Motion for Reconsideration of Award of Attorney's Fees
Public Court Documents
June 24, 1977

4 pages
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Case Files, Bolden v. Mobile Hardbacks and Appendices. Motion for Reconsideration of Award of Attorney's Fees, 1977. d13a3db2-cdcd-ef11-b8e8-7c1e520b5bae. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/50d6b3a3-cbef-4392-b014-c2deedde25ad/motion-for-reconsideration-of-award-of-attorneys-fees. Accessed June 13, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION WILEY L. BOLDEN, et al., ) Plaintiffs, ) VS. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 75-297-P CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, ) et al., Defendants. ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST THE CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA Plaintiffs move the Court to reconsider its' Order and Decree on Plaintiffs’ Claim For Attorneys' Fees and Expenses Against the City of Mobile, Alabama, for the following reasons: 1. In light of the Court's finding that the customary fee for public employment on a non-contingent basis hovers near the $40 per hour mark, awarding plaintiffs' counsel an equivalent or less amount is, as a matter of law, contrary to congressional intent and Fifth Circuit guidelines, which provide that a con- tingent fee is to be accorded a higher rate than a non-contingent fee. 2. Congress has established statutory requirements, not an equitable standard as existed prior to Alyeska Pipeline. It is congressional policy that civil rights be enforced through the private bar rather than by a government agency. Under the federal statutory scheme, the court's findings regarding Alabama's relative poverty and regressive tax structure are misplaced. 3. 42 U.S.C. 8 1973 1(e) and 1988 provide for prevailing parties to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The Court has acknowledged that the named plaintiffs were members of the NPVL, yet failed to award them the $1,500 their civil rights organization expended to force the government to protect their constitutional rights. The recovery of costs by the plaintiffs is an integral part of the remedy, and plaintiffs are legally entitled to recover the $1,500 advanced by the NPVL. 4. The Court's finding and conclusion makes no allowance for the fact that the "prevailing rates" were billed regularly while plaintiffs' award comes two years after the action began. Because of the burden of this and other protracted civil rights litigation, plaintiffs attorneys have on several occasions been forced to borrow money to meet payrolls and office expenses. The $40 per hour rate discounted at 8% for two years would mean that plaintiffs' attorneys are receiving an effective rate of a compensation of about $33 to $34 per hour for the work per- formed early in the litigation. 5. The effect of the ruling is to set a double standard that taxpaying plaintiffs, prevailing in complex civil rights litigation, after bearing the risks and expenses of the litiga- tion against their own government will receive less for attorneys fees and expenses than elected officials paid attorneys who defended the unconstitutional system. 6. The Court erred in finding that the customary fee for similiar work "hovers near the $40.00 per hour rate." It was stated that the assistant counsel for the County was paid $50 per hour, the City attorney was paid at least $50 per hour and the School Board attorney was $40 per hour plus a retainer. No defense attorney was paid $40 per hour without ‘a retainer for handling federal court litigation. 7. Plaintiffs submit the court erred in finding that the appropriate standard for the customary fee is that paid "for municipal or public service work". No place in the litigation or legislative history is it even indicated that such a standard is to be used. Rather fees are to be those which are adequate to "attract competent counsel." "(E)qually complex Federal ligitation, such as antitrust litigation" are cited as an appropriate standard. There is no evidence that the fees awarded by the Court "will attract competent counsel." To the contrary, there is unanimous testimony that substantially higher fees would be required to attract attorneys to represent plaintiffs in civil rights litigation. 8. The evidence is in coRtLich with respect to fees paid attorneys for the City, and the Court's reliance upon it is misplaced. In answers to interrogatories lead counsel for the City, after raising numerous objections, stated that his law firm was paid fees that "amounts to $50 per hour!" for a total of $85,035.00. Yet, in their letter to the Court of May 26, 1977, wherein they state the number of hours attributable to the trial, there appears to be some irreconciable figures. This information reveals an hourly figure in excess of $50 per hour, leaving the clear impression that the defendants billed at different rates for the various attorneys. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court will reconsider its order of June 14, 1977, and award plaintiffs their costs and attorneys' fees as prayed for in their amended motion. Respectfully submitted this 24th day of Jure, 1977. CRAWFORD, BLACKSHER, FIGURES & BROWN 1407 DAVIS AVENUE MOBILE, ALABAMA 36603 /) ~ A & eit 4%, W LU eis Lar NY, U. ACK3HER J LARRY T. MENEFEE EDWARD STILL 601 TITLE BUILDING BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35203 JACK GREENBERG ERIC SCHNAPPER 10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019 Attorneys for Plaintiffs CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby certify that on this 24th day of June, 1977, I served a copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST THE CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA upon counsel of record, C. B. Arendall, Esquire, Fred G. Collins, Esquire and Charles Rhyne, Esquire, by depositing same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid. A a ah a) er lr) ARTTORNEY i PLAINTIFFS /