Florida v. Board of Control Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida

    IN THE

g>uprrmp ( ta r t uf tl)p Inttrb States
O c to b er  T e r m , 1956

No.

T h e  S ta te  ox? F lo r id a , e x  e e l . V ir g il  D . H a w k in s ,
Petitioner,

V

T h e  B oard o f  C o n t r o l , e t  a l .,
Respondents.

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

R ic h a r d  W . E r v in  
Attorney General 

State of Florida
R a l p h  E .  O d u m  

Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida

J o h n  J .  B l a ir  
Assistant Attorney General 

State of Florida
W il s o n  W . W r ig h t  

Special Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida



IN THE

^uprpmp GLxmtt of tty? Inttefe States
O c to b er  T e r m , 1956

No,

T h e  S t a t e  oe  F lo r id a , e x  r e l . V ir g il  D . H a w k in s ,
Petitioner,

V

T h e  B oard o f  C o n t r o l , e t  a l .,
Respondents.

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

R ic h a r d  W . E r v in  
Attorney General 

State of Florida
R a l p h  E .  O d u m  

Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida

J o h n  J, B l a ir  
Assistant Attorney General 

State of Florida
W il s o n  W . W r ig h t  

Special Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida



INDEX
Opinions Below _______________________________________________  X
Jurisdiction ______
Questions Presented 
Statement _______
Argument _____________________________________________________  24

Part One: The Law ________________________________________  14
Part Two: Factual Considerations ___________________________  28

Conclusion ___________________________________________________  5g

Appendix A
Opinion of U. S. Supreme Court of March 12, 1956, in The State of 
Florida, ex rel. Virgil D. Hawkins v. The Board of Control, et al. __ 60

Appendix B
House Concurrent Resolution No. 174 (Florida) _________________  61

Appendix C
Report of the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee__________ 69

CITATIONS
Cases:

Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U. S. 222, 56 S. Ct. 204, 80 L. ed 192 18
Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How. 189, 11 L. ed 97__________________  16
Bradenton v. State, 118 Fla. 838, 160 So. 506, 100 A.L.R. 400____ 17
Bruce v. Tobin, 38 S. Ct. 7, 245 U.S. 18, 62 L. ed 1 2 3 __________  19
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L. ed 
873, 74 S. Ct. 686, 38 A.L.R. 2d 1180; and 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct.
753, 99 L. ed 1083 _____________________________________1; 14) 17
Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 179 So. 695, 115 A.L.R. 857_____1  ’ 15
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 2 S. Ct. 10, 27 L. ed 359 ______ 26
Bute v. People of State of III, 68 S. Ct. 763, 333 U.S. 640, 92
L. ed 986 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25, 26
City of Safety Harbor v. State ex rel. Smith, 136 Fla. 636, 187 So.
173 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  15
Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 68 S. Ct. 641, 92 L. ed 784 18
Feldman v. United States, 64 S. Ct. 1082, 322 U.S. 487, 88 L, ed
1408, 154 A.L.R. 982_______________________________________ 25
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 55 S. Ct. 444, 294 U.S. 696, 79 L. ed 
1234, certiorari dismissed, 56 S. Ct. 183, 296 U.S. 207, 80 L.
ed 1 5 8 ___________________________________________________  ig
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 27 S. Ct. 618,
51 L. ed 1038 _____________________________________________  18
Holliday v. Pacific Atlantic S.S. Co., D.C. Del. 1953, 117 F. Supp.
729, affirmed 212 F. 2d 206 ________________________________  16
Hoxie v. N. Y., 73 A. 754, 82 Conn. 352 ______________________  23
In re Briley’s Estate, 155 Fla. 798, 21 So. 2d 595 ______________ 25, 26
In re Morris, Ala., 9 Wall. 605, 19 L. ed 799 __________________  16
In re Opinion of the Justices, 8 N.E. 2d 753, 297 Mass. 567 _______  25

Page

I

to
 b

o 
to



Page

Konkel v. State, 170 N.W. 715, 168 Wis. 335 ______________ __ 23
Magwire v. Tyler, 17 Wall. 253, 21 L. ed 576 __________________ 19, 20
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed 97 __________19, 20
Mayo v. Polk County, 169 So. 41, affirmed 81 Law ed 376 ______ 44
Miami v. Huttoe, 40 So. 2d 899 _____ _______________________  17
Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402, 86
L. ed 363 ______________________________________ ______........ 16
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed 579 ________ 19, 20, 24
Naim v. Naim 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E. 2d 849; 350 U.S. 985, 76 S.
Ct. 472, 100 L. ed 852 ________________ __________ ___ ____ ___  14
Nelson v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596, 10 So. 2d 131 ______ _________ 17
New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473, 51 S. Ct. 519, 75 L. ed
1176 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- 18
Parker v. Broom, 63 S. Ct. 307, 317 U.S. 341, 87 L. ed 315 ....... 23
Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark. 545, 577 _________________ _________ 26
People v. Daly, 105 N.E. 1048, 212 N. Y. 183 ...................................  23
People of the State of New York v. State of New Jersey and Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 256 U.S. 296, 41 S. Ct. 492, 65
L. ed 937 ______________________________________ __________  18
Ryan v. State, 58 S. Ct. 233, 302 U. S. 186, 82 L. ed 187________ 23
Safety Harbor v. State, 136 Fla. 636, 187 So. 1 7 3 _____________  17
Somlyo v. Schott, 45 So. 2d 502 ______________________  _____ 15
So. Fork Canal Co. v. Gordon, C. C. Cal. 1868, Fed case #13,189,
2 U.S. 479, 8 A.L.R. 279 ____________________________________ 16
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55
L. ed 619 ________________________________________________  18
Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 40 L. ed 960, 16 S. Ct. 754 ____19, 20
State ex rel American Legion 1941 Convention Corporation of Mil­
waukee v. Smith, 293 N.W. 161, 235 Wise. 443 _______________  25
State ex rel Bottome v. City of St. Petersburg, 126 Fla. 233, 170
So. 730 __________________________________________________  15
State ex rel. Carson v. Bateman, 131 Fla. 625, 180 So. 2 2 ________ 15
State v. Daytona Beach, 129 Fla. 896, 176 So. 847 _____________  17
State ex rel Gibbs v. Gordon, 138 Fla. 312, 189 So. 437 ________ 25
State ex rel Gibson v. City of Lakeland, 126 Fla. 342, 171 So.
227 ______________________________________________________  15
State of Florida, ex rel. Virgil D. Hawkins v. Board of Control of 
Florida, et al, 47 So. 2d 608 (1950), 53 So, 2d 116 (1951), 60 So.
2d 162 (1952), 83 So. 2d 20 (1955), 93 So. 2d 354 (1957). 342, 
U.S. 877, 72 S. Ct. 166, 96 L. ed 659; 347 U.S. 971, 74 S. Ct. 
783, 98 L. ed 1112; 350 U.S. 413, 76 S. Ct. 464, 100 L. ed 486;
reh. den. 351 U.S. 915, 76 S. Ct. 693, 100 L. ed 1449 ____1, 2, 3, 10, 28
State ex rel Long v. Carey, 121 Fla. 515, 164 So. 1 9 9___  15
State v. Miami, 153 Fla. 90, 13 So. 2d 707 _________     17
State ex rel Norman v. Holmer, 160 Fla. 434, 35 So. 2d 396 ____  15
State v. West Palm Beach, 141 Fla. 244, 193 So. 297 ___  17
State ex rel West Flagler Kennel Club v. Florida State Racing Com­
mission, 74 So. 2d 691 ____________________________________  15
Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 _________________ _______ 44

II



Page

Touchton v. Fort Pierce, 109 F. 2d 3 7 0 ______________________  17
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers, 
et al v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, et al., 351 U.S.
266, 76 S. Ct. 794, 100 L. ed 1162__________________________  21
United Enterprises v. Dubey, 128 Fed. 2d 843, 87 L. ed 537 ___ 45
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S. Ct.
632, 55 L. ed 663 ___________ _______________________________  18
United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 59 S. Ct. 795, 83 L. ed
1211______________________________________________________ 17
Urie v. Thompson, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 337 U.S. 163, 93 L. ed 1282 19
Westfall v. United States, 47 S. Ct. 629, 274 U.S. 256, 71 L. ed
1036 _______________________________________________________  25
Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 248, 26 L. ed 135________________19, 20

Statutes:
United States Code, Title 28 _______________________________  19
United States Code, Sections 1257(3), 1651(a) and 2106 of 
Title 28 _________________________________________________  2

Miscellaneous:
Congressional Record for 1956, Vol. 102, No. 54, p. 5092 ________ 38
Farewell Address of George Washington _________ _____ _ 24
Federalist P apers_____________________________      23
First Inaugural Address, Thomas Jefferson _______________________ 23
Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies, Section Edition, by
T. C. Spelling _____________________________________________  15
Martin, John Bartlow, “The Deep South Says Never,” Saturday
Evening Post of June 15, 1957 _______________________________  33
Myrdal, Gunnar, “An American Dilemma,” pages 58, 61 ________ 30

III



j^uprottr ( ta r t  of tfyr InitrtJ Stairs
O c to b er  T e e m , 1956

IN THE

No.

T h e  S t a t e  oe F lo r id a , e x  e e l . V ir g il  D. H a w k in s ,
Petitioner,

v.
T h e  B oard oe C o n t r o l , e t  a l .,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions of the United States Supreme Court are 

reported as follows: State of Florida, ex rel. Virgil D. 
Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, et al, 342 U.S. 
877, 72 S.Ct. 166, 96 L.ed. 659; 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct. 783 
98 L.ed. 1112; 350 U.S. 413, 76 S.Ct. 464, 100 L.ed. 486'; 
reh. den. 351 U.S. 915, 76 S.Ct. 693,100 L.ed. 1449, Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L.ed. 873, 
74 S.Ct. 686, 38 A.L.R. 2d 1180; and 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 
753, 99 L.ed. 1083. The opinions of the Florida Supreme 
Court are reported as follows: State ex rel. Hawkins v. 
Board of Control of Florida, et al, 47 So. 2d 608 (1950), 
53 So. 2d 116 (1951), 60 So. 2d 162 (1952), 83 So. 2d 20 
(1955), 93 So. 2d 354 (1957).

1



JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under Sections 

1257(3), 1651(a) and 2106 of Title 28 of the United States 
Code.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
May the Supreme Court of Florida in the exercise of 

its discretion delay the issuance of its writ of mandamus 
ordering petitioner’s admission to the University of Florida 
when such court has before it evidence that to order im­
mediate admission of petitioner at this time would work 
a serious public mischief and would seriously interefere 
with the proper operation of the State University System?

Did the Supreme Court of Florida act in violation of the 
instructions issued by this Court on March 12, 1956, when, 
predicated upon evidence received subsequent to the issu­
ance of such instructions to the effect that immediate 
admission of petitioner to the University of Florida would 
create havoc in the State University System and cause 
serious public mischief, said state court withheld the issu­
ance of its writ of mandamus pending the disclosure of 
evidence by petitioner that serious harm to the state and 
school system would not result thereby?

Should this Court refuse to accept the findings and de­
cision of the Florida Supreme Court and enter its own 
judgment ordering the immediate admission of petitioner 
to the University of Florida?

STATEMENT
The history of this case is found in State ex rel. Hawkins 

v. Board of Control, et al, (Fla.) 47 So. 2d 608; (Fla.) 53 
So. 2d 116, cert, denied 342 U.S. 877, 72 S.Ct. 166, 96 L,ed. 
659; (Fla.) 60 So. 2d 162, cert, granted 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.Ct. 
783, 98 L.ed. 1112; (Fla.) 83 So. 2d. 20, cert, denied 350 U.S. 
413, 76 S.Ct. 464, 100 L.ed. 486, reh. denied 351 U.S. 915, 76 
S.Ct. 693, 100 L.ed. 1449; (Fla.) 93 So. 2d 354.

2



On May 30, 1949, petitioner brought mandamus proceed­
ings in the Florida Supreme Court against respondents to 
compel his admission to the College of Law at the Uni­
versity of Florida. The Court, on August 1, 1950, ruled 
that similar facilities in the state for Negroes satisfied the 
equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. The Court did not enter a final order but retained 
jurisdiction in order to permit the parties to seek further 
relief at some later date. (Fla.) 47 So. 2d 608. On May 
15, 1951, petitioner filed a motion again in the Florida 
Supreme Court for a peremptory writ of mandamus. The 
motion was denied on June 15, 1951, on the grounds that 
no showing was made for the issuance of the writ. (Fla.) 
53 So. 2d 116. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The petition 
was denied on the grounds that no final judgment had 
been entered. 342 U.S. 877. The petitioner filed his motion 
for a peremptory writ of mandamus in the Florida Supreme 
Court again, and it was denied August 1, 1952. (Fla.) 60 
So. 2d 162. Reapplication was then made by petitioner to 
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

On May 24, 1954, the United States Supreme Court re­
manded petitioner’s cause to the Florida Supreme Court 
with directions that such cause be reconsidered “ in the 
light of the segregation cases decided May 17, 1954, Brown 
v. Board of Education, etc., and conditions that now prevail 
. . .  in order that such proceedings may be had in the said 
cause in conformity with the judgment and decree of this 
(United States Supreme) Court above stated, as, according 
to right and justice and the Constitution and Laws of the 
United States, or to be had therein . . . ” State ex rel 
Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U.S. 971, 74 S.C’t. 783, 
98 L.ed. 1112.

Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the Florida Supreme Court, on July 31, 1954,

3



entered an order directing the petitioner to amend his 
original petition in mandamus “ so as to place before this 
(Florida Supreme) Court the issues raised by the original 
petition ‘in the light of the segregation cases decided May 
17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Education etc., and conditions 
that now prevail,’ ” and directing the respondents “ to 
amend their return so as to present to this Court any 
answers they may have to said amended petition which 
will enable this Court to carry out the mandate of the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”

In due course, and prior to the ‘ ‘ implementation decree ’ ’ 
of the United States Supreme Court, respondent filed an 
amended return which, among other defenses, stated “ the 
admission of students of the Negro race to the University 
of Florida, as well as to other institutions of higher learn­
ing established for white students only, presents grave and 
serious problems affecting the welfare of all students and 
the institutions themselves and will require adjustments 
and changes at the institutions of higher learning; and re­
spondents cannot satisfactorily make the necessary changes 
and adjustments until all questions as to time and manner 
of establishing the new order shall have been decided on 
further consideration of the United States Supreme Court.” 
On October 19, 1955, the Supreme Court of Florida held, 
in essence, that although petitioner may not be constitu­
tionally denied admission to the University of Florida be­
cause of race, nevertheless the possible threat of mischief 
and economic havoc to the public and the state university 
system, and the attendant possible need for time to assure 
a proper and smooth transition to a new order in the State 
University System, lent validity tô  the above-mentioned 
defense of respondents, which was. designed to establish a 
predicate for an understanding of such need. The Supreme 
Court of Florida therefore determined that at least a need 
existed for intelligence in this regard before it could prop­
erly issue its peremptory writ of mandamus. The Supreme

4



Court of Florida considered this determination a fortiori 
essential and valid in light of this Court’s decision of May 
31, 1955, herein referred to as the “ implementation de­
cision,” wherein it was stated:

“ Full implementation of these constitutional principles 
may require solution of varied local school problems. 
School authorities have the primary responsibility of 
elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; 
courts will have to consider whether the action of 
school authorities constitutes good faith implementa­
tion of the governing constitutional principles. Because 
of their proximity to local conditions and the possible 
need for further hearings, the courts which originally 
heard these cases can best perform this judicial ap­
praisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to re­
mand the cases to those courts.
“ In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, 
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility 
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting 
and reconciling public and private needs. These eases 
call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of 
equity power.
“ At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in 
admission to public schools as soon as practicable on 
a non-discriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest 
may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in 
making the transition to school systems operated in 
accordance with the constitutional principles set forth 
in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may 
properly take into account the public interest in the 
elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effec­
tive manner. But it should go without saying that the 
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be 
allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with 
them.
“ While giving weight to these public and private con­
siderations, the courts will require that the defendants 
make a prompt and reasonable start toward full com­
pliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a

5



start has been made, the courts may find that addi­
tional time is necessary to carry ont the ruling in an 
effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants 
to establish that such time is necessary in the public 
interest and is consistent with good faith compliance 
at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts 
may consider problems related to administration, aris­
ing from the physical condition of the school plant, 
the school and transportation system, personnel, re­
vision of school districts and attendance areas into 
compact units to achieve a system of determining ad­
mission to the public schools on a non-racial basis, and 
revision of local laws and regulations which may be 
necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will 
also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants 
may propose to meet the problems and to effectuate 
a transition to a racially non-discriminatory school 
system. During this period of transition, the courts 
will retain jurisdiction of these cases.
“ The judgments below, except that in the Delaware 
case, are accordingly reversed and remanded to the 
district courts to take such proceedings and enter such 
orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are 
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a 
racially non-discriminatory basis with all deliberate 
speed the parties to these cases. . . .
“ It is so ordered.”

The Supreme Court of Florida further indicated that the 
clear import of the “ implementation decision” was that 
State Courts shall apply equitable principles in the deter­
mination of the time when segregated schools shall become 
integrated. Borrowing from the language of the ‘ ‘ implemen­
tation decision” the Florida Court said: “ these cases call 
for the exercise by the Courts of the traditional powers of 
an equity Court with particular reference to ‘its facilities 
for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs,’ 
and the ‘practical flexibility in shaping its remedies.’ ”

The Supreme Court of Florida decided that pursuant to

6



well established principles of equity and the directive of 
the “ implementation decision” to the effect that the Court 
retain jurisdiction “ during this period of transition,” the 
Court “ may properly take into account the public interest” 
as well as “ personal interest” of petitioner in the elimina­
tion of such obstacles as might impede a systematic and 
effective transition to the accomplishment of the results 
ordered by the United States Supreme Court.

It was the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida that, 
both under the equitable principles applicable to mandamus 
proceedings and the express command of the United States 
Supreme Court in its “ implementation decision,” the exer­
cise of a sound judicial discretion requires the Court to 
withhold, for the present, the issuance of a peremptory writ 
of mandamus in this cause pending subsequent determina­
tion of law and fact as to the time when the petitioner 
should be admitted to the University of Florida School of 
Law. The Florida Supreme Court, therefore, appointed 
the Honorable John A. H. Murplxree, Circuit Judge, as 
Commissioner of the Court, to take testimony from peti­
tioner and respondents and such witnesses as they may 
produce material to the issues alleged in the defense of the 
respondents as follows:

“ That the admission of the students of the Negro race 
to the University of Florida, as well as to the other 
state institutions of higher learning established for 
white students only, presents grave and serious prob­
lems affecting the welfare of all students and the 
institutions themselves, and will require numerous ad­
justments and changes at the institutions of higher 
learning; and respondents cannot satisfactorily make 
the necessary changes and adjustments until all ques­
tions as to time and manner of establishing the new 
order shall have been decided on the further considera­
tion thereof by the United States Supreme Court, at 
which time the necessary adjustments can be made as 
a part of one over-all pattern for all levels of education

7



as may be finally determined, and thereby greatly 
decrease the danger of serious conflicts, incidents and 
disturbances. . . . ”

Judge Murphree was directed to file a transcript of such 
testimony, without recommendations or findings of fact, 
to this Court within four months from the date of the order, 
which was October 19, 1955. (Fla.) 83 So. 2d 20.

On January 23, 1956, respondent requested an extension 
of time for the filing of such information by the Commis­
sioner for the following reasons:

(1) The assistant attorney general who handled the 
cause for respondents in the trial Court and the 
Supreme Court died during the pendency of this 
cause.

(2) The scope of the survey is so extensive that the 
information cannot be available for the Court by 
the due date of February 19, 1956, in that:
(a) such survey requires a study of student, faculty 

and parent attitudes toward integraton of Ne­
groes at the University of Florida Law School; 
and

(b) it will require a survey or analysis of the facili­
ties, students and faculties at Florida Agri­
cultural and Mechanical University (Negro in­
stitution), including an accurate estimate, if 
possible, as to number of students now attend­
ing such university who would seek transfer 
to the University of Florida School of Law, or 
to another school; and

(c) it will require a determination as to whether 
such order would result in an increase or de­
crease in the student population at the Univer­
sity of Florida which had not been contemplated 
by school authorities and for which no adminis­
trative planning has been accomplished; and

(d) such study will require consideration of the 
phenomenal growth of Florida’s population

8



which is directly related to overcrowded con­
ditions of the universities and public schools 
of the state and in which population increase, 
economic growth and swiftly changing social 
structure places Florida in a unique position 
and creates problems relating to school segre­
gation which do not exist to the same degree 
in other southern states; and

(e) the survey will require a thorough study and 
analysis to be made of the existing facilities 
at the University of Florida with regard to 
dormitory space, food and recreational facili­
ties, and the adequacy of such facilities to 
meet the needs of the present enrollment of a 
drastically increased or decreased enrollment 
which might result if Negroes are admitted to 
the University of Florida Law School at this 
time; and

(f) such survey will require a review of available 
data relating to known achievement level dis­
tinctions between white and Negro high school 
and college students in Florida, and a com­
parative analysis of the effect of such distinc­
tions upon administrative efforts to maintain 
and improve scholastic standards at Florida 
institutions of higher learning in general and 
upon the University of Florida Law School 
specifically if Negro students are integrated 
into the white universities at this time.

Respondents’ request for extension of time indicated that 
surveys and studies were presently being made relating 
to such problems and that such surveys and studies could 
not be completed and analyzed with any degree of accuracy 
prior to the expiration of the present school term. Re­
spondents also indicated that petitioner, in any event, would 
not be eligible for enrollment at the University of Florida 
School of Law until September, 1956, when the regular 
school term commences. It has been a long standing policy 
at the University of Florida that beginning law students 
cannot begin at the Summer Session.

9



The Florida Supreme Court granted respondents until 
May 31, 1956, in which to submit the requested information.

Petitioner, on January 16, 1956, rather than avail himself 
of the opportunity of presenting evidence before the court 
appointed Commissioner, sought in this Court the issuance 
of a writ of certiorari or any common law writ which might 
possibly be applicable to an interlocutory judgment of this 
nature.

On March 12, 1956, this Court denied petitioner’s request 
for certiorari, and in the same order vacated its mandate 
of May 24, 1954, to the Supreme Court of Florida (347 U.S. 
971), and substituted in lieu thereof an order instructing 
the Supreme Court to consider as applicable to the instant 
case certain other cases decided by this Court prior to 
the Brown decision and the “ implementing decision” and 
relating to graduate professional schools. 350 U.S. 413 
(App. A.)

Respondents requested a rehearing for the purpose of 
clarifying the intent of such substituted order, but such 
rehearing was denied. 351 U.S. 915.

Pursuant to the directions contained in the October 19, 
1955, opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, the court- 
appointed Commissioner, John A. H. Murphree, Circuit 
Judge, held testimony on May 21, 1956, on the question 
relating to the effect, if any, on the public, and State Uni­
versity System, of an immediate admission of petitioner to 
the University of Florida. Counsel of record for the re­
spective parties were duly notified of the hearing, but 
neither the petitioner nor his counsel made an appearance. 
As part of the record Judge Murphree made the following 
statement:

“ I would say for the record that at a conference last 
January, about January 27, between myself as Com­

10



missioner in this cause, and Mr. Odom, of the Attorney 
General’s office, and Mr. Hill, who represents Hawkins, 
that this present hearing was scheduled at 9:30 this 
morning, and that I advised the parties at that time 
that the Commissioner would expect to receive the 
evidence submitted by the Board of Control first and 
would then hear from Hawkins. On May 14 I wrote 
to counsel for the respective parties in this case and 
reminded them of my letter of January 27 which sched­
uled this hearing for this morning at 9:30; and when 
Hill and Hawkins did not show up at 9:30 this morning 
I telephoned Mr. Hill’s office to find out if by chance 
he had met with mishap on his way to Gainesville, 
and his secretary advised that he did not intend to 
attend the hearing. As Commissioner, I, therefore, 
assume that nothing will be presented on behalf of 
Hawkins. Unless the Board of Control has something 
further, this hearing is concluded.”

At this hearing the Commissioner accepted into evidence, 
after the proper legal predicate was laid, a survey con­
ducted by the State Board of Control. This survey was 
instituted in an effort to make a determination as to 
whether serious administrative and other problems would 
be encountered as a result of the Florida Supreme Court 
decree that a member of the Negro race should not be denied 
admission to the University of Florida. A factual compila­
tion of the attitudes of the students, parents of the students, 
faculties, alumni, and health service employees, of the three 
State universities toward desegregation, was contained in 
such survey, including the attitude of parents of white and 
Negro high school seniors toward desegregation.

Being germane to the question, the survey also included 
a study made by the Board of Control of the physical facili­
ties at the three State universities to determine their current 
use, what additional facilities might be available because of 
anticipated construction, and whether any shortage might 
exist by the fiscal year 1959-60. The study included a

11



survey of classroom, food service, health service, housing, 
library, and recreational facilities.

On May 28, 1956, the Commissioner filed a transcript of 
the above-mentioned testimony “ without recommendations 
or findings of fact” to the Supreme Court of Florida in 
accordance with such Court’s directive of October 19, 1955. 
83 So. 2d 20.

On June 20, 1956, petitioner applied to the Supreme 
Court of Florida for the issuance of a peremptory writ of 
mandamus ordering his immediate admission to the Uni­
versity of Florida. A hearing was held on such application 
before the Supreme Court of Florida on September 4, 1956, 
at which time both parties to the cause presented their 
respective arguments.

On February 19, 1957, respondents moved the Supreme 
Court of Florida to refer this cause to a Commissioner 
appointed by the court “ for the purpose of receiving testi­
mony from the Petitioner and Respondents and such other 
witnesses as either party may produce relative to matters 
previously unknown to Respondents, and recently discov­
ered evidence affecting the bona fides of this cause, said 
evidence having been received by the State of Florida 
Legislative Investigating Committee on February 4 through 
February 7, 1957, or at times subsequent thereto.”

The motion for referral to a Commissioner for the purpose 
of taking testimony on the bona fides of this cause was 
denied by the Supreme Court of Florida on February 26, 
1957, which order of denial was subsequently corrected on 
March 5,1957. On May 31, 1957, subsequent to such denial, 
an investigating committee of the Florida Legislature cre­
ated for the purpose of investigating groups, both white 
and Negro, suspected of functioning for the purpose of 
creating racial strife and discord within the State of

12



Florida, submitted a report of its findings and recommen­
dations. (App. C.) One of the Committee’s recommenda­
tions requested that a copy of the testimony given before 
such committee “ be made available to the proper officials 
of the Florida Bar and the state attorneys having juris­
diction where the hearings were held, with the request 
that the same be carefully studied and if violations of law 
or ethics have occurred that proper proceedings be insti­
tuted against any such offender.” Such testimony included 
statements made by Horace E. Hill, the original counsel 
of record for petitioner in this cause. On May 27, 1957, 
said counsel of record, alleging ill health, requested and 
received the permission of the Supreme Court of Florida 
to withdraw from this cause.

On March 8, 1957, the Supreme Court of Florida rendered 
its decision to defer final judgment in this cause, and to 
delay the issuance of its peremptory writ of mandamus in 
light of properly presented factual information prompting 
the application of principles of equity necessary in the 
consideration of the issuance of such writ, and delaying 
the issuance of such writ until the facts will permit, or 
until the petitioner is prepared to present testimony which 
will obviate the necessity of applying such principles.

13



ARGUMENT
P A R T I: THE LAW

Argument of law in response to questions presented in 
Petitioner’s brief:

This Court, in its order to the Supreme Court of Florida 
of March 12, 1956, said: . . The judgment is vacated
and the case is remanded on the authority of the Segre­
gation Cases decided May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483. As this case involves the admis­
sion of a Negro to a graduate professional school, there is 
no reason for delay. He is entitled to prompt admission 
under the rules and regulations applicable to other quali­
fied candidates.” (Emphasis supplied.) (App. A.) Re­
spondents and the Supreme Court of Florida, in light of 
sound reason and the necessary employment of legal and 
equitable principles, can only logically interpret the lan­
guage of this order as having reference to the question of 
race. Argumentum ah inconvenienti plurimum valet in lege. 
Aside from race, it is manifest that constitutional, legal 
and practicable reasons may exist at times to deny or 
delay the admission of an applicant to a state university, 
whether he be white or Negro. It is also evident that if 
petitioner’s interpretation were accepted it would abrogate 
the long-established rule which denies to federal courts the 
right to regulate or control long-established rules of pro­
cedure adopted by the state courts for the administration 
of justice therein, cf. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E. 2d 
849; 350 U.S. 985, 76 S.Ct. 472, 100 L.ed. 852.

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court of Florida adhered 
to the above-mentioned order of this Court that as to the 
issue of race there is no reason for delaying petitioner’s 
admission to the University of Florida. However, such 
order did not foreclose the authority of the Supreme Court 
of Florida to exercise its discretion to determine that it

14



was necessary and essential to consider other issues of 
vital importance to the public interest and safety of the 
State of Florida before issuing its peremptory writ of 
mandamus.

Even in a case where a clear legal right is shown, the 
exercise of jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus rests, 
to a considerable extent, within the sound discretion of the 
Court, subject, however, to the well-settled principles which 
have been established by the courts or fixed by statute; 
and evidence will usually be received, upon request of the 
respondent, to show that the writ should not issue. Re­
spondents understand of course that such discretion is not 
absolute but yet the court may refuse the issuance of such 
writ even though warranted by the rules of law, if hardship 
or injustice would result to the opposite or to third parties 
from granting it. See Injunctions and Other Extraordinary 
Remedies, Second Edition, by T. C. Spelling.

The Supreme Court of Florida has held on numerous 
occasions that the writ of mandamus is discretionary and 
is only granted in the sound discretion of the court, and 
will decline its use if to do so would tend to work a serious 
mischief. State ex rel Long v. Carey, 121 Fla. 515, 164 So. 
199; Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 179 So. 695, 115 A.L.R. 
857; State ex rel West Flagler Kennel Club v. Florida State 
Racing Commission, 74 So. 2d 691; State ex rel Norman v. 
Holmer, 160 Fla. 434, 35 So. 2d 396; Somlyo v. Schott, 45 
So. 2d 502; City of Safety Harbor v. State ex rel Smith, 
136 Fla. 636, 187 So. 173; State ex rel Carson v. Bateman, 
131 Fla. 625, 180 So. 22; State ex rel Gibson v. City of 
Lakeland, 126 Fla. 342, 171 So. 227; State ex rel Bottome 
v. City of St. Petersburg, 126 Fla. 233, 170 So. 730.

Where a superior court issues its mandate to the lower 
court with instructions to accomplish a certain act but 
without indicating how such act shall be performed, it has

15



been held that a large measure of discretion exists as to 
the manner of performance. Holliday v. Pacific Atlantic 
S.S. Co., J3.C. Del. 1953, 117 P.Supp. 729, affirmed 212 F. 2d 
206. The duty of the court below to obey and give effect 
to the mandate of the Supreme Court is effective only to 
the extent practicable. In re Morris, Ala., 9 Wall. 605, 
19 L.ed. 799.

The action of the Supreme Court of Florida in delaying 
the issuance of its writ of mandamus was not contrary to 
the letter or spirit of the mandate of this court issued on 
March 12, 1956. Subsequent to such order of this Court 
the Supreme Court of Florida obtained evidence indicating 
that issues other than race existed which required the 
application of equitable principles prompting the delay of 
such writ. This action was in harmony with the principle 
that the mandate of the Supreme Court must be promptly 
and implicitly enforced by the Court below unless modified 
or restrained by subsequent evidence. So. Fork Canal Co. 
v. Gordon, C.C.Cal. 1868, Fed. case #13,189, 2 TJ.S. 479, 
8 A.L.R. 279.

The Florida Supreme Court upon receipt of testimony 
received by its Commissioner considered it essential to 
apply equitable principles and thereby delay the issuance 
of its writ. It is a well-established principle that a court 
of equity is never active against conscience or public con­
venience. Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How. 189, 11 L.ed. 97. 
This Court has always, felt it proper to apply principles of 
equity against the enforcement of legal doctrines upon the 
disclosure that the public interest might be affected ad­
versely by the immediate enforcement of a legal decree. 
It is also manifest that courts of equity may appropriately 
withhold their aid when the plaintiff is using the writ 
asserted in a manner contrary to the public interest. Morton 
Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86 
L.ed. 363. Although mandamus is a common-law remedy,

16



the Supreme Court of Florida has consistently held that 
the application and enforcement of such writ should be 
governed by equitable principles. State v. Daytona Beach, 
129 Fla. 896, 176 So. 847; State v. West Palm Beach, 141 
Fla. 244,193 So. 297; Miami v. Huttoe, 40 So. 2d 899; Safety 
Harbor v. State, 136 Fla. 636, 187 So. 173; Bradenton v. 
State, 118 Fla. 838, 160 So. 506, 100 A.L.R. 400: Nelson v. 
Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596, 10 So. 2d 131; State v. Miami, 153 
Fla. 90, 13 So. 2d 707; State v. Board of Control, 83 So. 2d 
20. Such is also true of the federal application of such writ. 
Touchton v. Fort Pierce, 109 F. 2d 370.

The Supreme Court of Florida, in light of testimony re­
ceived by its Commissioner, considered it necessary to 
adopt these long adhered to principles in order to avoid 
public mischief and the occurrence of serious administra­
tive problems in the operation of the State University 
System. These considerations are manifestly essential if 
an orderly and peaceful transition to the new order created 
by the Brown decision is to be made. The extent to which 
a court of equity may grant or withhold its aid and the 
manner of molding its remedies may be dictated or effected 
by the public interest involved. United States v. Morgan, 
307 U.S. 183, 59 S.Ct. 795, 83 L.ed. 1211.

The State of Florida has experienced success in main­
taining an emotional equilibrium in the wake of this Court’s 
ruling prohibiting segregation in the public schools. This 
is attributable to the application of long-established equita­
ble principles by the Supreme Court of Florida in dealing 
with this problem. Traditionally, equity has been charac­
terized by practicable flexibility in shaping its remedies 
and by the facilities for adjusting and recognizing public 
and private needs. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.ed. 1083. In some cases 
it is essential that a court apply equitable principles in

17



order to strike a proper balance between the needs of the 
plaintiff and the consequence of giving the desired relief. 
Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 68 S.Ct. 641, 92 L.ed. 
784. The necessary flexibility of established forms em­
ployed by courts of equity permit proceedings and remedies 
to be adapted to the circumstances of each individual case 
and their formulation in such a manner as to safeguard, 
adjust and enforce the rights of all parties. Alexander v. 
Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 56 S.Ct. 204, 80 L.ed. 192.

The Supreme Court of Florida in its last decision, predi­
cated upon the evidence before it, decided that it should 
delay the issuance of its writ at this time. Having so 
decided, the Supreme Court of Florida deferred final judg­
ment and offered petitioners an opportunity to present 
evidence before it, at any time, which would indicate that 
such a writ could be issued without attendant mischief. 
Deferring judgment and permitting time is not novel, this 
Court having consistently permitted time in the implemen­
tation of decrees involving long-established public policy 
which affected the public interest. Recognizing that certain 
decrees present an urgent need for adjustment this Court 
has permitted time in which to overcome the many prob­
lems attendant in such adjustment. United States v. Amer­
ican Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632, 55 L.ed. 663; 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 
55 L.ed. 619. The need for a period of gradual transition 
in some cases has been held by this Court to be a valid and 
necessary consideration. Hew Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 
473, 51 S.Ct. 519,75 L.ed. 1176; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 27 S.Ct. 618, 51 L.ed. 1038; People of the 
State of New York v. State of New Jersey and Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 256 U.S. 296, 41 S.Ct. 492, 
65 L.ed. 937.

The Supreme Court of Florida having deferred judgment, 
petitioner’s request for certiorari is premature inasmuch

18



as such writ is applicable to final judgments. Fox Film \ 
Corp. v. Muller, 55 S.Ct. 444, 294 U.S. 696, 79 L.ed. 1234, j 
certiorari dismissed, 56 S.Ct. 183, 296 U.S. 207, 80 L.ed. 158; j  
Bruce v. Tobin, 38 S.Ct. 7, 245 U.S. 18, 62 L.ed. 123; Urie v./ 
Thompson, 69 S.Ct. 1018; 337 U.S. 163, 93 L.ed. 1282.

Petitioner cites five eases in his brief for the proposition 
that this Court has authority under Title 28, United States 
Code, to enter its own judgment in a case of this nature, 
in that “ in the past (it) has issued such judgments, espe­
cially in situations where a state court has failed to act in 
conformity with a prior mandate of this Court.” The cases 
cited for such proposition are: Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
1 Wheat. 304, 4 L.ed. 97; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 4 L.ed. 579; Magwire v. Tyler, 17 Wall. 253, 21 L.ed. 
576; Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 248, 26 L.ed. 135; and 
Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 40 L.ed. 960,16 S.Ct. 754.

A valid distinction exists between each of the cited cases 
and the case at bar. In both Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 
supra, and Williams v. Bruffy, supra, the cases were ap­
pealed to this Court and subsequently reversed and re­
manded with directions to the Virginia Court of Appeals.
In both cases the Virginia Court of Appeals questioned 
the authority of this Court to issue such mandate. In the 
Martin case, the Virginia Court said, “ This Court is unani­
mously of the opinion that an appellate power of the Su­
preme Court of the United States does not extend to this 
Court . . . ” In the Williams case, the same court said, 
“ For these reasons this Court, with highest respect and 
consideration for the Supreme Court of the United States, 
must decline to take any further action with respect to 
the mandate of said court.”

In Magwire v. Tyler, supra, the case was remanded by 
the United States Supreme Court on second hearing to the 
Supreme Court of Missouri with directions. The Supreme

19



Court of Missouri carried out the minority portion of the 
mandate and then ignored any authority of this Court in 
such regard by dismissing the case. On the third hearing 
of this case this Court said, “ The Missouri Supreme Court 
has no power to evade or reverse the United States Supreme 
Court. ’ ’

It is true that in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 
supra, this Court entered its own judgment but it is equally 
true that such judgment was not the result of the refusal 
of a state court to obey a prior mandate of this Court.

Stanley v. Schwalby, supra, is cited by petitioner as a 
case wherein this Court remanded a case and ordered its 
own judgment (see footnote 1, page 2, Petitioner’s brief). 
It is to be noted, however, from a reading of the opinion 
of this case, that the judgment was reversed by this Court 
and the case was remanded “ with instructions.”

Respondents consider it equally important to point out 
that the aforementioned cases cited by petitioner in his 
brief range chronologically from 1816 to 1895, and deal 
with a variety of subjects, none of which are germane to 
the subject at hand: ‘rA treaty and title to land” (Martin 
v. Hunter); “ Federal Banks v. State Taxation” (McCulloch 
v. Maryland); “ Right to title of real property involving a 
Secretary of Interior’s ruling” (Magwire v. Tyler); “ Debts 
and rights of citizens of northern and southern states after 
the Civil W ar” (Williams v. Bruffy); and “ Right of title 
to real property occupied by Federal troops” (Stanley v. 
Schwalby).

Not only are the points for which the above cases are 
cited distinguishable from the case at bar but the facts 
involved and the entire surrounding circumstances in each 
of the cases are far afield from the interest at hand. The 
above cases are cited by petitioner in his brief for the

20



proposition that this Court should consider that the Su­
preme Court of I  lorida has disobeyed this Court ’s mandate 
of March 12, 1956, and should therefore enter its own judg­
ment. A careful study of the proceedings of the Supreme 
Court of Florida subsequent to the issue of this Court’s 
mandate of March 12, 1956, will show that the actions of 
the Supreme Court of Florida have been completely dis­
similar to the actions of the inferior courts in the cited 
cases. The Supreme Court of Florida has neither disobeyed 
nor evaded the mandate of this Court. Such cases did not 
involve the public interest and welfare of a sovereign state 
to the degree manifest in the case at bar and should there­
fore have no applicability or persuasion to the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Florida which is predicated entirely 
on the grounds that it has the duty, responsibility, and the 
inherent authority to act in such a way as to avoid public 
mischief in this state. The Supreme Court of Florida has 
indicated its willingness to carry out this Court’s mandate 
without causing public mischief.

On June 4, 1956, this Court entered an order in the case 
of United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Imple­
ment Workers, et al v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Board et al, 351 U.S. 266, 76 S.Ct. 794, 100 L.ed. 1162 and, 
where applicable to the instant case, stated: “ the dominant 
interest of the state in preventing violence and property 
damage cannot be questioned. It is a matter of genuine 
local concern. The states are the natural guardians
against public violence. It is the local communities that 
suffer most from the fear and loss occasioned by coercion 
and destruction. We would not interpret an Act of Congress 
to leave them powerless to avert such emergencies without 
compelling directions to that effect. We hold that Wis­
consin may enjoin the violent Union conduct herein in­
volved. The fact that Wisconsin has chosen to entrust its 
powers to a Labor Board is of no concern to this Court.”

21



This case clearly recognizes the constitutional powers of 
of states to exercise reasonable and proper authority to 
avoid disorder, and, in the language of this Court, to act 
as “ the natural guardians of the people against violence.”

The only distinction which may be made in the Wisconsin 
case, supra, and the case at bar, is that in the Wisconsin 
case this Court was considering a conflict between an Act 
of Congress and a Wisconsin state statute providing ad­
ministrative safeguards. In the case at bar there is no 
conflict between Federal and state laws, since Congress 
has not enacted any legislation on the subject of state school 
segregation, and the only apparent conflict is whether this 
Court’s previous pronouncements on the issue of racial 
segregation in public institutions of learning should be in­
terpreted and enforced in a manner that refuses to recog­
nize, and over-rides, the inherent powers of the State of 
Florida to safeguard the peace and welfare of its people 
through the administrative processes provided by state 
constitutional and legislative provisions, and by the appli­
cation of equitable principles in the public interest by the 
Supreme Court of Florida.

In certain areas of government, States’ rights have been 
surrendered to the Federal Government, but in such cases 
the avenue by which the United States Supreme Court en­
ters the State Judiciary is by certiorari, a privilege granted 
to the Supreme Court by the States. In no instance has 
the Supreme Court been given the “ right” to reply to cer­
tiorari except by “ mandate” and “ direction” to the state 
courts. Should the United States Supreme Court issue a 
direct order to the Board of Control and by-pass the State 
Court, it would not only be usurping its power but it would 
deny the people of the State of Florida their rights to the 
judicial discretion which might otherwise be exercised by 
the Supreme Judiciary of this State, a body which is far 
more familiar with the problems of the people of Florida 
than any other court in the Union.

22



It is a fundamental principle of law that a state has all 
the sovereign powers of an independent nation over all 
persons within its territorial limits subject to the restraints 
of the Federal Constitution, Ryan v. State, 58 S.Ct. 233, 
302 U.S. 186, 82 L.ed. 187; Parker v. Brown, 63 S.Ct. 307, 
317 U.S. 341, 87 L.ed. 315.

The dual nature of the American Government, while 
simple in theory, frequently presents practical complexities 
which are difficult to harmonize. People v. Daly, 105 N.E. 
1048, 212 N.Y. 183. No boundary separating the field of 
state and federal control can be marked out for the reason 
that in many cases they overlap, and for this reason it may 
be difficult at first to determine which court has authority 
to operate within the state. Konkel v. State, 170 N.W. 715, 
168 Wis. 335.

Under the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution recog­
nizes the necessary independent existence of the states 
within their proper spheres and their attendant indepen­
dent authority. Hoxie v. N.Y., 73 A. 754, 82 Conn. 352. In 
this regard the Federalist Papers contain the following 
statement:

“ The powers delegated by the proposed constitution 
to the federal government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the state government are nu­
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally upon external objects, as war, peace, nego­
tiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the 
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. 
The powers reserved to the several states will extend 
to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of 
the people, and the internal order, improvement and 
prosperity of the state.”

Thomas Jefferson’s first Inaugural Address stressed the

23



importance of permitting the individual states to manage

their internal operations when he stated:
“ I will compress them (said the President) within the 
narrowest compass they will bear, stating the general 
principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact 
justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, re­
ligious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friend­
ship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; 
the support of the State Governments in all their rights, 
as the most competent administrations for our domes­
tic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti­
republican tendencies; . . (emphasis supplied)

The importance of this federal-state relationship was 
noted by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 
4 Wheat. 316, when he stated:

“ No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think 
of breaking down the lines which separate the states 
and of compounding the American people into one 
common mass.”

George Washington pointed up this important consid­
eration when he stated in his Farewell Address:

“ If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or 
modification of the constitutional powers be in any 
particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment 
in the way which the constitution designates. But let 
there be no change by usurpation, for, though this, in 
one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the 
customary weapon by which free governments are 
destroyed. The precedent must always greatly over­
balance in permanent evil any partial or transient 
benefit which the use may at any time yield.”

Permitting the individual state to handle without inter­
ference matters of strictly local concern is in harmony with 
the principle that every state as an integral member of the

24



Federal Nation has the duty to aid in the preservation of 
the Nation and to that end to do everything within its means 
and power. State ex rel American Legion 1941 Convention 
Corporation of Milwaukee v. Smith, 293 N.W. 161, 235 
Wise. 443.

It is equally true that the Federal Government owes the 
same obligation to the states to aid in the preservation 
thereof by contributing to the peace and harmony therein. 
While there are two distinct sovereignties, federal and 
state, they are designed and expected to be adapted to 
each other to work together in harmony, the Federal Gov­
ernment exercising those powers granted to it by the States, 
each mutually and independent of the other. See Feldman 
v. United States, 64 S.Ct. 1082, 322 U.S. 487, 88 L.ed. 1408, 
154 A.L.R. 982; In re Opinion of the Justices, 8 N.E. 2d 
753, 297 Mass. 567; State ex rel Gibbs v. Gordon, 138 Fla. 
312, 189 So. 437. State governments possess all the powers 
incident to political government and not delegated to the 
United States. See Bute v. People of State of 111., 68 S.Ct. 
763, 333 U.S. 640, 92 L.ed. 986.

Although the sovereign states have delegated exclusive 
jurisdiction in certain enumerated eases, such has not been 
done in the field of education and, hence, in this and other 
such matters the dual sovereignty of the State and the 
United States continue to exist. See Westfall v. United 
States, 47 S.Ct. 629, 274 U.S. 256, 71 L.ed. 1036. The line 
of operation between the United States and the several 
states as to jurisdiction and sovereignty is clear in its 
constitutional aspects and, although it is sometimes diffi­
cult to define, it is sharply maintained. In re Opinion of 
the Justices, supra.

It is and has been established policies of both State 
and Federal Governments to treat possible conflicts be­
tween their powers in such a manner as to produce as little

25



conflict and friction as possible. Bute v. People of Illinois, 
supra. Where two sovereignties operate in the same area, 
one with delegated and the other with reserved powers, 
if conflicts arise in the exercise of some spheres of power, 
they should be resolved in a way that neither sovereignty 
will be hampered in the exercise of a power in which the 
public welfare requires that it be the supreme exponent. 
See In re Briley’s Estate, 155 Fla. 798, 21 So. 2d 595.

The state and federal government should operate in 
perfect harmony. Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark. 545, 577. This 
Court considered the importance of this maxim when, in 
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 2 S.Ct. 10, 27 L.ed 359, 
it stated: “ For the sake of harmony and to avoid confusion, 
the Federal Courts will lean towards an agreement of views 
with the state courts if the question seems to them balanced 
with doubt. Acting on these principles, founded as they 
are on comity and good sense, the Courts of the United 
States, without sacrificing their own dignity as independent 
tribunals, endeavor to avoid, and in most cases do avoid 
any unseemly conflict with the well-considered decisions 
of the state courts.”

Petitioner would have this Court assume that the Su­
preme Court of Florida has arbitrarily flouted its mandate. 
This is a subtle but oft-used method of influencing another 
to gain an objective by suggesting that such other’s rightful 
prerogatives and authority have been flagrantly violated 
by the one sought to be worsted. It is an appeal in part 
to pride and the attribute of superiority. However, we 
do not believe this high Court will be so subtly and psycho­
logically digressed from the law to an unwarranted assump­
tion that its superiority has been flouted.

This Court will recognize that the Supreme Court of 
Florida is conscious of its duty and responsibility in the 
case; that the Florida Court after due investigation is

26



seriously concerned with factual conditions other than race; 
and that it is not flouting but it is attempting to avoid 
untoward events and protect petitioner and others from a 
premature and mischief provoking contretemps.

This Court we believe will not arrogantly brush aside 
as impertinent a delay by the Supreme Court of Florida 
based on factual considerations and local conditions. Courts 
do not move on predicates which allow no consideration of 
facts or conditions. Equity is not arrogant. It proceeds 
cautiously in the light of facts and the public interest.

We sincerely believe that in this dilemma where there 
is in process an experimentation in seeking to adjust legal 
rights with customs, usages, traditions, prior laws, the high 
Court of this Nation will welcome the counsel, the prudence, 
and the careful considerations of a state appellate court 
unless and until it is shown that the latter is acting in bad 
faith. We submit bad faith is not shown on the part of 
the Supreme Court of Florida by petitioner, rather peti­
tioner in his extreme desire to win his point at all costs 
would have this great Court completely disregard and 
peremptorily strike down the very moderate, mild and 
reasonable determination of the Florida Court that some 
delay is expedient for reasons other than race.

27



PART II

FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

The question of the immediate admission of a student 
of the Negro race to the University of Florida cannot be 
considered as isolated from broad general considerations 
involving both legal and factual matters which result in 
the social dilemma of racial segregation.

The prime issue here is one of fact, not law. The two 
should not be confused. This Court overlooked this con­
sideration when it stated in its March 12, 1956, opinion 
in this case (State of Florida ex rel. Virgil Hawkins vs. 
Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 100 L.ed. 486, 76 S.Ct. 
464), that it had already ordered the admissionfos a matter 
of legal right) of negroes to institutions of higher learning 
in three other states and that therefore “ there is no reason 
for delay” in Florida.

Such an inference assumes without proof of any kind 
that the factual situation some years ago in university 
integration cases in other states is identical to the factual 
situation in Florida in 1956.

To rely on a previous legal ruling as to constitutional 
rights in Oklahoma as authority for an assumption as to 
factual conditions in Florida is illustrative of the common 
fallacy in logic termed “ irrelevant conclusion” or possibly, 
if it is blindly adhered to, argmnenhum ad baculum (appeal 
to force).

In its opinion in this case filed by the Supreme Court of 
Florida on March 8, 1957, the court said:

“ It is unthinkable that the Supreme Court of the 
United States would attempt to convert into a writ 
of right that which has for centuries at common law 
and in this state been considered a discretionary writ;

28



nor can we conceive that that court would hold that 
the highest court of a sovereign state does not have 
the right to control the effective date of its own dis­
cretionary process. Yet, this would be the effect of 
the court’s order, under the interpretation contended 
for by the Eelator. We will not assume that the court 
intended such a result. ’ ’

Speaking further the court said:

“ We cannot assume that the Supreme Court intended 
to deprive the highest court of an independent sover­
eign state of one of its traditional powers, that is, the 
right to exercise a sound judicial discretion as to the 
date of the issuance of its process in order to prevent 
a serious public mischief.”

In support of these contentions and its findings that the 
writ sought by the petitioner in this case should be delayed 
in the interest of the public welfare, the Supreme Court of 
Florida reviewed briefly the facts developed by a commis­
sioner appointed by the court and submitted to it. It took 
note of the fact that although the Eelator (petitioner) had 
due notice and an opportunity to be heard at all hearings 
scheduled by the commissioner, he did not appear nor did 
he attempt to present any testimony in support of his right 
to immediate admission. The voluminous testimony, sur­
veys and factual findings submitted to the Florida Supreme 
Court by its commissioner presented an overwhelming case 
in favor of caution and delay in the issuance of a writ 
which would order the petitioner’s admission to the Uni­
versity of Florida. All of this testimony and factual ma­
terial were properly presented to the Supreme Court of 
Florida through its commissioner and are now a part of 
the record of this case and available for the information 
and guidance of this Court.

The Supreme Court of Florida reached the conclusion 
that its “ study of the results of the survey material to the

29



question here, and other material evidence, leads inevitably 
to the conclusion that violence in university communities 
and a critical disruption of the university system would 
occur if Negro students are permitted to enter the state 
white universities at this time, including the Law School of 
the University of Florida, of which it is an integral part. 
This Court has an opportunity to prevent the incidents of 
violence which are, even now, occurring in various parts of 
this country as a result of the states’ efforts to enforce the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the Brown case.”

The allusion to general conditions prevailing throughout 
the country and the realities of the situation are recognized 
in a book which has come to be considered authoritative 
on racial matters. This book, “ An American Dilemma,” 
by Gfunnar Myrdal, page 58, makes the following statement:

‘ ‘ This attitude of refusing to consider amalgamation— 
felt and expressed in the entire country—constitutes 
the center in the complex of attitudes which can be 
described as the ‘common denominator’ in the prob­
lem. It defines the Negro group in contradistinction to 
all the non-colored minority groups in America and all 
other lower class groups. The boundary between Negro 
and white is not simply a class line which can be suc­
cessfully crossed by education, integration into the na­
tional culture, and individual economic advancement. 
The boundary is fixed. It is not a temporary expedi­
ency during an apprenticeship in the national culture. 
It is a bar erected with the intention of permanency. 
It is directed against the whole group.” (Emphasis 
supplied)

And

“Almost unanimously white Americans have communi­
cated to the author the following logic of the case 
situation which we shall call the ‘white man’s theory 
of color caste.’ (Emphasis supplied)

30



“ (1) The concern for ‘race purity’ is basic in the 
whole issue; the primary and essential command 
is to prevent amalgamation; the whites are de­
termined to utilize every means to this end.

“ (2) Rejection of ‘social equality’ is to be understood 
as a precaution to hinder miscegenation and par­
ticularly intermarriage.

“ (3) The danger of miscegenation is so tremendous 
that the segregation and discrimination inherent 
in the refusal of ‘social equality’ must be ex­
tended to nearly all spheres of life. There must 
be segregation and discrimination in recreation, 
in religious service, in education, before the law, 
in politics, in housing, in stores and in bread­
winning. ’ ’

Myrdal throughout his book clearly evidences a genuine 
concern for the plight of the Negro in America but we feel 
that the tenor of his book is in sharp contradiction to the 
reasoning and arguments of the petitioner in this case who 
insists that his right to enter the University of Florida is 
personal and present, should be granted immediately, and 
no other factors should be considered. In this connection 
we agree with Myrdal’s statement on page 61 of his book 
cited above:

“ Negroes are in desperate need of jobs and bread, even 
more so than of justice in the courts, and of the vote. 
These latter needs are, in their turn, more urgent even 
than better schools and playgrounds, or, rather they 
are primary means of reaching equality in the use of 
community facilities. Such facilities are, in turn, more 
important than civil courtesies. The marriage matter, 
finally, is of rather distant and doubtful interest. ’ ’

The truth of Myrdal’s assertion as to the almost total 
opposition of white citizens to an enforced integration of 
schools at any level is confirmed by an abundance of reliable

31



evidence dealing specifically with Florida which will be 
dealt with subsequently in this brief.

Voicing this opposition as an official expression of the 
feelings of the white people of Florida, the Florida Legis­
lature adopted a resolution of interposition in its 1957 ses­
sion. Said resolution has been made a part of and is at­
tached to this brief as Appendix B.

This resolution which is not without historical precedent, 
we construe to be the strongest possible form of protest 
which can be legally filed by the people of a sovereign state 
in opposition to an action of any branch of the Federal 
government which the people consider to be inherently 
wrong. We do not view this resolution as being an unlawful 
defiance of the authority of this Court but we do respect­
fully submit that it is an official, sincere expression of the 
feelings of a free people which should be given due con­
sideration by this Court in determining the wisdom and 
authority of the action of the Supreme Court of Florida 
in delaying the issuance of its writ of mandamus which 
would compel petitioner’s immediate admission to the Uni­
versity of Florida.

Further concern because of racial problems in Florida 
is reflected in a report of an Investigative Committee of 
the Florida Legislature. This report which, was submitted 
to the Florida Legislature on May 31, 1957, is made a part 
of and attached to this brief as Appendix C.

The report contains the following statement relating to 
the bona tides of this case.

“ In the opinion of counsel, the record discloses that 
certain attorneys for the NAACP have engaged in un­
ethical conduct in violation of the canons of ethics 
governing the practice of law in Florida. I t likewise 
discloses the very strong possibility that some of the

32



witnesses before this committee committed perjury. 
Therefore, it is recommended that a copy of the perti­
nent testimony be made available to the proper officials 
of the Florida Bar and the state attorneys having 
jurisdiction where the hearings were held, with the 
request that the same be carefully studied and if viola­
tions of law or ethics have occurred that proper pro­
ceedings be instituted against any such offender.

“ The Florida State Teachers Association has con­
cerned itself with integration law suits. It, together 
with the NAACP, has been one of the prime movers in 
instigating the filing of the Virgil Hawkins case, to 
which the Florida State Teachers Association has been 
one of the principal financial contributors. The record 
shows that Virgil Hawkins and the other plaintiffs 
involved in this case had virtually no control over the 
course of this litigation and absolutely no financial 
responsibility for the same, the case having been han­
dled and controlled entirely by persons and organiza­
tions other than the individual plaintiffs.

“ A much more damaging report as to the NAACP’s 
activities would undoubtedly be dictated by the record 
except for the fact that all records of NAACP have 
been secretly removed from the jurisdiction of this 
state for the express purpose of preventing this com­
mittee from examining the same.”

Overtones of racial unrest, violence and the sincere op­
position of law-abiding citizens throughout the country to 
the immediate implementation of this Court’s decision in 
the Brown case are apparent on every hand and must be 
considered in the realm of general knowledge worthy of the 
consideration of this Court.

An article in the June 15, 1957, issue of the Saturday 
Evening Post written by John Bartlow Martin entitled 
“ The Deep South Says Never” appears to be a factual 
report of the general attitude toward integration of the 
races throughout the South. In this article Mr. Martin says,

33



“ Segregation is not a principle upheld by louts and bullies. 
It is viewed as inherently right by virtually every white 
person in the four-state South of which we speak.”

Although Mr. Martin’s study did not include Florida 
specifically, we know his findings are to a large extent 
equally applicable in this state.

Florida’s specific condition in this regard is the subject 
of an exhaustive and objective study of sociological, physi­
cal and psychological conditions relevant to the University 
of Florida and Florida’s system of higher education made 
by the State Board of Control. This study which was the 
basis of the order of the Supreme Court of Florida which 
petitioner seeks to circumvent is too bulky to include in its 
entirety in this brief.

We feel, however, that it is important to bring to the 
attention of this Court certain portions of said study so 
that it may be properly advised as to the difficulties at hand 
without having to refer to the record which is voluminous. 
This can best be accomplished through statements of wit­
nesses at the hearing which summarizes the findings of the 
study and their own conclusions.

The sworn testimony of the Honorable Fred H. Kent 
(who was chairman of the State Board of Control at the 
time of the hearing before the Commissioner appointed 
by the Supreme Court of Florida) includes the following 
statement:

“ A. The Board of Control, and all of its members, definitely 
are of the opinion that we are confronted with a major 
problem posed by the decision of the Supreme Court 
decreeing what—or rather, I  might say, decreeing that 
a Negro is entitled to be admitted to the University of 
Florida and the Florida State University. Our major 
problem at the present time has been to determine

34



what the effect of admitting such a Negro to either of 
those institutions would be. We have been trying to 
study that problem for the purpose of presenting the 
various aspects of it to the Supreme Court of Florida 
in this particular proceeding. We haven’t reached that 
phase at which we would try and solve the problems, 
because we don’t know yet exactly what we are going 
to be confronted with, what the Court is going to de­
cide. Our study data being limited to what problems 
will have to be decided and not what the solution of 
them will be.

I might say that I have been on the Board of Control 
for three years, Chairman of it for approximately a 
year, and that has been unquestionably the biggest 
problem that has confronted us during that time.

Q. Could you make a statement to the Court pointing out 
what, in your opinion, are the most serious problems 
of administration which will be created if Negroes are 
admitted to the white universities ?

A. Yes, but before I do, I would like to qualify myself to 
the extent of showing that my thinking is controlled 
by concern for the welfare of the University of Florida, 
Florida State University, and Florida A. & M. Uni­
versity, and not by prejudice against members of the 
Negro race or because I am trying to avoid having my 
children attend the University of Florida as an inte­
grated school. I have four children, one girl, and three 
boys. My two oldest boys I have sent to the Philips 
Exter Academy at Exter, New Hampshire, which is a 
preparatory school and does not enforce segregation. 
My second son is in his third year there. My oldest 
son graduated at Exter and then went to Yale, which 
does not enforce segregation, and graduated from that 
University. My daughter went to Bryn Mawr College, 
Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, which does not enforce seg­
regation. Therefore, I  believe that those facts indicate 
that my thinking is not controlled by prejudice towards 
integration, but is controlled by what might happen at 
the University of Florida if we enforce integration 
under existing facts—existing circumstances. I am

35



sure that an examination of every one of the members 
of the Board of Control would demonstrate that not 
any one of them is any more prejudiced than I am.

At the beginning of my statement I want to say that 
copies of these two volumes entitled “ Study on De­
segregation, Part I and Part I I ” have been furnished 
to me and all members of the Board of Control. I 
have studied both volumes carefully and am prepared, 
I believe, to stand a rather thorough examination or 
cross-examination on them; that is, as to their general 
substance and as to the conclusions to be derived from 
them. I would not be able to remember the exact figures 
appearing in them, because there are too many. I have 
studied the summaries which are set forth in the first 
33 pages of Vol. I and the first 11 pages of Vol. II, and 
wish to state under oath that I believe that they are 
correctly and reasonably arrived at and that I concur 
in the conclusions and statements of opinions therein 
expressed.

I have been authorized by every member of the 
Board of Control to make that statement on his behalf. 
I further have been directed to state that it is the unani­
mous opinion of the Board of Control that the adminis­
trative problems summarized on pages 31 and 32, of 
Part I of that survey, are very real problems which 
our Board fears may create unsolvable problems and 
which may result in great injury to the University of 
Florida if we are forced to meet them forthwith. Those 
problems are so well explained by the summaries and 
conclusions set forth in those two volumes which have 
been placed in evidence and are, in fact, so self-explan­
atory that I will not expand on them, except as they 
relate to other thoughts which I will express.

I further want to say that I have listened to Dr. 
Culpepper’s explanations of and comments on those 
exhibits and Mr. Skelton’s explanations of and com­
ments thereon, and I am completely in accord with all 
of the statements made by both of them. I do want to 
testify under oath further that as Chairman of the 
Board of Control that I consider each of the problems

36



listed on pages 31 and 32 as a very real problem and 
one which is potentially of great danger to the welfare 
of the University of Florida.

I would like to testify to certain other problems 
which we on the Board of Control fear most and which 
are only indirectly pointed to by the printed surveys 
filed in evidence today; yet, they are demonstrated by 
that survey to be very real. We on the Board are con­
cerned particularly by three additional major prob­
lems. First, the safety of the students in our State 
supported institutions, and 1 refer to their physical 
and moral safety. Second, the financial welfare of our 
institutions. And, third, the academic standing or 
standard of those universities.

Dealing with the first, I should like to refer to the 
safety of the students at our State owned institutions. 
The recent incident at the University of Alabama has 
shown what can happen where only one Negro enters 
a college such as the University of Florida. Those 
surveys filed here today show: one, that the parents 
of Negro high school seniors, if given the opportunity 
to do so, next year would send 369 Negro children to 
the University of Florida and 205 to Florida State 
University; second, that of the Negro students now at 
Florida A. & M. approximately 250 would transfer to 
F. S. U. and 310 to the University of Florida if per­
mitted to do so. That means that we could anticipate 
an influx of from 450 to 500 Negroes at Florida State 
University and from 675 to 700 Negroes at the Univer­
sity of Florida. We fear that the influx of so many 
Negroes would multiply the chance of disorder, fights, 
riots, and attendant trouble.

This morning’s paper describes an incident at Del­
ray Beach which shows that the same thing which hap­
pened at the University of Alabama can happen in 
Florida. It points out that last week the municipal 
authorities in Delray provided that the Negroes could 
use the beaches at Delray along with the white people. 
On yesterday the Police Department at Delray Beach 
is reported as having had to disperse a riot or dis-

37



turbance caused by white teen age children who tried 
to make the Negroes leave the beach. So if teen-agers 
do that at Delray Beach it appears to be reasonable 
to expect that they might do the same thing at the 
University of Florida. Further, the surveys filed here 
show that a substantial number of students and a sub­
stantial number of parents of students state that they 
expect to take action, which apparently is positive ac­
tion, to persuade Negro students to leave the Univer­
sity or make it so unpleasant for them that they will 
move out of a dormitory room or out of a class or out of 
a cafeteria or otherwise stop using the facilities of the 
University of Florida. The only assumption that we 
can reach is that by making it so unpleasant for them 
that they would have to move they mean to resort to 
violence or some equally irritating action which would 
undoubtedly result in disorder.

Next, we cannot overlook another unpleasant danger. 
On March 27, 1956, Congressman Williams of Missis­
sippi filed in the Congressional Record for 1956, Vol. 
102, No. 54, at page 5092 certain statistics compiled 
from the official records of the United States Depart­
ment of Justice and the District of Columbia Police 
Department and the Department of Public Health, 
which demonstrates conclusively that integration of 
the races poses a real problem of public safety, public 
health, and danger to public morals of our State stu­
dents. I believe that the Court will take judicial notice 
of the contents of the Congressional Record, so I don’t 
offer it in evidence; but I do respectfully ask that it be 
studied.

If I may, I would like to illustrate the difference in 
morals between the students in the white and colored 
institutions by giving an example of an occurrence that 
is unpleasant but I think it should be considered here. 
We don’t have here a record of the total number of 
cases in which this has happened, but I feel that they 
are certain facts which illustrate the different moral 
standards of the two races which are known to mem­
bers of the Board because they come before us for

38



consideration. We have had a few isolated instances 
at both of the white institutions in which unmarried 
girls have left school either voluntarily or have been 
asked to leave because they became pregnant.

Let me emphasize that with a total enrollment of 
approximately 15,000 the two white universities have 
had only isolated occurrences of that sort. Contrasted 
with the situation at the white colleges we have had a 
very substantial number of young, unmarried Negro 
women who have left school for that reason at Florida 
A. & M. University, which is much smaller, having an 
enrollment of only about 2600.

Regarding the plaintiff Hawkins, we have had affi­
davits furnished to our Board which indicate that 
Hawkins is the possessor of a violent and apparently 
ungovernable temper, as was indicated by instance in 
which he is alleged to have inflicted severe physical 
punishment on a student under his tutelage. We believe 
that such a man if admitted to Florida University 
under existing conditions would be apt to create 
trouble.

Concerning the second point which I raised, that is, 
the financial welfare of our Universities, we have sev­
eral reasons for fear. First, the surveys filed in evi­
dence today demonstrate that we could expect that, 
first, 41% of the parents of students now in our white 
universities would cause them to drop out of those 
schools or transfer to another school; and that 62% of 
the white 1956 high school graduates would send their 
children elsewhere than to the University of Florida 
or Florida State University if we have enforced inte­
gration. That prospective loss of revenue speaks for 
itself.

Second, there are other prospective losses of reve­
nue. For instance, we receive six million dollars, or 
about 25% annually, of our operating revenue at the 
University of Florida from grants made to that insti­
tution for the performance of work for which it is 
exceptionally well equipped. Those grants come be­
cause we have exceptional students and exceptional 
professors. If we lose the indicated number of stu-

39



dents, plus the 7% of professors who say that they 
will leave, and if our revenue is reduced so substan­
tially that we won’t be able to pay prices for salaries 
so as to keep our present most highly paid professors, 
we might very well lose a big percentage of that per­
sonnel and of those grants.

Third, we have built at the University of Florida 
several dormitories, which are being paid for from 
revenue certificates. We are about to build others that 
will cost three million dollars. If Negroes move into 
them it seems clear from our surveys that the whites 
intend to move out. It appears that those who say they 
won’t move probably will be subjected to such ridicule 
and teasing that they, too, will move ultimately. The 
history of Negroes moving into white living areas 
demonstrates that that action is to be expected, for 
experience shows that when a Negro moves into an 
area the property values fall and the whites move out. 
If that happens to our dormitories we will face ruin 
financially. That is the only way we have found to 
finance the building of them. If we default on the ones 
that we have built, we will not be able to finance any 
more.

Next, this Court and the Supreme Court of Florida 
know—in fact, it is a matter of general public knowl­
edge—that the State supported universities in the 
South have had a desperately hard time surviving 
financially up until the past ten years. That has been 
true in Florida. Legislators, generally, simply have 
been disinclined to appropriate funds for higher edu­
cation. During the past decade, and possibly the past 
two decades, the tide has turned and has begun to flow 
slowly in the opposite direction. We now appear to be 
on the threshhold of real progress in building more 
and better colleges and being able to provide better 
salaries for our heretofore underpaid professors and 
administrative personnel. With enforced racial inte­
gration the tide will, I am afraid, turn the other way 
once more—and with a vengeance.

Indicative of the thinking of the politicians of this 
State is our very recent primary in which we nom-

40



mated a candidate for Governor. Almost the only issue 
in that campaign was the maintenance of segregation. 
Each candidate tried to outdo the other in insisting 
that he could and would best maintain segregation. 
Each pledged himself to maintain it. That shows two 
things: one, each realized how intensely the white peo­
ple want to maintain segregation; and, two, each 
agreed to try to do his best to do so. Assuming that 
those persons elected to the legislature feel the _same 
way, it seems rather evident that the legislature is not 
going to appropriate much money for integrated uni­
versities.

We have had a hard time before. We will really be 
in trouble if we have integration in our universities, 
for then those who have fought us in the past will have 
reenforcement on their side so great that we fear that 
we won’t be able to overcome it. I am afraid that we 
will be given only niggardly financial support; that 
we will lose our top instructors because we won’t be 
able to pay what they must earn in order to stay here; 
and that our universities will face dry rot and ruin. 
This should be considered along with that problem. In 
the past our alumni have been our greatest help in 
getting funds from the legislature.

The survey filed today indicates that we will lose 
the support of 52% of those alumni if we have inte­
gration. Without them we will be impotent when we 
appear before the legislature asking for funds.

The third point which I have suggested that we are 
particularly concerned with is the academic standing 
or standards in the University of Florida in the event 
of enforced integration. I call your attention again to 
Table 4, on page 29 of Vol I, filed with you today, but 
I am not going to testify at length regarding it because 
Dr. Culpepper has already covered that point so ably. 
I do want to point out, however, that it shows by indis­
putable statistics how poorly prepared and how ill 
qualified the Negro high school graduates are when 
compared with the white high school graduates. For 
the past several years we have set a standard of ad­
missions at the University of Florida based on the

41



admission of only those students in the top 75% of 
their classes. That was not by rule of the Board of 
Control, but was handled on an advisory basis by ad­
ministrative officers at the University. This past year 
the Board of Control, for the first time, recognized the 
need for such a restriction and at both the University 
of Florida and Florida State University approved en­
trance requirements which limited attendance, except 
in exceptional cases, to high school graduates who 
would be in the top 60% of their class.

Negroes are admitted at Florida A. & M. University 
if they have a high school diploma. If they had to 
comply with the present entrance requirements at the 
University of Florida only about eight percent of the 
Negro high school graduates could meet those require­
ments. It might be said that such entrance require­
ments, therefore, would protect the University of Flor­
ida and Florida State University from having a decline 
in their academic standards because of an influx of 
poorly prepared Negroes; and it should.

But the question then arises, “ What will be done 
about Florida A. & M. University?” First, will the 
State of Florida continue to run a university for Ne­
groes who cannot pass entrance exams at the Univer­
sity of Florida and Florida State University, but pro­
vide no school for whites who cannot pass such an 
exam. That would be a clearcut case of discrimination 
in favor of Negro students and against white students.

Second, will we have two firstclass universities and 
one admittedly sub-standard one. What value will a 
degree from such a sub-standard university be? For 
how long could we get instructors and students to at­
tend such an admittedly sub-standard university?

Our Board, after considering those questions, con­
cluded that if any one of the three universities is forced 
to have racial integration that we immediately would 
put all three of them on the same basis as to admis­
sions. Either all three will have the same high admis­
sion standards and consequent high academic stand­
ards, or all three will have no admission requirements 
and a correspondingly low academic standard. We

42



have left it up to the State Board of Education to 
approve or disapprove of our action. If it approves it, 
we then would set admission standards. I  believe that 
they will be set on the same level at all state univer­
sities and that they will be set at about the level now 
maintained at the University of Florida.

That would be very bad for the prospective Negro 
student and would probably result in Florida A. & M. 
University either going out of existence entirely or 
becoming a college in which about 90% of the students 
would be white. Integration unquestionably would re­
sult in the abandonment of substantially all of the 
graduate work now being offered at Florida A. & M. 
University because it would be an unnecessary dupli­
cation of the same courses offered at the University of 
Florida or at Florida State University.

There are a few other points I would like to make. 
The first is this. The United States is being outstripped 
today in its race to educate and develop scientists, 
engineers, doctors, etc., by the Soviet—for two reasons: 
first, the Soviet not only subsidizes their bright young 
students, they make them go to college. We, in this 
country, don’t subsidize ours. We don’t even allow the 
child’s parents an income tax deduction for educating 
his children; and we certainly don’t make them go to 
college. Consequently, we find that we are losing a sur­
prisingly large percentage of our most brilliant high 
school graduates, who simply don’t go to college at all. 
We even now are looking for ways and means to get 
him in college.

I discussed that problem with Dr. Allen, Vice-Presi­
dent of the University of Florida, only last week. I 
find that we are trying to make college attractive. We 
are trying to make them—that is, those high school 
graduates and their parents realize that a college edu­
cation is a must. If instead of having a State Univer­
sity which is a glamorous and attractive place we have 
one that bears a stigma, such as is indicated it will bear 
in the minds of so many parents of high school grad­
uates by these statistics filed today, we will lose more 
and more of these fine students—with a consequent loss 
to our Country.

43



Secondly, I  want to emphasize the very important 
part that our Agricultural and Engineering Schools at 
the University of Florida have played in economic de­
velopment of Florida. Our farmers, cattlemen, citrus 
growers, businessmen all recognize that fact. The loss 
of such a great asset, or even the severe crippling of it, 
as might be occasioned by integration as indicated by 
these surveys, would be a blow which would create 
irreparable harm to the economy of our State.

Third, I don’t know how important it is, but if Ne­
groes are admitted to the University of Florida I 
assume that they will be eligible to participate in inter­
collegiate athletics. Florida is a member of the South­
eastern Conference. Many of the colleges which are 
members of that group prohibit games with colleges 
which permit Negroes to play on their team. Consid­
erable confusion and monetary loss, therefore, would 
be occasioned from that source.

Briefly, our Board’s position, as I understand it, 
is this: the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of Hawkins v. The Board of Control, found that 
“ a Negro has a right under the Constitution of the 
United States to attend a graduate school of the Uni­
versity of Florida.” The gist of that decision is that 
that right cannot be denied him solely because of his 
being a member of the Negro race. That, however, does 
not mean that he must be allowed to attend that Uni­
versity.

The Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of Thorn­
hill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740, held that “ liberties 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are not absolute, but 
must be regulated in the public interest.”

The Supreme Court of the United States has recog­
nized and approved a decision of the Supreme Court 
of Florida which held that “ all personal and property 
rights are held subject to the police power of that 
State, and that neither provision of the State nor the 
Federal Constitution will intercept regular and lawful 
exercise of such power. ’ ’ That was in the case of Mayo 
v. Polk County, 169 So. 41, affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 81 Law Ed. 376. In it the

44



Supreme Court of Florida said, “ All personal and 
property rights are held subject to the police power of 
the State, and neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor 
corresponding provisions of the State Constitution will 
intercept the regular and lawful exercise of this 
power.”

The Supreme Court of the United States indicated 
its approval of the decision in another case which arose 
in Florida, but this time in the District Court of the 
United States for the Northern District of Florida, 
and affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
which the Court described the broad police power 
vested in a State. That is the case of United Enter­
prises v. Dubey, 128 Fed. 2d 843, 87 Law Ed. 537. In 
that case the Court said that “ a State, by legislature 
under its police power, may provide for the protection 
of the public health, the public morals, and the public 
safety, unless Congress has preempted the particular 
field in question, or unless the State transcends its le­
gitimate authority and undertakes the regulation of 
Interstate Commerce by imposing burdens upon it.”

The States of the Union have never relinquished 
their sovereign power so as to protect their citizens by 
appropriate legislation. It appears to me, therefore, 
that it would neither be unreasonably arbitrary or 
capricious for the State, represented by our Board, in 
the exercise of its police power, to forbid racial inte­
gration in the University of Florida or the other insti­
tutions under our control, in view of the evident threat 
to the public safety, to the public morals, and to the 
public health. And the Board of Control expects to 
continue to follow that policy until directed to do other­
wise by the Supreme Court of Florida. ’ ’

At the same hearing, Dr. J. B. Culpepper, Executive 
Secretary for the State Board of Control, who had the 
responsibility for making the survey on the subject of 
desegregation at the University of Florida which is a part 
of this record, testified:

“ Q. Please state your name.

45



A. My name is J. B. Culpepper. I  am serving presently 
as Executive Secretary for the State Board of Control 
of Institutions of Higher Learning.

Q. In that capacity, Dr. Culpepper, have you had the re­
sponsibility for making a survey or study on the subject 
of desegregation at the University of Florida?

A. Yes, I have, and we have applied it not only to the 
University of Florida but also to the Florida State 
University and to the Florida A. & M. University.

Q. Will you amplify as to your reasons for including the 
other two State Universities in this study!

A. The reason that we have included all of the State Insti­
tutions under the direction of the Board of Control is 
that we wanted to make a study which was approached 
objectively and which would reveal to the Board 
clearly and conclusively precisely what problems, if 
any, would be encountered in moving toward desegre­
gation. We felt that the study ought to be as broad a 
study as was necessary to bring together those con­
clusions which would be helpful to the Board and to 
the Court. Consequently, in making plans it seemed 
to us wise to make the following studies. We did a 
study of the facilities of the three institutions with 
regard to housing, with regard to class rooms, the 
health services, the library facilities, food services, and 
recreation. We felt that we ought to take a look at the 
present admission policy with regard, particularly, to 
the impact of the policy upon the growth of the Insti­
tutions and what would be the effect in relation to pos­
sible additional students that would come because of 
desegregation. We felt that we ought to project the 
anticipated enrollments through to 1960, thereby get­
ting some idea as to what problems we would encounter 
with an ever increasing enrollment. We felt that we 
ought to survey the students of the Universities, the 
faculties of the Universities, the parents of the Uni­
versities, and the alumni of the Universities to find 
out what their attitudes are toward desegregation. In 
order to project the study to the future and to get as 
much additional information as possible to show prob­
lems that might be involved, we also surveyed parents

46



of high school seniors, both Negro and white, through­
out the State. Those are the studies that were made 
and we attempted to get at them as fairly and as forth­
rightly and as honestly as we knew how so that infor­
mation would be available to all concerned.

Q. Dr. Culpepper, the immediate question before the 
Court has to do with the admission of one colored man 
named Hawkins, who is seeking admission to the Col­
lege of Law at the University of Florida. Could an 
objective study and an accurate study be made of just 
the University of Florida College of Law without tak­
ing into consideration the other Colleges at the Uni­
versity of Florida and of the other two State Univer­
sities ?

A. We think that you would have to study all of the insti­
tutions and all of the schools within the institutions, 
because we feel that it is a broad problem and pre­
sumably if admission is allowed to the College of Law 
under the rulings that would be made, it follows that 
they would be eligible, presumably, under the same 
circumstances for admission to other parts of the insti­
tution and to the other institutions. Therefore, we 
made our study comprehensive in taking that position.

Q. Do you consider that the three State Universities are 
so inter-related from administrative standpoint that 
what affects one would necessarily affect the others?

A. Yes, I do. I can give an illustration that might be 
pertinent at this point. When we made the study of 
the parents of high school seniors we sent out to the 
Negro parents 4,464 questionnaires. In other words, 
there were that many Negro parents involved. We 
received from those Negro parents of high school sen­
iors 1295 replies; and of these 1295, 1115 indicated 
that they would send their children to one of the three 
State Universities. Now we feel that the percentages 
being what they are, that we got very nearly every 
Negro parent who planned to have his or her child 
attend a State University. Now, here is the interesting 
thing about that set of returns. Of these 1115 returns— 

The Court: Was that to the exclusion of Florida 
A. & M.?

47



A. No, the data I ’m about to give will relate to A. & M., 
F. S. U., and the University of Florida. These Negro 
parents, now—

The Court: You will permit me to ask this ques­
tion: you say 1115 said they would send their 
children to “ a State University.”

A. “ A State University.”
The Court: Embracing A. & M., F. S. U., and the 
University of Florida?

A. That is right.
The Court: But they didn’t attempt to say whether 
they would send them to F. S. U. or University of 
Florida, or—•

A. Well, that is what I ’m coming to, Judge Murphee. Of 
that total number 581 said they would send their chil­
dren to Florida A. & M.—that is, of the 1115. 205 said 
they would send their children to the Florida State 
University, and 369 said they would send their children 
to the University of Florida. So, roughly half of them, 
of the total 1155, said they would send their children 
to either F. S. U. or the University of Florida. Now 
to return to the point. The point that I want to make 
is that if this is allowed, then you can see, Mr. Odom, 
that the problem not only is one with relation to Law, 
but it also is one with relation to any other part of 
either of the two white institutions.

Q. Would these figures indicate a shift in enrollment from 
A. & M. to the white universities?

A. I think that the answer is “ yes.” Now there is related 
to it another problem, and that is that in the projection 
of enrollment, which is shown in the study, we have a 
tremendous number of students who are desirous of 
attending each of the institutions and if all these stu­
dents come—and they will, because we have projected 
it on a pretty solid base—we will have more students 
in each of the institutions than we have facilities to 
take care of them.

Q. I  understand, then, that your survey has indicated that 
all three of the State Universities are already over-

48



taxed as to facilities to take care of the present enroll­
ment under the present dual system of education. Is 
that correct?

A. That is correct. The study of this is shown on page 33 
of the Study. It shows under projection of enrollment 
that beginning in the school year of 1959-1960—and 
this is a very conservative projection—there will be 
8,448 students at the Florida State University, as com­
pared with 6400 at the beginning of this current aca­
demic year just ending. There will be 14,784 students 
at the University of Florida, as compared with 10,868 
at the beginning of this year. There will be 3,658 stu­
dents at Florida A. & M., as compared with 2,649 at 
the present time. Now our studies of facilities and 
housing, which Mr. Skelton may elaborate upon a little 
later, will show you that we presently do not have 
adequate facilities for the present enrollment; so, un­
questionably, we are confronted with rather serious 
problems.

Q. Dr. Culpepper, would a shift on the part of Negro 
students from Florida A. & M. to the two State white 
universities further complicate the administrative 
problems which you now have which are caused by this 
over-crowded situation?

A. Yes, we think so. We attempted to summarize the vari­
ous administrative problems which may be encountered 
by the white universities in the event of desegregation. 
If you like, I would be glad to run through those, or 
we can hold it until later when Mr. Skelton, who was 
the director for the study, may bring it in.

Q, I would like for you to comment in more detail on your 
observation which I believe you made that a study was 
made in distinction of achievement levels between the 
two races.

A. Yes, we have done that. The summary of the com­
parisons of percentile ranks for white and Negro exam­
inees in the Florida state-vride twelfth grade testing 
program is given on page 29 of the Study. This is a 
very interesting study and comparison and bears the 
careful est examination by those who have authority

49



with regard to admission of students to institutions. 
We took the test results from 105,000 white high school 
seniors over a period of years and we took the results 
from 16,743 Negro high school students, and we ran 
the white percentile rank as the students fall in relation 
to how they scored on this high school test. It is a test 
which is a psychological test to get at general ability. 
We test the knowledge and ability of the individual 
to perform with regard to English, with regard to 
Social Studies, with regard to Natural Science, and 
with regard to Mathematics. What we did was to take 
the scores of the Negroes and compare those with the 
scores of the white, and we found—and I won’t go 
into all the detail of it—that 92.4% of the Negro stu­
dents who were tested—and this is a very representa­
tive group—92.4% of the Negroes tested fell below the 
40 percentile of the white students tested, and this, 
usually, we find is the cut-off point or the point at which 
white students succeed or fail in college work. We 
took all of the tests, because that’s the way to get at 
it, that were involved and ran an average and the 
average shows that on the Psychological test and the 
four subject areas 91.14% of the Negroes fall in the 
lower 40% of the white students who took the test. 
If you applied it at the 50 percentile, then 94.44% of 
the Negroes will fall in the lower half on the scores 
that whites made. Now what that indicates on the 
basis of experience is that some better than 90% of 
the Negroes would be in difficulty academically when 
they come to the white institutions under present stand­
ards. If it operated any other way, then, obviously, 
there would have to be a lowering of standards in terms 
of instruction and grade procedure in the white insti­
tutions. And we must not let that happen, because we 
have to maintain our academic standards in the insti­
tutions.

Q. Under the present system operating in the institutions 
of higher learning Negroes do not have to compete 
against white students. Is that correct!

A. That is right.
Q. And your study there on these tests indicate that some

50



90% could not compete. Is that a fair conclusion!
A. That appears to be the circumstances on the basis of 

that study. Of course, we are very interested in our 
program of higher education and in the public schools, 
for that matter, to assist the Negroes as rapidly as 
possible to improve their level in knowledge and under­
standing in the subject areas and in general ability; 
but that is a time procedure.

Q. Dr. Culpepper, if the University systems were inte­
grated and the Florida A. & M. University admission 
standards were identical with those of the white uni­
versities, would you care to comment upon the reason­
ably anticipated effect that that would have on Florida 
A. & M.!

A. Well, in my judgment it would be disastrous; that is, 
to the Negro students who presently are attending or 
who would desire to attend. If the same admission re­
quirements were applied with some 4500 Negro seniors 
in the State today and if only 10% of them could go 
above and would go above, as shown by test results, 
the 40 percentile which might well be the cut-off point, 
then 450 Negroes of the total number of high school 
seniors would be eligible under the admission policy 
to go to college. If you took, say, half of those—the 
other half not being able to go or not desiring to go 
for some reason or other—that would be 225, and if 
you took half of those who might go to the State Insti­
tution, then you would come out somewhere in the 
neighborhood of about 100 young people who would 
be eligible for admission to the Florida A. & M. Uni­
versity. Now with ordinary attrition and drop-out, if 
you projected that over a period of four years, be­
ginning with roughly a 100 students in the Freshman 
year, you could see that in a period of four years the 
present institution of some 2600 students would have 
fallen to less than 400 students. * * *

Q. Dr. Culpepper, would you like to comment further upon 
any administrative problems which have been revealed 
by this study which you consider of great importance!

A. Well, we have summarized what we consider to be the

51



chief administrative problems and I assume that Mr. 
Skelton will go into those later. However, there are one 
or two observations which I should like to make, if I  
may.

The over-all tabulation showing the summary of 
the white groups with regard to questions concerning 
whether or not we should admit Negroes to the insti­
tutions immediately, and variations thereof, appears 
to me to be quite significant and I think is somewhat 
indicative of problems that might emerge. The stu­
dents at the Florida State University and at the Uni­
versity of Florida indicated these replies. These are 
summaries. This is shown on Table 2, page 2, in the 
Study. Better than 20%-20.44% of the students said 
“ admit immediately.” Of the parents of these students 
7.79% said “ admit them immediately.” Of the alumni 
12.43% said ‘ ‘ admit them immediately. ’ ’ Of the faculty 
37.04% said “ admit them immediately.” Now that 
ranges from “ admit them immediately” down through 
to “ not admit them under any circumstances.”

The second classification was “ admit them after a 
reasonable period of preparation for integration. ’ ’ The 
students on that particular classification, 43.21% said 
“ admit them after a reasonable period.” So roughly 
64% of the students said “ admit them immediately 
or after a reasonable period of preparation for integra­
tion.” Of the parents 22.45% said “ admit them after 
a reasonable period.” And so you have something like 
30% of the parents saying “ admit them either now or 
within a reasonable period.” The alumni, 31.05% said 
“ after a reasonable period,” or roughly 43% of them. 
And the faculties, 44.46% said “ admit them after a 
reasonable period,” or roughly about 81 or 82%— 
about 82% said “ admit them now or after a reasonable 
period.

Now look at the variation as between parents on 
the one hand, students on the other, and then a third 
variation would be the faculty reaction. And as you 
interplay those reactions you can get all sorts of com­
plexities in terms of reactions. You can go over to 
the other side and show that those who say “ delay 
admitting them as long as we legally can,” 14% of the

52



students, roughly, said “ delay as long as we can,” and 
24%, roughly, of the parents said “ delay as long as 
we can.” Twenty-three per cent of the alumni said 
“ delay as long as we can.” And about 12]/2% of the 
faculty said “ delay as long as we can.” Of the stu­
dents, 21%, roughly, said “ don’t admit them under 
any circumstances.” So there are roughly 35% of the 
students who have very serious doubt about admitting 
the Negroes and who want to delay as long as they 
legally can or not admit them under any circumstances. 
The parents, 44.06% say “ do not admit them under 
any circumstances.” So you have some 68%, or a sub­
stantial majority of the parents, who are very doubtful 
about this process of admission of Negroes to the 
institutions.

And the alumni, 31.46% say “ admit them under no 
circumstances,” which means that roughly 55% of 
them take the same position as that group of parents. 
Anri of the faculty 3.66% say “ under no circumstances 
admit them,” or roughly 16%. So, if you will look at 
that and see that a substantial majority of the parents 
are gravely concerned about this and feel they should 
not be admitted, a majority of the alumni feel the 
same way, a substantial group of students, some 35%, 
a little better than a third, feel the same way, it is 
reasonable to suppose that out of that complexity of 
point of view in this matter of social change you could 
expect reactions and repercussions that would be dis­
ruptive.

Q. Did you find the same attitudes expressed to a greater 
or lesser degree on the part of the parents of high school 
seniors who will be coming to the State universities 
next year?

A. The attitude of high school seniors or the parents of 
high school seniors, 5.32% of them said (this is shown 
under Table 4, page 2, Part II of the Study), that they 
felt they should be admitted at once. This is in com­
parison with 7.79% of the parents whose youngsters 
are in college. 16.09% said that they felt that they 
should be admitted after a reasonable period of prep­
aration, in comparison with 22.45% of the parents 
whose children are in college.

53



You see these percentages are running lower in the 
high schools. 16.66% said that we should delay as 
long as we legally can, in comparison with 24.28% of 
the parents of children in college who said we should 
delay as long as we legally can. And 60.18% of the 
parents of high school seniors said we should not admit 
them under any circumstances. So if you add the 60%, 
roughly, and the 16.66% you come up with about 77%, 
roughly, of the parents of high school seniors who are 
very doubtful about this process. Of the parents of 
college students that percentage is about 68%. ”

The above excerpts from the testimony given on these 
matters and other quoted material are by no means com­
prehensive. An examination of the complete record of facts 
and testimony considered by the Supreme Court of Florida 
in this case is necessary to a full understanding of the mag­
nitude of the problem at hand.

We submit that an objective study of these factual 
considerations will reveal that the Supreme Court of 
Florida was correct in its conclusion that it could not 
at this time order the petitioner to be admitted to the 
University of Florida without causing public mischief.

SUMMARY FROM THE SURVEY REPORT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS WHICH MAY BE ENCOUNTERED

1. Provision for housing of Negro students
2. Administration of an increased number of course drops 

by students indicating that they would not be in the 
same class with a Negro (The magnitude of this prob­
lem will depend on the number of Negroes admitted 
and the influence of the parents on the students.)

3. Need for additional time and personnel to administer 
the program of more rigid entrance requirements

4. Vigilance on the part of administrators and counsellors 
to prevent racial incidents which may occur because of 
the admission of Negroes.

54



5. Restriction of campus food service facilities to students, 
parents, faculty, out of town guests, and residents of 
the communities who come as guests of individuals asso­
ciated with the universities

6. Inspection of off-campus housing to protect the health 
and welfare of all students

7. Replacement of the faculty and staff who would resign 
because of integration

8. Arrangement for chaperones for university social events 
who would not object to attending such affairs where 
Negroes are present

9. Development of understandings on the part of alumni 
of the universities to insure continued loyal and enthu­
siastic support

10. Adjustments in food service operations to prevent de­
ficits resulting from loss of student patrons refusing to 
eat where Negroes are permitted

11. Counseling of students to prevent them from engaging 
in activities to discourage Negroes from attending 
classes (Faculties may have to assume more responsi­
bility in maintaining order in classrooms and be ever 
alert to possible disturbances on campus.)

12. Provision for care of Negroes in the student health 
services

13. Modification of regulations governing swimming class­
es and other sports

14. Review of present offerings at the Florida A. & M. 
University to eliminate unnecessary and uneconomical 
offerings (e.g., Law, Pharmacy, Nursing Education, 
Graduate Agriculture.)

55



CONCLUSION

We know that the petitioner in this ease, his legal 
counsel and the organization for whose objectives he serves 
as a symbol, sincerely and deeply feel that the Brown de­
cision was right as a matter of law and that racial integra­
tion of public education is desirable.

We know that they feel these things so strongly that 
they are either unable or unwilling to accept the fact that 
an overwhelming majority of white citizens in Florida who 
are equally sincere do not agree but rather are convinced 
that a legally coerced association between the races is evil 
and that their own constitutional rights in this respect have 
been violated by the Brown decision.

The real difficulty is grounded in the fact that the Brown 
decision has contradicted the sincere beliefs of a majority 
of Florida citizens as to their basic rights and freedom. 
They therefore dissent.

It is true that freedom of association or the inherent 
right to choose one’s associates is not spelled out in the 
Federal constitution. We think the reason for this omission 
is obvious. There has never been a question as to this right 
in the minds of free men. The right is so apparent that the 
necessity for spelling it out would no more occur to a con­
stitutional draftsman than the need for writing in a guar­
antee of the right to have children.

Although the Federal constitution is silent on this sub­
ject, we can understand this Court’s ruling in effect that 
the right of freedom of association is so inherent that any 
law, state or federal, which abridges this right is contrary 
to the basic precepts of our form of government which is

58



designed above all else to preserve the dignity, importance 
and freedom of its individual citizens.

Such a ruling theorizes that a law which forbids two 
men from talking together, working together or studying 
together if they want to do so is clearly repugnant to the 
culture, philosophy and law which has slowly evolved 
through the centuries in western Europe and culminated 
in western civilization as we know it today in this land.

But the Siamese twin of such a law, a court order which 
compels association of persons against their wishes, in 
schools and colleges and which ignores their intense oppo­
sition, is equally repugnant and possibly even more dis­
astrous to human dignity.

The foundation of the human right to enjoy the associa­
tion of other human beings is the mutual respect and affec­
tion of both parties to the contract.

Without this mutuality of feelings in an association com­
pelled by law, friendship is dethroned by hatred—respect 
erodes into contempt and the individual’s freedom of choice 
is usurped by the state. Our American system of education 
both in public schools and universities inescapably involves 
social intercourse, friendship, free and voluntary associa­
tion in every area of school life of persons unencumbered 
by cumpulsive antagonisms. It involves both psychological 
and philosophical considerations which should be freed of 
this element of compulsion either for or against association.

In short, the ruling of this Court which seeks to preserve 
the right of individual citizens to choose their friends and 
associates in public schools and colleges by striking down 
laws which enforce a cleavage between races must not, if we 
are to avoid disaster, be turned into a two-edged sword 
which seeks to compel an association by law which is un­
wanted and strongly resisted by either or both races.

57



This, we think, is the sword which the petitioner is asking 
this Court to place in his hands. Hawkins’ legal rights as a 
Negro have already been established by this Court but the 
Supreme Court of Florida is asked to go a step farther and 
direct the petitioner’s immediate admission to the Uni­
versity of Florida despite conditions which now prevail in 
this state. This we believe is unrealistic and will not result 
in a successful implementation of his legal rights.

The factual problem now confronting us is properly one 
of administration, not of law. The law cannot alter the 
minds or mores of men in a free nation and the dilemma 
is concerned with the conflict between the law and mental 
attitudes. We know that these conflicts exist and believe 
that we have given this Court abundant evidence of a solid 
wall of opposition to integration in Florida schools and 
colleges which justifies the Supreme Court of Florida in 
delaying its writ in the interest of the general peace and 
welfare of this state.

We respectfully request that this Court take realistic 
notice of the compelling factual reasons which require the 
Supreme Court of Florida to withhold its writ of mandamus 
in this case at this time and that this Court will continue 
to recognize, as it has done in the past, the historic right 
of the highest court of an independent sovereign state to 
exercise a sound judicial discretion as to the date of the 
issuance of its process in order to prevent a serious public 
mischief.

For these reasons, we respectfully request this Court to 
deny petitioner’s request for a writ of certiorari and a

58



direct order of this Court compelling his admission to the 
University of Florida.

R ic h a r d  W . E r v in  
Attorney General 
State of Florida

R a l p h  E .  O d u m

Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida

J o h n  J .  B l a ir

Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida

"Wil s o n  W . W r ig h t

Special Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I  do hereby certify that copies hereof have been sea­
sonably furnished by registered mail to Robert L. Carter, 
Esq., Thurgood Marshall, Esq., and William L. Taylor, 
Esq., 20 West 40th Street, New York City, New York, 
Attorneys for Petitioner.

J o h n  J .  B l a ir  
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida

59



APPENDIX A
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 624.—October Term, 1955.

T h e  S t a t e  oe F lo r id a , ex rel.
V ir g il  D. H a w k in s ,

Petitioner
v .

T h e  B oard  oe C o n t r o l , et al.
On Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari to the 

Supreme Court of 
Florida.

(March 12, 1956.)
Per Curiam.

The petition for certiorari is denied.

On May 24, 1954, we issued a mandate in this case to 
the Supreme Court of Florida. 347 U. S. 971. We directed 
that the ease be reconsidered in light of our decision in 
the Segregation Cases decided May 17, 1954, Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483. In doing so, we did 
not imply that decrees involving graduate study present 
the problems of public elementary and secondary schools. 
We had theretofore, in three cases, ordered the admission 
of Negro applicants to graduate schools without discrimi­
nation because of color. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629; 
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 
332 U. S. 631; cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for 
Higher Education, 339 U. S. 637. Thus, our second deci­
sion in the Brown case, 349 U. S. 294, which implemented 
the earlier one, had no application to a case involving a 
Negro applying for admission to a state law school. Ac­
cordingly, the mandate of May 24, 1954, is recalled and 
is vacated. In lieu thereof, the following order is entered:

60



Per Curiam: The petition for writ of certiorari is
granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded 
on the authority of the Segregation Cases decided May 17, 
1954, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483. As this 
case involves the admission of a Negro to a graduate pro­
fessional school, there is no reason for delay. He is en­
titled to prompt admission under the rules and regulations 
applicable to other qualified candidates. Sweatt v. Painter, 
339 IT. S. 629; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Oklahoma, 332 IT. S. 631; cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Education, 339 U. S. 637.

APPENDIX B
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 174

A RESOLUTION to declare the United States Supreme 
Court decisions usurping the powers reserved to the 
states and relating to education, labor, criminal pro­
cedure, treason and subversion to be null, void and of 
no effect; to declare that a contest of powers has arisen 
between the State of Florida and the Supreme Court 
of the United States; to invoke the doctrine of inter­
position ; and for other purposes.

Be It Resolved by the House of Representatives of the of 
the State of Florida, the Senate Concurring:

That the Legislature of Florida doth hereby unequivo­
cally express a firm and determined resolution to maintain 
and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the 
Constitution of this State against every attempt, whether 
foreign or domestic, to undermine and destroy the funda­
mental principles, embodied in our basic law, by which the 
liberty of the people and the sovereignty of the States, 
in their proper spheres, have been long protected and 
assured;

61



That the Legislature of Florida doth explicitly and pre- 
emptorily declare that it views the powers of the Federal 
Government as resulting solely from the compact, to which 
the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and 
intention of the instrument creating that compact;

That the Legislature of Florida asserts that the powers 
of the Federal Government are valid only to the extent 
that these powers have been enumerated in the compact 
to which the various States assented originally and to 
which the States have assented in subsequent amendments 
validly adopted and ratified;

That the very nature of this basic compact, apparent 
upon its face, is that the ratifying States, parties thereto, 
have agreed voluntarily to surrender certain of their sover­
eign rights, but only certain of these sovereign rights, to a 
Federal Government thus constituted; and that all powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, have been reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people;

That the State of Florida has at no time surrendered to 
the General Government its right to exercise its powers in 
the field of labor, criminal procedure, and public education, 
and to maintain racially separate public schools and other 
public facilities;

That the State of Florida, in ratifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, did not agree, nor did the 
other States ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment agree, 
that the power to regulate labor, criminal proceedings, pub­
lic education, and to operate racially separate public schools 
and other facilities was to be prohibited to them thereby;

And as evidence of such understanding as to the inherent 
power and authority of the States to regulate public edu­
cation and the maintenance of racially separate public

62



schools, the Legislature of Florida notes that the very 
Congress that submitted the Fourteenth Amendment for 
ratification established separate schools in the District of 
Columbia and that in more than one instance the same 
State Legislatures that ratified the Fourteenth Amend­
ment also provided for systems of racially separate public 
schools;

That the Legislature of Florida denies that the Supreme 
Court of the United States had the right which it asserted 
in the school cases decided by it on May 17, 1954, the labor 
union case decided on May 21, 1956, the cases relating to 
criminal proceedings decided on April 23, 1956, and Janu­
ary 16, 1956, the anti-sedition case decided on April 2, 
1956, and the case relating to teacher requirements de­
cided on April 9,1956, to enlarge the language and meaning 
of the compact by the States in an effort to withdraw from 
the States powers reserved to them and as daily exercised 
by them for almost a century;

That a question of contested power has arisen; the Su­
preme Court of the United States asserts, for its part, that 
the States did in fact prohibit unto themselves the power to 
regulate labor matters, criminal proceedings and public 
education and to maintain racially separate public institu­
tions and the State of Florida, for its part, asserts that 
it and its sister States have never surrendered such rights;

That these assertions upon the part of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, accompanied by threats of co­
ercion and compulsion against the sovereign States of this 
Union, constitute a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous 
attempt by the Court to prohibit to the States certain rights 
and powers never surrendered by them;

That the Legislature of Florida asserts that whenever 
the General Government attempts to engage in the deliber­
ate, palpable and dangerous exercise of powers not granted

63



to it, the States who are parties to the compact have the 
right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the 
progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their 
respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties ap­
pertaining to them;

That failure on the part of this State thus to assert its 
clear rights would be construed as acquiescence in the 
surrender thereof; and that such submissive acquiescence 
to the seizure of one right would in the end lead to the sur­
render of all rights, and inevitably to the consolidation 
of the States into one sovereignty, contrary to the sacred 
compact by which this Union of States was created;

That the question of contested power asserted in this 
resolution is not within the province of the Court to de­
termine because the Court itself seeks to usurp the powers 
which have been reserved to the States, and, therefore, 
under these circumstances, the judgment of all the parties 
to the compact must be sought to resolve the question. The 
Supreme Court is not a party to the compact, but a creature 
of the compact and the question of contested power should 
not be settled by the creature seeking to usurp the power, 
but by the parties to the compact who are the people of 
the respective states in whom ultimate sovereignty finally 
reposes;

That the Constitution of the State of Florida provides for 
full benefits to all its citizens with reference to educational 
facilities and under the Laws of Florida enacted by the 
Legislature through the Minimum Foundation Program its 
citizens under states’ rights, all are being educated under 
the same general law and all teachers are being employed 
under identical educational qualifications and all are certi­
fied by the State Board of Education alike, which enables 
the people, themselves, in Florida to provide an educational 
establishment serviceable and satisfactory and in keeping

64



with the social structure of the state. The people of Florida 
do not consent to changing state precedents and their rights 
by having doctrines thrust upon them by naked force alone, 
as promulgated in the school cases of May 17, 1954, and 
May 31, 1955;

That the doctrines of said decisions and other decisions 
denying to the States the right to have laws of their own 
dealing with subversion or espionage, and criminal pro­
ceedings, and denying the States the right to dismiss indi­
viduals from public employment who refuse to answer 
questions concerning their connections with communism 
by invoking the Fifth Amendment, and denying the States 
the right to provide for protective “ right to work” laws, 
should not be forced upon the citizens of this State for the 
Court was without jurisdiction, power or authority to in­
terfere with the sovereign powers of the State in such 
spheres of activity.

That the Court in its decisions relating to public educa­
tion was without jurisdiction because (1) the jurisdiction 
of the Court granted by the Constitution is limited to ju­
dicial cases in law and equity, and said cases were not of a 
judicial nature and character, nor did they involve contro­
versies in law or equity, but, on the contrary, the great 
subjects of the controversy are of a legislative character, 
and not a judicial character, and are determinable only by 
the people themselves speaking through their legislative 
bodies; (2) the essential nature and effect of the pro­
ceedings relating exclusively to public schools operated by 
and under the authority of States, and pursuant to State 
laws and regulations, said cases were suits against the 
States, and the Supreme Court was without power or au­
thority to try said cases, brought by individuals against 
States, because the Constitution forbids the Court to enter­
tain suits by individuals against a State unless the State 
has consented to be sued;

65



That if said Court had had jurisdiction and authority to 
try and determine said cases, it was powerless to interfere 
with the operation of the public schools of States, because 
the Constitution of the United States does not confer upon 
the General Government any power or authority over such 
schools or over the subject of education, jurisdiction over 
these matters being reserved to the States, nor did the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment authorize any inter­
ference on the part of the Judicial Department or any 
other department of the Federal Government with the 
operation by the States of such public schools as they 
might in their discretion see fit to establish and operate;

That by said cases the Court announces its power to 
adjudge State laws unconstitutional upon the basis of the 
Court’s opinion of such laws as tested by rules of the in­
exact and speculative theories of psychological knowledge, 
which power and authority is beyond the jurisdiction of 
said Court;

That if the Court is permitted to exercise the power to 
judge the nature and effect of a law by supposed principles 
of psychological theory, and to hold the statute or Con­
stitution of a State unconstitutional because of the opinions 
of the Judges as to its suitability, the States will have been 
destroyed, and the indestructible Union of Indestructible 
States established by the Constitution of the United States 
will have ceased to exist, and in its stead the Court will 
have created, without jurisdiction or authority from the 
people, one central government of total power;

That implementing its decision relating to public edu­
cation of May 17, 1954, said Court on May 31, 1955 upon 
further consideration of said cases, said: “ All provisions
of Federal, State, or local la w __ must yield” to said
decision of May 17, 1954; said Court thereby presuming 
arrogantly to give orders to the State of Florida;

66



That it is clear that said Court has deliberately resolved 
to disobey the Constitution of the United States, and to 
flout and defy the Supreme Law of the Land;

That the State of Florida, as is also true of the other 
sovereign states of the Union, has the right to enact laws 
relating to subversion or espionage, criminal proceedings, 
dismissing public employees who refuse to answer ques­
tions concerning their connections with communism and 
“ right to work” protection, and has the right to operate 
and maintain a public school system utilizing such educa­
tional methods therein as in her judgment are conducive 
to the welfare of those to be educated and the people of the 
State generally, this being a govermental responsiblity 
which the State has assumed lawfully, and her rights in 
this respect have not in any wise been delegated to the 
Central Government, but, on the contrary, she and the other 
States have reserved such matters to themselves by the 
terms of the Tenth Amendment. Being possessed of this 
lawful right, the State of Florida is possessed of power 
to repel every unlawful interference therewith;

That the duty and responsibility of protecting life, prop­
erty and the priceless possessions of freedom rests upon 
the Government of Florida as to all those within her terri­
torial limits. The State alone has this responsibility. La­
boring under this high obligation she is possessed of the 
means to effectuate it. It is the duty of the State in flagrant 
cases such as this to interpose its powers between its people 
and the effort of said Court to assert an unlawful dominion 
over them; THEREFORE,

Be It Further Resolved by the House of Representatives
of the State of Florida, the Senate Concurring:

Section 1. That said decisions and orders of the Su­
preme Court of the United States denying the individual 
sovereign states the power to enact laws relating to espio-

67



nage or subversion, criminal proceedings, the dismissal of 
public employees for refusal to answer questions concern­
ing their connections with communism, “ right to work” 
protection, and relating to separation of the races in the 
public institutions of a State are null, void and of no force 
or effect.

Section 2. That the elected representatives of the peo­
ple of Florida do now seriously declare that it is the intent 
and duty of all officials, state and local, to observe, honor­
ably, legally and constitutionally, all appropriate measures 
available to resist these illegal encroachments upon the 
sovereign powers of this State.

Section 3. That we urge firm and deliberate efforts to 
check these and further encroachments on the part of the 
Federal Government, and on the part of said Court through 
judicial legislation, upon the reserved powers of all the 
States’ powers never surrendered by the remotest impli­
cation but expressly reserved and vitally essential to the 
separate and independent autonomy of the States in order 
that by united efforts the States may be preserved.

Section 4. That a copy of this Resolution be transmitted 
by His Excellency The Governor to the Governor and Legis­
lature of each of the other States, to the President of the 
United States, to each of the Houses of Congress, to Flor­
ida’s Representatives and Senators in the Congress, and 
to the Supreme Court of the United States for its infor­
mation.

Filed in Office Secretary of State May 2,1957.



APPENDIX C
REPORT OF THE FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE 

INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
This report covers the investigations and findings of the 

above committee, under authority of Chapter 31498, Acts 
of the 1956 Special Session of the Legislature.

The committee staff began functioning October 22, 1956, 
gathering documentary and other evidence. The committee 
held a series of four public hearings. A total of 69 wit­
nesses were heard under oath, and 115 documentary exhi­
bits, all properly identified and authenticated by the various 
witnesses, were received in evidence. The entire testimony 
before the committee has been transcribed and consists 
of 2,087 pages of testimony under oath.

The committee’s investigations included a rather large 
number of organizations, including the National Associa­
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, the Seaboard 
White Citizens Council, the Inter Civic Council, Inc., and 
the Dade County Property Owners Association. Sworn 
testimony was taken on all of the above and a rather large 
number of other organizations came to the attention of the 
committee, but due to the lack of time and restricted per­
sonnel, it was impossible to make anything approaching a 
reasonably thorough investigation sufficient to prepare a 
hearing on.

NAACP AND NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND 
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

The record shows the NAACP to be a corporation, organ­
ized under the laws of the State of New York, having four 
organizational levels. The top level maintains permanent 
offices in New York City and has a board of directors of 
approximately 50 people. Directly under this organization 
are seven regional offices among which are divided the

69



various states and territorial possessions of the United 
States. Florida lies within the fifth region, which is com­
posed of the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Missis­
sippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. This 
region is known as the Southeast Region. Directly under 
the regional offices is a state level office called the state 
conference of branches. Under the state conference of 
branches are the various local branches which consist of 
the local membership in the various cities and counties of 
the state. All branches are chartered by the national office 
in New York.

Prior to 1942, all of the activities of the NAACP were 
carried on under one corporate entity. Since that time, 
it has been carried on under two separate corporate entities, 
the second one being the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu­
cational Fund, Inc., organized under the laws of the State 
of New York. This corporation is set up in such a manner 
that donations to it are deductible on the income tax returns 
of the donor. Although these two corporations are separate 
legal entities, they act with such perfect concert that there 
can be no doubt that the NAACP Legal Defense and Edu­
cational Fund, Inc. is in fact the mere alter ego of the 
NAACP.

The NAACP has formulated a plan calling for the full, 
complete and absolute integration of the races in this 
country in every phase of American life by 1963. This 
includes the removal of all legal prohibitions against inter­
marriage of the races.

The NAACP is directly responsible for securing the de­
cisions of the United States Supreme Court holding separate 
but equal facilities in education, both elementary and at 
the higher levels, to be in violation of the United States 
Constitution. Having secured these decisions, the NAACP 
has set itself up as a sort of executive arm of the federal

70



courts to execute the integration decrees of federal courts 
which, standing alone, are not self-executing under the law.

In order to accomplish its aim of complete integration, 
the NAACP has promulgated a very concrete and highly 
effective set of plans. A national legal department is main­
tained in the New York offices of the Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc. A legal staff is likewise maintained 
at the regional, state conference, and branch levels. It is 
the primary duty of the various legal staffs to accomplish 
the aims of the NAACP by carrying on integration litiga­
tion in the cases furnished by the various local branches 
of the NAACP.

The national office maintains a very rigid and strict disci­
pline over the paid employees of the NAACP and likewise 
over the various local and state offices and branches. A 
highly effective chain of command and communication has 
been maintained throughout all levels of the organization 
with the national office. Directives from the national office 
are sent periodically to all local branches outlining in detail 
the steps to be taken in the various phases of American 
life to accomplish the ends of the NAACP. A carefully 
planned program of attack, legally, legislatively, and pub­
licity-wise, is being executed in the following areas:

1. In public education
2. In public recreation
3. In public transportation
4. In public health
5. In public and private housing
6. In all fields of employment, both private and public
7. In all governmental agencies

At the present time, the main emphasis is being placed 
on public school facilities. Directives, sent to all branches 
in the south, outline in detail the steps to be taken by the

71



local brandies to effectively integrate the public schools 
of the south. The steps are as follows:

1. File at once a petition with each school hoard for in­
tegration. (Sample petitions are sent with this direc­
tive.)

2. Follow up the petitions with periodic inquiries to the 
board to determine the results.

3. Begin educational meetings on desegregation with em­
phasis on the fact that the matter is in the hands of 
the federal courts.

4. Organize the parents of the community and prepare 
them, and their children to become plaintiffs in law 
suits seeking integration of the schools.

5. Seek support of individuals and community groups, 
p a rticu la rly  in the w hite community, through 
churches, labor organizations, civic organizations, and 
personal contacts.

6. “ When announcement is made of plans adopted by 
the school board, get the exact text of the school 
board’s announcement and notify the state conference 
and the national office at once so that you will have 
the benefit of their views as to whether the plan is 
one to provide for effective desegregation. It is very 
important that branches not proceed at this stage 
without consultation with the state and national 
offices.”

7. If no plans are announced or no steps toward deseg­
regation taken, the time for a law suit has arrived. 
At this stage, court action is essential because only 
in this way does the mandate of the Supreme Court 
that a prompt and reasonable compliance become fully 
operative upon the school boards in question.

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8. At this stage, the matter will be turned over to the 
legal department, and they will proceed with the 
matter.

Plaintiffs are solicited and, in some cases, people’s names 
are used as plaintiffs without their knowledge. The NAACP 
finances the litigation in its entirety, the plaintiff having 
no financial responsibility to the case whatsoever. The 
financing of these cases is undertaken hv the NAACP with­
out regard to the individual plaintiff’s ability to pay. Some 
plaintiff’s are people of substantial means, wThich bears out 
the testimony of some of the NAACP attorneys that the 
NAACP is not a legal aid society to render legal assistance 
to the poverty-stricken. Cases are filed where no proper 
authorization from the plaintiff is ever executed to the 
attorney who actually handles the case.

The association directs that no local branch is to enter 
into any sort of compromise agreement with local author­
ities for anything short of full integration. In Sarasota, a 
perfectly agreeable solution to the majority of the colored 
citizens of that city was offered by the county commissioners 
for a separate segregated beach. The NAACP would not 
agree to the separate beach and stopped the proposed settle­
ment which concerned only local citizens of Sarasota.

Pleadings in integration cases are sent to the national 
legal department for revision and approval before filing, as 
are briefs. The individual plaintiffs are not allowed to 
select counsel of their choosing but must accept the NAACP 
counsel designated by the local branch. The policy of the 
national office requires that the NAACP have absolute con­
trol over all law suits in which the NAACP participates. 
This effectively shuts off the possibility of compromise on 
a local level.

In fine, the NAACP is engaged in a gigantic law practice

73



with the NAACP running up and financing eases and the 
legal department operating under the NAACP Legal De­
fense and Educational Fund prosecuting the same. An 
audit of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
Inc. from its inception in 1942 through 1955 discloses that 
the association made a pecuniary profit on the litigation 
undertaken by it in every year except the first, when it took 
a small loss of approximately $1,100.00. At the end of 1955, 
the audit reveals an ending surplus of $126,689.22.

The funds for supporting these cases are secured from 
the membership and from soliciting the public at large and 
other organizations.

Although the NAACP has done business in Florida for 
many years, the charter of the national association was 
never placed on record with the Secretary of State, as 
required by law, until after the enactment of the authority 
under which this committee was created. No permit has 
ever been received by any branch of the NAACP or any 
other part of the NAACP to solicit funds in Florida, al­
though such solicitations have been made for a long number 
of years.

The record shows five petitions for desegregation of 
public schools have been filed in Florida pursuant to the 
directive of the national office of the NAACP above set 
out. The Dade County petition has been followed up by 
the filing of a law suit in the Federal District Court by the 
NAACP on behalf of five plaintiffs. The record shows that 
all five of said plaintiffs executed the same contract with 
the NAACP attorney handling the case. Under the terms 
of that agreement, the plaintiffs are not liable for any costs 
or attorneys’ fees. The attorney bears no responsibility to 
the five individual plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have absolutely 
no control over their causes. They cannot even stop their 
law suit or discharge their attorney. The agreement stipu-

74



lates that the Miami branch of the NAACP has all those 
rights and that the attorney can be replaced only by the 
branch and is responsible to it alone.

The great bulk of the NAACP’s activities, above de­
scribed, are in the opinion of counsel contrary to the spirit 
and letter of the canons of ethics and general laws govern­
ing the conduct and practice of law; and amount to an 
abuse of the judicial processes of the courts in which these 
cases are carried on.

The NAACP, in conjunction with the Inter Civic Council, 
Inc., whose officers happen to be the local officers of the 
Tallahassee Branch of the NAACP, maintained financially 
and supplied the leadership for the boycott movement in 
Tallahassee. The boycott movement drew heavy financial 
and moral backing from certain individuals on the faculty 
at the Florida A&M University. This support included the 
use of their automobiles in the car pool operation, which 
the Municipal Court of Tallahassee held to be unlawful and 
illegal operation in the trial of the Inter Civic Council, Inc. 
and the 21 individual defendants. Some faculty members 
were convicted in that case.

Dr. Gore, in September 1956, called the entire staff of the 
Florida A&M University together and cautioned them 
against participating in this, boycott movement. Certain 
members of the faculty still persisted in their participation 
to the extent that Dr. Gore called them, in for personal and 
private conversations regarding their activities in the boy­
cott. In this class, among others, were: I. W. Elliott, Henry 
W. Warner, Dr. Emmett Bashful, Dr. 0. V. Smith, E. D. 
Irons, Irene Mandexter, M. G. Miles, James Hudson, Dr. 
H. E. Cobb, Dr. S. S. Lewis, and Paul Lewis. Edwin F. 
Norwood, Sr. was also active in the boycott.

, In the opinion of counsel, the record discloses that certain

75



attorneys for the NAACP have engaged in unethical conduct 
in violation of the canons of ethics governing the practice 
of law in Florida. It likewise discloses the very strong 
possibility that some of the witnesses before this committee 
committed perjury. Therefore, it is recommended that a 
copy of the pertinent testimony be made available to the 
proper officials of the Florida Bar and the state attorneys 
having jurisdiction where the hearings were held, with the 
recprest that the same be carefully studied and if violations 
of law or ethics have occurred that proper proceedings be 
instituted against any such offender.

The Florida State Teachers Association has concerned 
itself with integration law suits. It, together with the 
NAACP, has been one of the prime movers in instigating 
the filing of the Virgil Hawkins case, to which the Florida 
State Teachers Association has been one of the principal 
financial contributors. The record shows that Virgil 
Hawkins and the other plaintiffs involved in this case 
had virtually no control over the course of this litigation 
and absolutely no financial responsibility for the same, the 
case having been handled and controlled entirely by persons 
and organizations other than the individual plaintiffs.

A much more damaging report as to the NAACP’s activ­
ities would undoubtedly be dictated by the record except 
for the fact that all records of NAACP have been secretly 
removed from the jurisdiction of this state for the express 
purpose of preventing this committee from examining the 
same.

SEABORAD WHITE CITIZENS COUNCIL
The Seaboard White Citizens Council was organized 

under the laws of Washington, D. C. It has been in Florida 
only a very short time. The only illegal activity which 
could be attributed to it, which has come to the attention 
of the committee, is the attempted burning of a cross by 
four members of said organization in Miami, all of whom

76



have been convicted for said act. The executive secretary 
for the council, Federick John Kasper, was interrogated 
at length. It is the opinion of committee counsel that 
Kasper is either an opportunist, or an unstable personality 
craving the spotlight of public attention, or else he is a 
“ plant”, or a “ guided missile”, as it were, of some other 
person or organization. His own testimony discloses him 
to be a violent anti-semitic disciple of the mad poet and 
treasonist Ezra Pound. This young man has never been a 
success in any enterprise or undertaking in his entire life­
time until he formed the Seaboard White Citizens Council. 
Prior to his association with the council, his testimony 
shows he flitted from temporary employment in one field of 
endeavor to temporary employment in other fields of en­
deavor without any indication of any stability or steadi­
ness of purpose whatsoever. His two bookstore operations 
were financed on monies he succeeded in extracting from 
two or more women. Each store stocked an amazing quan­
tity of anti-semitic and outright fascist literature. They 
appear to have been a sort of gathering place for people 
of fascist leanings, all of whom appear to have been close 
friends and disciples of the mad poet Ezra Pound. In 
addition to serving as a gathering place for the above 
described people and as a dispensary of fascist literature, 
Kasper’s bookstores seem mainly to have served as places 
for intermixing of the white and Negro races. This peren­
nial business failure has come closer to supporting himself 
financially through his Seaboard White Citizens Council 
operation than in any other endeavor in his lifetime.

It is impossible to imagine how this man’s ideas, actions 
and conduct can redound to the benefit of any segment of 
the people of Florida or the entire south for that matter. 
In fine, Kasper discloses himself to be an outside inter­
meddler in the racial problems of Florida and the south, 
whose motives are highly questionable and whose presence 
and activities the State of Florida can very well do without.

77



DADE COUNTY PROPERTY OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION

An examination of the entire records, as well as the 
president and several members of the Dade Comity Property 
Owners Association, fails to disclose any unlawful or 
dangerous conduct on its behalf.

All of the above is supported by the committee’s public 
record. There is, in the files of this committee, a great deal 
of substantial evidence which, due to the limitations of 
time, has not been placed in the record. Nor has the staff 
had sufficient time to conduct the thorough type of inves­
tigation which should really be conducted on the organiza­
tions above referred to. This evidence embraces a con­
siderable number of organizations to which no reference is 
made in this report.

Within the last few days, information and sources of 
information have become available to the staff which tend 
to show the Communist Party and certain other subversive 
organizations have made plans to use the racial tensions in 
the south to set one segment of the population against the 
other in this country and to thereby help accomplish their 
aim of world domination. Evidence now available to the 
staff strongly indicates that the Communist Party has 
sought to, and to some degree may have actually, infil­
trated the NAACP and sought to use it for this purpose. 
Unfortunately it is impossible to conduct the type of inves­
tigation and to hold the necessary hearings to determine the 
true nature and extent of this situation within the lifetime 
of this committee.

We regret to report that on February 27, 1957, in a public 
committee hearing in Miami, Florida, one Allen H. Neuharth 
of 19220 Northwest Fifth Avenue, Miami, Florida, repeat­
edly stood in wilful, open, and continued defiance of this

78



committee and of the Legislature of Florida. He repeatedly 
declined the lawful instructions of the acting chairman of 
the committee to answer relevant and lawful questions 
propounded to him without assigning any lawful excuse 
for his failure to answer. His testimony appears on pages 
1382 through 1420 of the record, inclusive. We feel that the 
citation and punishment of this witness for contempt of 
the Legislature is essential to the preservation of the Legis­
lature’s right to compel witnesses to appear and testify. 
We, therefore, are reluctantly driven to recommend that 
this witness be cited for contempt.

We further recommend that copies of this committee’s 
report be mailed to the Attorneys General of each of the 
forty-eight states.

Respectfully,
/s / H e n r y  W. L a n d , Chairman

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