Supplemental Opinion

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UNITED STATES
EASTERN DISTRICT

RALEIGH

DISTRICT COURT
OF NORTH CAROLINA
DIVISION

rE
IF
i}la

FII EUUE

j' t' ", ., L' lyC,.:

RALPH GINGLES, €t aI.

Plaintiffs,
vs.

RUFUS L. EDIVIISTENT €t aI.

J. RICH LICNARD. CLSRK
U. S. DiSTFICT COURT

E. DIST. NO. CAR.

No.81-803-CrV-5

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION

Defendants.

Before PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, BRITT, Chief District Judge,and DUPREE, Senior District Judge.

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge:

on January 27, 1984, this court enjoined certain elec-
tions under the Lgg2 legisrative redistricting plan for erec-
tion of members of the North carolina senate and House of
Representatives, declaring the plan viorative of section 2 of
the Voting Rights Ac-t of igeS, 42 U.S.C. S I973. Specifical-
ly, the court herd thaL, in five House districts and in two

senate distr icts, the pran diruted the voting strength of
brack citizens either by submerging or by fracturing concen-
trations of black voters sufficient in numbers and contiguity
to constitute effective voting majorities in appropriately
drawn districts. The courtrs order enjoined defendants from
holding any legislative elections that would affect black

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registered voters in the charlenged districts and arro.:ed the

General Assembly until March 15, 1984, to submit for the

courtrs approvar a dury-enacted redistricting plan remedying

the specific violations found.

on March 8, 1984, the Generar Assembly responded to the

court's order by enacting, in the form of six birrsT Er redis-
tricting plan drawing new district lines affecting each of the

originarly-charrenged districts and, by motion on March 12,
1984, submitted this pran to the court for approvar. contem-

Poraneously, the state submitted the plan for consideration by

the Attorney Generar of !h" united states insofar as it
affected voters in areas of the state covered by S 5 of the

Voting Rights Act.

on March 15, 1984, the praintiffs submitted a preriminary

Response objecting to the pran and proposing certain modifica-
tions to the pran's redistricting of the areas covered by

former House Districts 8 and 36. concurrentry, the praintiffs
moved the court for reave to take depositions of the state
legislators and Iegislative staff members directly involved in
developing the enacted pran, and requested an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of the remedial adequacy of the staters
proposed pIan. on March 19, 1984r w€ denied the plaintiffs'
motion and their request for'a hearing, determining to decide
the question of legisrative compliance on the record as then

made.

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The plan presented to the court

the following material respects the

the districts challenged at trial:
1. Former House District No. 8.

HD8
HD 70

HD 23
HD 68
HD 69

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for approval changes

district lines in aI1

29 .6*
69.1r

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of

Former House District No. I was a four-member district
compr ised of all of wilson, Edgecombe and Nash counties.
Bracks comprised 39.5t of its totar population. The plan

divides this area into House District No. 7o and House

District No. 8. oistrict No. 7o runs roughly north-south
through the center of the former district, while District No.

8 occupies the barance of the three-county area, encrosing

District 70 on three sides. Brack citizens in Districts 7o

and B comprise the forrowing percentages of the total popula-

t ions :

2. Former House oistrict 23

Former House District- No. 23 was a three-member district
containing arl of Dlrrham county. Bracks comprised 36.38 of
its totar popuration. The pran divides Durham county into
three single-member districts having the folrowing black

citizen population percentages:

67 .22
31.09
IO.9B

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3. Former House District 21.

Former House District 2l

containing all of Wake Count.y.

total population. The plan

single-member districts with
population percentages :

HD 2L
HD 6I
HD 62
HD 63
HD 64
HD 65

HD 36
HD 54
HD 55
HD 55
HD 57
HD.58
HD 59
HD 60

was a six-member district
Blacks comprised 2L.Bt of its
divides the county into six
the following black citizen

63.48
6.58

21.38
9.5r

I2.1r
18 .13

4.58
16.9r
12. 18
18.09
2.LZ

28.2*
63.1r
66.38

registered

4. lqrlner House District No. 36.

Former House District 3G was an eight-member district
comprised of all of Mecklenburg county. Blacks comprised

26.5t of its total population. The plan divides this area

into eight single-member districts with the following black

citizen population percentages:

Bracks citizens constitute 57.42 and 69.59 of the

voters in Districts 59 and 60 respectively.
5. Former House District 39.

Former House District 39 rrras a five-member district
containing almost arl of Eorsyth county. Bracks comprised

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25.18 of its totar population. The plan divid6s th-.s area

between House Districts 66 and 67, both single-member

districts, and House oistrict 39, a three-member district.
These districts have the folrowing black citizen popuration
percentages 3

HD 39 4.4*
HD 66 56.1r
HD 67 55.48

Black citizens comprise 55.4t and 53.89 of the registered
voters of HD 66 and 67 respectively.

6. Former Senate District 22.

Former senate District 22 was a four-member district
comprised of all of Mecklenburg and Cabarrus Counties. Blacks

comprised 24.38 of its totar population. The plan divides
this area into four single-member districts having the

following black citizen population percentages:

SD 22
SD 33
sD 34
SD 35

11. IT
66.08
14.48
5.88

62.58 of the registered voters in SD 33 are b1ack.

7. Former Senate District 2.

Former senate District z I a singre-member distr ict,
occupied a large area in the northeast section of the state.
Bracks comprised 55.It of its total popuration and 46.22 of
its registered voters. By redrawing the district lines of
former Senate Districts 1r 2,6,9, I0r ll and L4, the plan

established new Senate oistrict 2 in which blacks constitute
60.7 I of the total population.

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wit,h the matter now before us on defendants' moL^on and

plaintiffsr responser w€ have det.ermined to decide the issue

of the submitted pran's remediar adequacy to the extent we may

at this time. our decision may only run to those aspects of
the plan that do not affect areas of the state cove.red by

section 5 of the voting Rights Act, because at this time the
pran is sti11 under consideration, insofar as it affects
covered areas, by the Attorney General of the united states.
rn that situation, our power is so rimited. see McDanier v.

Sanchev, 452 U.S. 130 (198I).

While we are somewhat reluctant to fragment our consider-
ation and decision on the adequacy of the submitted plan we

believe that in the interest of arl concerned this is the

proper course. Our reasons, briefly put, are as follows:
Among the features of the legisrative pran submitted to

this court is a revised schedure for the conduct of primary

erections which provides alternative dates depending upon the

date uPon which approval for holding elections in particular
districts may be rec-eived'from "a court of competent jurisdic-
tion." The first =u"r, date is June 5, 1984, which is to be

used if court approval is received by 5:00 p.m. on April 20,

1984. The next date is Jury L7,1984, which is to be used if
approvar is received after Aprir 2L but before 5:00 p.m. on

I"tay L7, 1984.

obviousry, the interests of arl parties and of the pubric
wirr be best served by arrowing primary elections to be herd

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at the earliest practicable dates consistent wi'_h the

plaintiffsr rights as established in this action. The alter-
native dates provided in the regisrative pran are not

challenged for fairness by the praintiffs, and we find them

valid features of the general remedial pIan.

No reason appears why approvar should not now be given to
hold elections in accordance with the state I s schedule in
those districts to which our power of approvar presently
extends and as to which we find approvar warranted. rt is not
possible at this time to know when preclearance or objection
by the Attorney General with respect to covered areas within
the plan wirl be forthcoming. To arlow erections to proceed

at the earriest of the arternative dates provided in the

staters planr w€ must act at this time.

For the foregoing reasons, and for reasons that forlow,
we now determine that the legislative plan under submission

adequately remedies the viorations found by this court in
respect of all t,hose areas of the state not covered by section
5, and we therefore approve the plan to that extent. Because

of the specific oui""tion= raised by praintiffs to some

features of the planr w€ explain the basis for the approval we

g ive.

of the new districts in this pran, HD I s g and 7o

(formerly HD 8) and sD 2 (reconstituted from portions of
former sDrs 1, 21 6r 9, r0, 1l and 14) lie within areas of the

state covered by S 5 of the voting Rights Act. our ensuing

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discussion and approval therefore does not run to any of those

districts, nor Eo the specific objections of plaintiffs to any

of them.

II
Arthough they do not concede the plan's varidity in other

respects, the praintiffs have objected specificalry to the

proposed pran's redistricting of the area covered by former

House District 35, that is, Ehe Mecklenburg district. Their
contention, briefry summarized, is that in respect of that
area the defendants have faired to meet their burden of
showing that the pran has neither the purpose nor the effect
of diluting black minority voting strength, and that it there-
fore adequately remedies the S 2 violations found.

rn support of this contention, praintiffs point to the

following characteristics of the pran in that area. First,
although containing the maximum possible number of districts
in which blacks could constitute an effective voting majority,
the plan fractures substantial black population concentrations
which, though insufficient in numbers and contiguity to con-

stitute another voting majority, might nonetheless exercise
considerable voting porver as a substantial voting minority in
one at least of appropriately constructed singre-member

districts. Second, the plan contains districts so irregularly
shaped that voters assertedly wirr not be abre to learn in
which district they live so as to be abre to use their votes

effectively. According to plaintiffs, since defendants can

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offer no justifying policy for these irregularities, apart

from the desire to protect incumbents, they have not met their
burden of showing that the plan is free from any discrimina-
tory purpose or effect, and is thus adequate fully to remedy

the violations earlier found.

In part to buttress this argument, plaintiffs have

submitted their own proposed redistricting pran for this area.

Their plan, in cont.rast to that of the defendants, divides
Meckrenburg county into eight single-member districts having

the following black citizen population percentages:

PLaint i f fs
Proposed House District

District 36
District 54
Distr ict 55
District 55
District 57
District 58
District 59
District 60

I Black
@

65.6r
44.7*
11.68
4.72
I.58
4.39

L4.22

This alternative to the state I s plan has two salient
characteristics. First, it contains districts whichr oD the

who1e, are significantly more regurar in shape than are their
counterparts in the'state's pIan. second, the plaintiffs'
plan, drthough containing the same number of singre-member

districts in which black citizens comprise effective voting

majorities, also contains one other singre-member district in
which the brack population approaches, but does not reach, a

major i:cy.f/ By contrast, in none of the white-majority
districts under the state's pran does brack popuration

percentage exceed 30*.U

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III
we conclude that plaintiffs' objections neither require

nor justify our refusal to approve, to the extent noted, the

staters plan as submittedr and that on the record before us no

other basis appears for refusing that approval.

we start by observing of the staters plan that it indis-
putably remedies each of the specific violations found in the

originarly chalrenged plan, including those in the areas to
which specific objection is now made by praintiffs. That is
to sdy, the plan now submitted does not, as did Lhe originally
challenged pran, dilutel . €ither by "submergence" or by

"fracturer" any concentration of brack voters sufficient in
numbers and contiguit,y to constitute an effective voting
majority in an otherwise constitutionally constructed single-
member district. I{e do not understand plaintiffs to challenge

this proposition. we therefore concrude initiarly that in
exercise of its primary jurisdiction responsive to this
courtrs order, the state has now effectively remedied the

racial vote dirution uiorution= originally charged by

1 This "packed" district, No. 55, would contain a blackpopulation of 44.7*.
2 under the sLaters pran brack citizens comprise zg.2z ofthe population in HD 58, the rargest black concentrationoutside the safe districts.
of courser "packing" one additionar district to achievesubstantial black minorities in the challenged area would beat the expense of the brack minorities in the other white-majority districts.

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plaintiffs and found by this court in respect of all areas not

covered by section 5.

plaintiffsr present challenge to the remedial planr ds we

understand it, focuses on that plan's "reSuItn upon the voting

strength of those registered black voters who, Et least in one

of the originally challenged redistricting areas, are left out

of (or left over from) the remedially created black majority

single-member districts. As we understand plaintiffs' objec-

tions, they must be based upon either or both of two

intertwined factual/Iega1 theories.

The first theory seems. to be that racial vote dilution,

in the White v. Register/Voting Rights Act constitutional and

statutory senser IndY be found not only with respect to aggre-

gations of black voters large enough to make up effective

voting majorities in single-member districts, but with respect

to smaller aggregations as well; and that dilution in that

Sense now results from the state's plan with respect to those

aggregations of black voters outside the remedially created

single-member districts.

The second tf,"oryr less clear, is apParently that

equitable considerations may in any event require that a state

redistricting plan adopted to remedy judicially found dilution

by submergence (or fracturing) of effective voting majorities

must not only remedy the specific violation found but also

maximize (or at least not significantly diminish) the voting

strength of those black voters outside remedially drawn

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single-member districts; and that the state's ptan here fails
in this respect.

So far as we can tellr D€ither of these factual/Iegal
theories has been definitively addressed though intimations

may be found in extant racial vote dilution jurisprudence.

Certainly neither is directly addressed in the text of amended

section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, nor, except perhaps

tangentially, in the Actrs legislative history. Because in

the two respects now specifically challenged the staters plan

might be thought questionable under either or both of these

theories, we think it necesspry to address them head-on.

As to whether the general concept of racial vote dilution
can properly be applied under any circumstances to smaller

aggregations of black voters than those sufficient to make up

effective single-member district voting majorities we reserve

decision, but we think it at least doubtful. Because the

basis for our doubt bears critically upon our consideration of

the furt,her questions whether a staters j udicially ordered

remedial plan must in any event maximize the voting strength

of any such smaller aggregations within its general reachr w€

briefly outline the basis of our doubt.

There is, first off, the fact that the principle cases

authoritatively developing the vote dilution concept have

involved the impact of districting upon effective voting

majorities. E, e.q., Roqers v. Lodqe, 458 U.S. 613 (1982);

MobiIe v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); White v. Reqester, 4L2

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,

U.S. 755 (I973). Confined to such measura1tel/ aggregations,

the concept has a principled basis which permits rational and

consistent, albeit sometimes difficult, application; not so

confined, it lacks any such basis. That is to sdy, at the

effective voting majority level it is possible to say with
substantial assurance that to submerge or fracture such an

aggregation in a racialty polarized voting situation
effectivery deprives it of the presumptive capabilit.y to
elect, so1eIy by its group voting strength, representatives

"of its choice." See Nevitt v. Sides, 57L F.2d 209, ZL6 (5th

cir. r97B) (submergence); Kirksev v. Board of supervisors, s54

F.2d I39 (5th Cir. 1977) (fracturing). The raw power of such

an aggregation "to elect" provides a crear measure of its
voting strength, hence a fair and workabre standard by which

to measure dilution of that strength. short of that rever,
there is no such principled basis for gauging voting strength,
hence dilution of that strength. Nothing but raw intuition
could be drawn upon by courts to determine in the first place

the size of those sm-a11er aggregations having sufficient group

voting strength to be capable of dilution in any regarly

3 this is not to suggest that "effective voting majority"
is an easily defined or measured voting entity, in our
original opinionr w€ conceded that it is not. e_f_nqleE_v._
Edmisten, No. 81-803-CIV-5, slip op. at 24 n.21 (E.d.N.C. Jan.
27 , 1984) (three-judge court). But it does have a specific
Iow-side rimit that provides a measurable reference point: no
aggregation of less than 508 of an arears voting age popula-
tion can possibly constitute an effective voting majority.
The difficurty comes only in deciding how much larger than 50E
must be the aggregation. See, id.

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meaningful sense and, beyond that, to give some substantive

content other than raw-power-to-elect to the concept as

applied to such aggregations.

We are doubtful that either the Supreme Court in
developing the dilution concept in constitutionar voting
rights ritigation, or the congress in embodying it in amended

section 2 of the VoEing Rights Act intended an apprication
open-ended as to voter group size. There must obviously be

some size (as well as dispersion) limits on those aggregations

of voters to whom the concept can properly be appried. we do

not readily perceive the li.mit short of the effective voting
majority level that can rationally be drawn and appl iea.L/

For that reason, were the present objections being made

to an originar regisrative districting plan on the basis that
it diluted the voting strength of such smarler aggregations of
brack voters, we wourd be disposed to reject it on the basis
that the concept could not properly be appried in that
context.

But here, of course, the challenge

original plan buL to a remedial one which

1S

has

not to such an

concededly done

4 though the constitutionality of amended section z isnot chalrenged in this action, it is nevertheless appropriate
to observe that the rationality of its interpretation andapplication in this respect might determine its constitution-
aIity. Under familiar principles of statutory construction,
this militates against any construction of the statute thatwould allow open-ended application of the embodied dilution
concept so far as voter group size is concerned. see Lynch v.
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710-11 (L962).

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all that may be done to remedy the viorations or iginarly
found, the dilution of effective voting majority aggregations.

The gist of the challenge is that once a vote dirution viora-
tion has been judicially found, a regislative remediar pran

must go beyond rectification of the specific violation found

and maximize (or at leasE not intentionally minimize) that of
residual aggregations of black voters as weII.

I^Ie assume that in an appropriate case a court in
assessing a legisrature's remediar plan designed to remedy

section 2 dilution violations might properly invoke equitable
considerations to reject a plan that did no more than provide

the maximum possible number of "safe" black-majority, single-
member districts in the rerevant area. see I{hitecomb v.

chavis, 403 u.s. l24t 151 (197r). But we take it that this
does not require, nor permit, the rejection of a regisrative
plan simply because the reviewing court would have adopted

another thought to provide a better, more equitable overall
remedy for the originally found raciar vote dirution. such a

principre of judiciar deference crearly applies in respect of

legislative reapportlo.,*"nt plans enacted to remedy constitu-
tional viorations of one-person-one-vote principles, see white
v. weisert 4L2 u.s. 783, 794-97 (L972). we see no reason why

the same principre shourd not appry to regisrative prans

enacted to remedy racial vote dilution found violative of
amended section 2 of the voting Rights Act. rn the latter
context, as in the former I d state Iegislature I s primary

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jurisdicLion for legislative apportionment and redistricting

must include the right, free of judicial rejection, to

implement state policies that may fail to remedy to the

fullest extent possible the voting r ights violations

originally found, just so long as the remedial plan does not

inflict ne$, violations of those rights. See White v. Weiser,

4L2 u.s. 783, 795 (1973) .

Herer we are frank to say that were we exercising primary

jurisdiction to remedy the specific violations originally

found in the area of original House District 35, we might well

have adopted a plan more comparable to that proposed by plain-

tiffs than to that now submitted by the staLe. Seer.1g--,

Chapman v. Irleier | 420 U. S. 1 (1975) ; Connor v. trlilliams , 404

U. S. 549 (197 2) i East Carroll Parish School Board v.

[tarshall , 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976) . We may assume, -ry]c,
thatr ds plaintiffs contend, the staters plan in this area

probably represents no more than a grudging minimal response

to the remedial necessities faced by the legislature.

Certainly there is np manifestation in the plan itself of any

affirmative effort to do more. We may also assumer EIS

plaintiffs suggest, that the staters plan reflects a primary

concern to protect incumbents that prevailed over any concern

t,o enhance black voting strength outside the safe single-

member districts or to insure compactness and cohesion in

drawing district lines.

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Be al1 that as it hoy, we cannot say of the challenged

portions of the state's plan that they so seriously and demon-

strably impinge upon the voting strength of the residual

aggregations of black voters in the affected areas that the

plan violates anew the voting rights of those persons.

The protection of incumbents, even though demonstrably a

more dominant concern in the minds of the enactors of the

staters pran than enhancing residuar brack voter strength,
does not per se require judiciar rejection of the state pran.

See Weiser, 4L2 U.S. at 797.

While the district li.nes were obviously not drawn to
insure maximum compactness and cohesion of the new districts
in the remedial plan, their configurations do not approach the

obvious gerrymandering that might raise constitutionar ques-

tions on that score arone. see Gomitrion v. LiqhtfooL | 364

U.S. 339 (1960); Karcher v. Daqqett, 51 U.S.L.W. 4853, 4B6O

(U. S. June 22, 1983) (Stevens , J. , concurring) .

This reaves the question whether the staters failure to

create in the disputed area a single-member district with a

substantial brack popuration minority (as opposed to spreading

the residual black populations in increments not greater than

308 among a number of singre-member districts) requires or

jusLifies disapproval of the pran. The question, in other

words, is whether equitabre considerations require that,
having been found in violation of the Voting Rights Act by

dilution of brack voting strength through the submergence of

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effective black voting majorities, the state must be held not

only to remedying that specific violation but also to

maximizLng in this way the voting strength of these residual
aggregations of black voters.

We can assume, for present purposes, that even if the

vote dirution concept could not properly be applied to such

smarler aggregations of voters in an originar chaltenge to
legislative districtingr €guitable considerations might never-

theless sometimes justify a court's requiring a state to
enhance the voting strength of such a residual aggregation

beyond that proposed in its. remediar plan. But we are satis-
fied that this courd only be proper where, arr other

considerations aside, a court could determine with assurance

that its imposed plan would indeed significantly enhance Lhe

voting strength of the residuar group above that resurting
from the staters pran. only on the basis of that sort of
assurance could a court be justified in displacing state
poricies in order to vindicate federarly secured voting
rights. There may.be sucrr situations, but we cannot with
sufficient assurance find it, here.

As earrier noted, gauging the voting strength of less-
than-majority popuration groups either absorutery or

rerativery is a difficult and uncertain business at best.

vlhen a raciar grouprs numbers are not sufficient to give it
the raw power as a matter of sheer maLhematics to win

erections, its "voting strength" as otherwise manifested is

.,4

l{"
\--

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dependent on such a variety of factors as to defy fair and

conf ident measurement.

concededry, numbers may still be the prime voting
strength factor even with respect to population minorities.
Generarry it can be assumed that a cohesive 45t popuration
minority in district x wirr have greater voting strength than

wourd a cohesive 30? popuration minority in district y. But

this, of course, is not necessariry true. rt depends, among

other things, upon the phirosohical-politicar make-up of the
popuration majorities in the districts. Dependent upon that
factor arone, the 30s popu.ration minority may in fact have

greater voting strength than does the 459. such non-mathema-

tical factors are quintessentially political in nature, the
kind whose assessment is most treacherous for courts of Iaw

and most appropriate for the regisrative process. see [Iobile
v. Bolden, 445 u.s. 55, 93 & n.15 (1990) (stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).

Here, for exampler w€ might sense intuitivery that the

overall voting strength of the residual brack voter group in
former House District 36 would be enhanced by districting that
packed one district to near-majority black popuration status
while cutting back still further the black minorities in the
other five white-majority districts under both praintiff and

state prans. But this would only be intuition, and dubious

intuition at that.

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In fact r we have no idea of the practical interaction
between the demonstrably severe racial polarization in voEing

patterns in the affected areas and a near-majority status for
the brack minority in such a "packed" district. rntuitivery,
again, we might suspect, if anything, a hardening of the

arready severe polarization patterns in such a now more

seriousry "threatenedu district. Nor do we have any idea of
the philosophical-poriticar compositions of the white majori-
ties in the various white-majority districts as proposed by

praintiffs, a factor that obviously bears criticarly upon the

potential for brack-white .political alliances, hence black

voting strength, in those districts. c!. upham v. seamon, 456

u.s. 37 (1982).

The required assurance cannot be supplied by the fact
that the directry affected groups of brack voters, acting

through their class action representatives, seek imposition of
the plaintiffsr packed district pIan. rn our original opinion
r're pointed out that such a f ormally expressed group j udgment

in a crass action si:fficed as answer to a state's defense of
the fracturing of an effective brack voting majority into two

substantial black population minor ity districts. In that
cont,ext the staters defense of its districting pran was that
fracturing in that way did not so assuredly diminish overall
black voting strength beyond that which wourd have been

possessed by one majority black district and one ineffectual
minority brack district as to justify a finding of vote

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dilution. There, however, it was possible to sdy, as it is
not here r that the fracturing would assuredly deny to one

element within the group the rah, power, potentiarly possessed,

to elect a representative of its choice. See Ginqles v.

Edmisten, No. B1-803-CIV-5, slip op. at 66 n.33 (E.D.N.C.

Jan. 27, 1984).

Herer we have no independent assurance that the proferred

compromise of interests within the residual group of black

voters would significantly enhance the group's voting strength
above that resurting from the state pran. rmposition of the

proferred plan might therefo.re be a vain exercise, and a court

exercising equity powers shourd no more engage in potentially
vain exercises in this context than others.

Obviously the plaintiff class may not simply be given

effective veto power over any remedial plan submittedr ES

wourd be done were we simply to defer to its group judgment on

the matter at issue.

IV

For the reasons-expressed, we reject praintiffs' specific
objections to the 

"a"4"'= remedial prun as it affects the area

included within former HD 36, and upon general consideration
of the plan as it affects that and aII other areas not covered

by section 5 of the voting Rights Act, we approve the pran

insofar as it creates new SD's 22, 33, 34 , 35

(Mecklenburg/Cabarrus); new HDrs 23, 68, 59 (Durham); new HD,s

2Lr 61, 62,63,64,65 (Wake); new HDrs 36r 54r 55r 56, 57,

-2L-



58, 59 , 60 (Mecklenburg) ; and new HD's 39 , 66 , and 67

(Forsyth); and insofar as it re-schedules dates for primary

elections.

An appropriate order will be entered.

22



t-

UNITED STATES
EASTERN DISTRICT

RALEIGH

DISTRICT COURT
OF NORTH CAROLINA
DIVISION

f: B':E N.I l-. Iilnr: IWE L.rt

i ; 0 i!x.+

?3ril
:'(

.i. PEt-1 LiOi'iARD, CLERiI
U. S. DiSTR|CT COUPI'

E. I.'IST. NO. CAR
RALPH GINGLEST €t aI.

Plaintiffs,
vs.

RUEUS L. EDMISTENT et aI.

)
)

)
)
)
) No.81-803-CIV-5

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to
approve the legislative redistricting pran adopted by the
General Assembry of North carolina on March g, 19g4,

responsive to this courtr s order of January 19, 19g4, and

plaintiffsr response to the motion;

upon considerution of the motion papers and the record,
and in accordance with the supprementar opinion of the court
filed this day, it is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that:

1. The regislative redistricting plan submitted by

defendants on March L2, 1984, for consideration by this court
is APPROVED insofar as it redistricts former House Districts
2Lr 23r 36 and 39 by chap.6t House Bill 1, Extra session
1984; insofar as it redistricts former senate District 22 by



..1

Chap.4, Senate Bill 2, Extra Session 1984; and insofar as it
provides for the holding of primary elections in the resulting
districts by Chap. 2, House Bill 3, Extra Session 1984.

2. The injunction entered by this court in its order of
January 19, 1984, is DrssoLvED insofar as it applied to the

conduct of elections within the various districts resulting
from those portions of the redistricting plan approved in
paragraph 1 of this order, vLz:. senate Districts 22, 33, 34

and 35 (tvlecklenburg and cabarrus counties) ; House Distr icts
36, 54, 55, 56 , 57 , 58, 59 and G0 (Mecklenburg County) ; House

Districts 21, 6I, 62, 63,. 64 and 65 (Wake County); House

Districts 39, 66 and 67 (part of Forsyth county) ; House

Districts 23, 68 and 69 (Durham County) .

3. Jurisdiction is retained in this court for such

further proceedings as may be required.

With the concurrence of Judge Britt and Judge Dupree.

.r Dic lI ips
Circuit J dge

t certifY the foregoing to be a tru'
366 66;1r:cl coPY of the original'

J. Rich Leonard, Clerk

tJnitetl Stlt':s District Court

Easisrn District of North Carolina

Uni ted
For the

SON Ph
States
Court

evI}$u-,--tNlSruJ
DePutY Clerk 2-



U.S. Depertnent of Justice

CivilRights Dvision

Oflicc of the Assistant Attorney Gcneral Uathingon, D.C.20530

2t apR n84

Kathleen Heenan McGuan, Esg.
The Farragur Building, suite 1020
900 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Ms. McGuan:

This refers to the primary election schedules (House
Bill 3, Chapter 2 (1984)) and the reaPportionment of Senate
Districts 1, 2,6,9,10, 11, and 14 (Senate Bill 1, Chapter 5
(1984)), for the State of North Carolina, submitted to the
Attorney General pursuant to Sectlon 5 of the Votlng Rights
Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. L973c. We recelved PortLons
of your initial submission on March 12 and 29, 1984.

Ttre Attorney General does not lnterpose any objections
to the changes i-n question. However, rre feel a resPonslbtlity
to point ouE that Sectl-on 5 of the Votlng Rtghts-Act e_xpressly
provides that the fallure of the Attorney General -to object
does not bar any subsequent Judicial actlon to enJoin the
enforcement of such changes. In additlonr 8s authorized by
Section 5, the Attorney GeneraL reaervea the right to reexamine
this submission tf additlonal lnformation that would otherwl-se
require an objection comes to hLs attentlon drrrlng the remalnder
of -the sixty-day review period. See the Procedures for the
Administration bt Section 5 (28 C.F.R. 5L.42 and 51.48).

Sections 10, 11, L2, and 13 of House Bill 3, Chapter 2,
are viewed as enabllng legislation. Ttrerefore, 1oca1 Jurisdic-
tions are not relieved of-their responsiblllty to seek preclear-
ance, pursuant to the requirements of Section 5, of any_changes
affecting votlng (e.g., iealignnent of precl-ncts, use of paper
ballotsr-etc.) inpT-mented as a result of the provlsions of
House Bil l 3 . Seb also 28 C. F.R. 51 .14.

Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Asslstant Attorney General

Civtl Rights Dl-vision

Sl-ncerel,y,



U.S. Departrrent of Justice

IIBR: SSC: pdk
DJ 165-012-3

Washington, D.C. 20530

I r unv €84

Mr. J. Rlch Leonard
Clerk, UnLted States Dlstrlct Court
Eastern District of North Carollna
P.O. Box 25670
Ralelgh, North Carollna 276LL

Re: Ginsles v. Ednieten, No. 81-83-CIV-5
G;5;N-.c. ffi 1e84)

Dear Mr. Leonard:

It ls our understandlng that the court desLres to be
kept aavtsed as to the status of the eubnlsslon of the redis-
tricttng of North Carollna Senate Dlstrlcts-1, 21 6t-9, 10, 11,
;;J-i4 Is.r,rt. 8111 1, Chapter 5-(l?qt)) and House Dlstricts 8

and 70 (House Bill 2, Chapter 1 (1984)) submltted Pursuant to
Section-5 of the Voting Righte Act. -.In this regard, Y€ have
enclosed a copy of the-AprlL 27 , 1981 letter lnterposLng no 

-ouj."itoo to's6nate Dlstilcte 1, 2, 6, 9r- 10, 11r-and 14 and a
cofly of the May 11, 1984, letter fgquestlng more lnformatlon
coirlernlng Hoube Dlstrlcte 8 and 70.

Slncerely,

tlm. Bradford Reynolde
Assistant AttorneY General

Clvl1 Rlghts Dlvl-elon

Gerald l{. J
ihlef, Votlng

cc (w/enclosr:res): alL counsel of record



oo