Bayoud's Response to Motion to Certify State Law Question or, Alternatively, to Disqualify Counsel

Public Court Documents
January 25, 1990

Bayoud's Response to Motion to Certify State Law Question or, Alternatively, to Disqualify Counsel preview

5 pages

Includes Correspondence from Taylor to Clerk.

Cite this item

  • Case Files, LULAC and Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Bayoud's Response to Motion to Certify State Law Question or, Alternatively, to Disqualify Counsel, 1990. 2d99fa48-247c-f011-b4cc-7c1e52467ee8. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/49871866-632c-4b40-871d-c61c27f33acc/bayouds-response-to-motion-to-certify-state-law-question-or-alternatively-to-disqualify-counsel. Accessed November 07, 2025.

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    LIDDELL, SAPP, ZIVLEY, HILL & LABOON 

A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 

ATTORNEYS 

  

1200 TEXAS COMMERCE TOWER 

TEXAS COMMERCE TOWER 2200 ROSS AVENUE 
DALLAS, TEXAS 7520lI 

237 PARK AVENUE HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002 (214) 220-4800 

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017 713) 226-1200 TELECOPIER (214) 220-4899 

(212) 455-9300 
-— 

TELECOPIER(212) 986-7281 TELEX 76-2616 301 CONGRESS AVENUE 

SUITE 1400 

AUSTIN, TEXAS 7870 

(512) 320-4111 

TELECOPIER (512) 320-4161 

TELECOPIER (713) 223-3717 

January 25, 1990 

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 

  

Gilbert Ganucheau 

Att’n: Eileen Boudin 
Clerk, Fifth Circuit 
600 Camp Street 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

Re LULAC v. Mattox, No. 90-8014 
  

Dear Ms. Boudin: 

Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced matter is an 

original and four copies of Secretary of State George Bayoud’s 

Response to Motion to Certify State Law Question Or, Alternatively, 

to Disqualify Counsel. Please return one file-stamped copy to us 

for our files. 

Thank you for your attention to this matter. 

Very truly yours, 

Andy Jay lov 
Andy Taylor 

AT/amb 
Enclosure 

wat\lclerk.8 

 



  

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FirTH CIRCUIT 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 

CITIZENS (LULAC), et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

VY. NO. 90-8014 

JIM MATTOX, et al., 

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Defendants-Appellants. 

BAYOUD’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO CERTIFY STATE LAW 

QUESTION OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL 

COMES NOW George S. Bayoud, Jr., ("Bayoud") Defendant- 

Appellant herein, and files this, his Response to Motion to Certify 

State Law Question Or, Alternatively, to Disqualify Counsel, and 

would show the Court as follows: 

i. Article 5, § 3-c(a) of the Texas Constitution vests the 

Texas Supreme Court with jurisdiction to answer questions of state 

law: 

(a) The supreme court and the court of criminal 
appeals have jurisdiction to answer questions 
of state law certified from a federal appel- 
late court. 

Tex. Const. art. 5, § 3-c(a). Pursuant to subsection (b), the 

Texas Supreme Court promulgated Rule 144 of the Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, which sets forth the procedure by which a 

review of those questions shall occur. Tex. Const. art. 5, § 3- 

c(b). Rule 114(a) provides, in pertinent part: 

 



The Supreme Court of Texas may answer ques- 
tions of law certified to it by the Supreme 
Court of the United States or a Court of 
Appeals of the United States when requested by 
the certifying court, if there are involved in 
any proceedings before the certifying court 
questions of law of this state which may be 
determinative of the cause then pending and as 
to which it appears to the certifying court 
that there is no controlling precedent in the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas. The 
Supreme Court may, in its discretion, decline 
to answer the questions certified to it. 

  

  

  

  

Tex. R. App. P. 114(a) (emphasis added). 

2 The "question of state law" posed by the Attorney General 

on page 2 of his Motion is not a question of law which is deter- 

minative of the cause now pending. Lucas v. United States, 757 
  

S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988) (example of question of law which was 

determinative of the cause). Accordingly, this question is not of 

the type contemplated by the rules of the Texas Supreme Court as 

proper for certification. 

3. This Court has already ruled on the question posed by the 

Attorney General in denying the Motion to Strike on January 11, 

1990. Mr. Mattox’ current Motion is simply a disguised attempt to 

seek a rehearing with this Court. 

4. The cited case of United States v. State of Texas, 680 
  

F.2d 356, 368 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982), is no authority for the 

proposition that George Bayoud, a Constitutional State Officer 

designated by law as the Chief Election Officer of Texas, is 

-—2-  



  

prohibited from filing appropriate papers herein reflecting his 

views of the legal issues involved through his attorneys John L. 

Hill, Jr. and Andy Taylor. The Court has already overruled the 

Attorney General’s efforts to thwart filings by the Secretary of 

State in denying the Attorney General’s Motion to Strike. The 

Attorney General’s Motion to Certify State Law Question Or, 

Alternatively, To Disqualify Counsel should be denied. 

Respectfully submitted, 

LIDDELL, SAPP, ZIVLEY, HILL 
& LABOON 

nL. #8ill, Jr. 7 
tate Bar No. 00000027 

Andy Taylor 
State Bar No. 19727600 

3300 Texas Commerce Tower 
Houston, Texas 77002 

(713) 226-1200 

     

  

  

ATTORNEYS FOR GEORGE S. BAYOUD, 
JR., SECRETARY OF STATE OF TEXAS 

 



  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

instrument has been served upon all counsel of record, by overnight 

federal express, on this AS day of January, 1990. 

ee Chet §- 
#3 
  

WAT\LULAC. 14

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