Supplemental Opinion
Public Court Documents
April 20, 1984

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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Supplemental Opinion, 1984. a809d228-d592-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/46f8c371-cf8a-45d8-8de8-775a330c5a96/supplemental-opinion. Accessed April 28, 2025.
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ooo ooo { Iooi jO oo UNITED STATES EASTERN DISTRICT RALEIGH DISTRICT COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION rE IF i}la FII EUUE j' t' ", ., L' lyC,.: RALPH GINGLES, €t aI. Plaintiffs, vs. RUFUS L. EDIVIISTENT €t aI. J. RICH LICNARD. CLSRK U. S. DiSTFICT COURT E. DIST. NO. CAR. No.81-803-CrV-5 SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION Defendants. Before PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, BRITT, Chief District Judge,and DUPREE, Senior District Judge. PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge: on January 27, 1984, this court enjoined certain elec- tions under the Lgg2 legisrative redistricting plan for erec- tion of members of the North carolina senate and House of Representatives, declaring the plan viorative of section 2 of the Voting Rights Ac-t of igeS, 42 U.S.C. S I973. Specifical- ly, the court herd thaL, in five House districts and in two senate distr icts, the pran diruted the voting strength of brack citizens either by submerging or by fracturing concen- trations of black voters sufficient in numbers and contiguity to constitute effective voting majorities in appropriately drawn districts. The courtrs order enjoined defendants from holding any legislative elections that would affect black -1- ooo oo Oo registered voters in the charlenged districts and arro.:ed the General Assembly until March 15, 1984, to submit for the courtrs approvar a dury-enacted redistricting plan remedying the specific violations found. on March 8, 1984, the Generar Assembly responded to the court's order by enacting, in the form of six birrsT Er redis- tricting plan drawing new district lines affecting each of the originarly-charrenged districts and, by motion on March 12, 1984, submitted this pran to the court for approvar. contem- Poraneously, the state submitted the plan for consideration by the Attorney Generar of !h" united states insofar as it affected voters in areas of the state covered by S 5 of the Voting Rights Act. on March 15, 1984, the praintiffs submitted a preriminary Response objecting to the pran and proposing certain modifica- tions to the pran's redistricting of the areas covered by former House Districts 8 and 36. concurrentry, the praintiffs moved the court for reave to take depositions of the state legislators and Iegislative staff members directly involved in developing the enacted pran, and requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the remedial adequacy of the staters proposed pIan. on March 19, 1984r w€ denied the plaintiffs' motion and their request for'a hearing, determining to decide the question of legisrative compliance on the record as then made. -2- I The plan presented to the court the following material respects the the districts challenged at trial: 1. Former House District No. 8. HD8 HD 70 HD 23 HD 68 HD 69 oo for approval changes district lines in aI1 29 .6* 69.1r ooo oo IN of Former House District No. I was a four-member district compr ised of all of wilson, Edgecombe and Nash counties. Bracks comprised 39.5t of its totar population. The plan divides this area into House District No. 7o and House District No. 8. oistrict No. 7o runs roughly north-south through the center of the former district, while District No. 8 occupies the barance of the three-county area, encrosing District 70 on three sides. Brack citizens in Districts 7o and B comprise the forrowing percentages of the total popula- t ions : 2. Former House oistrict 23 Former House District- No. 23 was a three-member district containing arl of Dlrrham county. Bracks comprised 36.38 of its totar popuration. The pran divides Durham county into three single-member districts having the folrowing black citizen population percentages: 67 .22 31.09 IO.9B 3- ooo oo oo 3. Former House District 21. Former House District 2l containing all of Wake Count.y. total population. The plan single-member districts with population percentages : HD 2L HD 6I HD 62 HD 63 HD 64 HD 65 HD 36 HD 54 HD 55 HD 55 HD 57 HD.58 HD 59 HD 60 was a six-member district Blacks comprised 2L.Bt of its divides the county into six the following black citizen 63.48 6.58 21.38 9.5r I2.1r 18 .13 4.58 16.9r 12. 18 18.09 2.LZ 28.2* 63.1r 66.38 registered 4. lqrlner House District No. 36. Former House District 3G was an eight-member district comprised of all of Mecklenburg county. Blacks comprised 26.5t of its total population. The plan divides this area into eight single-member districts with the following black citizen population percentages: Bracks citizens constitute 57.42 and 69.59 of the voters in Districts 59 and 60 respectively. 5. Former House District 39. Former House District 39 rrras a five-member district containing almost arl of Eorsyth county. Bracks comprised -4- ooo Oo OO 25.18 of its totar population. The plan divid6s th-.s area between House Districts 66 and 67, both single-member districts, and House oistrict 39, a three-member district. These districts have the folrowing black citizen popuration percentages 3 HD 39 4.4* HD 66 56.1r HD 67 55.48 Black citizens comprise 55.4t and 53.89 of the registered voters of HD 66 and 67 respectively. 6. Former Senate District 22. Former senate District 22 was a four-member district comprised of all of Mecklenburg and Cabarrus Counties. Blacks comprised 24.38 of its totar population. The plan divides this area into four single-member districts having the following black citizen population percentages: SD 22 SD 33 sD 34 SD 35 11. IT 66.08 14.48 5.88 62.58 of the registered voters in SD 33 are b1ack. 7. Former Senate District 2. Former senate District z I a singre-member distr ict, occupied a large area in the northeast section of the state. Bracks comprised 55.It of its total popuration and 46.22 of its registered voters. By redrawing the district lines of former Senate Districts 1r 2,6,9, I0r ll and L4, the plan established new Senate oistrict 2 in which blacks constitute 60.7 I of the total population. -5- ooo ocr jO wit,h the matter now before us on defendants' moL^on and plaintiffsr responser w€ have det.ermined to decide the issue of the submitted pran's remediar adequacy to the extent we may at this time. our decision may only run to those aspects of the plan that do not affect areas of the state cove.red by section 5 of the voting Rights Act, because at this time the pran is sti11 under consideration, insofar as it affects covered areas, by the Attorney General of the united states. rn that situation, our power is so rimited. see McDanier v. Sanchev, 452 U.S. 130 (198I). While we are somewhat reluctant to fragment our consider- ation and decision on the adequacy of the submitted plan we believe that in the interest of arl concerned this is the proper course. Our reasons, briefly put, are as follows: Among the features of the legisrative pran submitted to this court is a revised schedure for the conduct of primary erections which provides alternative dates depending upon the date uPon which approval for holding elections in particular districts may be rec-eived'from "a court of competent jurisdic- tion." The first =u"r, date is June 5, 1984, which is to be used if court approval is received by 5:00 p.m. on April 20, 1984. The next date is Jury L7,1984, which is to be used if approvar is received after Aprir 2L but before 5:00 p.m. on I"tay L7, 1984. obviousry, the interests of arl parties and of the pubric wirr be best served by arrowing primary elections to be herd -6- ooo Oa aO at the earliest practicable dates consistent wi'_h the plaintiffsr rights as established in this action. The alter- native dates provided in the regisrative pran are not challenged for fairness by the praintiffs, and we find them valid features of the general remedial pIan. No reason appears why approvar should not now be given to hold elections in accordance with the state I s schedule in those districts to which our power of approvar presently extends and as to which we find approvar warranted. rt is not possible at this time to know when preclearance or objection by the Attorney General with respect to covered areas within the plan wirl be forthcoming. To arlow erections to proceed at the earriest of the arternative dates provided in the staters planr w€ must act at this time. For the foregoing reasons, and for reasons that forlow, we now determine that the legislative plan under submission adequately remedies the viorations found by this court in respect of all t,hose areas of the state not covered by section 5, and we therefore approve the plan to that extent. Because of the specific oui""tion= raised by praintiffs to some features of the planr w€ explain the basis for the approval we g ive. of the new districts in this pran, HD I s g and 7o (formerly HD 8) and sD 2 (reconstituted from portions of former sDrs 1, 21 6r 9, r0, 1l and 14) lie within areas of the state covered by S 5 of the voting Rights Act. our ensuing -7 - ooo Oj jO discussion and approval therefore does not run to any of those districts, nor Eo the specific objections of plaintiffs to any of them. II Arthough they do not concede the plan's varidity in other respects, the praintiffs have objected specificalry to the proposed pran's redistricting of the area covered by former House District 35, that is, Ehe Mecklenburg district. Their contention, briefry summarized, is that in respect of that area the defendants have faired to meet their burden of showing that the pran has neither the purpose nor the effect of diluting black minority voting strength, and that it there- fore adequately remedies the S 2 violations found. rn support of this contention, praintiffs point to the following characteristics of the pran in that area. First, although containing the maximum possible number of districts in which blacks could constitute an effective voting majority, the plan fractures substantial black population concentrations which, though insufficient in numbers and contiguity to con- stitute another voting majority, might nonetheless exercise considerable voting porver as a substantial voting minority in one at least of appropriately constructed singre-member districts. Second, the plan contains districts so irregularly shaped that voters assertedly wirr not be abre to learn in which district they live so as to be abre to use their votes effectively. According to plaintiffs, since defendants can -8- ooo O1 jO offer no justifying policy for these irregularities, apart from the desire to protect incumbents, they have not met their burden of showing that the plan is free from any discrimina- tory purpose or effect, and is thus adequate fully to remedy the violations earlier found. In part to buttress this argument, plaintiffs have submitted their own proposed redistricting pran for this area. Their plan, in cont.rast to that of the defendants, divides Meckrenburg county into eight single-member districts having the following black citizen population percentages: PLaint i f fs Proposed House District District 36 District 54 Distr ict 55 District 55 District 57 District 58 District 59 District 60 I Black @ 65.6r 44.7* 11.68 4.72 I.58 4.39 L4.22 This alternative to the state I s plan has two salient characteristics. First, it contains districts whichr oD the who1e, are significantly more regurar in shape than are their counterparts in the'state's pIan. second, the plaintiffs' plan, drthough containing the same number of singre-member districts in which black citizens comprise effective voting majorities, also contains one other singre-member district in which the brack population approaches, but does not reach, a major i:cy.f/ By contrast, in none of the white-majority districts under the state's pran does brack popuration percentage exceed 30*.U -9- ooo Oj jO III we conclude that plaintiffs' objections neither require nor justify our refusal to approve, to the extent noted, the staters plan as submittedr and that on the record before us no other basis appears for refusing that approval. we start by observing of the staters plan that it indis- putably remedies each of the specific violations found in the originarly chalrenged plan, including those in the areas to which specific objection is now made by praintiffs. That is to sdy, the plan now submitted does not, as did Lhe originally challenged pran, dilutel . €ither by "submergence" or by "fracturer" any concentration of brack voters sufficient in numbers and contiguit,y to constitute an effective voting majority in an otherwise constitutionally constructed single- member district. I{e do not understand plaintiffs to challenge this proposition. we therefore concrude initiarly that in exercise of its primary jurisdiction responsive to this courtrs order, the state has now effectively remedied the racial vote dirution uiorution= originally charged by 1 This "packed" district, No. 55, would contain a blackpopulation of 44.7*. 2 under the sLaters pran brack citizens comprise zg.2z ofthe population in HD 58, the rargest black concentrationoutside the safe districts. of courser "packing" one additionar district to achievesubstantial black minorities in the challenged area would beat the expense of the brack minorities in the other white-majority districts. / J t t-/tt, ' 1 l I i -10- ool Oj jO plaintiffs and found by this court in respect of all areas not covered by section 5. plaintiffsr present challenge to the remedial planr ds we understand it, focuses on that plan's "reSuItn upon the voting strength of those registered black voters who, Et least in one of the originally challenged redistricting areas, are left out of (or left over from) the remedially created black majority single-member districts. As we understand plaintiffs' objec- tions, they must be based upon either or both of two intertwined factual/Iega1 theories. The first theory seems. to be that racial vote dilution, in the White v. Register/Voting Rights Act constitutional and statutory senser IndY be found not only with respect to aggre- gations of black voters large enough to make up effective voting majorities in single-member districts, but with respect to smaller aggregations as well; and that dilution in that Sense now results from the state's plan with respect to those aggregations of black voters outside the remedially created single-member districts. The second tf,"oryr less clear, is apParently that equitable considerations may in any event require that a state redistricting plan adopted to remedy judicially found dilution by submergence (or fracturing) of effective voting majorities must not only remedy the specific violation found but also maximize (or at least not significantly diminish) the voting strength of those black voters outside remedially drawn -11 - ooo oO single-member districts; and that the state's ptan here fails in this respect. So far as we can tellr D€ither of these factual/Iegal theories has been definitively addressed though intimations may be found in extant racial vote dilution jurisprudence. Certainly neither is directly addressed in the text of amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, nor, except perhaps tangentially, in the Actrs legislative history. Because in the two respects now specifically challenged the staters plan might be thought questionable under either or both of these theories, we think it necesspry to address them head-on. As to whether the general concept of racial vote dilution can properly be applied under any circumstances to smaller aggregations of black voters than those sufficient to make up effective single-member district voting majorities we reserve decision, but we think it at least doubtful. Because the basis for our doubt bears critically upon our consideration of the furt,her questions whether a staters j udicially ordered remedial plan must in any event maximize the voting strength of any such smaller aggregations within its general reachr w€ briefly outline the basis of our doubt. There is, first off, the fact that the principle cases authoritatively developing the vote dilution concept have involved the impact of districting upon effective voting majorities. E, e.q., Roqers v. Lodqe, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); MobiIe v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); White v. Reqester, 4L2 l I Cl,-r. Ju-, /L,, r-1 -L2- , U.S. 755 (I973). Confined to such measura1tel/ aggregations, the concept has a principled basis which permits rational and consistent, albeit sometimes difficult, application; not so confined, it lacks any such basis. That is to sdy, at the effective voting majority level it is possible to say with substantial assurance that to submerge or fracture such an aggregation in a racialty polarized voting situation effectivery deprives it of the presumptive capabilit.y to elect, so1eIy by its group voting strength, representatives "of its choice." See Nevitt v. Sides, 57L F.2d 209, ZL6 (5th cir. r97B) (submergence); Kirksev v. Board of supervisors, s54 F.2d I39 (5th Cir. 1977) (fracturing). The raw power of such an aggregation "to elect" provides a crear measure of its voting strength, hence a fair and workabre standard by which to measure dilution of that strength. short of that rever, there is no such principled basis for gauging voting strength, hence dilution of that strength. Nothing but raw intuition could be drawn upon by courts to determine in the first place the size of those sm-a11er aggregations having sufficient group voting strength to be capable of dilution in any regarly 3 this is not to suggest that "effective voting majority" is an easily defined or measured voting entity, in our original opinionr w€ conceded that it is not. e_f_nqleE_v._ Edmisten, No. 81-803-CIV-5, slip op. at 24 n.21 (E.d.N.C. Jan. 27 , 1984) (three-judge court). But it does have a specific Iow-side rimit that provides a measurable reference point: no aggregation of less than 508 of an arears voting age popula- tion can possibly constitute an effective voting majority. The difficurty comes only in deciding how much larger than 50E must be the aggregation. See, id. -13- meaningful sense and, beyond that, to give some substantive content other than raw-power-to-elect to the concept as applied to such aggregations. We are doubtful that either the Supreme Court in developing the dilution concept in constitutionar voting rights ritigation, or the congress in embodying it in amended section 2 of the VoEing Rights Act intended an apprication open-ended as to voter group size. There must obviously be some size (as well as dispersion) limits on those aggregations of voters to whom the concept can properly be appried. we do not readily perceive the li.mit short of the effective voting majority level that can rationally be drawn and appl iea.L/ For that reason, were the present objections being made to an originar regisrative districting plan on the basis that it diluted the voting strength of such smarler aggregations of brack voters, we wourd be disposed to reject it on the basis that the concept could not properly be appried in that context. But here, of course, the challenge original plan buL to a remedial one which 1S has not to such an concededly done 4 though the constitutionality of amended section z isnot chalrenged in this action, it is nevertheless appropriate to observe that the rationality of its interpretation andapplication in this respect might determine its constitution- aIity. Under familiar principles of statutory construction, this militates against any construction of the statute thatwould allow open-ended application of the embodied dilution concept so far as voter group size is concerned. see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710-11 (L962). -14- all that may be done to remedy the viorations or iginarly found, the dilution of effective voting majority aggregations. The gist of the challenge is that once a vote dirution viora- tion has been judicially found, a regislative remediar pran must go beyond rectification of the specific violation found and maximize (or at leasE not intentionally minimize) that of residual aggregations of black voters as weII. I^Ie assume that in an appropriate case a court in assessing a legisrature's remediar plan designed to remedy section 2 dilution violations might properly invoke equitable considerations to reject a plan that did no more than provide the maximum possible number of "safe" black-majority, single- member districts in the rerevant area. see I{hitecomb v. chavis, 403 u.s. l24t 151 (197r). But we take it that this does not require, nor permit, the rejection of a regisrative plan simply because the reviewing court would have adopted another thought to provide a better, more equitable overall remedy for the originally found raciar vote dirution. such a principre of judiciar deference crearly applies in respect of legislative reapportlo.,*"nt plans enacted to remedy constitu- tional viorations of one-person-one-vote principles, see white v. weisert 4L2 u.s. 783, 794-97 (L972). we see no reason why the same principre shourd not appry to regisrative prans enacted to remedy racial vote dilution found violative of amended section 2 of the voting Rights Act. rn the latter context, as in the former I d state Iegislature I s primary -15- jurisdicLion for legislative apportionment and redistricting must include the right, free of judicial rejection, to implement state policies that may fail to remedy to the fullest extent possible the voting r ights violations originally found, just so long as the remedial plan does not inflict ne$, violations of those rights. See White v. Weiser, 4L2 u.s. 783, 795 (1973) . Herer we are frank to say that were we exercising primary jurisdiction to remedy the specific violations originally found in the area of original House District 35, we might well have adopted a plan more comparable to that proposed by plain- tiffs than to that now submitted by the staLe. Seer.1g--, Chapman v. Irleier | 420 U. S. 1 (1975) ; Connor v. trlilliams , 404 U. S. 549 (197 2) i East Carroll Parish School Board v. [tarshall , 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976) . We may assume, -ry]c, thatr ds plaintiffs contend, the staters plan in this area probably represents no more than a grudging minimal response to the remedial necessities faced by the legislature. Certainly there is np manifestation in the plan itself of any affirmative effort to do more. We may also assumer EIS plaintiffs suggest, that the staters plan reflects a primary concern to protect incumbents that prevailed over any concern t,o enhance black voting strength outside the safe single- member districts or to insure compactness and cohesion in drawing district lines. -16- Be al1 that as it hoy, we cannot say of the challenged portions of the state's plan that they so seriously and demon- strably impinge upon the voting strength of the residual aggregations of black voters in the affected areas that the plan violates anew the voting rights of those persons. The protection of incumbents, even though demonstrably a more dominant concern in the minds of the enactors of the staters pran than enhancing residuar brack voter strength, does not per se require judiciar rejection of the state pran. See Weiser, 4L2 U.S. at 797. While the district li.nes were obviously not drawn to insure maximum compactness and cohesion of the new districts in the remedial plan, their configurations do not approach the obvious gerrymandering that might raise constitutionar ques- tions on that score arone. see Gomitrion v. LiqhtfooL | 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Karcher v. Daqqett, 51 U.S.L.W. 4853, 4B6O (U. S. June 22, 1983) (Stevens , J. , concurring) . This reaves the question whether the staters failure to create in the disputed area a single-member district with a substantial brack popuration minority (as opposed to spreading the residual black populations in increments not greater than 308 among a number of singre-member districts) requires or jusLifies disapproval of the pran. The question, in other words, is whether equitabre considerations require that, having been found in violation of the Voting Rights Act by dilution of brack voting strength through the submergence of -t7 - effective black voting majorities, the state must be held not only to remedying that specific violation but also to maximizLng in this way the voting strength of these residual aggregations of black voters. We can assume, for present purposes, that even if the vote dirution concept could not properly be applied to such smarler aggregations of voters in an originar chaltenge to legislative districtingr €guitable considerations might never- theless sometimes justify a court's requiring a state to enhance the voting strength of such a residual aggregation beyond that proposed in its. remediar plan. But we are satis- fied that this courd only be proper where, arr other considerations aside, a court could determine with assurance that its imposed plan would indeed significantly enhance Lhe voting strength of the residuar group above that resurting from the staters pran. only on the basis of that sort of assurance could a court be justified in displacing state poricies in order to vindicate federarly secured voting rights. There may.be sucrr situations, but we cannot with sufficient assurance find it, here. As earrier noted, gauging the voting strength of less- than-majority popuration groups either absorutery or rerativery is a difficult and uncertain business at best. vlhen a raciar grouprs numbers are not sufficient to give it the raw power as a matter of sheer maLhematics to win erections, its "voting strength" as otherwise manifested is .,4 l{" \-- -18- dependent on such a variety of factors as to defy fair and conf ident measurement. concededry, numbers may still be the prime voting strength factor even with respect to population minorities. Generarry it can be assumed that a cohesive 45t popuration minority in district x wirr have greater voting strength than wourd a cohesive 30? popuration minority in district y. But this, of course, is not necessariry true. rt depends, among other things, upon the phirosohical-politicar make-up of the popuration majorities in the districts. Dependent upon that factor arone, the 30s popu.ration minority may in fact have greater voting strength than does the 459. such non-mathema- tical factors are quintessentially political in nature, the kind whose assessment is most treacherous for courts of Iaw and most appropriate for the regisrative process. see [Iobile v. Bolden, 445 u.s. 55, 93 & n.15 (1990) (stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Here, for exampler w€ might sense intuitivery that the overall voting strength of the residual brack voter group in former House District 36 would be enhanced by districting that packed one district to near-majority black popuration status while cutting back still further the black minorities in the other five white-majority districts under both praintiff and state prans. But this would only be intuition, and dubious intuition at that. -19- In fact r we have no idea of the practical interaction between the demonstrably severe racial polarization in voEing patterns in the affected areas and a near-majority status for the brack minority in such a "packed" district. rntuitivery, again, we might suspect, if anything, a hardening of the arready severe polarization patterns in such a now more seriousry "threatenedu district. Nor do we have any idea of the philosophical-poriticar compositions of the white majori- ties in the various white-majority districts as proposed by praintiffs, a factor that obviously bears criticarly upon the potential for brack-white .political alliances, hence black voting strength, in those districts. c!. upham v. seamon, 456 u.s. 37 (1982). The required assurance cannot be supplied by the fact that the directry affected groups of brack voters, acting through their class action representatives, seek imposition of the plaintiffsr packed district pIan. rn our original opinion r're pointed out that such a f ormally expressed group j udgment in a crass action si:fficed as answer to a state's defense of the fracturing of an effective brack voting majority into two substantial black population minor ity districts. In that cont,ext the staters defense of its districting pran was that fracturing in that way did not so assuredly diminish overall black voting strength beyond that which wourd have been possessed by one majority black district and one ineffectual minority brack district as to justify a finding of vote -20- dilution. There, however, it was possible to sdy, as it is not here r that the fracturing would assuredly deny to one element within the group the rah, power, potentiarly possessed, to elect a representative of its choice. See Ginqles v. Edmisten, No. B1-803-CIV-5, slip op. at 66 n.33 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 1984). Herer we have no independent assurance that the proferred compromise of interests within the residual group of black voters would significantly enhance the group's voting strength above that resurting from the state pran. rmposition of the proferred plan might therefo.re be a vain exercise, and a court exercising equity powers shourd no more engage in potentially vain exercises in this context than others. Obviously the plaintiff class may not simply be given effective veto power over any remedial plan submittedr ES wourd be done were we simply to defer to its group judgment on the matter at issue. IV For the reasons-expressed, we reject praintiffs' specific objections to the "a"4"'= remedial prun as it affects the area included within former HD 36, and upon general consideration of the plan as it affects that and aII other areas not covered by section 5 of the voting Rights Act, we approve the pran insofar as it creates new SD's 22, 33, 34 , 35 (Mecklenburg/Cabarrus); new HDrs 23, 68, 59 (Durham); new HD,s 2Lr 61, 62,63,64,65 (Wake); new HDrs 36r 54r 55r 56, 57, -2L- 58, 59 , 60 (Mecklenburg) ; and new HD's 39 , 66 , and 67 (Forsyth); and insofar as it re-schedules dates for primary elections. An appropriate order will be entered. 22 t- UNITED STATES EASTERN DISTRICT RALEIGH DISTRICT COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION f: B':E N.I l-. Iilnr: IWE L.rt i ; 0 i!x.+ ?3ril :'( .i. PEt-1 LiOi'iARD, CLERiI U. S. DiSTR|CT COUPI' E. I.'IST. NO. CAR RALPH GINGLEST €t aI. Plaintiffs, vs. RUEUS L. EDMISTENT et aI. ) ) ) ) ) ) No.81-803-CIV-5 Defendants. ORDER This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to approve the legislative redistricting pran adopted by the General Assembry of North carolina on March g, 19g4, responsive to this courtr s order of January 19, 19g4, and plaintiffsr response to the motion; upon considerution of the motion papers and the record, and in accordance with the supprementar opinion of the court filed this day, it is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that: 1. The regislative redistricting plan submitted by defendants on March L2, 1984, for consideration by this court is APPROVED insofar as it redistricts former House Districts 2Lr 23r 36 and 39 by chap.6t House Bill 1, Extra session 1984; insofar as it redistricts former senate District 22 by ..1 Chap.4, Senate Bill 2, Extra Session 1984; and insofar as it provides for the holding of primary elections in the resulting districts by Chap. 2, House Bill 3, Extra Session 1984. 2. The injunction entered by this court in its order of January 19, 1984, is DrssoLvED insofar as it applied to the conduct of elections within the various districts resulting from those portions of the redistricting plan approved in paragraph 1 of this order, vLz:. senate Districts 22, 33, 34 and 35 (tvlecklenburg and cabarrus counties) ; House Distr icts 36, 54, 55, 56 , 57 , 58, 59 and G0 (Mecklenburg County) ; House Districts 21, 6I, 62, 63,. 64 and 65 (Wake County); House Districts 39, 66 and 67 (part of Forsyth county) ; House Districts 23, 68 and 69 (Durham County) . 3. Jurisdiction is retained in this court for such further proceedings as may be required. With the concurrence of Judge Britt and Judge Dupree. .r Dic lI ips Circuit J dge t certifY the foregoing to be a tru' 366 66;1r:cl coPY of the original' J. Rich Leonard, Clerk tJnitetl Stlt':s District Court Easisrn District of North Carolina Uni ted For the SON Ph States Court evI}$u-,--tNlSruJ DePutY Clerk 2- U.S. Depertnent of Justice CivilRights Dvision Oflicc of the Assistant Attorney Gcneral Uathingon, D.C.20530 2t apR n84 Kathleen Heenan McGuan, Esg. The Farragur Building, suite 1020 900 Seventeenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Dear Ms. McGuan: This refers to the primary election schedules (House Bill 3, Chapter 2 (1984)) and the reaPportionment of Senate Districts 1, 2,6,9,10, 11, and 14 (Senate Bill 1, Chapter 5 (1984)), for the State of North Carolina, submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to Sectlon 5 of the Votlng Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. L973c. We recelved PortLons of your initial submission on March 12 and 29, 1984. Ttre Attorney General does not lnterpose any objections to the changes i-n question. However, rre feel a resPonslbtlity to point ouE that Sectl-on 5 of the Votlng Rtghts-Act e_xpressly provides that the fallure of the Attorney General -to object does not bar any subsequent Judicial actlon to enJoin the enforcement of such changes. In additlonr 8s authorized by Section 5, the Attorney GeneraL reaervea the right to reexamine this submission tf additlonal lnformation that would otherwl-se require an objection comes to hLs attentlon drrrlng the remalnder of -the sixty-day review period. See the Procedures for the Administration bt Section 5 (28 C.F.R. 5L.42 and 51.48). Sections 10, 11, L2, and 13 of House Bill 3, Chapter 2, are viewed as enabllng legislation. Ttrerefore, 1oca1 Jurisdic- tions are not relieved of-their responsiblllty to seek preclear- ance, pursuant to the requirements of Section 5, of any_changes affecting votlng (e.g., iealignnent of precl-ncts, use of paper ballotsr-etc.) inpT-mented as a result of the provlsions of House Bil l 3 . Seb also 28 C. F.R. 51 .14. Wm. Bradford Reynolds Asslstant Attorney General Civtl Rights Dl-vision Sl-ncerel,y, U.S. Departrrent of Justice IIBR: SSC: pdk DJ 165-012-3 Washington, D.C. 20530 I r unv €84 Mr. J. Rlch Leonard Clerk, UnLted States Dlstrlct Court Eastern District of North Carollna P.O. Box 25670 Ralelgh, North Carollna 276LL Re: Ginsles v. Ednieten, No. 81-83-CIV-5 G;5;N-.c. ffi 1e84) Dear Mr. Leonard: It ls our understandlng that the court desLres to be kept aavtsed as to the status of the eubnlsslon of the redis- tricttng of North Carollna Senate Dlstrlcts-1, 21 6t-9, 10, 11, ;;J-i4 Is.r,rt. 8111 1, Chapter 5-(l?qt)) and House Dlstricts 8 and 70 (House Bill 2, Chapter 1 (1984)) submltted Pursuant to Section-5 of the Voting Righte Act. -.In this regard, Y€ have enclosed a copy of the-AprlL 27 , 1981 letter lnterposLng no -ouj."itoo to's6nate Dlstilcte 1, 2, 6, 9r- 10, 11r-and 14 and a cofly of the May 11, 1984, letter fgquestlng more lnformatlon coirlernlng Hoube Dlstrlcte 8 and 70. Slncerely, tlm. Bradford Reynolde Assistant AttorneY General Clvl1 Rlghts Dlvl-elon Gerald l{. J ihlef, Votlng cc (w/enclosr:res): alL counsel of record oo