Brown v. Rippy Appellees' Petition for Rehearing

    No. 15872

In the

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Charles Brown, a minor by his father and next 
friend, Walter Brown, Jr., et al,

Appellants,
v.

Dr. Edwin L. Rippy, as President of the Board of Trustees 
of the Dallas Independent School District, 

Dallas County, Texas, et al.,
Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas

APPELLEES’ PETITION FOR REHEARING

A. J. Thuss,
1122 Davis Building,
Dallas, Texas,

Attorney for Appellees.

W A R L IC K  L A W  P R IN T IN G  C O . -  L A W  B R IE F  P R IN T IN G  ~  D A L L A S  -  R I - 6 7  1 1



No. 15872

In the

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Charles Brown, a minor by his father and next 
friend, Walter Brown, Jr., et al,

Appellants,
v.

Dr. Edwin L. Rippy, as President of the Board of Trustees 
of the Dallas Independent School District,

Dallas County, Texas, et al,
Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas

APPELLEES’ PETITION FOR REHEARING
The Appellee, DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, respectfully presents this its petition for a 
rehearing and petitions the Court to set aside the judgment 
entered on the 25th day of May, 1956, vacating and revers­
ing the action of the trial judge and remanding said suit 
with directions to grant it a rehearing and to enter a 
judgment affirming the action of the trial court.

Appellee’s grounds for its petition are:

I
The writ of injunction if issued would be a futile and 

useless order. The scholastic school year for the Dallas



2

District of 1955-56 having been completed, all evidence 
would now be purely anticipatory and based on conjecture 
and surmise. The scholastic school year of 1956-57 will 
not commence until September, 1956 and no negro children 
have been excluded from any school as of now.

II
The trial court has been given, in the matter of desegre­

gation, wide discretion in the formulation of an order 
defining the position of the litigating parties. The deter­
mination by the trial court to the end that the administra­
tive school authorities have not been given an opportunity 
to arrive at a decision as to how desegregation shall be 
accomplished should not be disturbed.

III
The plaintiffs’ petition shows on its face a design and 

desire, and would certainly have the effect of depriving 
the School Board of its right to exercise an administrative 
function to desegregate in an orderly manner. The trial 
court in the face of the record decided that it was too 
early for the court to intervene and properly dismissed the 
suit without prejudice because of its premature status.

IV
The judgment of the trial judge holding the suit to have 

been prematurely filed because the Board had not suffi­
cient time to solve the varied problems accompanying the 
transition from a segregated system to a desegrated sys­
tem should not be disturbed unless it appears to be a clear 
abuse of discretion.



3
V

The pleadings of plaintiffs disclosed an impatient atti­
tude seeking to deprive the School Board of its discretion 
to effect a desegregated system and the trial court having 
considered the pleadings, taking judicial notice of the 
public conditions and emotions of the people in the Dallas 
School District, did not abuse its discretion by dismissing 
the case as prematurely filed without prejudice to refile.

Appellee respectfully prays this petition be granted and 
the action of the trial court be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

A. J. Thuss,
1122 Davis Building,
Dallas, Texas,

Attorney for Appellees.

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

State of Texas )
County of Dallas j

I, A. J. THUSS, first being duly sworn, say that the 
above and foregoing petition for rehearing is presented in 
good faith and not for delay.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO this th e .........day of
June, 1956.

Notary Public, Dallas County, 
Texas



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