Senate hearing notes (Statements from Senators Hatch and Mathias)

    72-2008
No.

In the

Uiited States C urt ef Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit

r—♦—

RONALD BRADLEY, ET AL.
v,

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, ET AL,

PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE,

Appellants.

— — —

Appeal from the District Court of the United Slates 
lor the Eastern District of Michigan, 

Southern Division
V ... -

BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR APPELLANTS

— — ~

ROSS, BRUFF AND HENRIKSEN 
WILLIAM ROSS
A t t o r n e y s  f o r  A p p e l l a n t s

215 South Gratiot Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043 
465-1313



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Offset printing by Carl J. Pitt 
1044 Penobscot Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) 961 -9177



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Pages

T A B L E  O F  CO N TEN TS O F  B R IE F

Table of Authorities ....................................................................... i

Statement of Issue ........................................................................  iii

Table of Contents of Appendix ......................................................  iv

Statement of the Case .................................................................... 1

Summary ..................................................    4

Argument ................................................................................   4

Conclusion ............................................... .................................... . 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Bennet v Madison Board of Education,
437 F2 554 5th Cir (1970).....................................  10-12

Layne-New York Co. v Allied Asphalt C o.,
53 F, R.D, 529, U. S. Dist. Ct. W. D. Penn
(1971) .............................................................................  16

Moore v Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
298 FS 288, U. S. Dist. Ct. E. D. New Orleans
(1969) at page 292 .........................................................  9-10

Oliver v School District of Kalamazoo,
448 F2 635, (CA6, 1971)..................................... 8-9

Smith Petroleum Service, Inc. v Monsanto Chemical
Co., 420 F2 1103 (CA 5, 1970) at page 1115 . . . 13

Smuck v Hobson, 408 F2 175,
(Dist. of Col, District, 1969)........................ 5-7, 7-8, 12

Textile Workers Union of America v Allendale,
226 F2 765 (Dist. of Col. Cir. 1955).................... 13-16



T A B L E  O F  A U TH O R ITIE S

Pages
OTHER AUTHORITIES:

2 Barron & Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure, P. 201 .................  4

Federal Rule 24(a) and (b ) ........ (cited throughout b rie f.)

MCLA 423.211 3



STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

IN A LAW SUIT CONCERNING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 

IN WHICH THE TRIAL JUDGE FINDS AS A FACT THAT 

THE SCHOOL DISTRICT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SEG­

REGATED, IN WHICH THE TRIAL COURT ORDERS INTER­

DISTRICT TRANSFER OF BOTH PUPILS AND TEACHERS, 

SHOULD HE PERMIT THE EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING 

AGENT FOR THE TEACHERS OF ONE SUCH DISTRICT,

TO INTERVENE IN THE PROCEEDINGS?



.IV

T A B L E  O F  C O N TE N TS O F  A P P E N D IX

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5

Relevant Docket Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Motion of Professional Personnel of Van Dyke (The exclusive 
bargaining agency of the Board of Education of the Van Dyke 
Public Schools), Robert Paul; Josephine Galia, Gary W. 
Pierce^ Max B. Harris, Florence Crawford and Doris E. 
Labbe, As Class Representatives to Intervene As Party-
Defendants . o

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Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene by 
Professional Personnel of Van Dyke, Robert Paul, 
Josephine Galia, Gary W. Pierce, Max B. Harris, 
Florence Crawford and Doris E. Labbe e »  a  <  «> •  «

Conditions of Intervention submitted by Professional 
Personnel of Van Dyke . , 9 *

Ruling and Order on Petitions for Intervention . *  •  0  «S .«* & *>

Petition for Re-Hearing of Motion of Professional Personnel
of Van Dyke, et al.

Brief in Support of Petition for Re-Hearing of Motion of 
Professional Personnel of Van Dyke for Leave to Intervene 
As Party Defendants . . . .

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Answer of Intervening Defendant, Detroit Federation of
Teachers to Petition for Rehearing of Motion of Professional 
Personnel of Van Dyke, et a l., to Intervene...........................

Rulings and Order on Motions and Other Matters Heard
June 14, 1972 9 «  f  » ■» <* e  9  * 9 9 9 »  9 9

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No.
72-2008

In the

United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circiit

-- ----— -

RONALD BRADLEY, ET AL„

WILLIAM G. MILLXKEN, ET AL.

PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE,
Appellants.

—♦...... -
Appeal from the District Court of the United States 

for the Eastern District of Michigan*
Southern Division

—— -
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS 

PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a school desegregation case. The plaintiffs are 

black school children attending schools within the jurisdiction of the 

Board of Education of the City of Detroit, all parents having school 

children within such district and the National Association for the



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S t a t e me n t  o f  the Case
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Advancement of Colored People. The original defendants are William 

G. MxXliken, Governor of the State of Michigan, Frank J. Kelley, 

Attorney General for the State of Michigan, Michigan State Board of 

Education,and the Board of Education of the City of Detroit.

Quite early in these proceedings The Detroit Federation of 

Teachers Local 231, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO and 

the Citizens Committee for Better Education were granted permission to

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intervene.

When it became apparent that the trial court, after finding |j
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de facto segregation in the Detroit School system, contemplated ordering

a metropolitan plan for desegregation, which envisioned the transfer of

both students and teachers inter districts (so-called Metropolitan Plan),
• ■ - . 

several school districts that would be affected by such finding and order,

filed motions for intervention. These motions were granted. (App. 16a)

Likewise, white school children attending schools in the affected school f

districts and an association known as TRI-COUNTY CITIZENS FOR ji
; . | 

INTERVENTION IN FEDERAL SCHOOL ACTION NO- 35257 were granted

permission to intervene. (App. 16a) j
. ■; |

However, the two collective bargaining agencies of school
■ ’ • ' • j

districts affected - -  the Michigan Education Association, and the appellant jj 

herein - -  were denied such right. (App. 16a) j

All of the defendants, original and intervening have filed |
!!Notices of Appeal before this Court and oral argument has been had on j|
j!I!such appeals. j!: / l!

The movant to intervene, appellant herein, an independent j



S t a t e me n t  ©f the Case
3

(i. e« unaffiliated) collective bargaining unit, is the exclusive bargaining 

agent for the teaching personnel of the Van Dyke School District, having 

been so elected under the appropriate statutes of the State of Michigan 

(MCLA 423.211),, As such exclusive bargaining agency it has entered
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into Master Agreements with the School District of Van Dyke, The
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Master Agreements cover the salaries, fringe benefits and general 

working conditions of the teaching personnel of the School District of

Van Dyke,
itThe School District of Van Dyke is in southeastern Macomb
1County (northeast of Wayne County), It lies between Eight Mile Road

H i 1 . |  i H i H i |  . jf
and Ten Mile Road as its southerly and northerly boundaries, respec­

tively, and between Sherwood and Schoenherr Avenues as its easterly 

and westerly boundaries, respectively.



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SUMMARY

In a school desegregation case, in which the trial judge finds

de facto segregation In which such trial judge contemplates massive inter 

school district transfer of students and teachers, the exclusive bargaining 

agent for one such school district has a right to intervene under Federal 

Civil Rule 24 a (2), or in the alternative, it is an abuse of discretion not 

to permit such movant to intervene under Federal Civil Rules 24b,

ARGUMENT

Even prior to its liberalizing 1966 amendment, Federal Civil 

Rule 24 was to be construed broadly. The rule is liberally construed 

in the light of earlier decisions regulating federal intervention practice 

which the rule amplifies and restates. 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal 

Practice and Procedure, P. 201. [West Publishing Co. (1950) and cases

therein cited. ]

Rule 24 states:

Upon timely application, anyone shall be 
permitted to intervene in an action: when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which; is the subject of 
the action and he is so situated that the disposi­
tion of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant’s interest is ade­
quately represented by existing parties.

It is submitted that the movant-appellant readily and dis-

cernably meet all three requirements of the Rule. Clearly, it has an

interest in an order that may affect its contract of employment with a

school district that becomes a part of a so-called 'Metropolitan Plan. "



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A r g u m e n t
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This interest is both professional and economic. Professional, in that

it would desire and seek the best possible "mix" of both students and j
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teachers. Economic, in that it would hope that its contractual relation -
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ships with the Van Dyke School District would be respected and enforced 

by the trial court,

In Smuck v Hobson, 408 F2 175, Dist. of Co. District jj
— — — —  - |

(I960), a school desegregation case, in which the parents of white children

moved to intervene [after the involved school district had determined not

to appeal the trial court's findings] that Court wrote at page 178:
|

As the trial judge pointed out in his decision 
to grant intervention to the parents, under the 
pre -amendment cases the task of defining what j
constitutes an "interest” was typically "sub- j
sumed in the questions of whether the petitioner 
would be bound or of what was the nature of his j
property interest, " The 1966 amendments j
were designed to eliminate the scissoring ef­
fect whereby a petitioner who could show "in­
adequate representation" was thereby thrust j
against the blade that he would therefore not 
be "bound by a judgment, " and to recognize |
the decisions which had construed "property" 
so broadly as to make surplusage of the adjec­
tive. In doing so, the amendments made the 
question of what constitutes an "interest" more 
visible without contributing an answer. The 
phrasing of Rule 24(a)(2) as amended parallels 
that of Rule 19(a)(2) concerning joinder. But 
the fact that the two rules are entwined does 
not imply that an "interest" for the purpose of 
one is precisely the same as for the other,
The occasions upon which a petitioner should j
be allowed to intervene under Rule 24 are not 
necessarily limited to those situations when :
the trial court should compel him to become a j
party under Rule 19. And while the division 
of Rule 24(a) and (b) into "intervention of j
Right" and "Permissible Intervention" might l
superficially suggest that only the latter in- j:
volves an exercise of discretion by the court, |!



Argu.rn.ent

the contrary is clearly the case,

The effort to extract substance from the con- 
elusory phrase "interest" or "legally protect­
able interest" is of limited promise, Parents 
unquestionably have a sufficient "interest" in 
the education of their children to justify the 
initiation of a lawsuit in appropriate circum­
stances, as indeed was the case for the plain­
tiff-appellee parents here. But in the context 
of intervention the question is not whether a 
lawsuit should be begun, but whether already 
initiated litigation should be extended to in­
clude additional parties, The 1966 amend­
ments to Rule 24(a) have facilitated this, the 
true inquiry, by eliminating the temptation, or 
need for tangential expeditions in search of 
"property" or someone "bound by a judgment, " 
It would be unfortunate to allow the inquiry to 
be led once again astray by a myopic fixation 
upon "interest, " Rather, as Judge Leventhal 
recently concluded for this Court, "[A] more 
instructive approach: is to let our construction 
be guided by the policies behind the 'interest5 
requirement, * * * [T]fae 'interest' test is 
primarily a practical guide to disposing of 
lawsuits by involving as many apparently con- 
cerned persons as is compatible with efficiency 
and due process, " (Emphasis added)

The decision whether intervention of right 
is warranted thus involves an accommodation 
between two potentially conflicting goals: to
achieve judicial economies of scale by resolv­
ing related issues in a single lawsuit, and to 
prevent the single lawsuit from becoming 
fruitlessly complex or unending, Since this 
task will depend upon the contours of the parti­
cular controversy, general rules and past deci- 
sions cannot provide uniformly dependable 
guides. The Supreme Court, in its only full- 
dress examination.of Rule 24(a) since the 
1966 amendments, found that a gas distrib­
utor was entitled to intervention of right 
although.its only "interest" was the economic 
harm' it claimed would follow from an allegedly 
inadequate plan for divestiture approved by the 
Government in an antitrust proceeding. While 
conceding that the Court's opinion granting



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A r g u m e n t
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intervention in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. 
y, El Paso Natural Gas Co. "is certainly sus- j
ceptible of a very broad reading, " the trial j
judge here would distinguish the decision on the 
ground that the petitioner "did show a strong, 
direct economic interest, for the new company 
[to be created by divestiture] would be its sole 
supplier. " Yet while it is undoubtedly true j
that "Cascade should not be read as a carte 
blanche for intervention by anyone at any time, " 
there is no apparent reason why an "economic 
interest" should always be necessary to justify 
intervention. The goal of "disposing of law- j
suits by involving as many apparently concerned 
persons as is compatible with efficiency and due 
process" may in certain circumstances be met 
by allowing parents whose only "interest" is 
the education of their children to intervene.

Hence, the movant-appellant has an interest, most direct 

and immediate, in the type of Metropolitan Plan adopted by the court, if 

one is adopted. (It should be noted that the movant-appellant did not 

desire intervention to oppose the findings made by the trial court relative 

to the de facto segregation in the Detroit School system or to its proposed 

remedies for such segregation.) (App. 6a) jf:
A second facet of Federal Rule 24 is that the "disposition j

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of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [the inter- 

venor’s] ability to protect that interest. " Again, in a case of this nature,}

litigated over a long period of time and at great expense, appealed many
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times and at many levels and which will probably, finally be appealed jj
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by the parties to the United States Supreme Court, the movant-appellant g
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will either have his day in Court now or never. As the Court in Smuck jj
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v Hobson, supra, said at P. 180: J

Rule 24(a) as amended requires not that the |
applicant would be "bound" by a judgment in the jj



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A r g u.m e n t
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action, but only that "disposition of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest, " In Nuesse v.
Camp this Court examined a motion by a state 
commissioner of banks to intervene under the 
new Rule 24 (a) in a suit brought by a state bank 
against the United States Comptroller of Cur­
rency, The plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
would violate the National Bank Act if he approved 
the application of a national bank to open a new 
branch near the plaintiff’s office, The inter - 
venor feared an interpretation of the statute which 
would stand as precedent in any later litigation 
he might initiate. The Court, agreeing, con­
cluded that "under this new test stare decisis 
principles may In some cases supply the prac­
tical disadvantage that warrants intervention as 
of right, "

The third requirement under Federal Rule 24 is that the
j

interests of the movant not be adequately represented by any of the 

parties. Once more, this is true in the instant matter, The Detroit 

Federation of Teachers, itself an intervener, is the exclusive bargaining j 

agency of the school teachers of the Detroit School Board, It has 

national affiliations. It is large, On the other hand, the movant- j|

appellant is a small independent exclusive bargaining agency of a rela­

tively small school district outside of the Detroit area and outside of jII
Wayne County, Moreover, the Detroit Federation of Teachers has never 

made the claim that it can represent the interests of the movant-appellant.
!

It should be noted that this court, in Oliver v School j]
|f

District of Kalamazoo, 448 F2 635 Sixth Cir Ct of App (1971), in a 

per curiam opinion, permitted the following organizations to intervene i
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in a school desegregation case: Kalamazoo City Education Association, j
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The Michigan Education Association* The National Educational Association,



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A r g u.m e nt
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The League of Women Voters of Michigan, and the Kalamazoo Area League 

of Women Voters,

The interest of the movant-appellant. Professional Personnel j 

of Van Dyke, in the instant litigation is at least as great as that of the 

organizations permitted to intervene in Oliver y Kalamazoo, and 

probably much greater.

If, arguendo, the movant-appellant does not have the right to j

intervene under Federal Rule 24 (a), it should be permitted to intervene

under Federal Rule 24 (b)» The trial court in Moore v Tangipahoa j

Parish School Board, 298 FS 288, US Dist Ct E„ D0 New Orleans

(1969) wrote at page 292:

Alternatively, both applicants seek per­
missive intervention under Rule 24 (b), which 
provides in part:

I
"Upon timely application anyone may be 
permitted to intervene in an action: * * *
(2) when an applicant’s clainr or defense f
and the main action have a question of law j
or fact in common, * * * In exercising
its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties, "

Rule 24(b) should be liberally construed,
Western States Machine Co, v, S. S.
Hepworth Co, , E. D.,N. Y, , 1941, 2 F. R. D.
145, ” [B]asically, * * * anyone may be 
permitted to intervene if his claim and the 
main action have a common question of law 
or fact, " unless the court in its "sound dis - 
cretion [determines that] * * * the inter­
vention will unduly delay or prejudice the !
adjudication of the rights of the original j
parties, Allen County School Board of Prince 
Edward County,'supra 28 F„ R, D9 at 363, j



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It is beyond dispute that the claims of the 
white students and parents of Tangipahoa 
Parish are based on common questions of law 
and fact with the issues raised in the main 
action. Nor can it be denied that, as a 
practical matter, the applicants have an im ­
portant interest in the outcome of this liti­
gation, All students and parents, whatever 
their race, have an interest in a sound educa­
tional system and in the operation of that sys - 
tern in accordance with the law.

It is the opinion of the appellant, that in a public interest type |j
of case, such as school desegregation matter, broad spectrums of points 

of view should be encouraged by the courts - not rejected. The dissent- I]
ing opinion of Circuit Judge Wisdom in Bennet y Madison Board of

I fj
Education, 437 F2 554 5th Cir (1970) is overwhelming. In that cause, j; — “—  ——“

the National Education Association sought intervention in a desegregation 

matter brought by private citizens (as here). Judge Wisdom found that 

the Association had a right under Section 24 (a) of the rule, and alter-
• , rInately, it was an abuse of discretion by the trial court under Section (b)

fj

of the rule to not permit intervention.

Judge Wisdom wrote on Page 556, (and the identical problem jH
will face the Court in improvising a Metropolitan Plan in the instant .

action):

NEA represents a very real interest in these 
school desegregation cases --  that of its members 
who are black teachers in these school districts.
These teachers will be directly affected by the 
actions of the court and the school board in 
carrying out the disestablishment of the dual jl
school systems. The decision of this Court in j|
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School jj
District, 5 Cir. 1970, 419 F.2d 1211 (en banc), jj
requires that the racial ratio of teachers in jj
each school be the same as that in the system as jj

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A r g u.m e n t



A r g u.m e n t

a whole. Practical problems exist in shifting 
to such a system. With the changing racial 
compositions of schools,, there must necessarily 
be some replacement of black administrators 
with white administrators, causing the loss of 
important positions within the educational 
hierarchy. Additionally, many school sys­
tems must decrease their teaching staffs and 
administrative personnel because of shrinking 
student bodies. (Emphasis added)

NEA also meets the second test of Rule 
24(a)* being nso situated that the disposition 
of the action may as a practical matter impair 
or impede [its] ability to protect" its interests.
In theory a second suit by NEA would not be 
barred by res judicata --  the standard for inter­
vention before the 1966 Amendments --  though 
its outcome might be affected by stare decisis. 
See Atlantis Development Corp. v. United 
States* 5 Cir. 1967, 379 F,2d 818.

And at P. 557:

parties. The courts should handle school 
cases as units. This Court implicitly supports 
such a practice by evaluating school districts 
in terms of all the constitutional requirements 
for dismantling a dual school system. See, 
e .g . , United States v. Jefferson County Board 
of Education, 5 Cir. 1966, 372 F.2d 836, 
aff’d en banc, 1967, 380 F„2d 385; Singleton 
v. Jackson, supra. There are sound reasons 
for such a practice. The types of discrimina­
tion which a school boardmust abjure and undo 
are inherently interrelated. For instance, 
desegregation of student bodies cannot be sep­
arated from faculty desegregation. Planning 
for the latter depends on methods used to 
accomplish the former: which schools5 racial
composition will be changed; whether any schools 
will be closed altogether; whether a decrease 
in the total size of the public school student body 
should be planned for. We know, for example, 
that when formerly black schools are integrated, 
there may be a move to replace black admini­
strators with whites. We know also that when 
black schools are closed as part of the deseg­
regation process - -  which occurs more frequent



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than the closing of white schools - -  the jobs 
of black faculty and staff are jeopardized.
Students have an interest in learning from a 
desegregated faculty.

In the context of mapping future plans - -  
students, faculty, facilities, and extracur­
ricular activites must be considered in the over­
all changeover. NEA may help courts avoid 
repetitious and inefficient litigation. The 
fundamental policy of Rule 24, to encourage 
simultaneous adjudication of related claims, 
is the same policy that underlies the practice 
of considering together all school desegrega­
tion issues.

Judge Wisdom also found that no existing party could r e ­

present the interest of the teachers "The private plaintiffs, students and
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11 |j their parents, cannot be taken to represent adequately the interests of

12 I the teachers. Students are more interested in student desegregation.i|
13 :• Their interest in fair treatment of teachers is clearly less direct than

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14 jj that of teachers themselves, "

||; : JJfS A • 1; A A . . gAAv A-1 5 A'A '%  1 A iArlAA/ ' A- A

Under Rule 24, petitions to intervene must, of course, be 

timely. Timeliness is to be considered under all the surrounding cir -̂ 

cumstances. The movant-appellant, as soon as it determined that it

18 i; may be involved in a Metropolitan Plan of desegregation, moved for inter-
| j

19 ;i vention. Prior to that time, it clearly had no interest in the litigation.| j | i
20 It offered to accept the previous findings of the Court (App 6a). It

was most interested in submitting evidence and having its professional
3 Si :

22 || conclusions considered by the court in teacher placement and terms of

employment as well as in placement. In no way would the granting

of its petition to intervene have delayed the trial or inconvenienced the 

court or the then party litigants. Smuck v Hobson, infra held that



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that Petition to Intervene even after final judgment is not untimely. (P 18&)

A most complete discussion, on "timeliness!f is contained in 

Smith Petroleum Service, Inc. v Monsanto Chemical Co, 420 F2 1103 1

5th Cir (1970), at R 1115:

It is true, of course, that an application for 
intervention, whether as a matter of right or per­
missive, must in every case be timely; Rules 
24(a) and 24(b) provide for intervention "upon 
timely application. " See 2 Barron & Holtzoff, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 594, at 364 
(Wright ed. 1961); 3B Moore, Federal Practice 
3T 24.13, at p. 24-521 (2d ed. 1969). The deter­
mination as to whether an application to inter­
vene is timely, however, is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. [Citing cases]

Moreover, "[W]hether an application for inter­
vention is timely does not depend solely upon the 
amount of time that may have elapsed since the 
institution of the action, although of course that 
is a relevant consideration. " [Citing cases]
The trial court may take into account all the 
circumstances of the case, including any c ir ­
cumstances contributing to delay in the appli­
cation for intervention. [Citing cases]
Furthermore, it has been suggested that "the 
most important factor" which should be considered 
by the trial court "is whether any delay in mov­
ing for intervention will prejudice the existing 
parties to the case. " 2 Barron & Holtzoff,
supra, § 594, at 366.

Finally, movant-appellant would cite two cases, other than

school desegregation cases, that illustrate the liberal attitude, a practical 

attitude rather than a doctrinaire one, of the courts as regards Federal

Rule 24. !|
One pre-dates the 1966 amendment, the intent of which was j

1to yet further "liberalize" the rule. In Textile Workers Union of jj

America v Allendale, 226 F2 765 Dist of Col Cir (1955), the plaintiff, jj



A r g u me n t
14

manufacturing goods for sale to the United States, brought the action to 

review a determination of the Secretary of Labor fixing nation-wide mini­

mum wages. A union of employees as well as a competing manufacturer

sought to intervene. Their motions were denied by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals reversed, saying on Page 767 of 24(a):

In conventional litigation, one is bound by 
a judgment in the action, within the meaning 
of Rule 24(a), when the judgment is res judi­
cata as to him. Appellants in this case were 
not parties in a technical sense to the adminis­
trative proceeding; nevertheless they are 
"bound" by the determinations therein in a very 
practical sense. Authoritative rulings made in 
this proceeding fixed a wage at a national level. 
These rulings are under attack in the suit for 
review below. It is true that, if the attack 
succeeds, the final judgment would preclude 
neither the appellants nor the appellees from 
later pressing their interests at the adminis­
trative level. But ultimate victory at that 
point cannot overcome the "practical disad­
vantage" to which appellants may be subjected 
as a result of the prior judicial action, For 
example, if the determinations are upset, the 
membership of the appellant union will be 
deprived of economic benefits. That the union 
may subsequently receive other benefits from 
new determinations which it may procure can­
not compensate for the losses suffered in 
the interim. Nor does the fact that the union 
may bargain for a wage higher than the mini­
mum convince us that it and its members are 
not bound, in a practical sense, by minimum 
wage determinations. Similarly, if the 
appellant-employer is forced out of business 
by an injunction restraining the effectuation 
of the wage determinations, he can take little 
solace from a subsequent moral victory.
Hence we think that the strict test of res judi­
cata is inappropriate in applying Rule 24 (a) 
to the present case.

Ii
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And on P age 768:



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A r g u.m e n t

Generally "a claim of an absolute right to 
intervene must be based upon the language of 
Rule 24 (ah " But this rule is not "a com­
prehensive inventory of the allowable instances 
for intervention" as of right. Missouri-Kan­
sas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 1967 
312 U. S. 502, 505, 61 S. Ct. 666, 85 L. Ed.
975. In that case, in reversing an order 
denying intervention, the Supreme Court 
was not concerned with the distinction be - 
tween 24(a) and (b). In fact the Court spoke 
in terms of permissive intervention:

"We are not here dealing with a con­
ventional form of intervention whereby an 
appeal is made to the court’s good sense to 
allow persons having a common interest with 
the formal parties to enforce the common 
interest with their individual emphasis. 
Plainly enough, the circumstances under 
which interested outsiders should be allowed 
to become participants in a litigation is, 
barring very special circumstances, a mat­
ter for the nisi prius court. But where the 
enforcement of a public law also demands 
distinct safeguarding of private interests by 
giving them a formal status in the decree, 
the power to enforce rights thus sanctioned 
is not left to the public authorities nor put 
in the keeping of the district court’s dis­
cretion. "

In that case, a consent decree specifically 
provided for such intervention. But the teach­
ing of the case is not so narrowly limited. It 
expresses generally the proposition that failure 
to come within the precise bounds of Rule 24 's 
provisions does not necessarily bar interven­
tion if there is a sound reason to allow it.

At Page 77:

Under the circumstances of this case then, 
we think the denial of appellants ’ petitions to 
intervene exceeded the limits of discretion.
As we said in Wolpe v. Poretsky, appel­
lants "have such a vital interest in the result 
of [the] suit that they should be granted per- 
mission to intervene as a matter of course



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Ar  gujn e nt

unless compelling reasons against such, inter - 
vention are shown?7”  N(T^uclT*Trcompelling rea-
s°ns" appear here.

The interventions sought here would serve 
the ends of justice, They would also promote 
judicial and administrative convenience by 
avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings and by 
bringing to the aid of the tribunal the parties 
who "may know the most facts and can best
explain their implications. " (Emphasis added)

Reversed and remanded.

In Layne-New York Co. v Allied Asphalt Co. , 53 F, R„ D, 52 9,

U. S. District Ct. W, D. Penn (1971), the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania^ 

motion to intervene was granted under both section (a) and (b) of Rule 24. 

The suit was a patent infringement cause, involving a process for sealing J 

off abandoned mines. It based its motion for intervention on the thrust 

that if the patents were sustained "the bidding process in this area will 

be seriously chilled" P, 530.

The Court went on to say:

. . . Of paramount importance in this case, we 
consider the public interests of the people of 
Pennsylvania in this matter, Pennsylvania 
suffers peculiar damage by reason of a large 
number of abandoned coal mines whose run offs 
cause a great amount of pollution in the streams 
of the Commonwealth, We well understand the 
Commonwealth’s apprehension as to the effect 
of a decision upholding the validity of this 
patent upon bidding processes for future con­
tracts in this area.

If this intervention were denied, the Common­
wealth might well institute a separate suit again­
st this plaintiff or successive contractors would 
be met by similar litigation. It is in the high­
est public interest to solve this situation.once 
and for a ll,  in these, so far as we can as­
certain, the first suits which have raised these 
questions, W e:w i l l  therefore allow-the inter­
vention.



17

CONCLUSION

Ijj
It is gainsaid that the primary question in the instant matter jjI f If Ifis of great public importance. It may very well be the most noteworthy jj

f!II
of issues of these days; certain it is that it is one of the half dozen most jjIii
noteworthy issues. jjII

Once an order is entered herein that affects the Van Dyke
|f

School District the movant-appellant will be practically foreclosed from jj11 s-l11
litigating its rights in any forum,. Its members may be laid off, trans­

ferred, have their salaries reduced, their contractual rights decimated, 

have their tenure lost, without any day in court.
1Moreover, whatever court is finally charged with the awe- |
jj

some task of entering the final order in this cause, if such plan calls jj
- l|ilfor cross-districting busing, it would be deprived of valuable expertise j

jjthat the movant-appellant would be able to muster to assist that court. jj

If

The trial court's Order (App. 16a) denying tne movant- jj
P

appellants motion to intervene should be reversed, subject to reasonable jj
conditions (those contained in such order and applicable to the inter- jj

1• U- - Isvenors permitted to intervene). I■’ IS- - ■, ■ - , - . •.••• ■ I!
Respectfully submitted, jj

jj
ROSS, BRUFF & HENRIKSEN f?!
WILLIAM ROSS |
Attorneys for Appellants Professional 

Personnel of Van Dyke
ff

215 South Gratiot Avenue
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043 jj
465-1313

Dated: November 16, 19 72.



Appendix



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A P P E N D I X

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Ronald Bradley, et aL 
vs,

William G. Milliken, et al.

No, 35257

Professional Perssonnel of Van Dyke,
Appellants

1972

Feb, 22

Apr, 11

Apr, 2 5

CA6 No, 72-2008

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

Motion of ProfessionalPersonnel of Van Dyke (the exclusive 
bargaining agency of the Board of Education of the Van 
Dyke Public Schools), Robert Paul, Josephine Galia,
Gary W. Pierce, Max, B, Harris, Florence Crawford 
and Doris E. Labbe, as class representatives to intervene 
as party defts. with brief and proof of service, filed. 
Hearing Feb, 22/72

Petition for re-hearing of motion of Professional Personnel 
of Van Dyke, Robert Paul, Josephine Galia, Gary W. 
Pierce, Max B» Harris, Florence Crawford and Doris 
E» Labbe, for leave to intervene as party defts, with 
brief and proof of service, filed.

Answer of intervening deft. Detroit Federation of Teachers to 
petition for rehearing of motion of Professional Personnel 
of Van Dyke, et a l., to intervene and proof of service, filed

June 29 Rulings and order on motions and other matters heard June

14/72, filed and entered.



2a

MOTION OF PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE
(The exclusive bargaining agency of the Board of «

Education of the Van Dyke Public Schools),
ROBERT PAUL, JOSEPHINE GALIA, GARY W, PIERCE,
MAX B, HARRIS, FLORENCE CRAWFORD and DORIS E.

LABBE. , As Class Representatives to Intervene As
Party Defendants

(Filed Feb. 22, 1972)

NOW COMES the Professional Personnel of Van Dyke,

Robert Paul, Josephine Galia, Gary W. Pierce, Max B. Harris,

Florence Crawford and Doris E. Labbe, by their attorneys ROSS, BRUFF 

& RANCILIO, P, C. moving to intervene as party defendants in this 

cause and show unto this Honorable Court as follows:

1. That the movant, PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL OF VAN 

DYKE, is the exclusive bargaining agency of the teaching personnel of 

the Board of Education of the Van Dyke Public Schools (geographically 

located in southern Macomb County), a political subdivision of the State 

of Michigan*

2c That the movants, ROBERT PAUL, JOSEPHINE GALIA,

GARY W„ PIERCE, MAX B„ HARRIS, FLORENCE CRAWFORD and

DORIS E. LABBE, are members of the movant, PROFESSIONAL

PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE, and that they bring this motion on, each

for himself or herself and as members of the movant PROFESSIONAL 

PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE, a group so numerous as to make it im- jj

practicable to bring them all before this Honorable Court* I|
3 c That the movant, PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL OF VAN 

DYKE, as exclusive bargaining agent of the Board of Education of the 

Van Dyke public schools, is the signator of a collective bargaining



Motion of Professional Personnel of Van Dyke . . , etc.
3a

agreement with such Board of Education.

4. That the movant, PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL OF VAN

DYKE has been able to negotiate an exceptionally advantageous collective
■

bargaining agreement for its members, including the individual movants 

herein.

5. That the movants are fearful that the party litigants herein
|f

will urge upon this Honorable Court relief that will not sufficiently pro- ii|S
tect these movants in their property rights and human rights as set forth )j

ll
in the Master Agreement between professional Personnel of Van Dyke 

and the Board of Education of the Van Dyke Public Schools and their

right to teach in a school of their own choice and to pupils of their own
Itit

choice.

6. That upon information and belief, these movants are the only 

ones who have or intend to file a motion to intervene on behalf of a 

collective bargaining agency with a school district or on behalf of teachin 

personnel of a school district not in the county of Wayne, State of 

Michigan.

7. That the rights and obligations are unique to any of the other 

party litigants, interveners, or would-be intervenors in this cause..
J8. That upon information and belief some of the party litigants

. • ' ' ■ . I
and intervenors herein have requested relief to be granted them by this I
Honorable Court, which would, be harmful to these movants and not in

their best interests. Moreover, much of the relief requested by the 

litigants and intervenors is unconstitutional on its face, j
1

9. These movants have requested concurrence of the attorney



Motion of Professional Personnel of Van Dyke . . . etc.
.4a

for intervenors in this cause, but such has been denied. Moreover, upon! 

information and belief, this Honorable Court has determined that it will 

decide and determine all Motions for Leave to Intervene.
I

10. This motion is brought on under Rule 24 (b)(2) (Permissive 

Intervention), Federal Rules.

11. Individual movants herein move to intervene by reason of 

Rule 23 (a)(3) (Class Actions), Federal Rules.

WHEREFORE, these movants request that they be permitted 

to intervene in this cause so that they may argue the appropriate relief 

to be granted by this Honorable Court in accordance with the determina­

tions heretofore made by this Honorable Court.

ROSS, BRUFF & RANCILIO, P. C. 

by: s /  William Ross______ __________________
WILLIAM ROSS 
Attorneys for Movants 
215 South Gratiot Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043 
465-1313

Dated: February 16, 1972

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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO INTERVENE BY PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL
OF VAN DYKE, ROBERT PAUL, JOSEPHINE GALIA, 

GARY W. PIERCE, MAX B. HARRIS, FLORENCE 
CRAWFORD and DORIS E. LABBE

Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is as follows;

"(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application 
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:
(1) when a statute of the United States confer a condi­
tional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's j 
claim or defense and the main action have a question j 
of law or fact in common. When a party to an action 
relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute 
or executive order administered by a federal or state 
governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, ; 
order, requirement or agreement issued or made 
pursuant to the statute of executive order, the officer 
or agency upon timely application may be permitted 
to intervene in the action. In exercising its discre- j 
tion the court shall consider whether the intervention 
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the j 
rights of the original parties. " |

If• • j|
The discretion of the trial court to permit intervention is .

extremely broad. Its application should be liberally construed. j

(2 Federal Practice and Procedure 201). None of the party litigants I
and the intervenors can properly represent these movants. Moreover,

I
these movants may well be helpful to the Court in its determination of -'I
the proper relief to be granted.

Respectfully submitted,: : • ICwSSsm v . A ,fiW, , ;  gffSs v  m iM  e: M0:*  ■

ROSS, BRUFF & RANC1LLIO, P.C.
• \II

By: s /  William Ross   n
WILLIAM ROSS |
Attorneys for Movants ,
215 South Gratiot Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043 |j
465-1313 |

Dated: February 16, 1972



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CONDITIONS OF INTERVENTION SUBMITTED BY 
PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE

Professional Personnel of Van Dyke, movant for intervention,;;
h■ iiwould suggest the following conditions for intervention, such conditions
J

to be applicable to proceedings on the trial level only:
III

1. Interveners to be bound by the previous findings and con- sim : in i  sielusions of the Court,
ft

2, Intervenors to introduce evidence only as to the appropriatene| 

of remedy (ies) to be formulated by the Court.

Ross, Bruff and Rancilio

by s /  Julius M. Grossbart
Julius M. Grossbart 

3400 Guardian Bldg. 
Detroit, Michigan 
962-6281

ftIS



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RULING AND ORDER ON PETITIONS FOR INTERVENTION
IIAt a session of said Court held in the 

Federal Building, City of Detroit,
County of Wayne, on this 15th day of 
MARCH, A. D. 1972.

PRESENT: HONORABLE STEPHEN J. ROTH
United States District Judge

|
The motion of intervening defendants Denise Magdowski, f|et al. to add parties defendant is continued under advisement, to await

f
further developments in this proceeding. |

Ruling on the motion of the Jefferson-Chalmers Citizens
|

District Council to intervene is continued in accordance with the request 

of the movant.

The motions of Allen Park Public Schools, et a l., the 

Grosse Pointe Public Schools, the School District of the City of Royal 

Oak and the Southfield Public Schools are GRANTED, under Federal
j

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24(a)(2) and, in the alternative, under
j

Rule 24 (b)(2), under conditions hereinafter specified.
:|

The motion of Kerry Green, et a l., including Tri-County 

Citizens for intervention in Federal School Action No. 3 52 57, is

GRANTED under Rule 24 (b)(2), under conditions hereinafter specified.
j

The intervention of the Tri-County Citizens for Intervention is granted 

for the following reasons: (1) The standing of the National Association

for the Advancement of Colored People was not challenged by the 

original parties to this action; (2) For practical purposes the grant of 

intervention to Kerry Green, et al. is a grant of intervention to said
i

organization. The court, for the reasons stated, has not and does not pas



Ruling and Order on Petions for Intervention

on the procedural propriety of either the standing of the NAACP or the 

intervention of the citizens' group.

The motion of the City of Warren, a municipal corporation 

of the State of Michigan, to intervene, is DENIED, as of right, under 

Rule 24 (a)(2), and in the discretion of the court, under Rule 24(b)(2).

The motion of Nancy Bird, et a l., to intervene, is DENIED, 

under Rule 24 (a)(2), and under Rule 24 (b)(2), in the discretion of the 

court, for the reason that their interests are already adequately repre­

sented by the parties, including those to whom intervention has been 

granted this day.

The motion of Professional Personnel of Van Dyke, to 

intervene, is DENIED, under Rule 24 (a)(2) and, in the discretion of the 

court, under Rule 24 (b)(2).

The petitioners who have been denied intervention shall have 

a right to appear as amicus curiae.

The interventions granted this day shall be subject to the 

following conditions:

1. No intervener will be permitted to assert any claim of

defense previously adjudicated by the court.

2, No intervenor shall reopen any question or issue which 

has previously been decided by the court.

3. The participation of the intervenors considered, this 

day shall be subordinated to that of the original parties and previous 

intervenors.

4. The new intervenors shall not initiate discovery



Ruling and Order on Petitions for Intervention
9a

proceedings except by permission of the court upon application in writing 

accompanied by a showing that no present party plans to or is willing to 

undertake the particular discovery sought and that the particular matter 

to be discovered is relevant to the current stage of the proceedings.

5. No new iniervenor shall be permitted to seek a delay of
' II j

any proceeding in this cause; and he shall be bound by the brief and hearing

schedule established by the court's Notice to Counsel, issued March 6,

1972, j

6. New intervenors will not file counterclaims or cross - 

complaints; nor will they be permitted to seek the joinder of additional 

parties or the dismissal of present parties, except upon a showing that 

such action will not result in delay.

7. New intervenors are granted intervention for two prin­

cipal purposes: (a) To advise the court, by brief, of the legal pro­

priety of considering a metropolitan plan; (b) to review any plan or 

plans for the desegregation of the so-called larger Detroit Metropolitan 

area, and submitting objections, modifications or alternatives to it or 

them, and in accordance with the requirements of the United States
II

Constitution and the prior orders of this court.

8. New intervenors shall present evidence, if any they

have, through witnesses to a number to be set, and limited, if necessary,

by the court, following conference.

9. With regard to the examination of witnesses, all new
v  w k  '  \  k  \ v k k : ;  k k k  : k  :  ; *  ; k ; :If

intervenors shall among themselves select one attorney per witness to act 

for them, unless one or more of the new intervenors show cause



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Ruling and Order on Petitions for Intervention

otherwise.

These conditions of intervention shall remain subject to 

change or modification by the court in the interest of timely disposition

of the case.

DATE: March 15, 1972.

s /  STEPHEN J. ROTH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



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PETITION FOR RE-HEARING OF MOTION OF
PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE
(The exclusive bargaining agency of the Board of

Education of the Van Dyke Public Schools),------- _ ■  —  “ “

ROBERT PAUL, JOSEPHINE GALIA, GARY W.---------_  —  ,j
PIERCE, MAX B. HARRIS, FLORENCE CRAWFORD
and DORIS E, LABBE, FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE

AS PARTY DEFENDANTS.
— ------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------

(Filed April 11, 1972)

Professional Personnel of Van Dyke, petitioner herein, moves 

the Court for re-hearing of the denial of its motion for leave to intervene 

for the reasons following:

1 „ Professional Personnel of Van Dyke, movant herein, is 

the exclusive bargaining agent of the Van Dyke School District. That the

Van Dyke School District is located in Southern Macomb County, State of 

Michigan.
i

2. That at the time the Court denied the motion of Profes­

sional Personnel of Van Dyke for leave to intervene dated March 15,

1972, the Court had not as yet determined to adopt the so-called 

metropolitan plan.

3. That the Professional Personnel of Van Dyke is an inde­

pendent and unaffiliated trade union and has negotiated a Master Agree­

ment with the Van Dyke School District, which Master Agreement sets 

forth the terms of employment between the teaching personnel of the

Van Dyke School District and the said School District.

4. That an important aspect of the Court's final deter­

mination in this matter will be its effect on the terms of employment of



Petition fo r  Re “Hearing of. Motion to Intervene . . . etc.
.12a

the teaching personnel of the various school districts encompassed by the 

Metropolitan Plan.

5. That when only the Detroit School District seemed to be 

the school district involved in these proceedings, the Court granted the 

application of the Detroit Federation of Teachers for leave to intervene.

6. That the posture and thrust of the intervenor, Detroit 

Federation of Teachers, is adverse to that of this movant, Professional 

Personnel, of Van Dyke.

7. That this movant has been unable to procure the consent 

of the opposition parties.

8. That the interests of Professional Personnel of Van 

Dyke can be protected only if its permitted to intervene as a party,

9. That the motion of Professional Personnel of Van Dyke 

and its Brief in support thereof is incorporated herein.

WHEREFORE, Professional Personnel of Van Dyke requests

||i!

a re-hearing of its Motion for Leave to Intervene and that it be granted 

leave to intervene.

ROSS, BRUFF & RANCILIO, P. C.

By: s /  William Ross_____ _____________
WILLIAM ROSS 
Attorneys for Movant 
215 South Gratiot Avenue
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043 
465-1313

;;fln

Date: April 10, 1972



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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
RE-HEARING OF MOTION OF PROFESSIONAL 

PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE FOR LEAVE TO 
INTERVENE AS PARTY DEFENDANTS

Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is as follows;

n(h) Permissive intervention,, Upon Timely application 
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) 
when a statute of the United States confer a conditional 
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or 
defense and the main action have a question of law or 
fact in common. When a party to an action relies for 
ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive 
order administered by a federal or state governmental 
officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, 
requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant to 
the statute or executive order, the officer or agency 
upon timely application may be permitted to intervene 
in the action. In exercising its discretion the court 
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly 
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the 
original parties. "

The discretion of the trial court to permit intervention is 

extremely broad. Its application should be liberally construed. (2 

Federal Practice and Procedure 201). None of the party litigants and 

the interveners can properly represent these movants. Moreover, these 

movants may well be helpful to the Court in its determination of the pro­

per relief to be granted.

Respectfully submitted:

ROSS, BRUFF & RANCILIO, P.C.

By: s /  William Ross ______
WILLIAM ROSS
Attorneys for Movant
215 South Gratiot Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043 
465-1313

Date: April 10, 1972



ANSWER OF INTERVENING DEFENDANT, DETROIT 
FEDERATION OF TEACHERS TO PETITION FOR

REHEARING OF MOTION OF PROFESSIONAL 
PERSONNEL OF VAN DYKE, ET AL. , TO INTERVENE

(Filed April 2 5, 1972)

Now comes Detroit Federation of Teachers, Local #231, 

AFT, AFL-CIO, by its Attorneys, Rothe, Marston, Mazey Sachs, 

O'Connell, Nunn & Freid, and in answer and opposition to the Petition 

for Rehearing on the Motion to Intervene by Professional Personnel of

Van Dyke, avers:

L Answering paragraph 1, intervening defendant admits 

the allegations therein, on information and belief,

2, Answering paragraph 2, intervening defendant neither 

admits nor denies the allegations of said paragraph, not having sufficient 

information on which to base a belief, and leaves Petitioner to its proofs 

thereof,

3, Answering paragraph 3, intervening defendant admits 

the allegations of said paragraph, on information and belief.

4, Answering paragraph 4, this defendant avers that said 

allegations are speculative.

5, Answering paragraph 5, intervening defendant admits 

the allegations therein.

6, Answering paragraph 6, intervening defendant neither 

admits nor denies said allegations, not having sufficient information on 

which to base a belief, and leaves petitioner to its proofs.

7, Answering paragraph 7, intervening defendant denies



15aAnswer of Intervening Defefendant . . . etc.

that it sought such consent, but admits that it would not consent thereto,

8, Answering paragraph 8, intervening defendant denies 

said allegations,

9, Said allegations do not state a basis for relief.

In further answer, applicant states no new grounds warranting

intervention in the premises,

WHEREFORE, defendant Detroit Federation of Teachers 

prays that such petition for rehearing be denied,
t;

f
Respectfully submitted,

ROTHE, MARS TON, MAZEY, SACHS, 
O’CONNELL, NUNN & FREID

by s /  Theodore Sachs____________________
Theodore Sachs

Attorneys for DFT 
1000 Farmer 
Detroit, Michigan 48226 
965-3464

DATED: April 21, 1972

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RULINGS AND ORDER ON MOTIONS AND OTHER 
MATTERS HEARD JUNE 14, 1972

At a session of said Court held in 
the Federal Building, County of Wayne,
City of Detroit, on the 29th day of JUNE,
A. D, 1972.

PRESENT: HONORABLE STEPHEN J. ROTH
United States District Judge

Hearings were conducted on motions and other matters out­

standing as of June 7, 1972 in the above-entitled cause. In addition to J.
|matters listed in the notice dated June 7, 1972, the parties were directed 

to call all other matters which were pending and unresolved to the atten­

tion of the court; its intention being to put matters in order.

Having considered all matters noticed for hearing and ail 

additional matters brought to the attention of the court at such hearing;

IT IS ORDERED:

That the applications of the Grosse Pointe Human Relations 

Council, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, the City of Troy and the 

Central United Methodist Church for leave to appear as Amicus Curiae 

are DENIED, T'l
The application of the Michigan Educational Association for 

leave to appear as Amicus Curiae is GRANTED.

The petition for intervention by the Organization of School

Administrators and Supervisors is DENIED.

Having reheard the petition of the Professional Personnel of

Van Dyke to intervene, the previous denial of its motion to intervene is
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Rulings and Order on Motions and Other Matters Heard 6/14/72

AFFIRMED.

The motion of defendants Magdowski, et al. to add additional

parties defendant was, at the hearing, in effect, withdrawn, and the same
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shall be considered as withdrawn.

The Detroit Board of Education motions to quash certain jj 11
subpoenaes and to strike plaintiffs' plan, and its objections to the state's

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metropolitan plans, are each, in view of the state of the proceedings and

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the issuance of the court's bindings and Conclusions" and "Order for the

Development of Plan of Desegregation, " considered MOOT.
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The Plaintiffs' motions to particularize one of the State

Board's plans and to adjudge the Detroit Board of Education plan legally

insufficient are, in view of the ruling and order referred to in the para”

graph next above, considered MOOT.

Plaintiffs' motion for expenses incurred in the preparation of

its metropolitan plan is held in ABEYANCE pending the filing of
i f f®  A -supporting affidavits, if

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Plaintiffs' motions for expenses to be assessed against the

State Board of Education and the Detroit Board of Education, and to j|

require the purchase of transportation equipment are held in ABEYANCE 
pending further proceedings.

The disposition of matters above referred to are ORDERED 
as indicated and may this day be entered by the Clerk.

DATE: JUNE 29, 1972.

s /  STEPHEN 3, ROTH n

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE