Certificate of Service for Supplemental Brief for Appellees
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April 19, 1985

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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Brief of the Appellees Intervenors, 1985. f69d796a-d692-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/02533ea2-e22a-4995-bde6-09aa89e286a9/brief-of-the-appellees-intervenors. Accessed April 06, 2025.
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No. 83-1968 October Term, 1985 --------<0-------- LAcY H. THORNBURG, et al., Appellants, v. RALPH GrNGLEs, et al., Appellees. On Appeal From the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES INTERVENORS --------0-------- •c. ALLEN FOSTER KENNETH J. GUMBINER FosTER, CoNNER, RoBSON & GuMBINER, P .A. 104 North Elm Street Greensboro, North Carolina 27401 (919) 273-1733 Attorneys for Appellees/Intervenors *Counsel of Record COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 835-7427 Ext. 333 1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Whether the District Court erred in finding a viola tion of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the political process in the challenged districts is not equally open to minorities because (a) the weighted average dif ferential between the registration of black and white age-qualified voters exceeds 15%, (b) elections have been and are marred by persistent and severe racially polarized voting and (c) in the last 15 years, only eight different blacks have been elected to an aggre gate of 248 potential seats 1 II. Can a few black victories negate a finding of vote polarization when the differenoo between the per centage of blacks and the percentage of whites who voted for black candidates i s so substantial as to dis play a consistent pattern of voters casting ballots along racial lines 1 ITI. Regardless of the definition of racially polarized voting, should the lower Court's finding of a viola tion of Section 2 be set aside in light of Congress' clear intent to incorporate the analysis of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 353 (1973), into amended Section 2 and the fact that White found impermissible· vote dilution even without a finding of racial polarization¥ ll PARTIE.S TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW PLAINTIFFS (APPELLEES) in the action below are Ralph Gingles, Sippio Burton, Fred Belfield and Joseph Moody, individually and on behalf of a certified class of all black residents of North Carolina who are registered to vote. PLAINTIFFS j INTERVENORS (APPELLEES) are Paul B. Eaglin, Mason McCullough and Joe B. Roberts, members of the certified class. DEFENDANTS (APPELLANTS) are Lacy H., Thorn burg, Attorney General of North Carolina; Robert B. J or dan, III, Lt. Governor of North Carolina; Liston B. Ram sey, Speaker of the House; the State Board of Elections of North Carolina; Robert N. Hunter, Jr., Chairman; Robert R. Browning, Margaret King, Ruth T. Semashko, William A. Marsh, Jr., members of the State Board of Elections; and Thad Eure, Secretary of State. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Pages QUESTIONS PRESENTED -------------------- ---------------------------------------------- 1 P ARTIE'S TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW -------------···· u TABLE OF CONTENTS-··----···---------·--·-····--·--·------'--------·····----······--··-- m TABLE OF AUTHORITIES·········-·········-···--···-·--···-·-----·-·······--··------ 1v STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------··-·-···-·······-·····-··--·---·--·-··-··-·--····--·-·-·· 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT---·-·-··--·-········--····-················· 4 ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT, BASED UPON THE TO TALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCE'S, THE POLITICAL PROCESSES IN THE CHALLENGED DISTRICT'S ARE NOT EQUALLY OPEN TO PARTICIPATION BY THE PLAINTIFF CLASS. ................................. 8 A. Introduction ···-···--··········-·············-···-·······-··--·---·····-····--·--·- 8 B. The Interaction Between the Zimmer Factors Present and the Use of Multi member Districts Denies Minorities an Equal Opportunity to Participate in the Electoral Process and to Elect Represen tatives of Their Choice. ····-·········-·····--···-··-·-··-···-·-·· 9 C. 'The Court Did Not Hold that Section 2 Had Been Violated Because the Multi Member Districts Prevented Propor- tional Representation for Minorities. ......... 19 D. Because of Single-Shot Voting Tech nique-s, Limited Black Electoral Success May Mask the Results of a Discrimina- tory Law. .................................................................................... 25 IV TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued Pages II. THE COURT PROPERLY USED A DE FT NIT I 0 N OF VOTE P OLARIZATION WHICH WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH BLACKS 'WIN A FEW ELECTIONS. ·····-·········----------------------------- 26 A. Vote Polarization Exists Whenever the Difference Between the P ercentage of Blacks and the Percentage of Whites Who Voted for Black Candidates I s S ub stantial Enough to Display a Consistent 'Pattern of Voters Casting Ballots Along Racial Lines. ········-------------------------···--------------------------------- ---- 26 B. The Finding of Vote Polarization Is Not Foreclosed by the Mere Fact that Blacks Have Won a Few Elections. ·····-··········-········-······ 32 III. EVEN IF THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ARTICULATE THE PROPER DEFINI TION OF VOTE POLARIZATION, THE RE'CORD IS REPLETE WITH F ACT'S ;SUPPORTING THE COURT~s FINDING OF VOTE DILUTION. ·········-------------------------------------------··-· '33 CONCLUSION ··············-·······-------·····················-····-····----··································· '36 v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Pages CASES; Baker v . Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ................................................ 2, 15 Drum v. Seawell, 271 F. Supp. 193 (M.D.N.C. 1967) ...... 2 Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 u.s. 755 (19'73) ······················································································- 36 Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317 (19'67) ·····-···········-··········································-················-···································· 14 Nevett v . Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 19'78) ........................ 29 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) ......................................... .29, 30 Terrazas v. Clements, 581 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Tex. 1984) ·····················································-································-······································· 31 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 u.s. 248 (1981) ····································-····-······················································ 31 United States v. Marengo County, 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984) ............................................................................. -.............. 28, 35 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) ........................ 5, 7, 17, 21, 33, 34, 35·, 36 Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v . Mar- shall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam) ..... ...................... passim STATUTES: 42 u.s. c. ~ 1973 .................................................................................... 3, 4, 8, 20, 32 MISCELLANEOUS : S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1982 ........................ passim No. 83-1968 --------0-------- October Term, 1985 --------0-------- LAcY H. THORNBURG, et al., Appellants, v. RALPH GrNGLEs, et al., Appellees. --------0-------- On Appeal From the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina --------0-------- BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES INTERVENORS 0-------- STATEMENT OF FACTS For seventy years, the State of North Carolina offi cially, systematically and effectively discriminated against black citizens with regard to the electoral franchise. From 1900 until 1969, a combination of literacy tests, the poll 1 2 tax, multi-member districts, 1 anticsingle shot laws, num bered-seat plans, majority vote requirements, blatant racist appeals, intimidation, and socio-economic discrimination prevented the election of any black to either the House or the Senate of the North Carolina General Assembly. (,T.S. at 22a-33a) Through the inexorable march of no longer passive public opinion, federal legislative pressure and judicial decisions, the greater part of these discriminatory mech anisms were dismantled, but a few, including multi-member districts, remain. It was in this context that plaintiffs Gingles, et al., and plaintiffs-intervenors Eaglin, et al., challenged the 1982 redistricting plan adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly, on the grounds that "based upon the totality of the circumstances," (a) six multi-member dis tricts with substantial white voting majorities in areas where there are sufficient concentrations of black voters to form majority black single-member districts and (b) one single-member district which fractures into separate voting minorities a comparable concentration of black vot ers, in conjunction with the historical, social and political factors elaborated in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 1 Multi-member districts are, the State asserts, the result of the historical practice in North Carolina of not dividing coun ties in forming legislat ive districts. (App. Brief p. 3) The State seeks to imply (App. Brief p. 3, n. 2) that, because Art II §§ 3(3) and 5(3) of the 1968 revision to the North Carolina Constitu tion "merely" codified historical practice, no discriminatory intent can be inferred. In light of the absence of any require ment for population balance by district prior to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Drum v. Seawell, 271 F.Supp. 193 (M.D. N.C. 1967), however, the chronological coincidence of the 1968 constitutional amendment is remarkable. 3 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam), violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. ·~ 1973 (J.S. at 4a). In particular, plaintiffs contended that their class "have less opportunity ... to participate in the political process and to elect rep resentatives of their choice.'' 42 U.S. C. ~ 1973 (b). After an eight day trial before a three judge court consisting of the Honorable J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., Cir cuit Judge, W. Earl Britt, Jr., Chief District Judge, and Franklin T. Dupree, Jr., Senior District Judge, all North Carolinians, the Court held that the black registered voters in the challenged districts were submerged as a voting minority and thereby had less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. (.J.S. at 52a) In the course of its factual examination and conclu sions, the Court below made three critical findings rela tive to whether the members of the plaintiff class have an equal opportunity (a) to participate in the political process and (b) to elect representatives of their choice: 1. In the challenged districts, only 55·% of the black voting age population is registered to vote as compared to 70% of the white voting age population, a differential of 15·%. (J.S. at 24a-25a; Answer to Interrogatory 1) 2. Elections in the challenged districts have been and are marred by persistent and severe racially polarized vot ing. (J.S. at 38a) 4 3. Even in the context of progressive attitudes, leg islation and court decisions, only eight different black can didates have been elected in the challenged districts in an aggregate of approximately 248 elections since the first black was elected in 1969.2 While the State and the Solicitor-General place dif ferent interpretations upon these facts or attack them as a matter of law, they are not seriously challenged. Plain tiffs contend that they are essentially dispositive of this appeal. --------0-------- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1973, protects the right of minorities to equal op portunity to participate in the political process, judged in the context of the totality of the circumstance. A violation is established if members of the minority (1) have less op- 2 Challenged District House District 36 Senate District 22 House District 39 House District 23 House District 21 House District 8 Senate District 2 No. of Different Blacks Elected 1 (Berry) 1 (Alexander) 3 (Erwin, Kennedy, A., Hauser) 2 (Michaux, Spaulding) 1 (Blue) -0- -0- Source (J.S. 34a and 41a) (J.S. 34a and 42a) (J.S. 35a and 42a-43a) (J.S. 35a and 43a) (J.S. 35a and 44a) (J.S. 36a) (J.S. 36a) From 1969-1983, there have been eight elections in the chal lenged districts which elect 31 members of the House and Sen ate. (J.S. at 19a and 20a) 5 portunity than their counterparts in the electorate to parti cipate in the political process and (2) have less opportunity than others to elect representatives of their choice. Con gress took the language of amended Section 2 from White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 753 (1973), and intended thereby to incorporate the analysis of it and its progeny, including Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). White, Zimmer and the legislative history of Section 2 enumerate the factors which are relevant to the determina tion of the two ultimate findings which establish a viola tion. In the instant case, the District Court held that each and every Zimmer factor considered in conjunction with the suspect mechanism of multi-member districts, worked to deny the minority of their statutory rights to equal opportunity to participate in the political process. In a slightly different analysis than has previously been made, these factors may be appropriately allocated between the two halves of the statutory framework. In par ticular, minority blacks currently have less opportunity to participate in the political process as a result of (a) the undisputed history of intense and pervasive official dis crimination against blacks, the effects of which continue to persist despite the State's recent efforts, (b) the current depressed level of black participation in politics because of the lingering effects of racial discrimination in facilities, education, employment, housing and health, (c) a differen tial of over 15% between the percentage of age-qualified black and white voting registration, (d) minimal black par ticipation in legislative politics in comparison to black pop ulation and (e) the tenuous nature of the state policy, e.g. 6 not dividing counties, which necessitated multi-membered districts but which had been violated in other districts, to meet population deviation requirements or to obtain Sec tion 5 preclearance. Similarly, minority blacks currently have less oppor tunity to elect representatives of their cho·ice because of (a) discriminatory voting procedures, such as a majority vote requirement in primaries (which dilutes or negates the ef ficacy of "·single-shot" voting) and a lack of a sub-distri~t residency requirement in multi-member districts, (b) a con sistent history of inflammatory appeals to racial prejudice in political campaigns up to and including the most recent elections, (c) the election of only eight different black candidates to the nearly 250 legislative seat positions avail able since the first black in this century was elected to the House in 1969 (including the fact that, in two of the chal lenged districts, no black has ever been elected to the legis lature) and (d) persistent and severely racially polarized voting. With regard to factor (c)-limited black election suc cess-the lower Court did not hold that Section 2 had been violated because minorities had not achieved representa tion in proportion to their percentage of the population. The finding of underrepresentation only triggered the use of the Zimmer factors in order to investigate this anomaly under the totality of the circumstances; further, both Con gress and the courts accord slight weight to a few minority victories in Section 2 cases. Finally, particularly localized factors such as single-shot voting and some black candi dates who are acceptable to and serve the purposes of the dominant majority, mask the discriminatory effects of the submergence of the minority in multi-member districts. · 7 With regard to factor (d), the lower Court did not find polarized voting whenever less than 50% of the white vot ers cast ballots for minority candidates. Instead, the Court properly defined it as existing whenever the differ ence between the percentage of blacks and the percentage of whites who voted for black candidates is substantial enough to display a consistent pattern of voters casting ballots along racial lines. In other words, it is necessary to examine how both white and black electors vote and the extent to which the votes of each are cast along racial lines, together with other, particulaT circumstances of a given electoral contest, such as whether the black was opposed or unopposed. Once the plaintiff established a prima facie case of racial bloc voting through accepted regression analysis techniques, it was the State's burden to introduce evidence of other causative factors, other than race, as · rebuttal. Here, the State failed to offer any alternative explanation and should be bound by the findings below. Even if the lower court did not articulate the proper definition of vote polarization, a finding in this regard is not necessary to establish a violation of Section 2. In White v. Regester, this court considered Zimmer factors remarkably similar to the one involved here and found impermis-sible vote dilution without making a finding of vote· polarization. 8 I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT, BASED UPON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUM STANCES, THE POLlTICAL 'PROCESSES,IN THE ,CHAL.LENGE.D DISTRICTS ARE NOT EQUALLY OPEN TO PARTICIPATION BY THE PLAINTIFF CLASS. , A. Introduction. The question in this case is whether the plaintiff class has been denied the rights guaranteed to it by ·§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) and (b). The State asserts a minimal definition of these rights-that they are limited to the bare indicia of the political process which are satisfied if minorities enjoy "active and mean ingful participation in politics" (App. Brief p. 15; Sol. Gen. Brief dated July, 1985 p. 20 n.43.) Similarly, the State at tempts to characterize plaintiffs' contentions and the de cision of the Court below as requiring the very propor tional representation prohibited by the proviso to § 2(b). (App. Brief at 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 33; Sol. Gen. Brief dated July, 1985 pp. 6-7) The Court below expressly eschewed any requirement of proportional representation (J.S. at 15a) and plaintiffs certainly do not urge that result, which is clearly contrary to the statutory command. On the other hand, ·that statu tory command is equally clearly broader than the State's contentions. Section 2 defines the denial of the protected right -that "the political process [be] ... equally open to participation by" the minority-in two terms: that its "members have less opportunity ... to participate in the political process" and that its "members have less oppor tunity ... to elect representatives of their choice." The definition urged by the 'State-" active and meaningful par ticipation" applies only to the first half of the statutory framework. 9 The task before this Court, and the parties to this case, is to define the second half of the statutory framework, the meaning the phrase dealing with plaintiffs' showing they have been denied equal "opportunity . . . to elect repre sentatives of their choice." Thus, we must locate the point on that complex spectrum where, by virtue of the applica tion of a legal standard, minorities are so electoria1ly suc cessful that they have, in fact, had an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. Thi s po~nt must not, however, be so extreme as to be a requirement of propor tional representation. B. The Interaction between the Zimmer Factors Present and the Use of Multi-Member Districts De- nies Minorities an Equal Opportunity to Partici pate in the Electoral Process and to 'Elect Repre sentatives of Their Choice. As presaged by the foregoing Introduction, plaintiffs urge that the Zimmer factors and the challenged electoral mechanism be examined in light of the double framework of ·§ 2. We will allocate the Zimmer factors to that half of the framework to which they are actually more, or sole- ly, applicable.3 In this fashion, "equal opportunity to par ticipate'' is defined in terms of (a) the history of racial discrimination against black citizens in voting matters, (b) the effects of racial discrimination in facilities, education, employment, housing and health, (c) limitations on actual voting by black citizens, (d) the increased participation, if 3 This mode of analysis allows for the use (and proper allo cation) of additional factors which are not foreclosed by the legislative history or Zimmer and which may be applicable to this or any other case. 10 any; by black citizens in the political process and (e) the fairness of the State legislative policy underlying the chal lenged redistricting. Similarly "equal opportunity to elect" may be mr cumscribed by (a) limiting voting procedures, (b) the use of racial appeals in political campaigns, (c) the limited ex tent of election of blacks to public office and (d) racial polarization in voting. It is plaintiffs' crystal conviction and the unambigu ous factual findings of the Court below that the combina tion of the Zimmer factors with the use of multi-member districts has deprived them of both (a) the equal oppor tunity to participate in the electoral process and (b) the equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. 1: Equal Opportunity to Participate (a) The history of racial discrimination against black citizens in voting matters; In contrast to the State's assertion, the Court below did not saddle the State of North Carolina with ''an original sin." (App. Brief at 27) Instead, the Court found that, because of the extent and virulence of the undisputed history of official discrimination, its effects were still being currently felt. (J.S. at 22a) Even after most of the impediments to black voting were removed and some efforts were made by the State to increase black registration, the registration of age-qualified blacks is overwhelmingly less than that of a~e-qualified whites in 11 each of the counties which make up the challenged dis tricts.4 (J.S. at 24a-25a) In fact, in five of the counties, including one of the largest (Wake), the registration differential between whites and blacks has remained virtually unchanged dur ing the very period (1978-19•82) relied upon by the State to demonstrate the so-called ''progress" upon which it depends to overcome the findings and conclusions of the Court below. (Id.) In contrast, the 1Solicitor-General rec ognizes that these registration differentials are an ap propriate and, here, telling point. (Sol. Gen. Brief July, 1985 p. 26) Indeed, plaintiffs urge that they are disposltive proof that minorities are currently denied an equal op portunity to participate in the political processes of the challenged districts. As such, the registration differen tials are discussed in greater detail at subsection (c) infra. (b) The effects of racial discrimination in facilities, education, ·employment, housing and health. The Court below also found that the socio-economic effects of racial discrimination had depressed minority political participation. (J.S. at 2·6a) The State contends that the Court jumped to this conclusion despite the ab sence of proof that "participation by blacks in the elec tor·al process is depressed." (App. Brief at 29) In fact, however, the evidence was that economically disadvan- 4 The Court acknowledged the preceding governor's at tempt to increase the registration of blacks, but found that, un like the multi-member districts which, absent this lawsuit, would be with us forever, there was no guarantee that the efforts to increase black registration will be continued past the end of that administration. (J.S. at 25a) 12 taged blacks, for whom political contributions are a bur den, are even more hampered by the extra cost of multi member campaigns. It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General does not share the State's misconception; in fact, his brief does not challenge the lower Court's finding in this regard. Even more important, the State's attempt to show that black political participation is not depressed is dis ingenuous. The litany of Democratic party offices, po litical positions and elected offices held by minorities in the challenged districts is virtually all either intra-party, appointive or local in nature. While there may be less question that black participation is depressed at the local level, the important inquiry is whether it is depressed at the legislative district level. The only relevant proof of black political participation at the legislative district level which the S:tate .can cite are the few black representatives and senators elected since 19•69, both in the challenged dis tricts and elsewhere.5 Even with regard to these electoral successes, the critical fact is that many of them are the re sult of single-member districts, the very relief sought in this case.6 (c) Limitations on actual -voting by black citizens. The fact that blacks are registered to vote at a far lower rate ·than whites is virtually definitional of the s Discussed in detail below in Section IB under heading "2-Equal Opportunity to Elect Representatives of Their Choice." 6 In the course of the 1982 redistricting, the legislature cre ated single-member districts in counties not involved in this case, such as Guilford (Greensboro). As a result, blacks have enjoyed increased electoral success. 13 lack of equal participation. Based upon the registration statistics presented in this case, it is painfully evident that blacks do not, indeed, cannot, equally participate in the electoral process with whites. In the two largest counties involved in this case (Mecklenburg and Wake), the dis parity between white ·and black registration is well over 20%. In only a few of the smaller counties does the voter registration disparity decline to a still crippling 10%. Thus, in the counties that contain the most blacks, their opportunity to participate, as defined by registration rates, is the least. In fact, when the percentage registration sta tistics for each county in the challenged districts are ap plied to the absolute numbers of the voting age population in the county, the effect of the vast differential between black and white registration in the more populous coun ties is clear. While the numerical average of the regis tration differentials is 12.6%/ the weighted average is 15%.8 This current indicium of the lack of equal opportunity to participate is even greater in light of the fact that, be tween 19,80 and 1982, statewide white registration has dropped by 112,000 and black registration has increased by 12,096. (App. Brief at 13) Even with these black gains and white losses, black registration still lags so substan- 7 This figure is the numerical average of the difference be tween the percentage of blacks of voting age who are regis tered and the percentage of whites of voting age who are reg istered, as set forth in the opinion of the Court below in J.S. at 24a-25a (10/82 figures). 8 This figure ·is the weighted average obtained by applying the differentials from j.S. at 24a-25a to the voting age popula tion statistics for each county found in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 87. 14 tially behind white registration as to constitute irrefut able proof that, in the challenged districts, blacks do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process.9 (d) Increased participation, if , any, by black citizens in the political process. The trial court found that, despite the very recent in crease in black participation in politics, this factor did not overcome ''entrenched racial vote polarization" and, compared to the overall black population, black participa tion remained "minimal." (J.S. at 47a) While the State's Statement of the Case does contain references to some facts which the trial court weighed in reaching this find ing, the State does not separately dispute this finding in its brief, and therefore, this finding is not subject to re view. See generally Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.1S. 317, 330 (19,67). (e) The fairness of the State Legislative policy un derlying the challenged redistricting. As a final factor bearing upon the lack of equal op portunity to participate, the Court found that the ;State's justification for creating the challenged districts did not overcome other factors which established vote dilution. The Court quoted the 'Senate Committee Report which evi dences Congress' intent that ''even a consistently applied practice premised on a racially neutral policy would not 9 According to the testimony of Mr. Spearman, Chairman of the Board of Elections, even at this extraordinary rate of "catch up", over a decade would be required to equalize the registration percentage. 15 negate a plaintiff's showing through other factors that the challenged practice denies minorities fair access to the process." (J.S. at 49a, quoting S. Rep. at 29, n.117) Plain tiff Gingles made a compelling showing using the other Zimmer factors that "no state policy, either as demon strably employed by the legislature in its deliberations, or as now asserted by the state in litigation, could 'ne gate a showing here' [of] actual vote dilution ... " (Id.) The Court specifically examined the proffered justi fication. The State argued it had an unbroken historical policy of not dividing counties in the formation of legis lative districts and that, as a result, the use of multi-mem ber districts was necessary. Prior to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (19,62), however, multi-member districts were not "necessary" to avoid splitting counties because there was no requirement that districts be balanced in population. Thus, at most, the 'State's interest was in preserving a hoary relic.10 Moreover, the Court below found that, what ever its genesis, this policy could not justify diluting the votes of minorities, especially when it was not sufficient ly sacred to forestall the splitting of counties to meet pop ulation deviation requirements or to obtain Section 5 pre clearance. (J.S. at 50a) Put another way, the 'State's al leged ''policy" was properly viewed as a smokescreen. 2. Equal Opportunity to Elect Representatives of Their Choice. (a) Limiting voting procedures. The second prong of the Zimmer factor dicotomy con cerns the equal opportunity of the minority to elect repre- to Please also see footnote 1, supra. 16 sentatives of their choice. In Section 1 (c) above, we dis cussed direct limitations on participation, the most impor tant being diminished black voter registration. In this section, the concern is with · the indirect effects of voting procedures on the practical capacity of minorities to elect the candidates of their choice. In this connection, the Court found that North Caro lina voting procedures, such as the majority vote require ment in primaries and a lack of a subdistrict residency re quirement, had an adverse impact on black voting strength. (J.S. at 29a-30a) In multi-member districts, majority vote requirements have the practical effect of eliminating the possibility that the majority voters will so spread their votes over the white candidates as to allow a minority can didate to rank sufficiently high to obtain a seat because of concentrated support from the minority. This requirement diminishes the effectivenes-s of "single-shot" voting-the primary technique that minori ties have to combat vote dilution in a multi-member dis trict. \Vith this requirement, minorities can no longer elect their candidate by concentrating their votes. They must depend upon some cros-s-over votes from the white voters in order to attain majority status for any black .candidate . . Even though the Court found no black candidate for election to the General Assembly had failed to win an 17 election solely because of the majority vote requirement/1 it ''exists as a continuing practical impediment to the op portunity of black voting minorities in the challenged dis tricts to elect candidates of their choice." ( J.S. at 30) Con gress did not, however, require that a plaintiff in a Section 2 case must actually show that this limitation had affected an election in the past. Congress was concerned with the interplay between this rule and the suspect voting proce dure (multi-member districts). Thus, the statutory focus is on the potential for affecting future elections. In ap proving the relevance of this factor, the Congressional re port noted that the inquiry was "the extent to which the state ... has used ... majority vote requirements ... or other voting practices or procedure's that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group ... " S. Rep. at 28 (emphasis added) If Congress had de sired to impose a showing of actual impact on electoral suc ce·ss, it would have used "have enhanced", not "may en hance". Additionally, North Carolina lacks a subdistrict resi dency requirement; therefore, all candidates for the legis lature in the multi-member district may be from areas out side black neighborhoods. S ee White, 412. U.S. 766, n.lO. This factor makes it far more likely that the majority n The State asserts that, because of this fact, the lower Court's finding in this regard is "absurd." We argue in the text following this footnote that Congress did not ·intend the factor to be ·interpreted only in the past tense. In addition, the Court below was well aware of the fact that a black candi date [H. M. Michaux, currently a member of the House from challenged District 23 (Durham)] lost his 1980 bid for Congress from the district which includes challenged district 23 because of the majority vote requirement in the Democratic primary. 18 voters will elect all of the representatives in the multi member district, as was actually the case in the challenged districts. (Plaintiffs' Exh. 4-8) (b) The use of racial appeals in political campaigns . The use of racial appeals in political campaigns affects the opportunity that blacks have to elect candidates. The Court found that "[t]he record in this case is replete with specific examples of this general pattern of racial appeals in political campaigns." (J.S. at 31a) Additionally, for the past thirty years the Court found racial appeals to be "widespread and persistent." (J.S. at 32'a) A logical inference to be made from these findings is that these appeals have been successful in electing major ity candidates. If they were not, then candidates using them would have been weeded out in the political market place. With this inference, it is easier to unders'tand the syllogistic relationship between racial appeals and multi member districts. As shown by the fact that appeals. to race is a successful election technique, voters in these dis tricts tend to vote along racial lines. Because of the use of multi-member districts, the majority voter's practice of voting along racial lines lessens the opportunity for minori ties "to elect representatives of their choice." In an attempt to cast doubt on the lower Court's find ings, the State has sele.ctively chosen six campaigns in which it concedes that racial appeals were made. The State then implies that these six national campaigns were the only campaigns which underlay the Court's finding. (App. Brief a;t 31) In fact, however, the Court explicitly found that "[n]umerous other examples of assertedly more subtle forms of 'telegraphed' racial appeals in a 19 great number of local and statewide elections, abound in tihe record." (J.S. at 32a) Once again the State makes an excellent argument for this Court to defer to the findings of the lower Court which were based on days of testimony, hundreds of exhibits and an intimate knowledge of the North Carolina political en vironment. (See Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at pp. 8-42 for a full discussion of this argument.) (c) The extent of election of blacks to public office. (d) Racial polarization in voting. The extent to which blacks have been elected to office and racially polarized voting bear directly and critically on the question of whether blacks have an equal opportu nity to elect candidates of their choice. For a full dis cussion of each item, see Section III and Section II C and D, respeCJtively, infra. C. The Court Did Not Hold that Section 2 Had Been Violated because the Multi-Member Districts Pre vented Proportional Representation for Minorities. In an attempt to substantiate its claim that the Court has committed an error of law, the State has seriously misconstrued the opinion below. The State quotes the Court's language that minorities are '' 'effectively denied the political power to further those interests that numbers alone would presumptively give [them] in a voting con stituency not racially polarized in its voting behavior,'" (App. Brief at 20) and then claims that this statement was the only factor upon which Court based its findings of vote dilution. (Id.) 20 This interpretation is erroneous for two reasons. First, the District Court explicitly acknowledged that a violation of Section 2 cannot simply be based on "the fact that blacks have not been elected under a challenged district ing plan in numbers proportional to their percentage of the population." (J.S. at 15a) (.citation omitted) Second, if the District Court believed this one fact was enough to warrant a :finding of a statutory violation, it would not have been necessary for the Court to discuss and weigh the numerous other Zimmer factors that are present in this case. Instead, the lower court corre0tly analyzed the evJ dence and found that blacks were "presumably" under represented so as to trigger a further investigation into the causes of this underrepresentation anomaly. If blacks are not represented proportionaJtely in a jurisdiction, this is not a per se violation of Section 2. Rather, it is an anomaly which might be caused by illicit denial to a minor ity of their opportunity to participate in the poliJtical proc ess or which might be founded in some other benign fac tor. This very underrepresentation is, however, one cir cumstance that courts are explicitly allowed to use in find ing that the minority have less opportunity to elect repre sentatives of their choice. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). In contrast, it is the State which seeks to disregard the "totality of circumstances" standard by focusing on one Zimmer factor. The State asser1ts that," [t]he degree of success at the polls enjoyed by black North Carolinians is sufficient in itself . . . to entirely discredit the plaintiffs' theory that pre·sent legislative distri~ts deny blacks equal access to ~the political process." (App. Brief at 24) (em- 21 phasis added) Ignoring Congressional as well as judicial statements that the extent to which blacks are elected is just one factor to consider in a Section 2 claim, the State asserts that, solely because there have been 18 black vic tories in the challenged districts, no violation can be found. I d. T.he State'·s argument fails for two reasons. First, the number 18 is triply misleading (a) because it includes two blacks elected from districts not challenged here (House Districts only partially within Senate District 2), (b) because it aggregates all of the black victories at tained in the seven challenged districts and (c) because this number of victories is infinitesimal in the context of the number and years of elections since 1900 in which black candidates were nort even at the starting block, let alone the finisJJ. line. Lumping victories together masks the true effeets that these multi-member districts have on the mi nority's ability to participate in 1Jhe electoral system. Ad hering to the judicial mandate which requires an intensely localized examination of the facts involved in Section 2 claims, White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 769, the number of victories are put in their proper perspective only when dis aggregated into their respective districts and compared to the number of elections lost. In both House District 8 (Edgecombe, Nash, Wilson) and Senate District 2 (Easrtern North Carolina), no black has ever 12 been elected to the legislature.13 To the ex- 12 As pointed out above, it must be remembered that "ever" is a long time in North Carolina politics-since 1900, eighty five years and three generations ago. t3 Two representatives have been elected from House Dis tricts within Senate District 2, but these two House Districts are not being challenged in this lawsuit. 22 tent that the State relies on black victories in order to outweigh the rest of the Zimmer factors, the State must concede a violation in at least these two districts.14 The State acknowledges this fact when it cites the authorita tiveness of 'the House report's statement that [i]t would be illegal for an at-large election scheme for a particular state or local body to permit a bloc voting majority over a substantial period of time con sistently to defeat minority candidates. H. Rep. at 30. The white majority having always defeated the minority candidates in House District 8 and Senate District 2, there should be no question left of the propriety of the lower Court's conclusions and order with regard to them. In the rest of the districts, the asserted "substantial" black successes actually constitute only a pitiful "few" vic tories when they are disaggregated. In House District 36 (Mecklenburg) and Senate District 22 (Mecklenburgj Ca barrus) only one black from each district has ever been successful. (J.S. at 34a) In House District 21 (Wake) only one black candidate has ever been successful, and he was reelected only once. (J.S. at 35a) In House District 39 (Forsyth), three blacks were elected but only one of these was elected for two terms and the two elected in 1982 were successful only after this litigation was begun. It is important that the black victor, Hauser, testified at the trial that whites had suddenly become extremely support ive of his campaign. (See Hauser Deposition) (J.S. at 35·a) House District 23 (Durham) has had the most rep- t4 In addition, as the Solicitor-General correctly notes in his brief (Sol. Gen. Brief July, 1985 p. 7, n.11), this Court's notation of jurisdiction does not encompass the State's challenge to the District Court's conclusions with regard to House District 8 and Senate District 2. As a result, summary affirmance would seem required. They are discussed here only because the pic ture of racial vote dilution in those districts is illustrative of the other challenged districts. 23 resentation by blacks, having a black member of the House every year since 1973. (Id.) Even these five victories are, however, insignificant when one considers that there have been only two individuals involved and that the incumbent since 1978 (Kenneth Spaulding) has run uncontested each time in either the primary, the general election, or both. The Court below, all of whose members are from North Carolina, was well able to understand this phenomenon based upon its judicial notice of the fact that Mr. 'Spauld ing is a. member of one of the most prominent Durham business families. 15 In this connection, Mr. Lovett, the President of the Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People, testified without contradiction that a neco essary factor in the Committee's solicitation of black can didates was its perception of the black candidate's accep tance by the white community, with particular emphasis on 1s The State asserts that the minority's right to elect can didates of their choice is not tantamount to the right to elect candidates of their race. (App. Brief at 33) If this contention be true, the converse ·is equally so-the election of a particular black may not be probative of the minority's ability to elect candidates of their choice. When minority candidates run unopposed in a political context with a history of very recent official discrimination and persistent racially polarized voting (including the refusal of whites to vote for even the unopposed blacks), a Court should give more than a passing scrutiny to the probative value of their election "success." A more appropriate inference would be that the black candidate in question was acceptable to the dominant white majority while alleviating potential racial un rest in non-political areas. The other s·ide of the same coin is the well-known political fact that Republicans do not contest the seats of many con servative Democrats in the South. In neither case, however, does the minority actually have the opportunity to elect rep re.sentatives of their choice. In the first case, the black minor ity gets an official of the·ir race but whose economic interests are more aligned with those of the dominant white majority; (Continued on next page) 24 the candidate not being outspoken with respect to the par ticular concerns of the black community. Second, Congress and the courts have been explicit with regard to the slight weight which should be afforded to a few minority victories in Section 2 claims. In Zim mer, the defendants argued thaJt the victories of three blacks in a challenged district should foreclose a finding of vote dilution. 485· F.2d at 1307. The Court rejected this argument on the· ground that it would "merely be inviting attempts to circumvent the Constitution" by encouraging those who wish to thwart a successful challenge to an elec toral scheme to engineer the election of a few blacks. 4B5· F.2d at 1307. The mere possibility of encouraging at tempts to thwart vote dilution cases in this manner was enough for the Court to reject the defendants1 argume11t, without requiring a factual finding that such an attempt had actually occurred. Congres•s has also emphasized that black success is just one factor among the totality of circumstances to be (Continued from previous page) in the second, the Republican minority gets an official suit able to 'its economic interests but who will vote with the op position on the critical question of organizing the House or Senate. In both cases, the result is a half-way house for a mi nority as yet only partly enfranchised. In the case of the black minority, however, the right to full political equality is guar anteed by § 2. Perhaps even more important, the extent to which the po litical compromise suggested by the anomaly of a black run ning unopposed by the dominant white majority should be considered pro or con the State in the evaluation of this Zimmer factor, is uniquely a question for the trier of fact, in this case a Court of three distinguished citizens of the jurisdiction in question. With the benefit of their local knowledge, experience and appreciation, they have decided that the greater weight of the factor cuts against the State; that appropriately inspired conclusion should not be disturbed here. 25 considered. S. Rep. at 194. Thus, isolated victories are not dispositive of vote dilution; instead, their paucity .con firms the lower Court's finding that blacks have been un able to elect candidate·s of their choice in the challenged districts. D. Because of Single-Shot Voting Techniques, Lim ited Black Electoral Success May Mask the Re sults of a Discriminatory Law. Single-shot voting may enable blacks to be elected, yet they will still have less than the statutorily required equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. By the use of single-shot voting, blacks will appear to enjoy some success at electing candidates of their choice, while they are actually being deprived of their right to vote for a full slate of candidates. (J.S. at 41a) When minorities are placed in a multi-member district, one of the techniques they use in order to get a particular candidate elected is to ''single-shot'' their vote. In theory, the minority voters will all vote for the minority candidate and not cast the rest of their votes for any other candidates in the race. This tactic deprives the other candidates of the minority vote and, thus, the minority candidate has a better chance of being elected as one of the top vote get ters. In order to use this method to elect their candidate, the minority must forfeit their right to vote for any of the· other representatives from their multi-member district. In contrast, the majority voters are able to cast all of their votes. The majority is able to influence the election of all representatives while the minority, by ''single-shot'' vot ing, is only able to influence the election of one represent- 26 ative. If the minority choses not to "single-shot" vote in a multi-member district with several Zimmer factors pres ent, they will be deprived of all opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. Either way, they will have less of an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice than the majority voters and are thereby deprived of their stat utorily guaranteed right. II. THE COURT PROPERLY USED A DEFINITION OF VOTE POLARIZATION WHICH WOULD BE AP PLICABLE TO JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH BLACKS WIN A FEW ELECTIONS. A. Vote polarization exists whenever the difference between the percentage of blacks and the percent age of whites who voted for black candidates is substantial enough to display a consistent pattern of voters casting ballots along racial lines. To interpret raw statistics under a vote dilution claim, the Court must look at the alternatives available to voters. The lack of white candidates in some races will uncharac teristically increase the minority candidates' vote totals. Even in races such as these, however, pieces of the perva sive vote polarization pattern can still be discerned. For example, black candidates may receive some white support in a few elections but that support is still far less than the almost unanimous support of black voters. This difference in voting conforms to the pattern of racial bloc voting al ready established in other races in these districts. In this case, the lower Court utilized precisely this analysis in its extensive discussion of and findings with regard to spe cific elections in the indjvidual districts. (J.S. at 38a-46a) Contrary to the assertion of the State (App. Brief at H6), the lower Court did not find racial bloc voting when- 27 ever less than 50% of the whites voted for the black candi date. This definition was implicitly disavowed by the lower Court. For example, in the Court's discussion of polarized voting in Mecklenburg County, it pointed to the fact that black candidate Berry received 50% of the white vote. The Court still found polarized voting in Mecklen burg despite this fact because, in the race in which Berry received these votes, there were only seven white candi dats running for eight positions. (J.S. at 42a) Similarly, in Durham County, when a black candidate received votes from 43% of the white voters in the 1982 General Election, the Court once again found evidence of polarized voting. (J.'S. at 44a) The black in this election ran unopposed. Thus, the Court found that 57% of the white voters failed to vote for the black candidate even when no other choice was available. In comparison only 11% of the blacks failed to vote for the unopposed black. The Court held, compellingly so, that the voters in this election clearly voted along racial lines despite the fact that the black candidate obtained substantial white support and actually won the election. In this same vein, vote polarization cannot simply be found as a matter of law if less than 50% of the whites vote for the black .candidate. The appellants set up a ''straw man'' by accusing the lower Court of using this definition. It completely ignores the standard by which courts, including the District Court in this case, decide whether the percentage of white votes attained by the black candidate is aberrational. The standard actually used not only focuses on the white support for black can didates, but also includes an examination of the way blacks voted. Simply because less than 50:fo of the whites voted 28 for a black candidate tells the Court only half the story of polarization. If less than 50% of the blacks also voted for the black candidate, then no polarization is shown. The Court below certainly understood and appreciated this principle when it cited the 1978 elections in House Districts 3.9 (Forsyth) and 23 (Durham) where the black candidates, Sumter and Barnes, each received less than 50% of the votes of both blacks and whites. Thus, inherent in any definition of polarization is a comparison between the voting habits of two groups. The State argues that because blacks have received white support past certain numerical levels that polariza tion cannot be found. Vote polarization cannot be defined so discretely because it exists on a spectrum. Congress did not expect courts to generate an absolute cut-off point with respect to the percentage of white votes obtained which would foreclose a finding of vote polarization. In listing the Zimmer factors, Congress instructed the courts to examine "the extent to which the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized." S. Rep. 97- 417 at 29 (emphasis added). For Congress, the finding of racial polarization is just one factor which, itself, can exist at many different levels of intensity. The Courts, also, have recognized that polarization cannot be defined discretely. In United States v. Marengo County, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that polarization can be shown through direct statistical evidence or it can '' 'be indicated by a showing under Zimmer of ... past dis crimination in general ... , large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candidates running from particular geographic subdistricts.' " 731 F.2d 1546, 1567, 29 n.34 (1984) [quoting Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223, n.18 (5th Cir. 1978)]. Because polarization can be shown on the basis of nonstatistical evidence, it is not a concept rebutted by a defined cut-off point. In the instant case, the finding of vote polarization was based on far more evidence than that which was held to be sufficient in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). In Rogers, this Court affirmed a District Court's finding that the at--large system of electing commissioners in Burke County, Georgia, was being maintained for "invidious pur poses.'' 458 U.S. at 616. In this Court's examination of the Zimmer factors present, evidence of vote polarization was deemed "overwhelming", 458 U.S. at 623, based solely on statistics generated when two blacks ran for county commissioner.16 In Rogers, the District Court had examined three pre cincts with a clear majority of blacks and one precinct with a bare majority of blacks. The Court compared the two black candidates' successes in these four precincts with their relative lack of success in predominantly white pre cincts. Statement as to Jurisdiction at 73a, Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). One black won in all four black precincts and lost in all of the white precincts. Id. The other black candidate won in three of the four black precincts and lost in the white precinctsY Id. There are two relevant points to make about this Court's finding of vote polarization based upon the facts in 16 In contrast, the Gingles District Court analyzed between five and 15 elections in each district. 17 It was not made clear whether this second black candi- date lost in a district with a clear or bare majority of blacks. 30 Rogers. First, the Court did not require the blacks to win in every black precinct in order to find vote polarization. Thus, even though the blacks did not enjoy unanimous black support, polarization was still found. Similarly, as in the case at bar, even though some whites voted for a black can didate, this fact did not foreclose a finding of vote polari zation. Second, the Rogers Court relied on the District Court's finding of vote polarization and did not examine the record further to establish by how much the black can didates lost in each of the white districts. Instead, it was sufficient for a finding of vote polarization that blacks basically won in the black precincts and basically lost in the white precincts. In contrast, in this case, the lower Court's conclusion is supported by a regression analysis which established the degree of black and white support for the black candidates in each race. As a result of this analysis, the Court found not only that blacks almost uniformly lost in white major ity districts but also, and more importantly, that in all cases the support of black candidates by white voters dif fered fundamentally and dramatically from the support of black candidates by black voters. In other words, the lower Court in this case complied with Congress' mandate to de termine the ''extent'' as well as the fact of racial polariza .tion. S. Rep. 97-417 at 29.18 18 Both the State (App. Brief pp. 41-44) and the Solicitor General (Sol. Gen. Brief july, 1985 p. 30 n.57) disparage the re gression analysis relied upon by the lower Court. They are ap parently unaware or ignore the fact that the State's own expert (Continued on next page) 31 By presenting a study that correlated a candidate's race with the race of voters, plaintiff Gingles made a prima facie showing of vote polarization. This showing could have been rebutted by the State if it had presented other studies which showed that factors other than race better explain the election results.19 For example, in Terrazas v. Clements, the District Court refused to find polarized vot ing when an hispanic candidate received 90% of the votes in "hispanic districts" and only 35% of the vote in "anglo districts." 581 F . Supp. 1329, 1352 (N.D. Texas, 1984) . The defendant there rebutted plaintiff's prima facie case with evidence that hispanics and whites voted along party - lines, which explained the results in more elections than did the racial polarization theory. 581 F . Supp. at 1352. In contrast, the State here made no such attempt to rebut Gingles' prima facie showing (J.S. at 38a, n.29) which, consequently stands un~hallenged. (Continued from previous page) "did not question the accuracy of the data, its adequacy as a reliable sample for the purpose use, nor that the methods of analysis used were standard in the literature." (J.S. at 39a, n.29) In addition, the general reliability of the plaintiff's expert analysis "was further confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Theo dore Arrington, a duty qualified expert witness .... Proceeding by a somewhat different methodology and using different data, Dr. Arrington came to the same general conclusion respecting the extent of racial polarization . . .. " (!d.) 19 The Solicitor-General concurs that the burden of going forward shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. Sol. Gen. Brief July, 1985 p. 30 n.57) See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 3;2 B. The finding of vote polarization is not foreclosed by the mere fact that blacks have won a few elec tions. The District Court, using vote polarization only as one factor in its vote dilution analysis, was correct in holding that a few black victories did not, of themselves, prevent the Court from finding vote polarization. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not protect minority voters only when they are completely shut out of the electoral process. Rather, it bars any practice that creates a climate in which minorites have "less oppor tunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. 1973(b). Congress made it clear that a few black victories did not foreclose a vote dilution claim. In its discussion of token black victories, no mention was made of the fact that black victories foreclose a finding of polarization. S. Rep. at 29, n.115 and at 19'4. Because all of the Zimmer factors are mutually independent, a finding that one factor is absent or inapplicable cannot preclude the finding that another is present and critical; therefore, simply because a few blacks win, this does not rebut the separate factor of vote polarization. As a result, the Dis trict Court looked for, and found, overall patterns within each district which indicated that citizens in the district consistently voted along racial lines. Thus, even when blacks win, a pattern of polarization can still be evident. If 90% of the blacks vote for a black candidate and only 2'5% of whites do so in a district with a population less than 62% white, the black candidate will 33 wm. It is clear that, in this example, vote polarization did not cost the black the election; it should, however, be obvious that significant racial polarization was present. It should be equally obvious that vote polarization can exist in a district when the Court examines other elections in which blacks do lose. One or two black victories can not make up for a host of black losses. To the extent that Congress indicated its awareness that, in many vote dilu tion cases, there would be some black victories, it would be erroneous to say that random victories prevent the Court from :finding the presence of such an important factor as vote dilution. In fact, the State's various contentions in this regard constitute a logical morass. It argues that, if the lower Court used an erroneous definition of vote polarization, the. Court's decision must be overturned. Implicit in this argument is the principle that vote polarization is integral to a finding of vote dilution. If this were true, however, its argument that black victories preclude the Court from :finding vote polarization fails. If black victories defeat a finding of vote polarization, which in turn prevents the Court from holding that black votes are diluted, then the congressional mandate ('S. Rep. at 29') that a few black victories do not defeat a vote dilution claim is thwarted. III. EVEN IF THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ARTICU LATE THE PROPER DEFINITION OF VOTE PO LARIZATION, THE RECORD IS REPLE.TE WITH FACTS SUPPORTING THE COURT'S FINDING OF IMPERMISSIBLE VOTE DILUTION. In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, this Court found vote dilution without making a finding of vote polariza tion. This case is especially pertinent because even the 34 State concedes that it was Congress' intent to codify the Court's analysis in White into the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. S. Rep. at 22-24. (App. Brief at 16·- 18) This Court in White upheld a District Court's invalida tion of multi-member districts in Texas and its resulting order to have them redrawn as single-member districts. The Court justified this holding "[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances." White., 412 U.S. at 769. Specifically, the. plaintiff in White claimed that the use of multi-member disrtricts was invidiously cancelling or minimizing the voting strength of racial groups in Dallas and Bexar Counties. 412 U.S. at 765. This Court held that, in order to sustain such a claim, the ''plaintiff's bur den is to produce evidence to support findings that the political process leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in ques tion- that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political proc esses and to elect legislators of their choice." 412 U.S. at 766 (citation omitted). In examining the multi-member district in Dallas CounJty, this~ Court outlined the types of evidence that would meet the quoted standard and thereby enable the plaintiffs in a vote dilution case to prevail. It was enough that the District Court examined the official history of racial discrimination, the white dominated political organi zation which was unresponsive to the needs of minorities, the use of racial campaign tactics and the limited electoral success of blacks.. 412 U.S. at 766. The Court also found that Texas election rules, such as a majority vote rule and the "place" rule, which required candidates to run in head- 35 to-head contests, ",enhanced the opportunity for racial dis.crimination." 412, U.S. at 76~6. The· findings in White are remarkably similar to those of the Court below in this case.20 It is. critical that, in White, two blacks had been elected from the multi-member zo The only factor not present in the case at bar and found in White is of minor importance. The White court found the presence of "a white-dominated" slating organization which "did not need the support of the Negro community to win elec tions in the county, and it did not therefore exhibit good-faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of the Negro community." White, 412 U.S. at 766-767. However, "[u] nresponsiveness is considerably less im portant under the results test." United States v. Marengo Coun- _ ty, 731 F.2d 1546, 1572 (11th Cir. 1984). In Marengo, the ap peals court held that the District Court's finding of "no 'sub stantial lack of responsiveness'" of officials should not weigh heavily against a finding of dilution. 731 F.2d at 1573. The Marengo court made two arguments. "First, Section 2 pro tects the access of minorities not simply to the fruits of gov ernment but to participate in the pmcess itself." 731 F.2d at 1572. In other words, even if the needs of minorities are ca tered to superficially, th is fact does not rebut evidence that mi norities are excluded from full and equal opportunity to par ticipate in the political process. Second, in contrast to the other Zimmer factors, "responsiveness is a highly subjective matter and this subjectivity is at odds with the emphasis of Section 2 on objective factors." 731 F.2d at 1972. Furthermore, although this one "slating" factor from the White case is absent from the instant case, there is an addition al factor in this case not present in White. When the lower Court in White examined Dallas County, it found that "[i]n con sequence of a long history, only recently alleviated to some de gree, of racial discrimination in public and private facility uses, education, employment, housing and health care, black regis tered voters of the State remain hindered, relative to the white majority, in their ability to partidpate effectively in the political process." (J.S. at 26a) The Court in White did not find that this factor was present in Dallas County but did state it was an im portant factor in Bexar County, which contained the other chal lenged district. 412 U.S. at 768. 36 district in Dallas County and impermissible vote dilution was still found. Similarly, the District Court in White found vote dilution in Bexar County even though five Mexican-Americans had been elected from that multi-mem ber distriClt. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 19'72), afj"d in part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (19'73). Thus, as is argued above, the elections of a few blacks negates neither vote polarization nor the propriety of a finding of impermissible. vote dilution. In summary, White found vote dilution without a find ing of racial polarization. The court in White based its holding on the same findings that the lower Court relied upon here. The only factor not present here is of minimal importance and is more than offset by the additional factor of socio-economic inequality. Consequently, this Court should, as it did in White, find that "these findings and conclusions are sufficient to sustain the District Court's judgment with respect to the ... multi-member districts ... " 412 U.S. at 767. ---------0--------- CONCLUSION The lower court's holding that House Dis1trict 8 (Edge combe, Nash, Wilson) and Senate District 2 (northeastern North Carolina) violate Section 2 should be affirmed on either of two grounds: first, that the notation of prob able jurisdiction does nQit cover the State's appeal as to them; second that together with the other Zimmer factors present, the fact that no black has ever been elected to a leg islative seat from those districts clearly establishes that the 37 political processes in those districts was not and is not equally open to minorities. The lower Court'·s holding that House Districts 36 (Mecklenburg), 39 (Forsyth), 23 (Durham), 21 (Wake) and Senate District 22 (Mecklenburgj Cabarrus) violate Sec tion 2 should be affirmed be.cause minorities there have neither an equal opportunity to participate in the political process nor an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their .choice in that, among other circumstances, (a) prior and current racial discrimination has resulted in dra matically lower voter registration percentages for blacks, (b) elections there are marred by persistent and severe racially polarized voting and (c) only a paltry number of - blacks has ever been elected to the legislature from these districts. August 1985 Respectfully submitted, *C. ALLEN FOSTER KENNETH J. GUMBINER FosTER, CoNNER, RonsoN & GuMBINER, P .A. 104 North Elm Street Greensboro, North Carolina 27401 (919) 273-1733 Attorneys for Appellees/Intervenors *Counsel of Record NAACP0420 NAACP0421 NAACP0422 NAACP0423 NAACP0424 NAACP0425 NAACP0426 NAACP0427 NAACP0428 NAACP0429 NAACP0430 NAACP0431 NAACP0432 NAACP0433 NAACP0434 NAACP0435 NAACP0436 NAACP0437 NAACP0438 NAACP0439 NAACP0440 NAACP0441 NAACP0442 NAACP0443 NAACP0444 NAACP0445 NAACP0446 NAACP0447 NAACP0448 NAACP0449 NAACP0450 NAACP0451 NAACP0452 NAACP0453 NAACP0454 NAACP0455 NAACP0456 NAACP0457 NAACP0458 NAACP0459 NAACP0460 NAACP0461 NAACP0462 NAACP0463 NAACP0464 NAACP0465 NAACP0466 NAACP0467