can go
about working out a solution.
In our combined judgment it would be extremely unwise
to comply with the recent request to integrate our public
schools at the beginning of the next school term, and it is
our decision that the request be denied.
Statem ent o f July 9 , 1 9 5 8
9b
Statement o f July 9,1958
We shall continue to do our best to meet our grave
responsibility to all the children in the Chattanooga public
school system. With God’s help, it can be done.
Chattanooga B oard of E ducation
R. E . B iggers
George C. H udson , Sr.
(Mrs. J. B.) S am m ie C. I rvine
Alf J. L a w , Jr.
W illiam D . L eber
R aymond B . W it t , J r .
F. H. T rotter, Commissioner and Chairman
10b
C hattanooga P ublic S chools
Chattanooga, Tennessee
March 7,1960
To th e C itizen s oe Chattan ooga :
The Chattanooga Board of Education denies the recent
demand for “total integration” of the Chattanooga Public
Schools with the conviction that to do otherwise would be
premature and to the detriment of the vast majority of
white and Negro children.
The school board has never questioned the legality of the
Constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court,
although individual members of the board may have ques
tioned the wisdom of the decision. The Court recognized
that implementation of these principles would require the
solution of varied problems. It placed upon the school
board the responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving them. In attempting to make the problems clear
to the community, we are in the first stage of compliance
with the Supreme Court’s decision. This step has not been
completed and cannot be completed by the school board
alone.
The Board of Education has been delegated the responsi
bility for public education in this community. We are con
vinced that a substantial majority of the people we serve
strongly prefer the continuation of our schools in accord
ance with the historical pattern. We are also fully aware
that a substantial minority of the community desires com
pliance with the Supreme Court’s decision. Ordinarily the
wishes of the majority would be a clear directive to the
Statem ent o f M arch 7 , 1 9 6 0
lib
school board. When the wishes of the majority are in direct
conflict with the Constitution of the United States, we know
that the Constitution must somehow prevail. There could
be no law if each community had the right to interpret the
Constitution in its own way.
Your school board has attempted to elucidate the prob
lem and will continue in its efforts. We have met many long
hours with various groups—pastors, business leaders, a
representative union group, Negro groups—always working
toward understanding of the Court’s action and its signifi
cance to the community.
We earnestly seek your understanding.
Chattanooga B oard of E ducation
S. D ean P etersen , Commissioner and Chairman
G eorge C. H udson , Sr.
(Mrs. J. B .) S am m ie C. I rvine
A lf J. L a w , J r .
W illiam D . L eber
B aymond B . W itt , J r .
Statement of March 7,1960
1
12b
Excerpts From Depositions
# ^ ^
D r. J ohn W alter L etson , being first du ly sw orn , was
exam ined and deposed as fo l lo w s :
Direct Examination by Mrs. Motley:
D. Mr. Letson, would you state your full name and posi
tion for the record, please! A. John Walter Letson,
Superintendent of Schools, City of Chattanooga.
—4—
D. How long have you been the Superintendent! A.
Since November 1957.
D. Are you one of the defendants in this lawsuit! A.
Yes.
# # # # #
— 21—
D. Now you said that you have been here since 1957, I
—22—
believe! A. Right,
D. That’s September 1957! A. November.
D. November 1957. Since you have been Superintendent
of Schools here has the Board adopted any resolutions
relating to integration of schools! A. Yes, the Board has,
has issued two statements, if I remember correctly.
D. Do you remember when they were issued? A. One
last summer. I don’t remember the exact date. It’s a
matter of record, however. One was issued this school year,
sometime in February, if I remember correctly.
D. So you think there are a total of two statements
issued by the Board relating to integration? A. Yes, since
I have been here.
D. We’d like to get the statements at the end. We don’t
— 3—
13b
need it right now. Now since you have been Superintendent
have you worked on any plan or plans for desegregating
the schools? A. Yes.
D. What are those plans? A. I have been a part of a
series of meetings that the Board has held in regard to
this problem since, since I ’ve been in Chattanooga.
D. You’ve attended a series of meetings? A. Yes.
—23—
D. With the Board? A. Yes.
D. Has any plan been approved or adopted or suggested?
A. The Board of Education has, did state its position be
fore I came to Chattanooga that established rather clearly
its purpose and intention. It did say that it was the inten
tion of the Board of Education to comply with the Supreme
Court’s decision.
In the intervening period of time the Board of Education
has been working, and I have been a part of that plan, to,
to follow the instructions of the Supreme Court in im
plementing that decision.
The Board of Education has certainly been in the process
of, of elucidating the problem and doing many things to
develop a community understanding of the problem and
its solution.
D. Now let’s see if we can be a little more specific. In
addition to announcing an intention to comply with the
Supreme Court’s decision, specifically what has the Board
done with respect to that intention ? Has it held any public
meetings ? Has it published any documents ? Has it devised
any plan? Has it studied any plans? A. It certainly has
studied plans. It has held a number of meetings. They have
not been public meetings. It has proceeded according to a
—2 4 -
plan in its desire and in its effort to live up to that original
statement.
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
14b
D. Well, other than meetings with the Board itself,
you’re saying that there have not been any public meetings
on this question? A. But there have been a number of
private meetings.
D. You mean the Board has met privately with persons
who are not members of the Board? A. Oh, yes.
D. How many such meetings do you think there have
been in the last three years? A. It would have to be a
guess. It’s a matter of record. I—I would say six, seven,
eight.
D. Are these community interest groups? A. Yes.
D. Citizens groups? A. Yes.
D. Now in addition to meetings, has the Board published
any documents on this question? That is, in addition to
the resolutions which we know we have copies of here, but
has the Board put out any informational material for the
benefit of the community? A. Not during the three years
that I have been here.
D. Now specifically, what plans has the Board studied?
A. There was a review of the Little Rock plan, Nashville
- 2 5 -
plan, certainly published materials of general application
in regard to this problem have been a matter of interest
and concern and information for the Board.
D. Has any specific plan been approved? A. Other than
that the Board of Education is proceeding according to its
plan to develop an acceptance of its original position, which
is that it was going to comply with the Supreme Court’s
decision.
D. Now since this suit has been filed has any plan or
change in plan been made? A. No change. A further con
sideration of the problem and the steps that the Board has
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
15b
taken and is contemplating taking in the accomplishment
of its original position.
D. Has the Board discussed this problem with the
teachers at these joint meetings that you refer to? A.
No, not the Board itself. It has been a subject of some
consideration by various groups in the school system.
D. Now getting back to this plan that you say the Board
adopted, when did the Board adopt this plan, do you recall
or do you know? A. I could only speak from the record.
It was soon after the original Supreme Court decision, ’54.
Mr.Witt: ’Fifty-five.
By Mrs. Motley.
D. And now in addition to the meetings which you spoke
of a moment ago with community interest groups, has the
- 2 6 -
Board done anything further or additional to implement
this plan that you talk about? A. Not to my knowledge.
The intention and desire of the Board of Education was
to proceed to the limits of time and ability to develop a
community understanding of the problem.
D. Now in developing this community understanding of
the problem, what techniques, specifically, have they been
using at these meetings, for example? A. A series of
meetings, first with ministerial groups. A discussion meet
ing that went into the background of the problem, tried to
assess the position of our community in relation to that
problem, and attempted to develop an understanding on the
part of the people in attendance of what the problem actu
ally is and how progress might be made toward the accom
plishment of that original position.
D. Now in addition to meeting with the ministerial
alliance, what other community groups have you met with,
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
16b
specifically? A. A number of informal groups with out
specific organizational connection, but groups that the
Board felt would be instrumental and informational in
helping with this problem.
D. What about the Parent Teachers Association? Have
you met with them? A. Not as an organization.
—27—
D. Have any of these meetings involved Negro citizens?
A. Yes.
D. What Negro citizen groups have you met with? A.
The ministerial group, of course, number one. The edu
cational group representatives from our own staff and our
own administrative staff throughout the school system, and
a few other meetings that were, that involved some, both
white and colored people, but they were not organizational ,
in the sense that they had an organizational tie.
D. Now what happens at these meetings? Do you have
school administrators who’ve had experience in integration
to come and speak to the groups ? A. No.
D. Or what? A. No. It’s an informal discussion among
the members of the Board of Education and those in at
tendance on the problem.
D. You’ve had no professional assistance, in other words?
A. No.
D. In the development of this plan? A. No other, no.
I think the answer should be no.
D. Now as a result of these meetings that the Board has
had with respect to its plan, has it arrived at any con
clusions, formulated any steps? A. No formal ones that
- 2 8 -
have, no formal ones that have been placed in writing, other
than those public statements that I previously mentioned.
I would say that in general the Board came away from most
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
L / } u y
17b
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
of these meetings with, with a clearer understanding of
the size of the problem and its difficulty.
D. Has the Board studied the possible use of the Ten
nessee pupil assignment law? A. Not in detail. It has been
a matter of record, of course, and has been a topic of con
sideration and discussion on a few occasions.
D. But that law hasn’t actually been used here, has it?
A. It has not been placed in effect at the present.
D. Now since you’ve been the Superintendent, do you
know whether the Board has received any petitions from
citizen groups to comply with the Supreme Court decision
and desegregate the schools? A. Yes, on one occasion.
D. When was that? A. Last summer.
D. The summer of ’59? A. Yes.
D. From whom or from what group did the Board receive
such a petition? A. I don’t remember the specific name.
I know Mr. Carter was one of the participants. I think
Mr. Mapp was also one of the participants.
—29—
D. We’d like to get a copy of that petition, too. A. Yes.
Mr. Craig: You will supply it?
The Witness: Yes, we will supply it.
By Mrs. Motley:
D. Now did the Board ever reply to that petition? A.
Yes. That’s one of the statements that—
D. One of the public statements? A. Yes.
D. That you have ref erred to ? A. Yes.
D. Now have any Negro parents ever requested assign
ment of their children to the white schools here? A. To
my knowledge, not until the present case came into the
picture.
18b
D. Now this petition that you referred to a moment ago
which you said the Board received last summer from Mr.
Mapp and Mr. Carter, now Mr. Mapp is one of the Plaintiffs
in the lawsuit, I understand? A. Yes.
D. Now in that petition did he request at that time that
the Board desegregate the schools? A. Yes.
D. Or did he request specific assignment of his children?
—30—
A. As I recall the petition it was a general request that
the Board desegregate the schools in Chattanooga.
D. Now after that petition, did Mr. Mapp ever request
an assignment of his children to a white school? A. Not
to my knowledge.
D. Did Mr. Mapp ever come to your office and say that
he wanted his child assigned to a white school? A. Not
until the existing case came into the picture.
D. Well, you mean he filed his case and then he came to
you and asked for an assignment? A. No. No. He asked
for the placement of his child previous to the beginning of
this lawsuit.
D. Now— A. But that was not following the petition
last summer, however. That was the point I was making.
D. It was not following the petition? A. It was not
immediately following that petition.
D. But first he sent a general petition asking for desegre
gation. Do I understand you correctly? A. Yes.
D. After— A. Which was answered by the Board.
D. Which was answered by the Board? A. (Witness
inclined his head.)
D. Now after that, he came in person to your office? A.
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
D. And requested assignment of his children to a white
school? A. Yes.
19b
D. Is that correct? A. Yes.
D. Now what happened with respect to that request that
he made in person? A. It was referred to the Board of
Education.
D. And what action did the Board take on it? A. The
Board issued a statement the following—I’m probably in
error. I ’m not sure. I don’t think the Board did issue a
statement following that request.
D. Did they send him a letter or anything? A. No.
D. Did they call him up and tell him anything? A. To
my knowledge, no.
D. Now in addition to Mr. Mapp, who else among the
Negro parents has ever come to your office in person and
requested assignment of his or her children to white
schools ? A. Reverend Kirnon and Mrs. Maxey.
D. Now they appeared also in person in your office? A.
Yes.
D. And that was after this petition of last summer? A. ,
Yes.
—32—
D. Now with respect to this petition which you say Mr.
Mapp and Mr. Carter signed, is it possible that that was
the summer of ’58 instead of ’59? A. Yes, that’s—yes, I
thing it was. It was in ’58. Also let me correct my state
ment a moment ag*o.
D. Sure. A. There was a statement made by the Board
following the request by Mr. Mapp and others to enroll
their children. There was a statement issued.
D. In writing? A. In writing, issued by the Board, and
a copy of it was forwarded to the persons involved.
Mr. Witt: You want that?
Mrs. Motley: We’d like to get a copy of that state
ment.
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
20b
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
By Mrs. Motley:
D. So that your statement now is that Mr. Mapp sent a
petition to the Board in 1958? A. Yes.
D. Originally? A. Yes.
D. The Board issued a statement with respect to that in
’58? A. Yes.
D. And then two years later, 1956, he appeared in person
—3 3 -
in your office, is that right ? A. You mean’60?
D. In 1960, I meant to say. A. Yes. I don’t recall the
date of that appearance, but it’s a matter of record.
D. That was this year? A. Yes.
D. Now when Mr. Mapp and Reverend Kirnon and Mrs.
Maxey came to your office and requested assignment of their
children to a white school, did they have children enrolled
in the public school system at that time ? A. Yes.
D. Do you know what school their children went to
school, what schools their children were enrolled in? A.
Orchard Knob, to my knowledge, although I think one was
in the group transferred to East Fifth Street by, trans
ported to East Fifth Street this year.
D. Well, why was this person transported, or a child
transported? A. In an effort to relieve an overcrowded
situation at the Orchard Knob School, we utilized some
space at the East Fifth Street School and the children were
transported there.
D. Now you say Mr. Mapp and Reverend Kirnon and
Mrs. Maxey had children in the Orchard Knob School when
they came to your office? A. I ’m not certain. It is my
- 3 4 -
understanding that they had children in the Chattanooga
public schools, and I ’m sure that, that some of those, some
21b
of the children involved were at East Fifth Street, al
though they were a part of the Orchard Knob School.
D. Now. A. For a part of this year.
D. Isn’t it that after they came to your office they were
transported or transferred to the East Fifth Street School?
A. No, that transfer had been made previous to—
D. Their coming? A. Previous to their coming.
D. And that transfer was made on the basis of the fact
that the Orchard Knob School was overcrowded? A. Yes.
D. Now isn’t it true that there was a white school called
the Glenwood School which was under-enrolled at that time
to which they might’ve been assigned? A. The three
children, or the children involved could possibly have been
assigned in terms of space to the (Kenwood School.
D. And is it not a fact that they requested assignment of
their children to the Glenwood School? A. Yes.
D. And at the time they requested that, there was space
—35—
there for them? A. Yes, space for the three involved. Not
space to relieve the overcrowded situation at Orchard
Knob.
D. Well, how many under-utilized classrooms did you
have in the Glenwood School at that time? A. They aren’t
un-utilized classrooms. They are classrooms with an en
rollment that could be expanded.
D. How many such classrooms would you say? A. Well,
I wouldn’t—it would be my guess without looking at the
record and the distribution of existing enrollment, that
f three or four of those classrooms could accept a few addi
tional children without exceeding the desirable level.
D. Now their request, the transfer was denied on the
basis of race, wasn’t it? A. It was referred to the Board
of Education and the Board’s statement answered that
request.
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
22b
D. I see. Now at the present time what is the enrollment
in the G-lenwood School and what is its capacity, do you
know? A. I would prefer to look at the record before giv
ing that answer.
D. Well, we’d like to get that also at the end. Now when
Mr. Mapp and Mrs. Maxey and Reverend Kirnon came to
your office, what specifically took place? A. They told,
they told me of their desire for their children to be enrolled
- 3 6 -
in the Glenwood School. I told them that the request would
be referred to the Board of Education.
D. You didn’t discuss with them the problem that their
children were Negro and the schools white? A. (Witness
shook his head from side to side.)
D. That never occurred to you? A. Not at that occasion,
not at that time.
D. You made no statement to them regarding the race of
their children? A. I ’m not sure that I understand your
question.
D. Now Mr. Mapp and Reverend Kirnon and Mrs. Maxey
are Negroes, are they not? A. Yes.
D. As far as you know? A. Yes.
D. They came to your office and requested assignment of
their children to a white school? A. Yes.
D. And you mean this was never discussed that their
children were white, or Negro and wanted to go to a white
school? A. Well, it was understood and known, of course.
I don’t think we particularly discussed it at that particular
time. Certainly it was a matter of common knowledge on
the part of all of us.
D. Now let me ask you this: Normally when a request
-—37—
for transfer is made, do you normally refer those requests
to the Board? A. No.
Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct
23b
D. What procedure do you follow when you receive a
request for transfer? A. We make it normally on the
basis of the attendance area in which the children are as
signed. There can be exceptions from that attendance only
for reasons that are believed to be justified.
That decision is normally made by the staff. A handi
capped child or for some particular reason that makes it a
difficulty for that child to attend the school in that area is
taken into consideration as the decision is made.
* * # # #
—47—
M r . W illiam D. L eber, being’ first duly sworn, was
examined and deposed as follows:
Direct Examination by Mrs. Motley:
D. Mr. Leber, would you state your full name? A.
William D. Leber, L-e-b-e-r.
D. Are you a member of the Board of Education of the'
City of Chattanooga? A. Yes.
D. How long have you been a member of the Board? A.
Since August of 1954.
D. Since you’ve been a member of the Board, has the
Board adopted any resolutions regarding desegregation of
the schools of Chattanooga? A. Yes.
D. I ’m going to show you this document and ask you
whether you recognize it. A. These are all the statements,
aren’t they ?
D. The first statement in the booklet which is entitled
“Official Statements of the Chattanooga Board of Educa
tion on the Supreme Court Decisions of May seventeenth,
1954, and May thirty-first, 1955,” contains a statement dated
July twenty-second, 1955. A. Yes.
D. And you were a member of the Board at that time?
William D. Leber—Direct
24b
William D. Leber—Direct
A. Yes.
D. Now the next statement is dated October twelfth, 1955.
Do you see that? A. Yes ma’am.
D. And you were a member of the Board at that time ? A.
Yes.
D. The next statement is dated November fifteenth, 1955,
and you were a member of the Board at that time? A.
Yes.
D. Next statement is dated March thirty-first, 1956.
Were you a member of the Board at that time? A. Yes.
D. The next statement is dated July ninth, 1958. Were
you a member of the Board at that time? A. Yes.
D. Final statement is dated March seventh, 1960. Were
you a member of the Board at that time? A. Yes.
D. Are you familiar with all of these statements? A.
Yes, I am. I couldn’t repeat them, I mean. I ’d have to read
them.
D. Now since July twenty-second, 1955, when the first
statement was adopted, would you tell us what the Board
has done with respect to integration, specifically? A. Yes.
We have attempted to elucidate the community in regard
—49—
to desegregation. We’ve met with numerous groups, com
munity-interest groups; groups that have come to us to
talk about the situation since that time.
D. Have you done anything other than talk to community-
interest groups? A. Nothing specifically except bringing
the community to an awareness of the problem, talking
vY among ourselves and talking to individuals. Other than
J that, nothing specifically except moving the community
toward the time of compliance, full compliance.
—48—
25b
D. At these meetings have there been any professional
persons discussing desegregation, how it’s effected, and so
forth? A. When you speak of “ professional,” you mean
outside professional groups?
D. Yes. A. No.
D. Now specifically, what problems, if any, were dis
cussed at these meetings? A. The change in the customs
that this community has observed for a period of a hundred
and fifty (150) years, or a hundred (100) years, whatever
the time may be; unaccustomed as the people would be to
this change, to try to get them to accept the change that will
be necessary in full compliance, and that sort of thing.
— 50—
D. Well, what has the Board done to try to get the com
munity to accept the decision. I don’t understand. Specif
ically what, what have you done? A. I think specifically
what we’ve attempted to do is to get the leadership of the
community to bring the community behind the school board,
to get them behind the school board. We need, we needed
the responsible people of the community to help in this
matter, to talk to the people and get them to understand, the
people that they may be the leader of. For instance, a min
ister of a church or a person that employs a lot of people,
for example. A person that’s active in community affairs,
that meets with groups of people like civic clubs and one
thing and another, to get them to back the school board
openly.
D. So that since 1955 until the present you have been
meeting with community leaders, is that right? A. Yes.
D. Now let me call your attention to the second statement
dated October twenty-second, 1955, the third paragraph of
that statement. It says this: “ It is evident that some people
have misunderstood our original statement of policy.” Now
it isn’t clear to me from reading this exactly what the Board
William D. Leber■—Direct
26b
had in mind by “ some people have misunderstood their
original policy.” A. You say it’s not clear to you?
—51—
D. No. What prompted the statement? A. In our orig
inal statement, if you notice the first few paragraphs or
the first paragraph, in fact, stated that, well, let’s see. It
wouldn’t be the first paragraph. Let’s see. “ The Chat
tanooga Board, we have come to a decision.” Yes, it is the
first paragraph, that we would comply with the decision of
the United States Supreme Court on the matter of integra
tion of public schools.
So many people just read that paragraph, and from that
first statement the manner in which the community received
it was, well, I don’t know exactly how to explain it, was com
pletely to the reversal of the way some of us expected it to
be received. It was received with violence, a violent re
action, you might say.
D. Well. A. Not any violent—
D. What violence? A. Not any physical violence, but—
so we felt after the first statement—
D. Well, what, excuse me. Would you explain what you
mean by violence? You say the statement was received with
violence? A. Violent reaction.
D. Violent— A. I changed that from violence to violent
—5 2 -
reaction, and I mean the people who were—I’m speaking in
my own behalf and not for anyone else—people who were
my friends became, they called me names. They—they
seemed to be not my friends any more. The groups in which
I moved denounced the decision that the school board had
made.
The community in general was, as I viewed it, was in an
uproar over this fact that we’d stated we’d comply, and they
William D. Leber-—Direct
27b
saw no reason for me having made such a statement, so
after that we felt, I felt with the others it was necessary that
we make another statement.
D. Did any group send any written statements to the
Board? A. Yes.
D. Opposing the Board’s position? A. Numbers of them.
D. Do you have those? A. I—
D. In the records ? A. I don’t. I ’m not sure that we have
kept those in the record. We received them individually
and not as a group. I don’t believe we received them as a
group.
D. Now I want to direct your attention to the statement
of November fifteenth, 1955; it refers here to the establish
ment of an Interracial Advisory Committee. Is that com-
—53—
mittee still in existence? A. No. It hadn’t been discharged
but it’s—it hadn’t been active.
D. How long has that committee been inactive? A. Since
its first meeting.
D. And its first meeting was November fifteen? A. Yes.
D. Nineteen fifty-five? A. (Witness inclined his head.)
D. And that was a public organizational meeting? A.
Yes, it was a public, not an organizational meeting. It was
a public meeting that this statement was to be read to them,
and the purpose of the Interracial Advisory Committee was
outlined in that statement.
D. Did the committee ever actually meet? A. Yes. They
met that night.
D. On November fifteenth? A. Yes.
D. Nineteen fifty-five? A. Yes.
D. Now who was on that committee, do you recall? A.
I can’t recall the names, but they were people from all
sections of the city, representing all walks of life, and they
William D. Leber—Direct
fatter u P »
28b
William D. Leber—Direct
were divided according to the ratio of the division of Negro
and white children in the schools.
We had about two-thirds white, I think, and one-third
—5 4 -
Negro on the, on the Interracial Advisory Committee. They
were chosen. Do you wish me to read them!
D. How many names do you have there! A. I think
there’s about thirty-five (35), isn’t there, Raymond!
D. Well, we could probably get a copy of that. I don’t
think it will be necessary for you to read those names. We’d
like to get a copy of that, Mr. Witt. A. Thirty-five I think
is right.
D. And the thirty-five people on that advisory committee!
A. Yes.
D. And they have not met since the opening or organiza
tional meeting! A. Not as an advisory committee. On that
Interracial Advisory Committee there were forty (40)
people; twenty-eight (28) white and twelve (12) Negro.
D. Now what happened at that first advisory counsel
meeting other than the reading of this statement by the
chairman! A. If I remember correctly, the chairman didn’t
even get to finish his reading of his statement because it,
it resulted in a riot, name-calling, almost physical violence,
in a general uproar, throwing of stink bombs. It ended in
a complete riot, and we feared for the safety of some of the
- 5 5 -
people on the Interracial Advisory Committee.
D. You mean the members of the committee rioted! A.
No.
D. Or outside the— A. The people attended, outside
people.
D. Oh, members of the public rioted! A. Yes.
29b
D. Is this the reason why there have not been any meet
ings since that time? A. With the Interracial Advisory
Committee, we felt that, that this, at that time, that this
question was so filled with emotion that we could not hold
a public meeting where we could discuss it.
D. Have you held any private meetings of the advisory
committee? A. No.
D. Was there any police protection at that first meeting,
public meeting of the advisory committee? A. No. We
did not anticipate that we would need police protection,
and we did not call on the police department. We didn’t,
in fact, know that there would be such a large attendance
of people present. There was a little notice put in the
paper about it. We did not put it there, however, but it was
put there, and we didn’t ask for police protection.
We weren’t too sure whether, how—whether we could
—56—
depend on the police or not. We didn’t know whether we
needed them or not or whether they’d come or whether
they’d send them or what-not, so we just didn’t have any.
D. You didn’t know whether you could depend upon the
police and you didn’t know whether they would come if
you sent for them? Did you ever make any inquiries— A.
No.
D. —of the police chief? A. As I said, we discussed it
but finally decided that we wouldn’t probably need them,
and we didn’t ask for them.
D. In other words, because of this hostility evidenced at
the meeting to your proposal, you just never called your
advisory committee again? A. No. That’s right.
D. Now that was five years ago? A. Yes.
D. Now what’s the reason for not calling the advisory
committee now, 1960, five years later? A. From the, on
William D. Leber—Direct
30b
the basis of which I just stated, that we felt that if we called
the advisory committee together it would of necessity have
to be a public meeting. When the school board meets it’s
supposed to be a public meeting, and as we felt we could
not hold these meetings in public, so therefore you might
say we went underground and at no time did the school
board meet after that as a group in—we met in small
- 5 7 -
groups and with small, small groups of individuals of com
munity-interest people.
D. Well, are you saying that you have not had a public
meeting of this advisory committee since ’55 because you
fear that you could not have a public meeting without this
rioting! A. That’s right.
D. How do you know that, since you haven’t had any
meetings— A. Well now.
D. —in five years? A. I, for one, was not willing to
attempt it after that first meeting.
D. Now do you have anything other than your mere
assertion that you could not get the cooperation of the
police? A. Do I have?
D. At future meetings? A. I didn’t say that.
D. Do you have any— A. I didn’t say that for future
meetings. I said for that meeting.
D. Well, let me ask you this: Has the Board ever at
tempted to get the cooperation of the police in connection
with any meetings of the Board? A. No, we never.
—58—
D. On this question? A. No, we never have.
D. So that, so that since 1955 the Board has not made
any effort to get this, to have a meeting, rather, of this
Interracial Advisory Committee? A. No.
William D. Leber—Direct
31b
D. Let me direct your attention to the statement dated
March thirty-first, 1956. The opening statement says
“Events in the last year have convinced the Chattanooga
Board of Education that the community will not accept any
form of integration within the city schools at any time
within the near future. We therefore take this opportunity
to report to the community our decision to postpone any
change in the public schools for a period of at least a few
years, probably five years or more.”
What investigation or study or survey did the Board
make to determine that the community would not accept
any form of integration within the city schools at any time
in the foreseeable future, and what study or survey did
the Board make to determine that it would be at least five
years before there could be any integration in the com
munity? A. Well, subsequent, or rather after the Inter
racial Advisory Committee riot, after our first statement,
the community was in such an upheaval according to the
people that talked with us individually, according to the
number of people that called the school office, according
to the pronouncements by people from, I ’d say, even pulpits,
- 5 9 -
in meetings held by people that were running for office, by
the general talk in any group that you happened to be
present, and a number of us at that time were very active
in civic affairs, going to numerous meetings most every
night in the week meeting with different people, and the
general upheaval and as it concerned the schools, led us to
believe the wisdom of making such a statement.
D. Did somebody make a report of this to the Board?
Did the Superintendent make a report? A. No.
D. In which he documented this? A. We made a report,
we talked it ourselves. It was in, every time we got to-
William D. Leber—Direct
32b
gether it was necessary that we talk about this situation.
In fact, if I remember correctly, the school Superintendent
at that time could not properly run the schools for trying
to answer the questions as to what the school board was
going to do the coming year, and so on, and so forth, and
it was necessary that we have a time when we could settle
the community, if we could, so that we could talk about this
matter in a peaceful atmosphere and carry our elucidation
problem faster and probably get to a place that we could
talk even to our friends about it.
D. Now what was the basis for the decision that it would
be probably five years or more? A. Of course, that, in our
—60— '
own mind we felt that it would take that long for the com
munity to settle down, that—
D. Well, how did you arrive at the figure five years as
opposed to some other figure? A. Well, I don’t know that
I could say just exactly why the five years. That we say a
period of at least a few years and probably five, on the basis
that it would take that long to elucidate the community to
even get a semblance of peaceful atmosphere in which to
move toward this full compliance that we talked about in the
first statement.
D. Now it’s been four years, a little more than four years,
hasn’t it? A. Yes.
D. Since you made this statement? A. (Witness in
clined his head.)
D. So you think that the Board is now ready to follow
its original determination to integrate the schools? A.
Well, I—I don’t—I don’t know whether you could say, as
you realize, that the school board is an agent of the com
munity. We represent both Negro and the white people
of this community, and until at least I ’m speaking for my
William D. Leber—Direct
33b
self now, until I feel that the least harm that can be done
to either a Negro child or a white child will be when I ’ll
move for full compliance, and until our elucidation process
which we’re now in proves to us that we can move with the
least harm to education in the City of Chattanooga, that’s
—61—
when I think we’ll move, or when I ’ll move. Whether it be
five years I don’t, I ’m—I couldn’t say.
D. Well, how do you measure this! How are you going
to be able to tell? A. I think the events of the last sixty
(60) days would be a good, or maybe ninety (90) days
now, I ’m not sure just how long ago it’s been, would be a
good example of whether or not the community’s ready for
it or not, if—
D. What’s happened in the last ninety days? A. Well.
D. Which affects this problem? A. These sit-ins at
Kress’s, for example. If one store can create a situation
whereby thousands of people milling and fighting and tear
ing at one another, if a few sit-ins can cause that what would
integration of forty-seven schools be?
D. So that what you actually do is to judge by the amount
of hostility which you feel is present in the community?
A. No.
D. Before implementing this plan? A. I wouldn’t say
that. Until this time not one person has come, I ’d say, I
might take that back, “ one person.” Not more than, not as
many as five people have publicly said that this should be
done now, and the leadership of the community has not
moved behind us. We know that.
D. In other words, you are saying that it’s not up to
—62—
the Board to decide when integration shall take effect, but
it’s up to the community to decide? A. No, I didn’t say
William D. Leber—Direct
34b
that, but after all, we are the agents of the community and
if the members of the community could get rid of this Board
if they wanted to.
D. Is the Board elected or appointed by the Mayor? A.
I-—I couldn’t answer that on a yes-or-no question. It’s—
the members are selected by a screening committee which
is presented to this Board. The Board then nominates and
sends to the Mayor and Commissioners, and they appoint.
D. Well, it’s a sort of self-perpetuating Board? A. You
might call it that.
D. Isn’t it? A. Yes.
D. And it isn’t elected by the people? A. No. But we,
the screening committee is representative of the community.
Mr. Witt: The Commissioner of Health.
The Witness: Huh?
Mr. W itt: The Commissioner of Health.
Mr. Meacham: The Commissioner of Health.
The Witness: Yes, there’s one exception, the Com
missioner of Health and Education who is, by his
office, Chairman of the Board. He’s elected by the
people.
—63—
By Mrs. Motley:
D. Now since March thirty-first, 1956, when you issued
this statement to the effect that integration would not take
place at any time in the near future, has the Board done
anything other than hold meetings to determine whether
there has been a change in the community attitude toward
the Board’s policy? A. No, they haven’t done anything
except hold meetings and receive, not formal receipt of the
community, various groups in the community or various
William D. Leber—Direct
35b
individuals in the community as talking to individual
members of the Board.
D. Has the Board made any studies to see to what extent
there would be integration or desegregation in the com
munity? A. No. Not a formal study, no.
D. Has the Board instructed the Superintendent to de
vise any plan? A. No. We feel that we have a plan, that
we’re in a plan of compliance at the present time.
D. Well, what is your plan? A. Elucidation, at the
present time. We are—
D. By “ elucidation” you mean talking to the community?
A. Yes, trying to.
D. Trying to win over the community? A. Trying to,
yes.
D. Now did I understand you to say a few moments ago
that not as many as five individuals have requested the
- 6 4 -
Board to integrate? A. No.
D. Recently? A. I didn’t say that. I said not as many
as five have publicly stated that they thought—
Mr. W itt: White community.
The Witness: Huh?
Mr. Witt: White community.
The Witness: White, white community, of the
white community.
By Mrs. Motley:
D. Now don’t you have some group here known as the
Community Relations Counsel composed of white persons
which has requested desegregation recently? A. There has
been a group. Now as to what the name, I I couldn t
definitely say that that was the name, but we have had a
William D. Leber—Direct
36b
group appear before the Board to request that we inte
grate, but there again, they have not made it known to the
community that they wished us to integrate. They want us
to integrate without—and they, they stay in the background.
D. When did they appear before the Board? A. I would
say about thirty (30) to forty-five (45) days ago, or maybe
it was just previous to this suit. I ’m not quite sure, but I
think it—
D. And that group is composed of whites, is it? A. Yes.
—65—
D. Do you know who the chairman is? A. I should know,
but I can’t recall his name.
Mrs. Irvine: Shavin.
By Mrs. Motley:
D. They represent more than five people, don’t they?
A. I think they do, but now remember I said five. They
have not publicly stated.
D. Does this statement of theirs appear in the minutes
of the Board? A. No. We did not meet as a board. Thej ̂
made no formal request. They just talked to the Board
members, they talked to us as individuals in a group.
D. Now let me direct your attention to the statement
dated July ninth, 1958, and ask you if that’s the statement
issued by the Board after Mr. Mapp and Mr. Carter pre
sented a petition to the Board asking for desegregation
of the schools. A. Yes sir, that’s it.
D. Now Mr. Mapp and Mr. Carter are Negro citizens of
Chattanooga, aren’t they? A. Yes. I ’m not sure that Mr.
Carter is at the present time a citizen of Chattanooga. I
think he moved, since moved.
D. Now let me direct your attention to the statement
William D. Leber—Direct
37b
dated March seventh, 1960, and ask yon if that is the state
ment issued by the Board in response to the request of Mr.
Mapp, Reverend Kirnon, and Mrs. Maxey to have their
children assigned to white schools? A. Yes, that’s it.
— 66—
D. Now what was that statement based on? Did the
Board make any survey or study to determine that the
demand for total integration is premature? A. It was not
made on a formal survey, but again the community arose
with the publication of the fact that integration had been
asked for, and anyone on this Board was aware of the fact
that to do what was asked to be done would bring dire
results to the school system of Chattanooga.
D. Now. A. And all education.
D. How were they aware of that fact? How— A. I beg
pardon?
D. How was the Board aware of that fact? A. Aware?
D. You say everyone on the Board was aware of the fact
that to integrate would bring dire results. How were you
aware of that fact ? A. By—-
D. On March seventh, 1960? A. By people of the com
munity talking to individuals, by letters to the editor, by—
in the newspapers, the general tone of the community. We
—we don’t just stay at home.
D. Was there anything other than talk that you went on?
Did you go on anything other than people talking? A.
—67—
What else would you—
D. I mean to who talked the loudest? A. What do you
have? Like what, for instance, here? Like what? Go on
what?
D. Did you make any study or survey to determine— A.
I said we made no formal study.
William, D. Leber—Direct
38b
D. Other than this talk ? A. No.
D. You just go by what you read in the newspaper? A.
No. I said we went by talking with individuals, by groups
of people in which we moved, and in that manner. The
people where we worked, where I work, and—
D. In other words, there’s been no formal determination
that integration is premature. This is just informal off-the-
cuff community talk, newspaper talk sort of thing? A. I
wouldn’t say it was newspaper talk. It’s the actual contact
with citizens which, in the movement of our daily lives,
both at work and in church and community activity.
D. How many newspapers do you have here? A. Two.
D. Are they both opposed to the Board’s position? A.
I ’m not sure that either one of them are opposed to the
Board’s position.
D. Has either newspaper supported the Board’s position?
A. I think both newspapers have supported the Board’s
- 68-
position. I—now you, when you—you may be talking about
one thing and I may be talking about another. I ’m talking
about the situation which we are now in, in compliance
with the Supreme Court’s decision.
D. Both newspapers have supported your statement that
you will comply with the Supreme Court? A. They did
not. You didn’t ask me that question.
D. I ’m sorry. I guess you misunderstood me. I asked
you whether— A. No, they did not support the original
statement. Both newspapers did not.
D. Did one? A. I think one did, yes.
D. And the other opposed? A. Yes.
D. Now in addition to the newspaper which opposed your
position, do you have a list of organizations or individuals
William D. Leber—Direct
39b
who opposed your position? A. I haven’t got a written
list, but I have it in my mind, as far as I ’m concerned.
D. Do you have communications from organizations op
posing your position in your files? A. I have had many
communications, many communications.
D. Are they a part of the official records of the Board?
A. No.
—69—
D. Now since this suit has been filed has the Board
made any plan for compliance with the Supreme Court’s
decision? A. Again, I wish to state that we feel we are
complying with the Supreme Court decision.
D. You feel that you are complying with it by talking
to people in the community? A. Yes. Elucidation.
D. And is that, that’s the extent of your understand
ing of the Supreme Court’s decision? A. No.
D. That all the school boards have to do is talk to
people in the community? A. No.
D. And when the people in the community get ready to
desegregate the schools the Board should then desegregate
the schools? A. No. However, the Supreme Court set
down three rules.
D. What three rules— A. And made other—
D. —are you referring to? A. Elucidation, assessing,
and solving.
D. Well, you’ve been elucidating. Have you been as
sessing the problem? A. We’ve attempted to, yes. I
- 7 0 -
think we have. I think we’ve assessed it.
D. And what is your conclusion? A. That the com
munity is not ready for integration.
D. And this is based on what? A. On the school
board’s assessing of the situation in Chattanooga.
William D. Leber—Direct
40b
D. Now how did you assess the situation? A. I told
you that once before. Talking with groups and moving
in the community.
D. Oh, I see. Now have you done any solving of the
problem? You said the third was solving, I think. A.
No, we haven’t solved it. The problem’s still unsolved.
I mean the way it—as far as full compliance is con
cerned.
D. Is there any integration at all in the Chattanooga
community in any public facility? A. I—I ’m not sure.
D. What about the buses? A. I—I was just fixing to
say, unless you were talking about the buses. I think
they have taken the signs down off the buses.
D. Now has there been any violence in connection with
that? A. Well, yes, there has. Not too much, but not—
D. Where? A. Not too much.
—71—
D. Where? A. There’s been—
D. Where has there been violence? A. There’s been
times when flare-ups have resulted.
D. Where? Where?
Mr. Meacham: Cutting.
The Witness: Huh?
Mr. Meacham: Cutting on the bus.
The Witness: Cutting and things like that. I
couldn’t specify the time or the place, but it has
happened.
By Mrs. Motley.
D. How many times has it happened? A. Well, I—
I don’t know. It’s probably happened more than I know
William D. Leber—Direct
41b
about. Some of those things don’t get in the paper. It’s
been in the paper several times.
D. Well, if it were a major disturbance it would cer
tainly be in the paper, wouldn’t it? A. I believe it would,
yes.
D. So that there haven’t been any major disturbances
in connection with desegregation of the buses, isn’t that
true? A. Major, no.
D. How long has that been in effect, desegregation of
the buses? A. I think that’s been about possibly four
years, I think, maybe. I ’m not sure.
—72—
D. About four years? A. I think so. Or maybe—
Mr. Meacham: Eieven (11) years.
The Witness: Maybe—
Mr. Meacham: Eleven years.
The Witness: Huh?
Mr. Meacham: Eleven years.
Mrs. Motley: Eleven years?
The Witness: You mean desegregation?
Mr. Meacham: They didn’t pass that ordinance
till the 1949 code.
Mrs. Motley: Desegregating the buses?
Mr. Meacham: The City—
The Witness: But they didn’t take those signs
down now.
Mr. Meacham: The City of Chattanooga has, for
your information, has utterly no segregation ordi
nance on its books, and has not had since 1949.
Mrs. Motley: All segregation ordinances?
Mr. Meacham: They were—
Mrs. Motley: Have been repealed?
William D. Leber—Direct
42b
Mr. Meacham: They were omitted and repealed
with publication of the 1949 code.
Mrs. Motley: I see.
Mr. Meacham: It took several years for people
—73—
to discover that, though.
By Mrs. Motley:
D. The school board, has the school board ever dis
covered that, Mr. Leber!
Mr. Meacham: We’ve still got the State laws.
D. That the City has no segregation ordinances? A.
They still—
D. And repealed all of them eleven years ago? A. I
wasn’t aware that they were that old, but I knew that
they had, that the City of Chattanooga had no ordinances
at the present time.
D. Has the Board taken that into consideration in its
assessment of whether the community is ready for— A.
I think it has.
* * # # *
—74—
By Mrs. Motley:
D. You heard Doctor Letson’s testimony, did you not?
A. Yes.
D. Did you hear him testify that he thought the Board
had met seven or eight times with these community-
interest groups? A. Yes.
D. Does that conform with your recollection of the
number of times the Board has met in the last— A.
Since he’s been here. We met.
William D. Leber—Direct
43b
D. Oh. A. We met.
D. Since he’s been here now? A. We met before he
came.
D. How many times all told wonld you say the Board
has met since 1955 with these groups? A. I—I tell you,
that would be a hard thing to say definitely. We would
, like—I think we have a record of that. I would judge
at least twelve (12) or fourteen (14) times, or maybe
—7 5 -
more than that, even.
D. Do these meetings appear in the minutes, or any
record of these— A. No, the Board doesn’t meet offi
cially, only small groups. You see, each of us live in
different sections of the city, and we’ll take a few of us
live in one section will take a group and meet in the homes
and talk about the situation. Some of us have conflict
ing—
D. Do you report to the Board then, as a whole, on
your meetings? A. No, we don’t make any formal report.
D. Now let me ask you this: Has the Board, as a
board, sitting in a board meeting, ever had any meetings
with these community-interest groups other than this ad
visory counsel? A. Yes.
D. When was that? A. Well, I think, I think that the
Board was in session. Now it may not have been. We
had, we met with a group from Saint Elmo, a Negro
group, P. T. A. group. Let’s see. I don’t know. It
may’ve been one, one or so other times. The Board was
in session, of course, at the time that Mr. Carter and
Mr. Mapp made their request, and we were in session
when we answered it, and that’s about the extent, I think.
D. So that the only time the Board has met in session
has been with Negro groups, is that right? A. I ’m not
William D. Leber—Direct
44b
William D. Leber—Cross
—76—
sure. I—I am not sure that that, that that is right. My
memory doesn’t, I can’t answer that definitely.
I). But you can’t recollect any meeting with any white
groups when the Board was in session, can you? A. Well,
of course we have white groups at all of our meetings,
and I ’m not sure that that question has or has not come
up at our official meetings.
* # # # #
Cross Examination by Mr. W itt:
X. Mr. Leber, are you a member of a labor union?
A. Yes sir.
X. Which union ? A. International Typographical Union.
X. Do you participate in union affairs? A. Yes sir.
X. Would you describe the reaction, as you perceived
it, of the organized labor in this community to the school
board’s decision of July twenty-second, 1955, to comply
with the Supreme Court’s decision? A. Yes. At that
time the C. A., A. F. of L., C. I. 0. was not a joint group.
I was a member of the A. F. of L. and the Central Labor
Union was a body of people where all the A. F. of L.
unions had delegates that transacted business for the
unions of the area, and in Chattanooga particularly, things
that were of interest.
—76a—
(The following was dictated over the telephone to
the reporter by Mr. Raymond Witt on June 9, I960:)
“During the noon recess the attorneys all repaired
to Judge Darr’s chambers wherein he ruled that
the Defendants had the right to examine witnesses
following the direct examination of the Defendants
45b
by the Plaintiffs’ attorneys, and reserved until a later
date the right to assess the cost of such examinations
to the proper party.
“Attorneys for the Plaintiffs noted their exceptions
to Judge Darr’s ruling.”
William D. Leber—Cross
—77—
They had a meeting, they held meetings two times a
month, and the first meeting they held after the original
decision of the statement that the school board made, a
resolution was introduced to the C. L. U., Central Labor
Union, praising the school board for its decision to com
ply with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
The Labor World at that time was printed once a
week, and in the following issue of the Labor World an
editorial was written praising the decision of the school
board.
There were very few delegates attending that meeting
where this resolution was adopted on the strength of, on
account of the fact that it was summertime and we do
not have such a very good attendance in the summertime.
I believe afterwards a count was made of twenty-two
people being present.
The following meeting, the hall was full. The temper
of the delegates were of such nature that they would not
allow any other business to be transacted at C. L. U. ex
cept to take up this resolution that had been passed by
the preceding body.
—78—
The meeting at that time rescinded the action of the
previous meeting, and instead of praising the school board
they denounced it and, and said they’d have no part in such
46b
an affair and they thought that we were completely out of
order in doing what we did. They, at the meeting that’s
what took place. Just about what took place.
X. Was this a surprise to you? A. It was absolutely.
It was a surprise to a number of us who, I knew in my
thirty (30) some-odd-years of membership in the union,
I felt that if one group of people would support such a
decision it would be the labor group, because the parent
organization, A. F. of L., for the past twenty-five years in
national conventions had passed resolutions saying that
integration of the public schools should be a fact, and I
thought that, with the integrated meetings of the C. L. U.
delegates, with labor working side by side with Negro and
white, that a decision to integrate the school system would
be accepted but while I am more, my—my connections are
more with the labor group and church groups, probably,
than any other groups, I have been denounced in labor
most violently.
In fact, I couldn’t even, up to two years after that decision
I couldn’t’ve even been elected chairman of my chapel. In
fact, people passing by me at work threw vindictive darts
at me, by word of mouth, in the fact that I had a part in
this decision. I was very much surprised.
—79—
X. Did you attend a meeting with a group from the
school board and the executive committee of the Central
Labor Union at a later date? A. I did.
X. Did the executive committee of the Central Labor
Union indicate any support for the school board? A. None
whatsoever, in that they would openly support the school
board in its decision. I think that no support openly would
come from it. All of them said that they hoped it wouldn’t
happen and offered no visible means of support.
William D. Leber—Cross
47b
X. Is your union integrated locally? A. We do not
have any Negroes in our local union.
X. Are there any integrated local labor unions? A. I ’m
not sure that I could answer that exactly. I just really don’t
know. I know that they have a few Negro delegates to the
C. L. C. which is now the combined group of A. F. of L.,
C. I. 0. at the central labor counsel meetings once a month.
Now whether they’re integrated unions, I don’t know.
X. In the private meetings that you have testified that
the school board has held, would you describe how those
meetings were conducted? A. Yes. The manner in which
we followed was that the Board would tell the group pres
ent what, what they—what the plan was, what the problem
was. Would go into the various meetings that the Board
—80—
had had in discussing the statements that we’d made, why
we made them, and I—I think generally that’s about the
way that it was, was handled, and—
X. Have you met with a group of Methodists, white
Methodist ministers? A. Yes.
X. Bid this group indicate approval of the school board’s
position? A. I ’m not too sure whether they approved the
school board’s position or not. They did not say that they
would in any way help the school board or in any way
publicly support integration or at any time would they
mention it in their churches, as they were willing to listen.
They were, they patted us on the back for a job well done
up to now, hoped we could continue to do a good job, and
as far as that was concerned just count them out.
X. Bid they offer the Board any support? A. None that
I can recall at all. None whatsoever.
X. Bid you meet with a group of Presbyterian ministers ?
A. I did.
William D. Leber—Cross
48b
X. Did you meet with a group of Cumberland Presby
terian ministers, white? A. I—I believe I was at that
meeting, yes.
X. Did you meet with a group of Baptist ministers ? A.
I believe it was the First Cumberland, First Presbyterian
- S i -
ministers’ group I did not meet with, and I met with the
Baptists.
X. Did you meet with a group of Episcopal ministers?
A. Yes.
X. Did you meet with a group in Mr. Harry Miller’s
home? A. Yes.
X. Do you consider, do you have any evidence that you
can testify to of any progress that has been made toward
community acceptance of this decision in recent years ? A.
No. In fact, it’s, it’s a little, if you want to use the words,
discouraging that the leadership of the community is com
pletely devoid of its responsibility in this case, or this
problem. No visible support was given. Even some went
so far, some preachers even went so far as to say “Before
I ’ll bring this up in my church I ’ll have a call in my
pocket to another church before I ’ll even mention it.”
X. Are you speaking of white ministers? A. White
ministers.
X. Why do you consider the leadership of the community
to be particularly important? A. I think the leadership,
the leadership of the community is important in that they
are the ones that usually have the pulse of the people in
which they move amongst at the tip of their fingers. The
preachers. We’ve always felt that they stood for law and
—8 2 -
order, and I think they do; that they always stood for
what’s right and what’s wrong; and I believe they do; but
William D. Leber-—Cross
49b
yet at the same time in this question of integration or
desegregation they just don’t seem to want to, to have any
thing to do with it.
In fact, a number of them have told me so, that they
just were not going to mention it in their church, and that
was that, and they just intimated that I just as well quit
talking about it, as far as they were concerned.
X. Has one of the purposes of these meetings been to
encourage, accept, the acceptability, the acceptance of the
fact that compliance is inevitable? A. Yes, it has, and I
think that, that the elucidation process that we’ve been
through has brought the extreme, if you want to use the
extremes at both ends to a closer understanding of the prob
lem.
Maybe in one meeting we might have somebody that
would say “Well, why don’t you just go ahead and inte
grate?” And then maybe we’d have ten or twelve that would
just hold their hands up in holy horror, and with those two
extremes I think that we have gotten those that refuse to
see, before refused to see the problem to understand it a
little bit better.
Yet at the same time they seem to want to hold back.
They don’t want to get out in front themselves. They don’t
want to be known to be identified with it. They want us to
- 8 3 -
get up on the—and do it and just leave them out of it, and
if, if that’s the only way that it can be done.
X. Ho you believe there has been an increase in the
number of people who believe the decision, compliance is
inevitable? A. Yes.
X. In recent years? A. I think they have. I think that
there’s, that there’s a greater understanding exists at the
present time in the City of Chattanooga. I think that, as
William D. Leber—Cross
50b
an example, there has been some integrated meetings. I
was asked previously were there any public meetings and
I, maybe I misunderstood the question. I don’t know
whether you’d consider some meetings public meetings or
not, but take for example at our education counsel we had
some integrated meetings.
I think the, some groups have met at the Episcopal
Church. I think maybe some of the other churches have
have had integrated meetings. I don’t think these were
meetings for show, just for show. I think they were sincere
meetings of the two groups coming together trying to solve
their mutual problems in an area in which they’re both
interested, and I don’t believe that could’ve happened five
years ago, and I think that the school board could be
responsible for the understanding and the coming together
in a great measure. It may not’ve been entirely, but I think
in a great measure that could’ve been.
—84—
X. How have you found out that more people consider
compliance inevitable? A. Well, I think the way I found
out is by this elucidation process that we’re in, of meet
ing with the people.
X. No, I mean how, of your own personal knowledge,
from what has happened to you? A. Well, you mean as
fas as I move in the labor union, or just personnel on
the street, or—
X. You’ve made the statement in answer to the ques
tion that more people consider compliance to be inevit
able. I would like for you to detail the facts upon which
you arrived at that conclusion. A. Well, to enumerate
them I—I guess I ’d say that I ’ll go to my labor union.
William D. Leber—Cross
51b
I think that there’s a greater feeling among the member
ship of my union, of which there are a hundred and sixty-
five (165) in Chattanooga, is that if I go to a meeting
I take great part in their plans, that it is inevitable.
X. Do they tell you this? A. Yes. Not all of them,
but a good many of them do. I think that five years ago
they, of course they wouldn’t even speak to me hardly,
but now I can be elected, and I am at the present time
chairman of my chapel, which shows that the condition
is improved.
They seem to think that the school board has done a
- 8 5 -
good job in, in bringing understanding among the races.
In my church, I belong to Centenary Methodist Church,
which is quite a large church and I ’ve been a member
there a long time and I know a number of people there,
and in talking to them which there’s a great bull session
every Sunday morning on the front of the church, a
number have said they don’t like it but it seems to be
inevitable, and a number without saying at first have said
that it’s inevitable.
People that I have never met before and I ’m intro
duced as a member of the school board have said that
they feel like it’s inevitable, and I believe that that’s the
manner in which I ’ve— (breaking off).
X. Is it in your opinion, in your understanding of the
school board’s position, is the school board waiting for
complete agreement of the total community to comply?
A. Absolutely not. We know that there could never be
complete agreement. I think that I, for one, on the school
board member, am waiting until we feel that least harm
can be done to the school system and to individuals and
the school pupils and teachers and one thing and another
William D. Leber—Cross
52b
before we move to full compliance. We can never hope
to have a hundred percent compliance.
X. Have you made any personal efforts on a man-to
man basis to convince your acquaintances of the necessity
— 86—
of compliance? A. Yes, I have. I’ve—-I’ve talked and
talked and talked to a number of people and I—just any
number. I couldn’t begin to estimate how many people
I have talked to.
X. Would you say twenty-five (25) ? A. I ’d say more
than twenty-five. Maybe I ’ve talked to the same person
twice, but I ’d say it was nearer a hundred (100).
X. In your opinion has this gradual change toward
improvement in the community’s attitude progressed to
the point where you think the Board could order imme
diate desegregation? A. No, I do not.
X. What percentage of the white leadership would you
think the Board would have to have supporting it before
the Board could move? A. That might be difficult to
answer in that, in the churches if we just had one or two
white churches of leading white churches with a member
ship, of a rather larger membership to come out and say
that this is the thing we must do; if a few civic clubs
would go on record as saying that this is the thing that
must, we must do; if—if we could.
I—I don’t know whether you’d call it leadership or not,
in politics of the community. When a man can run for
county judge and on the basis of sit-in receive fifteen
thousand (15,000) votes after he’d been disbarred, dis
qualified, held up and we might say even ridiculed to the
community for some of the things he’s done, you might
consider that the people that vote are the leaders of the
William D. Leber—Cross
53b
William D. Leber—Redirect
- 8 7 -
community, and I ’d say that at least we should have a
majority of the voters of the community in favor of in
tegration.
X. You say “ in favor of it.” Do you mean to say ap
proving desegregation? A. Approving, yes. Approving
some method of desegregating the school system.
X. Would you draw any distinction between being, ac
cepting the decision or approving it or being resigned
to it? A. Yes, I ’d draw a distinction between that. I
think that acceptance would not necessarily mean in favor
of it. I think that it would mean resigned to it and they
would not do violence to the physical set-up of the school
system where children could go home in safety, or be in
school in safety, without the police or some sort of pro
tection being provided for them, and I—I believe that
would be resignation rather than complete acceptance on
the— (breaking off).
X. How many people have told you that they are in
favor and urge integration in the white community? A.
I—I ’d say less than twenty (20).
Mr. Witt: That’s all.
Redirect Examination by Mrs. Motley:
ED. Now Mr. Leber, in addition to this community
hostility that you refer to during the course of your testi-
— 88—
mony, has the Board relied on anything else in post
poning desegregation here? A. I ’m not sure that I get
what you mean.
Mrs. Motley (to the reporter): Would you read
the question back, please?
William D. Leber—Redirect
(The reporter read the question.)
I
The Witness: I’m—I’m not too sure that, of
course, the hostility of the community and the harm
that it could do to the school system as a result
of this hostility, causing the deterioration in the
type of education that the children, both white and
Negro, would receive, if that’s what you mean, yes.
The hostility has, is the basis on which I say that
has caused me to postpone desegregation.
By Mrs. Motley:
RD. Now I ’d like to understand your testimony. Is it
your testimony that the climate of opinion has improved
here in the last five years, or that the climate of opinion
has deteriorated! Which is it! A. I would say that the
climate, up until a few months ago, we thought or I thought
had improved immeasurably. Of course there’s a difference
in possibly judging whether or not the climate has im
proved by what might happen in private situations like the
sit-in or in the school situation, but I believe that more
people feel the inevitability of integregation in Chattanooga
today than they did five years ago.
RD. Now since this suit was filed would you say that
—89—
there has been an improvement in the attitude of the people,
or a deterioration of that attitude! A. I believe that this
suit caused some deterioration in the attitudes. I think
that, whether I could judge that the attitude of the people
was a lasting one or not, for the moment some of them got
real mad, some of them that I thought were ready, we’ll
say, for integration, and I think it had a stiffening attitude
55b
toward some people rather than letting it go on. They
thought we were doing—
ED. Has this been discussed at the Board meeting, this
stiffening attitude1? A. I don’t know that it has been dis
cussed officially at our Board meetings. We discussed it,
I think, individually.
ED. Now let me ask you this: Have you read any of the
opinions of the Supreme Court on segregation— A. Yes.
ED. —in schools? A. I have.
ED. Which ones have you read? A. Well, we have
several. I believe I read the Little Eock opinion, and now
understand I ’m not a lawyer, and I ’m not sure that I
understood the opinion; and I read the Nashville one, I be
lieve. Didn’t you supply that?
Mr. W itt: That’s the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Witness: Circuit Court of Appeals, and I be-
—90—
lieve we had some briefs on a case out in Texas, may
be Dallas, I belieye.
By Mrs. Motley:
ED. Did you ever read the opinion of the Supreme Court
in the Brown case in May 1955? A. No, I never read that.
ED. Did you ever read— A. Oh, well now, no.
ED. —the major decision itself? A. Let me take that
back. I ’m not sure whether I read that case.
Mr. Meacham: That’s the original case.
The Witness: Huh?
Mr. Meacham: That’s the original case.
The Witness: Yes, that’s the original case. Yes.
William D. Leber—Redirect
56b
William D. Leber—Redirect
By Mrs. Motley.
ED. There were two decisions in connection with the
original case. There was a decision in ’54 in which they
announced the principle of segregation in schools as uncon
stitutional. Then there was a second opinion in 1955 in
which they— A. I think that must’ve been the one I read,
that second opinion.
ED. Discussed the type of decree to be issued in these
cases. Do you remember reading that? A. I think I—I
think that ’55 was the one that I read.
—91—
ED. But you also remember the Little Eock case? A.
Yes.
ED. And do you remember the Little Eock case, they said
that the desegregation plan could not be suspended be
cause of the community hostility? A. Yes, but if it’s my
understanding of that case, of course, I, not going into it,
the school board had ended, I mean they were in a manner
of suspension themselves. They weren’t doing anything.
We’re working at this case. We’ve got this plan and we’re
working at it. We’re not dragging our feet. We don’t want
to drag our feet.
ED. But you understand that the Supreme Court has
said that community hostility cannot suspend or delay
implementation of the constitutional principle. You under
stand that this question has already been decided by the
Supreme Court, don’t you? A. No, I didn’t understand it
that way.
ED. You don’t understand that the Supreme Court’s al
ready ruled on— A. In other words, I was connected
jointly. I mean the, the working of the school board with
the hostility of the community. The—
57b
ED. You don’t understand the Supreme Court’s already
ruled that you can’t rely on community hostility as a basis
for not moving. You don’t understand that?
—92—
Mr. Meacham: Well, in one case.
The Witness: I—I don’t understand that gener
ally, no.
By Mrs. Motley:
ED. You don’t? A. (Witness shook his head from side
to side.)
Dr. John Walter Letson— Recalled—Cross
Mrs. Motley: Well, we don’t have any further
questions.
Mr. Witt: I don’t have any further questions.
(Further this deponent saith not.)
̂ ̂ ̂ ^
—93—
Db. J o h n W alter L etson , recalled, was examined and
deposed further as follows:
Cross Examination by Mr. W itt:
# # # * •
—105—AE,w w w w
X. Has the Board made any effort, so far as you know,
to provide the leadership to secure the understanding of the
community to the inevitability of compliance with the Su
preme Court’s decision? A. Mr. Witt, I ’d like to say that
in my judgment and my—I know in terms of my experience,
58b
I have never worked with a group that I felt was any
more sincere in its delineation of this problem and in its
attack on this problem than has been this Board of Educa
tion. I would say that that has been true from the day that
it was my privilege to become acquainted with this group
up until the present, and I would also like to say that there
has never, in any experience that I have had with this
Board of Education, been any indication of subterfuge or
duplicity in the approach it has made to this question.
Mrs. Motley: Excuse me. (To the reporter:)
—106—
Would you read the previous question?
(The reporter read the previous question.)
Mrs. Motley: Thank you.
The Witness: And in that, in that answer, Mr.
Witt, in speaking of the apparent sincerity of this
group, I would say that it has certainly attempted
to provide the leadership in bringing, helping to
bring this community forward in understanding of
the complexity and the eventual acceptance of this
solution.
By Mr. W itt:
X. In your analysis of the situation and from your ex
perience what importance, importance do you attach to
the position of the white leadership of the community in
the solution of this problem and eventual compliance? A.
Chattanooga has a rather unique problem as compared with
most other communities of its size and nature, and that is
the relationship with public and private schools that is
Dr. John Walter Letson— Recalled—Cross
59b
somewhat different from the one you’ll find in the average
community.
This relationship creates a very definite problem in terms
of the financing of public education in Chattanooga. A con
siderable portion of the leadership of this community by
individual decision is not a part of the public school sys
tem in that their children attend private schools.
This has had an impact upon the financing of education
in Chattanooga, and I think any degree, anything that would
— 107—
accelerate that process or further that process would make
the problem of financing public education in this City even
more difficult.
X. How would you define community leadership in the
sense that you are using the word? A. Those people who,
through their influence, have an impact upon the thinking
and actions of other people.
X. For example? A. Thinking of the owner of a large
business, or the manager of a large business, to some de
gree, has an influence upon the thinking of his employees.
The ownership of the mass media, of course, influences to
some degree the thinking of the people. In terms of
finances, the people who are best able to provide the re
sources are those who would be in leadership positions.
X. Would you include any religious group in this leader
ship structure? A. Yes, because I certainly think that the
leaders, that the pastors are very influential individuals
in terms of the thinking of our community and in terms
of influence in the thinking of our community.
X. Of your own knowledge, do you know of any white
pastor who has publicly supported the school board from
his pulpit? A. To my knowledge there has been none in
Chattanooga.
Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Cross
60b
X. Of this leadership group that you defined, where did
the large percentage of their children attend school? A.
The private schools.
X. Of your acquaintance, based upon your acquaintance
with the community sector or segment of the community
leadership, do they support the school hoard’s decision to
comply, publicly or privately? A. I would say that it
is my very definite opinion that they do not, and I would
comment as Mr. Leber did that there is a distinction be
tween acquiescence and opposition hut in, in a great ma
jority of the cases I would say that there has been and there
still is vigorous opposition.
There may have been some growth in the acceptance
of the inevitability of this change, hut there has been very
little growth in the, in the acceptance of it in the sense
that it implies approval.
# # * * #
Redirect Examination by Mrs. Motley:
RD. Doctor Letson, in the three years that you’ve been
here, do you know of anything other than community hos
tility on which the Board has relied to postpone desegrega-
—109—
tion? A. I know that the Board has been very conscious
of what would be the result of, of a move in this direction
in terms of its effect upon individual students.
ED. And this is the only reason why the Board has not
desegregated the schools, because there was this community
opposition? A. Community opposition and this related
question of, of its effect upon the over-all school system,
because the Board has been very conscious of this, of this
financial problem and what would be, in its opinion, in-
Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Redirect
— 108—
61b
evitable damage to the educational opportunities that could
be provided for all boys and girls if there was an action
in this direction before the community had reached a point
of general acceptance.
# # # # #
—113—
Ry Mrs. Motley:
ED. Now Doctor Letson, how much more time, in your
opinion, is going to be needed before the Board can de
segregate the schools here in Chattanooga? A. I can’t an
swer that question. I would certainly say that it will re
quire less time than it, than appeared to be the case when
—114—
I came to Chattanooga.
ED. And as far as you have been able to determine, there
are no obstacles to desegregation here in Chattanooga other
than this community hostility about which you spoke at
great length? A. I would certainly say that there are
some additional obstacles that apply to the individual
children involved, and I say, I say this as it applies to
children of either race: There is no more, no greater
tragedy that could happen in the life of any child than
to be rejected by his peers and if, if this is accomplished
or is done before there is a general readiness on the part
of children, school system, the damage that will be done
to the individual pupils involved from, from an educational
and emotional standpoint will be very great.
In the consideration of this Board of Education that,
that point has been discussed, it has been considered, and
again not limited in terms of race but discussed in terms of
Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Redirect
62b
our over-all administrative policies for the administration
of the school system.
It has its implications in many aspects of, of the ad
ministration, and it is certainly every educator’s hope that
conditions will be such in all of our schools that will be
conducive to the maximum growth and development of every
child.
ED. Well, this supposed rejection of, I suppose you
—115—
assume Negroes would be rejected by whites, that’s—
Mr. Witt: Not necessarily.
The Witness: Not necessarily am I saying that, or
assuming that.
By Mrs. Motley.
ED. Or vice versa, you say? A. No, I ’m not saying it
either way. I ’m saying that it is certainly an educational
problem to be considered in the decision as to whether we
proceed in this direction. It may work the other way round.
ED. I don’t— A. The Negroes may reject the whites.
I mean it works either way, but if it is—
ED. Well. A. If it is a fact—
ED. All this rejection you’re talking about stems from
the segregated pattern, doesn’t it? It’s all based on that,
this rejection of people because of color? Isn’t that based
on segregation, the fact that they have been set aside? A.
To some degree I think you’re right, but I wouldn’t say
that it’s the only answer. We have the same problem in
our white schools with some children now, and in the Negro
schools with some children now.
ED. Oh, you already have this problem of rejection on
the part of children for other reasons? A. It’s, it’s always
Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Redirect
63b
a part of education, yes. It’s a basic part of education and
—116—
a basic problem that—
ED. So that this wouldn’t be any new problem to you,
then, would it? A. Wouldn’t be new. It would merely be
a complication.
Mr. Meacham: Acute.
By Mrs. Motley:
ED. Doctor Letson, I believe you stated during the course
of your testimony that all of the meetings of the Board are
required to be public meetings? A. All meetings of the
Board where there is an action taken.
ED. Now this meeting on March seventh, 1960, was that
a public meeting at which the Board took action on the ap
plication of these Plaintiffs for assignment of their children
to school? A. At the time that it was made a matter; of
the record and at the time that the Board officially acted
upon it, it was a public meeting.
ED. Now was March seventh a regular meeting day of
the Board when this resolution or statement was adopted?
A. I don’t think so.
ED. So that the public was not generally aware, was it,
that the Board was having a meeting at which action was
going to be taken, when this statement was drawn up ? A.
It was officially made a part of the record at the regular
Board meeting following that, that day.
—117—
ED. So that when this statement was drawn up it was
not a public meeting, was it? A. No, not at the—not at
the time that the Board worked on it. At the time that
the Board officially adopted it, it was a public meeting.
Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Redirect
64b
RD. Now isn’t it a fact that this statement was released
to the press prior to that official meeting? A. Yes, it was.
—120—
Dean Petersen—Direct
M b . D ean P etersen , b e in g first du ly sw orn , w as exam ined
and deposed as fo l lo w s :
Direct Examination by Mr. Williams:
D. This is Mr. Dean Petersen? A. Right.
D. Mr. Petersen, I believe yon are Chairman of the
Board of Education of Chattanooga, are you not? A.
That’s right.
D. Mr. Petersen, are you also the Commissioner of Edu
cation of the City of Chattanooga? A. I am.
D. Will you explain, if you please, the system of govern
ment in the City of Chattanooga? A. The City govern
ment of Chattanooga consists of a mayor and four com
missioners: Commissioner of Public Works, Streets, and
Sewers, one. Commissioner of Fire and Police. Commis
sioner of Parks and Playgrounds. And fourth, the Com
missioner of Education and Health. That’s my position.
And the Mayor is the Chairman and the Fiscal or Finance
Commissioner.
D. Yes. And this, this Commission sits as a board or
counsel? A. That’s right.
D. From time to time, does it not? A. That’s right.
—121—
D. And has the general supervision of all governmental
affairs for the City of Chattanooga? A. That is right.
D. Yes sir. Now as Chairman of the Board of Educa
tion, how long have you been the Chairman of the Board
65b
of Education? A. Since April the twentieth, 1959, thirteen
months and eleven days.
D. Were you— A. Twelve days.
D. Were you on the Board prior to that time? A. No,
I was not.
D. Did you hold any public office prior to that time? A.
No.
D. Yes sir. A. This is my first public office, yes sir.
D. Yes sir. Since you have been Chairman of the Board
what plan or plans has the Board formulated to deal with
the question of desegregation of the schools? A. Well, as
has been stated by the Superintendent and by Mr. Leber,
we are in the process of elucidating.
D. Yes sir. And by this, and by this you mean this proc
ess of meeting privately with what you deem to be respon
sible community leaders in an attempt to get them to agree
— 122—
with the decision? A. To agree.
D. Is that correct, sir ? A. Yes.
D. Yes sir. A. In substance.
D. Yes sir. And except for that, the Board has not con
sidered or formulated any plan for compliance with the
decision of the Supreme Court relating to segregation in
public schools, has it? A. The Board has been in this proc
ess of elucidation since I have been on the Board. Of
course, I—all I know before April the twentieth, 1959, is
hearsay, what they have told me, and of course I have read
the statements—•
D. You have— A. —that they have made.
D. Yes sir. You have read the resolutions, the previous
resolutions that were made by the Board, I presume, sir?
A. Yes.
Dean Petersen—Direct
66b
D. Yes sir. And you have attended the Board meetings?
A. I have attended—
D. And— A. —all of the official Board meetings.
D. Yes sir. A. Since I have been a member.
D. Yes sir. And you have heard, in the deliberations,
— 123—
the discussions, as to what progress the Board had made
thus far and what it had done? A. Yes.
D. And you have never heard in any Board meeting any
indication that the Board had done anything further than
what you have just testified that it had done and was doing?
A. Yes.
D. Is that correct, sir? A. That’s right.
D. Yes sir. Mr. Petersen, I previously mentioned the
Commission, the City Commission, and I believe that you’ve
testified that that Commission does handle the govern
mental affairs of the City? A. That’s right.
D. And as Commissioner of Education and Health you
bring your problems to the Commission, the Commissioner,
the other Commissioners bring their problems there and
you all discuss them together and try to work out on a co
operative basis the best program for the government of the
City, is that correct, sir? A. That is correct.
D. And when you are called upon by some other Commis
sioner to perform some function which is related to some
thing that he’s doing, you do your best to afford full co
operation to the end that the governmental affairs of the
- 124-
City may be properly integrated and carried out, is that
correct, sir? A. If I believe in—
D. Yes sir. A. —in what he is proposing, yes. I have
a vote which is the same as any other vote.
D. Yes sir. Well, in your capacity as Chairman of the
Dean Petersen—Direct
67b
Board of Education and as Commissioner of Education,
if you bad a problem relating to law enforcement in con
nection with the schools or with the health department of
the City, you would and could call upon the Police Com
missioner to take care of that for you and to cooperate
with you in carrying it out, would you not, sir? A. We, we
expect—
D. Yes sir. A. —the Police Commissioner to uphold
law and order.
D. Yes sir. A. In our City.
D. And you would be entitled to that cooperation on the
part of the Police Commissioner, would you not, sir? A.
That is right.
D. Mr. Petersen, you heard the testimony here of Mr.
Leber to the effect that the Board was attempting, well,
and you have testified yourself that the Board was attempt
ing to wait until they could obtain a climate of acceptance
of the decision before they took any steps toward it, toward
- 1 2 5 -
desegregation? A. (Witness inclined his head.)
D. Now I will ask you, sir, how much more time is it
your opinion that the Board needs before it takes any af
firmative steps to comply with the Supreme Court decision?
A. I can’t say exactly how many years or months, weeks,
or days. I don’t know.
D. Well. A. But I do know of the hostile atmosphere,
because I have lived in this community for forty-seven (47)
years and I think I know the people pretty well.
D. Well, you are not a part of that hostile attitude your
self, I ’m sure. As a member of the Board you take the
position in accordance with this first statement that the
Board intends to comply with the law. A. I haven’t—
Dean Petersen—Direct
68b
D. Do you not, sir? A. I haven’t been accused of being
a part of the asmosphere. My record is open.
D. Yes sir. A. And has been.
D. Mr. Petersen, do you know of anything that the Board
has relied on since you have been a member of the Board,
other than this hostile attitude on the part of the com
munity? A. That is the main thing.
— 126—
D. Yes sir. A. But it has many facets.
D. Yes sir. You’ve considered all, all the facets that
you can think of, of the community hostility, but it all comes
back to the fact that you just aren’t, you just feel like the
people don’t want it, is that it, sir? A. Yes. We—we—-I
feel like that.
Mr. Williams: Yes sir. Thank you. Thank you,
sir.
Cross Examination by Mr. Meacham:
X. Commissioner, let me clarify a matter or two here.
At the outset you related the names of the various Commis
sion posts, but I believe the names you gave were the ones
under the older law and most of those names have now been
changed. As a matter of correcting that, why, the Com
missioner of Public Works, Streets, and Airports is the
correct name of that department? A. (Witness inclined
his head.)
X. The Department of Public Utilities, Grounds, and
Buildings is the correct name for another department?
A. That I called Parks and Playgrounds.
X. That was the old name. And the Health and Educa
tion is correct? A. (Witness inclined his head.)
X. As is Fire and Police? A. Fire and Police. I was
Dean Petersen—Cross
69b
Dean Petersen—Cross
—127—
aware of the fact that I wasn’t stating them right, and I
thank you for correcting me there.
X. Now under the charter of the City of Chattanooga its
government is managed by this Board of Commissioners,
and under the law is it not true that this Board of Commis
sioners can act only throug'h the minutes of its meetings,
the action taken reflected in those minutes, and as indi
viduals the Commissioners have no power! A. That’s
right.
Mr. Williams: Well, I, well, that’s all right.
Mr. Meacham: It’s just a matter of record. That
is the charter law.
Mr. Williams: That’s all right.
By Mr. Meacham:
X. Now Commissioner, does the City Commission of
Chattanooga have any control over the public schools! A.
The City Commission appropriates the money for the public
schools. The City Commission does not attempt in any way
to run the public schools from the standpoint of personnel,
administration, or anything of that sort.
X. Under the charter amendment of 1941 which created
the independent school board, the only function that the
City Commission has at the present time is to appropriate
money for its operation and to confirm nominations of suc
cessor Board members, is that correct! A. Right, and to,
—128—
and to approve property purchases, things of that kind.
X. But it has no power or responsibility for the admin
istration and operation of the schools! A. That’s in the
hands of the Superintendent and his staff.
70b
X. And it has no power to make— A. And the Board.
X. It has no power to make policy for the management
of the schools? A. That’s right.
X. That’s vested in the school board? A. That’s in the
school board.
X. How do you have any powers over the school by
virtue of your office as Commissioner of Health, Education
and Health, while the Board is not in session? A. I do not.
X. Ho you have any power of administration of the
schools? A. I do not.
X. Your power is entirely as a member and ex-officio
Chairman of the Board of Education? A. That is right.
X. And I believe you are the odd member and cast a vote
only when there’s a tie? A. There isn’t any reason to cast
—129—
a vote, for me to cast a vote unless there is a tie.
X. That’s right, A. I am entitled to cast a vote if I wish.
If I wish to express my opinion, I can vote, regardless of
what the result is.
X. Now Commissioner, prior to the time you entered
public life, became a member of the City Commission, what
was your occupation? A. I was a principal of Red Bank
High School, which is a county high school in one of our
adjoining municipalities, township of Red Bank-White Oak.
X. Prior to that time had you been in the City educa
tional system? A. One time I was Supervisor of Athletics
and Physical Training for the City of Chattanooga, and the
football coach at the Chattanooga or City High School.
X. And prior to that time I believe you taught and
coached at Central High School? A. That’s right.
X. The large county high school? A. For sixteen (16)
years I was coach and teacher at Central High School,
Athletic Director.
Dean Petersen—Cross
71b
X. Now I believe yon were asked about, in your opinion
was the Board of Education basing its entire course in this
—1 3 0 -
matter upon the hostile attitude or atmosphere of the City.
Have you been in contact with few or many people who have
expressed their position in this matter? A. Mr. Meacham,
I have been in contact with a great many people. During
my campaign for this office I met a lot of people in all walks
of life, of course, and I did not realize until that time that
so many people were interested in so many ways in this
problem that we’re talking about, but I certainly have run
into and I—I hear, as every other member of this Board
hears every day of my life, I—I hear people pro and con
discussing this problem. Everybody is interested in it, it
seems, or most everybody, and we have different shades of
opinion about it, different ideas as to what should be done.
X. In your opinion is this hostile attitude diminishing to
any extent at the present time? A. I think it’s diminishing
in some quarters, and I thing the sit-in strikes has intensi
fied it in other quarters, and if I may, since you have asked
a question or brought up this point, Mr. Williams asked
about did I think it was entirely the hostile attitude that
motivates the Board in what it’s doing now and what it
has been doing, this process we call elucidation, I would
like to say that the members of this Board have over and
over again in our discussions brought up the fact that they
want to do the thing which will not hurt the children of the
—1 3 1 -
City of Chattanooga, regardless of race. Over and over
again that has been mentioned from so many angles, so
that I—I would be amiss if I left that out of my testimony
here today.
X. In your opinion, if there were a hasty step taken to
Dean Petersen—Cross
72b
integrate the schools immediately, is there any likelihood
that the school system here might be destroyed or abolished?
A. Well, I—I think it’s possible if the people who furnish
the money would not continue to furnish the money. I
think that most of our people, regardless, want to see our
public schools kept, kept open here. A great many of them
do, anyway. Some who would not.
X. Now you read the Chattanooga News-Free Press, I
assume? A. Yes, I read the Free Press and the Times.
X. Are you familiar with the editorial policy of the Chat
tanooga News-Free Press with reference to the establish
ment of private schools by grants from the state to in
dividual pupils? A. Yes, I am.
X. Is that part of the atmosphere in this community? A.
A segment of it.
X. About what percentage of the people of Chattanooga
would you indicate the News-Free Press represents or
whose opinion they reflect? A. Well, I don’t know that I
- 1 3 2 -
can do that accurately. I heard a statement just recently
to the effect that they, circulation of the Chattanooga Free
Press is ten thousand (10,000) more daily than that of the
Chattanooga Times at the present. I think that will answer
your question maybe in part.
X. And did you hear the editor or publisher of that
paper say that the policies that he had pursued were de
signed to fit the majority of the people here? A. I did.
X. Is that part of the atmosphere of this community
that certain high and powerful groups are willing to estab
lish private schools to the detriment or possible extinction
of public schools? A. That was what was said.
X. That’s been a published pattern for the last several
months, has it not? A. Yes. You might say more than
that. Certainly for the last several months.
Dean Petersen—Cross
73b
X. As to the private schools,— A. Yes.
X. ■—of course? A. Yes.
X. Desegregation has been a target— A. Right.
X. —of that paper for many years? A. Right.
—133—
X. Now during this period of some thirteen (13) months
that you’ve been a member of the Board, the discussions
that you’ve had with various public groups and the citizens
as a whole that you’ve come in contact with, in your opinion
is it possible peacefully, with good order and no damage
to the schools, to desegregate them as of this time? A. I
—I couldn’t say yes that I believe that at this time. I be
lieve that we would have extreme difficulties if we would
desegregate completely at this time.
X. February of this year, were the police forced to
turn fire hoses upon a mob here in the City? A. It was,
yes.
X. What did that grow out of? A. On our main street.
The sit-down.
X. In your opinion has that helped or hurt the cause of
desegregation here? A. I think it has hurt it more than
it has helped it, because—
X. Now then. A. Because the police and fire depart
ments, of course, were part of the police department at the
time, because they did what they did some of our Negro
people think that it will be an easy thing to control what
ever may happen in case of desegregation, and I think that
they are mistaken in that idea. No matter, the police force
—1 3 4 -
in Chattanooga, as in many other cities in the United States,
as is lacking in numbers, we all feel, those who know any
thing at all about our government feel that we should have
more policemen than we have, and if we should have de
segregation, why, it’s quite possible that even though the
Dean Petersen—Cross
74b
colored people do have great faith now, some of them, in
our police department, I doubt that the police department
could physically do what they would expect them to do in
certain events.
X. On this occasion in February I believe that the
auxiliary police reserve and firemen were called out to
handle the situation?
Mr. Williams: I didn’t hear that question. Pardon
me.
By Mr. Meacham:
X. I believe that auxiliary police and firemen were called
out in addition to the regular officers to help cope with the
situation? A. That’s right, every one available.
X. Now I understood you to say, direct examination,
that you did not base your opinion that immediate desegre
gation could not be had solely on this question of violence
or hostility. Do you have any other bases upon which you
place that opinion? I believe you’d already mentioned the
possible closing or in effect destruction of the school sys
tem. A. I said—
—135—
X. Or anything with reference to the individual pupils?
A. I said that it is possible that the schools could be dam
aged seriously due to lack of finances that the people of
this community or any other community ceased, they don’t
believe in what’s going on to the point where they refuse
to support them, if they withdraw their children from the
schools and send them to private schools that there is a
possibility that our public school system would be hurt to
the point where it couldn’t function at all as it is fuctioning
now, and therefore the children of both races would be
severely hurt.
Dean Petersen—Cross
75b
Now I didn’t, in your question there, I doubt if I got the
full implication of what you mean. If you would restate it,
why—
X. Well, what I was referring to was whether in your
opinion hasty and forceable desegregation of the schools
might injure some of the pupils either physically or psy
chologically? A. Why, certainly, in addition to the phy
sical, the emotional, or psychological damage to them would
very likely occur to possibly large numbers of the children.
I—I believe that.
Mr. Meacham: That’s all.
Redirect Examination by Mr. Williams:
ED. Mr. Petersen, you’ve heard Doctor Letson’s state
ment that the Negro population of the school comprises ap-
—136—
proximately thirty-nine percent of the entire population?
A. Yes.
ED. Would you say that the Negro population of Nash
ville comprises approximately the same percentage of the
population, I mean of Chattanooga, comprises approxi
mately the same percentage of the population of Chat
tanooga? A. Now you’re a little bit mixed up.
ED. In other words, I ’m asking you, sir,— A. Start
again, please.
ED. —if you know what approximately is the percentage
of the Negro population in Chattanooga. A. The late,
the latest report that we have had has been 39.7.
ED. Yes sir. Approximately, that’s— A. That is, in
the—in the—
ED. In the City proper? A. In the schools, now.
Mr. Meacham: Thirty-five (35) in the City.
Dean Petersen—Redirect
76b
Dean Petersen—Redirect
By Mr. Williams:
ED. Well, the— A. It’s thirty-five.
ED. Then you would say that the population in the City,
that the total Negro population in the City is a little less?
A. Than—
ED. But about the same amount as the Negro population
in the schools? A. Well.
—137—
ED. Yes sir. A. The Negro population in the schools
is a little bit more.
ED. Yes sir. It’s about a third? A. By some—
ED. It’s about a little over a third? A. A little over a
third.
ED. Yes sir. A. Eight.
ED. Now the schools are financed through appropriations
which are made by the Board of Commissioners of the City
of Nashville, is that not correct, sir?
Mrs. Motley: Chattanooga.
The Witness: You mean Chattanooga?
By Mr. Williams:
ED. Of Chattanooga. I ’m sorry. I can’t get away from
my home town, Mr. Petersen. A. Most of our money is
collected by the county and by the state. Most of our reve
nue comes from the state and county.
ED. Oh, I see. A. This year the direct appropriation
from the City of Chattanooga in round numbers was just a
little bit more than six hundred thousand dollars ($600,000).
We have two million eight hundred thousand (2,800,000)
plus from the county and a little bit less from the state
—138—
this year for total budget of a little bit more than six mil
lion dollars ($6,000,000).
77b
ED. Then, then a substantial proportion of your schools,
school funds come from the state which has no connection
with the City of Nashville except—
Mrs. Motley: Chattanooga.
The Witness: Chattanooga.
By Mr. Williams:
ED. City of Chattanooga, except that Chattanooga is a
governmental subdivision ? A. That’s right. Of course, we
send the money to Nashville. We send the money over
there.
ED. I guess that’s why I keep mentioning Nashville. A.
We send a whole lot more than we get back.
ED. Yes sir. A. As every big county does.
ED. Well, these funds come from state taxes which are
returned to Chattanooga1? A. To Hamilton County and to
Chattanooga.
ED. Yes sir. A. Yes.
ED. And of the funds which are contributed by the City,
they are obtained from the taxation of this better than one-
third Negro population also, are they not? A. It’s mostly
from property owners.
ED. Yes sir. A. In Chattanooga.
—139—
ED. And there are a considerable portion of the Negro
people who are property owners, are there not, sir? A.
There are—
ED. Yes. A. —quite a few.
ED. Yes sir. A. I couldn’t tell you the percentage.
ED. And— A. I don’t know.
ED. And most of these funds which come from state
taxation are based on the sales tax, are they not, sir? A.
Sales tax.
Dean Petersen—Redirect
78b
Bean Petersen—Redirect
RD. Yes sir. A. Gasoline tax.
RD. Which is applicable to the Negro? A. Cigarettes.
RD. Yes sir. A. And so on.
RD. Now Mr. Petersen, you said that one of your con
siderations in connection with this community hostility was
that you didn’t want to hurt little children, is that correct,
sir? A. That’s right.
RD. Yes sir. And if it should he true that thirty-nine
percent of the children in your school system are being hurt
— 140—
then that would and should he a major consideration which
the Board ought to take into consideration, should it not,
if thirty-nine percent are being hurt by segregation, then
that would be a factor that you’d want to take into con
sideration, would it not, sir? A. (No audible reply.)
RD. Sir? A. I am—I do not admit that—
RD. I see. Yes sir. A. -—that that thirty-nine percent
of the children are being hurt.
RD. Then if you— A. We have good schools.
RD. Then— A. For—
RD. Then—
Mr. Meacham: Let him—
Mr. Williams: You—
Mr. Meacham: Let him answer.
Mr. Williams: Pardon me, sir. Pardon me, sir.
By Mr. Williams:
RD. Go ahead, sir. A. You might as well say on the
other hand that sixty-one percent are being hurt.
RD. Yes sir. It would be your opinion that if the schools
were integrated that the sixty-one percent who are white
— 141—
would be hurt then, is that correct, sir? A. Possibly.
79b
ED. Yes sir. And then you do disagree with the Supreme
Court decision, do you not, sir? A. I do.
RD. Yes sir. A. Yes.
ED. And as a matter of fact, Mr. Petersen, when you ran
for the office, you ran on an opposition to integration plat
form, did you not, sir? A. I made the statement that I did
not want to see the operation of the schools changed.
RD. Yes sir. And that has a part in the part that you
have played in the deliberations of the Board since you
have been Chairman, the Chairman of the Board in con
nection with the action, any action which the Board may
have taken or not taken, does it not, sir? Well, what I ’m
trying to say is your feeling in that regard as expressed in
your platform has had a part to play in the actions which
you’ve taken as a member of the Board? A. I have not
changed my mind.
Mr. Williams: Yes sir. That’s it. That’s all.
Recross Examination by Mr. Meacham:
EX. You have joined in and agreed with the policy that’s
—142—
been announced by this Board since you’ve been a member,
have you not? A. As to what’s been done by this Board
since I ’ve been on it, I—I agree to, yes, the statements that
have been made.
EX. You take no responsibility, though, for what was
done before? A. I cannot take responsibility for what
was done before I became a member of the Board.
Mr. Meacham: That’s all.
(Further this deponent saith not.)
* * * * *
Bean Petersen—Recross
Mrs. Sammie C. Irvine—Direct
—143—
M bs. S am m ie C. I rvin e , being first duly sworn, was ex
amined and deposed as follows:
Direct Examination by Mrs. Motley:
D. Mrs. Irveen.
Mr. Craig: Irvine.
D. I ’m sorry. It’s Irvine. A. Irvine.
D. Irvine? A. (Witness inclined her head.)
D. How long have you been a member of the school
board? A. Since it was created in 1941.
D. Now I ’m going to ask you to look at the little docu
ment, blue-covered document in front of you, which con
tains the official statements of the Board of Education on
the Supreme Court’s decision, and direct your attention to
the statement dated March thirty-first, 1956. A. March?
D. Thirty-first. A. Yes.
D. Nineteen fifty-six. A. All right.
D. Now were you a member of the school board at that
time ? A. I was.
—144—
D. Did you participate in the adoption of this statement?
A. I did.
D. Now isn’t it a fact that at the time this statement
was adopted the Board had actually abandoned its original
intention to integrate the schools and had decided to drop
the whole matter for a while? A. Not, not changing their
minds on our, our plan and what we were going to do.
D. Now isn’t it true that the statement itself says that
“ Events in the last year have convinced the Board of
Education that the community will not accept any form of
integration within the City schools at any time within
the near future” ? A. Yes.
81b
Mrs. Sammie C. Irvine—Cross
D. “We therefore take this opportunity to report to the
community our decision to postpone any change in the
public schools for a period of at least a few years, probably
five years or more” ? A. I consider that a postponement,
but just still holding to our decision.
D. So that on March thirty-fist, 1956, the Board had actu
ally postponed its plan to integrate, hadn’t it? A. Well, we
realized that the time was not right.
D. And this was based upon this community hostility?
—145—
A. Largely.
D. What happened at that meeting and all? A. Yes.
D. Is there anything on which the Board relied other
than community hostility? A. Well, I can—
D. To reach this decision? A. In thinking of it from my
own personal point of view, which goes back to the ques
tion of hostility, I was—had such an experience of what
had formerly been my very close friends socially and whose
homes I ’d been in and had been in my home that were
just so very much opposed to anything that I was doing.
D. So that this decision to postpone was then based
upon what your friends had said and the hostility that you
had met individually? A. Well, that was the way I would
have of judging the feeling of citizens that I knew well.
D. And that was the basis of this statement there? A.
Well, with all of us. It was a combined statement, of course.
D. Yes. A. With all of us.
Mrs. Motley: All right. That’s all.
Cross Examination by Mr. W itt:
—146—
X. Just one question, Mrs. Irvine. A. Uh-huh.
X. You’ve testified that the community hostility con-
82b
cerned you, Mrs. Irvine, but did you not also give primary
concern to the results of this community hostility1? A. Oh,
yes.
X. What results did you foresee? A. Well, we had con
tinually, from the beginning, said that we, in our state
ments, that we wouldn’t—were determined not to do any
thing that would hurt a white child or a colored child and
that that, from the—all of the evidence that was coming
to me was just what was happening even on, among adults,
but it would be a result of our trying to integrate at this
time.
X. Well then, was your decision then based in the final
analysis on your own conception of your responsibility to
all the children? A. Indeed.
X. It was this responsibility which was your primary
consideration? A. That’s right.
X. The community hostility merely influenced your judg
ment as to this? A. That’s right.
# # # * #
—148—
M r . G e o r g e C. H u d s o n , being first duly sworn, was ex
amined and deposed as follows:
Direct Examination by Mrs. Motley:
D. Mr. Hudson? A. (Witness inclined his head.)
D. How long have you been a member of the Board? A.
About three years.
D. About three years? A. June or July of 1957.
D. Now since you have been a member of the Board do
you know of anything on which the Board has relied other
than community hostility to postpone integration here in
George C. Hudson-—Direct
83b
Chattanooga? A. All of the things that I ’m familiar with
have been mentioned here already.
D. I ’m sorry, I can’t hear you. A. All of the things
with which I ’m familiar have already been mentioned here.
D. You have— A. That is, the.—
D. You have nothing to add other than this community
hostility as the basis for the postponement? A. I am in
fear, which is one of my primary considerations, that it
will damage the children involved.
—149—
D. What will? A. Desegregation.
D. How will it damage the children? A. Emotionally by
being ostracized, rejected, not accepted.
D. How do you know this? A. Well, I ’ve never been
in a position of being rejected.
D. This is— A. Rejected.
D. This is all conjecture on your part. I mean you
don’t have any scientific study or survey? A. Oh, no,
I ’m not a scientist.
D. I mean you just, this is all conjecture, isn’t it, on
your part? A. No, not necessarily.
D. What is it based on, then, that this will happen? A.
It’s based on reading, on sociologists and others with re
gard to what happens to people when they’re rejected, not
accepted in their group; a knowledge of how I think I
would feel under similar circumstances. It’s not scientific,
of course.
D. What psychologists or sociologists have you read?
A. I can’t give you any text. I can’t give you any, the
names of any books or any authors on the subject.
D. But the Board hasn’t made any study, really, to de-
—150—
termine the effects of integration or what it might be on
George C. Hudson—Direct
84b
children here, has it? A. The Board is made up of pro
fessional and business people who have very little time to
do research in other fields.
D. And so that you really don’t know what the effects
of integration will be, do you? A. There are a lot, a great
many things I don’t know.
Mrs. Motley: Do you want to read the question,
please ?
(The reporter read the last question.)
The Witness: Not from personal experience.
By Mrs. Motley:
D. Now I think you mentioned that you felt that some of
the children might be rejected? A. Yes.
D. Which group were you referring to? A. I think it
could happen in either group, where there’s a large ma
jority one way, some small minority in another.
D. Have you studied or has your Board studied integra
tion in some other communities like Baltimore or Washing
ton and other places? A. We have done a great deal of
reading on the subject, yes. We have never made trips to
those areas to get first-hand information.
— 151—
D. Has the Board given any consideration in the last
three years to the effect of segregation on Negro children
that the Supreme Court talked about? A. Well, that’s
your whole problem, isn’t it? If I understand your ques
tion. Certainly we’ve discussed it.
D. Yes. The psychological damage incurred? A. Oh,
yes.
George C. Hudson—Direct
85b
D. You say you’ve discussed it? A. (Witness inclined
Ms bead.)
D. Now you say the Board has considered the psycho
logical damage to Negro children involved. What conclu
sion has the Board reached with respect to that? A. We
didn’t ever take a vote on it, hut I think there is some
unanimity of agreement that any such ostracism on the
part of others, one group of school children from another
group of school children resolves in an emotional disturb
ance to the one who’s been ostracised.
D. And this includes the present system of segregation,
the Negroes are set aside, the basis of that? A. I ’m in
clined to think on the basis of conversations with some of
my Negro friends that it occurs not only between white and
Negro but between groups of whites and groups of Negroes.
Anybody that has, who is different from someone else is
going to be withdrawn from, and to some extent ostracised
—152—
D. So that you’re talking about a problem which is not
going to result from integration, but a problem that we
have as people, as human beings— A. I—
D. •—anyway? A. I think that’s true. I think it’s, it’s a
larger problem on, on the differences in race, but the prob
lem exists also in cases of foreigners who do not speak
English well, who speak broken English, who cannot fit well
into the pattern of the group with which they are as
sociated. That sort of thing.
Mrs. Motley: Well, I think that’s all.
Mr. Witt: No questions.
Mrs. Motley: Thank you.
(Further this deponent saith not.)
# # # # #
George C. Hudson—Direct
86b
Raymond B. Witt—Direct
—153—
M e . R aymond B. W it t , b e in g first du ly sw orn , w as ex
am ined and d eposed as fo l lo w s :
Direct Examination by Mr. Craig:
D. We bad some discussions leading up to this deposi
tion that we’re taking now. That’s true, isn’t it? A. Yes
sir.
I). I ask you specifically, sir, if you didn’t express to
me a sort of fear or apprehension of some untoward inci
dent as a result of our taking depositions at all, and speci
fically here at this place? A. Mr. Craig, in all of my legal
representation of any client I feel that it is my responsi
bility to analyze all of the possibilities in any situation and
then attempt to be prepared for any eventuality, no matter
how remote it may be. This was the sense in which I made
this comment to you.
D. Yes sir. A. I merely recognized that this was a pos
sibility.
I). And suggested that maybe some place in the Federal
Building would be safer? A. Yes sir, I did.
D. I ask you if the other members of the Board, I mean
if you got that opinion from other members of the Board
or if they had your same fears? A. I think I ’ll have to
take complete responsibility for that.
—154—
D. Now would you or not say that you assessed the
situation rightfully or wrongfully? A. Very fortunately
I assessed that the possibility was, was remote and it did
not occur, thank you, so far.
D. Based on that, do you think that maybe your assess
ment of the situation as it existed and the possibilities of
any hostility on the part of the community might’ve been
87b
assessed wrong? A. Of course, Mr. Craig, I realize the in
herent weaknesses in any one individual’s assessment of a
total community.
D. Pardon me, and may I say that I was thinking in
terms of the whole Board, the whole Board’s assessment
of the situation as it did or might exist under a program
that would desegregate the schools prior to this time? A.
It is my considered judgment that the present members of
this school board have a better evaluation of this total com
munity on the question of integration than any other peo
ple in the whole world, because of their peculiar position
and not because of the ability particularly of any member of
the Board or the Board together.
It’s merely because of the focal point that they happen
to hold in this community, and that in their judgment of
this situation they represent virtually thousands of factual
situations which to them all add up to their judgment;
—155—
whether it’s right or wrong, this is the situation.
D. But you did decide, and I mean the Board as a whole,
after you had this organizational meeting of this Inter
racial Advisory Committee, that your assessment of the
situation in Chattanooga had been wrong when you made
your first announcement? A. When we made our first
announcement, if you’re referring to the statement of July
the twenty-second, 1955.
D. Yes sir. A. The Board’s assessment of the com
munity had been of an extremely limited nature, because
if you will recall the final, what I refer to as implementa
tion decision of the Supreme Court, I believe, was handed
down on May thirty-first, 1955, and our statement was given
to the public on July twenty-second, which was approxi
mately seven and a half weeks later. So the Board had had
Raymond B. Witt—Direct
88b
Raymond B. Witt—Cross
an extremely limited opportunity to assess the community’s
reaction to this decision. We live with the continuing knowl
edge that our assessment may be completely wrong, but
still it must, we are the ones that must make this.
Mr. Craig: That’s all, sir.
The Witness: Thank you, sir.
Cross Examination by Mr. Meacham:
X. Mr. Witt, I want to ask one thing here. Isn’t there
another factor in this matter that the City at large is losing
—156—
rapidly its white population, moving into the county,
against whom no suit’s been filed?
Mrs. Motley: I didn’t hear the end of that.
Mr. Meachan: Moving into the county against
whom no suit has been filed.
Mrs. Motley: Oh.
The Witness: Well, based upon the school attend
ance data for the current school year, this is cer
tainly a reasonable explanation, plus the observation
of the development, I mean the west side redevelop
ment and the shift in population there, I think it’s
safe to assume, of course I could not make a flat
statement without a very thorough survey that this
is true, but based upon the limited information I
have I think it is true, and I think it will prob
ably continue.
By Mr. Meacham:
X. This loss of population naturally is going to result in
lowering the revenues of the City of Chattanooga to pro-
89b
Raymond B. Witt—Cross
vide funds for schools, isn’t it? A. I think that will be
true.
X. And one reason that these people have moved is be
cause of the threat or imminence of integrated schools. Is
that part of it? A. That would be—
Mr. Craig: His opinion.
The Witness: —certainly an opinion that, from
my acquaintance with the talking with people in the
— 1 5 7 -
community, that certainly the vast majority of them
would prefer to not be in a situation where their
children would go to school with Negro children, and
therefore it’s probably that this is part of their
decision.
X. Well. A. Of course, I—
X. Among our adjoining municipalities, are there any
Negro citizens in Red Bank-White Oak, to your knowledge?
A. I don’t, I can’t answer that question.
X. Are there any in East Ridge? A. I can’t answer that
question. I don’t think so, but I don’t know.
X. Now you were asked about your assessment, and of
course you’ve heard testimony today about the. hostile at
titude. Did you receive a communication this morning in
that vein? A. Unfortunately, yes. I ’m sure it was a crank,
but nevertheless I got it.
X. Would you care to exhibit that at this time? A.
(Witness removed an object from his brief case.) It’s harm
less in a sense. (All counsel examined same.) This is, of
course, nothing but an annoyance, but it’s a very simple
thing for somebody to object to.
(Discussion had off the record.)
90b
Raymond B. Witt—Redirect
X. Back on the record, then. One more question, Mr.
Witt. You’ve been on this board for how many years'?
—158—
A. Since 1953.
X. In your opinion, based upon your knowledge of the
community atmosphere, feeling, the ingrained, more rea
soned customs of the people in this section, is the time ripe
for desegregation of the schools at the present moment1?
A. No. There’s no, in my opinion, to do it now would be,
well, I ’ll say this: It would be—I would not be discharg
ing my responsibility, as I see it, to both the white children
and the Negro children of this community if I voted to
desegregate the schools at the present time.
X. Have you been encouraged by the developments, the
voluntary public integrated meetings that have been held,
the fact that the education and gospel that the school board
has been spreading is beginning to take some root? A.
This is a two-edged sort of thing. What I call the intel
lectual or the mental acceptance of inevitability of com
pliance has in my opinion, from what people have said to
me voluntarily and otherwise, there has been a marked
development or increase in the numbers of people who now
have come to the mental acceptance of the fact that it’s
inevitable, but the basic tragedy that I see in it is by the
same token I see a developing attitude among white peo
ple of the intensity of their feelings towards the Negro
race which is extremely unfortunate, but it exists.
—159—
Redirect Examination By Mrs. Motley:
RD. Mr. Witt, you’re a lawyer, aren’t you? A. Sup
posed to be, yes ma’am.
RD. And I assume that you’ve read the Supreme Court’s
91b
decisions on school segregation, haven’t you? A. The ma
jority of them, yes.
ED. Did you read the Supreme Court’s decision of May
twenty-four, 1955, the second Brown suit? A. Yes.
ED. May thirty-one. A. Yes ma’am.
ED. Nineteen fifty-five. A. Yes ma’am.
ED. Then you know, don’t you, that the Supreme Court
has already ruled that opposition to the principle of non-
segregation will not be permitted to set that principle aside,
don’t you? A. No.
ED. You don’t know that? A. I think you would find
that in the law schools that decision of the Supreme Court
in the Little Eock case, I believe is what you’re referring to.
ED. No, I ’m referring to the decision of May thirty-one,
1955.
—160—
Mr. Meacham: Brown against Topeka.
Mrs. Motley: Brown against Board of Education.
Mr. Meacham: Board of Education.
The Witness: I am aware of the fact that mere
hostility was mentioned, but there was also other
phraseology in the decision reconciling public and
private interests with all deliberate speed, the
eventual, the implementation of constitutional princi
ples that are additional factors that require con
sideration to the one you mentioned. Of course,
I ’m fully aware of—
By Mr. Motley:
ED. They specifically eliminated community hostility or
disagreement— A. I think the—
ED. -—with the Supreme Court’s decision. A. I think
the word—
Raymond B. Witt—Redirect
92b
Mr. Meacham: That was the Little Rock case.
The Witness: I think the adjective—
Mrs. Motley: What?
Mr. Meacham: That was the Little Rock case.
The Witness: Now wait a minute. I think the word
that was used was “mere,” the mere hostility of the
community will not be allowed to—
By Mrs. Motley:
RD. Disagreement with this decision. A. Yes.
RD. Is that what they said? A. Yes, the mere disagree-
—161—
ment will not be allowed to, in effect,—
RD. To set aside the principle? A. That’s right.
RD. Words to that effect?
Mr. Williams: It goes without saying that the
mere—
The Witness: Disagreement.
Mr. Williams: —disagreement with the principles
will not be allowed to yield because of disagreement
with them.
Mrs. Motley: That’s right.
The Witness: That’s right. Well, of course,—
By Mrs. Motley:
RD. That’s all you’ve been talking about, isn’t it, mere
disagreement with the decision? A. No.
RD. What have you been talking about? A. We’ve
been, I think that what the Board has been talking about
is the results of this hostility as foreseeable and as the
Board is able to prejudge them, and the responsibility that
Raymond B. Witt-—Redirect
93b
the Board will have to assume for its decision. The hostility
is a reality.
This Board is acting in a representative capacity. This
Board owes a responsibility, a sworn responsibility to all
the citizens of this community. Our individual feelings are
completely irrelevant in the matter, and we’re attempting
—162—
as best we know how to discharge our responsibility to the
citizens of this community and to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and as we see it, the discharge of these re
sponsibilities are in basic conflict with each other in this
community.
ED. You represent the Negroes in this community, or
just whites? A. We attempt to represent the Negroes and
the whites.
ED. What other Board decisions do you have pending
approval of the community? You have any other Board de
cisions which are resting or pending approval of the com
munity? A. Our, our position is not the approval of the
community, that we are—we are awaiting the approval of
the community.
ED. What is your position? A. Our position—
ED. That’s what I understood you to say. A. No. Our
position is that, as I understand it, is that we must, this
Board must have some public tangible support from a sub
stantial jDortion of the white community before we can act
in such a way as to not harm the school system and the
community.
ED. Where do you find that in the Supreme Court’s de
cision? A. It’s not in there.
ED. It isn’t in there? A. In so many words.
ED. Is it? A. No.
Raymond B. Witt—Redirect
— 163—
94b
RD. And then in the March 1956 resolution of the Board,
were you a member of the Board then? A. I was.
RD. When they decided to postpone it for a period of
five years because of events of the preceding year? A. Yes.
RD. Now those events that are referred to, they’re re
ferring to community hostility, aren’t they? A. Yes.
RD. And the Board’s postponed its plan dependent, be
cause of community hostility, did it not? A. It postponed
the physical placing of Negro and white children in the
same classroom. It did not in any way postpone or slow
down its attempt to make the problem clear to the com
munity and try to get community understanding of the
problem so that the community then could move toward an
acceptance of what we have said from the beginning was
inevitable.
RD. You mean the plan included the placement of Negro
children in white schools? A. No, I do not. I mean, I am
distinguishing between, when you use the word “plan”
the implication is, as I understand it, that plan means the
—1 6 4 -
moment when, the time when Negro and white children
will be in the same classroom.
RD. That’s right. A. Plan, as we see it, is a transition
period in which we attempt, the best we know how, with the
limited resources we have, to provide the leadership to the
thinking community to come to an acceptance of its in
evitability.
In this community you have had a constant reiteration
day after day, “you don’t have to do it, you don’t have to do
it,” and we have been attempting to get across to the
community that it is inevitable, that it has got to be done,
and until the community leadership—we aren’t concerned,
we aren’t particularly worried about what some fringe
group says, but until the community leadership, the peo-
Raymond B. Witt—Redirect
95b
pie with whom we associate from day to day and the people
that normally or in some instances nsed to be our friends
say “We will support you, and we will support you and
take the risk,” how can the Board act?
Rib. But your plan never included the actual placement
of Negroes in the schools? A. Oh, of course. Absolutely.
BD. It did or did not? A . This, this will be a step in the
plan. The only time we’re, the only thing we’re disagreeing
with you on is when.
BD. Well, what did you postpone in 1956 when you
—165—
adopted that resolution? A. There were rumors.
BD. Postponing for five years, what did you postpone?
A. There were rumors in the community that certain
schools would be desegregated or that we would be de
segregated and there was a certain—it was creating an
atmosphere in the community that was unhealthy, and since
we did not think that then was the time to move we decided
to tell the community about it in an attempt to lessen the
tension in the community and develop a climate in which
two people could talk to each other.
BD. In other words, what you postponed in 1956 was any
intention to place Negroes in white schools, is that right?
A. We postponed at that time the time when you would
put, that’s right. In other words, he would, we would con
tinue with our elucidation plan as we saw it, but the time
when any Negro children, any white children would be put
together, we said probably five years. We don’t know.
BD. So that in 1956 you postponed the time when Negro
children would actually be placed into white schools, is that
right ? A. I think that’s right.
BD. And that postponement was based upon community
hostility, wasn’t it, which arose during the previous years,
Raymond B. Witt—Redirect
Raymond B. Witt—Redirect
—166—
you said? A. It was based upon community hostility and
a balancing of our conflicting responsibilities that we had
to balance.
ED. That you had to balance? A. That’s right.
ED. Now you read the Supreme Court’s decision in the
Little Eock case, didn’t you? A. Yes ma’am.
ED. And there the school board had postponed a de
segregation plan because of community hostility, had it
not? A. That’s correct.
ED. And the Supreme Court ruled in that case that the
school board could not postpone the desegregation plan
because of community hostility, didn’t it? A. It did not—
Mr. Meachain: I thought they just asked for two
and a half years. They didn’t actually postpone it.
Mrs. Motley: They wanted to postpone it for two
and a half years.
Mr. Meacham: Two and a half years, and that’s
what they were asking for, but they hadn’t done it.
Mrs. Motley: Well, the District Court had granted
it. That’s how it got to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Mr. Meacham: They were sued.
By Mrs. Motley.
ED. So that the answer, the question is the Supreme
- 1 6 7 -
Court’s already ruled that you can’t postpone any desegre
gation plan because of community hostility, hasn’t it? A.
In that, no, I don’t think so. Of course, that—
ED. What did they rule? A. I think that the law of the
Little Eock case before the Supreme Court is that in any
97b
situation where the full force of the state government and
all the officials of a state are thrown against and contrary
to the constitution of the United States as interpreted by
the Supreme Court and the entire power of the federal
government that there can be no answer but that the state
will have to yield, and to me that was the decision in the
Little Rock case, and the Little Rock school board was
merely caught in between two mammoth forces over which
they had no control.
ED. And you don’t have that situation in Tennessee, do
you, where the whole power of state government is pitted
against your effort— A. No, and we’re—
ED. —to desegregate? A. We’re thankful that we do
not.
Mr. Meacham: Yet.
The Witness: Yet. Of course, the Legislature
meets in January.
By Mrs. Motley:
ED. But you think that you will probably have it here in
the local community, that opposition to your decision? A.
—1 6 8 -
Well, that’s one thing I don’t think I have to think. I think
I know that.
ED. And there’s nothing else upon which the Board
places this postponement other than community hostility,
is there? A. And the results of that community hostility.
Mrs. Motley: I think that’s all.
Mr. Williams: That’s all.
(Further this deponent saith not.)
* # * # #
Raymond B. Witt—Redirect
r \
r \
/^ \
3 8
No. 14,517
In the
Itutpii States! (Emtrl of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
Jam es Jo n ath an M app and D eborah L ’T an y a M app,
m inors, by Jam es R . M app, their father and n ext friend;
Pless M axey, J r ., a m inor, by his m other and n ext friend,
Mrs. Josephine M axey; Kathy K irnon, a m inor, by her
father and n ext friend, T h e R everend H . H . K irnon,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs.
T h e B oard of Education of the C ity of Chattanooga,
H am ilton C ounty, T ennessee; Dean Petersen, C hairm an of
the B oard of Education of the City of Chattanooga; George
C. H udson, Sr., Mrs. J . B. Irvine, W illiam D. L eb er, R ay
m ond B . W itt, J r ., C orley R . Y oung, and G ordon K ellett,
M em bers of the B oard of Education of the C ity of C hatta
nooga; and B ennie C arm ichael, Superintendent of Schools
of the C ity of Chattanooga, Tennessee,
Defendants-Appellants.
B R I E F A N D A P P E N D IX F O R A P P E L L A N T S
W I T T , G A IT H E R , A B E R N A T H Y ,
C A L D W E L L & W IL S O N
R A Y M O N D B. W I T T , J R .
1234 V olunteer Bldg.
Chattanooga 2, Tennessee
A ttorneys for T h e Board of Education
of the C ity of Chattanooga,
H am ilton County, Tennessee.
Court Index Press, Inc. — Law Printers — 809 Walnut St. Cincinnati 2, Ohio.
S T A T E M E N T O F Q U E S T IO N IN V O L V E D
Since the U n ited States Suprem e C o u rt has placed the
prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving such varied local school problem s as m ay be in
volved in the full im plem entation of the constitutional
principles enunciated in B row n , et al v. B oard o f E d u ca
tion o f T o p ek a , Kansas> 347 U . S. 483 (1 9 5 4 ), 349 U . S.
294 (1955) upon local school authorities, in this instance,
the defendant Chattanooga B oard of Education , w hen such
a B oard submits a Plan of D esegregation representing the
sum total of its efforts to discharge such responsibility in
good faith and in conform ity with the criteria of im ple
m entation set forth in the second B row n decision, is not
a D istrict C ou rt required to hear such proof as is offered
by a defendant B oard in support of its Plan of D esegre
gation as a necessary requisite to obtaining the facts upon
w hich to m ake the judicial appraisal required of the Dis
tric t C o u rt as to w hether the defendant B oard has dis
charged the prim ary responsibility placed upon such
B oard by the U n ited States Suprem e C ou rt, particularly
when the actions and plans of such defendant to be so
appraised m ust necessarily involve facts and conditions
peculiar to the local com m unity, and finally, req u ire a
B oard judgm ent of factors incapable of precise deter
m ination?
T h e D istrict C o u rt answered this question “ N o ” .
A ppellant contends the answer should have been “Yes” .
I N D E X
Statem ent of Q uestion I n v o lv e d ............................................ i
Statem ent of F a c t s ........................................................................... 2
A rgu m en t —
P O IN T I — Since the U n ited States Suprem e
C o u rt has placed the prim ary responsibility for
elucidating, assessing, and solving such varied
local problem s as m ay be involved in the full im
plem entation of the constitutional principles
enunciated in B row n , e t al. v. B oard o f E du cation
o f T o p ek a , Kansas, 347 U . S. 483 (19 5 4 ), 349 U.S.
2 9 4 (1955) upon local school authorities, in this
instance, the defendant Chattanooga B oard of
Edu cation , when such a B oard subm its a Plan of
D esegregation representing the sum total of its
efforts to discharge such responsibility in good
faith and in conform ity w ith the criteria of im ple
m entation set forth in the second B row n decision,
is not a D istrict C o u rt required to hear such proof
as is offered by a defendant B oard in support of its
Plan of Desegregation as a necessary requisite to
obtaining the facts upon w hich to make the judici
al appraisal required of the D istrict C o u rt as to
w hether the defendant B oard has discharged the
prim ary responsibility placed upon such Board
by the U n ited States Suprem e C ou rt, particularly
w hen the actions and plans of such defendant to
be so appraised m ust necessarily involve facts and
conditions peculiar to the local com m unity, and
finally, require a B oard judgm ent of factors in
capable of precise determ ination?
T h e D istrict C ou rt answered this question “N o ”.
A ppellant contends the answer should have been
“Y es.” .......................................................................................... 7
Relief .......................................... 14
CASES C IT E D
Page
Brow n, et al. v. B oard of Education of T op ek a, K an
sas, 347 U .S. 483 (19 5 4 ), 349 U .S. 2 9 4 (19 5 5 ) . .7 , 8, 10
Kelly v. B oard of Education of the C ity of Nashville,
270 F. 2d 2 09 , Sixth C ircu it (19 5 9 ) at p. 2 2 4 . . 10-11
C ooper v. A aron , 358 U . S. 1, at p. 2 5 .................................. 10
IN D E X T O A P P E N D IX
C hronological L ist of R elevant D ocket Entries . . . . la
T h e Chattanooga Plan of D e se g re g a tio n ........................ 3a
D efendants’ B rief in Support of its Plan of D esegrega
tion ....................... ..................................................................... 9a
O rder of Ju d ge D arr, D istrict J u d g e .................................. 37a
In the
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Sixth Circuit
N o. 14 ,517
Jam es Jo n ath an M app and D eborah L ’T an y a M app,
m inors, by Jam es R . M app, their father and n e x t friend;
Pless M axey, J r ., a m inor, by his m other and n ext friend,
Mrs. Josephine M axey; Kathy K irnon, a m inor, by h er
father and n ext friend, T h e R everend H . H . K irnon,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs.
T h e B oard of E d u cation of the C ity of Chattanooga,
H am ilton County, T ennessee; D ean Petersen, C hairm an of
the B oard of E ducation of the C ity of C hattanooga; G eorge
C . H udson, Sr., Mrs. J . B . Irvine, W illiam D. L eb er, R ay
m ond B. W itt, J r ., Corley R . Y oung, and G ordon K ellett,
M em bers of the B oard of Education of the C ity of C h atta
nooga; and B ennie Carm ichael, Superintendent of Schools
of the C ity of Chattanooga, T ennessee,
Defendants-Appellants.
2
B R I E F F O R A P P E L L A N T S
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S
T h e com plaint in this action was filed in the U nited
States D istrict C o u rt for the E astern D istrict of Tennessee,
Southern Division, on A p ril 6, 1960, by Jam es R . M app,
Mrs. Josephine M axey, and the R everend H . H . K irnon
for th eir m in or children invoking jurisdiction pursuant
to provisions of T itle 28, U n ited States Code, Section 1343
(3), being a suit in equity authorized by law, T itle 42 ,
U nited States Code, Section 1983, to be com m enced by
any citizen of the U n ited States or o th er person w ithin
the jurisdiction thereof, to redress the deprivation under
color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom o r usage
of a state of rights, privileges, and im m unities secured by
the Constitution and laws of the U n ited States. T h e rights,
privileges, and im m unities sought to be secured by this
action are rights, privileges and im m unities secured by
the due process and equal protection clauses of the F o u r
teenth A m endm ent of the Constitution of the U n ited
States. (A pp’t. A 7 )1
T h is case concerns the racial desegregation of the public
schools in the City of Chattanooga. T h is was a proceeding
for a perm anent in junction enjoining defendant Board,
its m em bers and the Superintendent of Schools of C hatta
nooga from continuing the operation of a com pulsory
bi-racial school system and for o ther relief. Plaintiffs are
all citizens of the U n ited States, State of T ennessee, re
siding in Chattanooga, H am ilton County, Tennessee.
Plaintiffs are all m em bers of the N egro race. T h e action
was brought on their own behalf and on behalf of oth er
' Appellants’ appendix filed with the Circuit Court, No. 14,444,
February 21, 1961, at page 7a.
3
Negro children and their parents in the City of Chatta
nooga who are similarly situated. The minor plaintiffs
are eligible to attend and do presently attend public
schools in Chattanooga under the jurisdiction, manage
ment, and control of the defendants. Defendants are as
set forth in the caption.
Plaintiffs contend that the operation of a compulsory
bi-racial school system in Chattanooga violates the rights
of the plaintiffs and members of their class which are
secured to them by the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Con
stitution.
The plaintiffs state that the injury which they and the
members of their class suffer as a result of the operation
of a compulsory bi-racial school system is irrevocable and
will continue to irrevocably injure plaintiffs and their
class until enjoined by the Court.
The plaintiffs requested a decree enjoining defendants,
their agents, employees and successors:
(1) from operating a compulsory bi-racial school sys
tem in Chattanooga, Hamilton County, Tennessee;
(2) from continuing to maintain in a dual scheme or
pattern of school zone lines based upon race and
color;
(3) from assigning pupils to schools in the City of
Chattanooga on the basis of the race and color of
the pupils;
(4) from assigning teachers, principals, and other
school personnel to the schools in the City of
Chattanooga on the basis of the race and color of
the person to be assigned and on the basis of the
race and color of the children attending the school
to which the personnel are to be assigned;
4
(5) from approving budgets making available funds,
approving employee and construction contracts,
and approving policies, curricula and programs
which are designed to perpetuate or maintain or
support a school system operating on a racially
segregated basis. (App’t. A 13)
In the alternative, plaintiffs prayed that the Court in a
decree direct defendants to present a complete plan within
a period of time to be determined by the Court, for the
reorganization of the entire school system of Chattanooga,
Hamilton County, Tennessee, into a unitary non-racial
school system. Plaintiffs further asked that the Court re
tain jurisdiction pending Court approval and full and
complete implementation of defendants’ plan.
On April 26, 1960, defendants moved to strike from the
plaintiffs’ complaint certain portions thereof with regard
to the assignment of school teaching personnel and other
personnel on the basis of race or color. Said motion to
strike was sustained.
Depositions of the defendants were taken on June 1,
1960, by plaintiffs’ attorneys. The answer of defendants
was filed on June 7, 1960. (App’t. A 16). Defendants ad
mitted the operation of a bi-racial school system and sub
mitted that the defendant Board since July 22, 1955, had
been actively working with and carrying forward a plan
for elucidating, assessing, and ultimately solving with all
deliberate speed the problem of achieving a desegregated
school system in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Defendants in
said answer briefly outlined the actions taken by defend
ants in implementing its plan of elucidation.
Defendants’ plan submitted that its actions constituted
a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance but
that in its judgment additional time was necessary. De-
5
fendants also requested the C ou rt to approve its plan for
elucidation thereby giving the necessary tim e in w hich
to elucidate, reconcile and bring ab ou t acceptance of a
plan for desegregation of the school system.
O n Ju n e 7, 1960, a m otion for a trial w ith an advisory
ju ry was filed by defendants.
. O n Ju n e 20, 1960, plaintiffs filed a m otion for sum m ary
judgm ent with accom panying affidavits and brief in
sfipport of said m otion. (A pp’t. A 35).
O n Ju ly 8, 1960, defendants subm itted a m otion for
sum m ary judgm ent on the basis that the facts did n ot w ar
ran t a class action and that the adm inistrative rem edies
under the Tennessee Pupil A ssignm ent Law had not been
exhausted by plaintiffs. B rief in support thereof was at
tached. (A pp’t. A 55).
O n Ju ly 15, 1960, plaintiffs’ reply to defendants’ m otion
for sum m ary judgm ent was filed along w ith m em orandum
of points and authorities in opposition to the m otion.
(A pp’t. A 63).
O n Ju ly 20, 1960, oral argum ents were heard on the
m otions for sum m ary judgm ents and defendants subm itted
a brief in opposition to plaintiffs’ m otion for sum m ary
judgm ent. (A pp’t. A 75).
O n O ctober 21, 1960, the D istrict C o u rt filed its m em or
andum on said m otions denying defendants’ m otion and
granting plaintiffs’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent and
fu rth er d irecting defendants to subm it a plan for desegre
gation of the schools of the City of C hattanooga before
the 20th day of D ecem ber, 1960, and providing for a
hearing on defendants’ plan to be held in the D istrict
C ou rt on Jan u ary 9, 1961. (A pp’t. A 97). A n appropriate
ord er was filed on N ovem ber 3, 1960. (A pp’t. A 100).
A m otion was filed by defendants on N ovem ber 28,
1960, (A pp’t. A 101) for an am endm ent to the order
6
granting a discretionary appeal. A brief in support of
said m otion was also filed. (A pp’t. A 102). An ord er
denying said m otion was entered on D ecem ber 6, 1960.
(A pp’t. 107a).
On D ecem ber 2, 1960, defendants filed a notice of appeal
in the office of the C lerk of the D istrict C o u rt in C h atta
nooga and also filed an appropriate cost bond. (A pp’t.
A 116).
On D ecem ber 8, 1960, a m otion to stay judgm ent pend
ing appeal was filed by defendants. (A pp’t. A 107).
O n D ecem ber 13, 1960, plaintiffs filed a m em orandum
in opposition to defendants’ m otion to stay judgm ent
pending appeal. (A pp’t. A 108).
O n D ecem ber 14, 1960, the C ou rt filed a m em orandum
on m otion to suspend injunction denying the m otion.
(A pp’t. A 112).
O n D ecem ber 19, 1960, an appropriate ord er was en
tered with regard to the denial of the stay. (A pp’t. A 115).
On D ecem ber 20, 1960, the C hattanooga Plan of D e
segregation was filed, (p. 3a of appendix). Plaintiff’s
objections to said plan and brief in support thereof were
filed on D ecem ber 30, 1960. O n Jan u ary 3, 1961, Ju d ge
D arr reassigned the hearing to Jan u ary 23, 1961. On
Jan u ary 19, 1961, defendants filed a brief in support of
th eir Plan of D esegregation as filed, (p. 9a of appendix).
O n the date set for the hearing, Ju d g e D arr delivered
a m em orandum opinion from the bench in open cou rt
p rior to the introduction of any proof, holding that the
Plan as subm itted does not m eet the requirem ents of the
C ourt. O n Jan u ary 27, 1961, an ord er was entered to
said effect and requiring defendants to subm it an alternate
plan w ithin sixty days. (p. 37a of appendix).
T h ereafter, notice of appeal was properly filed with cost
bond.
7
D efendants contend that the D istrict C o u rt com m itted
substantial e rro r as follows:
In failing to hear proof offered by defendants in
support of and justification of the design and stru ctu re
of the Plan of Desegregation as subm itted by defend
ants, and in disapproving such Plan w ithout hearing
such proof.
A R G U M E N T
P O I N T I
Since the U n ited States Suprem e C o u rt has placed the
prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving such varied local school problem s as m ay be in
volved in the full im plem entation of the constitutional
principles enunciated in BROWN, ET A L . v. BOARD OF
E D U C A T IO N OF TOPEKA, KANSAS, 347 U. S. 483
(1954), 349 U . S. 294 (1955) upon local school authorities,
in this instance, the defendant Chattanooga Board of E d u
cation, w hen such a B oard subm its a P lan of D esegregation
representing the sum total of its efforts to discharge such
responsibility in good faith and in conform ity with the
criteria of im plem entation set forth in the second BROWN
decision, is not a D istrict C ou rt required to hear such proof
as is offered by a defendant B oard in support of its P lan
of D esegregation as a necessary requisite to obtaining the
facts upon which to m ake the judicial appraisal required
of the D istrict C o u rt as to w hether the defendant B oard
has discharged the prim ary responsibility placed upon
such B oard by the U n ited States Suprem e C ou rt, p articu
larly w hen the actions and plans of such defendant to be
so appraised m ust necessarily involve facts and conditions
peculiar to the local com m unity, and finally, req u ire a
8
Board judgment of factors incapable of precise determin
ation?
The District Court answered this question “No”.
Appellant contends the answer should have been “Yes”.
T h e language of the U n ited States Suprem e C o u rt in
the second B row n decision is clear and unam biguous as it
places prim ary respon sib ility upon local school authorities
for elucidating, assessing, and solving the varied local
school problem s involved in the full im plem entation of
the constitutional principles req u irin g the rem oval of racial
discrim ination from a public school system. T h is respon
sibility m ust be discharged in good faith. I t is also clear
that D istrict C ourts are to make a judicial appraisal of the
actions of local school authorities, such as defendant B oard
of Edu cation , to determ ine w hether o r n ot such B oard has
m et such responsibility in good faith.
Is it possible to make such an appraisal w ithout hearing
the proof offered by the defendants? T h e Suprem e C ou rt
specifically recognized the “com plexities” facing school
boards operating bi-racial school systems. (S49 U . S. 294,
299). T h e defendant B oard was presented w ith an awe
some responsibility—H ow to rem ove racial discrim ination
and also m aintain an efficient school system providing a
quality education?
If the possible detrim ental im pact upon the school sys
tem resulting from the rem oval of racial discrim ination
could be disregarded, the problem becam e relatively
simple. B u t how could a school board show total disregard
for the educational program of all the children of the
com m unity, for to provide such a program is its sole reason
for existence?
H as D efendant B oard acted in good faith in this di
lem m a? Has it assumed “the prim ary responsibility”
9
placed upon it by the Suprem e C ourt? (supra, at 299 ).
W h at steps did it take to define the “varied local school
problem s” (supra, at 29 9 ) involved in the rem oval of
racial discrim ination from its school system? Did it make
these problem s clear to its com m unity? H ow did it go
about assessing and evaluating such problems? A re there
problems? A re they of substance? W h a t solutions are
proposed? A re the solutions reasonable and practicable?
Does the Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation reflect a
“facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs”? (supra, at 300). W h at public needs? W h at p ri
vate needs?
Does the Plan recognize “ the personal interest of the
plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as prac
ticable on a non-discrim inatory basis”? (supra, at 300).
H ow did defendants in terp ret “as soon as practicable”?
W as this interpretation made in good faith or did defend
ants indulge in sophistry?
Does the C hattanooga Plan “properly take into account
the public interest in the elim ination of such obstacles in
a systematic and effective m an n er”? (supra, at 300). Is
this the “public interest” in a national sense, o r does it
refer to the citizens of Chattanooga, o r a com bination
thereof?
Does such Plan reflect that com m unity disagreem ent has
caused a yielding of the vitality of the constitutional p rin
ciples involved? Has defendant B oard given weight to
“public and private considerations” in the design and
structure of the Plan of Desegregation? (supra, at 300).
H ave the defendants carried the burden of establishing
that the tim e required by the Plan “is necessary in the
public in terest” to carry ou t the ruling in an effective
m anner “and is consistent with good faith com pliance at
the earliest possible date”? (supra, at 300).
10
H ave the defendants m ade a “constructive use of tim e”
and do they propose to do so during the fu rth er period of
transition? (C o o p er v. A a ro n , 358 U . S. 1, at 25).
Since courts were authorized to consider school adm in
istration problem s in m aking this judicial appraisal, was
n ot it incum bent upon school officials to carefully analyze
such adm inistrative problem s in designing and stru ctu rin g
its P lan of D esegregation? D id the defendants concerned
perform this function? A nd how thoroughly and carefully?
Is not this one elem ent of proof bearing directly upon de
fendants’ assum ption of the responsibility placed upon
them?
Defendants respectfully contend that the D istrict C o u rt
com m itted e rro r in refusing defendants th eir day in court.
In so doing, the Suprem e C o u rt decisions in the B row n
cases were incorrectly in terpreted and applied by said
D istrict C ou rt. In view of the ch aracter, quality and com
plexity of the factual findings inherent in a judicial
appraisal of w hether “the action of school authorities con
stitutes good faith im plem entation of the governing
constitutional principles” , defendants contend that a Dis
tric t C o u rt cannot discharge its judicial responsibility in
the instant situation w ithout being provided with all the
evidence as to w hat the facts are in C hattanooga, w hat the
defendants did and propose to do, and why. (349 U . S. at
299).
T h e language of the B row n D ecision s as referred to
above, is sufficiently clear that no additional case authority
would appear necessary to prove the rightness of defend
ants’ resistance to the D istrict C o u rt’s refusal to hear the
evidence.
T h e following quotations from K elly v. B oard o f E duca
tion o f th e C ity o f N ash ville , 270 F. 2d 2 09 , Sixth C ircu it
(1959) support this position:
11
“T h erefo re , a con sid era tion o f th e sch oo l p rob lem s
confronted by the B oard of E d u cation of the C ity of
Nashville, and the so lu tion s arrived at by the B oard,
is necessary to a determ ination of the controversy be
fore us.” (Em phasis ours) (at 215)
“T h e reasons why the school authorities supported
this plan and considered it best, under the circu m
stances, are pertin en t to the determ ination of the
issues before us, inasm uch as the solution of such
school problem s is the prim ary responsibility of the
local school authorities. Brow n v. B oard of E d u ca
tion, supra.” (at 216)
“ Cases involving desegregation, like other cases, de
pend largely upon the facts. W h ile the law has been
stated, perhaps, as definitely as it can be stated at
the present tim e, by the Suprem e C ou rt, nevertheless,
its application depends upon the facts of each p ar
ticu lar case. ‘(Because) of the Sreat variety of local
conditions, the form ulation of decrees in these cases
presents problem s of considerable com plexity’. Brow n
v. B oard of Education , 347 U . S. 4 8 3 , 495 , 74 S. Ct.
686 , 692 , 98 L . Ed. 8 7 3 .” (at 225)
T h e clear im port of these quotations is that a D istrict
C o u rt m ust hear proof as to the consideration given local
school problem s by the local school authorities, as well
as the local solutions proposed for these local problem s.
T h e C hattanooga Plan of Desegregation is the end result
of such considerations, and as such cannot contain its own
justification. T h is property is left for the proof to be
subm itted.
A dditional support for defendants’ contentions that
e rro r was com m itted in the refusal to hear proof is found
in the following quotations from the case of K elly v . B oard
o f E d u ca tion o f th e C ity o f N ash ville , su pra :
12
“ F o r this reason decisions applying the desegregation
doctrine in o th er cities or areas w here different condi
tions obtain are of little value. L o ca l con d ition s call
fo r th e ap p lica tion o f a local rem ed y (Em phasis
ours) (at 225 ).
“ * * * Because of the n atu re of the problem s and
the local conditions, the school authorities often find
th at action taken by o th er school districts is inappli
cable to the facts w ith w hich they are dealing. * * *
T h e public interest m ust be considered along with
all the facts and conditions prevalent in the school
district. Educational standards should not be low
ered .” (Q uoting from a decision by Ju d g e Jo h n J .
Park er in B riggs v. E llio tt , D. C ., 132 F . Supp. 776).
(at page 226).
“ ‘T h ese decisions serve only to dem onstrate that local
school problem s are ‘varied ’ as referred to by the
Suprem e C o u rt’, and th at w hat w ould be a reasonable
am ount of tim e to effect com plete integration in one
city or area, m ight be unreasonable in an o th er.”
(Q uoting with approval from A a ron v. C o o p er , 243
F . 2d 361 , 363 , E igh th C ircu it), (at page 227).
T h e defendant B oard has a “prim ary responsibility” .
T h e D istrict C ou rt m ust m ake a “judicial appraisal” .
Guide lines for such appraisal have been outlined by the
Suprem e C o u rt:
“adjusting and reconciling public and private needs”
“the public interest in the elim ination of such ob
stacles in a systematic and effective m an n er”
“giving w eight to these public and private considera
tions”
“p rom pt and reasonable start”
“carry ou t the ruling in an effective m an n er”
“consider problem s related to adm inistration”
13
A ll of the criteria req u ire the exercise of judgm ent. D e
fendants contend that since the D istrict C o u rt was to m ake
its appraisal w ithin such guidelines it followed th at D efend
ant B oard m ust also follow such criteria in the process of
discharging its prim ary responsibility. W h erev er and
w henever the exercise of judgm ent is concerned, the good
faith of those exercising such judgm ent is an essential p art
of the total circum stances to be appraised. A nd w hen the
application of generalized criteria are involved in such
judgm ents, specific factual proof as applied to the p ar
ticular situation is the only possible foundation for a
judicial determ ination of good faith. T h e D efendant
B oard exercised judgm ent in the circum stances peculiar
to C hattanooga. Unless the D istrict C o u rt is fully advised
of the pertin en t facts considered by the C hattanooga B oard
of Edu cation , its judicial appraisal w ould be founded on
incom plete data. N o oth er conclusion is possible.
W ith o u t hearing the facts, the D istrict C o u rt can n ot be
in a position to m ake a factual determ ination as to the
existence or absence of good faith upon the p art of D e
fendant Board. A nd w ithout such determ ination, a ju d i
cial appraisal of the judgm ent exercised by such Board,
and reflected in its Plan of Desegregation, cannot have a
solid foundation.
F o r exam ple, it would appear incontrovertible th at D e
fendant B oard has an equal responsibility to both white
and N egro children insofar as the quality of educational
opportunity is concerned w ithin the Chattanooga School
System. In an attem p t to m eet this responsibility while
effecting a radical change in the school system, D efendant
B oard stru ctu red its Plan of D esegregation in such a way as
to provide a good educational environm ent in each de
segregated classroom. Known or predictable factors con
trib u tin g to tension w ithin a classroom were isolated and
14
plans m ade to reduce such to an absolute m inim um . In
essence this m eant that a classroom w ould n ot only have
to be desegregated b u t integrated if the children in such
classrooms were to have equal opportunities for norm al
grow th and developm ent. Obviously, the details of such
a procedure and the reasons therefor could n ot be in cor
porated w ithin the Plan of D esegregation. A nd the Dis
tric t C o u rt could not be in a position to m ake a judicial
appraisal of this factor w ithout h earing proof on this point.
O th er sim ilar judgm ents are reflected in the Plan of D e
segregation. D efendants request the opportunity to lay
such facts before the C o u rt p rio r to having its Plan of
Desegregation approved or disapproved.
R E L I E F
A ppellants respectfully request that the D istrict C o u rt
be directed to provide appellants an opportunity to pre
sent proof in support and justification of the design and
stru ctu re of its Plan of D esegregation p rio r to the finding
of any facts and any decision approving o r disapproving
said Plan of D esegregation, and th at such fu rth er relief
be granted as the C o u rt m ay deem equitable.
R espectfully subm itted,
T h e B oard of E ducation of the City
of C hattanooga, H am ilton C ounty,
T ennessee, et al.
R A Y M O N D B. W I T T , J R .
Its A ttorney
A P P E N D I X
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES
1961
1-19 D efendants’ brief in support of its plan of de-
segregation, filed. Service of copies m ade by counsel.
1-23 T w o copies of M em orandum , to M r. R aym ond
B. W itt, J r ., from B ennie C arm ichael, Supt. of C hattanooga
P ublic Schools; 2 copies of R ecord of A ctivities of C h atta
nooga B oard of E ducation from M ay 1, 1955 through
Jan u ary 11, 1961, and a “Sum m ary of the evidence” de
fendants are prepared to subm it as explanation and justifi
cation of the Plan of D esegregation as presented by defts,
filed.
1- 27 O rder, D arr, D .J ., that Plan of D esegregation does
not m eet requirem ents but that it is not presently rejected ;
that deft, will file an alternate plan w ithin 60 days; that
the righ t of defts. to a reconsideration of the first plan,
and the rights of the pltfs. o r defts. to except to present
judgm ent is reserved; and that the operation of the in
ju n ction is suspended until term ination of the appeal, filed.
C . C. 11, p. 348-a.
2 - 10 N otice of A ppeal of the B oard of Education , City
of Chattanooga, filed. Service of copies by Clerk to all
attorneys of record.
2-10 Cost B ond in the sum of $ 2 5 0 .0 0 filed.
2a
In the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Eastern District of Tennessee
Southern Division
Civil A ction N o. 3564
JA M E S JO N A T H A N M A P P and D E B O R A H L ’T A N Y A
M A PP, m inors, by Jam es R . M app, th eir fath er and
n ext friend,
and
P L ESS M A X E Y , J R ., a m inor, by his m oth er and n ext
friend, Mrs. Josephine M axey,
and
K A T H Y K IR N O N , a m inor, by her father and n ext
friend, T h e R everend H . H . K irnon,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
T H E B O A R D O F E D U C A T IO N O F T H E C I T Y O F
C H A T T A N O O G A , H A M IL T O N C O U N T Y , T E N
N E S S E E , a public body corporate,
and
D E A N P E T E R S E N , C hairm an of the B oard of E ducation
of the City of Chattanooga,
and
G E O R G E C. H U D S O N , SR ., M RS. J . B . IR V IN E , W I L
L IA M D. L E B E R , R A Y M O N D B. W I T T , J R .,
C O R L E Y R . Y O U N G and G O R D O N K E L L E T T ,
m em bers of the Board of E ducation of the C ity of
C hattanooga,
and
B E N N IE C A R M IC H A E L , Superintendent of Schools of
the C ity of Chattanooga, Tennessee,
Defendants.
3a
THE CHATTANOOGA PLAN OF DESEGREGATION
(Filed D ecem ber 20, 1960.)
Pursu an t to the O rder of this C o u rt entered on N ovem
ber 3, 1960, defendant B oard of E d u cation of the C ity of
C hattanooga and B ennie C arm ichael, Superintendent,
do hereby subm it the following plan of desegregation:
I. A Policy of Compliance
1. T h e C hattanooga B oard of Education , since 1954,
has been keenly aware of the overturn of the long-estab
lished doctrine of separate but equal facilities for the races.
Its concern has been of both a philosophical and practical
nature.
A fter the Suprem e C o u rt decision of 1954, the B oard
studied the issues of principle involved and, after serious
and deeply sincere deliberation, publicly announced its
in ten t to com ply with the decision.
T h e greatest concerns were in m eeting the requirem ents
of the ord er of the C ou rt to assess local conditions, to
provide for com m unity-w ide elucidation of the local im ple
m entation of the C o u rt’s decision, and to find practical
means by which racial discrim ination could be abolished
eventually in the Chattanooga City School System w ith the
least dam age to the educational process.
Shortly after the B oard ’s announced intent to com ply
with the Suprem e C o u rt decision, it appointed a biracial
advisory council to assist in the task of assessment of local
conditions and to elucidate to the com m unity the prob
lems of local im plem entation of the C o u rt’s decision. T h e
object of the B oard in this action was to seek the solution
of these problem s through the public forum , believing
that through free, open, full and continuous discussion
of the problem , a solution w ould be developed. U n fo r
tunately, en tren ch m en t on both sides of the question was
so intense that the norm al processes of dem ocracy d eteri
orated . In spite of this, the B oard has continued to hold
m any m eetings w ith various groups, both form al and in
form al, a t w hich the problem has been discussed in depth
w ith representative persons, m em bers of both races and
at great length.
2. T h ese actions have constituted the B oard ’s first step
in a plan of im plem entation of its publicly announced
policy of com pliance.
T h e B oard herew ith subm its the following and addi
tional steps in its plan of desegregation.
II. A bolishm ent of Compulsory School Segregation Based
U p o n Race
1. Effective w ith the beginning of the school year, 1962-
-63, com pulsory school segregation based upon race shall
be abolished in selected schools of the Chattanooga Public
School System; and students shall be adm itted to these
schools in grades one, two and three w ithout regard to race
in keeping w ith the procedures outlined in the following
sections. In addition, desegregation m ay be effected in
certain special program s. T h e elem entary schools to be
desegregated for the school year, 1962-63, will be announ
ced by O ctober 1, 1961.
2. Beginning w ith each subsequent school year, one
additional grade shall be desegregated in these schools,
i.e., grade four in Septem ber, 1963, grade five in Septem
ber, 1964, etc.
T'3. D esegregation will be effected in o th er schools and
special program s after the 1962-63 school year according
to plans to be subm itted to, and as approved by, the Dis-
4a
The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation
The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation
tric t C ou rt, said plans to be consistent w ith the general
principles and provisions of these initial steps.
III. Establishm ent of a Single System of School Zones
1. T h e C hattanooga B oard of E ducation will conduct
and analyze by Septem ber 1, 1961, a com plete school census
of the entire City of Chattanooga.
2. O n the basis of the analysis of these data, a plan of
single school zones based upon location and size of school
buildings and school population w ithout regard to race
will be established and announced by O ctob er 1, 1961.
3. T h e full and com plete application of these single
zone lines w ithout regard to race is the goal of this plan
and shall be achieved through the procedures outlined in
Sections IV and V , dealing with the In terim O peration of
Present School Zones and Admission to Schools by Single
Zones, respectively.
IV . T h e In terim O peration of Present School Zones
1. In the period of transition to single zones, children
m ay continue the practice of attending schools to w hich
they are zoned by existing Board policy.
2. School zones as now established, o r as they m ay be
subsequently am ended by the B oard of Education , shall
rem ain operative only until such a date as single zone lines
are in full and com plete application.
V. Adm ission to Schools by Single Zones
1. Beginning with the school year, 1962-63, students in
grades one, two and three residing w ithin a new single
school zone w hich places the pupil in a different school
than the one he would attend under existing zones, may
enroll in his new single zone school provided:
5a
The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation
(a) said school has been desegregated by the B oard
of E d u cation ; and
(b) provided parents, guardians, o r those acting in
the position of parents of students desiring to
enroll in said schools, shall file a w ritten notice
of in tent w ith the B oard of Edu cation , at its offi
cial headquarters p rio r to Jan u ary 1, 1962 ; and
subject to the paragraph im m ediately following.
2. T h e B oard of Education , in accordance w ith exist
ing policy, m ay adjust zone lines so as to m aintain sound
and efficient organization of individual schools.
V I. Privilege of T ran sfer
1. U pon receipt of applications, as provided in existing
school board policy, transfer of students in desegregated
schools m ay be granted when good cause therefor is shown.
2. T h e following will be regarded as some of the valid
reasons of good cause for transfer.
(a) W h en a student w ould otherwise be req u ired to
attend a school w here the m ajority of students in
that school or in his class are of a different race.
(b) W h en in the judgm ent of the Board, upon the
recom m endation of the superintendent, it is in
J T h e best interest of the student, u n der board
policy, to transfer him from one school to another.
VII. A T im etab le of Im plem entation T h ro u g h a C on
tinuing P rogram of Elucidation
1. T h e proper tim ing, continuation of the program of
study and elucidation and careful planning and organ
ization of the school system are the essence of this plan.
T h e Board, superintendent and adm inistrative staff recog-
6a
nize and accept responsibilities for the developm ent of
full understanding of the plan and its im plem entation —
to the schools and classes affected, to the com m unity at
large, and particularly to principals, teachers, parents and
pupils.
2. M eetings concerning these problem s have already
been held by the superintendent and staff w ith all p rin
cipals in the system. As the schools to be desegregated
are identified, a planned and continuous program of con
ferences with the principals and teachers of the schools
and classes im m ediately affected will be initiated in ord er
to develop a workable, equitable and successful transition
to the single zones.
3. U pon the com pletion of the census, and the tentative
identification of schools to be desegregated, the Board,
superintendent and staff will organize both form al and in
form al conferences with the com m unity leaders of the
affected schools in ord er to study the application of the
plan in each school and to provide data and suggestions
w hich m ay help the B oard refine its judgm ents in the final
selection of schools to be desegregated.
4. U pon receipt of w ritten notices of in ten t to enroll
on the basis of the single zones, the Board, superintendent
and staff will initiate' an intensive program of elucidation
of the specific plans under way for each school. T h is p ro
gram of elucidation will involve specifically the teachers,
parents, and pupils of the individual classes to be affected
upon the opening of school in 1962-63. C om m unity lead
ers will also be invited to join in this program of
elucidation, designed to make the transition workable
and successful.
5. T h e B oard will exhaust every avenue of com m unica
tion with the leaders and citizens of the com m unity at
large, in ord er to obtain the im plem entation of this plan
7a
The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation
8a
The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation
tow ard the continued m aintenance and im provem ent of
the efficiency and effectiveness of the instructional program
of the C hattanooga Pu b lic Schools.
6. In subsequent years, the program of elucidation
shall be continued in the follow ing schedule:
By O ctob er 1 — the publication of any m odification of ex
isting a n d /o r single zones, after the analysis of cu rren t
census data and discussion w ith com m unities affected.
—T h e publication of o th er and additional schools to
be desegregated after full analysis of data and dis
cussion w ith the com m unities affected.
By Jan u ary 1 — Submission of w ritten statem ent of in tent
to enroll.
From Jan u ary 1 to O pening of School — Program s of elu
cidation to the teachers, parents, and pupils involved
and to the com m unity at large.
iening of School — Im plem entation of zone m odifica
tions, desegregation of o th er and additional schools,
and admission to schools on single zone basis.
T H E C H A T T A N O O G A B O A R D O F
E D U C A T IO N —
G eorge C. H udson
M rs. J . B . Irvine, Sr.
G ordon K ellett
W illiam D. L eb er
R aym ond B. W itt, J r .
C orley R . Y ou n g
D ean Petersen, C hairm an of the B oard
of Education
B ennie C arm ichael, Superintendent
R A Y M O N D B. W I T T , J R .
A ttorney for Defendants
(D U L Y C E R T I F I E D )
9a
(C A P T IO N O M IT T E D )
DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS
PLAN OF DESEGREGATION
I
The Principle Issue
T h e principle issue in this hearing is w hether o r not
the Chattanooga Plan of D esegregation as presented m eas
ures up to the criteria outlined by the U n ited States
Suprem e C o u rt in B row n v. B oard o f E d u cation o f T o p ek a ,
347 U.S. 483 (5-17-54), 349 U.S. 2 9 4 (5-31-55) and as en
larged upon by the Suprem e C o u rt in C o o p er v. A a ron ,
358 U.S. 1 (9-29-58) and specifically applied by the Sixth
C ircu it in K elly v. B oard o f E d u cation o f C ity o f N ash
v ille , 270 F. 2d 209 (1 9 5 9 ), cert. den. 361 U.S. 924 . O ther
decided cases m ay bear upon the issue involved b u t the
above cases are of prim ary im portance.
II
Criteria of Compliance
Defendants subm it that the criteria of com pliance are as
follows and that the Chattanooga Plan of D esegregation
meets these criteria of com pliance:
1. I t is “a prom pt and reasonable start tow ard full
com pliance” . 349 U.S. 294 , 300.
2. I t reflects an adequate consideration by the defend
ants “of the com plexities arising from the transition to a
system of public education freed from racial discrim ina
tion ” . 349 U .S. 2 9 4 , 299 .
3. I t reflects an adequate assum ption by the defendants
of the prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assessing and
solving the “varied local school problem s”, a solution of
10a
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
w hich is necessary for the full im plem entation of the con
stitutional principles enunciated by the U . S. Suprem e
C ou rt in the B row n Cases. 349 U .S. 294 , 299 .
4. T h e Plan subm itted as well as the o th er acts of the
defendants constitute good faith im plem entation of the
governing constitutional principles. 349 U .S. 2 9 4 , 300 .
5. T h e C hattanooga Plan reflects a “facility for ad
justing and reconciling public and private needs” . 349
U.S. 294 , 300.
6. T h e C hattanooga Plan recognizes “the personal in
terest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as
soon as practicable on a non-discrim inatory basis” . 349
U.S. 294 , 300 .
7. T h e Plan “properly takes into account the public
interest in the elim ination of such obstacles in a system atic
and effective m an n er” . 349 U .S. 2 94 , 300 .
8. T h e Plan reflects that disagreem ent w ith the con
stitutional principles has n ot caused a yielding of the
vitality of such principles, supra, p. 300 .
9. T h e Plan reflects that w eight has been given to pub
lic and private considerations, supra, p. 300.
10. T h e defendants have carried the burden of estab
lishing that the tim e required by the Plan is necessary in
the public interest to carry ou t the ru lin g in an effective
m anner and is consistent w ith good faith com pliance at
the earliest practicable date.
11. T h e defendants have adequate plans to m eet the
local school problem s and to effectuate a transition to a
racially non-discrim inatory school system.
12. T h e Chattanooga Plan will accom plish the transi
tion to a school system m aintained on a racially non-
discrim inatory basis as soon as reasonably practicable
consistent w ith the public interest and the efficient opera
tion of the schools. 270 F . 2d 2 0 9 , p. 212 .
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
13. C om m unity opposition has been taken into account
only to m inim ize effects of such upon the efficiency of the
schools, supra, p. 212 .
14. D efendant B oard has m ade a “constructive use of
tim e” and they do propose to so do during the fu rth er
period of transition. 358 U.S. 1, p. 25.
III
D efendant B oard ’s Basic O bjective
T h e C hattanooga Plan of D esegregation represents the
com bined best wisdom and judgm ent of the Chattanooga
B oard of Education , its Superintendent and adm inistrative
staff, as to the m axim u m desegregation presently possible
consistent with a m inim um d etrim en t to public education
in the com m unity, and at the same tim e providing the
best possible base for expanding desegregation in an or
derly fashion in the future while im proving the quality
of public education in ou r com m unity.
T h is has been defendants’ objective consistently since
M ay of 1955. Every act has been evaluated as it m ight bear
directly o r indirectly upon this objective. T h e defendant
B oard does not claim infallible wisdom, nor does it claim
that mistakes m ay not have been m ade, n or that mistakes
will not be made as the im plem entation of this Plan p ro
gresses. B u t defendant B oard does state that it has done
the best it knew how to do, in the circum stances in which
it found itself.
IV
What is the Law?
In h erent in the C hattanooga Plan is the assum ption that
public education is of vital im portance to this com m unity,
I.
11a
12a
to the children of this com m unity, and to the nation. And
fu rther, that the rights of 2 6 ,0 0 0 children are involved.
T h e Plan fu rth er assumes that no act should be taken,
n or policy adopted, th at could be expected to have a
detrim en tal effect upon the quality of educational oppor
tunity for the 2 6 ,0 0 0 children.
T h e Plan also assumes that racial discrim ination m ust
be rem oved from the C hattanooga school system.
T h is Plan represents a judgm ent by the defendant C h at
tanooga B oard of E d u cation that com plete desegregation
instantly w ould result in a severe d etrim en t to the cause
of public education in C hattanooga for a substantial period
of tim e, and, therefore, com plete desegregation im m edi
ately is n ot advisable and is unwise.
T h e Chattanooga Plan also assumes that the Suprem e
C o u rt decisions in the B row n Cases, supra, do n ot require
im m ediate and com plete desegregation in order to com ply
w ith the constitutional principles enunciated in the two
B row n Cases. Im m ediate and com plete desegregation is
n ot the law.
T h e Plan also assumes that it is a basic tenant of the
constitutional principles referred to in the B row n Cases
th at the initial judgm ent on the ex ten t of desegregation
possible and practicable in any given com m unity is the
prim ary responsibility of the local school authorities; and,
fu rther, that this initial group judgm ent by the persons
charged w ith the responsibility of operating a school system
is entitled to substantial w eight if said school authorities
have conducted themselves in a good faith valuation of
their circum stances and if the local school authorities are
m aking a good faith effort to im plem ent the constitutional
principles enunciated in the B row n D ecision s.
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
T h e following quotation from K elly v. B oard o f E duca
tion o f th e C ity o f N ash ville , 270 F . 2d 2 09 , Sixth C ircu it
(6-17-59) at p. 215 is p ertinent:
“ ‘F u ll im plem entation of the constitutional prin
ciples involved in this case required (a) solution of
varied local school problem s. School authorities have
the prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assessing,
and solving these problem s * * * . ’ B row n v. B oard
o f E d u ca tion , 349 U .S. 2 94 , 299 . T h erefore , a consid
era tion o f the sch oo l p rob lem s co n fron ted by th e B oard
o f E d u cation o f th e C ity o f N ash ville , and the solu tion s
arrived at by th e B oard , is necessary to a d eterm in ation
o f th e con troversy b e fo re u s (Em phasis ours)
A gain at p. 216 in the same opinion:
“T h e reasons why the school authorities supported
this plan and considered it best, under the circum
stances, are pertinent to the determ ination of the
issues before us, inasm uch as the solution of such
school problem s is the prim ary responsibility of the
local school authorities. B row n v. B oard o f E duca
tion , supra.”
T h e n at p. 224 :
“ H olding that the appellees had carried the burden
of proof of establishing the validity of the School
B oard ’s plan, and that it should, therefore, be ap
proved, the cou rt, in its opinion, declared that ‘ it is
n ot th e business o f th e F ed eral C ou rts to op era te th e
p u b lic schools and they should intervene only when
it is necessary for the enforcem ent of rights protected
by the Federal Constitution. If the judgm ent of the
School Board was clearly erroneous, or if it was not
supported by the evidence, the C o u rt would be justi
fied in finding that the defendants had not carried
the burden of proof resting upon them and that the
School B oard ’s plan should be disapproved. H ow -
13a
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
14a
ever, where in this case, the judgment of the School
Board is supported by the clear preponderance of the
evidence, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
lawful prerogatives of the legally constituted school
authority if the Court should undertake to set its
judgment aside and substitute some other plan. A d
m ittedly the problem is not susceptible o£ an easy
solution. T h e Suprem e C o u rt of the U n ited States
has made it clear that adjustm ent m ust be m ade in
accordance w ith the exigencies of each case, and that
the concept of ‘all deliberate speed’ is a flexible one.
For this reason decisions applying the desegregation
doctrine in other cities or areas where different condi
tions obtain are of little value. L ocal conditions call
for the application of a local rem edy.’ ” (Em phasis
ours)
C ircu it Ju d g e M cA llister in the Nashville Case, supra,
at page, 2 26 , includes a quotation from the decision of
Ju d ge Jo h n J . Parker in Briggs v. Elliott, 133 F . Supp. 776 ,
a portion of such quotation w hich is as follows:
“ ‘It (the Suprem e C ourt) has not decided that the
federal courts are to take over or regulate the public
schools of the states * # #.Because of the n ature of
the problem s and the local conditions, the school au
thorities often find that action taken by o ther school
districts is inapplicable to the facts w ith w hich they
are dealing # # * . T h e public interest m ust be con
sidered along w ith all the facts and conditions preva
lent in the school district. Educational standards
should n ot be lowered. If the school authorities have
acted and are proceeding in good faith, their actions
should not be set aside by a co u rt so long as their
action is consistent with the ultimate establishment
of a nondiscrim inatory school system at the earliest
practicable date’ ” (emphasis ours)
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
V
P u b lic E ducation Must be Maintained and Efficiently
Operated
In B row n v. B oard o f E d u cation o f T o p ek a , supra, at p.
493 , the following significent statem ent is set forth:
“T od ay, education is perhaps the most im portant
function of state and local governm ents. Com pulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both dem onstrate ou r recognition of the
im portance of education to ou r dem ocratic society. It
is req uired in the perform ance of ou r m ost basic
public responsibilities, even service in the arm ed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
T od ay it is a principal instrum ent in awakening the
child to cu ltu ral values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust
norm ally to his environm ent. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child m ay reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, w here the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which m ust
be m ade available to all on equal term s.”
F rom this, D efendant Board reasons that one of the con
stitutional principles enunciated in this case is the im por
tance of public education. From this, defendant B oard
fu rth er reasons that the m aintenance of an efficient school
system providing a quality education is a cardinal prin
ciple that m ust be considered in any decision that a local
school board may make. T h is requires a local board to
make an evaluation of the negative im pact upon a school
system resulting from the rem oval of racial discrim ination
in some form of desegregation. It implies a balancing of
the rights of the com m unity to a continued quality educa
15a
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
tional program against the rights of the plaintiffs’ and those
sim ilarity situated to have racial discrim ination rem oved
com pletely from such school system. D efendant B oard
construes the Suprem e C o u rt’s decision to req u ire that
this evaluation be m ade by said B oard and D efendant
B oard believes th at if it had disregarded the probable or
possible im pact upon public education resulting from
desegregation that such could be a violation of the p rin
ciples enunciated by the Suprem e C o u rt in the B row n
decisions.
I t is req uired that the im m ediate im plem entation of such
constitutional rights in a public school system be balanced
against the detrim ental im pact upon public education re
sulting from desegregation for deterioration in the quality
of public education weakens the rights of the total com
m unity.
T h e Nashville B oard evaluated the circum stances and
factors existent in th eir own com m unity and cam e to the
conclusion:
“T h a t a sudden o r ab ru p t transition to a desegre
gated basis w ould engender adm inistrative problem s
of such com plexity and m agnitude as to seriously u n
derm ine and im pair the educational system of the
city .” K elly v. B oard o f E d u ca tion , 270 F . 2d 2 09 , 6th
C ir. (1959).
H ere is a specific criteria , th at is, the possible detrim en t
to an educational system resulting from desegregation.
T h is balancing of incom patible objectives is a responsi
bility of a school board. T h e D istrict C o u rt found:
“T h a t p rop er school adm inistration requires that
the school board take into account the existence of
this factor (the drastic ch aracter of the change im
posed by desegregation on a school system), n ot to
16a
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
17a
accede to hostility or placate the opponents of de
segregation, but in order to m inim ize the effects of
such opposition upon the efficiency of the schools
* # *_>> K elly v. B oard o f E d u ca tion , supra, p. 224 .
B oth the N egro and white children in the com m unity
have a vital interest in the quality of educational oppor
tunity afforded to them . T h is vital interest is shared by
th eir parents and the com m unity in general, as well as the
nation. T h a t desegregation in Chattanooga will have a
detrim en tal effect upon the quality of the educational
program is a certainty. T h e local B oard m ust evaluate
w ithin its judgm ent in good faith, (1) the possible d etri
m ental im pact upon public education resulting from vari
ous degrees of desegregation against (2) the constitutional
rig h t of plaintiffs and those sim ilarly situated to the full
benefit of their constitutional rights. T h e solution to such
balancing of rights is a com prom ise w hich results in a
m inim um detrim en t to public education w ith the m axi
m um exten t of desegregation, based upon a good faith
evaluation of all factors existing in C hattanooga pertinent
to such decision.
VI
During the Transition Period the Rights of Negroes
are Qualified
T h e principal difficulty arises from different in terp reta
tions of the significance of the Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions
in the two B row n Cases, supra. I t is apparently plaintiffs’
position that the law is that a N egro now has an unqualified
righ t to be adm itted to schools on a racially non-discrim ina-
tory basis. I t is defendant Board of E d u cation ’s position
that a N egro under such circum stances does not have an
unqualified right. Such righ t is qualified by the language
of the S econd B row n decision, supra, and also by the
Defendants’ Brief in Supp&rt of Its Flan of Desegregation
decision of the Sixth C ircu it in the Nashville case. K elly
v. Board o f Education o f the C ity o f N a sh ville , supra.
T h ese two decisions and the K elly decision m ean th at a
N egro has a righ t to be adm itted on a racially non-dis-
crim inatory basis if his admission is consistent w ith the
continued efficient operation of the school system to w hich
he is being adm itted. U n d er one interp retation , carried
to its extrem e, a board of education has no responsibility
to take into consideration the com m unity resistance to
desegregation; and if to desegregate w ould m ean, in the
best judgm ent of the board concerned, th at said school
system w ould be destroyed and done away w ith, then this
w ould n ot be a legally valid reason for refusing admission
to a N egro child.
W h at legal grounds are there for the defendant B oard ’s
position that this righ t is a qualified right? In the first
Brown decision, 347 U .S . 4 8 3 , at p. 4 9 3 , after the recitation
by the co u rt of the facts and the sum m ary of the points
brou gh t ou t by the plaintiffs and defendants, and p rior
to any specific reference to the n atu re of its decision, the
C o u rt stressed the im portance of public education to the
nation in a ra th er lengthy paragraph. T h is raises the
question: Is the im m ediate granting of rights to a N egro
of sufficient im portance that such should be granted in-
stanter, com pletely disregarding the effect of such adm is
sion upon a school system? If the Suprem e C o u rt m eant
to disregard such possible effect or any consideration th ere
of, then a N egro does have an unqualified right. O th er
wise, such right is qualified in some m anner. T h e exact
and precise natu re of the various qualifications will be
left to later consideration herein.
In the first Brown decision, supra, at p. 4 9 5 , the C ou rt
said that: “ * * * the form ulation of decrees in these
cases presents problem s of considerable com p lexity .” If
18a
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
the righ t of the N egroes was unqualified, then there
w ould have been no necessity of considering any com
plexities that the C ou rt referred to in the language quoted
above. A consideration of the com plexities was necessary
according to the C ou rt preparatory and prelim inary to
the form ulation of decrees effectuating the righ t that the
N egroes m ight have. It is defendants’ contention that
the bare declaration of a right is of no substance w ithout
the rem edy that effectuates that right and therefore the
rem edy and the righ t are m erged and the n ature of the
rem edy necessarily qualifies the right, or at least the tim e
w hen, and the circum stances under which, the righ t will
be fully m atured to the benefit of Negroes. T h is is a prac
tical m atter.
T h e n ext pronouncem ent by the Suprem e C o u rt was
M ay 31, 1955, in B row n , et al. v. B oard o f E d u cation o f
T o p ek a , 349 U.S. 294 . T h e last sentence in the first para
graph of this decision gives the substance of this decision
when the cou rt said: “ there rem ains for consideration the
m anner in w hich relief is to be accorded.” T h e n at page
299 there is the following:
“T hese presentations were inform ative and helpful to
the C ou rt in its consideration of the com plexities
arising from the transition to a system of public edu
cation freed of racial discrim ination.”
Of w hat significance is the word “transition”? I t certainly
implies that im m ediate rem oval of racial discrim ination
is n ot possible in public education and that there m ust be
an interim period of some tim e, varied according to local
ities concerned, in which there will continue to be racial
discrim ination. By inference such approves the continua
tion of racial discrim ination to some degree and for some
period of tim e. T h e C ourt speaks of an eventual rem oval
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Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
of all racial discrim ination as a goal to be attained at some
point in the future. I t certainly follows that if such re
m oval of racial discrim ination is a goal, that u n til the tim e
that goal is reached there will be racial discrim ination.
A nd if there is racial discrim ination it necessarily means
th at certain N egroes will not have an unqualified righ t
to admission to schools on a non-racial basis.
O n the same page the C o u rt refers to the “solution of
varied local school problem s” . I t goes on to place the
responsibility on school authorities “for elucidating, assess
ing and solving these problem s” . I t fu rth er states th at the
local courts will have to m ake the determ ination as to
w hether o r n ot the acts of the local school board in im ple
m enting the governing constitutional principles constitutes
good faith. T h e words “elucidating, assessing and solving”
all indicate a process, that is, a m ovem ent tow ard the a t
tainm ent of the goal of the rem oval of racial discrim ina
tion from public school systems. H ere , again, the C ou rt
is necessarily referring to an indeterm inate period of tim e
in w hich there will continue to be racial discrim ination
in public school systems.
A t page 300 , 349 U .S. 2 9 4 , the Suprem e C o u rt speaks
of courts being “guided by equitable principles” in “fash
ioning and effectuating the decrees” , “facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs” ; “ the personal
interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as
soon as p ra cticab le on a non-discrim inatory basis” . (E m
phasis ours) F u rth e r along the C o u rt refers to the
elim ination of a variety of obstacles in m aking the transi
tion. I t speaks of “ the public interest in the elim ination
of such obstacles in a systematic and effective m an n er” .
C ertainly, the C o u rt m ust have m eant here th at there were
certain obstacles that a school board w ould have to over
com e before it could free its school system of racial dis-
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Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
crim ination . A nd again, it is obvious that d u rin g the
tim e when these obstacles are being identified and are
being rem oved, there will continue to be racial discrim ina
tion and that the righ t of N egroes in such circum stances
to admission to a school on a non-discrim inatory basis will
n ot be an unqualified right. In these circum stances N egroes
will have to tem porarily forego their constitutional rights
until such obstacles have been rem oved.
A gain, later in the same opinion, the C ou rt refers to
“while giving w eight to these public and private considera
tions.” It requires defendant boards to make a prom pt
and reasonable start tow ard full com pliance. B u t here
the language is to “ the defendants” . Is the prom pt and
reasonable start requirem ent lim ited to defendants in the
lawsuit that the Suprem e C o u rt was concerned w ith or
does this prom pt and reasonable start apply to all school
boards in the U n ited States that at that tim e m aintained
a bi-racial school system?
T h e C o u rt w ent on to say that once such a start had
been m ade that the courts m ight find that additional tim e
was necessary and it placed the burden upon the defend
ants in such a situation to establish that additional tim e
was necessary in the public interest and that such tim e
was consistent with the good faith com pliance at the earliest
practicable date. H ere again the necessary im plication
of the C o u rt’s language is, that during this additional
tim e if such is proved to be necessary, there will be a
continuation of racial discrim ination in the school system
affected. I t again follows that as long as there is racial
discrim ination in such a school system that all N egroes
will n ot have an unqualified righ t to adm ittance to certain
schools. T h e n at p. 301, supra, the C ou rt stated:
“T h ey will also consider the adequacy of any plans
the defendants m ay propose to m eet these problem s
21a
and to effectuate a transition to a racially non-dis-
crim inatory school system. D uring this period of
transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these
cases” .
From this language it is obvious that local boards will have
to form ulate plans to m eet the problem s. T h is also pre
supposes that they w ould have to do some thinking and
analyzing in order to state w hat the problem s were before
they could plan how they were going to m eet them . A ll
of this again substantiates the fact that it is the law that
there will be a period of tim e in w hich racial discrim ination
will continue. A nd, if racial discrim ination continues,
certain N egroes will not have an unqualified rig h t to be
adm itted to schools on a non-discrim inatory basis.
T h e n ext case of im portance is the case of C o o p er , e t al
v. A a ro n , e t al, 358 U .S. 1, (1 9 5 8 ), the L ittle R ock case.
In any analysis of the m eaning of the words used by the
Suprem e C o u rt in this decision, it m ust be rem em bered
that this decision began w ith these words:
“As this case reaches us it raises questions of the high
est im portance to the m aintenance of ou r federal sys
tem of governm ent. I t necessarily involves a claim
by the G overnor and Legislature of the State that
there is no duty on state officials to obey federal cou rt
orders resting on this C o u rt’s considered in terp reta
tion of the U n ited States C on stitu tion ” .
T hese are strong term s and it should be noted that the
C o u rt states as a fact that the Arkansas governor and legis
lature both affirmatively stated and claim ed that they had
n o duty as state officials to o b ey F ed era l C ou rt orders. At
page 7, supra, the C o u rt points ou t that D istrict Courts
are directed to require a prom pt and reasonable start
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Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
tow ard full com pliance. F u rth er along on page 7, supra,
in speaking of the D istrict C ou rt the Suprem e C ou rt said:
“A fter analysis of the relevant factors (which, of
course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation) (the
C ou rt) m ight conclude that justification existed for
not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of
all qualified N egro children .”
E xactly what is the m eaning of the parenthetical expression?
It would seem that if this hostility to racial desegregation
would affect the quality of the public school system, that
it m ust be considered though it would not be sufficient
justification for not doing anything. T h e C ou rt goes on
to say:
“ In such circum stances, however, the C ou rt should
scrutinize the program of the school authorities to
make sure that they have developed arrangem ents
pointed toward the earliest practicable com pletion of
desegregation and had taken appropriate steps to put
th eir program into effective operation.”
H ere, again, the language used refers to a process, a transi
tion, and a period of time. A prom pt start is required and
any plan m ust be diligently and earnestly pursued. T h e
C ou rt goes on to say:
“State authorities were thus duty bound to devote
every effort toward initiating desegregation and bring
ing about the elim ination of racial discrim ination in
the public school system.”
T h e word “tow ard” and the phrases “bringing ab ou t” both
refer to a period of tim e and a transition period.
T h e following pertinent inform ation is found in an
article entitled “T h e U nited States Suprem e C o u rt and
23a
24a
D esegregation”, by Paul H artm an , in T h e M odern Law
Review , Ju ly 1960, at pages 356 and 357 :
“ In term s of res jud icata , the second B row n deci
sion applies to the school districts w hich were defend
ants in the cases before the cou rt. H ow ever, it is clear
that its im portance, like that of the first B row n deci
sion, goes far beyond settling a dispute betw een the
parties to the suits. T h e opinion granting relief was
m eant to provide a b lu ep r in t fo r th e ord erly transi
tion from racially segregated schools w herever they
existed to schools open to pupils w ithout regard to
color o r race.
“A n im p ortan t feature of this plan is the gradual
im plem entation of the first B row n decision declaring
segregation unconstitutional. As noted above, the
Suprem e C o u rt relied on ‘equitable principles’ on
authorizing this step-by-step approach. N o doubt, the
cases before the Suprem e C o u rt in the segregation
controversys were equity cases, since all plaintiffs ap
plied for injunctions. H ence, the co u rt had at its
disposal the broad discretionary powers granted to
courts of equity. W h a t is n o v e l is that th e en jo y m en t
o f clear con stitu tion a l rights o f individuals m ay be
delayed th rou gh th e op era tion o f eq u ita b le p rin cip les .
T h a t the righ t to be free from discrim ination is one
that requires im m ediate im plem entation follows from
Suprem e C o u rt decisions rendered betw een 1938 and
1950 in suits brought by N egroes w ho, because of
their race, were refused admission to state-supported
graduate schools. F inding that plaintiffs had been
denied the equal protection of the laws, the C ou rt
stressed the ‘personal and present’ natu re of their con
stitutional rights, and accordingly required the grad
uate schools to provide facilities for the N egro students
suing for relief, as soon as they did for applicants of
the white race. In these cases the im m ediate im ple
m entation did n ot present adm inistrative problem s;
it involved nothing m ore than the admission of one
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
person—the plaintiff in each suit; furtherm ore, it was
clear that the num ber of future qualified N egro claim
ants for admission to graduate schools w ould be
lim ited.
“ In contrast, it was obvious that the process of de
segregation of public elem entary and high schools as
req uired under the first B row n opinion w ould be an
operation of gigantic proportions. In the year be
tween the first B row n opinion affirming the consti
tutional right of the N egro pupil to equal protection
of the laws, and the im plem enting decision, the tre
m endous difficulties of uprooting an old-established
way of life in a large area of the U nited States becam e
all too clear. H e n c e , to so ften th e im pact o f the ru lin g
th e S u prem e C ou rt d ev e lop ed in the secon d B row n
decision the co n cep t o f gradualism justified by the
principle of flexibility governing the shaping of
rem edies in equity. T h e result was that the righ t of
the individual N egro elem entary or high school pupil
to im m ediate vindication of his ‘personal and present
constitutional right had to b e su bord in ated to the
in terest o f th e w h ole com m u n ity in a sm ooth and o r
derly transition to desegregate sch ools.” (Em phasis
ours)
Defendants subm it that we are concerned with qualified
rights during a period of transition.
VII
T h e C onstitutional R ights are Qualified by the P ublic
and Private Interest in an Efficient P ublic
School System
T h is represents a practical view point upon the part of
the Suprem e C ou rt in view of the radical nature of the
change required by its decisions. O nce it has been estab
lished and accepted that these constitutional rights are
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Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
qualified during a transition period, the n ext logical step
is to exam ine the n ature of these qualifications. W h at
standard or standards m ust be m et by a local school board
if it proposes a plan of desegregation th at does n ot grant
im m ediate desegregation in all schools? T h e w ording of
the Suprem e C o u rt decisions do n ot set forth a clear-cut
standard or set of criteria . T h e Suprem e C o u rt recognized
the existence of “varied local school problem s.” I t also
recognized that these problem s would have to be solved.
T h e C o u rt also referred to a balancing of rights and in ter
ests in referrin g to “a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs” ; “ the public interest in the
elim ination of such obstacles in a system atic and effective
m an n er” ; “giving w eight to public and private considera
tions.” T h e C o u rt also referred to:
“ Problem s related to adm inistration, arising from
the physical condition of the school plant, the school
transportation system, personnel, revision of school
districts and attendance areas into com pact units to
achieve a system of determ ining admission to public
schools on a non-racial basis, and revisions of local
laws and regulations w hich m ay be necessary in solving
the foregoing problem s.”
T hese principles are guidelines for both local school boards
and local D istrict C ourts, although they are perhaps p u r
posely general in character.
If the price of desegregation is the abolition of public
education, and if this is a co rrect interpretation of the
Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions, then the local school board
need make no evaluation of the im pact of desegregation
upon a school system. B u t if there is a degree of harm to
a school system and the educational process that is u n
acceptable while in the process of rem oving racial segre-
26a
gation, then the local school board m ust evaluate its com
m unity, the im pact of desegregation upon its com m unity,
and design a plan of desegregation that will m aintain a
reasonably efficient school system and at the same tim e
gran t the m axim um im plem entation of constitutional
rights of m em bers of the N egro race.
In exercising this judgm ent, defendant B oard necessarily
had to evaluate factors incapable of precise determ ination.
It is in this area that the good faith of the B oard is of the
essence in the valuation of the B oard ’s perform ance of
this specific responsibility.
W h en the Suprem e C o u rt placed upon the school au
thorities the prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assess
ing and solving certain local school problem s, the process
that was set forth by the Suprem e C ou rt and required
by it of local school boards, necessarily, would require the
passage of a certain am ount of tim e. T h is passage of time
w ould be required because the discharge of the respon
sibility laid upon school authorities by the Suprem e C ou rt
would require school authorities to do certain things as
they made clear to their respective com m unities the p rob
lems that were created by the Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions.
Elucidating is a process. Assessing is a process. A nd, in
the process of elucidating and assessing, the solution to
problem s evolves in the minds of those who are necessary
to the decision. N one of these responsibilities could be
discharged by a school board instantly. I t is basic that no
problem can be solved until the exact and precise nature
of that problem is carefully evaluated and determ ined.
T h is was why elucidating was felt by defendant B oard to
be a necessary first step in the process of com pliance with
the Suprem e C o u rt’s decision. F o r exam ple, defendants
determ ined that the first necessary step was for the com -
27a
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
m unity to com e to the position of accepting the fact that
com pliance w ith the Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions was inevi
table and that there was no escape, no subterfuge, and no
dodging that could be done. T h e means by w hich a
com m unity arrives at such a conclusion are varied and
different. D efendant B oard felt th at this intellectual
recognition of the finality of the Suprem e C o u rt’s decision
was necessary. Events in neighboring states and com m uni
ties over a period of years assisted the com m unity to arrive
at this decision of the acceptance of the inevitability of
the Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions.
T h e com m unity has resisted desegregation. D id the
Suprem e C o u rt d irect local school boards to com pletely
disregard resistance to desegregation, even though such
resistance could be and probably would be reflected in
m any ways so as to dam age public education seriously in
a com m unity? T h e m any ways in w hich resistance to
desegregation is reflected in a com m unity are often not sub
ject to con trol by any group o r governm ent. W e refer to
the attitudes that can be reflected in the classroom and
on the playground and by parent-to-parent, all within
behavior patterns that do not violate any law nor respond
to the application of force.
D efendant B oard has been constantly aware of the fact
that education takes place prim arily in the classroom. T h e
atm osphere in a classroom , the spirit of the classroom, the
relationship betw een the teacher and the students, and
the relationship betw een the students and each other, are
a necessary and vital part of the educational process. A ll
efforts w ith regard to public education are keyed to what
happens in a p articu lar classroom. Psychological and in
tangible considerations are involved, such as “those quali
ties w hich are incapable of objective m easurem ent but
w hich m ake for greatness in a law school” . Sw eatt v.
28a
P ain ter, 339 U .S. 629 . H ere is w here we m eet with term s
such as environm ent, feeling of inferiority, m otivation, edu
cational and m ental developm ent and such other term s
frequently quoted by the Suprem e C o u rt in B row n v.
B oard o f E d u ca tion , supra.
In the classroom defendants are speaking of integration
as distinguished from the term desegregation. W e are
speaking of acceptance in a psychological sense. In foot
note 11 in the first B row n decision, D r. K. B. C lark was
quoted in a paper given to the M id-Century W h ite House
Conference on Children and Y ou th in 1950 entitled “Effect
of Prejudice and D iscrim ination on Personality Develop
m en t” . A t a recen t m eeting of the A nthropology Section
of the A m erican Association for the A dvancem ent of
Science (D ecem ber 1960), Professor K enneth B. C lark of
the C ity College of N ew Y ork defined integration as “a
subjective individual process involving attitudinal changes
and ‘the rem oval of fears, hatred, suspicion, sterotype super
stitions and m yths’ ” . D efendant B oard felt that it could
not disregard the ultim ate im pact of desegregation upon
the respective classrooms where desegregation will occur.
In its attem p t to discharge its responsibilities for providing
educational opportunities to all children on an equal basis
it has had this im pact in m ind and has felt its responsi
bility to do all w ithin its power to lessen the im pact on
the individual classrooms insofar as it is possible to so do.
VIII
What Factors Resulting from Desegregation
Affect the Quality of Education
In K elly v. B oard o f E ducation o f th e C ity o f N ash ville ,
supra, Ju d ge M cA llister included in the opinion m any
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Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
references to factors that professional educators and school
board m em bers cited as having an im pact upon the quality
of education. T h e C o u rt in its opinion m entioned at
p. 212 that:
“T h e B oard of E d u cation * * * endeavored * * *
to find a solution w hich w ould accom plish the transi
tion as soon as practicable consistent w ith the public
interest and the efficient operation of the schools” .
W h ile it is true that the C ircu it C o u rt does n ot specifically
approve this statem ent n eith er does the C o u rt im ply that
the “efficient operation of the schools” is n ot a desirable
objective for the N ashville School B oard to consider.
T h ose portions of the Nashville B oard ’s testim ony that
the C ircu it C o u rt include or refer to in its O pinion bear
upon those factors that m ay be expected to have a d etri
m ental effect upon the school system.
T h e Superintendent of Schools, p. 2 1 7 , referred to the
plan as involving “less of this dam age to the children than
any o ther plan we could propose” . H e also referred to the
fact that the change “goes cou n ter to the feelings of a great
m any people” . “T h e re are a lot of adjustm ents to be
m ade and # # * that this adjustm ent can be m ade w ith less
friction * * * , it can be m ade m ore sm oothly, it can be
m ade w ith less difficulty, psychologically, educationally,
socially, and otherwise if it is done slowly” . F u rth e r along
the Superintendent m ade this statem ent: p. 217
“I t is very im portant that there be betw een the two
races and betw een individuals representing the two
races a relationship of friendliness, cooperation, and
respect such as I think we have had in the past * *
H om ogeneous grouping was m entioned as a desirable
educational objective and that quick desegregation would
ru n cou n ter to this objective.
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Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
31a
V irtually all of the testim ony in the N ashville case that
was considered sufficiently im portant by the C ircu it C ou rt
for specific recitation thereof in the opinion had to do w ith
factors having a negative im pact on the educational en
vironm ent in the classrooms. T hese were refences to:
“ tension affecting the teachers”
“new experience for the teacher”
“difficulties in securing teacher cooperation”
“questions of teacher recru itm en t”
“ap titu d e”
“achievem ent”
“teachers cannot do their best in the m idst of excite
m ent and turm oil and upheaval” .
A t page 2 20 , supra, the C ou rt referred to the Superintend
e n t’s testim ony as follows:
“T h is business of teaching and working through
teachers is not just a legal m atter. I t ’s a spiritual m at
ter at base, and unless we can develop that rapport,
w hich a teaching group m ust have to touch the lives
of children, we are not a successful school system, how
ever good our buildings m ay be or w hatever other
physical features we may have * *
T hese and sim ilar factors have been taken into consider
ation by defendant Board of Education in designing the
Plan of Desegregation.
F rom its own experience and from the experience of
other com m unities, it is apparent that readiness for de
segregation varies within a school system on a school-by
school basis. Factors showing a great am ount of readiness
of a particu lar school com m unity can be identified in
advance and these favorable factors can be used in an
intelligent fashion to develop greater readiness for the
desegregation process. T h is is the reason for the Chatta-
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
nooga Plan of D esegregation lim iting its original desegre
gation to selected schools. T h e purpose of the selection
is to introduce into the desegregated classrooms (when
such occurs) the m axim u m n u m b er of favorable factors in
order th at the experience of the desegregated classrooms
and schools will be an acceptable process for all persons
concerned. I t will rem ove m any fears of the unknow n
and it will dem onstrate the reality of an intelligent effort
to rem ove racial discrim ination. H ere the School B oard
finds itself in the field of sociology, psychology, and eco
nom ics. T h e schools to be selected will be selected by
the School B oard w ith these criteria in m ind, and w ith
the ultim ate objective of dem onstrating to the com m unity
the fact that desegregation will w ork and that m any of the
fears that parents have of this process are n ot necessarily
true.
I X
If Defendant Board’s Actions Constitute a Good Faith
Implementation of the Governing Constitutional Principles
the Plan Should be Approved Unless the Judgment is
Clearly Erroneous or if it is not Supported by
the Evidence
D efendant B oard is charged w ith the legal responsibility
of operating a public school system for the citizens of C h at
tanooga, Tennessee. A ncillary to this duty and. ordinarily
in harm ony therew ith it has a responsibility to operate in
a m anner consistent w ith the laws of the State of T en n es
see, the Federal laws, the C onstitution of Tennessee and
the C onstitution of the U n ited States. W h en the desires
of a vast m ajority of its constituency were placed in direct
conflict w ith its duty under the U n ited States C onstitution,
the School B oard faced a dilem m a of considerable m agni-
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Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
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Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
tude. T h e B oard consistently recognized its obligation to
com ply. T h e B oard ’s dilem m a was how to operate a school
system w ithin the fram ew ork of the U n ited States C on
stitution when to do so w ould be cou n ter to the wishes
of its constituency. O rdinarily, it is the School B oard ’s
responsibility to operate in such a way as to p u t into
effect in the school system the wishes of the people of
C hattanooga. A nd when any public body continues to
function cou n ter to the wishes of those whom it represents,
such public body is replaced by a group responsive to the
will of the m ajority of those citizens for whom it acts.
T h e C hattanooga B oard of Education found itself in
this dilem m a in 1955 following the B row n D ecision s, supra.
A ny B oard of Education placed in such position that
ignored either the m andate of the U nited States Suprem e
C ou rt or the m andate of those whom it represented and
for whom it acted, would have been violating a legal re
sponsibility. T h e only rem aining course for defendant
B oard was to attem pt to reconcile what appeared to be
irreconcilable. T h ere was no other choice.
I t is w ithin the reality of these paradoxical circum stances
that defendant B oard of E d u cation ’s good faith m ust be
judged. If defendant B oard had shown u tter disregard
for the cause of public education, there would have been
no dilem m a. On the contrary, if defendant B oard had
refused to acknowledge any responsibility to the U nited
States C onstitution there would have been no dilem m a.
D efendant Board believed both of its contradictory respon
sibilities to be of vital im portance. I t set out to m eet both
responsibilities within the lim it of its capacities and legal
authority. I t should be rem em bered that at the tim e de
fendant B oard originally took under consideration its posi
tion and policies with regard to the two B row n Decisions
in Ju n e and Ju ly of 1955 , that the only guides defendant
B oard had were the words used by the Suprem e C o u rt in
these two decisions.
T h e good faith of the eleven individuals who have served
as m em bers of the defendant B oard during this period is
a basic fact to be determ ined at the hearing. T h e B oard
exists as an agency of the people. T h e B oard is responsible
directly to the com m unity electorate. T h e existence of
this legal relationship has a d irect bearing on the exercise
of good faith by defendants. T h e join t judgm ents that
defendants have rendered from tim e to tim e were arrived
at in this atm osphere and environm ent. T h e realistics of
the m yriad factors im pinging on defendant B oard m ust
necessarily be considered for such factors as grasped by said
defendants were basic to the exercise of good faith.
“If the school authorities have acted and are p ro
ceeding in good faith, their action should not be set
aside by a co u rt so long as th eir action is consistent
w ith the ultim ate establishm ent of a non-discrim i-
natory school system at the earliest practicable date.
B riggs v. E llio tt , 133 F . Supp. 7 76 , 864 , 815 .
“ H olding that the appellees had carried the burden
of proof of establishing the validity of the School
B oard ’s plan, and that it should, therefore, be ap
proved, the cou rt, in its opinion, declared that ‘it is
not the business of the Federal C ourts to operate the
public schools and they should intervene only when
it is necessary for the enforcem ent of rights protected
by the Federal C onstitution. If the judgm ent of the
School B oard was clearly erroneous, of it it was not
supported by the evidence, the C o u rt would be justi
fied in finding that the defendants had n ot carried the
burden of proof resting upon them and that the School
B oard ’s plan should be disapproved. H ow ever, when
in this case, the judgm ent of the School B oard is sup
ported by the clear preponderance of the evidence, it
34a
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
w ould be an unw arranted invasion of the lawful
prerogatives of the legally constituted school authority
if the C o u rt should undertake to set its judgm ent
aside and substitute some other p lan’ K elly v. B oard
o f E d u cation o f C ity o f N ash ville , supra, approving
D istrict C ou rt, p. 224 .
S U M M A T IO N
In C o o p er v. A a ron , supra, page 20, Ju stice Fran k
fu rter said:
“By w orking together, by sharing in a com m on
effort, m en of different minds and tem pers, even if
they do n ot reach agreem ent, acquire understanding
and thereby tolerance of their differences * * #. T h e
L ittle R ock School B oard had em barked on an ed u
cational effort ‘to obtain public acceptance of its p lan’.
T h u s the process of the com m unity’s accom odation
to new demands of law upon it, the d ev e lo p m en t of
habits of accep tan ce of the righ t of colored children
to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Constitution, A m end. 14. had peacefully and prom is
ingly begun.” (Em phasis ours)
T h en at page 21 -
“T h e use of force to further obedience to law is in
any event a last resort and one not congenial to the
spirit of ou r n ation .”
A gain at page 26 -
“T h a t the responsibility of those who exercise power
in a dem ocratic governm ent is not to reflect inflamed
public feeling but to help form its understanding is
especially true when they are confronted w ith a prob
lem like a racially discrim inating public school system.
* * * Com pliance with decisions of this C o u rt is the
C onstitutional organ of the suprem e law of the land,
35a
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
has often, th rou gh ou t ou r history, depended on active
support by state and local authorities. I t presupposes
such su p p ort.”
T h e Plan of D esegregation adequately m eets the test
set forth by the Suprem e C ou rt. T h e defendant B oard has
perform ed its function in good faith and w ithin the spirit
of the Suprem e C o u rt decisions, particularly as expressed
by Ju stice Fran k fu rter. T h e Plan is supported by the
evidence. I t is consistent w ith the ultim ate goal of rem oval
of racial discrim ination and the efficient operation of a
public school system. It should be aproved.
R espectfully subm itted,
R aym ond B. W itt, J r .
1234 V olunteer B uilding
C hattanoga, Tennessee
Ellis M eacham
324 H am ilton Bank Building
C hattanooga, Tennessee
O f Counsel:
A nderson, M eacham & Collins
324 H am ilton Bank Building
C hattanooga 2 , Tennessee
C E R T I F I C A T E O F S E R V IC E
T h is is to certify that on this 19th day of Jan u ary , 1961.
I served upon A von W illiam s, J r . , Z. A lexan d er Looby,
M cC lellan-Looby Building, 327 C harlotte A venue, N ash
ville, T ennessee, and T h u rg o o d M arshall, Constance B aker
M otley, Suite 1790 T e n Colum bus C ircle, N ew Y ork 19,
N ew Y ork , attorneys for plaintiffs, a copy of D efendants’
B rief in Support of Its P lan of D esegregation, by m ailing
36a
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation
same to them via air m ail, special delivery, in properly
addressed envelopes w ith sufficient stamps affixed thereto.
A ttorney for D efendants
37a
(C A P T IO N O M IT T E D )
JUDGMENT
T h is cause cam e on to be heard this 23rd day of
Jan u ary , 1961, before the H onorable Leslie R . D arr,
U n ited States D istrict Ju d ge, upon the entire record and
especially upon the plan for desegregation heretofore filed
in this case by the defendants and the objections thereto
filed by the plaintiffs; and the C o u rt being of the opinion
that said plan, on its face, is not a m inim um or reasonable
start to desegregate the school system of C hattanoga with
all deliberate speed, and that defendants should be required
to subm it a second or alternate plan, b u t that the said first
plan should not be finally rejected pending the outcom e
of an appeal by the defendants now pending in the C o u rt
of Appeals for the Sixth C ircuit. It is therefore, O R D E R
E D , A D JU D G E D and D E C R E E D , as follows:
1. T h e said plan filed by the defendants in this case is
n ot sufficient on its face to m eet the req uirem ent of the
decision of the Suprem e C ou rt in B row n v. B oard o f
E d u ca tion (1935) 349 U.S. 294 , 75 S.Ct. 753 ; b u t said plan
is n o t presently rejected, pending determ ination of the
appeal by defendants now pending in the U nited States
C o u rt of Appeals.
2. T h e defendant, Board of Education will file with
this C o u rt an alternate, a second plan, within sixty (60)
days from date of this judgm ent.
3. T h e righ t of defendants to a reconsideration of the
first plan as it is or as am ended, and the rights of plaintiffs
Order of Judge Darr, District Judge
o r defendants to excep t to the present ju d gm en t of the
co u rt is reserved.
4. T h e operation of the injunction , excep t for the
req u irem en t herein that the defendants subm it said second
o r altern ate plan w ithin sixty (60) days, is suspended until
the term in ation of the appeal in this case now pending in
the U n ited States C o u rt of Appeals.
A pproved for E n try :
/ s / (M rs.) C onstance B aker M otley
/ s / L ooby & W illiam s
By A von W illiam s, J r .
A ttorneys for Plaintiffs.
R aym ond B . W itt, J r .
A ttorn ey for Defendants.
S ig n e d :--------------------------
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