Motion to Dismiss or Affirm
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1984

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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Working Files - Guinier. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, 1984. 51d87cc8-e192-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/47c66b91-9f0f-4d4b-939e-1065419e0edc/motion-to-dismiss-or-affirm. Accessed April 06, 2025.
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, No. 8r-1968 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 0cT0BER TERM, 198' RUFUS L. EDMISTENT et al., Appellants, V. RALPH GINGLES, et a1., Appellees. 0n Appeal From the United Stetes Distriet Court For the Eaetern District of North Carolina MOIION TO DISH.ISS OR AFFIRM JUL I US CHAMBERS LANI GUINIER* NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Ine. 1 6th Floor 99 Hudson Street New York, New York (ztz) ztg-'tgoo LESLIE J. rtINNER Fergueon, l{att , Wallas, and Adkins, P.A. 951 S. Independence Blvd. Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 (to4) 375-8461 Attorneys for Ralph Gingles, et al. Appellees *Counsel of Record .I QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. In this action brought undor Sectlon 2 of tha Voting Rights Act' the Diatrlct Court found ea a matter of fact that, under the totality of relevant circumstancoa in North CsroIina, the uBe of the challenged legialative districte results in black voters in those districte havlng Iesa opportunity than do other nembera of the electorate to participate in the polttlcal proceBB and to elect repreaentatives of their choice. llere theee findinge of fact clearly arronooue under Rule 52(a)? II. Doee admlniatretlvB preclearenco of a legisletive diatrict under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act ebaolutely bar private - lt parties from Iitigating that district under Section Rights Act, in the Face of language to the contrary? the legality of 2 of the Voting elear statutory -iii- TABLE OF CONTENTS l.l0TI0t{ T0 DIStIISS 0R AFFIR},1 ........... STATEI,IENT 0F THE CASE ... ... . ,. r. o...... Peo e 1 2 I. THE DISTRICT COURTIS DETERI,IINATION THAT NORIH CAROLINAIS GENERAL ASSEI,IBLY DISTRICTS VIOLATE $ Z OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IS BASED ON THE CORRECT STANDARD AND IS NOT CLEARLY ERR0NEOUS .o............r........... I A. The Diatrict Court Applied the Correet Standard 1n Determining That the Electlon Dlstricts ln Question Have e Diecrlminatory Rgault ..... ..... ..... . .... o . I B. The District Courtfs Ultimate and Subeidlary Findings Are Not Clearly Erronaoua .o......... 14 1. Tha Court l{eighed the Par- ticuler Circumetancea Rele- vant to Thie Actlon ln l.laking Its Ftndings ..... 14 2. The Dlstrict Court's Findlng oF Raclally Pblarizpd Voting ia Not Claarly Erro- nOOUA ... r ... r.. ........ 22 . , - The Dletrict'Court's UIti- mate Findlng of Diserimina- tory Raault ie not Clearly ErrongouS r '.......... o.. 15 -IV Pag e II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CON- SIDERED ALL THE STATE I S EVIDENCE 42 III. PRECLEARANCE UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT BAR APPELLEESI CLAIM UNDER SECTI0N 2 ........ 45 C0NCLUSI0N ..... ....... o...... 56 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Caseg: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 415 U.S. ,6 (tglq) ............... AIlen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 ( 1980) . . . ........ .... ... .... r... o Chandler v. Roudebuah, 425 U.S. 840 (tgle) ...r.....................!. Cooper v o Aaron , ,58 U. S. I ( 1 958) ... . Donnell v. United Statea , 682 F .2d 24O (0.C. Cir. 1982) ............. Eaat Carroll Parish Sehool Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 6t6 (tgte) .... Jones v. City of Lubbock, Tex., 727 F.2d '64 (Sttr Cir. 1984) ........ Paqe 51 50 54 12 r27 14r15 51 45 Kirksey v. Board of SupervLaore, 554 F.2d 1r9 (Sttr Cir. 1977 ) ....... 41 Kremer Yo Chemical Conetruction Corporation, 456 U.S. 461 (1982) .... o.................... 50 l,laJor y. Treen, 574 F. Supp. ,25 (8.D. Le. 198r)(tnree Judge court) ... ,4r40r48 l.{atter of l.{errill, 594 F.2d 1064 Cir. 1979 ) ................ v1 l.lonroe v o Bd. of Comnieaionere, . :::n ,91 u.s. 450 (1968) l,lorris Yo Gresaette, 4rZ U.5. 491 (1977) .. o............. o. ..... NAACP v. Gededen Co. School Bd. 691 F.2d 979 (tttrr Cir. 1982) .... Porter end Dietsch , Ine . v . F. T. C. t 605 F.2d 294 (Ztn Cir. 1979), cert. denisd. E[fu.t::Tltf(1979) ............. 51 Pullmen-Standard vo Srint, 456 U.S. 27, (1982) ............ o...... o. o. o. 15 Rogera v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 61, (1982) ... 15rtz Rybicki v. State Bd. of Election of IIlinoia, 574 F. Supp. 1147 (E.0. I1l. 198r)(tnree Judge court) ......... 14r40 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. o.f Ed., ,06 F. Supp., 1291 (w.D.N.C. 1'969 ) gllLd., 4O2 U. S. 1 (1971) ..... 44 Unttrd States v. East Baton Rouge Parleh Sehool Bd., 594 F.2d 56 (Sttr Cir. 1979 ) .............. t........ 48 United States v., ),larongo 1 Co., Comn. , 7r1 F.2d 1546 (ttttr Cir. 1984) 14r40 14r15 Velaaquez v. City of Abileno Tex., 72, F.?d 1017 (:tn cir. 19s4) Paoe ,0 45 5, ,54 27 r41 - Yii - Paoe t{hitcomb v . Chavie, 40, U. S. 124 (1971) .............o............... 40 l{hite v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (lgll) ................ o... 12r1rt41 )42 Zimmer v . l,lc Keithen, 485 F .2d 1297 (:ttr Cir. 197t ) ............ Conetitutlonal and Stetutorv Provleione U.S. Congt. amend. XIV ..o........ Yotlng Rtghte Aet Amendnent qf 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 1r1 (lgAZ) ................... Rule 52(a) F. R. Clv. P. ...."....... 28 CFR $ 5t.41 ................... 28 CFR $ 51.46 .....r....rrJoroooo Lsolelative Hletorv S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong.i2d 12 r27 o aaalm - t2 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. , $ 1971(c) ........ r........... o.... pqg8im 15 5' 55 Sesg. (1982) .........o..... 9r10r1rr17t 54r41r48r49r50 H.R. Rep. No. 97-227, 1 st Sesa. ( 1 981 ) 97th Cong. , 9 ,48aaa 0ther Authoritiee Ilright, l.llller end Cooper, Federql- Piactlce and ProceduraF . ...... 50 -1 No. 8r-1968 IN THE SUPREME COURI OF THE UNITED STATES 0cToBER IERM, 198' RUFUS L. EDI.IISTEN, et el ., Appel I ante , y. RALPH GINGLES, et 81.1 , Appel l eea . -! 0n Appeal From the United States Dietrict Court For the Eastern District of North Carolina H0TI0l,l. T0 DISl.lISS 0R. AFFIRI.I Pursuant to Rule 16.1 , Appelleee, RaIph Gingles, et el. e move that tha Court dismiee the appeal or affirm the judgnent balow on the ground that the queatione on -2 which the decision of the ao unaubetantlal ea not argument. ceaa dapcnds are to need further Statement of the Caee Appelleas filed' this a'ctlon on Sep- tember 1 6, 1981 , challcnging the 1981 ,; epportionment o'f both houses of the North Carol ina General Aesembly ( nthe General ,. Aedenblyi) on'the grounds, j3lgg IIIB, that the epportionmenta w6re illegal and unconstitutlonal in thatr (1) each had been enacted purBuant to provielone of the North Cerolina Constltutlon which wore required to be but had not been precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 196r, 1 e8 amcndad, 42 u.s.c. s 1975c ('s 5 of the Forty of North tiee are covered Voting Righte Aet. .Carolinara 100 coun- by Section 5 of the ,- Votipg Righta Actn or nsection 5'); and (2) the uae of multi-nember dietrlcts illegally aubrerged nlnority population coneentre- tiona end dil utad minority voting atrength in violation of the Conat,itution and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S,C. S 197r. After the Complaint wea filed, the State of North Carolina submitted the provisions of the North Caroline Consti- tution, rhich prohibit dividing countiea in the formation of a legislative dietrict, for precl eerance under Section 5. The Attorney General, 1n a letter eigned by l{illiam Bradford Reynolde, objected to the proviaiona, finding that the uae of large multi-member diatricts r necesBar il y eubmergea cognizable minority population concentratione into larger white elee- torates.x Jurledictional Statement at 6s. -4 The Attorney General, acting through Reynolde, also found the 1981 House, Senate and Congreseional plans r 8e well ea two subsequent House plans and one subsequent Senate pIan, to be recially diecriminatory. Deepite warnings from speeial counsel, black citizenst groupar and varioue legislators thet the use of multi-member districts could result in impermissible dilution of black citizenar voting strength, the General Assembly continued to use this method in the House and in the Senate. At en 8 day trial in July 198, before all three judges, appellees chal- lenged six of the multi-member districts, five in the House and one in the Senate. Appellees also challenged the configuration of one single member Senate District. Five o f the challenged dietricts consist E entirely of counties not covered by Section 5 and, therefore, were not aubject to the Attorney Generalrs review. 0n January 27, 1984, the Honorable J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., writing for the unanimous Dietrict Court, found that black citizena of North Carolina do not heve en equal opportunity to participate in the Staters political system and thet uae of the challenged Iegielative dietricts illegall y minimizes their opportunity to elect repreBentetives of their choice. The District Court made extensive and meticu- lous findinge that there currently existe: a dieparity between black and white voter registration which ia a Iegacy of paet intentional disfranchieement; savere socio- eeonom ic i nequit ies which result from past diecrimination and which give rise to a commonal ity of intereate within geo- graphically identifiable black communitiee; 6- mininal eleetoral aucca8a of black candi- datee; the uae of recial appeale ln cam- paigns;. and a peralstent feilure of most white yotere to vote for black eandidetes. In Ehort, the Court found thet, while there has been aome progrosa, the gep between the ability to partieipate of rhite and black votere renains substantial. Based on theee flnding the District Court entered a unanlmous 0rder which declered that the spportlonment of the General Asaembly 1n six chellenged multi- menber dietricts end one elngle member dietrict violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and enJolned eleetione in those diatricts pendlng court epproval of a dietrieting plan which does not violate 2Section 2. AppeIIeee did not challange el1 multi-member dietricte used by the State nor did the District Court rule that the use of multi-member districts ie pBD ae illegal. The Dietrict Court'a 0rder TE?vEt' -7 Appellanter petition for a atay of the 0rder wea unanimouely denied by the Dietrict Court, and waa subsequently denied by Chief Justice Burgerr of, February 24, 1984, and by the full Court on llarch 5, , 1984. untouched f0 multi-member districts in the Houee end 1, in the Senate. The Dietrlct Courtfe 0rder did not effect 48 of North Carolinare 5t Houee of Repregentative Dietricte end did not affect 27 of North Carolinars 29 Senate Dlstricts. By subeequcnt orders, the District Court approved tha State t s proposed remedial districts for aix of the aeven ehellenged diatricte, and primary elec- tiona have been held in those diatricte. The Dietrlet Court hae not acted on the Defendantar propoeed remediel apportion- ment of ona district, former Houea Diatrict No. 8, pending precleeranco of defendantat proposal under Section 5. 8- ARGUilFNT I. THE DISTRICT COURTIS DETER- I.IINATION THAT NORTH CAROLINA I S GENERAL ASSEI.IBLY DISTRICTS VIOLATE SZ OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IS BASED ON THE CORRECT STANDARD AND IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS A. The District Court Applied the Correct Standard in Determining That the Eleetion Dietricte in Quea- tion Have a Diecriminatory Result Seetion 2 of the Voting Rights Act waa amended in 1982, by the Voting Rights Amendrienta of 1982, 96 Stat . 1r1 ( June 29, 1982)', to provide that a claim of unlawful vote dilution is establiehed if, rbaeed on the totality of eircumstanceBrtr members of a. reeial..minoriby ihava less opporttrnity than other nembere to participate in the politieal process and to elect ropre- eentativee of their choice.r 42 U.S.C. $r 97,, a8 amendad. The Conmittee Reporta eccoirpanying the amendmcnt make plein the -9 congressional intent to reach election plans that minimize the voting strength of minority voters. S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97Lh Cong . , 2d Sess. at 28 (lgAZ ) ( nereafter ttSenate Reportrr or trS.Rep.tt) I H. R. Rep. No . 97 -227 , 97th Cong. , lst Sess. at 17-18 (1981 ) (hereafter "House Report").4 The Senate Report, at pages 27-rA, sets out a detailed and specific road map for the application of the amended Section 2. When called upon to apply the statute, as amended, to a claim of unlawful dilu- Appellants assert thab the Iegislative history of the 1982 amendments is unclear because there is no conference eommittee report. J. S. at 8. Howev er , as the House unanimously adopted 5.1992, which had been reported out of the Senate Committee on the Judieiary and adopted by the Senate, there was no need for a eonference committee or for a conference committee report. See J.S. at 9a, n.7. In fact there was no conflict between the intent of the House and of the Senate. The Senate adopted substitute language to spell out more specifically the standard which the House meant to codify. S. Rep. at 27. - 10 t ion, the federal courts urere directed by Congress to assess the interaction of the challenged electoral mechanism with the relevant factors enumerated in the Senate Report at 28-29. It is apparent flrom the analysis of Seet ion 2 c ontained in the Memorandum 0pinion and from the detailed assessment of the facts that the District Court under- stood and properly applied its Congres- sional charge to the facts oF this case. The actual standard applied by the District Court is embodied in its Ultimate Findings of Fact: 1. Considered in conjunction with the totality of relevant circumstances found by the court -- the Iingering effects of seventy years of official diserimination against black citizens in matters touching registration and voting, substantial to severe racial polarization in voting, the e ffects o f thirty years of persistent racial appeals in political eampaignsr a relatively depressed socio-economic status resultinq in significant degree from a eentury of de jure and de facto segrega- tionr Bod -Ttr-6ontinuTn!--E?Fect of a - 11 majority vote requirement the creation o f each o f the multi-member districts ehallenged in this action results in the black registered voters of that district being submerged as a voting minority in the district and thereby having less oppor- tunity than do other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 2. Considered in conjunction with the same cireumstances, the creation of single-member Senate District No. 2 results in the b I ac k registered voters in an area covered by Senate Districts Nos.2 and 6 hav ing their voting strength diluted by fracturing their concentrations into two distriets in each of which they are a voting minority and in conseguence have less opportunity than do other members of the electorate to participate in the pol it ical process and to elect represen- tatives of their choice. J. S. at 51a-52a. Appellants assert that "the district court erred by equating a violation of Section 2 with the absence of quaranLeed proportional representation.rr J.S. at 9. This statement, supported only by sentence fr agment from the opinion, J. S. the standardat 9-1Or grossly distorts actuall y used by the District Court, and -12 ignores the extensive discussion by the District Court of the meaning and proper application of Section ? of the Voting Rights Act. J. S. at lIa-1 8a. In that discussion, the Distriet Court explicitl y of the standardstated its interpretation to be applied and the factors considered: to be In determining whether, rrbased on the totality of circumstancesr" a state's eLectoral mechanism does SO tt resul ttt in r ac i al v o te d i I ut ion , the Congress intended t h at courts should look to the interaction of the challenged mechanism with those historical, social and political factors generally suggested as probative of dilution in White v. Reoester and subsequently@ the former Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. Mc Ke i t hen. 48 5 F .2d 1297 186-eI?. 1gTTl---Ten banc),@ grounds sub !gg. East CarroII Parish School Board v. MarshalI. These typically include, per the Senate Report accompanying the compromise version enacted as amended Section 2z -1' Itnereafter t,hc Diatrlct Court IlEted the factore enumerated at pp. 28-29 of the Senate Report.J J.S. at 12a-1fa. The Dietrict Court did not ignore Whi.te v. Reoeater , 412 U. S. 755 (197r) , and ite progeny r nor did the Diatrict Court interpret those caaea to require pro- portlonal repreaentation. See J. S. 14a-15a. Ae the Court explicitly aaid, "IT]he fact that blacks have not been elected under a challenged districting plan in numberB proportionel to their percentage of the population Idoea not eeteblish that vote dilution has resulted ].' J. S. at 1 5a. In BUm, the District Court examined eech faetor Bpecified by Congraas in the Senate Report and, without limiting its aaaaeament to juat one factor, eB appel- lanta do, aegassed them aa a totality.5 The The Courts of the Court below, amended Section to other circuits, as dld have interpreted the require the trial court - 14 Distr ict Court clearly Co n g r e s s i o n al I y m and ated applied the proper standard engaged in the anal ysis and The District Court's Ultimate and Subsidiary Findings of Fact Are Not CLearly Erroneous The Cqurt Weighed The Particu- Iar Circumstances Relevant To fTn-fi nq s- Since the District Court applied the proper standard to the facts before it, the real quest ion raised by appellants is whether the three judges properly weighed to examine the factors listed at pages 28-29 of the Senate Report and, consider- ing the totaliLy of the circumstances, determine whether the challenged election method violates Section 2. U. S. V. B. 1. Marenqo County Comm. , 731 F .Zffi 1565-1566 ( 11th Cir. 1984); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d t64, 384-rB5 (5th ir. 1984); Velasquez v. City of Abilene Tex. , 725 T. 574 F-Tapp. , 19Br)(tnree judge court). ffii+); Ryuicti v. state Bd. of Eleq_!:pJlB, 574 F : - 15 the voI uminous evidence. I.IhiIe the judges heard eight days of testimony, examined hundreds of documents, and made thirty- three pages of factual findings, the appellants base their argument, in essence, on one fact: the electoral success of a few black candidates in 1982. The ques- tion thus raised is whether, in assessing the totality of circumstances, the District Court's judgment as to the proper weight to give to this fact is clearly erroneor".' Rule 5Z(a), F.R.Civ.P., provides that neither the ultimate nor the subsidiary findings of faet of the District Court may be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. Rogers v . Lqdqe, 458 U. S. 61r, 6?2-621, 627 (1982) (clearly erroneous standard applies to finding that an at large voting system is being maintained for a discriminatory purpose and to the underl ying subsidiary findings) ; PulI- man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, also Velasquez 727 F.2d 364, 3 - 16 The District Court analyzed each of the factors suggested by Congress to determine its bearing on the ability of black citizens to elect eandidates of their choice to the General Assembly. 0ne factor is the extent of black electoral suceess. With regard to that factor, it is plain that before this action was commeneed in 1981, a nominal number of blacks had been elected to the General Assembly. The District Court discussed the 1982 elections and found them to be uncharacteristie. After examining blaek electoral suecesses and failures, Judge Phillips concluded: I T ]he success that has been achieved by black candidates to date is, standing al,one, too minimal in total numbers and too recent in relation to the long history of complete denial of any elective opportunities to compel or even arguably to support an u1 timate finding that a black candidate t s race is no longer a significant adverse factor in the poI it ical processes of the state -17 either ganerally or Bpe- eifically in the areaa of the challenged distriete. J.S. at 17a-]8a. Sse aleo, J.S. at 37a n.27 . ,Thie eonelueion waa considered along xith findinga on the other faetors 6numer- ated in the Senete Report. These are Bumnarized aa followa: E. There is e current dieparity in black and white voter regiatration reault- ing from the direct denial and chilling by the Stete o f regiatration by black citi- zena, which extended officially into the 1970rs with the uae of a literacy test and anti-eingle shot voting laws and numbered seat rBquiremente. The racial animositiee and reeietence rith which white citlzena have responded to attempts by black - 18 citizena to participate effectively 1n the political proeaaa ere atill evident today. J.S. at 22a-26a. ,b. Within each challenged dletrlet reciall y pol arized voting ie pereietent t aoyBre, and etetiatlcally aignificant. J.S. et f8a-f9a, 46a. North Carollna hee a naJorlty vote rsguirement whlch exists aa e con- tlnuing praotlcel lmpedlment to the opportunity of bleck voting minorities in the challanged dlstricta. J.S. at 29a-J0a. d. North Carolina haa a long hietory of public and privatB racial dlecrimination in alnoet aII arcea of life. Segregatlon lare rere not . repealed until the late 1 960 t s and eerly 1 970 I s. PubIic sehools x,ere not significantly desegregated until the earl y 1 970 | e. Thus r blacke oYsr l0 yeers oId ettendcd qualitetively inferlor segregated achoole. Virtually ell neigh- -19 borhoods remain racially identifiable, and past diecriminetion in employment continues to disedav antage blacks. B.l.ack houeeholds are three times ea likely as white houee- holds to be below poverty level. The lower socio-econom ic stetus of blacks results from the Iong history of discrimination, gives rise to epecial group interests, and currently hinders the grouprs ability to participate effectively in the politieel process. J. S. at 25a-29a. e. From the Reconstruction ere to the present time, appeals to racial prejudice against bleck citizene heve been used effectively aB a means of influeneing voters in North Carolina. As recently aa 198rr political cempaign materiels reveal an unmistakable intention to exploit white voters' exieting racial fears and prej- udicee and to create new ones. 31 e-12a. J. S. at -20 fl. The extent of election of blacks to public offiee at alI leveIs of govern- ment is minimal, and black candidates continue to be at a disadvantage. l{ith regard to the General Assembly in particu- lar, black candidates have been signifi- cantl y Iess successful than whites. J. S. at 33a-54a, 37a-38a. g. The State gave as its reason for the multi-member distriets its policy of leaving counties whole in apportioning the General AssembIy. Howev er , when the ehallenged apportionments were enacted, the Staters pol icy was to divide counties when necessar y to meet population deviation requirements or to obtain Section 5 preclearance. Many counties were divided. The poJ. ic y o f dividing counties to resolve some problems but not others does not justify districting which results in raciaL vote dilution. J.S. at 49a-50a. -21 The District Court included the extent to whieh blacks have been elected to offiee es none circumstancen to be coneidered, 42 U.S.C. $tgZr(b), mede en intensely local and det ailed appraiaal of aII of the relevant cireumatancBa, and determined that the chellenged distriets have a diecrlmi- natory result. For thle Court to rdvcree the Diatrict Court t s ultimate findinga would require this Court to find (1) tha't the Dietrict Courtrs asaeBament of prB-1982 electoral auceeaa was clearly BrroneouB i (2) that the Dietrict Courtrs asaesament that the 1982 eleetiona urere atypical was clearly erro- neoua; and (r) thet, in weighing the totality of the circumateneea, the reletive weight given by the Court to one poet litigation election year waB clearly SrroneouS. 2. -22 The District Court's Findino - rs Not Clearly Erroneous. Appellants assert that the electoral success o f some blacks in 1982 precludes the Distr ict Court from finding severe racially polarized voting. This is the only subsidiary finding appellants chal- 7 lenge. In finding voting to be racially polarized, the District Court engaged in a detailed analysis of election returns from each o f the challenged districts extending ov er sev er aI elections, supported by the testimony of numerous 1ay witnesses and Although appellants challenge this finding as an error of law, the finding of racially polarized voting is one ofl Fact covered by RuIe 52(a) . _Jqngs V-r_ !ubbock, 727 F.2d at 180. Appeffi limit this challenge to those areas not covered by $5. They do not discuss facts from either House District No. B (Wilson, Edgecombe, and Nash Counties) or Senate District No. 2. -2' expert testiarony regardlng avery election for the Generel Aseembly.in.which there hed been e blaek candidate in the challenged multi-member diatricts for the three election yeerB preceding the trial. J.S. fBa-39a. Baeed on ite exheuetive analyaie of the evidence, the Dietrict Court found that raciall y polarized voting treB aevere and porsiatent. Appellenta erroneously elaim that the Dietr ict Court deternined racial polari- zation by labaling every election in whlch lese than 501a of the whitea voted for the bleck eandidate aB racially polarized. J.S. at 17. Although it is true thet no black candidate ever managed to get votes from more than 5Ol of white voters, this is not the stendard the Distriet Court uged. Instead, the Dietrict Court examined the meeaurement of reeially polarized voting to determine the extent to which black and white -24 voters vote di fferentl y from each other the candidates. in relation to the race of J. S. at 39a, n.29. The Di st r ic t Co urt I s assessment can be sum- marized in three findingss €l. The ev idence shows patterns o f racial polarization. The Court found: 0n the av erage r 81 .7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the primary elections. In the general elections, white voters almost always ranked black candidates either last or next to Iast in the multi-can- d id ate field exeept in heav i1 y Democratic areas; in these latter, white voters consistently ranked black candidates last among Democrats if not Iast or next to last among all candidates. In fact r approximatel y two-thirds of white voters did not vote for black candidates in general elections even after the candidate had won the Democratic primary and the only choice was to vote for a Republi- can or no one. BIack incumbency al I ev iated the general IeveI of polarization revealed, but it did not eliminate it. Some black incumbents were reelected, but none received a majority of white votes even when the election was essentially uncontested. 25 J.S. et 40a. b. The correlation between the race o f the voter and the raee of the candidate voted for wee stetistieally aigniflcant at the.00001 level in every election analyzed. Although correlation coefflclente abovs en abaolute velue of .5 are relatively rere and thoee above .9 ers extrenEly rere, all eorreletlon coefficiente 1n this eaae werB betreen .7 end .98 wlth moat above .9. J.S. at 58e-19e and n.J0. c . In all but two elcctiona, the black cendidate loet emong white voters --that is the resulte of the election would have been different if held only in the whlte community than if held only in the black connunity. J.S. at f9a-404 and n.31. The District Court ueed the term ieubstantively significantt in these circumateneea. Appellanta posited -26 no alternative definition supported either b y c ase law or politicaL scienee literature. J.S. at 4Oa, n.32. Appellants offered no statistical analysis which eontradicted the conclu- sions o f the District Court. They did not question the accuraey of the data or assert that the methods of analysis used by appellees' expert were not sLandard in the literature. J.S. at lBa n.29. In fact, appellants conceded that the polarization of the voting was statis- t ic aI I y signi ficant for each o f the elections anal yzed. Nonetheless, appellants contest the District Courtrs finding of racially pol ar i zed v oting citing examples from onl y one post-litigation election year, 1982. This is particularly inappro- priate, as the District Court concluded that 19BZ was rrobviously aberrationalfl 27 and that whether it will be repeated ia sheer speculation. Among the aberra- tional fectors wea the pendency of this Iarsuit and the one tlme help of black candidatee by white Democrets who wanted to dafeat single member dlatricte. J.S. at J7a. This skaptical view of poat- litigation electoral aueceas is sup- ported by the legislative hiatory of the Vot ing Rlghts Act and the caBe law. Senate Report at 29 , n. 1 1 5; Zimmer v. HcKelthen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1r07 (5th Cir. 197r) (Sg banc) efffd on other qrou,nde aub nom Eaet Carrol-l Parleh Scfool Boerd yo ltlatshall , 424 u.5. 616 (1976)t NAACP v. Gadeden Co. School Board. 691 F.2d et 98r. 28 In addition to balng drawn only from post-litigation elections, the Bx enplea given by appellants ere mialeadlng and are taken out of context. For example: (a) Appellants point out that in ,.the 1982 Maqklenburg Houaa p.rlmsDyr black candldate Berry received.rflYa of the white vote. The District Court noted thie but stated that it idoes not alter the eo'ncluaion that there ie eubstantial racially polarized voting in Mecklenburg Count y in primaries. There u,ere onl y aeY en rhite candidatea for eight poaitione in the primary and one black candidete had to be elected. Berry, the incunbent chairman of the Board of Edueation, renked firet among black votere but eeventh emong whit6B.r J.5. at 42a. -29 The other black cendidate, Richard- son, wea renked laet by rhite votere in the primary but seeond, after Berry, by blaeke. In the general election, Richardson wea the only Democret who loet. Similarly, in the 1982 l,lecklenburg County Senate rece, the black candidete who u,aa auecessful in the primary y,ea the only Democrat who lost in the generel election, ranking first among blaek votera but gixth out of aeven by rhite votere for four BeetB. b. Appellenta point out that black eandidat6 Spaulding reeeived votea from 47/ of whlte votars in the 1982 general slection in Durhem County. They ncglect to point out there rraa no Republican ':, opposition in that election, and thet e majority of white votere therefore -r0 failed to vote for the black incumbent ev en when they had no other choiee. J.S. at 44a. Appellants also failed to point out that in the Durham County primary for '1982 there x,ere only two white eandl- datee for three seatB so et least one blaek had to win. As the District Court noted, nEven 1n this situation, 659^ of white voters did not vote for. the black incumbent, the clear choice of the bleek voterB.n J. S. at 44e. (c) Appellants point out that in Forsyth County two black candidetes in 1982 were successful but fail to note, as the Dietrict Court did, that white voters ranked the two blaek eandidetes seventh and eighth out of eight candi- dates for five seats in the general election while blaek voters ranked them first and seeond. J.S. at 45a. ,1 (d) As another example, whlle noting that black elected incumbante have been re-alected, appallants fail to note that white votere almoat alwaya continue to renk them laet and that black appointed incunbants hava uniformly been defeated. The three Judgee who heard the evi- dence conaiderad each of the facte whieh appellante point out r',,.together rith the surrounding eircumetancoa, and coh- eluded that theee piceae do not alter the eonclusion of severe and pereiatent raei-aIly polarized votlng. Appellanta aleo aaaart that rs- cially polarized voting 1a probatlve of vote dllutlon only if it alxeya cauasa blacks to lose. In fact, 1n 21 of the ,2 election conteata analyzed ln which the black eandidate recelved aubetential black support, the black -12 candidate did lose becauae of recial polarization in voting. That iar he lost 6yen though he waa tha top choice of black voters becauae of the pauclty of support among xhite voters. . Appellants aes.cr! that white* muet uni fornl y rin for rscially polarized vot lng to be probatlve. They aupport this argument by citing RogsIa v. Lodget .1!l!lg, I caae decidsd under the purpoas standard of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United Statee Constitution. Appellees do not believa that Rooers Y. Lodqe atanda for the propoBition boldly asaarted by appellanta, but the Court nead not conEider, in the context of thia eese, whether the complete absence of black electoral auecaaa is neeessary to raise an inference that en at large system ie being meintained for e diaeriminatory purpose. -,, The instant ceae wea decided under the Voting Rights Act, and the statutory language o f Seetion 2 apecifiea that a violation exista if black citizena have nlesB opportunityi to elect represanta- tives of thelr choice; it ie not llmited to situat lone in whlch black candidatae have absolutely no chence of being elected. 42 U.S.c. $ tgZf(b). Raeially pol ar l zed voting can give riee to tirf e unequal opportunity, 6ven if it doea not causc blaek candldates to loee ivery aingle election. Appetlants'r argument ie, in 88- aence, thet any bleek electoral auc- ceaa n€ceaearily dcfeats a Section 2 cleimr BD argunent rhich defiea the intent of Congreaa. .,999 S. Rep. at 29, n.115, and discussion at p. 35, infra. -14 Ae the Court noted in !,lai or y . 574 F.supp. ,25, ,r9 (E.D. La. ( three J udge court ) : Treen 1 98r) Nor does the fect that severel blacks have gained elective office in 0rleane Parish detract fr om pI ainti ffe I ehowing o f an overell pattern of polariza- tion... RaeiaI bloc voting, in the context of an eleetoral structure wherein the number of votes needed for election exceede the nunber of bleck voters, aub- etantially dimi.niehee the opportunity for bleck votere to elact the cendidate of their choice. The District Court coneidered ell o f the ev idenee, including the facts to which the appellante allude, and determined thet racially polarizad voting 1e aevere and persistent in the dietricte in quea- tlon. This finding ia not clearly erro- neouB. 1. -15 The District Courtra Ultimate r 1ndlno or D,.acrl.mlnaEorY neous' The task of the three District Court j udgei rtea tq sxeiliRe historic 8nd curren't racial and politieal realities in North Carolina, to determine if the challenged legieletive dietricts operate to diny'blaek citizsna an equal opportunlty to elect repr68antativea to the General Aeeembly. The Judges below engaged in an inteneely local eppraisal of these factors and eppellants aek thls Court to rule that their determinetion waa cleerly erroneouB. Appellanta do not challenge the lower courtre findinge on aix of Beven Seetion 2 faetors, and, aB dieeueaed in part IB(2), EJ3ISI the scventh subeidiary finding, that voting in North Carolina is recially polarized, ie not clearly erronaous. Thus, the queBtion is whether the Diatrict Court -16 properly esseBsed the totality of eircum- etances. In the Statement of the Cage eppBllante recite random black electoral auceaaaes and then imply, without eaying, that undar the eireunstencoa, a finding of diecriminatory rasult is erroneoua beceusa it is tentanount to a requirenent of proportional repraBentation. As rraa diecuased in part IB( 1 ) , .9.!!ALgr the Diatr ict Court did not ignore the election of blacks in ite weighing of the facte. Rather, after exanlning the extent of minority election, the District Court found, in addition to mlnlmal election of blacke to the Generel Asaambly before thie litigetion waa initiated, that in the six nrulti-member dietricte in guestion, black candidates rho ron Denocratic primarles betreen 197O and 1982 were three times aa ,7 llkely to lose in general elections aa were their white Democratlc counterparta. J. S. at JJa-f4e. In addition, the Dlatrict Court found that blacks hold only 9Z of city council seate (many from maJority black eleetion dietricts ) ; 7 .t% of the county commiesion seats; 4Z of sheriffrs officssi and 1Z of the officee of the Clerk of Superior Court. No black hea been elected to etateride office except three Judges who ran unop- posBd ae appointed incumbentB. No black hae been elected to the Congreas of the United Statee aa a repreB6ntative of thie Ietate. J.S. at 55a. , 0n e county by county basis appellants alao paint a lopaided picture. In Forsyth County eppBllanta apecify isolated in- atances o f elsetorel auceeaa but lgnore North Carolina ulation. is 22.42 black in pop- ,8 elBctoral failures sueh aa 3 ( 1 ) the defeat of eppointed black incunbenta which reaulted in no blacka belng elected to the House o f Repreaentativcs fron Foreyth County in 1978 and 1980, years in which all white Denocrate wsre eucceeaful; (?) the defeat 1n 1980 of the black who had been alectsd to the County Commiseion in 1976 which reeulted in e return to an all white County Comnlsaion; and (r) the defeat in 1978 and 1 980 of the bleck who had been slected to the Board of Education ln 1976 returning the Board of Edueation to lte preYioua all white status. 'In sach of thees lnetancaa the evi- dence shored that black Denocrata rere defeatad when rhite Republicans did well, but rhite Demoerata ron conEietently, Bven in good Republiean yEara. t9 In addition, appellanta do not mention thet Houae District No.8r which ie r9Z black in population and has four repre- sentatives, has nevcr elected a bleek rBpreBentative, J. S. at 76a, or that l,lecklenburg County, which, with eight House seate and four Senate seats, is the'largest district in the Generel Aeeembly and which is over 25r. black in population, hqs this eehtury elcctqd only one black senator (from 1975-1979) and one black repreaen- tetive ( in 1982, after this laweuit r.ea filed). J.s. et 14a. In l.lecklenburg .,County, e8 1n Forsyth County, black DemocretE who urare eucceeaful in Democratic primeries, in the House in 1980 and 1982 and in the Senate in 1982, u,era the only Democrate to loee to white Rcpublicens. No rhite Democret lost to a 9 Republican i in those elections. Thus, this caee ie in no wey eimiler Rather -40 than reguiring guaranteed election r ofld rather than simplistically considering erratie examples of electoral suecess, the District Court followed the statutory mandate by considering black electoral success and failure as one factor in the totality of circumstances leadinq to its conclusion o f discriminatory resurt. 42 U.S.c. $ 1971(b). 0ther courts have not required the complete absence of black efectoral success in order to find a violation of Section 2. United States v. Marengo County Commission, 711 F .2d at '1572; Maior v. Treen , 574 F. Supp. at 351-352; Rvbicki v. State Bd. of Electioqr.s, 574 F.Supp. at 1151 and n.5. This interpretation of the amended SZ is consistent with pre-amendment case law to Wh itcomb v. Chavis, 401 U. S. 124, 150-mblack defeat was caused by Democratie Party defeat r not by race. which held success does dilution. See at 766i NAACP -41 that some black electoral not preclude a finding of White v. Regestgr, 412 U.S. v. Gadsden Co. School Boardt 691 F.2d at -@., 1977). 983; (ir lsey v ._ Board o f 554 F .2d 1t9 , 1 4t ( :tn cir . The conclusion of the District Court t that the election of some minority can- d id at es does not negate a finding of d i scr im i n at or y result , is consistent with the clear intent of Congress as stated in the Senate Report: "IT]he election of a few minority candidates does not fnecessarily forecLose the possibility of dilution of the black voter , in violation of this section." S. Rep. at n.115. The determination of whether an electoral system has an illegal discrimi- natory result requires findings of fact which blend I'history and an intensely Ioeal -42 appraiBal of the design and impact of the ... muItl-member district in the light of past and present reality, political and otherHiBe.' l{hite v. Rqgeater , 412 U. S. et 769-77O. The Dietrict Court in this action engaged in just thie rrintensely locel appraieal.' The Dletrict Courtrs findlngs are ao metieulously supported by the rscord es to warrant Bummary afflrnance by this Court. II. THE DISTRICT SIDERED ALL COURT PROPERLY CON- THE STATEIS EVIDENCE Appellanta diepute the weight the Dietrlct Court gave to evidence thet a handful of black votere and a few black and white politiclans disagreed'with the single member district remedies propoeed by plaintiffs. 45 In their Juriadictional Statement appellante allude to the teEtimony of one black lagislator and aome white politicians who supported retention of the multi-menber redistricting plans under which they were elected end to the testinony of three blaek ritneasea who testified in oppoBition to single member districts. Appellante characterize thie evidonce as subetantial, J.S. at 21, and urge that the Court below erroneouely dieregarded it. In fact the Dietrict Court carefully evaluated the teetimony of all the Statere witneaBea ea a factor bearing upon the clain of racial vote; dilution. J.S. a.t 47a-48a. The Court foun'd that the black witneasea who testified for the State rere a idistinct minority' whoee views . rrr.ent almost exclueively to the desirability of the ramedy sought by plaintiffs, and not to -44 the present exietence of e condition of vote dilution.' J!.. This findlng ie amply eupportad by the reeord. The eppallanta srroneouEly eontend that ln ev al uating e claim of racial vote dilution, tha District Court ehould have found that evidenee that the plaintlffsl proposed remedy wea not unanimoualy endorsed by every member of the bleck or white community outxeighed e1l other evidonce of the obJective factors identl- fied aa relevant by Congress. This is f undament all y lnccinEistent rith the Congreasional mandate in amending Section 2 to eliminete reciel vote dilut.ron. It does not raiee e subetential queetlon. Compqre Srann v. Charlotle-Hecklenburq Boerd 'qf Educatlo,fr,,r ,06 F. Supp. 1291, 129t '(I.0. i N,C. 1969) arildr'4A2 U.S.. I (1971). 9f,. 45 Coooef Y. Aaron. ,59 u.s. 1, 16 (1959); l,lonroe v. Bd. of Cpqlliqs_lo!e-rq , 591 U. S. 45O, 459 ( 1 968) . III. PRECLEARANCE UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT BAR APPELLEES 'CLAI},I UNDER SECTION 2 Appellants rely on the decision by the Aesistant Attorney Genaral of the Unlted States to preclear the House and Sanate reapportionments purauant to Section 5 of the Vot ing Rights Act to contend that eppellaes (plaintiffs below) were estopped or preeluded from pursuing their Section 2 cl eina in those diatrlcta composed of -46 10eountiea covered by Section 5. Thia argunent ie specioue, and wea reJected by the Dietrlct Court for three reesons 3 ( 1 ) The statuta expressly conten- platea e de novo etetutory action by private plaintiffe i (2) tne substan- t iv e atendard for a violation of Section 5 is not coterninoua with the subatantive standard under Section 2i and (r) Section 5 preclearancB is en g €erte non-edverearial process thst hae no collateral eatoppel effect. Sect ion 5 of the Yoting Rights Act expreasl y contemplatee a !g novo action such ea in the inatant ceaes Neither an afflrmative indication by the 'Attorney Genbral that no obJection will be made nor the Attornay General. I s failure to obJ ect , nor a daclaratory . - Thia argument ie llmited to House District ,8 and Senate Dietrict *2, the only diatricta eompoaed of counties covered by Section 5. 10 -47 j udgment entered under this see tion shall bar a subsequent act ion to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. 42 U.S.C. $ 1977c. The statute does not limit such actions to purely constitutional claims or contain any qualiFications barring Section 2 action". " Private plaintiffs are entitled to bring a subsequent action whether preclearance results from I'a declaratory judgment entered under this sectiontt or from ttan affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made." Id . Moreov er, the language in Section 5 11 Appellants were so informed by the Assistant Attorney General in his April ,0, 1982 preclearance Ietter to the State:trFinallyrtt he wrote, ttwe feel a respon- sibility to point out that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act expressly provides that the failure of the Attorney General to object does not bar any subsequent judicial action to enjoin the enforcement of such changes. tl -48 should be viewed in the light of the recent amandments to Seetion 2, in rhich Congreas made cl ear that private citizena have e statutory eeuse of actlon to enforce their rights 1n both Section 5 covered and uneovered Jurisdictions. .gg Houee Report et 12i Senate Report at 4?. Pleintiffa are therefore not barred from mounting a de noyo statutor y or conetitutional attack upon a reapportionment plan notwithstanding proclearence. .b]g v. @, 9!lglg.r at ,27 r.11 citing @ v. Eaat Baton Rouqe Parieh Scho-ol, E!., 594 F.2d 56, 59 n.9 (5th Cir. 1977). Secondly, the failure of the Attorney General to objact under Section 5 cannot be probative of whethar there is a Section 2 violetion unless tha etandards under theae two sections of the Voting Righte Act ere the Beme. There ia nothing in the record rhich demonatretae whet standard the -49 Attornay General used in precleaiing House Distriet #8 or Senate District t2. It is particularly ambiguoua since theee two dlatricts w6re precleered in April 1982, two montha before the 19A2 exteneion and enactment of amendments to Section 2. It is mani fest , however, that the Attorney General did not uae the standard of a atatute yet to be enected. In eddition, the legielative history o f the em 6ndmant of .Section 2 auggeste that the uBe of the word Tr.eeultan 1n the statutle dietinguishea the standard for proving e violation under the Section 2 tot al it y o f c ircumstencea teet from the Section 5 regresaion atandard for deter- mining discriminatory purpose or effect. Senate Report at 68 and n.224; 2 Voting Rights Act: Haaringa on S.5J, S.1761, 5.1975, 5.1992 and H.R. 5112 Before the Subcomm. on the Conatitution of the Senete - 50 Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. B0 (lgAZ) ( remar ks o f Sen . Dole ) , 128 Cong. Rec. HrB41 (daily ed. June 23, 19BZ) ( remar ks o f Rep . Sensenbrenner , with which Rep. Edwards concurs). In short, nothing in itsel f, in the Iegislative recent amendment of Section I aw o f coI I ateral estoppel r the statute history of the 2, in the case 12 or in the 12 There are four criteria that must be established before the doctrine of col- lateral estoppel can be invoked. 1 ) The issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior liti- g at ion , 2) the issue must have been actually litigated, 3) it must have been determined by a valid and final judgment, and 4) the determination must have been essential to the judgment. See generally, Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiffi seqi Allen v. McCurryr 449 U. S. 90 ( 1 980) . 4'-' The party asserting estoppel has the burden of proving alI elements of the doctrine, especially the existence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Id. at 9'5'. Matter of MerriII , 594 F.2d 1064;1066 ( 5th Cir. 1979) ; Kremer v. Chemical Construction Cor por at i@ on of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality extensiveness, or fairness of pro- treatment of -51 other administrative agency determinations where there is a statutory 1tright to trial de 49!9r supports appellant- cedures followed in prior Iitigation.'r Even if all criteria are satisfied, relitigation may be appropriate because of the potential import of the first determination on the public interest or the interest of persons not parties to the original action. Porter and Dietsch, Inc. vo f.T.C., 605 F.2@. f00'(7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied' 445 U.S. 950 (1e7e) . 1' This Court has held that a Title VII plaintiff's statutory right to a trial de novo is not foreclosed bylubmission ofl tfi? il6Tm to final arbitration, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Comp any , 41 5 U. ffi74) , inant is a party t; the administrative proceeding. SimiIarIy, a federal employee whose employment discrimination claims were rejected by the Veterans Administration and the CiviI Serv ice Commission Board of Appeals and Review was nevertheles entitled to a trial @ jgyg. . Chandler v. Roudebush , 425 U. S. 840 (1976). Moreover, although admissible as evidence at the de novo proeeeding, the agency decision was entitled only to the weight deemed appropriate by the court. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 4'15 U.S. at SI elaim -52 that Section 5 preclearance precludes subsequent Iitigation of a violation under section 2. The nature o f the administrative preclearance process itself exposes the vacuity of appellants' preclusion argu- ment . Appel I ants concede thaL the Section 5 rev iew was conducted ex parte as a nonadversar y proceeding. lorn""" was no formal hearing consistent with fundamental 14 Jurisdictional Statement at 162 " In fact, these districts were designed by counsel and Iegislative drafters in daily contact with t.he Assistant Attorney General and members of the staff of the CiviI Rights Division.fr Indeed, other than this admission, the record is devoid of the reasoning or facts behind the Assistant Attorney General I s ultimate preclearance decision. In his preclearance letters r the Assistant Attorney General never even ment ions House District 8 and there is absolutely nothing in the record to support appellants' claim that the Attorney General determined "that it was in the best interests of the black voters not to diminish black influence in (Senate) District 5 in order torpack'(Senate) District 2.n J. S. at 16-17. notions of -53 15due process, and , unI ike appellants, who were in trdaily contact with the Assistant Attorney Generalrx J.S. at 1 6 , appel I ees could not be and were not parties to the preclearance determination. Nor were appellees entitled to appeal or in any form seek judicial review of the preclearance decision. Morris v. Gres- €g!19, 432 u. s. 4e1 (1e77 ) . The Justice Department Section 5 regulations provide that a covered juris- diction must submit voting changes for preelearance review, but the reviewing official is not required to publish an opinion nor set forth reasons for the preclearance decision. Se e 28 CFR $51 .4'l . The procedure is so in formal that a determ ination may be made without the Justice Department taking any definitive action at all. If a state submits a plan and the Department takes no action within sixty days, the plan is presumptively approved. Id. A con ference may be requested by the submitting jurlsdiction on reconsideration of an objection, 2B CFR S51.46, but none is required initially. Part ies opposing preelearance have no formal role in the deliberations. 15 -54 l,lort'is Y. Greesette ' aroae in the contsxt of a claim that private plainttffa had a right to judicial revlew of the adminietrative preelearance proeess. In holding that private parties had no such rlght to inquire into the reaeoning bahind the Attorney Generalrs decieion, to revisw the procesB by whieh he conaidered the change or to appeal directly his determi- nat ion , this Court u,ea persuaded that Congreaa had proyided, through the etatu- tory grant of a trial !g gy*, for black votere who disagree wlth the preclearance decision and who heve no other meena of protecting their interests. ilorrle' v. Gressette. 4rZ U.S. at 506-07. Indeed, this is dlrectly stated in the only other c aaa , Donne I I v. United Slg!-g.g , 682 F .2d 240r 247 (D.C. Cir.1982), which appellents eite to Bupport their claim of pre-emptl.on. Ne ither Donnell nor Morrie v . Grea- -55 se!_!9 supportB the eppellentsr preclusion arguments. Indeed, they affirmatlvely recognize that the Attorney General nay hav e intereets other than the intereate of minority voters and, more importantly, that the voters I interests are explicitly proteeted by the statutory right to a trial Sgry. Thus, the Dietrict Court properly found the Attorney Generalts preclearance determination trhas no issue preclueive ( col I ater al eatoppel ) effect in this action.n (Citation omitted) J.S. et 54a. The decieion belor should be affirmed summarily. 56 CONCLUSION Because appellants did not raiee any substantial queetion which requiree further argument, the Court ehould affirm the judgment of the Dietrict Court or dismiss the appeal. Respect fully submitted JULIUS CHAMBERS *LANI GUINIER NAACP LegaI Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 99 Hudson Street 1 6th Floor New York, New York 1001, (ztz)z'tg-1e00 LESLIE J. l{INNER Ferguson, l{att I Wallae , and Adkins, P.A. 951 South Independence Boulevard Charlotte, North Cerolina 28202 (704) tts-8461 Attorneys for Appelleee *Counsel of Reeord