Motion for Reconsideration of Award of Attorney's Fees
Public Court Documents
June 24, 1977
4 pages
Cite this item
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Case Files, Bolden v. Mobile Hardbacks and Appendices. Motion for Reconsideration of Award of Attorney's Fees, 1977. d13a3db2-cdcd-ef11-b8e8-7c1e520b5bae. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/50d6b3a3-cbef-4392-b014-c2deedde25ad/motion-for-reconsideration-of-award-of-attorneys-fees. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILEY L. BOLDEN, et al., )
Plaintiffs, )
VS. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 75-297-P
CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, )
et al.,
Defendants. )
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
AGAINST THE CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA
Plaintiffs move the Court to reconsider its' Order and
Decree on Plaintiffs’ Claim For Attorneys' Fees and Expenses
Against the City of Mobile, Alabama, for the following
reasons:
1. In light of the Court's finding that the customary
fee for public employment on a non-contingent basis hovers near
the $40 per hour mark, awarding plaintiffs' counsel an equivalent
or less amount is, as a matter of law, contrary to congressional
intent and Fifth Circuit guidelines, which provide that a con-
tingent fee is to be accorded a higher rate than a non-contingent
fee.
2. Congress has established statutory requirements, not
an equitable standard as existed prior to Alyeska Pipeline. It
is congressional policy that civil rights be enforced through
the private bar rather than by a government agency. Under the
federal statutory scheme, the court's findings regarding
Alabama's relative poverty and regressive tax structure are
misplaced.
3. 42 U.S.C. 8 1973 1(e) and 1988 provide for prevailing
parties to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The
Court has acknowledged that the named plaintiffs were members
of the NPVL, yet failed to award them the $1,500 their civil
rights organization expended to force the government to protect
their constitutional rights. The recovery of costs by the
plaintiffs is an integral part of the remedy, and plaintiffs
are legally entitled to recover the $1,500 advanced by the
NPVL.
4. The Court's finding and conclusion makes no allowance
for the fact that the "prevailing rates" were billed regularly
while plaintiffs' award comes two years after the action began.
Because of the burden of this and other protracted civil rights
litigation, plaintiffs attorneys have on several occasions been
forced to borrow money to meet payrolls and office expenses.
The $40 per hour rate discounted at 8% for two years would mean
that plaintiffs' attorneys are receiving an effective rate of
a compensation of about $33 to $34 per hour for the work per-
formed early in the litigation.
5. The effect of the ruling is to set a double standard
that taxpaying plaintiffs, prevailing in complex civil rights
litigation, after bearing the risks and expenses of the litiga-
tion against their own government will receive less for attorneys
fees and expenses than elected officials paid attorneys who
defended the unconstitutional system.
6. The Court erred in finding that the customary fee for
similiar work "hovers near the $40.00 per hour rate." It was
stated that the assistant counsel for the County was paid $50
per hour, the City attorney was paid at least $50 per hour and
the School Board attorney was $40 per hour plus a retainer.
No defense attorney was paid $40 per hour without ‘a retainer
for handling federal court litigation.
7. Plaintiffs submit the court erred in finding that the
appropriate standard for the customary fee is that paid "for
municipal or public service work". No place in the litigation
or legislative history is it even indicated that such a
standard is to be used. Rather fees are to be those which are
adequate to "attract competent counsel." "(E)qually complex
Federal ligitation, such as antitrust litigation" are cited as
an appropriate standard. There is no evidence that the fees
awarded by the Court "will attract competent counsel." To
the contrary, there is unanimous testimony that substantially
higher fees would be required to attract attorneys to represent
plaintiffs in civil rights litigation.
8. The evidence is in coRtLich with respect to fees paid
attorneys for the City, and the Court's reliance upon it is
misplaced. In answers to interrogatories lead counsel for the
City, after raising numerous objections, stated that his law
firm was paid fees that "amounts to $50 per hour!" for a total
of $85,035.00. Yet, in their letter to the Court of May 26,
1977, wherein they state the number of hours attributable to
the trial, there appears to be some irreconciable figures. This
information reveals an hourly figure in excess of $50 per hour,
leaving the clear impression that the defendants billed at
different rates for the various attorneys.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court will reconsider
its order of June 14, 1977, and award plaintiffs their costs
and attorneys' fees as prayed for in their amended motion.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of Jure, 1977.
CRAWFORD, BLACKSHER, FIGURES & BROWN
1407 DAVIS AVENUE
MOBILE, ALABAMA 36603
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NY, U. ACK3HER J
LARRY T. MENEFEE
EDWARD STILL
601 TITLE BUILDING
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35203
JACK GREENBERG
ERIC SCHNAPPER
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on this 24th day of June, 1977,
I served a copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST THE CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA
upon counsel of record, C. B. Arendall, Esquire, Fred G. Collins,
Esquire and Charles Rhyne, Esquire, by depositing same in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid.
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ah a) er lr)
ARTTORNEY i PLAINTIFFS
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