Letter from Opposing Counsel to Supreme Court RE: Petition for Writ of Cettiorari

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January 6, 1973

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Michael Rodak, Jr., Esq.
Clerk, Supreme Court of 

the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543

Re: Bloomfield Hills School District
v. Hon. Stephen J. Roth 
October Term, 1972 No. 72-747

Dear Mr. Rodak:

On November 21, 1972, we filed the above referenced 
Petition for Writ of Cettiorari in the Supreme Court of the 
United States. We informed the Court in that Petition (p.3) 
that an appeal was then pending before the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit from Bradley, et al. v. 
Milliken, et al. (1) The Court of Appeals rendered its opinion 
on December 8, 1572.

We are advised that school districts which are 
intervenors in Bradley, as well as several of the defendants 
therein, have filed petitions for rehearing and suggestions 
for rehearing in. banc with the Court of Appeals. The Court 
of Appeals has not acted upon these petitions at this date.

The December 8, 1972 opinion of the Court of Appeals 
in Bradley is not dispositive of the issues raised by Bloomfield 
Hills School District in its Petition in this Court. While 
it is true that the Court of Appeals has ruled that "...school 
districts which are to be affected by the decree of the District 
Court are 'necessary parties' under Rule 19" and that "...the 
affected district first must be made a party to this litigation 
and afforded an opportunity to be heard," the Court apparently 
circumscribed this "opportunity" by providing as follows:

(1 ) See 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich., 1971) and 345 F. Supp. 914 
(E.D. Mich., 1972).



Michael Rodak, t, Esq. 
January 6, 1973 
Page Two

D I C K I N S O N ,  W R I G H T ,  M c K E A N  & C U D L I P
»

"For the guidance of the District Court 
on remand, however, we hold that, in 
fashioning an equitable remedy in this 
case, it will not be necessary for the 
District Court to find discriminatory 
conduct on the part of each school 
district, either de jure or de facto, 
as a prerequisite to including such 
district in a desegregation area to be 
defined by the court's decree." (p.68, 
Slip Opinion)

In short, the requirement of the Court of Appeals 
that school districts be joined as parties to Bradley at this 
late date for the apparent purpose of fashioning a remedy to 
the de jure segregation of the Detroit School District does 
not cure the District Court's denial of fundamental due process 
with respect to this Petitioner. Due process requires an 
opportunity to be heard before the court has reached judgment, 
not after. Thus, we take issue with the characterization of 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Bradley as contained 
in Mr. Norman J. Chachkin's letter to you of December 26, 1972.

Accordingly, Bloomfield Hills School District desires
to press its Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court. We 
intend to supplement the Petition after disposition by the Court 
of Appeals of the petitions for rehearing. The purpose of the 
supplement will be to advise the Court of additional develop­
ments relating to this matter.

Very truly yours

Charles F. Clippert
Attorney for Petitioner, 

Bloomfield Hills School 
District

CFC/dh