Effects of Multimember State House and State Senate Districts in Eight North Carolina Countries, 1978-1982 Draft Paper

    EFFECTS OF I{ULTII{E1.IBER STATE HOUSE

AND STATE SENATE DISTRICTS

IN EIGHT NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES, I978-I982

Bernard Grofman
Prof essor of Pol'lt'lcal Sc'lence
School of Soclal Sclences
Unlverstty of Callfornla, Irvlne
Irvlne, Callfornla 92717

Draft (Appendtces Incomplete)

l{ay 20, 1983



I. Ef f ects of [,lul tlmember Dl str lcts:

A Theoretlcal Overvlew

Apportlonment schemes at the state and local level often make use of

multlmember dlstrlcts (rmnds), the polar type of whlch ls, of course, the

at-large electlon. Such plans typ'lca11y a'llocate the number of

representatlves to a dlstrlct 1n dlrect proportlon to that dlstrlct's
popttlatlon, wlth each voter ellglble to cast as many votes as there are

seats to be f'llled, and candldates elected on the basls of elther slmp'le

p1ura11ty or maJorlty runoff provlslons. In the aftermath of the Supreme

Court's entrance lnto the "po11t1ca1 tlcket" of reapportlonment, the

constltutlonallty of multlmember dlstrlcts has been challenged and

partlcular rmd plans struck down. In areas wlth substantlal mlnor'lty

populatlon and patterns of polarlzed votlng, mmd often have invldlous

effects on mlnorlty representatlon.

F1rst, and most lmportantly, multlmember dlstrlcts often act so as to

submerge raclal or 11ngu1st1c (or po11t1cal) m1nor1t1es. For mmds, the

"wlnner-take-all" character of p1ura1lty (or maJorlty run-off) electlons

creates the strong poss1b111ty that a speclflc maJorlty w1'11 elect ali
the representatlves from the dlstrlct, especlally'lf votlng 1s po'larlzed;

whereas the outvoted mlnorlty.m'lght have been able to elect some

representatlves 1f the multlmember dlstrlct had been broken up lnto

several slng1e-member dlstr'lcts, especlaly 1f mlnorlty strength 1s

geographlcally concentrated. Thls mlnorlty submergence can operate 1n

both prlmarles and general electlons. Especlally when mlnorlty

candldates are so unllkely of success that there are few 1f any mlnorlty



candldates 1n any glven context, add'ltlonal probable consequences of

m'lnorlty submergence are reduced turnout and reduced lnterest 1n po11t1cs

among voters 1n the mlnortty.l

A second (and closely related) problem of multlmember dlstrlcts

arlses from the propenslty of representatlves from such dlstrlcts to act

as a bloc. 0ften chosen large'ly by the same subset of voters,

predomlnantly or excluslvely of the same party, the ldentlty of lnterests

among the group of representatlves elected from a mrnd can be expected to

be greater than that whlch would have arlsen had representatlves been

chosen from dlstlnct dlstrlcts. Thus the set of representatlves elected

from a glven mmd mlght not fu1'ly mlrror the vlews of all the cltlzens 1n

the dlstrlct. In partlcular, representatlves elected from mmds may be

unresponslve to the mlnorlty groups 1n the dlstrlct whose candldate(s)

they have defeated.

A thlrd (and related) prob'lem wlth mu'lt'lmember dlstrlcts 1s that they

often lead to the electlon of representatlves who are not broadly

geographlcally representatlve of the area whlch they are supposed to

represent. Frequent'ly 1n multlmember dlstrlcts many or all of the

representatlves wlll reslde w1th1n a llmlted geographlc area,2 unless

there 1s a rule requlrlng representatives to reslde 1n geographlcally

deslgnated dl str'lcts.3

A fourth problem of multlmember dlstrlcts 1s that they s1gnlf1cant1y

lncrease the cost of campalgnlng by requ'lrlng campalgn'lng among a much

larger electorate. Thls wlll often work to.dlscourage candldates from

raclal or 11ngu'lst1c mlnorltles who are less able to afford the cost of a



large-sca1e campalgn. (See Jewell, .l982, for data from a number of

states bearlng on thls po1nt. )4 Dut. from the Charlotte Clty Councll

and Ralelgh Clty Councll electlons of .l979 and .l98.l, electlons whlch had

both a dlstrlct and at-1arge (multlmember) component, shows clearly that

successful multlmember campalgns are more costly than successful s1ng1e

member dlstrlct campalgns for both lncumbent and non-lncumbent candldates

( see Appended Report. )

A flfth argument agalnst multlmember dlstrlcts, only lndlrectly

related to the lssue of mlnorlty submergence, ls that the tle between a

representatlve and h1s/her constltuency'ls weakened when a voter does not

have a s1ng1e representatlve to regard as,rh'ls own." (See Jewel'1, .l982,

for support of thls argument based on surveys of state leglslators. )

In state leglslatures, multlmember dlstr'lcts are becom'lng iess common

Slne the early .l970's the Justlce Oepartment has dlscouraged the use of

multlmember dlstrlcts 1n states wlth slgnlflcant raclal or'llngulstlc

mlnorlty populatlons 1n Jurlsdlctlons covered by Sectlon 5 of the Votlng

Rlghts Act. As a result, a number of Southern states have ceased or

nearly ceased leglslatlve use of mmds 1n countles subJect to Justlce

preclearance. In state lower (upper) houses 1n .l968,66% 
146%l used some

mu1tlmember dlstrlcts, but by .l978, only 40% (26%l d1d so. (Berry and

Dye,.I979:86-87.) By .l980, the percentages hrere further reduced to 38%

for state louer houses and 22% for state upper houses. In .l98.l, 
the

Amerlcan Bar Assoclatlon adopted a resolution urglng that pure

s1ngle-member dlstrlctlng be adopted 1n both houses of all state
'leglslatlves.



Footnotes

lFor demonstratlon of how raclal bloc votlng and mlnorlty

submergence operates 1n North Carollna mmds see appended summary tab'les

on North Carollna House and Senate prlmary and general electlons 1n elght

Nor th Carol I na count 1 es , I 978-82.

2Euld.n.. whlch bears on thls argument as 1t applles to North

Carol I na 1 s g1 ven 1 n an appended repor t.
30f .orrr., use of deslgnated representailves provldes no cure for

the baslc problem of mlnorlty submergences 1n mmd electlons, and may even

make 'lt worse by creat'lng dlrect head-on-head Black vs. l.Jhlte conte;t.
40.t. on campalgn costs 1n Hawallan slng'le and multlmember

leglslatlve electlons'ls found'ln the transcrlpts of testlmony taken 1n

by 1982 the Hawa11 Reapportlonment commlsslon (see e.g., remarks by

Representat'lve Toguch'l ); and a complete body of evldence f or Hawa11

leglslatlve electlon drawn from actual campalgn expendlture records, ls

found 1n Exhlblt #27 of Travls v. Klnq (U.S.D1str1ct Court for the State

of Hawail, Harch .l982), the l{arch .l5,.l982, deposltlon of James Ha11, a

Reapportlonment Commlsslon member. Thls data fu11y substantlates the

vlew that multlmember dlstrlct campalgns are more expenslve than

s 1ng1e-member d'ls tr 1c t campal gns .



Refer enc es

Berry, Barbara L. and Thomas R. Dye. "The Dlscrlmlnatory Effects of

At-Large Electlons,'r Florlda State Unlversl ty Law Revlew, Vol . 7

(1979), 85-122.

Grofman, Bernard N. Resport on the constltutlonallty of the Hawa11

Reapportlonment Corrnlsslon' s proposed state 1eg'lslatlve

redlstrlctlng. Prepared test'lmony 1n Travls et al. v. K1ng, U.S.

Dlstrlct Court for the State of Hawail, Harch 23-24, .l982,

photo-offset.

Jewel I , l{alcolm E. "The Consequences of Slng'le- and l{ul t1-l{ember

Dlstr1ct1ng. " In B. Grofman, A. LlJphart, R. HcKay and H. Scarrour

(Eds. ), Representatlon and Redlstr'lctlnq Issues. Lexlngton, FlA:

Lex'lngton Books , I982, .I29-.l35 
.