Motion to Dismiss or Affirm
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1984
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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Working Files - Guinier. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, 1984. 51d87cc8-e192-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/47c66b91-9f0f-4d4b-939e-1065419e0edc/motion-to-dismiss-or-affirm. Accessed December 05, 2025.
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No. 8r-1968
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
0cT0BER TERM, 198'
RUFUS L. EDMISTENT et al.,
Appellants,
V.
RALPH GINGLES, et a1.,
Appellees.
0n Appeal From the United Stetes Distriet Court
For the Eaetern District of North Carolina
MOIION TO DISH.ISS OR AFFIRM
JUL I US CHAMBERS
LANI GUINIER*
NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational
Fund, Ine.
1 6th Floor
99 Hudson Street
New York, New York
(ztz) ztg-'tgoo
LESLIE J. rtINNER
Fergueon, l{att ,
Wallas, and Adkins, P.A.
951 S. Independence
Blvd.
Charlotte, North Carolina
28202
(to4) 375-8461
Attorneys for Ralph Gingles, et al.
Appellees
*Counsel of Record
.I
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. In this action brought undor Sectlon 2
of tha Voting Rights Act' the Diatrlct
Court found ea a matter of fact that, under
the totality of relevant circumstancoa in
North CsroIina, the uBe of the challenged
legialative districte results in black
voters in those districte havlng Iesa
opportunity than do other nembera of the
electorate to participate in the polttlcal
proceBB and to elect repreaentatives of
their choice.
llere theee findinge of fact clearly
arronooue under Rule 52(a)?
II. Doee admlniatretlvB preclearenco of a
legisletive diatrict under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act ebaolutely bar private
- lt
parties from Iitigating
that district under Section
Rights Act, in the Face of
language to the contrary?
the legality of
2 of the Voting
elear statutory
-iii-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
l.l0TI0t{ T0 DIStIISS 0R AFFIR},1 ...........
STATEI,IENT 0F THE CASE ... ... . ,. r. o......
Peo e
1
2
I. THE DISTRICT COURTIS DETERI,IINATION
THAT NORIH CAROLINAIS GENERAL
ASSEI,IBLY DISTRICTS VIOLATE $ Z OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IS BASED ON THE
CORRECT STANDARD AND IS NOT CLEARLY
ERR0NEOUS .o............r........... I
A. The Diatrict Court Applied the
Correet Standard 1n Determining
That the Electlon Dlstricts ln
Question Have e Diecrlminatory
Rgault ..... ..... ..... . .... o . I
B. The District Courtfs Ultimate and
Subeidlary Findings Are Not
Clearly Erronaoua .o......... 14
1. Tha Court l{eighed the Par-
ticuler Circumetancea Rele-
vant to Thie Actlon ln
l.laking Its Ftndings ..... 14
2. The Dlstrict Court's Findlng
oF Raclally Pblarizpd Voting
ia Not Claarly Erro-
nOOUA ... r ... r.. ........ 22
. , - The Dletrict'Court's UIti-
mate Findlng of Diserimina-
tory Raault ie not Clearly
ErrongouS r '.......... o.. 15
-IV
Pag e
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CON-
SIDERED ALL THE STATE I S EVIDENCE 42
III. PRECLEARANCE UNDER SECTION 5
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES
NOT BAR APPELLEESI CLAIM UNDER
SECTI0N 2 ........ 45
C0NCLUSI0N ..... ....... o...... 56
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Caseg:
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company,
415 U.S. ,6 (tglq) ...............
AIlen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
( 1980) . . . ........ .... ... .... r... o
Chandler v. Roudebuah, 425 U.S. 840
(tgle) ...r.....................!.
Cooper v o Aaron , ,58 U. S. I ( 1 958) ... .
Donnell v. United Statea , 682 F .2d
24O (0.C. Cir. 1982) .............
Eaat Carroll Parish Sehool Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 6t6 (tgte) ....
Jones v. City of Lubbock, Tex., 727
F.2d
'64
(Sttr Cir. 1984) ........
Paqe
51
50
54
12 r27
14r15
51
45
Kirksey v. Board of SupervLaore, 554
F.2d 1r9 (Sttr Cir. 1977 ) ....... 41
Kremer Yo Chemical Conetruction
Corporation, 456 U.S. 461
(1982) .... o.................... 50
l,laJor y. Treen, 574 F. Supp. ,25 (8.D.
Le. 198r)(tnree Judge court) ... ,4r40r48
l.{atter of l.{errill, 594 F.2d 1064
Cir. 1979 ) ................
v1
l.lonroe v o Bd. of Comnieaionere,
. :::n
,91
u.s. 450 (1968)
l,lorris Yo Gresaette, 4rZ U.5. 491
(1977) .. o............. o. .....
NAACP v. Gededen Co. School Bd.
691 F.2d 979 (tttrr Cir. 1982) ....
Porter end Dietsch , Ine . v . F. T. C. t
605 F.2d 294 (Ztn Cir. 1979),
cert. denisd.
E[fu.t::Tltf(1979) ............. 51
Pullmen-Standard vo Srint, 456 U.S. 27,
(1982) ............ o...... o. o. o. 15
Rogera v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 61, (1982) ... 15rtz
Rybicki v. State Bd. of Election of
IIlinoia, 574 F. Supp. 1147 (E.0. I1l.
198r)(tnree Judge court) ......... 14r40
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
o.f Ed., ,06 F. Supp., 1291 (w.D.N.C.
1'969 ) gllLd., 4O2 U. S. 1 (1971) ..... 44
Unttrd States v. East Baton Rouge
Parleh Sehool Bd., 594 F.2d 56 (Sttr
Cir. 1979 ) .............. t........ 48
United States v., ),larongo 1 Co., Comn. , 7r1
F.2d 1546 (ttttr Cir. 1984) 14r40
14r15
Velaaquez v. City of Abileno Tex., 72,
F.?d 1017 (:tn cir. 19s4)
Paoe
,0
45
5, ,54
27 r41
- Yii -
Paoe
t{hitcomb v . Chavie, 40, U. S. 124
(1971) .............o............... 40
l{hite v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755
(lgll) ................ o... 12r1rt41 )42
Zimmer v . l,lc Keithen, 485 F .2d 1297
(:ttr Cir. 197t ) ............
Conetitutlonal and Stetutorv Provleione
U.S. Congt. amend. XIV ..o........
Yotlng Rtghte Aet Amendnent qf 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat.
1r1 (lgAZ) ...................
Rule 52(a) F. R. Clv. P. ....".......
28 CFR $ 5t.41 ...................
28 CFR $ 51.46 .....r....rrJoroooo
Lsolelative Hletorv
S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong.i2d
12 r27
o aaalm
-
t2
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
, $ 1971(c) ........ r........... o.... pqg8im
15
5'
55
Sesg. (1982) .........o..... 9r10r1rr17t
54r41r48r49r50
H.R. Rep. No. 97-227,
1 st Sesa. ( 1 981 )
97th Cong. ,
9 ,48aaa
0ther Authoritiee
Ilright, l.llller end Cooper, Federql- Piactlce and ProceduraF
. ...... 50
-1
No. 8r-1968
IN THE
SUPREME COURI OF THE UNITED STATES
0cToBER IERM, 198'
RUFUS L. EDI.IISTEN, et el .,
Appel I ante ,
y.
RALPH GINGLES, et 81.1
, Appel l eea . -!
0n Appeal From the United States
Dietrict Court For the Eastern
District of North Carolina
H0TI0l,l. T0 DISl.lISS 0R. AFFIRI.I
Pursuant to Rule 16.1 , Appelleee,
RaIph Gingles, et el. e move that tha Court
dismiee the appeal or affirm the judgnent
balow on the ground that the queatione on
-2
which the decision of the
ao unaubetantlal ea not
argument.
ceaa dapcnds are
to need further
Statement of the Caee
Appelleas filed' this a'ctlon on Sep-
tember 1 6, 1981 , challcnging the 1981
,;
epportionment o'f both houses of the North
Carol ina General Aesembly ( nthe General
,.
Aedenblyi) on'the grounds, j3lgg IIIB, that
the epportionmenta w6re illegal and
unconstitutlonal in thatr (1) each had been
enacted purBuant to provielone of the North
Cerolina Constltutlon which wore required
to be but had not been precleared under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 196r,
1
e8 amcndad, 42 u.s.c. s 1975c ('s 5 of the
Forty of North
tiee are covered
Voting Righte Aet.
.Carolinara 100 coun-
by Section 5 of the
,-
Votipg Righta Actn or nsection 5'); and (2)
the uae of multi-nember dietrlcts illegally
aubrerged nlnority population coneentre-
tiona end dil utad minority voting atrength
in violation of the Conat,itution and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as amended, 42 U.S,C. S 197r.
After the Complaint wea filed, the
State of North Carolina submitted the
provisions of the North Caroline Consti-
tution, rhich prohibit dividing countiea in
the formation of a legislative dietrict,
for precl eerance under Section 5. The
Attorney General, 1n a letter eigned by
l{illiam Bradford Reynolde, objected to the
proviaiona, finding that the uae of large
multi-member diatricts r necesBar il y
eubmergea cognizable minority population
concentratione into larger white elee-
torates.x Jurledictional Statement at 6s.
-4
The Attorney General, acting through
Reynolde, also found the 1981 House, Senate
and Congreseional plans r 8e well ea two
subsequent House plans and one subsequent
Senate pIan, to be recially diecriminatory.
Deepite warnings from speeial counsel,
black citizenst groupar and varioue
legislators thet the use of multi-member
districts could result in impermissible
dilution of black citizenar voting
strength, the General Assembly continued to
use this method in the House and in the
Senate. At en 8 day trial in July 198,
before all three judges, appellees chal-
lenged six of the multi-member districts,
five in the House and one in the Senate.
Appellees also challenged the configuration
of one single member Senate District. Five
o f the challenged dietricts consist
E
entirely of counties not covered by Section
5 and, therefore, were not aubject to the
Attorney Generalrs review.
0n January 27, 1984, the Honorable J.
Dickson Phillips, Jr., writing for the
unanimous Dietrict Court, found that black
citizena of North Carolina do not heve en
equal opportunity to participate in the
Staters political system and thet uae of
the challenged Iegielative dietricts
illegall y minimizes their opportunity to
elect repreBentetives of their choice. The
District Court made extensive and meticu-
lous findinge that there currently existe:
a dieparity between black and white voter
registration which ia a Iegacy of paet
intentional disfranchieement; savere socio-
eeonom ic i nequit ies which result from
past diecrimination and which give rise to
a commonal ity of intereate within geo-
graphically identifiable black communitiee;
6-
mininal eleetoral aucca8a of black candi-
datee; the uae of recial appeale ln cam-
paigns;. and a peralstent feilure of most
white yotere to vote for black eandidetes.
In Ehort, the Court found thet, while there
has been aome progrosa, the gep between the
ability to partieipate of rhite and black
votere renains substantial.
Based on theee flnding the District
Court entered a unanlmous 0rder which
declered that the spportlonment of the
General Asaembly 1n six chellenged multi-
menber dietricts end one elngle member
dietrict violate Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, and enJolned eleetione in those
diatricts pendlng court epproval of a
dietrieting plan which does not violate
2Section 2.
AppeIIeee did not challange el1
multi-member dietricte used by the State
nor did the District Court rule that the
use of multi-member districts ie pBD ae
illegal. The Dietrict Court'a 0rder TE?vEt'
-7
Appellanter petition for a atay of the
0rder wea unanimouely denied by the
Dietrict Court, and waa subsequently denied
by Chief Justice Burgerr of, February 24,
1984, and by the full Court on llarch 5,
,
1984.
untouched f0 multi-member districts in the
Houee end 1, in the Senate. The Dietrlct
Courtfe 0rder did not effect 48 of North
Carolinare 5t Houee of Repregentative
Dietricte end did not affect 27 of North
Carolinars 29 Senate Dlstricts.
By subeequcnt orders, the District
Court approved tha State t s proposed
remedial districts for aix of the aeven
ehellenged diatricte, and primary elec-
tiona have been held in those diatricte.
The Dietrlet Court hae not acted on the
Defendantar propoeed remediel apportion-
ment of ona district, former Houea
Diatrict No. 8, pending precleeranco of
defendantat proposal under Section 5.
8-
ARGUilFNT
I. THE DISTRICT COURTIS DETER-
I.IINATION THAT NORTH CAROLINA I S
GENERAL ASSEI.IBLY DISTRICTS VIOLATE
SZ OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IS
BASED ON THE CORRECT STANDARD AND
IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
A. The District Court Applied
the Correct Standard in Determining
That the Eleetion Dietricte in Quea-
tion Have a Diecriminatory Result
Seetion 2 of the Voting Rights Act waa
amended in 1982, by the Voting Rights
Amendrienta of 1982, 96 Stat . 1r1 ( June 29,
1982)', to provide that a claim of unlawful
vote dilution is establiehed if, rbaeed on
the totality of eircumstanceBrtr members of
a. reeial..minoriby ihava less opporttrnity
than other nembere to participate in the
politieal process and to elect ropre-
eentativee of their choice.r 42 U.S.C.
$r 97,, a8 amendad. The Conmittee Reporta
eccoirpanying the amendmcnt make plein the
-9
congressional intent to reach election
plans that minimize the voting strength of
minority voters. S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97Lh
Cong . , 2d Sess. at 28 (lgAZ ) ( nereafter
ttSenate Reportrr or trS.Rep.tt) I H. R. Rep.
No . 97 -227 , 97th Cong. , lst Sess. at 17-18
(1981 ) (hereafter "House Report").4
The Senate Report, at pages 27-rA, sets
out a detailed and specific road map for
the application of the amended Section 2.
When called upon to apply the statute,
as amended, to a claim of unlawful dilu-
Appellants assert thab the Iegislative
history of the 1982 amendments is unclear
because there is no conference eommittee
report. J. S. at 8. Howev er , as the House
unanimously adopted 5.1992, which had been
reported out of the Senate Committee on
the Judieiary and adopted by the Senate,
there was no need for a eonference
committee or for a conference committee
report. See J.S. at 9a, n.7. In fact
there was no conflict between the intent
of the House and of the Senate. The
Senate adopted substitute language to
spell out more specifically the standard
which the House meant to codify. S. Rep.
at 27.
- 10
t ion, the federal courts urere directed by
Congress to assess the interaction of the
challenged electoral mechanism with the
relevant factors enumerated in the Senate
Report at 28-29.
It is apparent flrom the analysis of
Seet ion 2 c ontained in the Memorandum
0pinion and from the detailed assessment of
the facts that the District Court under-
stood and properly applied its Congres-
sional charge to the facts oF this case.
The actual standard applied by the
District Court is embodied in its Ultimate
Findings of Fact:
1. Considered in conjunction with the
totality of relevant circumstances found by
the court -- the Iingering effects of
seventy years of official diserimination
against black citizens in matters touching
registration and voting, substantial to
severe racial polarization in voting, the
e ffects o f thirty years of persistent
racial appeals in political eampaignsr a
relatively depressed socio-economic status
resultinq in significant degree from a
eentury of de jure and de facto segrega-
tionr Bod -Ttr-6ontinuTn!--E?Fect of a
- 11
majority vote requirement the creation
o f each o f the multi-member districts
ehallenged in this action results in the
black registered voters of that district
being submerged as a voting minority in the
district and thereby having less oppor-
tunity than do other members of the
electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of
their choice.
2. Considered in conjunction with the
same cireumstances, the creation of
single-member Senate District No. 2 results
in the b I ac k registered voters in an area
covered by Senate Districts Nos.2 and 6
hav ing their voting strength diluted by
fracturing their concentrations into two
distriets in each of which they are a
voting minority and in conseguence have
less opportunity than do other members of
the electorate to participate in the
pol it ical process and to elect represen-
tatives of their choice. J. S. at 51a-52a.
Appellants assert that "the district
court erred by equating a violation of
Section 2 with the absence of quaranLeed
proportional representation.rr J.S. at 9.
This statement, supported only by
sentence fr agment from the opinion, J. S.
the standardat 9-1Or grossly distorts
actuall y used by the District Court, and
-12
ignores the extensive discussion by the
District Court of the meaning and proper
application of Section ? of the Voting
Rights Act. J. S. at lIa-1 8a. In that
discussion, the Distriet Court explicitl y
of the standardstated its interpretation
to be applied and the factors
considered:
to be
In determining whether, rrbased
on the totality of circumstancesr"
a state's eLectoral mechanism does
SO tt resul ttt in r ac i al v o te
d i I ut ion , the Congress intended
t h at courts should look to the
interaction of the challenged
mechanism with those historical,
social and political factors
generally suggested as probative of
dilution in White v. Reoester and
subsequently@ the
former Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v.
Mc Ke i t hen. 48 5 F .2d 1297 186-eI?.
1gTTl---Ten banc),@
grounds sub !gg. East CarroII
Parish School Board v. MarshalI.
These typically include, per the
Senate Report accompanying the
compromise version enacted as
amended Section 2z
-1'
Itnereafter t,hc Diatrlct Court IlEted the
factore enumerated at pp. 28-29 of the
Senate Report.J J.S. at 12a-1fa.
The Dietrict Court did not ignore
Whi.te v. Reoeater , 412 U. S. 755 (197r) , and
ite progeny r nor did the Diatrict Court
interpret those caaea to require pro-
portlonal repreaentation. See J. S.
14a-15a. Ae the Court explicitly aaid,
"IT]he fact that blacks have not been
elected under a challenged districting plan
in numberB proportionel to their percentage
of the population Idoea not eeteblish that
vote dilution has resulted ].' J. S. at 1 5a.
In BUm, the District Court examined
eech faetor Bpecified by Congraas in the
Senate Report and, without limiting its
aaaaeament to juat one factor, eB appel-
lanta do, aegassed them aa a totality.5 The
The Courts of
the Court below,
amended Section to
other circuits, as dld
have interpreted the
require the trial court
- 14
Distr ict Court clearly
Co n g r e s s i o n al I y m and ated
applied the proper standard
engaged in the
anal ysis and
The District Court's Ultimate
and Subsidiary Findings of Fact
Are Not CLearly Erroneous
The Cqurt Weighed The Particu-
Iar Circumstances Relevant To
fTn-fi nq s-
Since the District Court applied the
proper standard to the facts before it, the
real quest ion raised by appellants is
whether the three judges properly weighed
to examine the factors listed at pages
28-29 of the Senate Report and, consider-
ing the totaliLy of the circumstances,
determine whether the challenged election
method violates Section 2. U. S. V.
B.
1.
Marenqo County Comm. , 731 F .Zffi
1565-1566 ( 11th Cir. 1984); Jones v. City
of Lubbock, 727 F.2d t64, 384-rB5 (5th
ir. 1984); Velasquez v. City of Abilene
Tex. , 725 T.
574 F-Tapp. ,
19Br)(tnree judge court).
ffii+); Ryuicti v. state Bd. of Eleq_!:pJlB,
574 F :
- 15
the voI uminous evidence. I.IhiIe the judges
heard eight days of testimony, examined
hundreds of documents, and made thirty-
three pages of factual findings, the
appellants base their argument, in essence,
on one fact: the electoral success of a
few black candidates in 1982. The ques-
tion thus raised is whether, in assessing
the totality of circumstances, the District
Court's judgment as to the proper weight to
give to this fact is clearly erroneor".'
Rule 5Z(a), F.R.Civ.P., provides that
neither the ultimate nor the subsidiary
findings of faet of the District Court may
be reversed unless they are clearly
erroneous. Rogers v . Lqdqe, 458 U. S. 61r,
6?2-621, 627 (1982) (clearly erroneous
standard applies to finding that an at
large voting system is being maintained
for a discriminatory purpose and to the
underl ying subsidiary findings) ; PulI-
man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,
also Velasquez
727 F.2d 364, 3
- 16
The District Court analyzed each of
the factors suggested by Congress to
determine its bearing on the ability of
black citizens to elect eandidates of their
choice to the General Assembly. 0ne factor
is the extent of black electoral suceess.
With regard to that factor, it is plain
that before this action was commeneed in
1981, a nominal number of blacks had been
elected to the General Assembly. The
District Court discussed the 1982 elections
and found them to be uncharacteristie.
After examining blaek electoral suecesses
and failures, Judge Phillips concluded:
I T ]he success that has been
achieved by black candidates to
date is, standing al,one, too
minimal in total numbers and too
recent in relation to the long
history of complete denial of any
elective opportunities to compel
or even arguably to support an
u1 timate finding that a black
candidate t s race is no longer a
significant adverse factor in the
poI it ical processes of the state
-17
either ganerally or Bpe-
eifically in the areaa of the
challenged distriete.
J.S. at 17a-]8a. Sse aleo, J.S. at 37a
n.27 .
,Thie eonelueion waa considered along
xith findinga on the other faetors 6numer-
ated in the Senete Report. These are
Bumnarized aa followa:
E. There is e current dieparity in
black and white voter regiatration reault-
ing from the direct denial and chilling by
the Stete o f regiatration by black citi-
zena, which extended officially into the
1970rs with the uae of a literacy test and
anti-eingle shot voting laws and numbered
seat rBquiremente. The racial animositiee
and reeietence rith which white citlzena
have responded to attempts by black
- 18
citizena to participate effectively 1n the
political proeaaa ere atill evident today.
J.S. at 22a-26a.
,b. Within each challenged dletrlet
reciall y pol arized voting ie pereietent t
aoyBre, and etetiatlcally aignificant. J.S.
et f8a-f9a, 46a.
North Carollna hee a naJorlty
vote rsguirement whlch exists aa e con-
tlnuing praotlcel lmpedlment to the
opportunity of bleck voting minorities in
the challanged dlstricta. J.S. at 29a-J0a.
d. North Carolina haa a long hietory
of public and privatB racial dlecrimination
in alnoet aII arcea of life. Segregatlon
lare rere not . repealed until the late
1 960 t s and eerly 1 970 I s. PubIic sehools
x,ere not significantly desegregated until
the earl y 1 970 | e. Thus r blacke oYsr l0
yeers oId ettendcd qualitetively inferlor
segregated achoole. Virtually ell neigh-
-19
borhoods remain racially identifiable, and
past diecriminetion in employment continues
to disedav antage blacks. B.l.ack houeeholds
are three times ea likely as white houee-
holds to be below poverty level. The lower
socio-econom ic stetus of blacks results
from the Iong history of discrimination,
gives rise to epecial group interests, and
currently hinders the grouprs ability to
participate effectively in the politieel
process. J. S. at 25a-29a.
e. From the Reconstruction ere to the
present time, appeals to racial prejudice
against bleck citizene heve been used
effectively aB a means of influeneing
voters in North Carolina. As recently aa
198rr political cempaign materiels reveal
an unmistakable intention to exploit white
voters' exieting racial fears and prej-
udicee and to create new ones.
31 e-12a.
J. S. at
-20
fl. The extent of election of blacks
to public offiee at alI leveIs of govern-
ment is minimal, and black candidates
continue to be at a disadvantage. l{ith
regard to the General Assembly in particu-
lar, black candidates have been signifi-
cantl y Iess successful than whites. J. S.
at 33a-54a, 37a-38a.
g. The State gave as its reason for
the multi-member distriets its policy of
leaving counties whole in apportioning the
General AssembIy. Howev er , when the
ehallenged apportionments were enacted, the
Staters pol icy was to divide counties when
necessar y to meet population deviation
requirements or to obtain Section 5
preclearance. Many counties were divided.
The poJ. ic y o f dividing counties to resolve
some problems but not others does not
justify districting which results in raciaL
vote dilution. J.S. at 49a-50a.
-21
The District Court included the extent
to whieh blacks have been elected to offiee
es none circumstancen to be coneidered, 42
U.S.C. $tgZr(b), mede en intensely local
and det ailed appraiaal of aII of the
relevant cireumatancBa, and determined that
the chellenged distriets have a diecrlmi-
natory result.
For thle Court to rdvcree the Diatrict
Court t s ultimate findinga would require
this Court to find (1) tha't the Dietrict
Courtrs asaeBament of prB-1982 electoral
auceeaa was clearly BrroneouB i (2) that the
Dietrict Courtrs asaesament that the 1982
eleetiona urere atypical was clearly erro-
neoua; and (r) thet, in weighing the
totality of the circumateneea, the reletive
weight given by the Court to one poet
litigation election year waB clearly
SrroneouS.
2.
-22
The District Court's Findino
-
rs
Not Clearly Erroneous.
Appellants assert that the electoral
success o f some blacks in 1982 precludes
the Distr ict Court from finding severe
racially polarized voting. This is the
only subsidiary finding appellants chal-
7
lenge.
In finding voting to be racially
polarized, the District Court engaged in a
detailed analysis of election returns from
each o f the challenged districts extending
ov er sev er aI elections, supported by the
testimony of numerous 1ay witnesses and
Although appellants challenge this
finding as an error of law, the finding of
racially polarized voting is one ofl Fact
covered by RuIe 52(a) . _Jqngs V-r_ !ubbock,
727 F.2d at 180. Appeffi
limit this challenge to those areas not
covered by $5. They do not discuss facts
from either House District No. B (Wilson,
Edgecombe, and Nash Counties) or Senate
District No. 2.
-2'
expert testiarony regardlng avery election
for the Generel Aseembly.in.which there hed
been e blaek candidate in the challenged
multi-member diatricts for the three
election yeerB preceding the trial. J.S.
fBa-39a. Baeed on ite exheuetive analyaie
of the evidence, the Dietrict Court found
that raciall y polarized voting treB aevere
and porsiatent.
Appellenta erroneously elaim that the
Dietr ict Court deternined racial polari-
zation by labaling every election in whlch
lese than 501a of the whitea voted for the
bleck eandidate aB racially polarized. J.S.
at 17. Although it is true thet no black
candidate ever managed to get votes from
more than 5Ol of white voters, this is not
the stendard the Distriet Court uged.
Instead, the Dietrict Court examined
the meeaurement of reeially polarized
voting to determine the extent to which
black and white
-24
voters vote di fferentl y
from each other
the candidates.
in relation to the race of
J. S. at 39a, n.29. The
Di st r ic t Co urt I s assessment can be sum-
marized in three findingss
€l. The ev idence shows patterns o f
racial polarization. The Court found:
0n the av erage r 81 .7% of white voters
did not vote for any black candidate
in the primary elections. In the
general elections, white voters almost
always ranked black candidates either
last or next to Iast in the multi-can-
d id ate field exeept in heav i1 y
Democratic areas; in these latter,
white voters consistently ranked black
candidates last among Democrats if not
Iast or next to last among all
candidates. In fact r approximatel y
two-thirds of white voters did not
vote for black candidates in general
elections even after the candidate had
won the Democratic primary and the
only choice was to vote for a Republi-
can or no one. BIack incumbency
al I ev iated the general IeveI of
polarization revealed, but it did not
eliminate it. Some black incumbents
were reelected, but none received a
majority of white votes even when the
election was essentially uncontested.
25
J.S. et 40a.
b. The correlation between the race
o f the voter and the raee of the
candidate voted for wee stetistieally
aigniflcant at the.00001 level in every
election analyzed. Although correlation
coefflclente abovs en abaolute velue of
.5 are relatively rere and thoee above
.9 ers extrenEly rere, all eorreletlon
coefficiente 1n this eaae werB betreen
.7 end .98 wlth moat above .9. J.S. at
58e-19e and n.J0.
c . In all but two elcctiona, the
black cendidate loet emong white voters
--that is the resulte of the election
would have been different if held only
in the whlte community than if held only
in the black connunity. J.S. at f9a-404
and n.31. The District Court ueed the
term ieubstantively significantt in
these circumateneea. Appellanta posited
-26
no alternative definition supported
either b y c ase law or politicaL scienee
literature. J.S. at 4Oa, n.32.
Appellants offered no statistical
analysis which eontradicted the conclu-
sions o f the District Court. They did
not question the accuraey of the data or
assert that the methods of analysis used
by appellees' expert were not sLandard
in the literature. J.S. at lBa n.29. In
fact, appellants conceded that the
polarization of the voting was statis-
t ic aI I y signi ficant for each o f the
elections anal yzed.
Nonetheless, appellants contest the
District Courtrs finding of racially
pol ar i zed v oting citing examples from
onl y one post-litigation election year,
1982. This is particularly inappro-
priate, as the District Court concluded
that 19BZ was rrobviously aberrationalfl
27
and that whether it will be repeated ia
sheer speculation. Among the aberra-
tional fectors wea the pendency of this
Iarsuit and the one tlme help of black
candidatee by white Democrets who wanted
to dafeat single member dlatricte. J.S.
at J7a. This skaptical view of poat-
litigation electoral aueceas is sup-
ported by the legislative hiatory of the
Vot ing Rlghts Act and the caBe law.
Senate Report at 29 , n. 1 1 5; Zimmer v.
HcKelthen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1r07 (5th Cir.
197r) (Sg banc) efffd on other qrou,nde
aub nom Eaet Carrol-l Parleh Scfool Boerd
yo ltlatshall , 424 u.5. 616 (1976)t NAACP
v. Gadeden Co. School Board. 691 F.2d
et 98r.
28
In addition to balng drawn only
from post-litigation elections, the
Bx enplea given by appellants ere
mialeadlng and are taken out of context.
For example:
(a) Appellants point out that in ,.the
1982 Maqklenburg Houaa p.rlmsDyr black
candldate Berry received.rflYa of the
white vote. The District Court noted
thie but stated that it idoes not alter
the eo'ncluaion that there ie eubstantial
racially polarized voting in Mecklenburg
Count y in primaries. There u,ere onl y
aeY en rhite candidatea for eight
poaitione in the primary and one black
candidete had to be elected. Berry, the
incunbent chairman of the Board of
Edueation, renked firet among black
votere but eeventh emong whit6B.r J.5.
at 42a.
-29
The other black cendidate, Richard-
son, wea renked laet by rhite votere in
the primary but seeond, after Berry, by
blaeke. In the general election,
Richardson wea the only Democret who
loet.
Similarly, in the 1982 l,lecklenburg
County Senate rece, the black candidete
who u,aa auecessful in the primary y,ea
the only Democrat who lost in the
generel election, ranking first among
blaek votera but gixth out of aeven by
rhite votere for four BeetB.
b. Appellenta point out that black
eandidat6 Spaulding reeeived votea from
47/ of whlte votars in the 1982 general
slection in Durhem County. They ncglect
to point out there rraa no Republican
':,
opposition in that election, and thet e
majority of white votere therefore
-r0
failed to vote for the black incumbent
ev en when they had no other choiee.
J.S. at 44a.
Appellants also failed to point out
that in the Durham County primary for
'1982 there x,ere only two white eandl-
datee for three seatB so et least one
blaek had to win. As the District Court
noted, nEven 1n this situation, 659^ of
white voters did not vote for. the black
incumbent, the clear choice of the bleek
voterB.n J. S. at 44e.
(c) Appellants point out that in
Forsyth County two black candidetes in
1982 were successful but fail to note,
as the Dietrict Court did, that white
voters ranked the two blaek eandidetes
seventh and eighth out of eight candi-
dates for five seats in the general
election while blaek voters ranked them
first and seeond. J.S. at 45a.
,1
(d) As another example, whlle noting
that black elected incumbante have been
re-alected, appallants fail to note that
white votere almoat alwaya continue to
renk them laet and that black appointed
incunbants hava uniformly been defeated.
The three Judgee who heard the evi-
dence conaiderad each of the facte whieh
appellante point out r',,.together rith the
surrounding eircumetancoa, and coh-
eluded that theee piceae do not alter
the eonclusion of severe and pereiatent
raei-aIly polarized votlng.
Appellanta aleo aaaart that rs-
cially polarized voting 1a probatlve
of vote dllutlon only if it alxeya
cauasa blacks to lose. In fact, 1n 21
of the ,2 election conteata analyzed ln
which the black eandidate recelved
aubetential black support, the black
-12
candidate did lose becauae of recial
polarization in voting. That iar he
lost 6yen though he waa tha top choice
of black voters becauae of the pauclty
of support among xhite voters.
. Appellants aes.cr! that white* muet
uni fornl y rin for rscially polarized
vot lng to be probatlve. They aupport
this argument by citing RogsIa v. Lodget
.1!l!lg, I caae decidsd under the purpoas
standard of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United Statee Constitution.
Appellees do not believa that Rooers Y.
Lodqe atanda for the propoBition boldly
asaarted by appellanta, but the Court
nead not conEider, in the context of
thia eese, whether the complete absence
of black electoral auecaaa is neeessary
to raise an inference that en at large
system ie being meintained for e
diaeriminatory purpose.
-,,
The instant ceae wea decided under
the Voting Rights Act, and the statutory
language o f Seetion 2 apecifiea that a
violation exista if black citizena have
nlesB opportunityi to elect represanta-
tives of thelr choice; it ie not llmited
to situat lone in whlch black candidatae
have absolutely no chence of being
elected. 42 U.S.c. $ tgZf(b). Raeially
pol ar l zed voting can give riee to tirf e
unequal opportunity, 6ven if it doea not
causc blaek candldates to loee ivery
aingle election.
Appetlants'r argument ie, in 88-
aence, thet any bleek electoral auc-
ceaa n€ceaearily dcfeats a Section 2
cleimr BD argunent rhich defiea the
intent of Congreaa. .,999 S. Rep. at 29,
n.115, and discussion at p. 35, infra.
-14
Ae the Court noted in !,lai or y .
574 F.supp. ,25, ,r9 (E.D. La.
( three J udge court ) :
Treen
1 98r)
Nor does the fect that severel
blacks have gained elective
office in 0rleane Parish detract
fr om pI ainti ffe I ehowing o f an
overell pattern of polariza-
tion... RaeiaI bloc voting, in
the context of an eleetoral
structure wherein the number of
votes needed for election exceede
the nunber of bleck voters, aub-
etantially dimi.niehee the
opportunity for bleck votere to
elact the cendidate of their
choice.
The District Court coneidered ell
o f the ev idenee, including the facts to
which the appellante allude, and determined
thet racially polarizad voting 1e aevere
and persistent in the dietricte in quea-
tlon. This finding ia not clearly erro-
neouB.
1.
-15
The District Courtra Ultimate
r 1ndlno or D,.acrl.mlnaEorY
neous'
The task of the three District Court
j udgei rtea tq sxeiliRe historic 8nd curren't
racial and politieal realities in North
Carolina, to determine if the challenged
legieletive dietricts operate to diny'blaek
citizsna an equal opportunlty to elect
repr68antativea to the General Aeeembly.
The Judges below engaged in an inteneely
local eppraisal of these factors and
eppellants aek thls Court to rule that
their determinetion waa cleerly erroneouB.
Appellanta do not challenge the lower
courtre findinge on aix of Beven Seetion 2
faetors, and, aB dieeueaed in part IB(2),
EJ3ISI the scventh subeidiary finding, that
voting in North Carolina is recially
polarized, ie not clearly erronaous. Thus,
the queBtion is whether the Diatrict Court
-16
properly esseBsed the totality of eircum-
etances. In the Statement of the Cage
eppBllante recite random black electoral
auceaaaes and then imply, without eaying,
that undar the eireunstencoa, a finding of
diecriminatory rasult is erroneoua beceusa
it is tentanount to a requirenent of
proportional repraBentation.
As rraa diecuased in part IB( 1 ) , .9.!!ALgr
the Diatr ict Court did not ignore the
election of blacks in ite weighing of the
facte. Rather, after exanlning the extent
of minority election, the District Court
found, in addition to mlnlmal election of
blacke to the Generel Asaambly before thie
litigetion waa initiated, that in the six
nrulti-member dietricte in guestion, black
candidates rho ron Denocratic primarles
betreen 197O and 1982 were three times aa
,7
llkely to lose in general elections aa were
their white Democratlc counterparta. J. S.
at JJa-f4e.
In addition, the Dlatrict Court found
that blacks hold only 9Z of city council
seate (many from maJority black eleetion
dietricts ) ; 7 .t% of the county commiesion
seats; 4Z of sheriffrs officssi and 1Z of
the officee of the Clerk of Superior Court.
No black hea been elected to etateride
office except three Judges who ran unop-
posBd ae appointed incumbentB. No black
hae been elected to the Congreas of the
United Statee aa a repreB6ntative of thie
Ietate. J.S. at 55a.
, 0n e county by county basis appellants
alao paint a lopaided picture. In Forsyth
County eppBllanta apecify isolated in-
atances o f elsetorel auceeaa but lgnore
North Carolina
ulation.
is 22.42 black in pop-
,8
elBctoral failures sueh aa 3 ( 1 ) the defeat
of eppointed black incunbenta which
reaulted in no blacka belng elected to the
House o f Repreaentativcs fron Foreyth
County in 1978 and 1980, years in which all
white Denocrate wsre eucceeaful; (?) the
defeat 1n 1980 of the black who had been
alectsd to the County Commiseion in 1976
which reeulted in e return to an all white
County Comnlsaion; and (r) the defeat in
1978 and 1 980 of the bleck who had been
slected to the Board of Education ln 1976
returning the Board of Edueation to lte
preYioua all white status.
'In sach of thees lnetancaa the evi-
dence shored that black Denocrata rere
defeatad when rhite Republicans did well,
but rhite Demoerata ron conEietently, Bven
in good Republiean yEara.
t9
In addition, appellanta do not mention
thet Houae District No.8r which ie r9Z
black in population and has four repre-
sentatives, has nevcr elected a bleek
rBpreBentative, J. S. at 76a, or that
l,lecklenburg County, which, with eight House
seate and four Senate seats, is the'largest
district in the Generel Aeeembly and which
is over 25r. black in population, hqs this
eehtury elcctqd only one black senator
(from 1975-1979) and one black repreaen-
tetive ( in 1982, after this laweuit r.ea
filed). J.s. et 14a.
In l.lecklenburg .,County, e8 1n Forsyth
County, black DemocretE who urare eucceeaful
in Democratic primeries, in the House in
1980 and 1982 and in the Senate in 1982,
u,era the only Democrate to loee to white
Rcpublicens. No rhite Democret lost to a
9
Republican i in those elections.
Thus, this caee ie in no wey eimiler
Rather
-40
than reguiring guaranteed
election r ofld rather than simplistically
considering erratie examples of electoral
suecess, the District Court followed the
statutory mandate by considering black
electoral success and failure as one
factor in the totality of circumstances
leadinq to its conclusion o f discriminatory
resurt. 42 U.S.c. $ 1971(b).
0ther courts have not required the
complete absence of black efectoral success
in order to find a violation of Section 2.
United States v. Marengo County Commission,
711 F .2d at '1572; Maior v. Treen , 574
F. Supp. at 351-352; Rvbicki v. State Bd. of
Electioqr.s, 574 F.Supp. at 1151 and n.5.
This interpretation of the amended SZ is
consistent with pre-amendment case law
to Wh itcomb v. Chavis, 401 U. S. 124,
150-mblack defeat was
caused by Democratie Party defeat r not by
race.
which held
success does
dilution. See
at 766i NAACP
-41
that some black electoral
not preclude a finding of
White v. Regestgr, 412 U.S.
v. Gadsden Co. School Boardt
691 F.2d at
-@.,
1977).
983; (ir lsey v ._ Board o f
554 F .2d 1t9 , 1 4t ( :tn cir .
The conclusion of the District Court t
that the election of some minority can-
d id at es does not negate a finding of
d i scr im i n at or y result , is consistent with
the clear intent of Congress as stated in
the Senate Report: "IT]he election of a few
minority candidates does not fnecessarily
forecLose the possibility of dilution of
the black voter , in violation of this
section." S. Rep. at n.115.
The determination of whether an
electoral system has an illegal discrimi-
natory result requires findings of fact
which blend I'history and an intensely Ioeal
-42
appraiBal of the design and impact of the
... muItl-member district in the light of
past and present reality, political and
otherHiBe.' l{hite v. Rqgeater , 412 U. S.
et 769-77O. The Dietrict Court in this
action engaged in just thie rrintensely
locel appraieal.' The Dletrict Courtrs
findlngs are ao metieulously supported by
the rscord es to warrant Bummary afflrnance
by this Court.
II. THE DISTRICT
SIDERED ALL
COURT PROPERLY CON-
THE STATEIS EVIDENCE
Appellanta diepute the weight the
Dietrlct Court gave to evidence thet a
handful of black votere and a few black and
white politiclans disagreed'with the single
member district remedies propoeed by
plaintiffs.
45
In their Juriadictional Statement
appellante allude to the teEtimony of one
black lagislator and aome white politicians
who supported retention of the multi-menber
redistricting plans under which they were
elected end to the testinony of three blaek
ritneasea who testified in oppoBition to
single member districts.
Appellante characterize thie evidonce
as subetantial, J.S. at 21, and urge that
the Court below erroneouely dieregarded it.
In fact the Dietrict Court carefully
evaluated the teetimony of all the Statere
witneaBea ea a factor bearing upon the
clain of racial vote; dilution. J.S. a.t
47a-48a. The Court foun'd that the black
witneasea who testified for the State rere
a idistinct minority' whoee views .
rrr.ent
almost exclueively to the desirability of
the ramedy sought by plaintiffs, and not to
-44
the present exietence of e condition of
vote dilution.' J!.. This findlng ie amply
eupportad by the reeord.
The eppallanta srroneouEly eontend that
ln ev al uating e claim of racial vote
dilution, tha District Court ehould have
found that evidenee that the plaintlffsl
proposed remedy wea not unanimoualy
endorsed by every member of the bleck or
white community outxeighed e1l other
evidonce of the obJective factors identl-
fied aa relevant by Congress. This is
f undament all y lnccinEistent rith the
Congreasional mandate in amending Section 2
to eliminete reciel vote dilut.ron. It does
not raiee e subetential queetlon. Compqre
Srann v. Charlotle-Hecklenburq Boerd 'qf
Educatlo,fr,,r ,06 F. Supp. 1291, 129t '(I.0.
i
N,C. 1969) arildr'4A2 U.S.. I (1971). 9f,.
45
Coooef Y. Aaron. ,59 u.s. 1, 16 (1959);
l,lonroe v. Bd. of Cpqlliqs_lo!e-rq , 591 U. S.
45O, 459 ( 1 968) .
III. PRECLEARANCE UNDER SECTION
5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT DOES NOT BAR APPELLEES 'CLAI},I UNDER SECTION 2
Appellants rely on the decision by the
Aesistant Attorney Genaral of the Unlted
States to preclear the House and Sanate
reapportionments purauant to Section 5 of
the Vot ing Rights Act to contend that
eppellaes (plaintiffs below) were estopped
or preeluded from pursuing their Section 2
cl eina in those diatrlcta composed of
-46
10eountiea covered by Section 5. Thia
argunent ie specioue, and wea reJected by
the Dietrlct Court for three reesons 3
( 1 ) The statuta expressly conten-
platea e de novo etetutory action by
private plaintiffe i (2) tne substan-
t iv e atendard for a violation of
Section 5 is not coterninoua with the
subatantive standard under Section 2i
and (r) Section 5 preclearancB is en
g €erte non-edverearial process thst
hae no collateral eatoppel effect.
Sect ion 5 of the Yoting Rights Act
expreasl y contemplatee a !g novo action
such ea in the inatant ceaes
Neither an afflrmative indication
by the 'Attorney Genbral that no
obJection will be made nor the
Attornay General. I s failure to
obJ ect , nor a daclaratory .
-
Thia argument ie llmited to House District
,8 and Senate Dietrict *2, the only
diatricta eompoaed of counties covered by
Section 5.
10
-47
j udgment entered under this
see tion shall bar a subsequent
act ion to enjoin enforcement of
such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure.
42 U.S.C. $ 1977c.
The statute does not limit such actions to
purely constitutional claims or contain any
qualiFications barring Section 2 action". "
Private plaintiffs are entitled to bring a
subsequent action whether preclearance
results from I'a declaratory judgment
entered under this sectiontt or from ttan
affirmative indication by the Attorney
General that no objection will be made."
Id . Moreov er, the language in Section 5
11 Appellants were so informed by the
Assistant Attorney General in his April ,0,
1982 preclearance Ietter to the State:trFinallyrtt he wrote, ttwe feel a respon-
sibility to point out that Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act expressly provides that
the failure of the Attorney General to
object does not bar any subsequent judicial
action to enjoin the enforcement of such
changes. tl
-48
should be viewed in the light of the recent
amandments to Seetion 2, in rhich Congreas
made cl ear that private citizena have e
statutory eeuse of actlon to enforce their
rights 1n both Section 5 covered and
uneovered Jurisdictions. .gg Houee Report
et 12i Senate Report at 4?. Pleintiffa are
therefore not barred from mounting a de
noyo statutor y or conetitutional attack
upon a reapportionment plan notwithstanding
proclearence. .b]g v. @, 9!lglg.r at
,27 r.11 citing @ v. Eaat
Baton Rouqe Parieh Scho-ol, E!., 594 F.2d 56,
59 n.9 (5th Cir. 1977).
Secondly, the failure of the Attorney
General to objact under Section 5 cannot be
probative of whethar there is a Section 2
violetion unless tha etandards under theae
two sections of the Voting Righte Act ere
the Beme. There ia nothing in the record
rhich demonatretae whet standard the
-49
Attornay General used in precleaiing House
Distriet #8 or Senate District t2. It is
particularly ambiguoua since theee two
dlatricts w6re precleered in April 1982,
two montha before the 19A2 exteneion and
enactment of amendments to Section 2. It
is mani fest , however, that the Attorney
General did not uae the standard of a
atatute yet to be enected.
In eddition, the legielative history
o f the em 6ndmant of .Section 2 auggeste
that the uBe of the word Tr.eeultan 1n the
statutle dietinguishea the standard for
proving e violation under the Section 2
tot al it y o f c ircumstencea teet from the
Section 5 regresaion atandard for deter-
mining discriminatory purpose or effect.
Senate Report at 68 and n.224; 2 Voting
Rights Act: Haaringa on S.5J, S.1761,
5.1975, 5.1992 and H.R. 5112 Before the
Subcomm. on the Conatitution of the Senete
- 50
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. B0 (lgAZ) ( remar ks o f Sen . Dole ) , 128
Cong. Rec. HrB41 (daily ed. June 23, 19BZ)
( remar ks o f Rep . Sensenbrenner , with which
Rep. Edwards concurs).
In short, nothing in
itsel f, in the Iegislative
recent amendment of Section
I aw o f coI I ateral estoppel r
the statute
history of the
2, in the case
12 or in the
12 There are four criteria that must be
established before the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel can be invoked. 1 ) The
issue sought to be precluded must be the
same as that involved in the prior liti-
g at ion , 2) the issue must have been
actually litigated, 3) it must have been
determined by a valid and final judgment,
and 4) the determination must have been
essential to the judgment. See generally,
Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Jurisdiffi
seqi Allen v. McCurryr 449 U. S. 90 ( 1 980) .
4'-'
The party asserting estoppel has the burden
of proving alI elements of the doctrine,
especially the existence of a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue. Id. at
9'5'. Matter of MerriII , 594 F.2d 1064;1066
( 5th Cir. 1979) ; Kremer v. Chemical
Construction Cor por at i@
on of issues is
warranted if there is reason to doubt the
quality extensiveness, or fairness of pro-
treatment of
-51
other administrative agency
determinations where there is a statutory
1tright to trial de 49!9r supports appellant-
cedures followed in prior Iitigation.'r Even
if all criteria are satisfied, relitigation
may be appropriate because of the potential
import of the first determination on the
public interest or the interest of persons
not parties to the original action. Porter
and Dietsch, Inc. vo f.T.C., 605 F.2@.
f00'(7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied' 445 U.S.
950 (1e7e) .
1' This Court has held that a Title VII
plaintiff's statutory right to a trial de
novo is not foreclosed bylubmission ofl tfi?
il6Tm to final arbitration, Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Comp any , 41 5 U. ffi74) ,
inant is a party t;
the administrative proceeding. SimiIarIy,
a federal employee whose employment
discrimination claims were rejected by the
Veterans Administration and the CiviI
Serv ice Commission Board of Appeals and
Review was nevertheles entitled to a trial
@ jgyg. . Chandler v. Roudebush , 425 U. S.
840 (1976). Moreover, although admissible
as evidence at the de novo proeeeding, the
agency decision was entitled only to the
weight deemed appropriate by the court.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 4'15 U.S. at
SI elaim
-52
that Section 5 preclearance
precludes subsequent Iitigation of a
violation under section 2.
The nature o f the administrative
preclearance process itself exposes the
vacuity of appellants' preclusion argu-
ment . Appel I ants concede thaL the Section
5 rev iew was conducted ex parte as a
nonadversar y proceeding.
lorn""" was no
formal hearing consistent with fundamental
14 Jurisdictional Statement at 162 " In
fact, these districts were designed by
counsel and Iegislative drafters in daily
contact with t.he Assistant Attorney General
and members of the staff of the CiviI
Rights Division.fr Indeed, other than this
admission, the record is devoid of the
reasoning or facts behind the Assistant
Attorney General I s ultimate preclearance
decision. In his preclearance letters r the
Assistant Attorney General never even
ment ions House District 8 and there is
absolutely nothing in the record to support
appellants' claim that the Attorney General
determined "that it was in the best
interests of the black voters not to
diminish black influence in (Senate)
District 5 in order torpack'(Senate)
District 2.n J. S. at 16-17.
notions of
-53
15due process, and , unI ike
appellants, who were in trdaily contact with
the Assistant Attorney Generalrx J.S. at
1 6 , appel I ees could not be and were not
parties to the preclearance determination.
Nor were appellees entitled to appeal or
in any form seek judicial review of the
preclearance decision. Morris v. Gres-
€g!19, 432 u. s. 4e1 (1e77 ) .
The Justice Department Section 5
regulations provide that a covered juris-
diction must submit voting changes for
preelearance review, but the reviewing
official is not required to publish an
opinion nor set forth reasons for the
preclearance decision. Se e 28 CFR $51 .4'l .
The procedure is so in formal that a
determ ination may be made without the
Justice Department taking any definitive
action at all. If a state submits a plan
and the Department takes no action within
sixty days, the plan is presumptively
approved. Id. A con ference may be
requested by the submitting jurlsdiction
on reconsideration of an objection, 2B CFR
S51.46, but none is required initially.
Part ies opposing preelearance have no
formal role in the deliberations.
15
-54
l,lort'is Y. Greesette ' aroae in the
contsxt of a claim that private plainttffa
had a right to judicial revlew of the
adminietrative preelearance proeess. In
holding that private parties had no such
rlght to inquire into the reaeoning bahind
the Attorney Generalrs decieion, to revisw
the procesB by whieh he conaidered the
change or to appeal directly his determi-
nat ion , this Court u,ea persuaded that
Congreaa had proyided, through the etatu-
tory grant of a trial !g gy*, for black
votere who disagree wlth the preclearance
decision and who heve no other meena of
protecting their interests. ilorrle' v.
Gressette. 4rZ U.S. at 506-07. Indeed,
this is dlrectly stated in the only other
c aaa , Donne I I v. United Slg!-g.g , 682 F .2d
240r 247 (D.C. Cir.1982), which appellents
eite to Bupport their claim of pre-emptl.on.
Ne ither Donnell nor Morrie v . Grea-
-55
se!_!9 supportB the eppellentsr preclusion
arguments. Indeed, they affirmatlvely
recognize that the Attorney General nay
hav e intereets other than the intereate of
minority voters and, more importantly, that
the voters I interests are explicitly
proteeted by the statutory right to a trial
Sgry.
Thus, the Dietrict Court properly
found the Attorney Generalts preclearance
determination trhas no issue preclueive
( col I ater al eatoppel ) effect in this
action.n (Citation omitted) J.S. et 54a.
The decieion belor should be affirmed
summarily.
56
CONCLUSION
Because appellants did not raiee any
substantial queetion which requiree further
argument, the Court ehould affirm the
judgment of the Dietrict Court or dismiss
the appeal.
Respect fully submitted
JULIUS CHAMBERS
*LANI GUINIER
NAACP LegaI Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street
1 6th Floor
New York, New York 1001,
(ztz)z'tg-1e00
LESLIE J. l{INNER
Ferguson, l{att I Wallae ,
and Adkins, P.A.
951 South Independence
Boulevard
Charlotte, North Cerolina
28202
(704) tts-8461
Attorneys for Appelleee
*Counsel of Reeord