Motion to Tax Costs

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| IN THE IN. amy | | § ILL IY | 
1 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES | 

| October Term, 1970 | 

{ Nos. 281, 349 | 

l JAMES E. SWANN, et al., 

| Petitioners, | 
1! { 

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| CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
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I 
I CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, 

| Petitioners, 
i Vv. 

| JAMES E. SWANN, et al. 

I MOTION TO TAX COSTS 

| JACK GREENBERG 
I JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
| NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
| 10 Columbus Circle 
I New York, New York 10019 

I J. LeVONNE CHAMBERS | 
I ADAM STEIN | 
I 237 West Trade Street | 

Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 | 

C. O. PEARSON | 
203-1/2 East Chapel Hill Street | 
Durham, North Carolina 27702 | 

ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM | 
Stanford University Law School | 
Stanford, California 94305 

Attorneys for Petitioners 

  

 



  

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1970 

Nos. 281, 349 

  

JAMES E. SWANN, et al., 

Petitioners, 

Vv. 

CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION. 

CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, 

Petitioners, 

Vv. 

JAMES E. SWANN, et al., 

  

MOTION TO TAX COSTS 

Petitioners James E. Swann, et al. respectfully requests 

that the Court enter an order allowing petitioners their costs in 

this Court in No. 281, including the cost of printing the 

appendix, for the reasons stated below. 

Statement 
  

1. This case was decided April 20, 1971, with an opinion by 

Chief Justice Burger for a unanimous Court. This Court's deci- 

sion of April 20, 1971, concluded by stating: 

For the reasons herein set forth, the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed 

as to those parts in which it affirmed the 

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judgment of the District Court. The order of 
the District Court dated August 7, 1970, is 
also affirmed. 

| & 

| A petition for rehearing filed by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 

| of Education was denied June 7, 1971, and the judgment issued on 

that date. Petitioners Swann, et al. wrote to the Clerk on 

June 8 requesting that they be allowed their costs in No. 281 

pursuant to Rule 57(2). The Clerk responded July 7, 1971--having 

in the interim requested and received a response from opposing 

| counsel--that no costs were allowed to petitioners and stating: 

The judgment of this Court, entered April 20, 
1971, by its term affirms the judgment of the 
United States Co.rt of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit. Under Rule 57(2), costs are allowed to 
the appellant when the judgment of the court 
below is reversed or vacated, which is not the 
case here. It appears, therefore, that the judg- 
ment was entered in accordance with the rule. 

2. A brief resume of the somewhat unusual procedural history | 

of the case is useful to put the matter in context. The Court 

granted three separate petitions for certiorari in the case. See 

1399 U.S. 926; 400 U.S. 805; 400 U.S. 802. The first petition in 

| No. 281 (previously No. 1713, Oct. Term, 1969) was filed June 18, 

1970, and granted June 29, 1970 (399 U.S. 926). The petition in 

No. 281 was filed by Swann, et al. seeking review of a decision 

by the Fourth Circuit which, on the school board's appeal from a 

district court desegregation order of February 5, 1970, had 

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| "vacated" the district court judgment. The Fourth Circuit 

approved the district court's plan for secondary schools but held 

that the elementary school plan unduly burdened the board. 

  

hl/ Swann v, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 
  

138, 160 (4th Cir. 1970), vacating a district court decision 
reported at 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D, N.C., Feb. 5, 1970). 

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Petitioners, supporting the entire district court order, filed 

the petition in No. 281 seeking to have that district court order 

reinstated and the Fourth Circuit reversed insofar as it set 

aside the district court's plan. Petitioners also filed a Motion | 

2/ 
to Advance and for Pendente Lite Relief. On June 29, 1970, this 

Court granted certiorari and reinstated the district court plan | 

pending further proceedings in that court, stating (399 U.S. 926) :| 

... Petition for writ of certiorari granted, 

provided the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 

left undisturbed insofar as it remands the case | 
to the District Court for further proceedings, | 
which further proceedings are authorized, and 
the District Court's judgment is reinstated and 
shall remain in effect pending those proceedings. 

The decision on the motions to expedite is 

deferred. Mr. Justice Black dissents from the 
Court's order which reinstates the district 

court's judgment. He would grant the motion to 
expedite action in this Court and set the case 
for hearing at the earliest possible date. 

The Court not having acted on the request that the matter 

proceed without a printed record (see note 2), it thereupon became! 

the duty of petitioners to prepare an appendix. The voluminous 

appendix of more than 1,300 pages (including more than 240 pages 

of lower court opinions) was printed at petitioners' expense and 

timely filed. The cost of printing as indicated by the attached 

3/ 
bill, was $14,105.03 (see Appendix A, infra). 

  

2/ Because the primary item of costs at issue in this case is the 
printing of the appendix, it is perhaps relevant to mention that | 
in the Motion to Advance petitioners asked that this Court "con- 
sider the case on the original record without printing or, 
alternatively, to permit reproduction of the appendix record used 
in the Court of Appeals by other than standard typographic means. "! 

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3/ The attached printers' bill (Appendix A, infra) indicates 
that petitioners printed 65 copies of the appendix. We submit 
that in the circumstances of the case most, if not all, of the 
copies were reasonably necessary. We served copies on Messrs. 

 



  

On July 2, 1970, during the Court's vacation, the school 

board filed a cross-petition for certiorari (No. 349, Oct. Term, 

1971) in which the board challenged the entire district court 

plan. In July 1970 the district court conducted further hearings | 

and entered orders on August 3 and August 7, 1970, which left in 

effect the February 5, 1970, judgment. The Fourth Circuit 

declined to issue a stay at the board's request, and the board's | 

motion for a stay addressed to the Chief Justice and referred by 

him to the Court was denied in this Court. The board then filed 

a motion for an ancillary writ of certiorari pertaining to the 

proceedings since the writ was granted in No. 281, and the Court, 

treating the motion as a petition for certiorari, granted it as 

well as the petition in No. 349, on October 6, 1970 (400 U.S. 802-| 

803, 805). In the meanwhile, the parties had been notified that 

  

(Continued) 

Horack and Waggoner representing the Board of Education, as well 
as upon the Solicitor General of the United States and the Attor- | 
ney General of North Carolina. We also served counsel for the 
National Education Association and the United Negro College Fund, 
et al. who had filed amicus briefs with leave of this Court (399 
U.S. 926). Subsequently, we served Mr. Blakeney, counsel for 
appellants in a related case, No. 444, Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklen-| 
burg Board of Education, which Mr. Blakeney sought to have | 
consolidated with No. 281. Furthermore, petitioners were twice 
requested by the Clerk's office to furnish additional copies of 
the petition for certiorari and the voluminous appendix containing] 
the many opinions below, so that they thought it a reasonable pre-| 
caution to print a number of extra copies of the appendix. 

  

  

The board's counsel, by letter to the Clerk, has also argued 
that if petitioners obtain costs they should be limited to $5.59 | 
per page, the price paid by the board in printing the appendix in 
No. 349. Petitioners in No. 281 printed the appendix by standard 
typographic means at prevailing rates in New York without overtime, 
or rush charges notwithstanding the great bulk of the material and 
the short time involved. The ruling urged by the board would, if | 
it were adopted by the Court as a precedent, haw the effect of pret 
venting litigants from having their printing work done in union 

! print shops. If any limitation on the price per page for printing 
| work is to be adopted, beyond the general notion that work shall | 
| be done at the prevailing printing rates, it ought to be announced] 
"in advance by rule of Court and not applied after the fact as | 
y urged by the board. 

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| oral argument in all the cases was scheduled by order of the Chief | 

Justice for October 12, 1970. The board then prepared an appendix | 

in No. 349 consisting of the district court proceedings after the 
| 4/ 

grant of certiorari in No. 281. 

3. This Court's decision completely affirmed the district 

court's February 5, 1970, desegregation order. Thus, the Court 

| completely rejected the position of the board of education which | 

| challenged the February 5 order throughout the appellate proceed- 

ings and completely upheld the position of petitioners Swann, et 

al. who had supported the order. There is no dispute over the 

; fact that Swann, et al. were the winning litigants; this was 

acknowledged by counsel for the school board in his letter to the 

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|| Clerk of this Court of June 16, 1971. 

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE MOTION 
  

1. Petitioners Swann, et al. are entitled to costs in | 
  

  

No. 281 as a matter of course under Rule 57(2). | | 

Rule 57(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court states that "In | 

cases of reversal or vacating of any judgment or decree by this | 

court, costs shall be allowed to the appellant or petitioner, 

unless otherwise ordered by the court." Petitioners in No. 281 

sought to have the Fourth Circuit judgment of May 26, 1970, 

| reversed or vacated only in part, that is insofar as it vacated 

  

. 4/ The appendix in No. 349, consisting of 510 pages, was much 

smaller than that printed in No. 281, since the earlier appendix 

included all the record before the Court of Appeals. 

5/ Mr. Waggoner's letter to Mr. Seaver said "Referring to 

Mr. Nabrit's letter of June 8, we acknowledge that in general, 
|' Swann, et al. prevailed in both appeals." 

 



    

the district court order of February 5, 1970. Petitioners obtained 

. the relief they sought by this Court's order of June 29, 1970 (399 | 

U.S. 926) which "reinstated" the district court order. By "rein- 

stating" the district court order, this Court necessarily vacated 

| the Court of Appeals' order to that extent. All of the subsequent | 

| proceedings, including the final decision, confirmed that result. 
| 

Accordingly, although this Court's orders have not used the word 

"reversed" or "vacated" their plain and obvious intended purpose 

and effect was to set aside the Court of Appeals' order to the 

extent that it was in conflict with the district court order. This 

Court's affirmance of the district court order of August 7, 1970 

| (which continued in effect the February 5th elementary school 

order which the Court of Appeals had disapproved), also amounted td 

| saying the same thing as reversing the Court of Appeals' judgment 

in this respect. Thus, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was vacated 

to the only extent that petitioners in No. 281 complained of it, | 

and, accordingly, under Rule 57 (2) costs should be allowed. 

Rule 57, which allows costs to a petitioner who succeeds in 

'having a judgment reversed or vacated, and requires an unsuccess- | 

| ful petitioner to pay costs, has been applied with relatively 

U.S. 156, 159-160. Ordinarily costs are awarded to the "prevail- 

141 U.8, (15 Pet.) 317; St. Louis & S.F. R. Co. Vv, Spiller, 275 

little change in this Court since the January Term 1838. See 

Rules of Court prefixed to 37 U.S. (12 Pet); Bradstreet v. Potter, 
  

  

ing party" in accordance with "the long established practice and 

juniversally recognized rule of the common law." Mansfield C. & 

L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 387. The practice of awarding 

  

  

‘costs to the prevailing party has long applied in this and other 

| federal courts. St, Louis & S.F. R, Co, v. Spiller, supra; Ex 
   



  

  

Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 317: Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 
  

  

265 U.S. 78; 6 Moore's Federal Practice p. 1301, et seq.:; cf 

Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161. Nothing has 
  

transpired in this case to justify any deviation from the general 

rule of awarding costs to prevailing petitioners. 

It should be noted that this Court has long awarded costs to 

an appellant or petitioner under Rule 57 even where a judgment 

appealed from is reversed only in part. St. Louis & S.F. R. Co. 
  

v. Spiller, supra. Thus, where only part of a petitioner's argu- 
  

ments are vindicated on appeal, he is entitled to costs. It 

follows a fortiori that petitioners in this case are entitled to 
  

costs where they prevailed with respect to the only matters com- 

plained about in the judgment below. 

This Court has applied the rule on costs in accordance with 

the purpose and spirit of the rule and has not woodenly applied 

it so as to award costs to parties who prevail in only a formal 

or nominal sense. Mansfield C. & L.M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 
  

379, 388-389; Rogers v. Durant, 106 U.S. 644. In Mansfield the 
    

Court, noting that the rule "leaves room for the exercise of dis- 

cretion," awarded costs against a nominally prevailing party: 

In the present case, the writ of error is not 

dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this court: 

on the contrary, the jurisdiction of the court 

is exercised in reversing the judgment for want 

of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court; and although, 

in a formal and nominal sense, the plaintiffs in 

error prevail in obtaining a reversal of a judg- 

ment against them, the cause of that reversal is 

their own fault in invoking a jurisdiction to 

which they had no right to resort, and its effect 

is, to defeat the entire proceeding which they 

originated and have prosecuted. In a true and 

proper sense, the plaintiffs in error are the 

losing and not the prevailing party and, this 

court having jurisdiction, upon their writ of 

error, so to determine, and in that determination 

 



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being compelled to reverse the judgment, of which, 

on other grounds, they complain, although denying 

their right to be heard for that purpose, has jur- 

isdiction, also, in order to give effect to its 

judgment upon the whole case against them, to do | 

what justice and right seem to require, by award- | 

ing judgment against them for the costs that have | 

accrued in this court. (111 U.S. at 388-389) | 

  

  

In the instant case, as in Mansfield, costs ought to be awarded to | 

| the party who actually prevailed in order "to do what justice and 

' right seem to require" (111 U.S. at 389). 

i 2. It is equitable to award costs to petitioners Swann, 
  

| et al. | 

The Court may exercise an equitable discretion to award 

  

| costs even 1f it be assumed arquendo that the matter is not gov- | 

erned by the terms of Rule 57(2). Mansfield, C. & L.M. R. Co. v. 
  

i Swan, 111 U.S. 379; Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, supra; 
  

Ex Parte Peterson, supra; Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra. 
  

Rule 57 contemplates that the Court may on occasion award costs 

I by special order to fit the exigencies of a case. 

This is a case where private plaintiffs have supported long 

| and expensive litigation to vindicate the constitutional rights 

| of thousands of individual students attending the public schools 

| of Charlotte-Mecklenburg. They maintained the litigation more as | 

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| "private attorneys general" (cf. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 
  

390 U.S. 400, 402) to vindicate the public interest and that of | 

| countless other children in securing obedience to the Constitu- 

tion than as private litigants vindicating their individual 

| interests. In the Newman case, supra, this Court construed the 

| counsel fee provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 

to grant counsel fees routinely to prevailing plaintiffs who sued 

 



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to enjoin racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. | 

  

| The reasoning of the Court in Newman applies with even greater | 

| force to the award of conventional court costs in a school deseg- 

|| regation case. It would be a positive discouragement of private 

1 litigation to vindicate the constitutional principles of Brown v. 

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| Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, if this Court were to deny con- 
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| : os : St ais | ventional court costs to petitioners who succeed in such litigation 

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This is a case where the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of | 
| if | 

| Education has vigorously resisted every step of the litigation 
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| designed to eliminate the unconstitutional dual system of segre- | 

| gated schools maintained by the board. Chief Justice Burger's 

| opinion, for the Court, referred to the "total failure" of the 

| school board to meet its obligations noting "the school board had 

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totally defaulted in its acknowledged duty to come forward with 
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| an acceptable plan of its own, notwithstanding the patient efforts | 

lof the district judge who, on at least three occasions, urged | 
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'6/ In Newman the Court said (390 U.S. 400, 401-402): | 

  
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it 

1 was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and 
| that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private 
I litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with 

the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form only, 
| When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he 

cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, 
he does so not for himself alone but also as a "pri- 
vate attorney general," vindicating a policy that 
Congress considered of the highest priority. If suc- 
cessful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their 
own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in 
a position to advance the public interest by invoking 
the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress 
therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees--not 
simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance 
arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, 

| to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimina- 
| tion to seek judicial relief under Title II. (Footnotes 

omitted.) 

 



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; 28 L.ed.2d at 554, | | the board to submit plans" ( U.S. at 

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| 571). Judge Sobeloff recounted in some detail the tactics by 

| Swann wv. Charlotte~-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 138, 
  

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|which the board "resisted and delayed desegregation at every turn. "| 

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ji 154-155, note 9 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 

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| part). 

| Indeed, the question of whether the board's conduct, or the | 

other equities, justify an award of counsel fees and costs not 
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jgenerally taxable is pending in the district court. See Newman, 

(supra, 390 U.S. at 402, note 4; Spraque v. Ticonic National Bank, 
  

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|supra; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375; Rolax Vv. 
  

Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 186 F.2d 473 (1951); Vaughan v. 
  

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i Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527; Bell v. School Board, 321 F.2d 500 (4th 
  

  

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ICir, 1963). And see a learned opinion by Judge Merhige awarding 

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counsel fees in the Richmond, Va. school desegregation case and 
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Collecting all the relevant authorities including numerous school 

desegregation cases. Bradley v. School Board of the City of 
  

Richmond, Va., F. Supp. (W.D, Va,, May 26, 1971) (Civ. 
  

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Action No. 3353-R). The reasoning of theses cases applies with 

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even greater force to support an award of normal taxable costs in | 

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(this case. The matter of counsel fees is, of course, committed to | 

lene discretion of the district court in the first instance. We | | 

seek no order with respect to counsel fees by this present motion, 

‘pat mention the matter by way of suggesting that this Court's ais- | 

loasition of the costs issue ought not unintentionally preempt 

consideration of the counsel fee issue by the district court. | 

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The school board, by documents submitted to the Clerk has 

   



  

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| involved unsettled questions of national importance and the case 

was used by the Court as a vehicle for deciding issues affecting 

many communities. This argument is unpersuasive because this 

ll Court's certiorari discretion is exercised only in such cases 

where there are "special and important reasons" for the Court to | 

grant certiorari. See this Court's Rule 19. In documents sub- 

mitted to the Clerk the board also suggested that the parties 

should bear their own costs. In addition to the reasons advanced 

above why petitioners should be awarded costs, this suggestion 

prompts us to point out that the petitioners in No. 281 have   
|| printed the record used in deciding both their petition and the | 

cross-petition, except for the proceedings below after certiorari   was granted. The school board avoided sharing the initial costs   
of printing the bulk of the record only fortuitously by virtue 

| of the fact that its cross-petition for certiorari was filed while 

| the Court was in vacation and after the petition in No. 281 was 

granted. Surely the fortuitous allocation of expenses to date 

  | affords no just or principled basis for allocating the costs of   
' the litigation. 

Finally, it should be noted that the petitioners were awarded   
! their costs in the companion case involving Mobile, Alabama, 

  
| which was decided largely on the authority of the Swann decision.   i 
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| Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, U.S. 

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| ,» 28 L.ed.2d 577. The judgment in the Davis case was reversed 

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| in part. Since the decisions in the two cases are so closely 

  

related and were decided together in essentially the same manner, 

| there is plainly no just basis for awarding court costs to   

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|petitioners in the Mobile case and denying them in Charlotte- | 

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Mecklenburg. 

I Respectfully submitted, 

I WIT. SR (or zz | 

} Se GREENBERG | 
| S M. NABRIT, III | 

| NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
1 10 Columbus Circle | 
| New York, New York 10019 

  

J. LeVONNE CHAMBERS 

if ADAM STEIN | 
" 237 West Trade Street 

| Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 

I C. O. PEARSON 
203-1/2 East Chapel Hill Street | 

I Durham, North Carolina 27702 | 

ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM 
H Stanford University Law School 

Stanford, California 94305 

I Attorneys for Petitioners 

| CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

| This is to certify that on the 28th day of July, 1971, a 

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H copy of the foregoing Motion to Tax Costs was served on counsel 

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for the board of education by United States mail, air mail, postage 
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prepaid, addressed to William J. Waggoner, Esg., Waggoner, Hasty 
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jand Kratt, Suite 723, Law Building, Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 

| 
| rm eh 1 < En Ne 
  

| James M, Nabrit, 11 

I fttorney for Petitioners 

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: " APPENDIX "A" 
- Phone: WOrih 6-21.77 &® 

MIEILEN PRESS INC 

LAW, FINANCIAL & CORPORATE PRINTERS 

445 GREENWICH STREET ; 
NEW YORK. N. Y. 10013 PAGE ONE 

SOLD TO . N.A.A.C.P, Legal Defense Fund 
10 Columbus Circle, 

New York, N.Y. 
Suite #2030 

10019 

SHI 

Y. 0554 

August 19, 1970 

P TO 

Re: James E, Swann, et al, 
VS. 

Charlotte=Mecklenburg Board 

  

  

  

  

    
  

  

      
  

Att: Mr. James Nabrit 111 of Education, et al, 

4 1 2 NO. 3 638 1a SHIPPED VIA i ams Li fsmaw — 

Sa BL DESCRIPTION u 1 PR CE z an . ~ a4 

To printing 3 volumes of Appendix in above matter: | 

VOLUME I: | 
8 pp. index @$8.05/pg. $6440 | 
1 folio page 175 
76 pp. offset @$1.75/pg. 133/00 
388 pp. @$7.00/pg. 2,716/00 
12 exhibits 1 fold @$9. 95 119140 
Folding 75 copies of 12 exhibits @$, 09 81/00 
Tip-in 75 copies 12 exhibits @$. 09 , 81/00 
Covers = nod 13/90 | 
45 extra copies of 485 pp. @3$.08 W [07 1, 746/00 | 
45 extra covers @$. 15 ar 6(75 | 
Perfect binding, 75 copies 181{50 | 

$5, 144|70 fivd. to pg. 2.. 

ror 3BH JA PRODUCT OF GOLDSMITH BRCS., 77 NASSAU ST., NEW YORK, N. Y. 10038 re 

Phone: WOrth 6-4177 

MEILEN PRESS INC INVOICE L - 6554 
LAW, FINANCIAL & CORPORATE PRINTERS 

445 GREENWICH STREET 

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10013 PAGE TWO 

SOLD TO * N.A.A.C.,P., Legal Defense Fund 
10 Columbus Circle, Suite #2030 
New York, N.Y, 10019 

August 19, 1970 

SHIP TO 

Re: James E. Swann, et al, 
Vs. 

Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board 

of Education, et al. 

  

CUSTOMER'S ORDER NO. DATE SHIPPED | OUR ORDER NO. SHIPPED VIA 

  

  

  

| TERMS 

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VOLUME II: E 
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"75 extra copies of 8 page index @$. 08 | 43 bh | 
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83 pp. offset @31.75/pg. 149 2 

261 pp. @$7.00/pg. , i 5 

Covers | ; Hh 

2 folio Pp. @3%1, 75/pg PE. % 90 

1 exhibit 2 sides (1 fold) | 2 2 
¥ HD 

. 1 exhibit (1 fold) 5 5 3. 

78 exhibits specially reduced @%$6. 65 hs i | 

161 pp. oy ip-in folio i 2 

2 footnotes mr 5 Da 

38 add'l ih notes @$. 36 i as De 

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MEILEN PRESS INC INVOICE L ~ 6554 
LAW, FINANCIAL & CORPORATE PRINTERS 

445 GREENWICH STREET 

NOW YOER, NX. 1003 PAGE THREE August 19, 1970 
SHIP TO 

SOLD TO °* N.A.A.C,P, Legal Defense Fund . Re: James E., Swann, et al. 
10 Columbus Circle, Suite #2030 VS. 
New York, N.Y. 10019 Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board of 

Education, et al. 

6381a Fi ein 
QUAN QUAN, DESCRIPTION UNIT PRICE AOU ORD'D SHIPPED LE anda Ea 

Fud, from Pg. 2 ceiver eeee 39,425 03 
(VOLUME II - cont'd) > Pr | 
Perfect binding, 75 copies 163 50 
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Folding 75 copies 2 exhibits @$. 09 13 50 

VOLUME III: 
75 extra copies of 2 pp. index @%. 08 48 00 | 
105 pp. offset @$1.7 5,/ pg. | 18375 | 
280 pp. @$7.00/pg. 1,960 00 
Covers yO) 9 13 PO 
2 caption pp, @$3.50/pg. Ug 7 00 
2 folio pp. @$1. 5 /p8. In! 3 50 
1 exhibit 1 fold A 9 D 5 

4 exhibits 2 folds @$13.30 53 20 
45 exhibits specially rec luced @$6. 65 209 25 
Strip-in folios, 150 pp. 2 50 

Tabular matter, 1/2 hr. $122 bt 4 00 | tied. to 5. 4 

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Phore: WOrth 6-4177 

MEILEN PRESS INC INVOICE 1, - 6554 
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NEW TORR. Ya1ub PAGE FOUR August 19, 1970 
SHIP TO 

SOLD TO * N.A,A.C.P, legal Defense Fund » Re: James E, Swann, et al, 

10 Columbus Circle, Suite #2030 VS. : 

New York, N.Y. 100 19 Charlotte~ Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, et al. 

Att: Mr James Mabrit 111 

  
  

  

  

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CUSTOMER'S ORDER NO. pe SHIPPED | wr | SHIPPED VIA | TERMS RN MFR 

vd. TOM PB, 3 svcevrnins 512, 242 48 

| (VOLUME III, cont'd) | 

45 extra copies of 443 Ely a3. 08 ! 594 80 

45 extra covers @$. Jee 8 75 

75 copies 5 ex hd tip-in @$. 09 | 33 9 

75 copies 1 exhibit (1 £01d) @$. 09 6 5 
75 copies 4 exhibits (2 fold) @s. 09 | 54 00 | 

’ Perfect binding, 75 copies 210800 1 0 od 

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