Brief of Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., and Don Edwards as Amicus Curiae

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IN TIIE SUPREIYIE COIJRT OE THE UNITED STATES

No. 83-1958

Lacy EI. Thornburg, et al.,
AppelIants,

v.

Ralph Gingles, et al.,
AppelIees.

ON APPEAL EROM IHE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR TEE EASTERN DISTRICT OE NORTII CAROLINA

BRIEE OE' 
EIs HoNonj\BtE tP.oMj\s p- niNrrr.r., .-rn , spnl<oe

OE SIIE HOUSE OE REPRESEMTATIVES
AI\iD

gEE EIONORABLE DON EDWARDS, CHAIRMAN OE TTIE
SUBCOMIVIITTEE ON TTIE CONSTITUTION OE THE

COMMITTEE ON TIIE JTIDICIARY OE TEIE HOUSE OE
REPRESEiTTATI\TES AS AIYIICUS CURIAE

The Speaker of the United States House of

Representatives, and the Chairman of the Subcommittee

on t!:,e Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary

hereby appear as amici curiae [with the consent of ttre

parties I .



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STATEMENT OE IMTEREST

This case presents an important issue of

interpreting the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,

P.L. 97-205, dS they pertain to Section 2 cf the Votinq

Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. S 1973. As the constitutional

spokesman for the Elouse, and as the Chairman of the

Subcommj.ttee with jurisdictj.on over the Voting Rigtrts

Act, amicl are vitally interested in the case, which

will determine whether Section 2 is to be preserved

as an effective mechanism to ensure that mefubers of

minority groups be accorded an equal opportunity to

participate in tha prr]ifir.al proeesses of this country

and to elect representatives of their choice. fhis

case also raj.ses ,an important question of the respect

to be given congiressional committee reports by which

the intent underlying a statute is expressed,. Ihe

Speaker, with other members of the Elouse, has participated.

as amicus curiae in nurnerous cases before this Court

involvj.ng issues affecting the leglslative branch, both

by motion, e.9., United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S.

447 (L979), and consent, e.9., National Organization

for Women v. Idaho, _ U.S. (1982).



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SU}IIVTARY OE ARGUMENT

Our primary concern in this case is the position

taken by the solici,tor General, as amicus curiae. The

Solicitor General challenges the standards applied by ;

Ehe District court in finding a voting rights violation,

but offers no alternative standards other than the

suggestion that ttre'evidence of some recent black

electoral success in tfue challenged districts should

be conBlusive that ttre form of ttrose districts does

. not deny blacks an equal opportunity to participate

in the political process. fhus, the Solicitor General

sccm*ng}lr asks t*l*s eeurt tse ru]-c tlrat ividence ofl ra'-ent'

and lj.mited, electoral success should be preclusive

of a Section 2 claim. Such a rule would be contrary

to the comprehensive and realistic analysis of Section 2

claims called for by the 1982 amendments, and would

raise a:r artificial barrier to legitimate claims of

denial of votingl rights r*trich, in some ways, would Pose

as significant an impediment to the enforcement of

Section 2 as the specific intent rule of Citv of Mobile v.

Bolden, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), rejected by Congress in

1982.

' To assume that some electoral success by some

members of a mi.nority group, rto matter how few or



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incidental such successes may be, conclusively evidences

an equal opportunity for that giroup fully to participate

in the political process does violence to comrnon sense.

Experience, as documented by the pre-Bolden case law,

proves that the systemati.c denial of fuII and equal

voting rights to blacks may be accomPani.ed by the

occasional success of some blacks in primary or general

elections. As the courts have uniformly recogzrized.,

the vice of the denial of equal voting rights to a

minority group is.not salved by such token or incidental

successes of its members.

Solicitor General is inconsi.stent with the.Iiteral

Ianquage of Section 2, and was expressly repudiated

by Congress when it considered the :.982 Amendments.

Ihe best evidence of Congiressr intent with regards to

tlre 1982 Amendments is the Report of the Senate Judiciary

Committee, S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1982) (hereinafter the "Senate Reportrr). This Report

cannot be disregarded as the view of a trliberal minority,rt

as argued in the arnicus brief of the Solicitor General,

for there is overwhelming evidence that this view was

accepted by members of Congiress generally, including,

importantly, the authors of the compromlse Iegislation

reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee.



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Ttre effort of the Solicitor General to denigrate

the importance.of the views expressed, in the Senate

. Report has significance going beyond this particular

case. A majority of the Judiciary committee sought

to provide, in the Senate Report, a detailed statement

of the purpose and effect of t}.e l.9a2 amendments, a

statement which was reli.ed. upon by members of both houses

of Congress in passing upon the legislation' By

belittling the significance of this Report, the Solicitor

General seeks to cut the ]-9e2 annendments free from their

legislative history, presumably so that they may advance

in oEfuer cases; as they have here; aJE *nEgr?retatio+

cf t}.at legislation j.nconsistent with the view of the

congressional majority. ffr:." effort would undermine

firmly established principles of interpret,ation of Acts

f Congress, and allow state and federal administrative

agencies to perform radical surgery at will on such

Iegislation.



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ARGUME}fiT

I. TO ASSUME COMPLIA.I'ICE WITH SECTION 2 UPON EVIDENCE
OE SOME ELECTORAL SUCCESS BY MEI4BERS OE A MINORIEY
GROI'P VIOEATES THE LITERAL REQUIREMENTS OE TIIAT
PROVISION; EVIDENCE OE SOME ELECTORAL SUCCESS MUST

BE VTEWED AS ONE OE TIIE ''TOTALITY OE CIRCUMSTANCESII
CONSIDERED

The suggestion by the Solicitor.General that

the evid.ence of some electoral success by blaci{s in

the challenged d,istricts in North Carolina is dispositive

of the Section 2 claim ignores the plain lanquage of

the statute. ! Section 2 instead requires that claims

r We make no effort herei.n to state the facts at issue
+rt tsh+s- ease in a cornpleta rnan.'cr Sti 1'l . it is imPortant

. to note the limited nature of the black electoral success
which appellants and the Solicitor General have seized
upon as- tonclusj-ve evidence that blacks have an equal
opportunity to participate in the North Carolina electoral
ploce=s. five multimember districts with at-Iarge voting
are at issue:

House District No. 36 and Senate District No' 22
(Mecklenburg and Cabarrus Counties) -- Black candidates
have won only two eLections in this century. One black

T:,iJ' ;;"1, ll"H",;i ?:'.$i*i I i33" i ; ffi : "3::: : : 
"11" 

" "
primary), and one served in the four member Senate
&etegalion from 7975-1990. This limited success is
offset by frequent electoral defeats. In Elouse
District 36, ieven black candi.dates have tried and failed

;i ":i'" :;3H"1::*n133u i "i130' ?"';ffi:"': I =:::i: :?"::"
1980. Blacks comprise approximately 25 percent of the
population in these Districts-

li::; :::::1":=*3,,"' 3, 
( :"::,::-:ffi:I':"i$:ill,.-i,3*

1974 lo 1978. Tr+o blacks were elected to the House
in 1982. No black has ever been elected to the State
Senate from the County. A black was one of five members
of the County Commlssion from 1976 to 1980, she lost

IEootnote continued on followinS Page]



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brought thereunder be analyzed on the basis of the

tttotality of circumstancestt present in the challenged

district , ef which the extent of past black electoral

success is only one relevant circumstance.

The controlling provision is Section 2(b), which

states:

nA violation of subsection (a) is
established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination
or election in the State or political.
subdivision are not equally open to

l3r;. 
*"i"ll::i"-:: 

133o;ro3:";:";:ff::: :;'d3'f"l?o
of Education from 7974 Eo 1978, he lost to a Republican
in 1978, but regained his seat in 1982. Blacks comprJ.se
25.1 percent of the County's population.

House District No. 27 (Wake County) -- Since 1981, one

3 I i:Ln: :#:::"' l i : 5'3" : : "H". :' ffi ;-;::: i "ti li'3:' iil;
County. One black served in the Senate for two terms
(1975-1980). In other offices filled by at-Iarge
elections, one in seven County Commissioners J.s black,

t*iii:1":!iiF:;ii"!:s:":iril ?:;r":";;i::if.:H:I",
from 1973 to 1975, was black and a black has been County
Sheriff since 197A.

Elouse District No. 23 (Durham County) Since 7973,
one black has been elected to the th.ree-member delegation
(running unopposed by a white in the primary and general
election i-n 1982). Blacks constitute 36.3 percent of
the population of the county. 'Blacks have had
considerably less success in the Durham City CounciI,
where they fill three of 12 seats in at-large electi-ons.
The City of Durham is 47 percent black in population.



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participati.on by members of a class of
Litizens protected by subsection (a)
in that its members have. Iess opportunity
than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members
of a protected class have been elected
to office in the State or Political
subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, That nothing
in thj-s section establishes a right to

' have members of a protected class elected
in numbers equal to their proportion
in the PoPulation.tt

This express statutory provision clarifies that

The ext,ent to which members of a protected class have

been elected to office in the state or political

=,,t^CiViSicn iS nnc r^i r-errmstance WhiCh m3,Y b€

considered t1 Obviously, other factors which

comprise the tttotalj.ty of circumstancesn surrounding

the political process must also be considered. Ttrus,

electoral success. is a relevant crlterion, but not the

sole or dominant concern, as posited by the Solicitor

General.2

2 Certain statements made in the ami.cus brief of tlre
Solicitor General suggest that black electoral success
in proportion to the btack proportion of the population
shoula- be preclusive of a Section 2 claim. Brief for
the United States as Ami.cus Curiae 17-19. Whatever
the relevance of this position to t}.e facts of this
case (black electoral success has neared proportionality
only in three of the five districts, and then only in
the most recent election), it is untenable as a matter
of law. Congress clearly stated its intent that Sect{on 2

claims should not depend upon the proportionality of
minority group representation. Section 2 seeks to deflect
excessive concern on the racial or lingual identity

IFootnote conti.nued on followinS Page]



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Indeed, the statutory language necessarily

contemplates that a Section 2 violation may be proven

despite some minority group electoral success. fhe

focus on the rrextentrr of minorlty grouP electoral success

contemplates gradations of success from token or

incidental victories to electoral domination -- and

presumes that a violation of Section 2 may be proven

in cases where members of the group have been eiected

to office, but the group nevertheless has been deni.ed

a full-scale eqrta-I opportunity to participate in the

political process.

IEootnote 2 continued from precedinS page]
of individual officeholders and, instead, focus attention
where it properly belongs: on tlre existence of an equal
opportunity for members of the m5-nority group to
participate in the political process.

As a practical matter, it cannot be assrrmed that
proportionate black electoral success evidences an equal
opportunity on the part of blacks to participate in
the political process. Eor example, single-sLrot voting
is permitted in the multi-member districts here at issue.
Even given the reluctance of whj-tes to vote for black
candidates, blacks can elect a black candidate by single-
shot voting and perhaps attain proportionate
representation. In these circumstances, however,
proportionality does not eguate with equality of
opportunity, for, as tl:e di-strict court recogrnized,nblack voters must rely extensively on single-shot voting,
thereby forfeiting by practical necessity their right
to vote for a fulI slate of candidates.rt 590 E. Supp.
at 369.



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BecauseSection2isplainonitsface,itshould

be necessary to look further to the legislative history'

Maine v. Thiboutpt , 448 U.S. 1, 6 n'4 (1980); TVA v'

EIi1I,437U.S.153,L8*n.29(1978).NevertheIess,
we will examine that history because it confirms, in

ttte most unequivocal terms, the intent of congress that

the extent of minority group electoral success be analyzed

as a part of the totality of circumstances from which

to measure th,e openness of the challenged political

system to rninority group participation. Eurther, that

history provides an J.mportant indication of the manner

in which such analysis should be undertaken, and supports

II.

tl.e analysis and. conclusions of the court below.

rEIE LEGISLATIVE IIISTORY OE TIIE 1982 A}4ENDME}TTS AI\iD

gTTg PRE.BOTDEN CASE LAW CONCLUSIVELY DEMONSTRATE

rHAT A VmTIoN oE SEeTIoN 2 MAY BE FOUND ALrHoUGH
IYIEMBERS OE A MINORITY GROUP EAVE EXPERIENCED LIMITED
ELECTORAL SUCCESS

The Legislative Eiistory: ihe Majority
Statement in the Senate Report Specifically
Provj.des that Some Minorlty Group Electoral
Success Does Not Preclude a Secti'on 2 Claim
if Other Ci.rcumstances Evidence a Lack of
Ecrual Access

Evenacursoryexaminationofthelegislative

history of the 1982 amendrnents shows very clearly that

congress did, not intend that limited electoral success

by a minority would foreclose a section 2 claim. This

A.



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intent is stated in the Senate Report,3 in the individual

views of members of the Committee appended to that Report,

and ln the floor debates.

The issue was addressed expressly in the Senate

Report more than once. The Senate Report includes as

one tttllpical factortr upon whic.h a plaintiff could rely

to establish a vj.olation under Secti-on 2, trthe extent

to which members of the minority group have been elected,

to public office in the jurisdiction.tr Senate Report

al 29. Additlcnal important comrnentary with regard

to this factor is ttren provided i.n a footnote:

ttTl:e fact that no members of a minority
group have been elected to office over
an extended period time J.s probative.

t In addition, t}:e Report of the Elouse Committee on
the Judiciary on !I.R. 3112, H. Rep. No. 97-227, 97t-'}:
Cong., Ist Sess. 30 (1981) (hereinafter the ttHouse

Reporttt ), also supports the view that limited electoral
success by a minority does not foreclose a Section 2
claim. As the Eouse Report explains, tt 

I a ] n aggregate
of objective factors should be considered.rr Id. (emphasis
added). In other words, no one factor is necessarily
determinative of the existence or nonexistence of a
votingr ri.ghts violation. A variety of factors trsuch

as a history of dj-scrimination affecting the rlght to
vote, racially polarity Isic] voting which impedes ttre
election opportunlties of minori.ty group members,
discriminatory elements of the electoral system such
as at-Iarge elections, a majority vote requirement,
a prohibiti.on on single-shot voting, and numbered posts
which enhance the opportunity for discrimination, and
discriminatory slating or t}.e failure of minorities
to win party nominatlon, tr should be considered- Elouse
Report at 30. of course, ttlalIl of t}:ese factors need
not be proved to establish a Section 2 violation-rr
rd.



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Eowever, the election of a few minority
candidates does not tnecessarlly foreclose
the possibility of dilution of t}:'e black
vote, t in vi.olation of this section-
Zimmer 485 F.2d at 13O7. If it did,
the possibility exists that the majority
citizens might evade the section €.9-,
by manipulaiing the election of a 'safe'
minority candidate. 'Were we to hold
that a minority candidaters success at
the polls is conclusive proof of a minority
groupt s access to the political process,
we would merely be inviting attempts
to circumvent the Constitution
Instead we shall continue to requi.re
an independent consideration of the
record. ' Ibid. n Senate Report 29 n- 115.
References are to Zimmer v. l4sl(eilhgn,
4ss E.zd, t2s7 (sth.--ilts73l@_
sub nom. East CarroII Parish School Bd. v.
l,f"rsftaff ,

No elearer statemen€ ef t&*e intent ef Congress witb

regard, to this issue seems possible-r

t In addition to disparagJ.ngi severally the sigrnificance
of t].e views expressed in the Senate Report, the Solj-citor
General also suggests that this statement merely indicates
that minority group electoral success wilI not defeat
a Secti.on 2 claim onlv if it can be shown that such
success was tl:e result of th'e majority ttengineeringt
the election of a tsafef minority candidate.tr Brief
for the United States as Amlcus Curj.ae, 17 n.15. This
would turn the statement in tl:e Senate Report on its
head, transforming an example which illustrates why
some success should not be dispositive into a legal
rule defining t}-e only circumstance where it is not-
Of course, there are numerous other reasons why some
electoral success night not evidence an equality of
opportunj.ty to participate in the electoral process-
For example, as in the instant case, ttre ability to
single-shot vote in multimember districts may produce
some black officeholders, but at the expense of denying
blacks the opportunity to vote for a fuII slate of
candidates. See 59O F. Supp. at 369.



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Eurther, ttlis analysis, and its reliance on

Zimmer v. McKeithen, is consistent with the express

view of Congress that ttltlhe 'resultsr standard is meant

to restore the pre-Mobile legal standards which governed

cases challenging election systems or practi.ces as an

illegal dilution of tl:,e minority vote. Specifica1ly,

subsection (b) embodies the test laid down by the Supreme

Court in White [v. Resester, 4L2 U.S. 755 (1973) ].rr

Senate Report 27.t This reliance on pre-Bolden case

Iaw is irnportant, for i.t was firmly established under

' There can be no doubt that this was the view of a

cod'ifies the legal standard articulated ln White v.
Regester, a standard, r*hich was. first appliea Uy tfre
Supreme Court in Whitcomb v. Chavis, and which was ,
subsequently apptffiome ffieral courts of Appeals
decisions.rr Senite Report 194. Senator Thurmond, ?rl
ogiponent of ttre bill, similarly rernarked that 'rthe
Committee Report could not be more explicit in its
adoption of the standard of the Supreme Court in lfhite v.
ReqLster. It is this test that has repeatedly be6--
offered in definition of t}:.e results standard by
proponents of the test during subcommittee hearinqs
and by Congressional proponents of the stand,ard.rr Senate
Report LO4 n.24.

Senator Thurmond goes on to argirre that, because
of this reference to pre-Bolden case law, courts might
justifiably ignore the Senate Report and other Ieglslative
tristory in favor of their own interpretation of that
precedent. Id. There j.s no justification for this
view, for, as was repeatedly emphasized by supporters
of the legJ.slation, the intent of t}.e majority was that
courts adhere to the congressional interpretation of
tl.e pre-Bolden case law, as expressed in the Senate
Report and elsewhere. ICites] Thus, the pre-Bolden
case law must be read through the prism of the legislative
history of the L982 amendments.

t



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that case law that a voting rights violation could be

established even though members of the plaintiff minority

group had experienced some electoral success within

the challenged system

Congress was acutely aware of this precedent.r

Indeed, in the case set by Congress as the polestar

of Secti ga 2 analysis -- White v- Regester -- a votingi

rights denj.al was found by this court despite linited

black and Eispanic electoral success j.n the challenged

districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties in Texas. Senate

Report 22.7

F

The Senate Report states:
ttv-[:at has been t]re judicial track record
under tbe !results testr? That record
received intensive scrutiny during the
Committee hearings. The Committee reviewed
not only the Supreme Court decisions
in Whitecomb and Wh.j-te, but also some
23 reported vote dilution cases in which
federal courts of appeals, prior to 1978,
followed lfl.ite.rr Senate Report 32.

A Iist and analysis of these 23 cases appears in
Votj-ncr Riqhts Act: Ilearings Before the Subcol@i !n
the Consti.tution of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciar
VoJ.-I, 97t}r cong., 2d Sess. 1,2:.6'1226 (1982) (hereinafter

Senate Eearingstr) (appendix to prepared statement
of Erank R. Parker, director, Voting Rights Project,
Lawyersr Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law).

7 T'l:e Senate Report quotes the porti.on of this Courtrs
opirtion in White v. Regester wherein it was observed
that tr i since Reconstruction, only two black candidates
from Dallas County had been elected to the Texas House
of Representatives, and threse two were the only black
candidates ever slated by the DaIIas Committee for
Responsible Government, white-dominated slating group. tr

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Congress also placed significant reliance upon

the opinion of the 5th Cj-rcuit i.n Zimrner v. McKeithen,

which i.t d,escribed as ttltlhe seminal court of appeals

d,ecision . subsequently relied upon in ttre vast

najority of nearly tvo dozen reported dilution cases.tt

senate Report 23. t In Zimmer the 5th circuit found

ceding Pagel
+rz u.s. at 766-69. rhe decision of tl.e distrlct court
indicates that the first of these candidates ran in
igee, and. that they were selectec by the white-dominated
DaIIas Committee for Responsible Government without
the participation of tlr'e black community'- -9.faves, v'
Barnls, 343 E. Supp. 7O4, 726 (W-D- Tex' 1972) '

A siruilar point was made with respect to Eispanic
success in Bexar County, where rt1o1n1y five Mexican-
Americans lad served on the Texas Legislature, and only
two were fiom the barri.o area-r 412 U-S' al 756-69'
The district court indicated that four of these five
were elected after 1960. Graves v. Barnes, 343 E. Supp.
at 732

The findings in wtrite v. Recrester seem unremarkable
until it is realized Eat-appellants and the Solicitor
General rely in the instant case on a lesser showing
of black elictoral success in certain distrlcts at
issue in- particular, Elouse District 35 and Senate
District 22 -- as conclusive evidence that no voting
rights violation has occurred-
I Emphasis was placed on this case in the debates on
the fioor of t}:g Senate as weII. Thus, Senator DeConcini
underlined the sign:rificance of Zimmer: ttPerhaps the
clearest expressi.on of the standard of proof in these
vote ditution cases may be found in the fifth circuit
case of Zimmer against McKeithen.tt _ Cong. Rec. 56930
(daily ed. June 17 , 1982 ) . Ile added, " [t]hese 23

iappett"tel cases are extremely important in the
ivafuation of a rresultsr test which would i-ncorporate
their standards into statutory law.tt Id.



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inconclusive the fact that three black candidates had

won seats in the ctrallenged at-Iarge district since

the institution of the sui.t. The court reasoned tl.at

uhile the appellee urged that ttthe attendent success

of three black candidates, dictated a finding that the

at-large scherne did not in fact dilute t}.e black

vote. . We cannot endorse the view that the success

of black candidates at the polls necessarily forecloses

the possibility of dilution of the black vote.tr 485

F.2d at 1307.

Similarly, Congress considered with approval

where prior to Bolden a votingl rights violation trad

been found, despite limited black electoral success,

because ttlbllack participation in Edgefield County has

been mereLy tokenism and even this has been on a very

small scale.tr McCain v. LYbrand, No. 74-2AL, 2t 18

(D.S.C. April 17, 1980), cruoted at Senate Report 25'r

Ihe decision in McCain v. Lvbrand also was di-scussed
in depth in the floor debates, because of a dispute,
involving Senator Eollings on one side and Senators
Thurmond and East on the other, concerning tlre continued
need for the remedial provision of Section 2 in their
home states. Senator HolLings spoke with approval of
the district court's finding of a voting rights violation
in that case, despite limited black participation on
the school board and other bodles, where such
participation was rrtokenismrt and on a small scale.

Conq. Rec. 56865-55 (daily ed. June 16, 1982) -

Senator Eollings eventually placed the decision of the
district court in the Senate Record Cong- Rec.
56950-54 (daily ed. June 1-7, 19e2).



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In additlon, there are ot]:er pre-Bolclen decisions of

similar import not specifically addressed in the Senate

Report or in the floor debates. ro

That no one in Congress understood electoral

success to be dispositive of a Sectj-on 2 claim also

is evident from the critj.cism of the 1982 Amendments,

Ievied by its opponents, that it would requlre a finding

10 So, in one of the 23 appellate decisions studied
by Congiress, the Eifth Ci.rcuit, while rejecting a
reapportionment pLan ordered by the district court because
it left t]:e chances for black success unlikely, noted
its continuing adherence to the Zimmer rule: ttwe add
the caveat that the election of E'fZFcandidates d,oes
net -rrtnmatiea'l 1v mean that black Votinc, strencrth is
not minimized or cancelled out.tr Kirksev v. Board of
Supervisors, 554 E.2d 139, 149 a.2l (Sth Cir. :.977).

This rule of comrnon sense rras respected by the
district courts. Eor example, in Graves v. Barnes,
378 E. Supp. 649, 659-51 (W.D. Tex. 1974), the court
concluded that the recent election of Hispanics to the
Texas House of Representatives and to the school board
did not frustrate a votlng rights claim.

Simllarly, a district court refused j-n Beer v.
United States, 374 E. Supp. 363 (D.D.C- l.374d, to d.eem
the city of New Orleans to be entitled to pre-clearance
under Section 5 despite a showing that four blacks
recently had won elective office in the muni.cipality.
The court reasoned that tr1t1he only successful black
candidates for ci.ty-wide office in New Orleans were
recipients of support from white organj.zatons or white
candidates The achievement of these candidates
cannot be equated with open access to the voting booth
and equal weight in the vote count.tr Id., 375. Returni-ng
to the same issue later, the court reiEErated, tl.at tttwle
do not regrard their victories as truly significant to
the probl,em under discussj-on. One was unopposed; the
others ran on tlckets strongly backed by weII known
white personalities. . Ttrese trlumphs represent
no more than nominal success . tt Id. , 398 .



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of a denj.al of voting rights whenever a minority group

experienced anything less than proportionate electoral

success and some other factor could be demonstrated,

such as historic discrimj.nation. or economic inequality. rr

Ihis criticism implicitly recogrnizes that some minority
group electoral success would not preclude a Section 2

claj.m, sj.nce its objection is that evi.d.ence of success

that was anything less than proportional representation

would be conclusive evidence of a voting rights violation.
Notably, proponents of the legislation never responded

that the showing of electoral success obviated inquiry
into the other factors (the position taken by the

Solicitor General); rather they ohserved that the bill
required assessment of the trtotality o-f, circumstances.rr

B. Ihe Majority Statement in t}.e Senate Report
Is an Accurate Staternent of tl:.e Intent of
Conqress with, Regard to the 1982 Amendments

Despite this unequivocal legislative history,
the Solici-tor General apparently maintains that Congress.

intended, in legislation desigmed to strengthen minority

rr So, Senator Eatch argued ln additional views to
the Senate Report, ttlulnder the results test, the absence
of proportional representation plus the existence of
one or more tobjective factors of discrimination,r such
as an at-Iarge system of government, would constitute
a Section 2 violation.rr Senate Report 97. See also
_ Cong. Rec. 56941 (daily ed. ,lune !7, 7982h SIOSZ
(June 18, 1982) (statements of Sen. Ilatch); 56785-86
(June 15, 1982) (statement of Sen. Byrd).



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voting rights, to adopt in 1982 the rule rejected in
Zimmer v. McKeithen. To this end, he attempts to detract
from the significance of the statement of the majority
in the Senate Report and, supplant for those views t]:e

statements of the authors of the compromise legislation
reported by the Committee, and, in particular, the

statements of Senator DoIe and Senator Grassley. See

Bri.ef for the United States as Asricus Curi.ae 8 n.5. 12

Significantly, the effort of the Solicitor General to
dj.scredit the majorlty statement in the Senate Report

gioes beyond this case. In anottrer recent appeal to

t2 Appellants and the Solicitor General also rely on
the Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution to
tlre Senate Courmittee on the Judiciary on S. 1992, 97th,
Congr., 2d Sess. (1992) (nsubcontmittee Reportrr). It
is difficult to see what relevance the Subcommittee
Report has to the interpretation of the 1982 amendments,
for it was harshly critical of ttre positi.on of the
Congressional majority in favor of overturning the Bolden
intent test and reinstating a results test. Id., 20-52.
The majority of tl.e Senate Subcommittee apparently was
quite happy with the existing state of the law, ana
saw no need for the l9A2 arnendments. Notably, the

'Ctrairman of the Subcommittee -- Sen. Orrin llatch --
opposed the DoIe compromise and voted for the bill
ultj.mately enacted only with grreat reluctance, and
continuing to state until the final vote on the bill
his view trtl:at these amendments promise to effect a
destructive transformation in the Voting Rights
Act. .rr Cong. Rec. 57139 (daily ed. June 18,
1-9e2). Of th-ilr otl:er members of the Subcommittee:
Sen. Strom Thurmond opposed the DoIe compromise; Sen.
Charles Grassley supported the compromise, and, as noted
below, expressly acceded to the majority view of ttre
Senate Report; and Senators Dennis DeConcini and patrick
Leahy objected to the conclusions of the Subcommittee
Report.



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this Court regardi-ng a Section 2 claim, Cltv Council

of the Citv of Chicago v. Ke'uchum, No. 84-627, the

Solicitor General slmilarly filed a brief as ami.cus

curiae argruing that the Senate Report is not indlcative

of the intent of Congress, and that grreater sig::ificance

should be gi.ven to the individual views of Senators

DoIe, Grassley and, Hatch. r! Brj.ef for the United. States

as Amicus Curiae , L2 a.!Q, 16 n.15. These efforts are

rnj.sguid,ed on both factual and legal ground.s.

1. The Maj ori.ty Statement in the Senate
Report Plainly Reflects the Intent
an{Effect of t}re Leglslation

To understand the significance of

view stated in the Senate Report, and of the indivldual

views of Senators Dole and Grassley, it is necessary

to understand the nature and the genesis of what is

aptly termed the DoIe compromi-se. The purpose of the

compromise was to reformulate the results standard to

ensure that the amended. Section 2 would not be interpreted

by courts to require proportional representation. The

bill ori.ginally adopted by the Elouse -- lI.R. 31,12

It The claim of the Solicitor General that the vievrs
of Sen. Hatch are important because he itsupported the
compromi.se adopted by Congresstt is more than a little
suspect. As noted in the preceding footnote, while
Sen. llatch did ultimately vote for the bill, he opposed
the DoIe compromise in Con'mi.ttee and voiced opposition
to the bill on the floor of the Senate.



E GERGEN64
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attempted to accomplish this with a disclaimer that
ItThe fact that member.s of a minority group have not

. been elected 1n numbers equal to the group's proportion

of tfue population shall not, ln and of itself, constitute.

a vlolatj.on of th,is section. n In addition, t1:e stated

puryose of the llouse bill vas to reinstate the standards

of pre-Bolden case law, which was understood by the

Eouse not to requi.re proportional representation. Eouse

Report 29-30

Ihe Eouse biII attracted imsrediate support in

the Senate. senators Kennedy and Matlr.ias introduced

rt

of approximately tr*o-tfuirds of ttre mernbers of the Senate

3s co-sponsors. lr Sti1l, certain members of the Senate,

and, in particular Senator DoIe, had lingering doubts

as to whether the lanquage of ttre Elouse bill was

sufficient to foreclose the interpretation of the Voting

Rights Act as requiringi ProPortional representation-

To ameliorate tlris concern, Senator DoIe -- in conjunctj.on

rr rnitially S. 1992 had 51 co-sponsors, and by the
time the Senate Judiciary Committee passed upon the
DoIe compromise, this number had grown to 66. Thus,
as Senator DoIe himself recogrnized in Committee
deliberations, Itwj.thout any change the llouse biII would
have passed. E Executive Session of the Senate Judlciary
Committee, Ylay 4, 19A2, reported at Voting Rights Act:
Elearinas before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
tfre Senate Co1rm. of the .Iu4fS.igry, Vol. II, 97th Cong-,

tt I I Senate Elearings tt 
) .



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with Senators Grassley, Kennedy and Mathias, among'

others -- proposed that Section 2(b) be added to pick

up the standard enunciated by this Court in White v.

Regester. In additi.on, the disclaimer included in the
I

Elouse bill was strengthened to state expressly that
Itnothing in this section establishes a right to have

members of a protected cld,ss elected in numbers equal

to tlleir, proportion of the population-tr lr

The DoIe compromise was not meant basically to

revise the L982 amendments. Rather, as senator Joseph

Biden explained in the committee debate over ttre DoIe

is, it clarifies wtrat everyone intended to be the

situation from the outset.rr Executive Session of tl:,e

Senate Judiciary Committee, May 4, L982, reported at

r! fhus, Senator Dole explained the proposed comprornise
as follows:

tt 1T1he compromise retains the results
standards of the Mathias/Kennedy biII.
Ilowever, we also feel that the legj-slatj-on
should be strengthened with additional
Ianquage delineating what lega1 standard
should apply under the results test and
clarifying that it is not a mandate for
proportlonal representation. Ehus, our
compromise adds a new subsection to
section 2, which codified lanquage from
the 1973 Supreme Court decision of White v-
Recrester.rr Executive Session of the
Senate Judiciary Comrnittee, Ylay 4, !982,
reported at II Senate Hearings, 60.



^ t GERGEN64' OO23 Pack = 5O3
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/<

II Senate Elearings. In introducing S. 1992 on the floor,

Senator Mathias also termed the Committee actions on

Section 2 a trclarifying amend,menttr which ttare consistent

with the basic thrust of S. 1992 as introduced and are

helpful in clarifying the basic meaning of t}.e proposed

anendment.rr 

- 
Cong. Rec. 56942, 56944 (daily ed-

June 17, 1982). 13

Given the genesis of the DoIe compromj-se, 1t

is hardly surprising that its authors -- in particular

Senators DoIe and Grassley -- did not perceive it as

inconsistent with the majority vier+ of the proposed

Icgi c'l ati on Trrdeed. in addj-tional comments to the

1' A similar understanding of the Senate bill tras
expressed on the floor of the Elouse by Representative
Don Edwards, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Elouse Comm. of the Judiciary:

ItBasically, the amendments to H.R. 3112
would . clarify the basic intent
of the secti-on 2 amendment adopted
previously by the House.

;t;.=. members Ithe sponsors of the
Senate compromlse] were able to maintain
the basic j.ntegrity and intent of the
Eiouse-passed bill while at t}.e same time
finding lanquage whlch more effectively
addresses the concern that the results
test would lead to proportj-onal
representation in every jurisdicition
throughout the country and which delineates
more specifically the legal standard
to be used under section 2. rr _ Cong.
Rec. H3840-3841 (daily ed. June 23, 1982).



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Senate Report, both Senators DoIe and Grassley forcefully

stated ttrat they thought the majority statement to be

accurate. Thus, Senator DoIe prefaced h5.s additional

views with the comment n1t1he Committee Report is an

accurate statement of the lntent of S. 1992, ES reported

by the Committee.nlT Senate Report 193. And, Senatpr

Grassley prefaced his views witl:, the cautionary remark

ttratttl express my views not to take issue witl:, the

body of the Report.rr Senate Report 196. So that there

could be no doubt as to his position, he later added

that ItI concur witJl the interpretation of this action

in the Committee Report.r' Senate Report 199.

In light of these remarks, it is difficult to

see the basis upon which the Solicitor General contends

t}.at the vier+s of Senators DoIe and Grassley \^Iere, in
some way, at variance t*ith the majority statement.

Certainly, Senators Strom II:urmond, Orrin Eiatch, Jeremialr

Denton and John East did file separate views which took

L' Ttre comments of Senator DoIe primarily vrere concerned
with stressing the intent of the Committee that the
results test and t]:e standard of White v. Regester should
not be constrr.red to require propoIIEEaI repre.sentation.
Senate Report 193-94. This in no way suggests that
Senator DoIe disagreed with the views expressed in the
majority report, for tlrat report went to great pains
to explain that neither the results test nor the standard
of White v. Reqesler implied a gararantee of proportional
representation. Senate Report 30-31. A disclaimer
to the sarne effect appears, of course, on the face of
the statute.



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-25

exception to the rnajority statement, in particular wi.th

regard to the issue r*hether a result standard could

be implemented as other than a requirement of proportional

representation, but they were the only four members

of the Committee to oppose the DoIe "J*pto^ise- 
t'

Executive Session of the Senate Judiciary Committee,

Nlay 4, 1982, II Senate llearings 85-86- As opponents

of the legislation and a small minority whose views

did not prevail, their statements are entitled to little

weight. Ernst & Er4s:! v. Elochfelder, 425 U-S. 185,

2O4 n.24 (1975); National 9'Ioodwork Mnfrs. Ass'n v- NLRB,

386 U.S. 6!2,639-40 (!967); NLRB v. Eruit Vesetable

Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964).1!

r' Senator DoIe objected to efforts by these four :members .

to redefine the intent of the 1982 amendments on the
floor of the Senate:

t'It seems strange that the minority is
norr, managing the bill. It seems strange
to this Senator that this is the case.
Although the Senator from Utah ISen.
Hatch] did vote to rePort the bill, I
would hope tl:ose of us who voted for
the substitute wiII be accorded ample
time also to make legislative hj.story
because there are some very important
issues concerningi every Senator in the
Chamber, not just the four who voted
against the substitute.tt 

- 

Cong. Rec.
55553 (daily ed. June 9, 1-982).

1! Senator Paul Laxalt was the only other member of
the Committee to file separate views. He argued that
the amended Section 2 incorporated an element of i.ntent
und.er an ttobjective designrt standard, which fresumed
that state and local offlcials intended the reasonably
foresee:hIe consequences of their action. Senate

IFootnote continued on following page]



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of the bill's purpose. So, early on in

S. 1992 recogeized

the majority

explanation

the debates

Senator KennedY noted that:

ItThose provisions, and tlre interpretation
. of those provisions, are spelled out

as clearly and, I th5.nk, as well as any
commlttee report that I have seen in
a long time in this body

tt I have spent a good deal of time
personally on this report, and I think
it is a superb comrnentarY on exactly
what this legislation ls about.
ttln shert, what tJris Leg:islativa raFnrt
points out is who won and who lost on
this issue. There should be no confusion
for future g'enerations as to wh,at the
intention of the lanquage was for those
who carried the day.tt 

- 
Cong. Rec.

55553 (daily ed. June 9, l-982).2o

IEootnote 19 continued from preceding Page]
Report 188. Senator Dole expressly took issue witlt
this characterization of the ttreoretical basis of the
results standard. Senate Report 194-95.

20 Senator Kennedy reemphasized this point a week later:
nlf there is any question about the meaning
of the lanquage, we urge the judges to
read the report for its meaning or to
Ilsten to those who were the principal
sponsors of the proposal, not to Senators
who fought against the proposal and who
have an entirely different concept of
what a Voting Rights Act should be.

Cong. Rec. 55780 (daily ed. June 15,
TEEz I .

f

Both proponents and oPPonents of

in the floor debates the sig:nificance of

statement in the Commj.ttee Report as an

IEootnote contj.nued on following page]



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_27

ILrus, the proponents of the tegislation, including

Senators DoIe,2r Grassley,22 DeConcini,23 Matl:ias,2a

and Kennedy,2r repeatedly pointed their colleagues to

ttre rnajority statement of the senate Report for an

explanation of the legislation. conversely, opponents

eceding F"gel' An admonitj.on rstrich senator DoIe treartily ectroed:

nI join tb.e Senator from Masiachusetts
in the hope ttrat when the judges look
at t}:,e legislative history, they wlII
Ieeh a! tlrosc who suFPnrterr wi go"ously
and enthusiistically the so-called
compromise.tt 

- 
Cong- Rec. S6781 (daily

ed. June 15, l9e2) -

senator Kennedy later remarlted to the same effect
ttEortunatelY, I will not have to be
exhaustive because the Senate Judi-ciary

. Committee Report, presented by Senator
Mathias, \ras an excellent exposition
of the intended meaning and operation
of the biII.rr 

- 
Cong- Rec- ????????

daily ed. (June 18, 1982).

2r 

- 
Congr. Rec. s696O-62, 55993 (daily ed. June !7,

r9e2 ) .

22 

- 

Cong. Rec. 56646-48 (daily ed- June 10, ].ge?) '

23 _ Cong. Rec. 56930-34 (daily ed. June !7, 1982).

2' 

- 

Cong. Rec. 5694t-44, S 6967 (daily ed. June !7,
1s82).
2' 

- 

Cong. Rec. 56995 (daily ed. June 17, 1982\;
57095-96 (June 18, 1982).



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of the legislatj.on -- such as Senator llatch,26 or

proponents of particular amendments such as Senator

Stevensz? -- Iooked to the majority statement of the

Senate Report as a basis for critlcism of the bill or

a restrictive interpretation of its purpose- At no

point in the debates did any Senator claim that the

majority statement of the Senate Report was inaccurate,

or that it represented ttre peculiar views of a minority

of liberal Senators. This seems only to be a new

perspectj.ve of the Solicitor General.

Respect for the majority statement of the Senate

Report earri ed to the floor of the Elouse durino the

abbreviated debate on the Senat,e bill- Thus,

Representative E. James Sensenbrenner explained to his

colleaqrues:

ItEirst, addressing the annendment to
section 2, which i.ncorporates the f resultsr
test in place of the 'intent' test set
out in the plurality opinion in Mobile
against Bolden, tl:ere is an extensive
discussion of how t}lis test is to be
applied in the Senate committee report.tt
_ Cong:. Rec. H3841 (daily ed. June 23,
1e82).

23 _ Cong. Rec. 56919-21,'56939-40 (daily ed. June !7,
1982) i s7o9l-92 (June 18, 1982) .

27 

- 

Cong. Rec. 55991, 55993 (daily ed. June !7,
1982r. The amendment offered by Senator Stevens is
particularly noteworthy -- it concerned the application
of the standards of Secti.on 2(b) in pre-clearance cases
because he largely sought to justify it on the basis
of a consi-stent statement in the Senate Report.



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Again, there is no suggestion by any member of the l{ouse

that the majori.ty statement in the Senate Report was

less than an accurate statement of the intent of Congress

with regard to the bill.

2. As a Matter of Law, the Majority
Statement in the Senate Report
Is Entitled to Great Respect

Even assu:ning, arqr.rendo, that Senators Dole and

Grassley did differ wittr the t}.rust of the Senate Report,

it would flout fundamental tenets of statutory

construction to acCord their individual views more weight

than the views of the Committee and Congress as a whole.

In the preced,ing term, this Court reaffirmed

the long-established, prlnclple that when examiningr

Iegislative history, committee reports are the most

authoritative lndicia of Congrressional intent:

ttln surveying legislative history we
have repeatedly stated that the
autlroritative source for fj.nding the
Iegislature's intent lies in t}-e committee
reports on the bill, which 'represent
the considered and collective understanding
of those Cong:ressmen involved in drafting
and studying proposed legislation.'
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186, 90
s. cr. 314, 324, 24 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1969).tr



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-30-

Garqia v. iI4ile{EleleE, _ u. s. _, 105 s. ct. 479,

483 (198a); accord Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 84O,

859 n.36 (1976); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969);

United States v. OrBri.en, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968);

United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585

(1ss7).

fhis Court in the Garcia case also reiterated

the principle that committee reports provide'"more

authoritatlverr evidence of Congressional intent than

statements by indivj.dual legislators. 1O5 S. Ct. at 483

See also United States v. OrBrien, 391 U.S. at 385;

Unitsed Statee v. Aut:omobile 9.iorkors, 352 Ir-S. ar Bnq

This principle holds regardless of the fact that tl:.e

indivldual legislator is a sponsor or floor managier

of the bill. See 9,hand1er v. Roudebush, supra, 425

U.S. at 859 n.36; Sperling v. United. States, 515 E.2d

465, 48O (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. deni-ed, 426 U.S. 919

(1975). Accord Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 35

n.15 (1992). Thus, tl:e f,act that Senator DoIe may be'

considered the ttsponsortt of the compromj.se is of no

conseguence in measuring the weight of his comrnents

against the ttmore authoritativert majority statement

in the Senate Report.



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Eurthermore, the so-called ttcompromise character

of the 1982 amendments should have little bearing on

the interpretation of the legislative history. Even

if Senator DoIers statements could be characterized

as endorsing a limitation on the scoPe of Sectiott 2,

those statenents would still not be entitled to the
rrparticular weightrr the .Soticitor General wishes to.

grant th,em. As this Court has recog:::ized, Itvhen t]:e

langrrage of the Act in its final form i.s a

compromise . the vi.ews of those who sought the most

restrictive wording cannot control interpretation of

the compromise version.rr Hardj.n v. Kentuckv Utilities

Companv, 390 U. S. 1, 11 ( 1958) . Ehus, when surveyi.ng

the legislatj.ve history of statutes specifically

identified as ttcompromise legislation,tt the Court }:as

adhered to the principle tl.at committee reports are

the most probative source of Congressj.onal intent.

See Wirtz v. Loca1 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n,

389 U.S. 463, 468-73, n.9-11

Ihis :rrle of common sense plainly is applicable

where, BS here, the proponents of tlre compromise wording

conceded that the legislation would have been enacted

without the compromise, and the compromise wordingr merely

was offered as a clarification of the intent of



" "t'*
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i

-32

Cong:ress.2! In these circumstances, there is no reason

to conclude that the intent of the proponents of the

compromise is more sigmificant to the leqislation than

the majority vj.ews.

III. TEE DISTRICT COIIRT APPROPRIATELY
LOOKED TO TIIE TOTALITY OE CIRCI'MSTAI,ICES
INCLT'DING TIIE EVIDENCE OE SOME BLACK
ELECTORAL SUCCESS TO DETERMINE WIIETEIER
BLACKS HAD EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICI:
PATE IN glIE ELECTORAL SYSTEM; TIIE COURT
DID NOT REOUIRE PROPORTIONAL REPRESEI{ITATION

At bottom, the argrument of the Solicitor General

that g3y electoral success by members of a minority

group should be conclusive evidence that the group enjoys

an equal opportunity to participate, rests on the claim

that such a rule is implicit in the d.isclaimer ttrat

Section 2 does not provide a minority group the right

to proportionate representation. So, the Solicitor

General has gone to great lengths to establish the

to provide a right to proportionate rePresentation --

as if that point was of sig:tr'i-ficance to the immedi-ate

issue.

This argument is, of cou:ise, a red herring.

The trier of fact may find a denial of equal voting

2' See text and notes accompanying nn. supra.



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opportunity where, despite evidence of token or incidental

minority group electoral success, evidence of other

historical, social and political factors indi.cates such

a denial. Such a finding in no way implies or

necessitates that Section 2 be applied as a giuarantee

of proportionate representation. The

ttd5.sproportionatenesst' of minority group rePresentatlon

is not the gravamen of the Sectj.on 2 claim in such a

case,. tlrough it may be a factor; rather, it is the

confluence of a varj.ety of factors which indicates tfuat

an equal opportunity to particJ.pate in the political

process has been denied the group.

Nor is there Erny reason to believe, as the

Solicitor General intimates, t}:.at the district court

below found a violation of Section 2 despite some black

electoral success ttbec.ause it erroneously equated the

legal standard of Sectj.on 2 with one of cnraranteed

electoral success in proportlon to the percentage of

black population.tt Brief for the United States as Amicus

Curi.ae 12 (emphasis in the ori.ginal). Ratl:,er, the

d,istrict court undertook just the sort of analysis of

the tttotality of circumstancesn present in the challenged

state legislative districts as is required by Section 2.



--csncgN64-

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Indeed, the district court faithfully analyzed

all of the so-calIed rrZimmer factorsn set forth in the

Senate Report. It found a history of offlcial
discrimination against blacks in voting matters --
includ,ing the use of devices such as a poll tax, a

Iiteracy test, and an anti.-single shot voting law --
which conti.nued to depress black voter registration.
590 E. Supp. at 359-61. It observed contj.nued residential
and educational segrregati.on, and the fact that socio-

economic conditions of blacks in North Carolina are

appreciably worse than those of whites. Id. at 351-53.

It noted a majority vote requi.rement imposed by North

of the historical domination of the Democratic party

in local races) which substantially irupeded, minori,ty

voters from electj.ng candidates of tlleir choice. Id.

at 363. It noted that racial appeals continue to be

made in North Carolina elections, even as recently as

th,e Senatorial campaign in 1984. Id. at 364. The court

observed Nort}:. Carolina had offered no legitimate policy
justification for the form of the challenged distrlcts.

Id. al 373-74. And, of crucial sigrnificance, the court

found a hiqh deg:ree of racially polarized or bLoc voting,

such that in most districts a majority of the white

voters would not vote for any black candidate. The



,*t grr\ulrtv=
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court found that where black candidates have been

successful, it is with little or no white support or

where they have been unchallenged. Id. al 367-72.

In light of these findings, lt is unremarkable

ttrat the dj.strict court found a denial of voting rights
despite some evidence of black electoral success. The

court observed that because of the racially polarized

electorate this success cErme at a price. tt[T]o have

a chance of success in electing candidates of their
choice in these districts, black voters must rely
extensi.vely on single-shot voting, thereby forfeiting
by practical necessj.ty their right to vote for a fuII

a

slate of candidates.rt Id. at 369. Eurther, the court

stressed that even ttris success was a recent phenomena,

and insofar as the l9A2 elections were concerned, trras

ntoo 'haphazardr and aberrational in terms of speclfic
candidates, issues, and political trends, and, in any

event, still too minimal in nu:nbers, to support any

such ultimate inferencerr of equality of opportunity.

Id. at 367 n.27.

Ihis is precisely the sort of analysis Congress

intended courts to employ in analyzing Section 2 claims.

There i.s no suggestion in the cpinion of the district
court that it grossly misinterpreted the intent of



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Congress and found a denial of voting rights simply

because blacks had attaj.ned less than proportional

success

CONCLUSION

For ttre reasons set forth above, amici respectfully
request that this Court reaffirm the principle that
mj.nority group electoral success is a factor to consider

in determining whether there is equality of opportunlty
to participate in the electoral process, bui cannot

by its nature be preclusive of a Section- 2 c1aim. We

further request tlr,at this Court, in interpreting the

the intent of the majority of.Congress as expressed

in the majority views of the Senate Report.

Respectful Iy submitted,

I