Slade v Harford County BOE Brief and Appendix for Appellant
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1957
62 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Slade v Harford County BOE Brief and Appendix for Appellant, 1957. 4bb406a9-c49a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/4b37b846-6227-4277-9e60-582125cd5857/slade-v-harford-county-boe-brief-and-appendix-for-appellant. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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Hutted States (Hourt of Appeals
For the Fourth Circuit
No. 7752
ROSALIND SLADE,
Appellant,
v.
SCHOOL BOARD OF HARFORD COUNTY,
Appellee.
BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR APPELLANT
T hurgood Marshall,
107 West 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.,
T ucker R. D earing,
627 Aisquith. Street,
Baltimore, Md.,
Juanita J. M itchell,
1239 Druid Hill Avenue,
Baltimore, Md.,
R obert B. W atts,
1520 E. Monument Street,
Baltimore, Md.,
Jack Greenberg,
107 West 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.,
I rma R obbins F eder,
of Counsel.
Counsel for Appellant.
INDEX TO BRIEF
PAGE
Question Presented ......................................................
Statement ........................................................................
Argument .......................................................................
Table of Cases
Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F. 2d 361 (C. A. 8th 1957) ..
Booker v. Tennessee Board of Education, 240 F. 2d
689 (6th Cir., 1957) ................................................
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 ..............
Clemons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro, 228 F.
2d 853 (6th Cir., 1956), cert, denied 350 U. S.
1006 ..............................................................................
Dunn v. Board of Education of Greenbrier, 1 R. Rol.
L. Rep. 319 (S. D. W. Va. 1956) .............................
Garnett v. Oakley, 2 R. Rel. L. Rep. 303 (W. D. Ky.,
1957) ............................................................................
Gordon v. Collins, 2 R. Rel. L. Rep. 304 (W. D., Ky.,
1957) ............................................................................
Jackson v. Rawdon, 235 F. 2d 93 (5th Cir., 1956),
cert, denied 352 U. S. 925 .........................................
Kelley v. Board of Education of the City of Nash
ville, 2 R. Rel. L. Rep. 21 (M. D. Tenn., 1957)___
Mitchell v. Pollock, 2 R. Rel. L. Rep. 305 (W. D. Ky.,
1957) ............................................................................
Pierce v. Board of Education of Cabell County
(S. D. W. Va, 1956, unreported) .........................
School Board of the City of Charlottesville v. Allen,
240 F. 2d 59 (4th Cir., 1957), cert, denied 353 U. S.
910 ................................................................................
1
2
9
11
11
9
11
10
11
11
v
13
12
11
10
9
11
PAGE
School Board of the City of Newport News v. Adkins,
246 F. 2d 325 (C. A. 4th, 1957), cert, denied
— U. S. — ................................................................ 9
Shedd v. Board of Education of County of Logan,
1 R. Eel. L. Rep. 521 (S. D. W. Va. 1956).............. 10
Taylor v. Board of Education of County of Raleigh,
1 R. Rel. L. Rep. 321 (S. D. W. Va. 1956) .......... 10
Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W. D. Ky., 1955) 10
Other Authority
Black, Paths to Desegregation, New Republic, Octo
ber 21, 1957 ................................................................ 13
INDEX TO APPENDIX
PAGE
Judgment ........................................................................ la
Opinion of November 23, 1956 ......................................... 4a
Opinion of June 20, 1957 ................................................ 16a
Excerpts from Testimony .............................................. 26a
Charles W. Willis:
Direct ............................................................ 26a, 36a
David G. Harry:
Cross ................................................................... 35a
Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1-a ......................... 40a
Question Presented
Whether appellants were denied rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment when the court below permitted
appellees’ school system to defer desegregation of certain
schools and grades for one to three years and prolong high
school desegregation until 1963 on a “ stair step” basis
(except for Negro students who might be admitted imme
diately upon passage of special examinations) where appel
lees did not sustain the burden of demonstrating the neces
sity for such delay?
o
Statement
This cause commenced with an earlier (separate) action.
See 146 F. Supp. 91, brought on behalf of some of the
appellants here to desegregate the schools in Harford
County. Two days before that cause came to trial appellees
adopted a resolution stating that
“ any child regardless of race may make individual
application to the Board of Education to be admitted
to a school other than the one attended by such child,
and the admissions to be granted by the Board of
Education in accordance with such rules and regula
tions as it may adopt and in accordance with the
available facilities in such schools, effective for the
school year beginning September, 1956.” 146 F.
Supp. at p. 93.
Counsel for the Board asserted that “ Since that plan
embraces the relief prayed for, I think that takes care of
that . . . ” Id. at p. 94. Relying on the Resolution, appel
lants agreed to dismiss the action, and believed the con
troversy concluded. Ibid. (The court concurred in their
interpretation and later, in a fresh suit (the instant one)
to require desegregation of the county’s schools, wrote that
“ plaintiffs were justified in believing, as I did, that appli
cations for transfer would be considered without regard
to the race of the applicant.” 152 F. Supp. at p. 119. The
Court therefore held appellees estopped to prevent admis
sion without regard to race of individual named plaintiffs
in the first suit. Id. at 119-120. The estoppel phase of the
suit is not at issue here and is set forth as background.)
On June 6, 1956 the Board announced its “ Transfer
Policy.” It reserved “ the right during the period of
transition to delay or deny the admission of a pupil to any
school, if it deems such action wise and necessary for any
good and sufficient reason.” 146 F. Supp. at p. 94.
On August 1,1956 it adopted a “ Desegregation Policy.”
Citing studies which allegedly indicated “ lowering of
3
school standards” upon desegregation and experience of
other areas with “ bitter local opposition” which prevents
“ orderly transition . . . and also adversely affects the
whole educational program.” 146 F. Supp at p. 95, the
Board announced that it would only permit Negro appli
cants for transfer to attend the first three grades of two
elementary schools in the county. Id. at p. 95. The reason
for selection of these schools was that they were, with
some slight exception, allegedly “ the only elementary
buildings in which space is available for additional pupils
at the present time.” The Board relied, too, on “ [s]ocial
problems posed by the desegregation of schools. . . . ” These,
it opined “ can be solved with the least emotionalism when
younger children are involved. The future rate of expan
sion of this program,” it concluded “ depends upon the
success of these initial steps.” Ibid.
Altogether sixty Negro children had applied for trans
fer under the impression that no racial distinctions were
to be made. There were, at the time, about 1,400 Negro and
12,600 white children in the school population. Of the
sixty applicants fifteen were admitted and forty-five re
jected pursuant to the “ Desegregation Policy” (App. pp.
26a-27a).
Appellants, therefore, on August 28, 1956, filed a fresh
suit alleging that defendants were under constitutional
duty to desegregate completely and that they were estopped
from retreating from their original resolution. (The Court
found an estoppel as to named plaintiffs, but held that the
County policy, generally, could not be fixed by estoppel.
Applicants here urge only their constitutional position.)
The trial court remitted appellants to an administrative
remedy before the State Board of Education.
The appellants (including intervenors who were granted
leave to intervene, 152 F. Supp. at p. 115) filed an appeal
with the State Board. While it was pending appellees
4
changed their policy once more on February 6, 1957. The
new policy provided that:
Applications for transfer will be accepted from
pupils who wish to attend elementary schools in the
areas where they live, if space is available in such
schools. Space will be considered available in schools
that were not more than 10% overcrowded as of
February 1, 1957. All capacities are based on the
state and national standard of thirty pupils per
classroom. 152 F. Supp. at p. 116.
Under the then newest plain five elementary schools
and the sixth grade in two schools were opened. Ibid.
The State Board held that the plan had been adopted in
good faith and constituted a reasonable start. Ibid.
At a hearing of this cause on April 18, 1957 the plan of
February 6 was amplified to include ten elementary schools
and the .sixth grade in one school; as well as three elemen
tary schools as of September 1958, when contemplated con
struction was projected to be completed. Three elementary
schools and the sixth grade of a high school would commence
receiving Negroes’ applications in September 1959.
As a normal result of the plan, the Board observed,
sixth grade graduates would have been ‘ ‘ admitted to junior
high schools for the first time in September, 1958 and
would proceed through high schools in the next higher
grade each year. This will completely desegregate all
schools of Harford County by September, 1963.” 152 F.
Supp. at p. 117.
At the April, 1957 hearing, the Court ruled tentatively
that the plan was “ generally satisfactory for the elemen
tary grades but not for the high school grades.” Ibid.
Another hearing was scheduled for June 11, 1957. On
June 5th, the Board changed its plan once more and noti
fied the parties of the change just before the hearing.
(App. p. 39a). The new plan—consisting of additions to
5
the old would permit Negro children to' enter high school
by a route additional to that of the earlier plan (whereby
they could enter only through normal promotions from
desegregated elementary schools). It would permit Negro
children to take .special examinations and be specially
evaluated for admission to nonsegregated high schools,
152 F . Supp. at 117; white children, and Negro children
entering via the high school plan designed to evolve during
1958-1963, would not be required to take these tests. Under
the revised plan complete desegregation of the seventh
grade, however, was still deferred until September, 1958.
152 F. Supp. at 119.
The reason given for the scheme of desegregating the
high schools over a period of four years in conjunction
with the right of .specially qualified Negro applicants to
enter starting immediately, as summarized by the Court,
was:
. . . when a child transfers to a high school from
another high school he faces certain problems which
do not arise when he enters the seventh grade, which
is the lowest grade in the Harford County high
schools. After a year or so in the high schools so
cial groups, athletic groups and subject-interest
groups have begun to crystallize, friendships and at
tachments have been made, cliques have begun to
develop. A child transferring to the school from
another high school does not have the support of a
group which whom he has passed through elementary
school. A Negro child transferring to an upper grade
at this time would not have the benefit of older
brothers, sisters or cousins already in the school, or
parents, relatives or friends who have been active
in the P. T. A. High school teachers generally, with
notable exceptions, are less ‘ pupil conscious’ and
more ‘ subject conscious’ than teachers trained for
elementary grades, and because each teacher has
the class for only one or two subjects, are less likely
to help in the readjustment. 152 F. Supp. at p. 118.
The pertinent parts of the plan of the school board,
viewed as a whole, as of the last hearing, and as embodied
G
in the Court’s order from which plaintiffs appeal, are now
as follows:
1. Defendants now and hereafter shall accept
applications for admission or transfer to all ele
mentary classes under their control (except in the
schools named in paragraph 2 as to which applica
tions will be accepted as described in that para
graph), in accordance with rules and regulations set
forth in paragraph 3 and every Negro child’s ap
plication to classes governed by the instant para
graph shall be considered and granted on the basis
upon which it would be considered and granted if
he were white.
2. Defendants shall accept Negro children’s ap
plications for admission or transfer to Old Post Road,
Bel Air and Highland elementary schools for the
school year 1958-1959 and thereafter; and shall ac
cept Negro children’s applications for admission or
transfer to Forest Hill, Jarrettsville and Dublin ele
mentary schools and the sixth grade at Edgewood
High School for the school year 1959-1960 and there
after. Every Negro child’s application to the schools
named in this paragraph for the respective school
years specified herein and thereafter shall be con
sidered and granted on the basis upon which it would
be considered and granted if he were white.
3. All applications for transfer to elementary
classes shall be made during the month of May on a
regular application form furnished by the Board of
Education and must be approved by the applicant’s
classroom teacher and the principal of the school the
applicant attends. Such applications will be re
viewed at the regular June meeting of the Board of
Education. Applicants and their parents will be in
formed of the action taken on applications prior to
the close of school in June of each year. In no event
shall a Negro child’s application for admission or
transfer be rejected if it would have been granted
had he been white.
4. A Negro child’s application for admission or
transfer to seventh grade classes commencing Sep-
7
tember, 1958, and thereafter, under defendant’s con
trol shall be considered and granted on the basis upon
which it would be considered and granted if he were
white. Such applications to the following classes
shall be so treated during and after the year set forth
alongside the class, as follows:
eighth grade — 1959
ninth grade — 1960
tenth grade — 1961
eleventh grade — 1962
twelfth grade — 1963
In 1963 and therafter all Negro applicants to all
classes shall be admitted on the same basis upon
vilich they would be admitted if they were white.
5. Commencing September, 1957 applications for
admission or transfer by Negro children not qualified
for admission or transfer under paragraph 4 to high
schools under defendants’ control will be considered
and granted if the applicants fulfill special qualifica
tions pertaining to the probability of success of each
individual pupil. These qualifications will be mea
sured by_ intelligence and achievement tests, grade
level achievements and other similar matters to be
adjudged by a committee consisting of the principals
of the schools from which the pupil is transferring
and the school to which he desires to transfer, the
Diiectoi of Instruction and the county supervisors
working in these schools. Apart from the fact that
these conditions may be applied only to Negro stu
dents not qualified for admission under paragraph 4
no i acial distinction is to be made in the administra
tion of these tests and evaluations. Such applications
may be made to the Board of Education between July
1 and July 14 of 1957 and years following in which
these tests may be given.
» * *
7. No racial distinctions whatsoever shall be
made by defendants in treating Negro children who
have been admitted to schools pursuant to this decree
(App. la-3a)
* * *
8
The record reveals that problems of overcrowding,
pupil adjustment, etc., would not stand in the way of free
transfer for white children who had never attended the
Harford County schools before and who moved into the
county:
“ Q. (By Mr. Greenberg) If white persons moved
from Delaware or Virginia or elsewhere, moved into
Harford County, that is at the present time, such
as to work in an industrial plant, would their children
be admitted to the schools at the present time?
A. (By Mr. Willis, Superintendent of Schools)
Yes, sir, they would.” (App. p. 29a)
See also App. 28a.
Moreover, whatever may be said of overcrowding it
was not so severe that the Subcommittee on Facilities of
appellees’ Citizens Consultant Committee on Integration
could not conclude: “ the committee is of the opinion that
provision can be made to accommodate such colored
students as apply for admission to Harford County public
schools for the year 1956-57.” (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1-a,
App. p. 44a)
The record further shows that deferring desegregation
of the seventh grade is without even purported justifica
tion:
“ The Court: Why can’t you admit a child to
the seventh grade in 1957?
“ The Witness: (Mr. Willis) I can’t say why,
your Honor, but the policy was moving forward
three years, and that was all.” (App. pp. 35a-36a)
* # #
“ The Court: It is a policy reason and there is
no administrative reason why you say the seventh
grade in 1958 and not the eighth grade also, that it
is only policy reasons.
‘ The Witness (Mr. W illis): The only extension
of the policy that has been accepted for the reasons
that have been given.
“ The Court: And no administrative reasons?
“ The Witness: Well, I won’t say none, but at
the moment I don’t think of any big one, let’s put it
that way.” (App. pp. 36a-37a)'
9
The Board’s plans were based not only on the alleged
considerations set forth above, but on apprehension that
proceeding otherwise might provoke public demonstrations
or opposition like some which occurred in Delaware and
elsewhere. (App. pp. 30a, 37a, see 146 F. Supp. at p. 95.)
Argument
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 sets forth
the only standards concerning what constitutes “ deliberate
speed” : (a) “ plaintiffs’ . . . admission to public schools
as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis ’ ’ ; and
(b) that “ [t]he burden rests upon the defendant to estab
lish that such [additional] time is necessary in the public
interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at
the earliest practicable date.” 349 U. S. at p. 300. While
the need to solve administrative problems may be occasion
for delay, and plans in the first instance are to be formulated
by school boards, “ the vitality of these constitutional
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of
disagreement with them.” Ibid.
The second Broivn opinion has been considered by
District Courts and Courts of Appeals on a number of
occasions. In this Circuit, district courts have ordered
complete desegregation by the next school year or term
in Charlottesville,1 2 Arlington,- Newport News 3 and Nor
folk,4 where local school officials had taken no steps what
ever towards desegregation, and, this Court has affirmed.
Moreover, in a series of West Virginia District Court cases
in this Circuit involving plans, overcrowding, fiscal prob
lems, and time for consideration, have been rejected as
grounds for delay when it was clear that Negro children
1 School Board of the City o f Charlottesville v. Allen, 240 F. 2d
59 (4th Cir., 1957); cert. den. 353 U. S. 910.
2 Ibid.
3 School Board o f the City o f Newport News v. Adkins, 246
F. 2d 325 (C. A. 4th, 1957) ; cert. den. — U. S. —.
4 Ibid.
10
could be admitted notwithstanding the preferred reasons
for deferment. Shedd v. Board of Education of County
of Logan, 1 R. Eel. L. Rep. 521 (S. D. W. Va. 1956); Dunn
v. Board of Education of Greenbrier, 1 R. Rel. L. Rep. 319
(S. D. W. Va. 1956); Taylor v. Board of Education of
County of Raleigh, 1 Rel. L. Rep. 321 (S. D. W. Va. 1956);
Pierce v. Board of Education of Cabell County (S. D.
W. Va. 1956, unreported). These cases have treated over
crowding not as a racial problem but as a spatial one.
I f there were to be a shortage of space, admissions could
be conditioned on room being available— but not on a
racial basis as appellees have done.
(Of course, such decisions did not outlaw the application
of normal transfer criteria. But, in this case, the Negro
children barred by the Harford plan may not use normal
transfer procedure.)
Other jurisdictions which have reviewed plans divide
into two principal categories: on the one hand, cases in
volving plans of districts in Kentucky, Ohio and the state
colleges of Tennessee; on the other, plans.involving schools
in Arkansas and Nashville. The first group of cases has
uniformly rejected delay based upon overcrowding, fiscal
problems, transportation difficulties and other administra
tive considerations where it could not be shown that these
actually were a bar to admitting Negro applicants.
In other words, the courts held that it was not enough
that problems existed; they could not defer desegregation
unless the burden of showing why time was required could
be met. In Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W. D. Ky.,
1955) the court pointed out that “ no white children either
before or after the application for admission of the plain
tiffs, were denied admission” and that “ good faith alone
is not the test. There must be ‘ compliance at the earliest
11
practicable date. ’ ” 136 F. Supp. at p. 181. Desegregation
was ordered by the next school year.5
Moreover in Clemons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro,
228 F. 2d 853 (6th Cir., 1956) cert, denied 350 U. S. 1006,
the Court of Appeals held that where as here, white chil
dren were not rejected during alleged overcrowding de
segregation could not be delayed for that reason. See also
Booker v. Tennessee Board of Education, 240 F. 2d 689
(6th Cir., 1957) cert. den. 1 L. Ed. 2d 915 reaffirming that
race may not be used as a standard to deal with crowded
conditions.
The second group of cases has approved plans running
into perhaps six years on the basis of a recital of problems
in school administration. But there has been no effort by
appellees in the instant case to catalogue in detail as prob
lems in Harford Comity the list of avowed reasons for delay
proffered in Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F. 2d 361 (C. A. 8th,
1957) one of the cases justifying delay:
Foremost among the problems of the Little Rock
School District are those of finances, structural or
ganization, enrollment, and the selection and train
ing of an adequate staff. These problems are not
new, but they will be greatly accentuated by integra
tion. By its plan the School Board is seeking to in
tegrate its schools and at the same time maintain or
improve the quality of education available at these
schools. Some of its objectives are to provide the
best possible education that is economically feasible,
to consider each child in the light of his individual
ability and achievement, to foster sound promotion
5 See also Gordon v. Collins, 2 R. Rel. L. Rep. 304 (W . D. Ky.
1957) (court rejecting alleged reasons for delay which included
overcrowding, transportation difficulties, reallocation problems, need
for time to study the problems, unfavorable social conditions; the
position of defendants is unreported) ; Mitchell v. Pollock, 2 R. Rel.
L. Rep. 305 (W . D. Ky., 1957) (rejecting similar grounds for de
lay) ; and see, for the same considerations and holding Garnett v.
Oakley, 2 R. Rel. L. Rep. 303 (W . D. Ky., 1957).
12
policies, to provide necessary flexibility in the school
curriculum from one attendance area to another, to
select, procure, and train an adequate school staff,
to provide necessary in-service training for the
school staff, to provide a necessary educational pro
gram for deviates (mentally retarded, physically
handicapped, speech correction, etc.), to provide the
opportunity for children to attend school in the at
tendance area where they reside, to foster sound ad
ministrative practices, to maintain extra-curricular
activities, to attempt to provide information neces
sary for public understanding, acceptance and sup
port, and to provide a “ teachable’ group of chil
dren for each teacher. With regard to the later ob
jective, it is the policy of the Board to group chil
dren with enough homogeneity for efficient planning
and classroom management. 143 F. Supp. at p.
860.6
Appellants submit that the alleged impedimenta prof-
ferred by appellees for delay herein have not only been
rejected in the largest number of cases where considerd by
the courts, but in those cases where reasons for delay have
been held sufficient the barriers have surpassed in com
plexity those advanced here.
The appellees are not in the dark as to how many Negro
applicants they may expect: about 60 in a school system
of 14,000 children; at least 15 of these already have been
admitted.
Their argument about overcrowding becomes meaning
less in view of this small number, when at the same time
they concede that comparable white children transferring
8 The Nashville ( Kelley v. Board o f Education of the City of
Nashville), 2 R. Rel. L. Rep. 21 (M . D. Tenn. 1957) delay was found
to have been justified by “ numerous administrative problems, in
cluding increased difficulty in procuring and retaining teachers, teach
ing adjustments required because of differences in achievement
levels o f students among Negro and white children, problems arising
from a liberalized student transfer system supplanting a strict
transfer system, as well as other problems . . .”
13
from out of the jurisdiction will be admitted. As to de
ferring desegregation of the seventh grade they are at a
loss even to advance a reason. With respect to the high
schools they urge only that high school work is so alien
from earlier educational experience that Negroes must he
introduced a few at a time so that there will be others with
whom they can associate. But white children too meet novel
situations in high school, and it defies experience to deny
that Negro children will make friends with their white
classmates.
The chief administrative problem that appellees have
experienced has been the formulation and reformulation
of so many plans. The clear inference from the record
has been that the sole reason for delay has been reluctance
to admit Negro children, not difficulties recognized by the
Supreme Court’s decision. Indeed appellees have stated
on a number of occasions that they have put off desegrega
tion because of fear of opposition. But compare, Jackson
v. Rato don, 235 F. 2d 93 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. den. 352
U. S. 925. While one may not view lightly the attitudinal
conflict that may accompany revision of school procedures
to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment, still the law
has recognized some and rejected other grounds for delay.
It does not recognize reluctance or social difficulties. More
over, as Professor Charles Black, probably the most per
ceptive commentator on the subject has demonstrated,
submitting to community opposition does not create the
acquiescence that purports to justify deferring or denying
the rights of rejected Negro children pending the delay.
Black, Paths to Desegregation, New Republic, October 21,
1957, p. 10.
W herefore it is respectfully submitted that the judg
ment below be reversed and appellees be required to cease
14
denying appellants their constitutional rights by the
beginning of the next school term.
Respectfully submitted,
T hurgood Marshall,
107 West 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.,
T ucker R. Dearing,
627 Aisquith Street,
Baltimore, Md.,
Juanita J. M itchell,
1239 Druid Hill Avenue,
Baltimore, Md.,
R obert B. AVatts,
1520 E. Monument Street,
Baltimore, Md.,
Jack Greenberg,
107 AVest 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.,
Counsel for Appellant.
Irma R obbins F eder,
of Counsel.
la
APPENDIX
Judgment
This cause having come on for final hearing by the court
without a jury on June 11, 1957 and the court having heard
all the evidence adduced and being fully advised in the
premises, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed as
follows:
1. Defendants now and hereafter shall accept applica
tions for admission or transfer to all elementary classes
under their control (except in the schools named in para
graph 2 as to which applications will be accepted as
described in that paragraph), in accordance with rules
and regulations set forth in paragraph 3 and every Negro
child’s application to classes governed by the instant para
graph shall be considered and granted on the basis upon
which it would be considered and granted if he were white.
2. Defendants shall accept Negro children’s applica
tions for admission or transfer to Old Post Road, Bel Air
and Highland elementary schools for the school year 1958-
1959 and thereafter; and shall accept Negro children’s
applications for admission or transfer to Forest Hill,
Jarrettsville and Dublin elementary schools and the sixth
grade at Edgewood High School for the school years 1959-
1960 and thereafter. Every Negro child’s application to
the schools named in this paragraph for the respective
school years specified herein and thereafter shall be con
sidered and granted on the basis upon which it would be
considered and granted if he were white.
3. All applications for transfer to elementary classes
shall be made during the month of May on a regular
application form furnished by the Board of Education and
must be approved by the applicant’s classroom teacher and
2a
Judgment
the principal of the school the applicant attends. Such
applications will be reviewed at the regular June meeting
of the Board of Education. Applicants and their parents
will be informed of the action taken on applications prior
to the close of school in June of each year. In no event
shall a Negro child’s application for admission or transfer
be rejected if it would have been granted had he been
white.
4. A Negro child’s application for admission or transfer
to seventh grade classes commencing September, 1958, and
thereafter, under defendant’s control shall be considered
and granted on the basis upon which it would be considered
and granted if he were white. Such applications to the
following classes shall be so treated during and after the
year set forth alongside the class, as follows:
eighth grade — 1959
ninth grade — 1960
tenth grade — 1961
eleventh grade — 1962
twelfth grade — 1963
In 1963 and thereafter all Negro applicants to all classes
shall be admitted on the same basis upon which they would
be admitted if they were white.
5. Commencing September, 1957 applications for admis
sion or transfer by Negro children not qualified for admis
sion or transfer under paragraph 4 to high schools under
defendants’ control will be considered and granted if the
applicants fulfill special qualifications pertaining to the
probability of success of each individual pupil. These
qualifications will be measured by intelligence and achieve
ment tests, grade level achievements and other similar
matters to be adjudged by a committee consisting of the
3a
Judgment
principals of the schools from which the pupil is transfer
ring and the school to which he desires to transfer, the
Director of Instruction and the county supervisors work
ing in these schools. Apart from the fact that these condi
tions may be applied only to Negro students not qualified
for admission under paragraph 4 no racial distinction is
to be made in the administration of these tests and evalua
tions. Such applications may be made to the Board of
Education between July 1 and July 15 of 1957 and years
following in which these tests may be given.
6. Infant plaintiff Moore shall be admitted to the
sixth grade at the Bel Air School. Infant plaintiff Spriggs
shall be admitted to the eighth grade at Edgewood High
School.
7. No racial distinctions whatsoever shall be made by
defendants in treating Negro children who have been
admitted to schools pursuant to this decree.
8. This Court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of
granting any other relief that may become necessary.
4a
T homskn, Chief Judge.
This action, brought by four Negro children seeking ad
mission to certain public schools in Harford County, Mary
land, present: (1) the usual questions under Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed.
873; Id., 349 U. S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083; (2)
the same questions of law which were raised by the de
fendants in Robinson v. Board of Education, D. C. D. Md.,
143 F. Supp. 481; and (3) a problem of equitable estoppel
arising out of a previous action brought by the plaintiffs
herein and others against the defendants herein, which was
dismissed by the plaintiffs in reliance upon a resolution
adopted by the defendants, the Board of Education of Har
ford County.
F acts
Harford County is predominately rural, but in the
southern portion of the county there are two large govern
ment reservations, the Aberdeen Proving Ground at Aber
deen, and the Army Chemical Center at Edgewood. On
these reservations there are non-segregated housing de
velopments.
There are approximately 12,600 white students and 1,400
Negro students in the public schools of Harford County.
The defendant Board of Education operates a 6-3-3 sys
tem; that is, 6 years of elementary school, 3 years of jun
ior high and 3 years of senior high. The white high schools,
at Bel Air, Bush’s Comer (North Harford), Edgewood,
Aberdeen, and Havre de Grace, are combination junior-
senior high schools; the colored schools, at Hickory and
Havre de Grace, are “ consolidated schools” , comprising
elementary, junior high and senior high classes.
Opinion of November 23, 1956
5a
On June 30, 1955, just one month after the second opin
ion in Brown v. Board of Education, the Board of Educa
tion of Harford County selected a Citizens Consultant Com
mittee of thirty-six members from all sections of the county,
five of whom were Negroes, to consider the problem of
desegregation of the public schools in Harford Comity
and to make reconnnendations to the Board of Education.
On July 27, 1955, a group of Negro parents petitioned
the Board of Education, calling upon them “ to take imme
diate steps to reorganize the public schools under your
jurisdiction on a nondiscriminatory basis.”
The Citizens Consultant Committee held its first meet
ing on August 15, 1955, and was split up into a number of
sub-committees, to consider facilities, transportation and
. social relationships respectively. A member of the staff
of the Board of Education served as consultant to each sub
committee. The sub-committees met at various times dur
ing the rest of the year 1955 and the first two months of
1956.
On November 29, 1955, the four infant plaintiffs in the
instant case, together with seventeen other Negro children,
through their parents and next friends, brought suit in this
court against the defendants herein (Civil Action No. 8615),
alleging that the Board had “ refused to desegregate the
schools within its jurisdiction and has not devised a plan
for such desegregation,” and praying that:
“ 1. The court advance this cause on the docket
and order a speedy hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction and the application for per
manent injunction according to law and that upon
such hearings:
“ 2. The Court enter preliminary and permanent
judgments that any orders, customs, practices, and
usages pursuant to which said plaintiffs are segre
Opinion of November 23, 1956
6a
gated in tlieir schooling because of race, violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con
stitution.
“ 3. The Court issue preliminary injunctions or
dering the defendants to promptly present a plan
of desegregation to this Court which will expedi
tiously desegregate the schools in Harford County
and forever restrain and enjoin the defendants and
each of them from thereafter requiring these plain
tiffs and all other Negroes of public school age to
attend or not to attend public schools in Harford
County because of race.
“ The Court allow plaintiffs their costs and such
other relief as may appear to the Court to be just. ”
On February 27, 1956, the Citizens Consultant Commit
tee held a meeting, at which all of the sub-committees pre
sented their final reports, and the full committee unani
mously adopted the following resolution:
“ To recommend to the Board of Education for
Harford County that any child regardless of race
may make individual application to the Board of Ed
ucation to be admitted to a school other than the
one attended by such child, and the admissions to be
granted by the Board of Education in accordance
with such rules and regulations as it may adopt and
in accordance with the available facilities in such
schools; effective for the school year beginning Sep
tember, 1956.”
On March 7, 1956, the Board of Education of Harford
County adopted the resolution as submitted by the Citizens
Consultant Committee.
Opinion of November 23, 1956
Opinion of November 23, 1956
On March 9, 1956, Civil Action No. 8615 came on for
hearing before me on defendants’ motion to dismiss the
complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
28 U. S. C. A. At the beginning of the hearing, counsel for
defendants advised the court that the Board of Education
of Harford County had “ approved or adopted” the recom
mendation offered by the Citizens Consultant Committee
and read the resolution into the record. lie then said:
*1 Since that plan embraces the relief prayed for, I think
that takes care of that, and I want to call that to Your
Honor’s attention.” Counsel for plaintiffs then said:
“ We are in a position to enter into a consent decree em
bodying the terms of this resolution. We would like to
discuss it, but I do not think there is any need for further
litigation.” Counsel for the defendants replied: “ I do
not think that the Court should enter a consent decree when
the relief prayed for is the policy adopted by the Board.
I think the complaint should be dismissed in open court
because there is really nothing before the Court to effectu
ate.” I then left the bench so that counsel could discuss
the matter more freely. When court reconvened the fol
lowing colloquy took place:
“ Mr. Greenberg: We discussed this resolution
that has been adopted by the School Board and we
have told counsel for the defendants that we are sure
they are proceeding in good faith and this plan is
acceptable to us, and we will dismiss our suit and
make that a matter of record in open court, and file
this.
“ Mr. Barnes: That’s agreeable to the defend
ants, your Honor.
“ The Court: I think it would be well to have the
record show that in view of the fact that you have
been presented with this you olfered to dismiss the
suit, and attach this paper as an exhibit.
8a
“ Mr. Greenberg: Yes, sir.
“ The Court: I am very happy this has worked
out in a very satisfactory way.”
The following stipulation, signed by counsel for all par
ties, was filed in the case on the same day:
“ Dismissal of Action
“ 1. This cause came to be heard in this Court on
motion to dismiss the 9th day of March, 1956.
“ 2. Defendants, by their counsel, presented to
the Court the attached Resolution of the Harford
County Citizens Consultant Committee, adopted by
the Harford County Board of Education, as sub
mitted, at its regular meeting on March 7, 1956.
“ 3. Relying upon said resolution, as adopted,
plaintiffs hereby withdraw their complaint, and pray
that the same be dismissed, costs to be paid by
plaintiffs.”
To this stipulation was attached a certified copy of the
resolution recommended by the Citizens Consultant Com
mittee and adopted by the Harford County Board of Edu
cation.
On June 6,1956, the Board of Education adopted the fol
lowing “ Transfer Policy” , which all parties agree was
reasonable:
“ I f a child desires to attend a school other than
the one in which he is enrolled or registered, it will
be necessary for his parents to request a transfer.
Applications for transfer are available on request.
These requests should be addressed to the Board of
Education, c /o Superintendent of Schools, Bel Air,
Maryland. Applications will be received by the
Opinion of November 23,1956
9a
Board of Education between June 15 and July 15,
1956. All applications for transfer must state the
reason for the request, and must be approved by
the principal of the school which the pupil is now
attending.
“ Applications for transfer will be handled
through the usual and normal channels now operating
under the jurisdiction of the Board of Education and
its executive officer, the Superintendent of Schools.
“ While the Board has no intentions of compel
ling a pupil to attend a specific school or of denying
him the privilege of transferring to another school,
the Board reserves the right during the period of
transition to delay or deny the admission of a pupil
to any school, if it deems such action wise and neces
sary for any good and sufficient reason.
“ All applications for transfer, with recommenda
tions of the Superintendent of Schools, will be sub
mitted to the Board of Education for final considera
tion at the regular meeting of the Board on Wednes
day, August 1, 1956. When requests for transfer are
approved, parents must enroll their child at the
school on the regular summer registration date,
Friday, August 24, 1956.”
The transfer policy was advertised in all newspapers
published in Harford County. Sixty applications for trans
fer of Negro pupils were submitted within the time specified.
On August 1, 1956, the Board of Education of Harford
County adopted a “ Desegregation Policy” , embodied in a
document which recited the appointment of the Citizens
Consultant Committee, the recommendation made by that
Committee, the resolution adopted by the Board of Educa
tion on March 7, 1956, and the transfer policy adopted by
the Board in June. The statement of Desegregation Policy
continued as follows:
Opinion of November 23, 1956
10a
“ The Supreme Court decision, which required
desegregation of public schools, provided for an or
derly, gradual transition based on the solution of
varied local school problems. The resolution of the
Harford County Citizens Consultant Committee is
in accord with this principle. The report of this
committee leaves the establishment of policies based
on the assessing of local conditions of housing,
transportation, personnel, educational standards,
and social relationships to the discretion of the
Board of Education.
“ The first concern of the Board of Education
must always be that of providing the best possible
school system for all of the children of Harford
County. Several studies made in areas where com
plete desegregation has been practiced have indi
cated a lowering of school standards that is detri
mental to all children. Experience in other areas has
also shown that bitter local opposition to desegre
gation in a school system not only prevents an
orderly transition, but also adversely affects the
whole educational program.
“ With these factors in mind, the Harford County
Board of Education has adopted a policy for a
gradual, but orderly, program for desegregation of
the schools of Harford County. The Board has
approved applications for the transfer of Negro
pupils from colored to white schools in the first
three grades in the Edgewood Elementary School
and the Halls Cross Roads Elementary School.
Children living in these areas are already living in
integrated housing, and the adjustments will not
be so great as in the rural areas of the county where
such relationships do not exist. With the exception
of two small schools, these are the only elementary
buildings in which space is available for additional
pupils at the present time.
Opinion of November 23,1956
11a
“ Social problems posed by the desegregation of
schools must be given careful consideration. These
can be solved with the least emotionalism when
younger children are involved. The future rate of
expansion of this program depends upon the suc
cess of these initial steps.”
Pursuant to the Desegregation Policy so adopted,
fifteen of the sixty applications were granted, and forty-
five, including those of the infant plaintiffs in the instant
case, were refused. On August 7, 1956, the defendant
Charles W. Willis, Superintendent of Schools, sent the
following letter to the parents of each of the infant plain
tiffs :
“ The Board of Education, at its regular August
meeting, adopted a policy for the desegregation of
Harford County schools. Under the provisions of
this policy your child will not be allowed to transfer
from his present school. Your request for a trans
fer has been refused by the Board of Education.
“ A copy of the desegregation policy is enclosed.”
Neither the infant plaintiffs nor their parents appealed
to the State Board of Education from the action of the
County Superintendent denying their requests for transfer.
Nor have any appeals been filed by or on behalf of any of
the other Negro children whose requests for transfer were
refused.
On August 28, 1956, the four infant plaintiffs by their
parents and next friends filed the instant suit, pursuant to
Rule 23(a)(3), “ for themselves and on behalf of all other
Negroes similarly situated” , alleging most of the facts set
out above and other facts, some of which are disputed,
which need not be detailed at this time.
Infant plaintiff Moore seeks transfer from the Central
Consolidated Elementary School in Hickory to the elemen
Opinion of November 23,1956
12a
tary school in Bel Air, where he resides; Spriggs seeks
transfer from the school in Hickory to the High School
(junior high) in Edgewood, where he resides; Slade and
Garland seek transfer from the Havre de Grace Consoli
dated School to the Aberdeen High School (9th and 11th
grades respectively). They pray that:
“ 1. The Court advance this cause on the docket
and order a speedy hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction and application for perma
nent injunction according to law and that upon such
hearing;
‘ ‘ 2. The Court enter preliminary and permanent
judgments, that any orders, customs, practices and
usages pursuant to which said plaintiffs are each of
them, their lessees, agents and successors in office
from denying to plaintiffs and other Negro residents
of Harford County of the State of Maryland admis
sion to any Public School operated and maintained
by the Board of Education of Harford County, on
account of race and color.” (sic)
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pur
suant to Rule 12(b), raising substantially the same points
which were considered in Robinson v. Board of Education
of St. Mary’s County, supra. I overruled that motion on
October 5, 1956. Defendants filed their answer on October
24, and the case was set for hearing on November 14. Both
sides offered testimony and documentary evidence. From
the testimony it appears that most, but not all, of the schools
in Harford County are overcrowded if the “ standards”
or “ goals” set out by the State are considered, namely, an
average of 30 per class in elementary schools and 25 per
class in secondary schools. But defendants conceded that
any white children moving into the county would be ad
mitted to the appropriate white school, however crowded.
Opinion of November 23,1956
13a
The factors considered by the Board of Education in adopt
ing the August 1 Desegregation Policy were discussed at
some length. The President of the Board of Education and
the County Superintendent testified that they did not con
sult counsel before adopting the August 1 Desegregation
Policy, but that they thought this policy was in accord
with the recommendation of the Citizens Consultant Com
mittee and with the March 7 resolution adopted by the
Board.
Plaintiffs ’ counsel do not charge bad faith against either
the Board or the Superintendent, but contend that:
“ I. The Harford County School Board Resolu
tion of March 7, 1956, meant that from the follow
ing school year and thereafter there would be no
legally compelled racial segregation of school chil
dren in Harford County;
‘ ‘ II. The defendants are estopped from any fur
ther delay in complete integration by their action in
causing plaintiffs to withdraw plaintiffs’ original
suit in reliance on the Board’s resolution, which
resolution was expressly incorporated by reference
into the court’s order of dismissal;
“ III. Plaintiffs are entitled to judicial rather
than administrative relief at this time in view of
the history and facts of this case;
“ A. Defendants, by their actions, are estopped
from asserting the doctrine of administrative ex
haustion as a defense;
“ B. Even if defendants were not estopped from
raising the defense of the doctrine of administrative
exhaustion, the defense would neverthelss fail as the
doctrine is not here applicable;
“ IV. Even if defendants could validly raise the
questions of necessary administrative delay, their
Opinion of November 23, 1956
14a
own actions clearly demonstrate the fact that no
additional time is needed to solve administrative
problems;
“ A. Defendants are administratively ready to
effectuate desegregation;
“ B. ‘ Community unreadiness’ constitutes no
legal justification for continued segregation.”
D iscussion
[1] The Maryland statutes and decisions were analyzed
in Robinson v. Board of Education of St. Mary’s County,
supra, 143 F. Supp. at pages 487-491. I adhere to that
analysis, and it need not be repeated here. It is clear that
some of the factors considered by defendants in the instant
case when they adopted the August 1 Desegregation Policy,
and some of the points argued by counsel for plaintiffs in
opposition thereto, involve administrative problems, over
which the State Board of Education has jurisdiction, and
which should be appealed to that Board under the Maryland
authorities. Some of the other factors and points involve
legal questions, which under Maryland law are for the
courts. Most, if not all, involve both administrative and
legal problems. Even the estoppel point is a mixed ques
tion, because the March 7 resolution leaves open at least
the question of available facilities, whatever other matters
may have been foreclosed.
Whether the court should attempt to segregate the legal
questions and decide them at this time, or should defer any
decision until the State Board has been given an oppor
tunity to pass on the problem as an integrated whole, is a
matter of comity and discretion. Since, at the time of the
hearing in the St. Mary’s County case, the State Board
assured the court that it will give prompt attention to any
Opinion of November 23,1956
15a
appeal filed by or on behalf of Negro students, I am satisfied
that I should not make a final decision in this case until
the plaintiffs have appealed to the State Board from the
action of the County Superintendent denying their applica
tions for transfer. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.
294, 75 S. Ct. 753; Hood v. Board of Trustees of Sumter
County School District No. 2, 4 Cir., 232 F. 2d 626; Carson
v. Board of Education of McDowell County, 4 Cir., 227 F.
2d 789; Robinson v. Board of Education of St. Mary’s
County, D. C. D. Md., 143 F. Supp. 481. However, the final
decision in this court, if one is necessary after the State
Board has acted, should be rendered within such time that
the losing parties may have an appeal heard by the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit at its June, 1957 term.
Conclusions
[2] 1. The appointment of the Citizens Consultant
Committee in the summer of 1955, its study, resulting in
its recommendation to the Board of Education, and the
resolution adopted by the Board on March 7, 1956, were
a prompt and reasonable start toward compliance with
the Supreme Court ruling.
2. I intimate no opinion at this time with respect to
the sufficiency or propriety of the Desegregation Policy
adopted by the Board on August 1, 1956.
3. I will enter a decree dismissing this action unless
the plaintiffs appeal to the State Board of Education on
or before December 15, 1956, from the action of the County
Superintendent refusing their applications for transfer.
I f plaintiffs enter such an appeal, I will stay further pro
ceedings in this case until the State Board shall have
decided the appeal or shall have delayed decision for an
unreasonable time; provided that after the State Board
shall have rendered its decision, or after March 1, 1957,
whichever is earlier, either plaintiffs or defendants may
request the court to set this case for further argument
and prompt decision.
Opinion of November 23, 1956
16a
T homsen, Chief Judge.
This action was brought by four Negro children, on
their own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated,
seeking admission to certain public schools in Harford
County, Maryland. The background and first stages of
the case are detailed in an opinion filed herein on Novem
ber 23, 1956, D. C., 146 F. Supp. 91.
Following that opinion, the four plaintiffs and eight
other children, who have asked and been granted leave
to intervene in this case, filed appeals with the State Board
o f Education from the refusal of the Superintendent of
Schools of Harford County to grant their applications for
transfer from consolidated schools for colored children to
various white schools which were not desegregated in Sep
tember, 1956.
While those appeals were pending before the State
Board, on February 6, 1957, the Harford County Board
adopted the following “ Extension of the Desegregation
Policy for 1957-1958” :
“ Applications for transfers will be accepted from
pupils who wish to attend elementary schools in the
areas where they live, if space is available in such
schools. Space will be considered available in
schools that were not more than 10% overcrowded
as of February 1, 1957. All capacities are based on
the state and national standard of thirty pupils
per classroom.
“ Under the above provision, applications will be
accepted for transfer to all elementary schools ex
cept Old Post Road, Forest Hill, Bel Air, Highland,
Jarrettsville, the sixth grade at the Edgewood High
School, and Dublin. Such applications must be
made during the month of May on a regular applica
tion form furnished by the Board of Education, and
Opinion of June 20, 1957
17a
must be approved by both the child’s classroom
teacher and the principal of the school the child is
now attending.
“ All applications will be reviewed at the regular
June meeting of the Board of Education and pupils
and their parents will be informed of the action
taken on their applications prior to the close of
school in June, 1957.”
After a hearing, the State Board dismissed the appeals,
finding that “ the Harford County Board acted within the
policy established by the State Board” , that “ the County
Superintendent acted in good faith within the authority set
forth in the August 1, 1956, Desegregation Policy adopted
by the County Board” ,1 that the Desegration Policy was
adopted in a bona fide effort to make a reasonable start
toward actual desegregation of the Harford County pub
lic schools” , and that “ this initial effort [the desegrega
tion of three grades in two elementary schools] has been
carried out without any untoward incidents” . The State
Board also took ‘ ‘ cognizance of the resolution of the County
Board of February 6, 1957” , set out above herein, “ as well
as the testimony to the effect that the proposed Harford
County Junior College, which is to be established in Bel Air
in the fall of 1957, will open on a desegregated basis, and
also the testimony to the effect that the present program
of new buildings and additions will make further desegre
gation possible” .
After the decision of the State Board, plaintiffs set this
case for further hearing, as provided in the earlier decree,
146 F. Supp. at page 98. That hearing was held on April
18, 1957. Charles W. Willis, the Harford County Super
intendent, explained and amplified the February 6, 1957
resolution of the County Board. The President of the
Opinion of June 20, 1957
1 See 146 F. Supp. at page 95.
18a
Board and its counsel accepted that interpretation. So
explained and amplified, the plan was substantially the
same as the plan which was later adopted by the County
Board on May 1, 1957, as follows:
“ The Board reviewed its desegregation policy
of February 6, 1957. In accordance with this plan,
the following elementary schools will be open in all
six grades to Negro pupils at the beginning of the
1957-1958 school year:
“ Emmorton Elementary School
“ Edgewood Elementary School
“ Aberdeen Elementary School
“ Halls Cross Roads Elementary School
“ Perryman Elementary School
“ Churchville Elementary School
“ Youth’s Benefit Elementary School
“ Slate Ridge Elementary School
“ Darlington Elementary School
“ Havre de Grace Elementary School
“ 6th Grade at Aberdeen High School
“ Schools now under construction or contem
plated for construction in 1958, if no unforeseen
delays occur, will automatically open all elementary
schools to Negro pupils by September, 1959. As a
result of new construction, the elementary schools
at Old Post Road, Bel Air, and Highland will accept
applications for transfer of Negro pupils for the
school year beginning in September, 1958. Forest
Hill, Jarrettsville, Dublin and the sixth grade at
the Edgewood High School would receive applica
tions for the school year beginning in September,
1959.
“ As a normal result of this plan, sixth grade
graduates will be admitted to junior high schools
for the first time in September, 1958 and will pro-
Opinion of June 20, 1957
19a
ceed through high schools in the next higher grade
each year. This will completely desegregate all
schools of Harford County by September, 1963.
“ The Board will continue to review this situation
monthly and may consider earlier admittance of
Negro pupils to the white high schools if such seems
feasible. The Board reaffirmed its support of this
plan as approved by the State Board of Education.”
At the April, 1957 hearing. I ruled tentatively that
the plan was generally satisfactory for the elementary
grades, but not for the high school grades, and suggested
that the parties attempt to agree on a modified plan. Con
ferences between counsel were held, but no agreement was
reached. The County Board, however, on June 5, 1957,
modified the plan as follows:
“ The Board reaffirmed its basic plan for the
desegregation of Harford County Schools, but agreed
to the following modification for consideration of
transfers to the high schools during the in terim
period while the plan is becoming fully effective.
“ Beginning in September, 1957, transfers will be
considered for admission to the high schools of Har
ford County. Any student wishing to transfer to a
school nearer his home must make application to the
Board of Education between July 1 and July 15.
Such application will be evaluated by a committee
consisting of the high school principals of the two
schools concerned, the Director of Instruction, and
the county supervisors working in these schools.
“ These applications will be approved or disap
proved on the basis of the probability of success and
adjustment of each individual pupil, and the commit-
tee will utilize the best professional measures of both
achievement and adjustment that can be obtained
in each individual situation. This will include, but
Opinion of June 20, 1957
20a
not be limited to, the results of both standardized
intelligence and achievement tests, with due con
sideration being given to grade level achievements,
both with respect to ability and with respect to the
grade into which transfer is being requested.
“ The Board of Education and its professional
staff will keep this problem under constant and con
tinuous observation and study.”
The modified plan was presented to the court at a hear
ing on June 11, 1957. It was made clear that when an
elementary school has been desegregated., all Negro chil
dren living in the area served by that school will have the
same right to attend the school that a white child living
in the same place would have, and the same option to attend
that school or the appropriate consolidated school that a
white child will have. The same rule will apply to the high
schools, all of which operate at both junior high and senior
high levels, as they become desegregated, grade by grade.
Of course, the County Board will have the right to make
reasonable regulations for the administration of its schools,
so long as the regulations do not discriminate against
anyone because of his race; the special provisions of the
June 5, 1957 resolution will apply only during the transition
period.
[1] Willis also testified that the applications which will
be made pursuant to the June 5, 1957 modification will be
approved or disapproved on the basis of educational fac
tors, for the best interests of the student, and not for other
reasons. I have confidence in the integrity, ability and
fairness of Superintendent Willis and of the principals,
supervisors and others who will make the decisions under
his direction. In the light of that confidence, I must decide
whether the modified plan meets the tests laid down in the
Opinion of June 20, 1957
21a
opinions of the Supreme Court and of the Fourth Circuit,2
with such guidance as may be derived from other decisions.3
The burden of proof is on defendants to show that a delay
during a transition period is necessary, that the reasons
for the delay are reasons which the court can accept under
the constitutional rule laid down by the Supreme Court, and
that the proposed plan is equitable under all the circum
stances. In considering whether defendants have met that
burden, the court must recognize that each county has a
different combination of administrative problems, tradi
tions and character. Many counties are predominantly
rural, others suburban; some have large industrial areas
or military reservations. See 146 F. Supp. at page 92.
[2] Eleven out of the eighteen elementary schools in
Harford County will be completely desegregated in Sep
tember, 1957, three months from now. Three more will be
completely desegregated in 1958, and the remaining four
in 1959. The reason for the delay in desegregating the
seven schools is that the county board and superintendent
believe that the problems which accompany desegregation
can best be solved in schools which are not overcrowded and
where the teachers are not handicapped by having too
many children in one class. That factor would not justify
unreasonable delay; but in the circumstances of this case
it justifies the one or two years delay in desegregating the
seven schools.
Opinion of June 20, 1957
2 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753,
99 L. Ed. 1083; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 74
S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873; Carson v. Warlick, 4 Cir., 238 F. 2d 724;
Carson v. Board of Education of McDowell County, 4 Cir., 227
F. 2d 789.
3 Aaron v. Cooper, D. C. E. D. Ark., 143 F. Supp. 855; Kelley
v. Board of Education of the City of Nashville, M. D. Tenn., 2 Race
Rel. L. Rep. 21 (1957). Cf Mitchell v. Pollock, W. D. Ky„ 2 Race
Rel. L. Rep 305 (1957).
22a
With respect to the high schools, other factors are
involved. Superintendent Willis testified that when a child
transfers to a high school from another high seiiool he
faces certain problems which do not arise when he enters
the seventh grade, which is the lowest grade in the Harford
County high schools. After a year or so in the high schools
social groups, athletic groups and subject-interest groups
have begun to crystallize, friendships and attachments have
been made, cliques have begun to develop. A child trans
ferring to the school from another high school does not have
the support of a group with whom he has passed through
elementary school. A Negro child transferring to an upper
grade at this time would not have the benefit of older
brothers, sisters or cousins already in the school, or parents,
relatives or friends who have been active in the P. T. A.
High school teachers generally, with notable exceptions,
are less “ pupil conscious” and more “ subject conscious”
than teachers trained for elementary grades, and because
each teacher has the class for only one or two subjects, are
less likely to help in the readjustment. The Harford County
Board had sound reasons for making the transition on a
year to year basis, so that most Negro children will have a
normal high school experience, entering in the seventh grade
and continuing through the same school. But I was un
willing in April to approve a plan which would prevent all
Negro children now in the sixth grade or above from ever
attending a desegregated high school.
However, the modified plan adopted on June 5, 1957,
permits any Negro child to apply next month for transfer
to a presently white high school, and if his application is
granted, to be admitted in September, 1957, three months
hence. This plan is different from any to which my atten
tion has been called or about which I have read. It is an
equitable way of handling the transition period. My only
doubt is whether it is necessary to postpone until September,
Opinion of June 20, 1957
23a
1958, the complete desegregation of the seventh grade. But
I am not charged with the responsibility of administering
the Harford County public school system. Although I
think the reasons given for the delay of one year are less
satisfactory than the reasons given for the rest of the
plan, a federal court should be slow to say that the line
must be drawn here and cannot reasonably be drawn there,
where the difference in time is short and individual rights
are reasonably protected, during the transition period,
as they are by the June 5, 1957 modification.
[3] Plaintiffs are obviously worried whether the June
5 plan will be carried out in good faith, or whether it will
be used as a means of postponing the admission of Negro
children into the high schools without proper justification.
Although, as I have said, I have confidence in Superin
tendent Willis and his staff, plaintiffs’ doubts are not un
reasonable in view of the past history of this litigation.
I will, therefore, enter a decree which will spell out the
rights of individual children under the plan, and will
retain jurisdiction of the case, so that if any child or his
parents feel that his application has been rejected for a
reason not authorized by the modified plan, a prompt hear
ing may be granted.
There remains the question of estoppel, based upon
the resolution adopted by the County Board on March
7, 1956, and the interpretation of that resolution by its
counsel in open court in the earlier Harford County case,
as a result of which the plaintiffs therein dismissed their
action. The facts on this point are set out fully in 146
F. Supp. 93 et seq.
[4] The March 7, 1956 resolution was somewhat
ambiguous, but, as it was interpreted by defendants’ coun
sel in open court, plaintiffs were justified in believing, as
I did, that applications for transfer would be considered
without regard to the race of the applicant. The County
Opinion of June 20, 1957
24a
Board interpreted it differently in the statement entitled
“ Desegregation Policy” adopted on August 1, 1956; see
146 F. Supp. at page 95. I cannot accept the interpreta
tion adopted by the County Board, but I fold that it was
adopted as a result of a mistake and not as the result of
any bad faith on the part of the Board, the Superintendent,
or their counsel. The Board adopted the Desegregation
Policy of August, 1956, in the honest belief that it was to
the best interests of all of the children in the County.
Pursuant to that policy the Superintendent admitted
fifteen Negro children to two previously white schools,
but denied admission to forty-five others, including the
infant plaintiffs herein.
There is grave doubt whether a governmental agency
such as a county school board can be estopped from adopt
ing a policy, otherwise legal, which it believes to be in the
best interests of all the people in the County. In the instant
case it would be inequitable and improper, on the ground
of estoppel, to require the County Board to open all schools
to Negroes immediately, as requested in the complaint.
The County Board should not be foreclosed by the facts
which I have found from taking.such actions, and adopt
ing and modifying such policies, as it believes to be in the
best interest of the people in the County, so long as those
actions and those policies are constitutional.
[5] The individual plaintiffs in the earlier case, how
ever, were prevented from pressing their individual rights
in this court and on appeal by the adoption of the March
7, 1956 resolution and by what took place in this court
in that case. See 146 F. Supp. 93 et seq. Two of those
infant plaintiffs are before the court in this case, and their
counsel urge that their individual rights, as well as any
class rights, be enforced. The reasons which prevent an
estoppel against the County Board so far as its general
Opinion of June 20, 1957
25a
Opinion of June 20, 1957
policies are concerned, do not apply with equal force to
the individual claims of those two children. It would not
be equitable to delay any further the enforcement of their
individual rights.
I will, therefore, include in the decree a provision
enjoining the County Board from refusing to admit Stephen
Moore and Dennis Spriggs to whatever school would be
appropriate for them if they were white.
26a
Excerpts from Testimony
* # *
Direct testimony of Charles W. W illis, Superintendent
of Schools.
[15 j Q. How many Negro children applied? A. We had
59 applications, and there was a mix-up on one that we
later admitted.
[16] Q. Well, approximately? A. That made 60.
Q. How many Negro children are there in the County
School System altogether? A. A little over 1400 at the
present time.
Q. How many white children are there in the County
School System? A. About 12,600, roughly ten percent Ne
gro children, about 14,000 children.
Q. That is 60 children of the total school population
out of how many ? A. 14,000.
Q. And how many Negro children were admitted? A.
Fifteen.
Q. Now, what was the reason for admitting fifteen and
rejecting the other forty-five? A. The main reason why
was we had facilities in the areas where the children were
admitted, and we had integrated housing in those areas,
and we felt that we would have less social adjustment prob
lems in the lower grades, and this was the beginning of
the plan of gradual integration, and we felt that that would
work in our System.
We had studied all we could find out about previous at
tempts and we had found out that trouble usually arose in
[17] rural areas, quite a bit more from rural areas, and
we had committees from these rural areas, protest any
action on the part of the Board, and this seemed like the
most workable plan.
27a
Q. Was there an absence of facilities to admit the forty-
live who desired admission? A. In some places, yes.
Q. For how many places? A. Well, I can’t exactly say
specifically because I don’t know just where the applica
tions were from, which schools they were made from.
Mr. Barnes: Maybe you had better ask him
about a specific school. Ask him about a specific
school.
The Court: Eventually 1 want to know about the
four applications as well as the others.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Now, in what instances was there an absence of facil-
itiesities— that is, tell us in something more than just gen
eral terms—with respect to not admitting any of these
forty-five applicants who desired admission. A. That was
from the area in Bel Air, Havre de Grace, Aberdeen. Jar-
rettsville, Highland, Churchville, Youth Benefit.
Mr. Greenberg: Should I give him the list?
The Witness: Yes, sir, 1 better look at it to be
sure.
Old Post Road, Einmerton, Aberdeen, Youth
Benefit, Forest Hill, Churchville, Bel Air.
[18] The Court: Jarrettsville.
Mr. Greenberg: Churchville.
The Witness: Highland. Dublin, Havre de
Grace. Those are Elementary Schools,
The Court: Well, Aberdeen Elementary, Bel Air
Elementary.
The Witness: All of those are Elementary.
The Court: All of those Elementary?
The Witness: Yes, not high schools. Bel Air.
Charles W. Willis—Direct
28a
The Court: A matter of facilities?
The Witness: Yes. North Harford. Edgewood.
The Court: Jarrettsville.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Mr. Willis, are you aware that the Citizens Consult
ant Committee reported that there is an excess of space in
the Havre de Grace Elementary and High School? A.
No, I was not aware they reported on the Havre de Grace
Elementary School, no.
Q. Well, look at page 4. A. Well, this is a four-room
affair, and we had this abandoned school building, and this
is used for purposes of special education.
Q. What about the high school? A. The high school I
didn’t list.
[19] The Court: You just said.
The Witness: The Havre de Grace High School,
no, I didn’t include that.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. You listed about fifteen schools in which there was
supposed to be an absence of facilities; is that correct? A.
Yes, sir, according to the standards that are used na
tionally.
Q. That would be an average of about three Negro chil
dren out of the total in those schools, and if there were
white children that moved into the area, would they be
admitted? A. They would be admitted.
Q. So it is not the absence of facilities but the fact
that the children were Negro; is that correct? A. I would
say that is not exactly it, no. We have to consider a lot
of factors including the transportation factor, which is one
Charles W. Willis—Direct
29a
of the big things in the County, as we transport over 14,000
children, and I think there is the plan, 1 mean tire idea of
adjusting the tiling and if you wish, let me explain it.
Q. Not at this time, no.
The Court: 1 think you should let him explain
it if he wishes to do so.
The Witness: Now, I would like to describe it
in this way, your Honor. When tire original opin
ion, the original [20] opinion of the Supreme Court
came out in 1954, the first opinion, the members of
tire Board of Education felt about these clearly in
needed facilities in the schools and were approached
by a great many people particularly in our rural
areas about how impossible it was at the time for us
to do anything along these lines.
The Court: In the matter of—
The Witness: In the matter of integration, and
it was the thought that if we would do it gradually in
a matter of starting off in one area which was bet
ter prepared for the integration program than in
another area we should do it that way, we would
have a better chance of success in these schools.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. If white persons moved from Delaware or Virginia
or elsewhere, moved into Harford County, that is at the
present time, such as to work in an industrial plant, would
their children be admitted to the schools at the present
time? A. Yes, sir, they would.
* * *
[33] Q. Why did you and the Board integrate the first
three grades in Bel Air Elementary— Edgewood Elemen
tary School and [34] Hall Cross Roads School and not
Charles W. Willis—Direct
30a
the other grades in these and the other schools in Har
ford County? A. For these reasons: One reason was
that space was limited in these schools; two, the people
were used to living together in integrated housing and
working together in areas of industrialization, and we also
had been informed by Mr. Wilson, our attorney, that the
suggestion to begin with a control area had been made last
year, and we got the impression that the feeling was that
if we could start in an area of decontrol than any other
place we had a much better chance of success.
Q. Well, were there any other reasons that moved the
Board? A. One was that in these specific areas we found
that little children had no prejudices; they can adjust more
easily than older children who have fixed prejudices, or as
adults, and also there is the problem that if you begin with
children putting them together that their social adjust
ments are much easier, they can adjust themselves more
readily, and are more emotionally stable, and this seemed
a more favorable climate in which to work, and our experi
ence has shown that what we have done is working satis
factorily, and the children are getting along all right and
satisfactorily.
Q. And it was for those reasons that the Board an
nounced [35] its desegregation policy of August 1st, 1956
that you denied these applications on August 7th, 1956? A.
I had no other reason except this that—
Q. Yes. A. —that the Board is primarily concerned
with the educational problem, and they were interested in
everyone getting the best possible education and also1 in the
non-interference with the advancement or extension of the
whole educational program, and we read in the papers,
principally in Delaware and other places that these things
have caused problems, trouble with the integration prob
lem, which was something that could affect the whole school
system.
Charles W. Willis—Direct
31a
Mr. Greenberg: 1 move to strike out this testi
mony, Your Honor, problems in Delaware, and so
on, there is no eveidence that any of those things
have any effect here, and in addition to that, I sub
mit that it is totally irrelevant.
The Court: Well, if it is one of the things that
influenced them it may be an important considera
tion. That was one of the points you are making.
# • *
[47] The Court: As to the next question, I will
allow [48] either side to object if they wish to object
because it is pretty close to what the Court has to
decide, but I take it that a decision on these ques
tions involves what might be called administrative
factors and policy factors, and that in any final de
cision they may be mixed.
What administrative reasons were there for re
fusing the transfer of each of these four children?
Mr. Barnes: Your Honor, don’t we have to define
what an administrative reason is or factor is?
The Court: Well, what he has said was that in
the case of two of the children there was an over
crowded condition in the Bel Air School. There
was an overcrowded condition in the Edgewood
school. There was no overcrowded condition in
Aberdeen.
Perhaps this is the way to put it: In making
your decision with respect to these sixty children,
did you consider the overcrowded condition of a
school, that is, an individual school, as a reason for
or a reason against transferring children, or was the
consideration of the overcrowded condition of the
individual school simply one of the factors considered
in adopting the general policy?
The Witness: I think there is a yes or no answer
which requires an explanation. I think the over-all
Charles W. Willis—Direct
32a
policy was predicated upon the things that I have
just mentioned [49] before which restricted the per
mission to transfer the first three grades, and within
that policy facilities were considered.
The Court: So that confining it to the first three
grades was a question of—
The Witness: Facilities.
The Court: —facilities.
The Witness: Yes, no—
The Court: No, so the question of confining it
to the first three grades was a question of policy.
That is, in the first three grades facilities were con
sidered?
The Witness: That is correct. That is what I
meant to say.
The Court: Was the decision to limit it to the two
schools, yours or the School Board’s?
The Witness: Well, I guess we come back to the
other statement that it was a matter of facilities in
the early schools that were available.
The Court: Were they the only two schools that
had the facilities available or were there a number
of other schools in which had facilities been available
to which a child might have been admitted if he had
applied ?
The Witness: There were two other schools, one
in Perryman and Darlington.
The Court: Two other schools were not over
crowded ?
[50] The Witness: That is correct.
The Court: And they were—and you say no
applications for Perryman?
The Witness: No.
The Court: And there was one application for
Darlington?
Charles W. Willis—Direct
33a
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: And that was refused?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: For policy reasons?
The Witness: Policy reasons I would say out
side of the original policy, yes.
The Court: Because it was a particularly sen
sitive spot?
The Witness: Yes, it is a very rural area, one
of our most rural areas.
The Court: I think that is all I have.
If either side wishes to ask any further questions
based upon the line I have opened up, you are wel
come to do so.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. When you speak of “ overcrowding” what do you
mean by overcrowding? What is your definition of over
crowding? A. Over thirty in an elementary and over
twenty-five in a high school.
[51] Q. Then in each of these schools when they have
that many they are overcrowded? A. No, you can’t say
that because in a high school you might have in one
class eight or ten or in another forty or forty-five.
Q. So you mean the over-all average? A. That is cor
rect. Those are the standard figures used in practically
all school analyses.
The Court: I think that is a fact that the Court
would have to find that you will have to use another
method of calculating crowding in the high and ele
mentary because there is a difference in courses.
The Witness: Yes.
Charles W. Willis—Direct
34a
Charles W. Willis—Direct
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. Now, in passing upon the application of each ap
plicant for transfer, did you look at the school to which he
applied, the grade in which he was applying and determine
that it was crowded or not crowded! A. Yes.
Q. You did that? A. Yes.
Q. And it turned out that the only two schools in Har
ford Comity that weren’t crowded were these two schools
to which the plaintiffs, or the two schools to which certain
applicants were seeking admission?
[52] The Court: I thought he said four.
The Witness: Yes.
By Mr. Greenberg:
Q. But if a white child had applied to any of the so-
called overcrowded schools he would have been admitted?
A. That’s correct.
The Court: Were there Negro schools in these
overcrowded also?
The Witness: Slightly, yes, but they are both
combination schools, part high and part elementary,
and you have to use both standards on them, but
they are just slightly over capacity.
The Court: Are they more overcrowded or less
overcrowded than white schools, or are they some
one way and some the other?
The Witness: I would say it would be about like
some of the others, your Honor, but I would like to
answer your question specifically this way that they
would have about a ten percent over their—they
would be about ten percent over their capacity based
upon the figures that we discussed before.
35a
David G. Harry—Cross
The Court: You are talking about the Hickory
Consolidated?
The Witness: Yes.
[53] The Court: Is about ten percent?
The Witness: About that point.
The Court: How about the Bel Air High school?
The Witness: That is about thirty-five percent.
It has a capacity of 690, and it ’s something like 800.
The Court: Is the Bdgewood High School any
more overcrowded than the Hickory Consolidated
School?
The Witness: I don’t think so. I think they are
probably about the same.
The Court: The other three were a matter of
policy?
The Witness: Yes.
# • •
Cross-examination of David 6 . H arry, President of
School Board.
[62] Q. You say these rural areas are sensitive areas;
is that correct? A. That is correct.
Q. And if these people moved in you would still refuse?
A. Well, it is part of the process of the educational system
in rural areas and when you find it is working in one part
of the County you have to work it out as a County System
and not as an individual system, and when you find it is
working in one part of the County you can move it to the
other parts of the County, but it was my opinion and the
opinion of the Board that we must limit it to the areas
which are at the present time integrated in housing and in
areas where the requests were greatest.
Q. So your reason was based on the fear that there
might be conflict or racial difficulties? A. That is my
feeling.
• * *
36a
[104] The Court: Why can’t you admit a child to the
seventh grade in 1957 ?
The Witness: (Mr. Willis) 1 can’t say why, your Honor,
but the policy was moving forward three years, and that
was all.
The Court: Is there any administrative reason as dis
tinguished from the considerations which may legally be
applied under the plan—I don’t want to limit the question;
I want to get everything—but what is the reason or reasons
why children cannot be admitted to Junior High School
in the fall of 1957 ?
You see, I am not in passing upon your plan passing
upon the validity of the reasons that you offer for that
plan. Some reasons I presume are valid; some reasons
are invalid.
I am not saying what the reasons are. Each one must
be applied to the facts of the particular case.
What is the reason why you can’t admit people to the
seventh grade?
The Witness: The only thing that I can say is that in
extending the policy it was a gradual, a policy of gradual
desegregation, and the Board in discussing it planned only
to extend it three years at this time.
The Court: That’s a matter of policy rather than [105]
a matter of administrative necessity.
The Witness: Or administrative convenience, and your
policy reasons have been stated in the evidence.
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: I want to be sure that when you have ad
ministrative reasons that they may be considered sepa
rately.
Now, I take it that you are allowing a child to enter the
seventh grade there, would you permit a transfer to the
eighth and ninth grades?
The Witness: The policy has not been extended beyond
that.
The Court: Well, are there administrative reasons for
saying that at the high school level children should start
Charles W. Willis—Direct
37a
at the seventh grade in junior high and the tenth grade in
senior high?
The Witness: I think nothing but policy reasons.
The Court: Nothing but policy reasons?
The Witness: That is correct.
The Court: It is a policy reason and there is no admin
istrative reason why you say the seventh grade in 1958
and not the eighth grade also, that it is only policy reasons.
The Witness: The only extension of the policy that
has been accepted for the reasons that have been given.
[106] The Court: And no administrative reasons?
The Witness: Well, I won’t say none, but at the mo
ment, I don’t think of any big one; let’s put it that way.
• # •
[157] Mr. Barnes: Well, here is what I am afraid of.
If you push this thing too fast, as my brother wants me
to do, you are going to have some incidents among the stu
dents themselves in these high schools until after this whole
problem has been developed in the lower grades when you
are not likely to have those problems, and the Board can
say honestly, “ We have tried it in the lower grades and
it worked well and there have been no incidents” , and you
go in with an entirely different atmosphere, not only from
the public viewpoint, and I think myself it ’s perfectly
absurd to say that you can’t give any consideration to
the public reaction in the public schools, but however that
may be, the reaction of the children themselves because,
if your Honor please, you can’t get away from the fact,
can’t help but reflect the attitudes of their parents par
ticularly in the adolescent age, and it ’s nonsense to say,
well because you don’t fear riots it has no effect upon the
pedagogical system of the county. It works on the minds
of the children.
If these colored children are not accepted, if they are
rejected, whether it be by cold indifference or by active
hostility, it is going to adversed affect their education.
Charles W. Willis—Direct
38a
[158] The Court: Well, isn’t that just what the Su
preme Court has said you can’t consider?
Mr. Barnes: No, I don’t think so, because that has to
do with the pedagogical system of education.
The Court: Well, if you can continue this prejudice
forever, then you will never get anywhere.
Mr. Barnes: No, not that.
The Court: You will never get anywhere.
Mr. Barnes: No, I agree you couldn’t continue it for
ever, that I am quite willing to concede; but where you
are making a bona fide effort to do it reasonably and ration
ally and to meet that problem, which we never have, cer
tainly within a reasonable time to my way of thinking.
This segregation situation has been with us for over a
century.
The Court: AVhat is going to be better in 1958 than
in 1957 ?
Mr. Barnes: Because you will have your complete ele
mentary schools practically completely integrated.
The Court: No, not completely integrated.
Mr. Barnes: No.
The Court: You will have two or three children who
will have graduated from the elementary schools, two or
three, or maybe a dozen, Negro children who will have had
one or two years in the elementary schools.
[159] Mr. Barnes: That is very important, it seems
to me.
The Court: And that’s all you are going to have.
Mr. Barnes: That’s true, and that’s important, it
seems to me.
The Court: And most of them are going to have one
year.
Mr. Barnes: Well, that’s so, because you have a prag
matic system as against a theoretical because the thing is,
will it work?
Charles W. Willis—Direct
39a
If I were going to theorize about this, I would say,
“ Well, nothing has ever happened, nothing is going to
happen” , and then it happens, what then?
Now, we have this system that has been adopted—
• • •
[175] Mrs. Mitchell: Your Honor, there has just been re
ceived this last resolution, and it is the first knowledge we
have received of any action of the Board of Education of
Harford County, and we would like to have the opportu
nity to go over the contents of the resolution which was
enacted on June 5, 1957, because we have not had an oppor
tunity to confer about it.
The Court: Well, a copy was given to me about five
minutes ago; so we are in about the same situation.
• • *
Charles W. Willis—Direct
40a
Aberdeen, Maryland
December 29, 1955
Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1-a
From: Subcommittee on Facilities
To: Harford Consultant Committee on Integration
Ernest H. Volkart, Chairman
I. A uthority
On September 23, 1955, a subcommittee consisting of
Harold Baker, Chairman, Mrs. Norman J. Schnepfe and
Mr. Paul Beatly Harlan, Associate Members, was ap
pointed to investigate and report on the various facilities
at the disposal of the Board of Education of Harford
County, particularly with reference to buildings, class
rooms, and pertinent training aids. The subcommittee
interpreted its mission to be : To establish a definite rela
tionship between the number of classrooms available
throughout the county, and the number of pupils enrolled,
using as a standard the optimum figures set by qualified
National and State authorities, and also, insofar as pos
sible, to preview conditions in the school year 1956-57. (See
Appendix I)
II. A ctivities
The subcommittees began its investigations on Septem
ber 28, 1955 and concluded them on November 29, 1955.
Each of the twenty-three schools was visited by one or other
member of the group. Neither principals nor teachers re
ceived advance notice of intended visits, thus assuring
observation of the normal routine of operations.
Duration of examinations, depending upon the size of
the unit, varied from one-half hour to two hours. Attention
was directed toward condition (both external and internal)
41a
of buildings. Heating and lighting facilities were carefully
noted. Cafeteria equipment and management, shops and
laboratories, domestic science rooms and equipment, safety
and health provisions, recreational and athletic space and
equipment, locker rooms, toilets, and all other adjuncts
pertinent to the comfort and well-being of teachers and stu
dents were inspected. Special attention was focused upon
classrooms with a view to determining whether the number
of occupants exceeded or fell short of the standard (twenty-
five high school or thirty elementary students per class
room) as determined by established authority. (See Ap
pendix II)
III. F indings
1. Buildings (General). In the Harford school sys
tem there are only three buildings of frame construction.
These include the elementary plants at Emmorton, Perry
man, and a four-room structure at Havre de Grace pur
chased for the use of primary pupils who could not be ac
commodated at Havre de Grace Elementary School. All
other buildings are of brick-concrete construction, and are
either new, or in such state of preservation as to warrant
alteration or addition to meet the demands of increased
enrollment or new activities. All buildings are in safe
condition.
2. Heating plants. These are, in the main, adequate.
Where practicable, coal-burning units are being replaced
by fuel oil systems.
3. Light. Window area, in proportion to wall area, con
forms to conventional specifications. Lighting systems are
adequate; fixtures are, for the most part, advantageously
located.
4. Cafeterias. All except two schools, Emmorton and
Perryman, have some provision for cafeteria service. The
Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1-a
42a
newer buildings incorporate complete, modern dining rooms,
kitchens, and food-storage space and equipment. Meals
are adequate, of high quality, and designed to supply the
nourishment required by the growing child. In many cases,
mothers of attending pupils volunteer for service in the
cafeterias. In buildings in which the cafeteria was not in
cluded in the original layout, gymnasiums, auditoriums, and
other adaptable rooms serve the purpose. All cafeterias
are clean, orderly, and well-staffed.
5. Domestic Science Rooms, Laboratories and Shops.
These facilities are confined to high schools and consoli
dated schools. Increasing interest in ‘ 1 do-it-yourself ’ ’ proj
ects, together with the already existing trend in that direc
tion, is reflected in the increasing demand for such train
ing. Some shop units have been added in the current year;
others are in the process of construction. Additional shop
space and equipment is necessary in several schools. The
same may be affirmed of Domestic Science facilities.
6. Recreation and Athletics. All schools have made
such provision for recreation and athletics as space and
funds will permit. In some cases students themselves have
raised funds or performed the manual labor necessary to
expand athletic facilities and programs.
7. Safety and Health. All schools have, in such mea
sure as space, personnel, and equipment will permit, estab
lished some system looking to the elimination of safety haz
ards, and to the promotion of first-aid treatment. First-
aid kits, cots, stretchers, and other equipment are at hand.
Where enrollment justifies such action, part-time or full
time nurses are employed.
8. Classroom—Enrollment Ratios, 1955-1956. Data
gathered through investigations of the subcoirunittee, sup
plemented by figures supplied by the Board of Education,
Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1-a
43a
indicate that during the current school year (1955-56),
7,808 elementary pupils are occupying 217 classrooms, an
average of 36 per room; that 5,479 high school students are
housed in 154 classrooms, an average of approximately
35.7 per room.
9. Current Classroom Construction. In anticipation of
increased enrollment, thirty-four additional classrooms are
in the process of construction, and are expected to he avail
able for use at the beginning of the 1956-57 school year.
These are located as indicated below.
H igh S chools E lementary S chools
Bel Air 16 Halls Cross Hoads 4
Aberdeen 6 Edgewood 4
Edgewood 4
10. Classroom—Enrollment Ratios 1956-57. The esti
mated elementary enrollment for the coming year (1956-57)
is 8,290. To accommodate these pupils, 225 classrooms are
available—an average of approximately 36.8 pupils per
room. High school registration is expected to total 5,930
for which 188 classrooms are provided—an average of ap
proximately 31.5 per room.
11. Observations (General). While the averages de
termined in the above paragraph exceed the figures gener
ally conceded to be ideal, they do indicate an improvement
over 1955-56 conditions especially as they apply to high
schools. During the prosecution of the mission with which
it was entrusted, your subcommittee has observed that while
in certain cases executive and teaching personnel has been
sorely taxed, the challenge has been promptly and efficiently
met. Facilities have been exploited to the utmost without
sacrificing any part of the educational or cultural training
to which the pupil is entitled.
12. Unused Capacities. In Appendix IV, Column 4, it
will be noted that eight schools are not expected to be filled
to capacity in 1956-57. These are as follows:
Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1-a
44a
Excerpts from Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1-a
E lementary H igh
Emmorton
Edgewood
Aberdeen
Havre de Grace
Halls Cross Roads
Slate Ridge
Darlington
Havre de Grace (special)
It is also apparent that these eight schools can accom
modate 510 more students than they expect to receive. This
condition may be attributed either to the fact that class
rooms have been added or that population in certain specific
areas has decreased. It should not be construed as affect
ing in any degree the averages established in Paragraph 10.
What it actually indicates is an unequal distribution of
pupils, since it can be seen by referring to Appendix IV,
Column 3, that the seventeen schools not mentioned in
Paragraph 12 will have 1,050 pupils in excess of their
capacities. It also points to the fact that the schools listed
in Paragraph 12 above may add to their rosters by admit
ting colored students residing in the area in which the
school is located, or near enough to such area as to make
use of existing transportation facilities. Such action
would materially reduce the pressure on other schools whose
facilities are sorely taxed.
IV. Conclusions. After carefully considering all fac
tors at its disposal, the committee is of the opinion that
provision can be made to accommodate such colored stu
dents as apply for admission to Harford County public
schools for the year 1956-57.
Respectfully submitted,
M rs. N orman J. S chnepfe,
M r. Paul B eatly H arlan,
M r. G. H arold B aker, Chairman.
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