Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants Memorandum on Status of the Case on Remand

Public Court Documents
February 25, 1977

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants Memorandum on Status of the Case on Remand preview

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  • Case Files, Campbell v. Gadsden County District School Board Hardbacks. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants Memorandum on Status of the Case on Remand, 1977. 98e424ed-a111-f111-8407-0022482cdbbc. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/5ae72a7a-8b2b-4322-8027-43101cf534bc/memorandum-in-support-of-plaintiffs-motion-for-summary-judgment-and-in-opposition-to-defendants-memorandum-on-status-of-the-case-on-remand. Accessed March 05, 2026.

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    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION 

JOHN HUTLEY, 
WITT CAMPBELL, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. : PCA ‘NO. 73-177 

GADSDEN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 

et al., 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM 
ON STATUS OF THE CASE ON REMAND 

After the hearing of February 18, 1977, the legal position 

of the Defendants seems relatively clear. The parties are in 

agreement that the Court of Appeals listed four elements which 

were of import in assessing whether the black vote had been 

diluted. The Court of Appeals found that one was proven and that 

two were not. The remaining element -- unresponsiveness of 

elected officials to the needs of the black community -- remains 

to be determined by a District Court. There have never been 

findings of fact or conclusions of law from a District Court with 

regard to this issue. 

The Defendants hope that somehow the Court of Appeals by 

implication had decided the unresponsiveness issue. In the last 

analysis, however, they concede that the issue was not before 

the Court of Appeals. They further indicated at the hearing 

before this Court on the 18th of February that the Court of Appeals 

"almost said that the issue was resolved." Thus admitting that 

of course it was not resolved. 

Their second argument revolves around the Supreme Court 

decision in Washington v. Davis. Looking at Washington v. Davis 

they see a requirement that there be a finding of intentional 

conduct on the part of the Defendant. The Court of Appeals in the 



Albany, Georgia case dealing with dilution of the black vote 

indicated that the finding of intention 'may' be required. 

Assuming arguendo that they are required, the argument based on 

the District Court's earlier determination of a lack of racial 

intent fails for a very fundamental reason. The Defendants are 

looking at the intention at the time of the passage of the 

statute. However, it is not the statute or the circumstances of 

its passage that is at issue here. The Plaintiffs have very 

clearly maintained throughout the litigation that there is no 

allegation that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. 

This is a situation in which the statute, when applied to the 

facts of a given county, produces an unconstitutional result, 

The correct analysis of the Plaintiffs' attack is discussed at 

some length in the Briefs of both sides and the Order of the 

District Court on the three judge court question, While this 

question was not briefed in the Court of Appeals, it was 

discussed at some length during oral argument and the Court of 

Appeals chose not to interfere with the judgment of the District 

Court based on the three judge court issue, Defendants' citation 

of authority not withstanding. Thus, if there is a requirement 

of intent, the intent that is at issue here is the intent of the 

School Board Defendants reflected through their unresponsiveness, 

This is an intent reflectad in the late 1960's and 1970's. The 

intent is abundantly clear, In the late 60's the Defendants ran 

a de jure segregated system which could hardly be considered any- 

thing short of overt racial discriminatory intent, Having been 

precluded from doing this in the 70's by this Court's Order in 

TCA No. 1616, they then embarked upon what has now been adjudicated 

as retaining segregation of elementary children within the class- 

room and discrimination in the selection of black persons for 

principal, assistant principal, county staff, and teacher positions. 

More pervasive racial discrimination in the period of supposed 

desegregation could scarcely be imagined. 

ay 



The final argument against the position taken by the 

Defendants -- that the judgment of the Court of Appeals makes 

dismissal on remand imperative -- is that had that been the 

intention of the Court of Appeals they would simply have 

expressed it and asked that this Court enter a dismissal. 

They did not do so. Thus, the only reasonable inference is 

that was not what they had in mind. 

The summary judgment for the Plaintiffs should issue be- 

cause there is no way in which as a matter of law the Defendants 

can show that it was ''responsive' as a matter of law to the 

needs of the black community in light of judgments already 

entered by this Court and the Court of Appeals. 

Respectfully submitted, 

—L AN V LC O0d OM 

324 West College Avenue 
Tallahassee, Florida 32 
(904) 224-8701 

Ze Spriggs/(larry = 

01 

Jack Greenberg 
Charles Williams 
Legal Defense Fund 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, N. Y.:10019 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

Certificate of Service 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing have been 

furnished by mail to Mr. Graham Carothers, Post Office Box 391, 

Tallahassee, Florida; and Mr. Richard Gardner, 201 Quincy State 

Bank Building, Quincy, Florida 32351 this 28 Yay of February, 

1977. 

0% il SS CBANM [Log OU 
Kent i of ie oi

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