Memorandum Opinion - Walker III: Joinder of Dallas as a Defendant Subject to the Consent Decree
Public Court Documents
September 22, 1989
59 pages
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Case Files, LULAC and Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Memorandum Opinion - Walker III: Joinder of Dallas as a Defendant Subject to the Consent Decree, 1989. d36d929a-1b7c-f011-b4cc-6045bdd81421. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/413251af-9e7d-489c-a836-f161294a21ba/memorandum-opinion-walker-iii-joinder-of-dallas-as-a-defendant-subject-to-the-consent-decree. Accessed November 06, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DEBRA WALKER, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CA 3-85-1210-R
Filed Aug. 4, 1989
(Revised Septio33, 1989) . oF
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL. ,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION -- WA :
JOINDER OF THE CITY OF DALLAS AS A
DEFENDANT SUBJECT TO THE CONSENT DECREE
This is a class action that involves racial discrimination in low-income
public housing in the City of Dallas and its suburbs. The original parties were
the plaintiff class ("plaintiffs”), the Dallas Housing Authority ("DHA"), and
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD").
: This opinion,? however, concerns the City of Dallas.? And, it holds:
(i) that the City of Dallas will be joined as a party defendant in this case;
Two companion opinions are bei
"Walker I: DHA Violations of
Master” and "Walker II: The F
and they will be cited in thi
2This opinion (originally filed Aug. 4 publication, Primarily by the deletion of some 59 £
N . A
v.-
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 1
(11) that the Consent Decree approved on Jan. 20, 1987 will be modified so that it is binding on the City of Dallas;
(111) that the plaintiffs are entitled to summary Judgment as to liability against the City of Dallas because the undisputed facts establish that the City was a substantial cause of DHA's deliberate racial segregation and discrimination in its public housing programs in Dallas; and
These rulings should come as no surprise. In April of 1988, the "Housing
Mediation Team” appointed by the Mayor recommended that "the City of Dallas
should voluntarily agree to enter into the Walker v. HUD Consent Decree,”
stating:
". . . We believe that there is strong sentiment by all parties with whom we have talked that the City has had an active, historical involvement in the DHA’s operations and, therefore, bears some responsibility for : the condition of Public housing in Dallas. As a result,
legal expenses in its defense. If the City is found liable, it then faces the likelihood of considerable financial outlays. It is for these reasons that we believe the City should enter the Consent Decree voluntarily.”
case subject to the Consent Decree -- and why summary judgment as to liability
should be entered against the City -- this opinion will discuss (i) the
procedural history, (ii) the relationship between DHA and tae City, (iii) the
long, unbroken history of deliberate segregation and discrimination in public
housing by DHA and by the City of Dallas (iv) the boning of the City and its
officials concerning the Consent Decree, and (v) the applicable Naw.
Be
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 2
I. The Procedural History
The complete procedural history of this action -- both before and after
the original parties settled the case with a Consent Decree approved by the Court
on Jan. 20, 1987 -- is detailed in the Walker I companion opinion. However, these
additional facts are necessary to show the procedural setting for this opinion.
On Sept. 8, 1988,
to file a Supplemental Complaint against the City). Both motions sought
injunctive relief against the City of Dallas for the following reasons:
"l) There is a need for additional resources to accomplish the purposes and programs of the Consent Decree,
"2) The City of Dallas has a legal obligation to assist in the disestablishment of the racial segregation in DHA's programs and the housing patterns of the City of Dallas,
"3) The City of Dallas has opposed and attempted to obstruct the operation of the Consent Decree,
"4) The City of Dallas was a substantial cause of the creation and maintenance of racial segregation and discrimination in the housing assistance programs administered by the Housing Authority of the City of Dallas [DHA]."
The City of Dallas filed its reply to the plaintiffs’ first motion (the
motion to modify the Consent Decree) on Oct. 7, 1988. However, the City did not
respond to the second motion (the motion to add the City as a party defendant);
instead, it simply filed an answer to the plaintiffs’ Supplemental Complaint on
Jan. 11, 1989.*
The plaintiffs threatened to do this in early 1988, and that resulted in the Mayor's appointment of the Housing Mediation Team in February of 1988.
J
ales ‘The order permitting the plaintiffs to file their Supplemental Complaint
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 3
On Dec. 12 and 14, 1988, a hearing was held on the Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Modify the Decree and to Enjoin the City of Dallas.® The evidence presented at
that time primarily concerned the Plaintiffs’s liability claims against the City,
and it did not focus on what specific relief should be granted. However, the
Plaintiffs sought a broad injunction which would:
ra Ty 0) #4 (1) prohibit the City of Dallas from “rae sin discrimination in "housing-related actions” ‘and “from obstructing the operation of the Consent Decree; * it.
(1i) require the City to provide a "local program of housing assistance that meets the replacement housing
(111i) require the City to provide "the counseling and transportation services” necessary to help black families move to non-minority areas in Dallas and its suburbs under DHA's § 8 assistance program:’
(iv) require the City to improve the "facilities and neighborhoods of DHA's family housing Projects” so they are equal to the facilities and neighborhoods of the "predominately white-occupied HUD assisted Projects”: and
(Vv) require the City to implement an effective code enforcement Program "to eliminate substandard
against the City of Dallas is being entered on the same day as this opinion.
the evidence introduced at Prior hearings or to Cross-examine any witness. At
the Dec. 21, 1988 Hearing, the City was given the full right to do this, as well as to introduce its own evidence and to challenge the testimony and exhibits offered by the plaintiffs, DHA and HUD at the Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing.
The significance and magnitude of this requirement is discussed in Walker iI
"The significance and magnitude of this requirement is discussed in Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 4
conditions” at DHA's public housing projects and § 8 assisted units.
The plaintiff's Dec. 21, 1988 motion (to add the City as a party defendant)
was expressly based upon the testimony and exhibits Presented at the Dec. 12,
1988 hearing. This was also true of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
(also filed Dec. 21, 1988). And, the response by the City of Dallas to this
~ SANS
Sang bY
%.. 5 he
summary judgment motion was based upon "the exhibits and tet Hin gdmitted into
re riba 3 a evidence at the Dec. 12, 1988 hearing.”® Sl eR
®Although none of the paterjal facts shown by the exhibits and testimony at the Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing were disputed, see the opinion in Walker I, at fn. ‘18, for this Court's credibility determinations regarding the witnesses who testified at each hearing in this case. Nor is this opinion intended to reflect in any way upon the performance of Mr. Alphonso Jackson, who became Executive Director of
DHA after the Dec, 12. 1988 Hearing in this case. See Walker-I, at fn. 4, Finally, as in Walker I, this opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 52, Fed. R. Civ. P. apy
AE
LE ha
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 5
11. Relationship Between DHA
1. The City’s Control of DHA In General
In 1938, DHA was created by the City of Dallas under Texas law. The five-
member Board of Commissioners, which has responsibility for the.operation of DHA,
OEORIS
is appointed by the Mayor of Dallas.® The relationship between. Biel)
was correctly described by City Council Member Lori Palmer: Sores
"So while it is true that there are times when Public officials in the City Council claim we have no direct responsibility or authority over that (DHA) board, that is not true. As a matter of fact, we make those appointments. And I have no doubt whatsoever that the policies and traditions which have been developed by the Dallas Housing Authority are a direct reflection of what has been the spoken or unspoken political climate in the city. I do not think that the DHA has been out on a limb in the development of those policies over many years.”
Similarly, DHA Executive Director Jack Herrington testified that, in his
experience, "members of the [DHA] Board have been responsive to the Mayor who
appoints them.”
: In addition, under the "Cooperation Agreement” between the City of Dallas
and DHA,'® the City agrees to "cooperate with [DHA] by such action as the City
and [DHA] may find necessary in connection with the development and
administration of the public housing” in Dallas. Accordingly, the City has
described its relationship with DHA in this manner:
State law authorizes the creation of public housing authorities, but provides that only the city council may activate such an authority. Tex. Local Gov. Code §§ 392.011(a), 392.031, 392.034.
<n
NY 10Thig cooperation agreement is required by 42 U.S.C. $8 1437 , (e)(2) as a condition to the receipt of federal assistance for public hous programs.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 6
"The Housing Authority of the City of Dallas was created by City Council resolution. It provides a specific public service in response to a need found by the Dallas City Council. State law recognizes this relationship as different from relationships the City has with other legal entities or governments. . . , The Authority is. in effect. an ‘arm of convenience’ of the city government.~!!
Recognizing that DHA has no power to levy taxes, the City of Dallas has
le iy ey provided assistance to DHA in numerous ways, including: performiig many of the 34 i EAs wh 3 ‘
p 5 ) aay nV > : Housing Quality Standard inspections for DHA's § 8 program; ‘ettdng as a co- : EERE SOR : administrator of DHA's § 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Progran: ‘and providing
relocation services for residents displaced by DHA's acquisition of land for its
Projects.
More significantly. the City of Dallas -- through its employees, as well
as the Mayor and members of the City Council -- has directly intervened in the
operations of DHA and has, on numerous occasions directed DHA to take certain
actions.!? Examples of this control which the City of Dallas has historically
exercised over DHA include:
+ + . the City's selection of sites for DHA's . Public housing;
‘ its direction that DHA construct the 3500- unit West Dallas Housing Project; and
. the City’s placement of one of its own employees into the Position of Executive Director of the DHA.
Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 2, pp. 7-9 (Dallas Department of Housing & Neighborhood Services, Report of the Task Force on Public Housing -- Jan. 1983).
5304(c) (1) (C).
i:
ye
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 7
These and many other situations in which the City exercised control over DHA are
discussed in part III ("Deliberate Segregation in Public Housing by DHA and by
the City of Dallas").
2. The City’s Responsibility Under the CDBG Program to Prevent Discrimination by DHA wo DT tA dln
Ne. Since August of 1974, the City of Dallas has Participated: the federal
Cae Te RAY : BR POLS BA he x :
Community Development Block Grant ("CDBG") program, vhidhi 1s admints ered by HUD.
kr Er bot es og i
million per year over the past 15 years.
Because of its receipt of these CDBG funds, the City had these obligations:
to refrain from racial discrimination in its housing-related activities; to
eliminate the effects of any past housing-related discrimination; and to
administer all programs and activities related to housing and community
development in a manner to affirmatively further fair housing. 42 U.s.c. §
5304(b) (2); 24 CFR § 570.601.
Under these CDBG requirements, it is clear that the City of Dallas also
had an obligation to Prevent DHA from engaging in racial discrimination and
segregation in its public housing programs -- and to further the goal of "fair
housing” by requiring DHA to eliminate the effects of its past discrimination
in public housing. This is particularly true since the City used DHA as a
substantial source of the "housing assistance” which the City had to show to HUD
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 8
in order to qualify for the $195 million in CDBG funds.!® Cf. NAACP v. Secretary
of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 154-157, 160-161 (1st Cir. 1987).
3. But The Tragic Facts
The City of Dallas can, without question, control the activities of DHA.
It has actually done so since 1938 under its general relationship vith DHA. And,
after August of 1974, it had the responsibility to do 2 under- the CDBG program.
At any time -- yes, at any tige -- the City of Ballas soutd fave forced
DHA to stop its deliberate policy of strict racial segregation in low-income
Public housing in Dallas. But instead, the tragic facts are these: Throughout
the history of DHA, the City has known of DHA’s blatant policies and practices
of racial Segregation and discrimination -- but, as detailed in the next section
of this opinion, not only did the City refuse to intervene to stop these illegal
practices, it actually participated in this conscious discrimination against
minorities in public housing in Dallas.
In order to receive CDBG funds, the City's Housing Assistance Plan filed with HUD must meet certain criteria -- including the promotion of a greater choice of housing opportunities and the avoidance of undue concentrations of assisted persons in areas which contain a high proportion of low and moderate income persons. The Plan must also specify a realistic goal of the number of housing units that will assist low-income persons. 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (1)(B) and (C). The City has repeatedly included the DHA Public housing programs as part of the means by which the City’s "realistic goals” for the use of CBDG funds will be met.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 9
III. DELIBERATE SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC HOUSING
BY DHA AND BY THE CITY OF DALLAS
From its beginning, the Primary purpose of DHA's Public housing program
was to prevent blacks from moving into white areas of this city. The City of
Dallas knew of this intentional segregation; and, it repeatedly took actions
Ay either to cause this racial discrimination and segregatio .
maintain it.
1. The Beginning (1938)
After DHA was created in 1938 by resolution of the Dallas City Council,
the very first site for DHA public housing was selected by the City of Dallas.
Specifically, a 1938 survey by the City Manager recommended "one of the Negro
slum areas” for the first low-income public housing project in Dallas:
"These areas [for the Roseland Homes project] are close in, located in the center of a well established Negro district and ideally sujted as a possible location for a Negro housing project. . . ~ié
“This survey specified the specific areas of the City tjat vere designated for whites, for "Negros,” and for "Mexicans.” Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 1 (General Survey of Housing Conditions, pp. 10-13). "i
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 10
In the same survey, the Dallas City Manager recommended the location of a
"Mexican project” as close as possible to "the Mexican area. ”!® There was,
however, no recommendation for a "white project” site.l6
2. Public Housing in Dallas: 1942-1953
Not surprisingly, DHA located the "Negro housing project" ‘(Rigs
wr Ld
Ly = PRs oon and the "Mexican project” ("Little Mexico”) exactly where the Dallas cy Manager
Tn Ad Tle had “recommended.” When they opened in 1942, Roseland Homes (611 units) was 100%
black and Little Mexico (102 units) was 100% Hispanic. In October of 1988 -- some
21 months after the Consent Decree was approved (Jan. 20, 1987) -- Roseland Homes
was still 94.45% black.l’
In 1937, DHA opened its first white project, Cedar Springs Place. When this
suit was filed in 1985, Cedar Springs (385 units) was 37% black, and in October
1988 it was 41.42% black. (White occupany at Cedar Springs was less than 18% in
1985, dropped to 13% by Jan. 20, 1987.)
5In a chilling forecast of the eventual demise of the historic "Little Mexico" area of Dallas, this same 1938 survey states:
"Due to the zoning classification, the high value placed on the Property and its future use as industrial property, this [the Mexican Area] is not a desirable location to house the Mexican slum dwellers. The Mexican Project should be removed from this immediate area but should be located as near as possible to the district in which they now reside.”
federal housing assistance without the use of DHA Programs by living in projects which receive subsidies directly from HUD. Dec. 12,.1983 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 89 (summary of location and occupancy characteristics of HUD-assisted projects in
alt LA The statistics throughout part III of this opinion are takemny from Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 31 and Dec. 12, 1986 Hearing: Pls. ‘Exh. 1\.«
Ey,
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 11
In 1943, DHA opened a second all-white project: Washington Place. However,
by 1974, Washington Place (347 units) was 54% black, and it ranged from 76%-81%
black from 1977-1984. In 1985, when this suit was filed, Washington Place was
gone, having been demolished after its controversial sale to Baylor University
Medical Center.
|
The next four projects opened by DHA were, of course, 100: hi ck: Frazier
ge) a,
SEs oF
n 1932: and Turner
Courts (550 units) in 1943; Brackins Village (102 wie)
Courts (294 units) and Rhodes Terrace (426 units) in 1953 “Tn October of 1988,
these four projects are still from 96-98% black.
3. Not In My Neighborhood: Chapter One (1950)
The first recorded instance of DHA yielding to political pressure and
neighborhood opposition in selecting sites for public housing took place in 1950.
Then, DHA was considering property at Haskell and Dolphin for "a Negro project.”
However, whites who owned land across the street objected: the DHA Board minutes
for October 30, 1950 describe the meeting of DHA’'s Executive Director with a
Somilttee representing the opposition to this "Negro project”:
"This committee was
. He reported that they
emarkation between colored Iesidents and white residents in that area was Haskell Avenue. He reported that he had explained to these people the plan of the Housing Authority to erect a very tall fence and to put shrubs, effectively separating the housing project which may be occupied by Negroes and the Property now occupied by these people but he had had little success in securing cooperation from them. He reported that the committee was aroused emotionally over the situation, and the people they represented were so aroused there is a possib ty that racia
which have existed in the past in South D become serjous if the Authority continues its plan to erect a public housing project in this particular spot.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 12
As a result, DHA abandoned its consideration of this site -- and continued
to honor the racial "areas of the City” outlined by the Dallas City Manager in
his 1938 survey.!®
4. The West Dallas Project (1950-55): ME TOR A Solution to the "Negro Housing Problem” 3) i,
In 1950, the City of Dallzs and DHA faced a sévede teres
a Le
aes JC od Fh additional low-income housing to keep blacks from moving into white areas. This
' need for
became known as the "Negro Housing Problem.”
Whites in South Dallas were demanding that the City of Dallas take action
to prevent black families from buying homes in white districts. Several bombings
of homes bought or built by blacks in white areas were reported. A Feb. 26, 1950
Dallas Morning News article depicted the "Negro Housing Problem” with a map:
"This map shows the Negroes’ housing plight in Dallas. In the shaded areas, most of the city’s 75,000 negroes live, spotted in between white neighborhoods. They cannot expand without spilling over into white sections.”
1%At this time (1950), state law gave Texas cities the power to enact ordinances under which there was residential segregation by race. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 1015b (repealed 1969). Section 321 of the 1907 Dallas City Charter expressly provided for the City's power to "provide for the use of separate blocks for residences, places of abode, places of public amusement, churches, schools and places of assembly by members of white and colored races.” The United
finally repealed by City Charter amendment in 1968. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 7 (Dallas City Charter - 1952). The City of Dallas admits that these laws established "racially segregated housing patterns [that] have not, yet fully been eradicated” -- but it denies that there is "any current policy within the City of Dallas to provide housing on a racially discriminatory basis.”
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 13
The same article summarizes the plan of a Dallas City Council member (Roland
Pelt) for "an entire Negro city” to be built next to the Trinity River.!®
The 1950 Joint Report on Negro Housing found that "the shortage of housing
for Negroes in Dallas is acute and critical”; that a "serious tension has
resulted, not only among the colored people, but also among a considerable
portion of our white population”; that some of the "present Hegtp residential
districts are ‘hemmed in’ and cannot possibly be expanded” without the consequent
. gM IH As
$$ "displacement of white residents”; that this "makes tof Brcadlontds ant Tonses.
disturbed and distressed communities, unrest, tension and trouble”; and that
"portions of South Dallas particularly have been subjected to this kind of
disturbance.”
Accordingly, the 1950 Joint Report on Negro Housing expressed "sincere
approval” of the recently announced plans for the West Dallas project. This
Report also stated:
"(a) The Negro housing sections, if carefully zoned and properly restricted by the City or county, will attract Negro families of good character, people who, under proper environment, will make citizens of whom our community can be proud.
"(b) We remind the People of Dallas that if we do not provide home sites for Negroes who want to, and can afford to, buy or rent suitable and decent homes, the alternative is terrible overcrowding, dissatisfaction, disease, tension resulting from Negroes buying into white neighborhoods, and many other serious consequences.
Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 8 (1950-51 newspaper articles); Pls. Exh. 9 ("Report of Joint Committee on Negro Housing” of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, the Dallas Citizens Council, and the Dallas Inter-Racial Committee, dated May 24, 1950 and January 24, 1951) ("the Joint Report on Negro Housing”): Pls. Exh. 10 (1962-66 doc uments, p. 1).
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 14
"Ihe Committees feel that the only satisfactory
and permanent solution to this problem can be realized
io . It is the opinion of
the Committees that this basic factor 1s recognized by
the Negro leadership of our community, go long as
atio e sense that {it is a ed here does
not mean discrimination.”
The 1950 Joint Report also said "that Dallas is fortunate in having a very high
type of Negro leadership, the leaders bein men of intelli ). sfon, and a
g g 11g Br ha
SE = 4 4 fine sense of civic responsibility, ~2° a, nn mi SER
It was with this climate that the City of Dallas requested DHA to build
the largest low-rise public housing Project in the nation: the 3500 unit West
Dallas project. Specifically, in a letter dated Sept. 25, 1950, Dallas Mayor
Wallace H. Savage requested:
(1) DHA to select West Dallas for "the location of approximately 3500 low-rent housing units for
Negroes, Latin Americans, and Whites”;
(11) DHA to apply for 1700 new construction public housing units, and combine these with the 1800 that DHA already had, for the West Dallas project.??
2%The 1950 Joint Report on Negro Housing, Pp. 20, also noted that "Negro School students” could "by special arrangements” use the Dallas Public Library - - and it recommended that "g study be made relative to adult negroes being given access to the Dallas Public Library for the securing of books they desire.”
Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 44. The West Dallas project is the second largest public housing project of any type in the United States.
“at this time, West Dallas was not even in the Dallas city limits. DHA's application for the West Dallas Project gave this description:
"The area selected is in what is known as ‘West Dallas,’ a sprawling slum community of approximately five square miles. . . West Dallas is the largest
concentration of substandard dwellings and sium
conditions in and around Dallas . oisig ie
BY
2 od
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 15
The City Council authorized the Mayor to send this request to DHA; indeed, City
Attorney Henry Kucera is described in contemporaneous DHA documents as the "chief
architect” of the West Dallas plan.
Of course, DHA acceded to the City's request to solve the "Negro Housing
Problem.” And, it planned and developed the West Dallas Project under an overt
policy of racial discrimination. So, when West Dallas wag bo
Loan yr.
<
(1) Edgar Ward Place (1500 units) vas 100% blaski®
IREATRSRIE. * Re
(11) Elmer Scott Place (500 units) was 100s Hispanic; and
(iii) George Loving Place (1500 units) was 100% white.
The segregation at West Dallas was so complete that separate parks and commercial
areas were set aside for the separate races.
However, within two years after the West Dallas Project was opened, DHA
was having substantial vacancy rates for the white and the Hispanic units. DHA
attributed this to the "stigma attached to the area known as West Dallas”; to
the "lack of adequate shopping facilities, churches and cultural facilities”:
to significant "environmental disadvantages, such as odors, smoke and dust from
neighboring industrial Plants”; and to the need for additional security, ??
However, in this same document, DHA noted:
"It should be pointed out that no occupancy Problem has been encountered in connection with (Edgar Ward Place], 1500 units for Negro occupancy. Although the latter project is also located in West Dallas and 1s subjected to the same adverse factors influencing [George Loving] and [Elmer Scott], it is apparent that the heavy and constantly increasing demand for low-rent Public housing for Negroes and the lack of other
Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 5 (1950's documents, Oct. 1955 Application, PP. 17, 22) (also noting "the general restlessness, mobility and instability of many of the white and latin-American families c@gprising the segment of the low-rent market who have been willing to move to ‘West Dallas'’'”).
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 16
adequate housing for Negroes in this community have combined to overcome all adverse factors and this has resulted in a stabilized occupancy with a long waiting list of Negro applicants.”
This report was the first indication that the *white” George Loving Place
and the "Hispanic” Edgar Ward Place might also become part of the "solution” to
the "Negro Housing Problem.”
ER
TEE... FH
! 1
> ' 9 i/ “ $ eo 2
TL TRE 5. Not In My Neighborhood -- Cha 0 96 gro REL
KV
In 1962, DHA proposed the construction of an additional 2000 wiles of low-
rent public housing in Dallas. A referendum was called in opposition to the
expansion of public housing. The City Council endorsed this referendum --
opposing new public housing for Dallas -- despite the fact that it was needed
for the poor in Dallas.
In the resulting campaign, there was opposition to the 3,000 units because
they were not going to be placed in West Dallas. There were also numerous ads
which raised the specter that the housing would be integrated and would be placed
in white neighborhoods. The anti-public housing referendum passed, and no new
low-rent public housing?* would be built in Dallas from 1955 (when West Dallas
was opened) to August of 1989.25
6. Assignment of Tenants By Race (1965-70): The Loss By DHA of Over $31 Million
24Except for projects for the elderly. Dec. 12, 1986 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 1.
The anticipated completion date for the 100 units of new public housing being constructed at Country Creek under the Consent Deéree. See this Court's opinion in Walker I.
-
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 17
DHA maintained the segregated nature of its public housing by its tenant
assignment and selection practices -- under which whites were assigned to all-
white projects and blacks were assigned to all-black projects. Accordingly, in
1965,%* DHA had two all-white units (George Loving, Cedar Springs), two all-
Hispanic units (Elmer Scott, Little Mexico), and six Projects that were 100%
black. However, in 1965, HUD -- acting under the provigions of TT} grat - Ne ho i 1964 (CLvil Rights Act, 42 U.5.C. 8.20000 <i tnaiiied that tiie cease its
od Bae Br,
wt o . ry
tle VI of the
assignment of tenants by race.?’
**Despite the fact that de jure racial segregation in public housing was declared unconstitutional in 1955. Detroit Housing Commissioners v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180, 183-184 (6th Cir. 1955).
?’Before this, HUD had accepted segregated public housing under a "separate but equal policy.” Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 25 (Hearing Before The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, June 1959). Heyward v. PHA, 238 F.2d4°689, 697 (5th Cir. 1956); Cohen v. PHA, 257 F.2d 73, 74 at fn. 5 (5th Cir. 1958).
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 18
. freedom of choice?
After some delay and resistance, aided by City Attorney Alex Bickley, DHA
finally adopted a "Freedom of Choice” desegregation plan -- which it claimed had
been approved by the Dallas Mayor and other local officials. 2®
Incredibly, under this "Freedom of Choice” plan, no notice was to be given
a Sl to applicants that they could apply to the Project of “theft; choice.” In
addition, the plan required DHA Board approval if an applicant ¥6y“S-particular
this "Freedom of Choice” Plan -- with the exception of West Dallas -- there was
no change in the racial composition of DHA's public housing; the white units
remained 100% white and the minority units remained 100% minority.
With respect to West Dallas, the 1965 "Freedom of Choice” plan called for
the "careful selection” of four black families to move, without publicity, into
George Loving Place (which had numerous vacancies in 1965). By 1967, George
Loving had become 35% black; and it was 72% black by 1969, over 90s black by
1971, and 95% black by 1974, 2°
. first-come. first-served?
In 1967, HUD rejected the use of "Freedom of Choice” Plans by DHA and other
Public housing authorities -- because such Plans were perpetuating racial
segregation in low-income housing. And, HUD required all public housing
%5This 1956 Plan was prepared in consultation with the Dallas Citizens Council, a civic organization that had supported racial segregation in public housing. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 10 (1962-1966 documents); Pls. Exh. 9 (1950 Joint Report on Negro Housing).
The all-Hispanic Elmer Scott Place had a similar transition; it had become 21% black by 1968, 57% black by 1970, and 85% black by 1975.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 19
authorities to adopt a "first-come, first-served” tenant selection policy and
to use a community-wide waiting list for all Projects administered by the
authority, 3°
In response, DHA's Board simply rejected HUD's Title VI mandate to stop
«
the use of the "Freedom of Choice” plan. HUD responded by, threatening to sue DHA
; pt / 3 ; ,, to withhold federal funds from both DHA and the City of Dallas;
oy
& v5; advised DHA to terminate the "Freedom of Chojce” plan, and DHA xsl
ta tly agreed
to do so and to adopt a "first-come, first-served” ont Y FN
Dallas City Attorney Alex Bickley participated with DHA in the negotiations
with the U.S. Department of Justice concerning the specifics of the plan to be
adopted. However, the final plan which Mr. Bickley and DHA negotiated, was one
which, in the opinion of the Justice Department, was:
". . . likely to result in little or no change in the racial composition of any of your other locations, all of which are Presently segregated. "3!
. back to "freedom of choice”?
Even this did not satisfy DHA -- which simply continued to operate under
its "Freedom of Choice” Plan. HUD found this out in 1969, and instructed DHA to
comply with Title VI by implementing the "first-come, first-served” plan. The
DHA Board responded with a resolution instructing the staff (1) to ask HUD for
a waiver of the "first-come, first-served” requirement, and (ii) if this waiver
*°Under these HUD requirements, offers were to "be made first in [projects] having the most vacancies” -- and, after an applicant had rejected three offers of vacancies, "he is subject to being dropped to the bottom of the [waiting] list.”
“Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 13 (1968 documents, pp. 27% 34, 66) (Oct. 12, 1968 from Justice Department to DHA attorney). GRY:
*»
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 20
was not given "immediately,” then to “return” to the "freedom of choice” plan.
HUD received this request for a waiver, but took no action on it. Accordingly,
the DHA Board formally rescinded its "first-come, first served” plan -- which
had never really been Put into effect -- and "returned" to its "Freedom of
Choice” plan.
lL Rss
egE
god s, -
. over $31 million: the price of "fr
.¥. RT y
In February 1970, the federal government notified DHA that its blatant
refusal to change the tenant assignment plans was in violation of Title VI. HUD
then deferred funding for all DHA projects which had not been approved. And,
from 1969 through 1974. DHA forfeited in excess of $3] million because the DHA
Board refused to try to end racial segregation in public housing in Dallas. This
loss included:
(i) the allocation for several hundred units of new public housing for Dallas;
(11) the cancellation of HUD's approval for the funding of Cliff Manor, a low-income project for the elderly;
(iii) the loss of all modernization funds for over four years, and the deferral of any modernization funds for West Dallas for almost a decade.
HUD specifically asked the City of Dallas for its assistance in getting
DHA to stop its blatant violation of Title VI -- and in requiring DHA to adopt
tenant assignment policies that would help desegregate public housing in Dallas.
However, this time -- unlike 1967 -- the City was not threatened with any loss
of federal funds. So the City of Dallas did nothing.
This conduct by the City of Dallas and by HUD in the period from 1969
through 1974 was inexcusable. And, as the City recognized years laver, this now-
meaningless battle by DHA (aided by the City) -- to maintain an illegal tenant
- » “Wn
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 21
{ © ®
assignment plan -- had a devastating effect upon the condition of low-income
public housing in the City of Dallas:
"Until 1969 the Dallas Housing Authority maintained its properties in a reasonable manner and kept its financial reserves high. During this period DHA accepted no federal money for modernization and much equipment and structural components (roofs, doors, windows, etc.) were near the end of their econoaic ‘iife and would soon need replacement. From 1969 to 1974, THs did not participate in federal modernization program. Faced with declining real income, Ren tte oO pre anc u
o) a
operties deterjorat dly and most projects have never been returned to the condition they were in before w32
7. Public Housing In Dallas: 1971-74
In 1971, DHA opened two projects for the elderly: Brook Manor (233 units)
and Park Minor (201 units). When George Loving Place in West Dallas started to
become a predominately black unit,33 a substantial number of white elderly
tenants requested transfers from West Dallas to an "elderly-only” project. DHA
got HUD approval for these transfers. In addition to reducing the number of
whites in West Dallas, these transfers enabled DHA to open Brook Manor as a 100%
white elderly unit.
The Park Manor elderly project opened in 1971 with a 79% black occupancy.
That same year (1971), DHA also opened two "Turnkey III” Projects: College Park
(125 units) and Bonnie View Estates (107 units). Both of thee projects, of
*2Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 2 (Report of the Task Force on Public Housing, Jan. 1983, PP. 22-23).
-
*George Loving was 55% black in 1968, 72% in 1969, 87% in 1970, and 91% in 1971. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 31.
-
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 22
< . ! »
course, were 100% black. And, in 1974, DHA opened another white unit: Cliff Manor
(185 units).
This meant that in 1974 -- after some 36 years of DHA's operations as an
"arm of convenience” of the City of Dallas -- DHA had:
(i) Eight all black units, plus George Loving (originally all-white) which was now 95% black and Elmer | Scott (originally all-Hispanic) which was. now 9.2%. black; ae YG 4K
tL
5= es Ek % os 3
(ii) only ope Hispanic unit, Little Mexico’: “208
(111) only three white units (Cliff Manor, Brook Manor and Cedar Springs) ;3*
(iv) one unit that was originally all-white, but which was now "mixed," Washington Place (54% black); and
(Vv) only one public housing unit that had not started as all-white or all-minority, Park Manor (which began as a 79% black unit in 1971 and which was 88% black in 1974).
However, with its illegal "Freedom of Choice” Plan, DHA managed to convert Park
Manor into a 95% black unit by 1977 -- and Washington Place into an 82% black
unit in 1982, just three years before it was demolished.3’
8. A Slight Change of Heart in 1974: The
Community Development Block Grant Program
On August 22, 1974, the federal Community Development Block Grant Program
("CDBG") came into existence. Under this HUD-administered program, the City of
Dallas was to receive some $195 million over the next 15 years. The CDBG program
*In 1974, Cedar Springs was 7.5% black and Little Mexico was 4% black. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing, Pls. Exh. 31.
Similarly, Elmer Scott would be 85% black in 1975 and 948-black by Oct. 1988.
°F on
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 23
prohibited race discrimination by recipients, 42 U.s.c. § 5309, so a "reform
movement” concerning DHA was stimulated.
The Mayor appointed a new DHA Board. Then, in November of 1974, a City
employee -- William Darnall -- became Acting Executive Director for DHA (while
keeping his position with the City as Assistant Director for the Department of
Eas Housing and Urban Rehabilitation). An Assistant City A
to represent DHA.3
DHA could again receive federal funding from HUD. So, with the assistance of the
City of Dallas Fair Housing Administrator, a City Fair Housing department law
student intern, and the Assistant City Attorney, Darnall proposed a series of
tenant selection and assignment plans.3’ The Board adopted these plans, and HUD
did make a determination that DHA was finally in compliance with Title VI.
However, by DHA's own admission, these new tenant assignment plans -- drafted
and proposed by City of Dallas employees -- really did nothing to offer the black
residents of DHA Projects an opportunity to move into desegregated housing.
| Indeed, the tenant assignment and selection plans were still discriminatory
when this suit was filed in 1985. In the Consent Decree, DHA agreed to revise
these plans, and finally -- after still more delay by DHA -- did so in after July
gal tenant assignment plan.
in effect, rejected by HUD in 1980.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 24
: . ; ®
of 1987.%® This meant that DHA had operated with illegal tenant assignment plans
for over 30 years (from at least 1955 through 1987) -- which maintained the
segregated nature of public housing by assigning tenants to Projects on the basis
of their race. And, the City of Dallas -- through the direct involvement of its
City Attorney in the DHA-HUD dispute over tenant assignment plans (1965- 1974),
through its threatened loss of federal funds in 1967," and” esse
(William Darnall) who drafted a new Plan in 1975 -- was. curly ag te
deliberate segregation policies of DHA. ti 1) Fei
9. Public Housing In Dallas: 1975-1986
the § 8 progr
In 1975, DHA began to operate its § 8 assistance Program which provided
rent subsidies to tenants seeking low-income housing -- and which certainly
provided DHA with an opportunity to desegregate its public housing by moving
black families into non-minority areas in Dallas and its suburbs.
Indeed, in 1978, DHA's own attorney stated in a letter to HUD that DHA not
only had the authority to honor § 8 certificates in the suburbs, but it also had
the constitutional duty to do so to help correct the effects of its past racial
discrimination. However, DHA allowed only a few tenants to go to the suburbs -
- and, subsequently, it completely refused to honor § 8 certificates in the
suburbs.
In February of 1980, HUD advised DHA that it had to adopt a new tenant
assignment and selection plan which would comply with Title VI. Specifically,
DHA was notified that:
r=
i ODN *8See this Court's opinion in Walker I. on
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 25
(1) Title VI requires DHA to remedy the situation under which white tenants find other public housing, while black families must rely on DHA for housing assistance:
(ii) DHA's § 8 program should be used to increase housing opportunities for current DHA minority tenants. SO non-minority t ou
resulting project vacancies, thus reducin the segregated nature of DHA’'s entire program, . -.. ak
PRA 8 iA DHA's primary response to HUD's demand was to idopt a.ne
he Tt KAR required persons who were tenants at any DHA project to wait for 9 days after
vacating their apartments before they were eligible to apply for § 8 assistance.
Obviously, the practical effect of this policy was to prohibit DHA's black
<
tenants from using the § 8 program -- since few public housing families had the
resources necessary to move into private housing for the 90-day waiting period.
DHA also adopted a revised tenant selection and assignment plan. However,
it contained nothing which would allow black DHA tenants to use the § 8 program
to move into non-segregated housing. This plan did receive local HUD approval,
but there is no record of it ever being submitted for national HUD approval.
. § 8 elderly projects
In 1979 and 1980, DHA was completing two § 8 new projects for the elderly:
Lakeland Manor (172 units) and Forest Green Manor (252 units). Instead of using
the regular applicant waiting list (18% black), DHA used a special waiting list
composed of persons who had specifically requested Lakeland Manor; that list was
7% black, so when Lakeland Manor opened in 1980, it was only 3.6% black.
Similarly, when Forest Green was opened in 1980, it was 16% black. In 1981, DHA
opened a § 8 Rehabilitation project for the elderly: Oakland Apartments (56
units). It was located in a black neighborhood and was 100% black! Then, in 1984,
i -ii TN. »
-
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 26
Audelia Manor (123 units) was opened as an elderly project; it was a white
Project (with a 9.8% black occupancy when this suit was filed in 1985).
From 1982 through 1986, DHA continued to assign most elderly whites to its
“white” projects -- apd most elderly blacks to its "black” projects. This
resulted, of course, in predominately one-race projects gor the slderly in need
r
of public housing. For example, when this lawsuit was filed tn ogy; Park Manor
was 93% black and Oakland Apartments was 94% black while | Manor was
95% white, Audelia Manor was 90% white, Cliff Manor was 85% “white, Brook Manor
was 80% white, and Forest Green was 74% white.
10. Not In My Neighborhood == Chapter Three (1978)
In 1978, DHA received authorization from HUD to construct 224 new units
of low rent public housing ("LRPH"). If these units had been constructed in non-
impacted areas, DHA would have been able to offer black tenants a choice of
housing outside of minority areas.
Instead, the City of Dallas -- acting through its City Manager and an
Assistant City Manager -- successfully obstructed the development of these 224
LRPH units on "scattered sites” in non-impacted areas of Dallas. Specifically:
(i) the DHA Proposals were vetoed because the number of units exceeded the maximum allowed (80 units) under "the current year goal” set for the City's Housing Assistance Plan; and
(11) the City's Housing Plan formally declared that Dallas would accept no more than its "fair share” of federally-assisted housing.
When the suburb cities refused to accept any of the 224 units, the City of Dallas
also rejected this needed public housing. Finally, in 1980, HUD revoked the
authorization for these 224 units.
rt
58
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 27
11. Not In My Neighborhood -- Chapter Four (1982-1986)
There was one break in the unrelenting segregation by DHA in its public
housing projects and § 8 programs. It occurred as the result of a 1982 lawsuit
which challenged the sale of Washington Place to Baylor University Medical Center
-- and the consequent demolition of the 347 units of public housing at Washington
Place. In the settlement of this suit (filed by Washington I
(ii) rehabilitation of 150 units in the "Near East Dallas Neighborhood” with the use of § 8 Modern Rehab funds; and
(iii) construction of 106 units of new low-rent public housing with funding provided by HUD.
DHA did rehabilitate Simpson Place (with 92 units); this project was 100%
black when it opened in 1985, but the black occupancy rate dropped to 64% in
1986. Also, the § 8 Moderate Rehab units were used to modernize Town Park (with
156 units) in a Predominately white area on Shadyside Lane in East Dallas: Town
Park was 57.2% black when it opened in 1985.
There was substantjal opposition to the location of Town Park in East
Dallas. However, unlike the previous "Not in My Neighborhood” opposition to
Public housing -- it’s not in the "Negro residential areas” set by City ordinance
(Chap. One, the Haskell-Dolphin location in 1950); they are not going to be put
in West Dallas (Chap. Two, the 3000 new units proposed in 1962); we’ll only
accept our "fair share” of public housing (Chap. Three, the 224 new units
Proposed in 1978) -- the opposition took a new form in the 1980's. For example,
the "Lakewood Homeowners Association” vigorously argued:
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 28
*** Town Park is too far from adequate facilities for the poor, such as grocery stores, retail shops, laundromats, hospitals, etc.
eee there is not adequate public transportation for low-income tenants at Town Park;
**+ the selection of Town Park will not further desegregation of public housing;
lie I **e there will be an adverse effect op the public
iis ket;
schools in this neighborhood;®® and
*** it is a "bad deal” because
much for Town Park.
These very same objections would be raised, again and again, to other
public housing proposed in non-minority areas -- including the numerous sites
considered by DHA for the 106 replacement units for Washington Place and the 100
units of new public housing required by the Consent Decree in this case *° And,
this is understandable.
No one wants low-income public housing in their neighborhood, certainly
not a project that may be predominately black. It should be placed in someone
else's neighborhood -- or just kept in the minority areas of town, as has been
done historically by DHA (with the support of the City of Dallas). However,
unless this pattern is broken, then public housing in Dallas will continue to
be segregated -- and, as the inevitable corollary, public housing for minorities
**0vercrowding is the "adverse impact” upon the schools if a low-income housing project is Placed in a non-minority area; but under-utilization of the schools is the "adverse impact” if units are demolished at an all-black project. Compare the opposition to Town Park with the inconsistent opposition to Country Creek and the demolition of units at West Dallas. DHA First Annual Report (Jan. 20, 1988), pp. 54-55; Sept. 18, 1987 Hearing: Testimony of Jack Herrington; presentation by Sidney Stahl, attorney for the Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce.
*°Compare the Town Park opposition (Pls. Exh. 14) to the opposition that DHA met in connection with the Washington Place units and with the selection of the Country Creek site. Sept. 18, 1987 Hearing: Testimony of Jack Herrington. And see this Court’s opinion in Walker I.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 29
will continue to be substandard, at best, and it will never even approach the
quality of low-income housing being provided for hits
Another recurring objection to public housing in ny neighborhood -- one
that is not without Justification in light of the miserable history of public
housing in Dallas -- is that DHA will not Properly maintain n these low-income
> 2 b.-3.5
"neighborhood
opposition -- like that which opposed the location of the Town Park and Country
Creek projects in non-minority areas -- were directed at DHA's failure to
Properly operate and maintain these units? And at the City of Dallas, as well,
for not requiring DHA to do so? Is there any real doubt that such political and
neighborhood opposition would be effective -- and that it would prevent the
deterioration of public housing projects like Town Park and Country Creek?*?
, both the "white" elderly projects of DHA and the public housing assistance which low-income whites have been furnished by HUD outside of the DHA programs. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Testimony of Craig Gardner; Pls. Exh. 35: Pls. Exh. 36; Pls. Exh. 39 (summary of location and occupancy characteristics of HUD- assisted projects in Dallas County).
i ‘These are intended merely as rhetorical questions, not as:a sermon. But In any event, they are certainly not findings of fact, and they do not form the basis for any finding of fact or conclusion of law in this opinson.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 30
12. Not In Any Neighborhood -- Chapter Five (1984-1988)
As discussed above, the Washington Place settlement in 1984 also provided
for the construction of 106 units of new low-rent public housing. Under the April
14, 1984 Agreed Judgment, these were to be located in "non-minority impacted
areas,” and DHA agreed to "make all reasonable efforts to complete site
A a Bi TE selection” within 6 months (i.e. , by Oct. 14, 1984) -- and to hide 106 units : i RR > Lr
ready for occupancy within two years (i.e., by April 14,198 FO
RRC nd Of course, DHA did not meet either of these deadlines. At e Sept. 18,
1987 hearing, DHA Executive Director Jack Herrington testified about the various
sites that had been considered by DHA for the Washington Place units -- but
rejected in the face of political and neighborhood opposition. *3
Finally, in August of 1984 -- two months before the site selection deadline
-- DHA asked HUD to approve the placement of these 106 units at its existing
Cedar Springs project. It did this with full recognition of the fact that this
violated the Agreed Judgment because Cedar Springs was located in an impacted
area; indeed, a May 1984 DHA memo to Executive Director Herrington stated:
"Both projects [Cedar Springs and Little Mexico] are located in census tracts which are, in HUD’'s definition, impacted. We may be able to fight that through EO if we can group several tracts in the area together and show an ‘integrated’ racial balance. This will be subject to arbitrary decisions here and at HUD."
At this time, Cedar Springs (385 units) was located in a census tract which was
48.3% minority; although Cedar Springs was only 29% black in 1984, by 1985 it
was 37% black and by 1987 it was 51s black.
*isept. 18, 19087 Hearing: Testimony of Jack Herrington; Rulings of the Court, pp. 1-4. One of the sites rejected for these 106 unity, because of neighborhood opposition and political pressure, was Country Creek -- which DHA, at the Court's direction, selected in Sept. 1987 for the 100 new LRHP units required by the Consent Decree in this case. See the Walker I opinion.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 31
Nevertheless, DHA requested the City of Dallas to amend its CDBG Housing
Assistance Plan to allow these 106 units to be constructed at Cedar Springs
site. The City complied with this Iequest. However, HUD rejected this, as well
as the City’s attempted modification of its Housing Assistance Plan, because the
Cedar Springs area "is lower income and contains a high proportion of assisted
housing units” -- and, therefore, was not a "location ’. a ptable for
. 2 =
construction” of the 106 new units. ** x iE
Then, in Oct. 1985 -- one year after the dos dltie tot onitoticn of the
106 units -- DHA sought help from the city in locating these Washington Place
replacement units in non-impacted areas; specifically, it asked permission to
use $300,000 in CDBG funds -- that had already been awarded to DHA -- to help
in the acquisition of sites outside of minority areas. However, the City refused
this request on the grounds that this proposal did not meet the intent of the
City’s initial grant for the use of this $300,000.
Finally, in 1987 -- over three years after the deadline for site selection
-- DHA managed to purchase five "scattered locations on which the 106 replacement
units will be constructed. There was, of course, opposition to these five sites
by neighborhood groups and local politicians because "no one wants public housing
in their neighborhood.”
13. Housing Quality Inspections (1978-1988)
Beginning in 1978, the City of Dallas conducted many of the Housing Quality
Standards inspections for DHA's § 8 programs. The city inspectors consistently
“Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 42 (16 unit documents, pp. 15-25). However, Assistant City Manager Harry Jones candidly testified that placing these 106 units at Cedar Springs would not have served "the goal of increasing housing opportunities for minorities outside of areas of low income and minority concentrations.” Pls. Exh. 66 (Jones deposition, PP. 11-12). ~
. il 4
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 32
approved units for black families, and in black neighborhoods, which were in
flagrant violation of HUD Housing Quality Standards. Indeed, between Jan. 20,
1987 and Jan. 20, 1988, DHA's quality control inspections found that 60% of the
units which had Previously been inspected and “passed” -- most by city inspectors
-- did not meet Housing Quality Standards upon reinspection.
Moreover, even when the City did fail a unit for qualfey@¥elations, it took no action to bring code enforcement proceed
CR Sr
aR So city inspection process has, without question, been a major factor causing the
both the segregation of black § 8 tenants and the substandard quality of the
housing received by blacks when compared to the quality of the housing of white
DHA tenants.
14. The City’s CDBG Program (1974-1988)
The Dallas Housing Assistance Plan, filed under the Community Development
Block Grant Program, lists a number of activities that purport to qualify the
City for the $15 million per year in CDBG funds. Yet, the City does not review
Hihee activities to determine if they are increasing open housing opportunities
or furthering the critical goal of fair housing. In fact:
the City of Dallas has no policy to encourage the location of low-income housing outside of minority areas;
- « . according to the Assistant City Manager with housing responsibilities, there is not even one City activity that is specifically directed at the goal of increased open housing opportunities; and
+ + . the City’s own reports to HUD list only one item, “helping to sponsor a fair housing poster contest,” under its obligations to further "fair housing. "43
oe
*>Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 67 (Harold Wasson deposition, pp. 19-20, 24-25); Pls. Exh. 66 (Harry Jones deposition, PP. 33-37); Pls. Exh. 58 (City
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 33
Moreover, the City's "fair housing” enforcement has been almost non-
existent. The total housing enforcement staff was one half-time Housing
Administrator and one half-time worker until 1989 -- when Assistant City Manager
Harry Jones was finally able to get an increased budget and four new employees
for the "fair housing” staff.*® There have been no prosecutions filed, and no
ve
settlement agreements reached, under the "fair Signe ite at least
1981. And, the City has chosen to effectively exenpe PMA ag other federally
assisted housing providers from its enforcement activities. hg
In addition, despite requests from HUD, the City has failed to request
"substantially equivalent status” for its "fair housing” program. If the City
had done so, it would be receiving federal funding for its fair housing effort.
24 CFR Part 111. However, the City’s Present "fair housing” ordinance does not
meet the standards for recognition as a "substantially equivalent” ordinance
because of its substantive and procedural weaknesses. 24 CFR §§ 115.3,-115.4.9
reports of actions to further fair housing). Assistant City Manager Harry Jones did testify that HUD has conducted an annual audit of the City's "fair housing Program.” However, effective Sept. 1988, a HUD regulation sets standards for determining whether a CDBG recipient has complied with the duty to "affirmatively further fair housing”; under this regulation, the City will be required to conduct its own analysis of its CDBG programs.
**This opinion is not intended to reflect in any way upon Assistant City Manager Harry Jones -- who is obviously a very dedicated, extremely competent, and very concerned City emplolyee; if Mr. Jones had been given adequate resources by the City, he would have corrected many of the problems that existed with the inspection and "fair housing” programs. Harry Jones is also very credible and, at times, painfully honest. See, e.g., Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing, Tr. 110, 121. See also Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Testimony of Harry Jones, Tr. 33,45, 104-106, 109): Pls. Exh. 67 (Harold Wasson deposition, PP. 9-10, 17, 24-25); Pls. Exh. 66 (Harry Jones deposition, Pp. 33).
‘Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 67 (Harold Wasson deposition, pp. 21- 23); Pls. Exh. 85 (City of Dallas Fair Housing Ordinance); Pls. Exh. 93 (City Memo on "substantially equivalent status”). Assistant City Manager Harry Jones did testify that the City planned to seek "substantially equivalent status,”
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 34
Finally, with respect to CDBG funds which have been given to DHA, the
plaintiffs contend:
"Past City grants of CDBG funds have been given to DHA when it was engaged in overt segregation and without requiring an end to the segregation and its effects. This must be compared with the City’s refusal to provide funds for DHA's present desegregation effort.
on. bat pd 416
Unfortunately, as is shown by this "history" of segregation fu fH)
nt ny
= Ls i a in Dallas, this contention is true.® It is also inektusipie.
15. e Rob a =
In 1980, DHA submitted an application to HUD for § 8 Moderate
Rehabilitation Program ("Moderate Rehab”) funds -- based on the explicit
certification that units located in an area of minority concentration would not
be selected for the program. The City of Dallas Housing and Urban Rehabilitation
Department was a co-administrator of this program.
However, these § 8 Moderate Rehab funds were used only to "rehabilitate”
housing in minority and low income areas.'? For example, the City of Dallas --
through two different City Managers -- supported DHA's use of § 8 Moderate Rehab
probably in 1989. Testimony of Harry Jones, Tr. 33-34.
‘%See, e.g., the City's refusal to permit DHA to use CDBG funds for the housing mobility and relocation benefits provided in the Consent Decree in this
‘The § 8 Moderate Rehab Program of DHA and the City resulted in a 90.6% black occupancy rate, with projects located only in minority and low-income impacted areas. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 37; Pls. Exh. 40.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 35
funds at the Robin Square Apartments near Fair Park. The Robin Square site met
none of HUD's site selection requirements: it was located in a blighted, minority
and low-income concentrated area; it had consistently failed Housing Quality
Standard inspections; and it had even been rejected in 1979 by DHA as an
appropriate location for public housing.
Nevertheless, § 8 Moderate Rehab funds were used to pais AY renovate
156 apartments at Robin Square. Yet, in a 1987 lawsuit Filed by SiS 8 of Robin
Square against DHA and the landlord of these apartments -. because the project
had not been maintained in a decent, safe, and sanitary position for years --
DHA Executive Director Jack Herrington testified that the conditions at Robin
Square have never met the DHA standards for the quality of housing should be
provided to DHA tenants. Herrington also testified:
"Q. At the time you were considering Robin Square for this moderate rehab participation, was the neighborhood a desirable one?
No.
Is it a desirable neighborhood today?
No.
Has it ever been a desirable neighborhood?
No.
As long as it's been on the moderate rehab program?
No.
d vo Vv take sition opposed to the use of Rob udre as a moderate rehab project site?
No.
»
[
™
Banks, et al. Vv. Robin Square Apartments, CA 3-87-1713-R 4K.D. Tex.).
bog
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 36
Q. Did anyone at DHA ever take a position opposed to the use of Robin Square as a moderate rehab
program site?
A. The official position of the authority would have been mine, so I would answer that no.”
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 37
Herrington's testimony in Banks -- that even though Robin Square was
totally unsuitable, he did not oppose its use for the § 8 Moderate Rehab
assistance -- might be explained by the plaintiffs’ allegation in that case that:
"In conversations during 1981 between Jack Herrington and local HUD officials about the inclusion of Robin Square as a § 8 Moderate Rehab pre gz Herrington explicitly stated that he wanted Robin 8 : on the program in order to avoid Placing units fg. 4 i white part of town targeted by the Moderates Reltid application. Herrington stated that he was “under political pressure [from certain members of the Dallas City Council] to keep the units out of white neighborhoods. *3!
This allegation was supported by the Affidavit of Elbert T. Winn, filed
in support of the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction in the Banks
case. In addition to reciting certain statements which Herrington supposedly made
about local political pressure -- statements which Herrington denies making, in
his affidavit also filed in Banks -- Elbert Winn, the Deputy Manager of the HUD
Dallas Area Office in 1981, described the reaction of the local HUD officials
to the Robin Square project:
"Irving Statman [HUD Dallas Area Manager] initially responded to Herrington’s request for HUD approval by objecting to the location and the condition of the [Robin Square] project. Statman referred to the Project as ‘cruddy’ and ‘horrible’ and said 'This Project has been sent to us so many times, it's a pity. It should be torn down.’ Statman also told Herrington that 'the site and neighborhood standards will not permit us to do this.’ Statman was referring to the §
Plaintiffs’ Statement of Evidence in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 14 (Banks, CA 3-87-1713-R). The choice of Robin Square is certainly not explained by Herrington's statements that he or City employees thought Robin Square "might improve that section of the community” (Pls. Exh. 40, p. 11) because that is directly contrary to DHA's certifications to HUD (Pls. Exh. 40, p. 20) and to the facts about the condition of Robin Square (see Pls. Exh. 40, pp. 84-86, 101-105, 109-110, 128-133).
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 38
8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program site and neighborhoods and their application to the Robin Square Apartments.
"Statman told Herrington that HUD would approve the Robin Square site only if the City of Dallas would write a letter endorsing the inclusion of the Robin Square Apartments as a Moderate Rehabilitation project and strongly enforce its housing codes in the area. »32
The Dallas City Manager did, in fact, write the letter requested; PLAtman; and,
oad because of the City’s support, HUD approved the use of ‘the S08 Federace Rehab
RY a TR funds for Robin Square -- a "cruddy” and vhorrible” prefect wR: ~ should have
been torn down. "33
The credibility dispute between Winn (HUD) and Herrington (DHA) concerning
"political pressure” on Herrington -- which does not form the basis for any
finding of fact in this opinion -- was not resolved in Banks. Neither Winn nor
Herrington testified in that case. Instead, on June 13, 1988, an agreed
injunction was entered in favor of the plaintiffs which, in substance, gave them
rights to move out of Robin Square immediately with the use of § 8 certificates.
Then, on October 4, 1988, HUD instructed DHA to cancel its contract with the
GiieP of Robin Square; and, DHA did this effective November 1, 1988 -. just six
Years after Robin Square had been opened as a § 8 Moderate Rehab project in a
deteriorating all-black neighborhood at the instance of DHA and with support of
the City of Dallas.
EY
Statement of Elbert T. Winn, Pls. Exh. 6 to the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Evidence in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed May 23, 1988 in Banks, CA 3-87-1713-R. The statements just quoted were not denied in the Herrington Affidavit filed in Banks on June 14, 1988.
>In connection with the entry of the agreed injunction in Banks, one of the participants made this comment: "If a tornado were to hit the Robin Square Apartments, it would do over $5.5 million in improvements.”
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 39
16. The West Dallas Project (1975-1988):
A Gigant
The West Dallas project was not a "solution” to anything, much less the
"Negro Housing Problem.” It is, instead, "a gigantic monument to segregation and
neglect."
u = d : Rd sl
a A Vo SE
-~
By 1975, after only 20 years of existence, at had
become "a publicly-owned slum.” The housing was in horrible condition because
no money had been spent on maintenance and rehabilitation for over ten years>>
-- the period during which DHA received no federal funding because both the City
and DHA felt it was more important to continue the segregation of public housing
in Dallas.-®
Jan. 2, 1987 letter to the Court by Dallas City Council Members Al Lipscomb and Diane Ragsdale.
*Without the $31 million that was forfeited from 1969 through 1974, "DHA management attempted to preserve financial soundness at the expense of physical maintenance. The Physical condition of DHA Properties [such as West Dallas]
they were in before. . . * Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 2, PP. 22-23. See part 6 above, "Assignments of Tenants by Race (1965-74): The Loss By DHA of over $31 million.”
**Because of this policy of deliberate segregation, West Dallas was over 95% black in 1975. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 31. a
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 40
There were numerous vacancies in the West Dallas Project, and many of these
And, this was not surprising because:
(1) persons who lived at West Dallas were almost 5 times as likely to be murdered as other Dallas residents;
(11) rapes were over 6 times more frequant in : Dallas than in other parts of the Citys. < .% ee
(111) according to Dallas police officers, -d: dealing was rampant at West Dallas, and hundreds of transients were hiding or living in the vacant units; and
A
ES La
(iv) there were substantial health risks because a large portion of the Project had been subjected to serious lead contamination by a nearby lead smelter, >®
Because of these conditions, West Dallas was not a "solution.” It was a
problem -- a very serious and incredibly difficult problem that defied every
effort to remedy the "publicly-owned slum.”
. the "quick fix" in 1976
In 1976, DHA obtained $13 million from HUD as a "rehabilitation grant” for
Project, Providing day care, and "creating small community areas within each Project” to develop tenant Pride in these areas. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 10, pp. 5-8.
1
**Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Approving the Consant Decree, pp. 9-13 (filed Jan. 20, 1987). ® 3 aL N= OF 4 PF IN
i Sh Tl
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 41
* : ®
the §$22,000-25,000 Per unit that has been required for the rehabilitation of
other public housing projects in Dallas.’
Moreover, because of mismanagement and incompetence -- if not theft and
fraud -- the grant resulted in little, if any, improvement of the West Dallas
project. Indeed, after the $13 million was spent, there were still approximately
1,300 units at West Dallas that were vacant and uninhabitable, eis
- Ry :
Raho)
. “ 24
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: > G
AS
A
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‘ .
In 1983, the 1983 City Task Force on Public Housing found:
(1) that at least 35% of the West Dallas units were so deteriorated that they were uninhabitable; and
(ii) "The underlying assumption for upgrading the West Dallas projects is that bilitati the housing units will not solve a e problems. The large concentration of units in the West Dallas area has created poor security conditions and the overall perception that West Dallas is not a desirable place to live. The revitalization strategy must attempt to reverse this perception through provision of not only decent housing but also retail centers, security, and jobs.”
In that same year (1983), DHA prepared a "master plan” for the
rehabilitation of the West Dallas project and the revitalization of the
surrounding community. The cost for this plan was $88 million.*° However, DHA
was not able to get anyone -- HUD, the City of Dallas, or private sources -- to
agree to contribute any financing for this $88 million master plan.
9A 1980 survey funded by the City of Dallas estimated that it would cost $47.8 million for the complete rehabilitation of West Dallas. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 46, (Millkey & Brown Study of West Dallas Project, pp. 20, 39, 59),
**The plan would have reduced the number of low-income units at West Dallas from 3,500 to between 1,400 and 2,000. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 49 (Lake West Master Plan, PP. 78-86).
:
hi
0)
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 42
Accordingly, later in 1983, DHA applied to HUD for $54 million to
rehabilitate all of the West Dallas units. HUD refused, and gave notice to DHA
that it would provide only $18 million for this Project -- and that it would
provide this amount only upon the conditions (1) that DHA would not apply for
any more HUD funds for West Dallas; and (11) that DHA would submit a workable
«a
WS
Ta Xa Ay
Plan that would restore both the Project and the- surro
SiR
” wb61
RES
La {. Sg a0 ad Then, in 1984, the "Mayor's Task Force on Pubic Houb¥ng”
Tecommended that
the City of Dallas use CDBG funds to rehabilitate 200 West Dallas units a year,
at-below-minimum standards, for a per-unit cost of $7,000. There is serious
question whether this minimum rehabilitation would have met HUD's standards for
"viability.” In any event, the City Council refused to commit even this amount -
- a total of $24.5 million over 17.5 years -- and it rejected the Task Force
proposal.
. just before the Consent Decree
The conditions at West Dallas in late 1986, Just before approval of the
Consent Decree in this case, were summarized by the testimony of DHA Executive
Director Jack Herrington at a Congressional Subcommittee hearing:
"In the three West Dallas housing projects -- George Loving Place, Edgar Ward Place and Elmer Scott Place -- there is an urgent need to reverse 30 years of wear, deterioration, vandalism, poor maintenance and inadequate funding. The overall housing conditions and 1,200 vacant, uninhabitable units have a negative impact on surrounding neighborhoods, business, industry and the
the physical deterioration of the neighborhood, and the concentration of federally-assisted housing in the area. Pls. Exh. 50, pp. 7-10.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 43
city as a whole. More than 8.000 adults and children live in a square mile area which has become, in many lespects, a publicly owned slug.”
Because of the appalling conditions at West Dallas -- housing that was
barely fit to live in; almost 1300 vacant units that were boarded up ; severe
problems with drug dealers, with other crimes, with transients, and with
vandalism; health risks due to lead contamination; jg biceep Ih icn roaches
Wels NL and rats and rubbish; and little or no hope that tHese- CRT : “change --
BE regent. In
1986, the rejection rates for George Loving, Edgar Ward and Elmer Scott ranged
from 58% to 60%; and, this was true even though the DHA staff had been instructed
to deny any housing assistance to a family that refused to take a unit in West
Dallas. ®2
And, because of the same horrible conditions, a substantial number of the
West Dallas tenants wanted to get out of the project. Evidence at the Dec. 12,
1986 fairness hearing established that as many as 85% of the tenants at West
Dallas wanted to move out of eis "publicly-owned slums” and that from 15-20% of
the tenants left West Dallas each year. As one of the plaintiffs (Mary Dews, a
counselor for the Dallas Tenants Association) testified:
". . . It was an awful experience. She talked about taking her own life if she couldn’t do better and she did not want to take her family to West Dallas. She was just that firm about it. She did not want West Dallas.
". . . [And] many of the tenants [at West Dallas] come into the office and ask for housing or want to relocate or want to transfer. And because of the 90-day
*2Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 51, p. 2; Pls. Exh. 52 (DHA summary of West Dallas rejection rates). On March 25, 1988, DHA began offering West Dallas units to new applicnts on a voluntary basis; however, from that date until Oct. 31, 1988, only 21 persons out of 1000 applicants (2.1%) chose to move into West Dallas. Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exhs. 55-56.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 44
policy it's real hard . . very hard, next to impossible. And they begin to cry. They talk about
d
And they want a better lifestyle for their children and for themselves. It's Just -- it’s heart breaking, [they]
crying 'WE WANT OUT!’”
At the time of the entry of the Consent Decree (Jan. 20, 1987), there were 1,917
black families subjected to these conditions at West Da Tass uh 08 aining 1,583
a a oF rou EY - % Ng y al Tg 2 units at West Dallas were vacant, and almost 1,300 of she Fe boarded-up
Se “7
for at least ten years because they were not fit for Yamiisl’ i -.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 45
16. Summary: *This City Has Not Been
Kind to the Poor and to Minorities”
It is obvious, from this history of public housing in Dallas, that the City
knew of DHA's deliberate discrimination and segregation in its § 8 assistance
programs and in its public housing projects. The City of Dallas could have
intervened to stop these illegal practices of DHA Ts
alr a
ges FTE
oa
In addition, the undisputed facts establish thar the
oe lw
ald Hay = :
tore Xs
PI a Eo,
fat
tself was a
substantial cause of this racial discrimination in public “housing in Dallas.
These are just some of the examples discussed above:
*** the City Manager selected the site for DHA's first "Negro" housing project;
*e+ the Mayor (and City Council) requested DHA to construct the 3500-unit West Dallas Housing project, as a solution to the "Negro Housing Problem” of the 1950's. in order to kkep blacks from moving into "white areas of the city”;
*** because of the City Council's opposition, the additional 3,000 units of public housing available in 1962 were denied to those in need of low-income housing;
*** because of the City support for (and the active participation of the City Attorney in) DHA's illegal tenant assignment and selection Plans, DHA was permitted to forfeit over $31 million in federal funds from 1969 to 1974 -- and this loss resulted in the rapid and irreversible deterioration of every DHA housing Project, including West Dallas;
**¢ the City blocked DHA’s development of the 226 units of needed public housing that were available in 1978;
*** the City did nothing to help DHA locate sites for housing in non-minority areas or to help DHA use § 8 programs to move black public housing families out of minority areas;
*¢* the City supported the opposition to DHA's efforts to locate the Town Park and Country Creek projects, and the 106 Washington Place’ replacement units, in non-impacted areas; FRCL + Lol
is be : SL.
wf Yoga,
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 46
*¢* the City has taken no action to correct the sub-standard quality of DHA housing by the use of code enforcement proceedings;
**+ the City has done very little to enforce "fair housing,” or to increase the housing opportunities for the poor outside of minority areas, despite its obligation to do so under its CDBG program;
**+ the City, despite DHA's policies of lat discrimination, has made (or Promised) grasta, of & funds to DHA when the particular project +h segregation (e.g., Robin Square), but has refused’ grants to DHA for efforts to correct its past policies of discrimination (e.g., funding for the mobility and relocation benefits under the Consent Decree in this case); and
*** the City simply continues to refuse to recognize that it has any responsibility to help solve the monumental problems that are the legacy of the City’s mistake in having the West Dallas Project built to keep at least 3,500 blacks out of the white areas of Dallas.
This, then, is a summary of deliberate segregation in public housing in
Dallas by DHA and by the City itself. It has not been a pleasant history to
record. But, if nothing else, it does demonstrate -- as City Council Member Lori
Palmer testified -- that:
". . . This particular city has not been kind to Poor people and to minorities. It has not been kind in providing the adequate availability of low-income housing, and it has not been kind to the availability of housing for families with children in particular. Ve are findine . . 4 major lack of low-income housing in
our city, and we do not vet find the public will or the private will to change that, . .~ (Dec. 12, 1986 Hearing, Tr. 24).
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 47
IV. Conduct By The City of Dallas And
a C e
The conduct of the City of Dallas, and some of its officials, after the
Court's approval of the Consent Decree (Jan. 20, 1987), also supports the joinder
of the City in this case.
l. Initial Participation and Support
The City of Dallas, of course, was not a party td tat Bens ais Decree.
However, the Mayor of Dallas (then, Starke Taylor) was instrumental in the
settlement. He, lawyers from the City Attorney's office, and other City employees
participated in the negotiations in 1986. The Mayor promised that the City would
support the settlement and would assist DHA in meeting its obligations under the
Decree®® -- and DHA viewed the support and endorsement of the City to be
essential to the success of the Consent Decree.
Indeed, without this assurance, neither the plaintiffs nor HUD would have
entered inco the sotbloncat. The Consent Decree recognized that DHA needed
resources to comply with all of its obligations under the Decree.®* And, just
as importantly -- in view of the long, dismal history of DHA's deliberate racial
discrimination and segregation -- it is obvious that the plaintiffs wanted to
“March 25, 1988 Hearing: Testimony of Jack Herrington (Mayor Taylor participated in the settlement negotiations, and his support was an important factor in concluding the settlement). Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing, Testimony of Assistant City Manager Harry Jones (Jones, the Mayor and two city attorneys participated in the negotiations), Tr. 32; Pls. Exh. 60, Mayor's letter of Nov. 5, 1986 to DHA Executive Director Herrington.
S44 The parties enter into this Decree on the explicit premise that the resources currently available to DHA to implement the Decree are inadequate. In order to implement the Decree, substantial resources will hays to be made available from institutions and organizations other than DHA." Gémsent Decree, P- 2.
: eT
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 48
have the City’s support so DHA would honor its commitments under the Consent
Decree. HUD had already recognized that the only successful attempts to
desegregate public housing have taken place where "the City Council, the Mayor,
the [Housing] Board, or some key political personage supported the effort. "”%5
The City argues that Mayor Starke Taylor did not have authority to speak
5 IF Taylor was not acting as a private individual in the’ sett pot iations -
he PR" i 3 I :
for the entire City Council. This is true. However, it™¥ a
ar adie 3
’ %
- he was participating in his official capacity as €he Mayor af Dallas. It is
also obvious that Mayor Taylor consulted with other members of the City Council,
since a majority of the Council initially supported the Consent Decree. For
example, DHA’s First Annual Report (Jan. 20, 1988) to this Court under the
Consent Decree contains this entry in the "Chronological Events” narrative (pp.
31-32):
"October, 1986: DHA Executive Director and attorneys for Plaintiffs brief City Council on the
Consent Decree. It is viewed by local leadership as a welcome solution to the longstanding community problems that West Dallas has caused since it was completed in the mid-1950's.”
The "welcomed solution” was the complete renovation of 800-900 units at
West Dallas; the demolition of at least 1300 units that had been vacant and
uninhabitable for over ten years; the one-for-one replacement of all units
demolished at West Dallas with § 8 assistance; and, using this § 8 program, the
transfer of those who wanted to leave West Dallas into non-segregated housing
in non-minority areas of Dallas and its suburbs. (See this Court’ opinion in
Walker II).
Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 30 ("Final Report/Feasibility Research for a Public Housing Desegregation Demonstration, May 15, 1985"); Pls. Exh. 29,
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 49
2. City Opposition to The Decree
This initial support by the City Council appeared to dissipate, in mid or
late 1987,% in the face of opposition from an unusual combination of diverse
7 groups®’ to the demolition of any units at West Dallas. And, ignoring the fact
that the entire Consent Decree was being supported by those who mattered most -
Ji Sk BEER FY 2 - the black families who wanted out of the squalor, the ering. oi khe hopeless
2 AY
life in West Dallas®® -- the City of Dallas, and Aon lected glipricials and
Lara J SARA employees, began to oppose the Decree and to obstruct it Mn vartous ways.
First, the Mayor of Dallas -- acting in her official capacity as Mayor®® -
The first notice of the City’s opposition in the DHA Reports to this Court stated: "Nov, 5, 1987: Executive Director attends meeting in Mayor Strauss’ office with the Mayor, Councilpersons, HUD representatives and those opposing the settlement. No decision results, but the position of HUD and DHA were made clear regarding a firm commitment to accomplish Decree objectives.” DHA First Annual Report, p. 60 (Jan. 20, 1988).
*’Some groups objected to the West Dallas demolition -- but not to any other part of the Consent Decree -- for obviously political reasons, such as the loss of votes or a power base if blacks were moved out of West Dallas. Other groups sincerely objected to the demolition of any public housing. Still others were sincere in wanting the West Dallas demolition delayed, to see "if there were any alterative solutions.” But some groups objected to the attempted egatjon o ; they suddenly discovered how important
st Dallas when the Consent Decree was
during the first year of the Decree --
the use of § 8 assistance. DHA First ’ : through Oct. 1989, the rejection rate for West Dallas was almost 98%. By October of 1988, there were only 1,074 occupied units at West Dallas, and the number of families who want to stay in West Dallas seem to have stabilized between 1000-1075. DHA Reports to the Plaintiffs, Jan. -Dec. 1988; DHA Report No. 7 to the Court (July 20, 1989). Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exhs. 55,56.
a
>
opposition by the
reasons that they
"Housing Mediation Team”
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 50
® ®
- contacted both local and national HUD officials to oppose any demolition in
West Dallas. Second, the Mayor and other City Council Members supported "the
Frost Amendment,” which purports to deny federal funding for the West Dallas
demolition.’ Third, the Mayor appointed Mattie Nash, an avowed and dedicated
opponent of the Consent Decree, to the DHA Board of Commissioners.’!
Fourth, not only has the City of Dallas refused to do anything to support
the Decree,’ or to help stop the massive violations .6¥ the Decr ‘by DHA (see
Tee gr
eon
the Walker I opinion), it has actually contributed t& some of these violations
-- by continuing to approve substandard housing for use in the DHA's § 8 programs
and by failing to use code enforcement proceedings to remedy these Housing
Quality Standard violations’?
was simply not ready for blacks to move to suburbs and non-impacted areas with § 8 assistance. Dec. 12, 1986 Hearing: Testimony of Lori Palmer.
°The City of Dallas opposition to the Consent Decree was cited by Congressman Martin Frost in support of "the Frost Amendment.” Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 76; Pls. Exh. 77, .p. 2.
"Mrs. Nash testified in opposition to the Decree at the Dec. 12, 1986 fairness hearing; and, at the time of her appointment to the DHA Board, Mrs. Nash was an appellant in an abortive appeal to have the consent decree set aside. Dec. 12, 1986 Hearing: Testimony of Mattie Nash. See Walker v. City of Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1988).
is unavailing; such a "loan" was of no value since, at the City’s insistence, DHA had already received HUD approval to use funds from the settlement of the lead contamination suit for the mobility and relocation expenses. DHA First Annual Report, pp. 35-37 (Jan. 20, 1988). oo
’ 2
See the discussion above in III (13): "Housing Quality Ynspettions (1978-
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 51
Finally, the Mayor and some City Council Members have opposed both the
construction of the 100 units of new public housing at the Country Creek site
and the demolition of any units at West Dallas.’* Although this Court certainly
does not question the sincerity of this opposition, one cannot help noting that
consistency is not a requirement for opposing the Consent Decree:
(1) some oppose the location of the 100 units fa County Creek because this is "simply boo Large 3
Project for low-income public housing; Se Te
a ANE
(11) but they also oppose the demolition of any of the 3500 units at West Dallas -- even those that have been vacant and boarded-up for over 10 years because they are unfit for human occupancy;
(111i) some oppose the demolition of any public housing at any location because of the need to preserve even dilapidated and uninhabitable units of low-income public housing;
(iv) but they also supported the demolition of Washington Place in 1975, and then did nothing to assist DHA in replacing these units with public housing in non- minority areas.
Some of the opposition to the Decree was also based upon a desire for more
time in which to find alternatives to the West Dallas demolition. But over two
d one-ha ears have passed since the approval of the Consent Decree -- and
not a single, viable “alternative” has been presented to this Court. There have
been no offers from Washington for the $88 million (or more) that it will take
to rehabilitate West Dallas and its surrounding neighborhood.’”® And, of course,
1979)."
’ADec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 60 (Mayor Strauss letter to HUD); Pls. Exh. 62 (Country Creek letters); Pls. Exh. 68 (newspaper stories re opposition); Pls. Exh. 69 (Mayor Strauss letter to HUD); Pls. Exh. 70 (Mayor Strauss remarks at press conference); Pls. Exh. 64 (Deposition of City Council Member Charles Tandy, pp. 13-15).
& g
oo
>The cost of renovating only the 3500 units at West Dallas was estimated
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 52
the City of Dallas has not been willing to commit any money for this purpose -
= or to follow the recommendation of the "Mayor's Housing Mediation Team” that
the City should "voluntarily agree to enter into the Walker v. HUD Consent
Decree.”
at $47.8 million in 1980 (Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 46, PP. 20, 39, 59), and at $65 million at the Dec. 12, 1986 fairness hearing (testimony of Jack Herrington). The cost of rehabilitating both the West Dallas Jamits and the surrounding neighborhood was estimated at $88 million in 1983 (Dec. 12, 1988 Hearing: Pls. Exh. 49, PP. 78-86). ig
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 53
V. The Applicable Law
Under the law, there are two separate justifications for compelling the
joinder of the City of Dallas in this case: the "All Writs Act,” 28 U.S.C. §
1651; and Rule 21," Fed. BR. Civ. P;
1. The All Writs Act ~ :
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) provides: sd
~ "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and Principles of law.”
Under the "All Writs Act,” it has been repeatedly held that federal
district courts may issue such orders "as may be necessary or appropriate to
effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued.”
United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159,.172 (1977). And, as stated
in New York Telephone:
"The power conferred by the Act extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice, Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 1, 6 (ED Mo. 1967), summarily aff'd, 389 U.S. 579 (1968): Board of Education v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (CA 10 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971), and encompasses even those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice. United States v. McHie, 196 F. 586 (ND Ill. 1912); Field v. United States, 193 F.2d 92, 95-96 (CA2), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951)" (434 U.S. at 174).76
76See also Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 6358, 692 at n, 32 (1979) ("nonparties who interfere with the implementation of court orders establishing public rights may be enjoined”); Clients’ Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1426 (8th Cir. 1983); Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 646 F.2d 925, 943 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. State of Texas, 405 F.2d 1250, 1251 (5th Cir. 1974).
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 54
2. Rule 21
Rule 21, Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that "parties may be dropped or added
by order of the court on motion of any party . . . and on such terms as are
Juss.
Falen mn roy Shi — nn
Under this rule, a party may be added at any: ® case. For
ae
* - 2 i ; example, parties have been added after trial and seen appeal was
pending.’” Indeed, in one case, Rule 21 was used to add part
had reached the United States Supreme Court.’®
3. Joinder of the City
In this case, it is necessary to join the City of Dallas, as a defendant
subject to the Consent Decree, in order to prevent the frustration of the Decree
-- and in order to prevent the City from obstructing the implementation of the
Decree.’?
| The City of Dallas is not an innocent bystander. Instead, as discussed
ove, the City has been a substantial cause of the racial segregation in pubic
housing in Dallas -- the very problems sought to be corrected by the Consent
"’Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F.Supp. 248 (D.C. Neb. 1970) (after trial): Reed v. Robilio, 376 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1967) (on appeal).
®Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
The appropriateness of adding, as parties, additional political
Milliken v. Bradley, 484 F.2d 215, 221-224 (6th Cir. 1973), reversed on other grounds, 418 U.S. 717, 744-745 (1974); Reed v. Rhodes, 662 F.2d 1219, 1221 (6th Cir. 1981); Hart v. Community School Board, 383 F.Supp. 699, 752=355 (S.D. N.Y. 1974); Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 51 F.R.D..%139 (E.D. Va.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 55
Decree -- both through its own actions and through its failure to stop DHA's
blatant practices of discrimination and segregation in all of its public housing
programs.
In addition, the Consent Decree was explicitly conditioned on the premise
"that the resources currently available to DHA to implement the Decree are
inadequate” and that "substantial resources will have ‘£5 bar
‘wv
institutions and organizations other than DHA." (Deczas, 'S
Rr aw,
Is no question that resources are not available to accomplish the remedial
purposes of the Consent Decree; for example:
(1) there has not been a sufficient supply of § 8 housing to meet the quality standards and locational requirements of the Decree;
(11) there has not been adequate resources to fund the demolition of all vacant units at West Dallas, particularly in view of the "Anti-Demolition Statute,” 42 U.S.C. § 1437p;%0
(iii) there has not been sufficient "fair housing” or code enforcement efforts by the City to accomplish the purposes of the Decree to assure housing opportunities for minority in non-impacted areas and to improve the quality of the public housing in all of DHA’'s programs; and
(iv) there has not been sufficient resources to improve the facilities and neighborhoods of the predominately minority DHA projects, so that they are substantially equivalent to the HUD assisted units currently housing white low-income families, ®!
In addition to these and other resources needed to effectuate the Consent
Decree,® DHA has engaged in repeated and pervasive violations of the Decree.
®This is discussed in the Walker II opinion.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 56
See the Walker I opinion. However, instead of assisting DHA in obtaining the
necessary resources -- or intervening to stop DHA's violations of the Decree -
- the City (through its elected officials and its employees) has chosen to oppose
the Consent Decree and to frustrate its implementation.
Accordingly, the joinder of the City of Dallas is not only
parties, primarily HUD, can provide the "additional resources” that are needed. This is wrong. The Consent Decree provides that "under no circumstances : shall any modification increase, alter, otherwise affect the financial or other obligations of HUD pursuant to this Decree without the written consent of HUD." Consent Decree, Summary p. 3.
83The City also contends that the plaintiffs waived the right to join the City by not suing it before the entry of the Consent Decree -- and that "the Court concurred with the decision that complete relief did not require joining the City.” Again, this is simply wrong. As discussed above, although the City was not a party to the Decree, it joined in the negotiations and its support for the Decree was promised and expected: otherwise, there would have been no settlement. Therefore, there was no "waiver” by the plaintiffs’ decision not to sue the City at that time -- and this Court, when approving a Consent Decree which recited that "substantial additional resources” were necessary, certainly expected the City to support, not oppose, the Consent Decree.
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 57
VI. Conclusion
For these reasons, the City of Dallas will be joined as a party defendant
in this case -- and summary judgment as to liability will be entered against the
City on the plaintiffs’ claims that the City of Dallas was a substantial cause
of DHA's deliberate racial segregation and discrimination in its public housing
programs in Dallas.
: cn Raper”
Dallas. However, the specific modifications to be made a “he scope of
injunctive relief -- together with the financial obligations to be imposed on
the City -- will be determined only after a hearing and the presentation of
evidence by all parties.
SIGNED THIS AA DAY OF Ltt i , 1989. /
ATES DISTRICT J
JERRY BUCHMEYER
MEMORANDUM OPINION -- Page 58
9 e
‘Do Not Remove This Sign- -By Order
Of The Sheriff Of Dallus County
———— 1. If you offer, accept or agree to offer or accept 1)
money or anything else of value to vote or not
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age:
BR
Pe