York v. City of Danville Brief for Plaintiff in Error

    I n  the

Supreme ( L m x x t nf Appeals of Itrputta
at R ichmond 

No. 6253

L. W ilson Y ork,
Plaintiff in Error,

City of Danville,
Defendant in Error.

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF IN ERROR

S. W. T ucker
214 East Clay Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Jack Greenberg
James M. Nabrit, III
Melvyn Zarr

10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

R uth L. Harvey

453 South Main Street 
Danville, Virginia

J. L. W illiams
212 North Ridge Street 
Danville, Virginia

Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error



I N D E X

PAGE

Proceedings Below ............................ ..... .........................  1

Assignment of E rro r .... ...... ..... ........................................  3

Questions Presented ..... ....................................................  3

Statement of F acts............................. ................. .......... . 4

A rgument

I. Appellants’ Convictions Deny Them Due Proc­
ess of Law Because There Was No Evidence 
in the Records Made Below of Conduct Pro­
hibited by the Danville Parade Ordinance,, or, 
in the Alternative, the Danville Parade Ordi­
nance, as Construed to Include Appellants’ 
Conduct, Does Not Convey Fair Warning of 
What Is Prohibited Thereby...... ...................... . 7

II. The Danville Parade Ordinance Is an Uncon­
stitutional Prior Restraint Upon Appellants’ 
First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of 
Freedom of Speech and Assembly......................  10

III. The Danville Parade Ordinance Is Offensive 
to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States Because It 
Vests Improperly Broad Discretion in the Is­
suer of Parade Permits ......................................  11

Concusion ................................................................................ 13

A ppendix

Ordinance No. 63-7.1 .......    la



IX

page

Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195 (1966) ....................... 12

Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1964) ......................  8

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) ...............  12
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965) ...........................11,12

Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 61 (1965) ...................  10

Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 (1961) ....................... 8

Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951) ..................... 11

Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951) ...................  11

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949) ................... 11
Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1959) ...............  8

Other A uthorities

Constitution of Virginia, Section 12 ...............................  10
Code of Virginia,- §46.1-229 (1966 Supp.) ......................  8
Code of Virginia, §46.1-230 (1966 Supp.) ......................  7
Code of the City of Danville, Section 16-20................... 1, 4
Ordinance No. 63-7.1 of the City of Danville.................. 4, 11

T able of Cases



Isr th e

(Usmtt u f  A pp ea ls nf U t r g t m a

at R ichmond 

No. 6253

L. W ilson Y ork, 

—v.—
Plaintiff in Error,

City oe Danville,

Defendant in Error.

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF IN ERROR

Proceedings Below

On July 28, 1963, the 62 appellants herein1 were arrested 
in Danville, Virginia and charged with parading without a 
permit, in violation of an ordinance of the City of Dan­
ville making it a misdemeanor to do so.2

Prior to trial, appellants’ plea in abatement was filed in 
the Corporation Court of Danville, alleging that the prose­
cutions should be abated on the ground that the parade 
ordinance under which they were charged, Section 16-20 of 
the City Code of Danville, as amended by Ordinance No. 
63-7.1 (set forth in the Appendix; hereinafter referred

1 The plaintiff in error and those other persons convicted with 
him in the consolidated trial below (R. 104-05).
_ 2 Some appellants were also charged with violating an injunc­

tion issued by the Corporation Court of Danville.



2

to as the Danville Parade Ordinance), was unconstitutional 
on its face. The ordinance was challenged (R. 5-7) as void 
for vagueness, as an unconstitutional prior restraint of 
state and federal rights of free speech and assembly and 
as an unlawful abridgment of those rights because of an 
improper standard governing the discretion of the issuer 
of the parade permit.

The plea in abatement was overruled and, on September 
13, 1963, appellants were tried in the Corporation Court 
of the City of Danville before the Honorable Archibald 
M. Aiken. After the prosecution rested its case, certain of 
the appellants moved to strike the evidence against them 
on the ground that the evidence failed to specifically iden­
tify those appellants as having participated in the alleged 
violation (R. 2). The court overruled the motion, and 
counsel for appellants timely excepted. Following the 
presentation of appellants’ case, counsel renewed their plea 
in abatement, which was again overruled and timely ex­
ception taken (R. 2).

The Corporation Court convicted each of the appellants 
of a violation of the Danville Parade Ordinance and meted 
out various sentences ranging from a $25.00 fine to a $50.00 
fine and 20 days imprisonment (R. 2, 3).3

3 Those appellants with sentences of $50.00 fines and 20 days 
imprisonment had 10 days of their imprisonment suspended; those 
appellants with $35.00 fines and 20 days imprisonment had 13 
days imprisonment suspended; and those appellants with $25.00 
fines and 20 days imprisonment had 15 days suspended. All these 
suspensions were conditioned upon the good behavior of the re­
spective appellants for a period of 2 years and upon the payment 
of the fines and costs of the respective appellants (R. 4). The 
Court granted a stay of execution of the sentences pending review 
by this Court (R. 5).



3

The court erred in holding that the ordinance, partic­
ularly as applied here, does not conflict with Section 12 of 
the Constitution of Virginia or with the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States.

Questions Presented

1. Is the Danville Parade Ordinance void for vagueness 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu­
tion of the United States, or, in the alternative, have ap­
pellants been convicted upon no evidence of guilt!

2. Is the Danville Parade Ordinance an unconstitutional 
prior restraint upon appellants’ First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and assembly? 3

3. Is the Danville Parade Ordinance violative of ap­
pellants’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free­
dom of speech and assembly because it vests improperly 
broad discretion in the issuer of the parade permits?

Assignment of Error



4

Statement of Facts

The Parade Ordinance which appellants were convicted 
of violating was adopted by the Council of the City of 
Danville on July 10, 1963, as Ordinance No. 63-7.1, in 
amendment and reenactment of §16-20 of the Code of the 
City of Danville. The Ordinance requires that an applica­
tion for a parade permit be filed with the Chief of Police 
not less than thirty (30) days before the date on which 
the proposed parade is to be conducted. Therefore, the 
Ordinance purportedly prohibited any and all parades 
conducted within thirty (30) days after its enactment, 
i.e., between July 10, 1963 and August 9, 1963, unless the 
Chief of Police exercised his discretionary authority to 
consider an application filed less than thirty (30) days be­
fore the date on which a parade was to be conducted.

In order to present to City officials the grievances of 
citizens concerning the racial turmoil that existed in the 
City of Danville, appellants attempted to secure an ap­
pointment with the Mayor’s Advisory Committee, and were 
advised by a Mr. Stinson, a City official, that two members 
of the Committee were out of town and no meeting could 
be held without them. Mr. Stinson stated that he and the 
City Manager would meet with appellant York and would 
call him back, which he never did (E. 95).

Prioi to July 28, 1963, no application for a parade 
permit had been made, although appellants had attempted 
to contact an appropriate official4 to inquire about the 
necessity of obtaining such a permit for the demonstration

. ' Required. No person shall engage in, participate in
aid, form or start any parade, unless a parade permit shall have 

(Stained from the Chief of Police (or other appropriate 
official or body). (Emphasis added.)



5

(R. 102). Also prior to July 28, 1963, the Chief of Police, 
having heard of the pending demonstration via the receipt 
of literature distributed by the Danville Progressive Chris­
tian Association stating that there would be a “D-Day” on 
the 28th5 (R. 11, 12, 19), issued a statement to the public, 
which was published in the newspaper, advising persons 
that if they demonstrated they would be arrested and jailed, 
with attendant prejudice to their employment (R. 19, 
20).

Faced with the frustration of being unable to meet with 
City officials, appellants and others, later estimated at 
approximately eighty in number (R. 13, 16), left the High 
Street Church where they had conducted a religious meeting- 
under surveillance by the police (R. 4) and began to walk 
in the general direction of downtown (R. 12, 98). They 
proceeded down Main Street in two groups, one per side­
walk, the group on the sidewalk abutting Woolworth’s 
estimated at about fifty and the group on the other side­
walk of Main Street estimated at about thirty (R. 13). 
The two groups proceeded down Main Street on both side­
walks until they reached Union Street. En route, the 
participants in the demonstration walked in no way dif­
ferent from those walking down Main Street that Sun­
day afternoon, except that they were walking two and 
sometimes three abreast (R. 16), and some participants 
were singing “We Shall Overcome” (R. 12, 102). Now and 
then the participants would voluntarily reduce their size 
to enable persons not participating to pass on the sidewalk 
(R. 12). There is some dispute in the record as to whether 
the participants were clapping their hands while singing.

5 “D-Day” was intended to be a protest day—protesting the re­
fusal of the City officials to discuss grievances with representa­
tives of the local citizens (R. 98).



6

The Chief of Police testified that he believed the partici­
pants were applauding or clapping in unison but he could 
not remember (E. 17), whereas L. Wilson York, one of 
the participants and plaintiff in error herein, testified that 
he did not hear anyone clap (E. 102). As the demonstrators 
arrived at the intersection of Main and Union Streets, at 
about 3 :30 p.m. the police “ sealed off the area”  and ex­
cluded all other persons except newspaper people. A  line 
of police officers was placed across Union Street so that 
the demonstrators could not proceed past that point, 
thereby forcing some persons to remain in the intersection 
of Union and Main Streets (E. 14). Speaking through a 
megaphone, the Chief of Police advised persons first 
reaching that “ sealed off”  area that they were under ar­
rest for violating the Corporation Court’s injunction and 
for parading without a permit (E. 12). The Chief of 
Police then went to the other side of Main Street and like­
wise informed the two groups on either side of Main Street 
that they were under arrest. Some of the demonstrators 
sat down and had to be carried onto the vehicles (E. 13). 
Plaintiff in error testified that he did so because he was 
tired, since the police “were taking their time about arrest­
ing us” . However, plaintiff in error got up and walked into 
the safety wagon (E. 101).



7

A R G U M E N T

I.
Appellants’ Convictions Deny Them Due Process of 

Law Because There Was No Evidence in the Records 
Made Below of Conduct Prohibited hy the Danville 
Parade Ordinance, or, in the Alternative, the Danville 
Parade Ordinance, as Construed to Include Appellants’ 
Conduct, Does Not Convey Fair Warning of What Is 
Prohibited Thereby.

Any fair reader of the Danville Parade Ordinance, either 
a lawyer or a layman, must conclude that the ordinance 
does not purport to regulate activities on the sidewalks of 
Danville. In Paragraph (B )(3 ), a parade is defined as any 
“march, ceremony, show, exhibition,, pageant or procession 
of any kind, or any similar display, in or upon any street, 
park or other public place in the City” (emphasis added). 
In Paragraph (D )(2 )(h ), it is required that the applica­
tion for a parade permit indicate “whether the parade will 
occupy all or only a portion of the width of the streets 
proposed to be traversed” ; in Paragraph (J) (5), it is speci­
fied that the parade permit must state “ [t]he portions of 
the streets to be traversed that may be occupied by the 
parade.” Clearly, activities on the sidewalks are not con­
templated as being within the ambit of these provisions.6 
A  fair reading of Paragraph (E) (“ Standards for Issu­
ance” ) buttresses that conclusion. The considerations there 
listed as relevant to the granting of a parade permit are

6 To illustrate, Virginia law prohibits pedestrians from care­
lessly crossing the “streets.”  Code of Virginia, §46.1-230 (1966 
Supp.). As with the present ordinance, it is hardly conceivable that 
this term could encompass the sidewalks.



8

traffic congestion, diversion of ambulance service and inter­
ference with fire and police protection. In addition, Para­
graph (L) (2) requires that “ [n]o driver of a vehicle shall 
drive between the vehicles or persons comprising a parade 
when such vehicles or persons are in motion or are con­
spicuously designated as a parade.” Clearly, this provision 
was not aimed at persons driving their cars upon the side­
walks of Danville.7

Since any fair reading of the Danville Parade Ordinance 
must ineluctably compel the conclusion that the ordinance 
does not regulate activities on the sidewalks, appellants 
were convicted upon no evidence of guilt. This is so be­
cause there is no dispute in the record that appellants were 
walking on the sidewalks (R. 12, 22, 28, 34, 38, 40, 49, 70, 
75, 84). Indeed, appellee’s Brief in Opposition to appel­
lants’ Petition for an Appeal concedes as much. To affirm 
appellants’ convictions without any evidence of guilt would 
deny appellants due process of law. Thompson v. Louis­
ville, 362 U. S. 199 (1959); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 IT. S. 
157 (1961).

In the alternative, if it were held that the records made 
below adequately support appellants’ convictions, then that 
holding would necessarily embody a construction of the 
Danville Parade Ordinance as applying to activities on the 
sidewalks. But to so construe the Danville Parade Ordi­
nance would render it “ void for vagueness” under prin­
ciples announced in Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U. 8. 347 (1964), 
for it would, as construed, have given appellants no fair 
warning that their conduct was prohibited. In Bouie, the

7 Indeed, a Virginia statute already specifically bars a person 
from driving a vehicle upon the “sidewalks.” Code of Virginia 
§46.1-229 (1966 Supp.).



9

Supreme Court of the United States reversed trespass con­
victions of persons who had conducted “ sit-ins” in a res­
taurant, invalidating the South Carolina trespass statute, 
Although recognizing that the statute, as the ordinance 
here, was not void because of vague or overbroad language, 
nevertheless the Court held that a surprising judicial con­
struction of that narrow statutory language “ produce [d] 
a potentially greater deprivation of the right to fair notice” 
(378 U. S. at 352). To apply the ordinance to appellants’ 
activities on the sidewalks, in the face of its plain meaning 
and statutory context, would be an unforeseeable and retro­
active judicial expansion of the type condemned in Bouie, 
where the Court said (378 U. S. at 352):

When a statute on its face is vague or overbroad, it at 
least gives a potential defendant some notice, by virtue 
of this very characteristic, that a question may arise 
as to its coverage, and that it may be held to cover his 
contemplated conduct. When a statute on its face is 
narrow and precise, however, it lulls the potential de­
fendant into a false sense of security, giving him no 
reason even to suspect that conduct clearly outside the 
scope of the statute as written will be retroactively 
brought within it by an act of judicial construction. If 
the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a person is 
required To speculate as to the meaning of penal stat­
utes’ as in Lanzetta [v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451], 
or to ‘guess at [the statute’s] meaning and differ as 
to its application,’ as in Connally [v. General Const. 
Co., 269 U. S. 385], the violation is that much greater 
when, because the uncertainty as to the statute’s mean­
ing is itself not revealed until the court’s decision, a 
person is not even afforded an opportunity to engage



in such speculation before committing the act in ques­
tion.

II.

The Danville Parade Ordinance Is an Unconstitu­
tional Prior Restraint Upon Appellants’ First and Four­
teenth Amendment Rights of Freedom of Speech and 
Assembly.

The Danville Parade Ordinance requires, by Paragraph 
(D )(1 ), that an application for a parade permit be filed 
with the Chief of Police “ not less than 30 days nor more 
than 60 days before the date on which it is proposed to con­
duct the parade.” This provision alone condemns the ordi­
nance under principles reaffirmed by the United States Su­
preme Court in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965). 
There, the Supreme Court held that any system of prior 
restraints of expression must “ assure a prompt final judi­
cial decision”  in order to “ avoid the potentially chilling 
effect . . .  on protected expression”  (380 U. S. at 59, 61). 
Here, the ordinance makes no provision for judicial re­
view. But, more importantly, the requirement of 30 days’ 
prior notice of a parade is simply too long: the length of 
this period is bound to have a chilling effect upon the exer­
cise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of freedom 
of speech and assembly.8

Paragraph (D) (3) (“ Late Applications” ) does not cure 
this vice; in fact, under the circumstances of this case, it 
has aggravated the prior restraint. Under Paragraph 
(D)(3),  the Chief of Police “where good cause is shown

8 This is also true of rights protected by Section 12 of the Con­
stitution of Virginia.



11

therefor” is authorized to consider late applications. The 
Chief’s discretion, however, is unlimited. Vesting such dis­
cretion in the Chief of Police does not comport with prin­
ciples of due process of law. Runs v. New York, 340 U. S. 
290, 293-94 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 
(1951); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965). Moreover, 
the constitutional vice of vesting unfettered discretion in 
the Chief of Police was aggravated in this case (if appel­
lants engaged in a “parade” ) by the circumstances that ap­
pellants were compelled to invoke that discretion in order 
to hold their demonstration on July 28, 1963, since the Ordi­
nance, No. 63-7.1, was adopted on July 10, 1963, only 18 
days before the demonstration.

III.

The Danville Parade Ordinance Is Offensive to the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States Because It Vests Improperly Broad 
Discretion in the Issuer of Parade Permits.

By Paragraph (E)(6) ,  the Chief of Police is authorized 
to deny a permit when he finds that the “parade” is reason­
ably likely to “ create a disturbance.” This standard is an 
inadequate check on official discretion, reflecting considera­
tions condemned in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 
(1949), where the Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment encompasses the right to “ invite dispute” , “ in­
duce a condition of unrest” , “ create dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are” or even “ stir people to anger” (337 
U. S. at 4). Moreover, this standard gives ample rein to 
officials to shut off unpopular views and constitutes an “ ob­
vious danger to the right of a person or group not to be



12

denied equal protection of the laws”  (Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U. S. 536, 557 (1965)). See also Cantwell v. Connecti­
cut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).

Recently, in Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195 (1966), 
the Supreme Court again had occasion to condemn a con­
viction based upon conduct “ calculated to create disturb­
ances of the peace.” In reversing a conviction for criminal 
libel, the Supreme Court noted that such a standard “ leaves 
wide open the standard of responsibility. It involves cal­
culations as to the boiling point of a particular person or a 
particular group, not an appraisal of the nature of the 
comments per se”  (384 U. S. at 200).

Since the ordinance permits the Danville Police Chief to 
ban “parades” solely on the basis of his estimate of the boil­
ing points of bystanders, it must be invalidated.



13

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, appellants’ convictions 
should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

S. W. Tucker

214 East Clay Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Jack Greenberg

James M. Nabrit, III
Melvyn Zarr

10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

R uth L. Harvey

453 South Main Street 
Danville, Virginia

J. L. W illiams

212 North Ridge Street 
Danville, Virginia

Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error



A P P E N D I X



APPENDIX

Presented: July 10, 1963 

A dopted : July 10, 1963

Ordinance No. 63-7.1

A n Ordinance A mending and R e-ordaining Section 16- 
20 of the Code of the City of Danville, 1962, R egulating 
P arades and Other Similar Uses of P ublic Places; A u­
thorizing the Chief of P olice to R eceive A pplications 
and I ssue P ermits; P roviding Standards for Issuance 
T hereof; E stablishing Procedure for A ppeal Upon Re­
jection of A pplication ; R equiring Compliance W ith P er­
mit Conditions; and Prescribing P enalties for the V iola­
tion of Its Provisions.

B e I t Ordained by the Council of the City of Danville, 
Virginia, that Section 16-20 of the Code of the City of Dan­
ville, 1962, regulating permits for parades and processions 
be, and the same is hereby, re-ordained as follows:

Section 16-20. Regulations for Parades and Other Simi­
lar Uses of Public Places.

A. Short Title. This Ordinance shall be known and may 
be cited as the “ Parade Ordinance of the City of Danville, 
Virginia” .

B. Definitions.

(1) “ Chief of Police” is the Chief of Police of the City of 
Danville, Virginia.

(2) “ City” is the City of Danville, Virginia.

(3) “ Parade” is any parade, march, ceremony, show, ex­
hibition, pageant, or procession of any kind, or any similar



2a

display, in or upon any street, park or other public place 
in the City.

(4) “ Parade Permit” is a permit as required by this 
Ordinance.

(5) “ Person” is any person, firm, partnership, associa­
tion, corporation, company or organization of any kind.

C. Permit Required. No person shall engage in, partici­
pate in, aid, form or start any parade, unless a parade per­
mit shall have been obtained from the Chief of Police (or 
other appropriate official or body).

(1) Exceptions. This Ordinance shall not apply to:

(a) funeral processions;

(b) students going to and from school classes or 
participating in educational activities, providing such 
conduct is under the immediate direction and supervi­
sion of the proper school authorities;

(c) a governmental agency acting within the scope 
of its functions.

D. Application. A  person seeking issuance of a parade 
permit shall file an application with the Chief of Police on 
forms provided by such officer.

(1) Filing Period. An application for a parade permit 
shall be filed with the Chief of Police not less than thirty 
days nor more than sixty days before the date on which it 
is proposed to conduct the parade.

(2) Contents. The application for a parade permit shall 
set forth the following information:



3a

(a) The name, address and telephone number of the 
person seeking to conduct such parade;

(b) If the parade is proposed to be conducted for, 
on behalf of, or by an organization, the name, address 
and telephone number of the headquarters of the or­
ganization, and of the authorized and responsible 
heads of such organization;

(c) The name, address and telephone number of the 
person who will be the parade chairman and who will 
be responsible for its conduct;

(d) The date when the parade is to be conducted;

(e) The route to be traveled, the starting point and 
the termination point;

(f) The approximate number of persons who, and 
animals and vehicles which, will constitute such pa­
rade; the type of animals, and description of the ve­
hicles ;

(g) The hours when such parade will start and ter­
minate ;

(h) A statement as to whether the parade will oc­
cupy all or only a portion of the width of the streets 
proposed to be traversed;

(i) The location by streets of any assembly areas 
for such parade;

(j) The time at which units of the parade will begin 
to assemble at any such assembly area or areas;

(k) The interval of space to be maintained between 
units of such parade;



4a

(l) If the parade is designed to be held by, and on 
behalf of or for, any person other than the applicant, 
the applicant for such permit shall file with the Chief 
of Police a communication in writing from the person 
proposing to hold the parade, authorizing the applicant 
to apply for the permit on his behalf.

(m) Any additional information which the Chief of 
Police shall find reasonably necessary to a fair deter­
mination as to whether a permit should issue.

(3) Late Applications. The Chief of Police, where good 
cause is shown therefore shall have the authority to con­
sider any application hereunder which is filed less than 
thirty days before the date such parade is proposed to be 
conducted.

(4) Fee. There shall be paid at the time of filing the ap­
plication for a parade permit a fee of three dollars.

E. Standards for Issuance. The Chief of Police shall 
issue a permit as provided for hereunder when, from a con­
sideration of the application and from such other informa­
tion as may otherwise be obtained, he finds that:

(1) The conduct of the parade will not substantially in­
terrupt the safe and orderly movement of other traffic con­
tiguous to its route;

(2) The conduct of the parade will not require the diver­
sion of so great a number of police officers of the City to 
properly police the line of movement and the areas con­
tiguous thereto as to prevent normal police protection to 
the City;



(3) The conduct of such parade will not require the di­
version of so great a number of ambulances as to prevent 
normal ambulance service to portions of the City other 
than that to be occupied by the proposed line of march and 
areas contiguous thereto;

(4) The concentration of persons, animals and vehicles 
at assembly points of the parade will not unduly interfere 
with proper fire and police protection of, or ambulance 
service to, areas contiguous to such assembly areas;

(5) The conduct of such parade will not interfere with 
the movement of fire-fighting equipment enroute to a fire;

(6) The conduct of the parade is not reasonably likely 
to cause injury to persons or property, to provoke disor­
derly conduct or create a disturbance;

(7) The parade is scheduled to move from its point of 
origin to its point of termination expeditiously and without 
unreasonable delays enroute;

(8) The parade is not to be held for the sole purpose of 
advertising any product, goods or event, and is not designed 
to be held purely for private profit.

F. Notice of Rejection. The Chief of Police shall act 
upon the application for a parade permit within three days 
after the filing thereof. If the Chief of Police disapproves 
the application, he shall mail to the applicant within five 
days after the date upon which the application was filed, a 
notice of his action, stating the reasons for his denial of 
the permit.

G. Appeal Procedure. Any person aggrieved shall have 
the right to appeal the denial of a parade permit to the City



6a

Council. The appeal shall be taken within ten days after 
notice. The City Council shall act upon the appeal within 
ten days after its receipt.

H. Alternative Permit. The Chief of Police, in denying 
an application for a parade permit, shall be empowered to 
authorize the conduct of the parade on a date, at a time, 
or over a route different from that named by the applicant. 
An applicant desiring to accept an alternate permit shall, 
within five days after notice of the action of the Chief of 
Police, file a written notice of acceptance with the Chief of 
Police. An alternate parade permit shall conform to the 
requirements of, and shall have the effect of a parade per­
mit under, this Ordinance.

I. Notice to City and Other Officials. Immediately upon 
the issuance of a parade permit, the Chief of Police shall 
send a copy thereof to the following:

(1) The City Manager;

(2) The Fire Chief;

(3) The Director of the Department of Public Works;

(4) The General Manager or responsible head of each 
public transportation utility, the regular routes of whose 
vehicles will be affected by the route of the proposed pa­
rade.

J. Contents of Permit. Each parade permit shall state 
the following information:

(1) Starting time;

(2) Minimum speed;

(3) Maximum speed;



7a

(4) Maximum interval of space to be maintained be­
tween the units of the parade;

(5) The portions of the streets to be traversed that may 
be occupied by the parade;

(6) The maximum length of the parade in miles or frac­
tions thereof;

(7) Such other information as the Chief of Police shall 
find necessary to the enforcement of this Ordinance.

K. Duties of Permittee. A  permittee hereunder shall 
comply with all permit directions and conditions and with 
all applicable laws and ordinances.

(1) Possession of Permit. The parade chairman or other 
person heading or leading such activity shall carry the pa­
rade permit upon his person during the conduct of the 
parade.

L. Public Conduct During Parades.

(1) Interference. No person shall unreasonably hamper, 
obstruct or impede, or interfere with any parade or parade 
assembly or with any person, vehicle or animal partici­
pating or used in a parade.

(2) Driving Through Parades. No driver of a vehicle 
shall drive between the vehicles or persons comprising a 
parade when such vehicles or persons are in motion and are 
conspicuously designated as a parade.

(3) Parking on Parade Route. The Chief of Police shall 
have the authority, when reasonably necessary, to prohibit 
or restrict the parking of vehicles along a highway or part 
thereof constituting a part of the route of a parade. The



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Chief of Police shall post signs to such effect, and it shall 
be unlawful for any person to park or leave unattended any 
vehicle in violation thereof. No person shall be liable for 
parking on a street unposted in violation of this Ordinance.

M. Revocation of Permit. The Chief of Police shall have 
the authority to revoke a parade permit issued hereunder 
upon application of the standards for issuance as herein 
set forth.

N. Penalties. Any person, firm or corporation violating 
any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall 
be punished as provided in Section 1-6 of the Danville City 
Code of 1962. Each day such violation is committed, or 
permitted to continue, shall constitute a separate offense 
and shall be punishable as such hereunder.

O. Separability. If any section, subsection, sentence, 
clause, phrase or portion of this Ordinance is for any rea­
son held invalid or unconstitutional by any court of com­
petent jurisdiction, such portion shall be deemed a separate, 
distinct and independent provision, and such holding shall 
not effect the validity of the remaining portions hereof.

P. Ordinances Repealed. All Ordinances and parts of 
Ordinances in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance 
are hereby repealed. Provided, however, that the repeal 
provided for herein shall not effect any offense or act com­
mitted or done prior to the adoption of this Ordinance; 
nor shall it effect any prosecution, suit or proceeding pend­



9a

ing or any judgment rendered on or prior to the adoption 
hereof.

A pproved

/ s /  J. R. Stinson 
Mayor

A ttest :

/ s /  R. L. H all 
Clerk

Ij R* L. Hall, Clerk of Council, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true and correct copy of Ordinance No. 
63-7.1, presented and adopted July 10,1963.

/ s /  R. L. H all

Clerk of Council



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