Amicus Curiae Brief of the School Board of Hillsborough County, Florida
Public Court Documents
September 16, 1970
9 pages
Cite this item
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Case Files, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hardbacks. Amicus Curiae Brief of the School Board of Hillsborough County, Florida, 1970. 90a02fd3-2e34-f111-88b4-0022482cdbbc. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/4d2f71b3-03c8-4e74-be81-c73c2dd1ed3c/amicus-curiae-brief-of-the-school-board-of-hillsborough-county-florida. Accessed June 02, 2026.
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[||394a0fcb-4006-458e-948a-d9d039dca86c||] IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1970
No. 281
JAMES E. SWANN, ET AL,
Petitioners,
VS.
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
Respondents.
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE SCHOOL BOARD OF
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
W. CROSBY FEW
725 East Kennedy Blevd.
Tampa, Florida 33602
Attorney for the School
Board of Hillsborough
County, Florida
Of Counsel:
JOHN M. ALLISON
512 Florida Avenue
Post Office Box 1531
Tampa, Florida 33601
FREE PRESS PUB. CO., INC., TAMPA, FLORIDA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE = 1
QUESTIONS : PRESENTED... o.oo Jo. buuel. so suun 2
ABCGUMENT: 11. coidssonan Jo bovol Povuinedt iu ts 3
CONCLUSION = inane rr=on = oma 5
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case Page
Alexander v. Board of Education, 306 US. 19 3, 4
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F.Supp. 776 Ema
Brown v. Board of Education, I, 347TU.S.483 = 3
Caddo Parish School Board v. U.S.,389 U.S. 840 ____ 4
Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, U.S.C.A.
6 Cir., (1966), 369 F.2d 55 (Deal I) cert. den.
389 U.S. 847, 88 S.Ct. 39, 19 L.Ed. 114 ________ 3
Mannings v. Board of Education of Hillsborough
County, Florida, 5 Cir., 1970 F.2d
[No. 28,643, May 11, 1970] _______ BeANITH 1
U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Education,
372 F.2d 836,380 F.2d 38 _________ Lao on 3, 4
Miscellaneous
Civil Rights Act of 1964—79 Stat. 241
3401(b) i... ae. 4
3404 (ey (2). >... 2, 4
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
Buled42(4): ........ ... cena 1
42 U.S.C.A.
$2000c.{b) .... . 0. Cillian 2
32000c~=6(a¥{2) ... _ ....... _.. in.o..... 2
Tlorido' Stotutes, $23401- ..- ~~ . o.. ..... 9
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1970
No. 281
JAMES E. SWANN, ET AL,
Petitioners,
VS.
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
Respondents.
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE SCHOOL BOARD CF
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
NATURE OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
This brief is filed on behalf of the School Board
of the County of Hillsborough, a political subdivision of
the State of Florida, and is sponsored by the attorney
for the School Board of Hillsborough County, Florida,
the authorized law officer thereof, under Rule 42(4) of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The School Board of Hillsborough County’s inter-
est arises because, in Mannings v. Board of Public In-
struction of Hillsborough County, Florida, 5 Cir. 1970,
_F2d___ [No. 28,643, May 11, 1970], the Fifth
Circuit, and in subsequent orders thereto entered by the
District Judge of the United States District Court for
2
the Middle District of Florida, certain elementary
schools were directed to be paired. Such orders entirely
ignored the provisions of Title 42, Sections 2000c. (b)
and 2000c.—6(a) (2), which provide that ‘“desegrega-
tion” shall not mean the assignment of students to pub-
lic schools in order to overcome racial imbalance, and
prohibit any official or court of the United States from
issuing any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in
any school by requiring the transportation of pupils
from one school to another in order to achieve such
racial balance. Such orders also necessarily required the
busing of students from parts of the school areas as
paired, to the school building where the classes were to
be held, a condition which did not previously exist prior
to the entry of such orders. Florida law provides that no
state funds shall be paid for the transportation of pupils
whose homes are within two miles from the nearest ap-
propriate school. Section 234.01, Florida Statutes. In a
number of instances, the pairing of elementary schools
directed as aforesaid results in requiring busing stu-
dents from portions of the school areas directed to be
paired, in excess of two miles to the school building
where appropriate classes are held, thus requiring the
busing of students not contemplated by the School
Board.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does the Constitution require or permit the
courts to order the busing of pupils solely to achieve
racial balance?
2. Did the courts below improperly disregard the
explicit direction of Congress in Section 407 (a) (2) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that “nothing herein shall
impower any * * * court of the United States to issue
LE)
3
any order seeking to achieve racial balance in any school
by requiring the transportation of pupils or students
from one school to another in order to achieve such
racial balance.” ?
ARGUMENT
No decision of this Court has required racial balanc-
ing. Every decision from Brown v. Board of Education,
I, 347 U.S. 483, through Alexander v. Board of Education,
396 U.S. 19, has reiterated the Constitution’s mandate
for wholly non-racial public school systems.
A concise statement of the law appears in Deal v.
Cincinnati Board of Education, U.S.C.A., 6 Cir. (1966)
369 F.2d 55 (Deal I), cert. denied 389 U.S. 847, 88 S.Ct.
39, 19 L.Ed. 114, where it was said:
“We hold that there is no constitutional duty on
the part of the Board to bus Negro or white children
out of their neighborhoods or to transfer classes
for the sole purpose of alleviating racial imbalance
that it did not cause, nor is there a like duty to
select new school sites solely in futherance of such
a purpose.” (emphasis supplied)
A three-judge court in Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F.Supp.
776, firmly declared:
“The Constitution, in other words, does not require
integration. It merely forbids discrimination.”
At least seven Circuit Courts of Appeal support this
doctrine. Only the Fifth Circuit has discarded its earlier
approval of the case and now adheres to the racially
oriented policy of racial balancing, U.S. v. Jefferson
County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, adhered to on
rehearing, 380 F.2d 385.
4
The concept of racial balancing as a form of deseg-
regation was explicitly and emphatically disapproved
by Congress when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
When the bill was considered on the floor of the House
on February 6, 1964, Mr. Cramer of Florida offered an
amendment which provided that “ ‘desegregation’ shall
not mean the assignment of students to public schools
in order to overcome racial imbalance.” Chairman Celler
of the Judiciary Committee accepted that amendment,
and, as thus amended, Section 401 (b) was not further
changed in the course of the passage through Congress;
it was carried on to the statute book as amended by Mr.
Cramer.
Notwithstanding the provisos in Section 401(b)
and 407 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they have
been either consistently misread, or simply disregarded
by the courts that have had these statutory directions
called to their attention. U.S. v. Jefferson County Board
of Education, supra, Caddo Parish School Board v. U.S.,
389 U.S. 840. This disregard of congressional action con-
stitutes another reason for review by this Court. Nothing
in the Constitution of the United States permits, much
Jess requires, the busing of school children to achieve
racial balancing. The direction (Alexander v. Board of
Education, 396 U.S.19) “to operate as unitary school sys-
tems within which no person is to be effectively exclud-
ed from any school because of race or color” forbids
the result obtained below, which in fact excludes several
hundred white children from the walk-in schools nearest
their homes simply because admitting them there fails
to achieve racial balancing within the entire system. Past
discrimination in cone direction does not justify present
discrimination in another.
5
CONCLUSION
These issues which have caused wide-spread con-
fusion must be resolved. The time is now. Amicus urgent-
ly requests the Court to announce that the busing of
pupils solely to achieve racial balance should not be re-
quired; that the concept of the neighborhood school
should be preserved, and that involuntary pairing of
schools is educationally and economically unsound,
threatening to encroach upon and destroy the historical
concept of the American school system.
Respectfully submitted,
W. CROSBY FEW
725 East Kennedy Boulevard
Tampa, Florida 33602
Attorney for the School Board of
Hillsborough County, Florida
Of Counsel:
JOHN M. ALLISON
512 Florida Avenue
Post Office Box 1531
Tampa, Florida 33601
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that copies of Amicus Curiae
Brief of the School Board of Hillsborough County,
Florida were served upon each of the attorneys named
below by depositing the same in the United States mail,
postage prepaid on this 17th day of September, 1970.
William J. Waggoner
1100 Barringer Office
Tower
426 North Tyron Street
Charlotte, North Carolina
Benjamin S. Horack
806 East Trade Street
Charlotte, North Carolina
Julius LeVonne Chambers
216 West Tenth Street
Charlotte, North Carolina
Jack Greenberg
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York
Conrad O. Pearson
203; East Chapel Hill
Street
Durham, North Carolina
Jerris Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.
Honorable Erwin N.
Griswold
Solicitor General of United
States
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Honorable Robert Morgan
Attorney General
tate of North Carolina
Department of Justice
Raleigh, North Carolina
William C. Cramer, M.C.
2165 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Stephen J. Pollak
Benjamin W. Boley
Richard M. Sharp
734 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Gerald Mager
General Counsel to the
Governor
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida
W. CROSBY FEW
Of Counsel for Amicus Curiae [||394a0fcb-4006-458e-948a-d9d039dca86c||]