Lampkin v. Connor Brief for Appellants
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1965
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Lampkin v. Connor Brief for Appellants, 1965. 69297348-ba9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/671cf14d-41b7-4eeb-ad4f-43a1f60c0938/lampkin-v-connor-brief-for-appellants. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
I n t h e
lmtp& (Emtrt uf Appeal#
F oe t h e D istr ic t of C o l u m b ia
No. 19,383
D a isy E. L a m p k in , et al.,
Appellants,
J o h n T. C o n n o r , Secretary o f Commerce, et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal From an Order of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
W il l ia m B . B r y a n t
615 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
J a c k Gre e n b e r g
J a m e s M. N a b r it , III
M ic h a e l M e l t s n e r
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York
Attorneys for Appellants
R ic h a r d L. B a n k s
W il l ia m R . M in g , J r .
S. W . T u c k e r
A. P. T ureaud
A. W . W il l is , J r .
M argaret B u s h W ilso n
Of Counsel
1
Statement of Questions Presented
1. Whether the district court should have dismissed the
complaint on the ground that appellants lack standing in
an action brought by:
(a) citizen-voters of the states of Pennsylvania, Mas
sachusetts, Missouri, Illinois, Ohio, and California, who
allege that their right to vote is debased and diluted by
the failure of federal officials, charged with the duty to
prepare the decennial apportionment of representatives,
to carry out their duties in accordance with §2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and 2 U. S. C., §6;
(b) citizens of the states of Virginia, Louisiana, and
Mississippi whose right to vote has been denied or abridged
and who claim the right to receive the protection of the
reduction in the basis of apportionment imposed by §2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment and 2 U.S.C. §6.
2. Whether the district court erred in finding that, if
appellants have standing, a summary judgment would be
entered in favor of appellees because §2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the due process clause of the Fifth Amend
ment; 2 U. S. C. §2a, 2 II. S. C. §6, and 13 U. S. C. §§4, 5,
11, 21,141 do not require appellees to prepare the decennial
apportionment by excluding’ from the basis of apportion
ment those disfranchised within the meaning of §2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and 2 U. S. C. §6.
3. Whether the district court erred in finding that, even
though appellees are required to include the disfranchised
when apportioning representatives, appellants are not en
titled to alternative relief declaring unconstitutional stat
utes which require an apportionment of representatives
which is not in accord with §2 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment.
Ill
I n t h e
IMtth States (Ermrt of Appeals
F oe t h e D istr ic t op C o l u m b ia
No. 19,383
E . D avis A l l e n , R . S im s A l l is o n , J . E dw ard A t k in s o n ,
N e p h u s H o m u s B a n k s , T heodore M . B e r r y , I na B o o n ,
W . N . D a n ie l , L u c il l e D e n m a n , N a t h a n ie l D e n m a n ,
P earlie E v a n s , J am e s H . G a r ro tt , D e n n is G il l u s ,
M il t o n H . H a n c o c k , R a y m o n d H ar ris , A r t h u r K e n
n e d y , C h a r le s L u c as , J o h n L u n d y , L au ra M cG ee ,
W il l ia m M cG e e , H e n r y F r a n k l in M aso n , C la re n ce
A. R o b in so n , M au r ic e R o se n pie ld , W il l ia m A. Ross,
C arole L . T u r e a u d ,
Appellants,
J o h n T. C o n n o r , Secretary of Commerce;
A. Ross E c k l e r , Director of the Bureau of the Census,
Appellees.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Jurisdictional Statement ...... 1
Statement of the Case ...................................................... 3
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ....... 11
Statement of Points .............. ............................................ 11
Summary of Argument .................................................... 12
A r g u m e n t ............................ 14
I. Appellants Have Standing To Sue ....................... 14
Group I Appellants Have Standing To Sue ....... 15
Group II Appellants Have Standing To Sue ..... 27
II. Appellees Are Required by §2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to Deduct From the Basis of a State’s
Representation the Number of Citizens Whose
Right to Vote Has Been Denied or Abridged by
That State. Any Other Interpretation of Present
Apportionment Statutes Would Render Them Un
constitutional ......................... .......... .................... ...... 30
Applicable Apportionment and Census Statutes
Should Be Construed So As Not To Conflict With
§2 of the Fourteenth Amendment ....................... 31
Apportionment In Accordance With §2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment Is Constitutionally Re
quired ......................................... ............ .................... . 39
V
Conclusion ....................................................................... 43
A ppendix of Statutes .................................................... 45
Appendix of Legislative History ................................ 53
Table of Cases:
Alabama Power v. Iekes, 302 U. S. 464 ................ ......... 26
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 .... 32
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 ..............15,16,17,18,19,38
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 IT. S. 124 ......................... 24
Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1 .................. 24
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 ................................... 17
Carroll v. Becker, 285 U. S. 380 ..................................... 16
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 ................................ 16
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 ......... ............................ 19
Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678 ....................... ................ 16
Davis v. Ohio, 241 U. S. 565 .......................................... 16
Dennis v. United States, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 51, 171
F. 2d 986 (1948) aff’d 339 U. S. 162 ........................ 38
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 ................ .................... 17
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 230 U. S. 107........... .............. 24
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 .......... 15,19, 22, 26
Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61 ...................... 37
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 ......................... ....15,17, 38
Helvering v. Independent L. Ins. Co., 292 U. S. 371 .... 24
Hylton v. United States, 3 Dali. 171 ............................. 23
PAGE
V I
Knight Templars & Masons’ Life Co. v. Jarman, 187
U. S. 197 ......... ................ .............................. ................. 32
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 43 .................................. 24
Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U. S. 375 ................................ 16
Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U. S.
713 ...................................................................................... 16
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 ................ ........... . 42
Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v.
Tawes, 377 U. S. 656 ........ ........ ..... ............................... 16
Missouri P. R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 446 ................... 32
X A A CP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 451 ...............................26, 28
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Dillon,------ U. S. App. D. C .------- ,
335 F. 2d 292 ................................ ........ ........................ 26
Phelps v . United States, 274 U. S. 343 ......................... 32
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 .... 24
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 ....................................... 15
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S. 695 ................................... 16
Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F. 2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945),
cert, denied 328 U. S. 870 ........................................... 37
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 ........................................ 15
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 ................................... 17
Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 IT. S. 397 .... 24
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103 ............... 24
Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D. C. 1960) ....... 32
United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 .......................... 17
United States v. Moriarity, 106 F. 886 (S. I). NT Y.
1901) ................................................................................. . 39
PAGE
V l l
United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385 ........................... 17
United States v. Sharrow, 309 F. 2d 77 (2nd Cir. 1963)
cert, denied 372 U. S. 949 .............................................. 39
United States v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94 (D. D. C.
1964) ............ ...................................................................... 26
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1....... 12,15,17,18,19, 38, 39
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomezo, 377 U. S. 633 ....................... 16
Wood v. Broom, 287 U. S. 1 ..........................-............... 16
PAGE
C o n s t it u t io n a l and S t a tu to r y P ro visio ns I n v o l v e d :
u. S. Const. Art. I, §2, Cl. 3 .............. 11, 23, 24, 29, 30, 33,
41,42, 43
u. S. Const. Art. I, §9, Cl. 4 .......................................11, 24
Art. :14, §2 ........... ....2, 3,4, 5, 6, 8, 9,10,12,13,
14, 20, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
35, 37, 38, 39,41, 42
2 U. S. C. §2a ...... ............ 5, 8, 9,11,12, 28, 30,
31, 32, 35, 36, 38
2 1U. S. C. §6 ........ .......... 1, 2, 3, 4, 8,10,11,12,
14, 30, 35, 37
13 u. s. C. §4 ....... ........ ..............8, 9,11,12, 31
13 u. s. C. §5 ....... .................8, 9.11,12, 30, 31
13 u. s. C. §6 ....... ............................. .11, 30, 31
13 u. s. C. §11 ...... .................8, 9,11,12, 30, 31
13 u. s. c . §12 ..... ................................... 11, 31
13 u. s. C. §13 ..... ................................... 11, 31
13 u. s. C. §14 ..... ................. ............... ...11, 30
13 u. s. C. §21 ..... .... ........... ...8, 9,11,12, 30, 31
13 u. s. C. §141 .... ...................8, 9,11,12, 30, 32
13 u. s. C. §221(a) ....................... ............. 39
28 u. s. C. §1291 .. ................................. 2
PAGE
viii
28 U. S. C. §1343 ......................... ................................. 2
28 U. S. C. §2201 ......... ................................................. 2
28 U. S. C. §2202 .......................... .................... -....... . 2
42 II. S. C. §§2000(1. 20000 1 ...................................... . 27
42 U. S. C. §20001 ...... .............-.................................... 11
11 D. C. §306 ................................................................... 1
O t h e r A u t h o r it ie s :
Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. 2d Sess. 36-38, 125, 1078, 1079
(1869-1870) .............................. 40
Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong. 2d Sess. 42, 82-83 (1871-1872) 41
71 Cong. Record 107-108 ................................................... 36
71 Cong. Record 1325, 1328, 1330-33 ............................. 33
Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of
America (Washington, 1953) ......... 23,24
Report No. 3, House of Representatives, 41st Cong.
2d Sess. ......... .................. ............. ....... .......................... - 40
Report, Committee on the Census of the House of
Representatives, 70th Cong. 2d Sess. No. 2010 ....... 33
Report, Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 89th
Congress, First Sess. on S. 1564 ......... ......................... 21
Report of the Senate, No. 2, 71st Cong. 1st Sess. ....... 35
Report of the President’s Commission on Registration
and Voting Participation, November 1963, p. 8 ....... 43
Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and
Present Status of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30
Ford ham L. Rev. 93 (1961) .................... ................. 40,41
I n t h e
United States (knurl of Appeals
F or t h e D is t r ic t of C o l u m b ia
No. 19,383
D aisy E. L a m p k in , et al.,
Appellants,
J o h n T. C o n n o r , Secretary of Commerce, et al.,
Appellees.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
Jurisdictional Statement
The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked pur
suant to 11 D. C. Code §306, appellants alleging that “ This
is an action in equity against officers of the United States,
to be found in the District of Columbia, for a declaration
that they should perform duties owed to” appellants “by
reason of rights secured” by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and
2 U. S. C. §6 (JA 4a, 5a).
Two groups of appellants joined in this action. Group I
consisted of 15 persons from six states who are citizens
of the United States, over the age of 21, and who are duly
registered voters for all general elections in their respec
tive states (JA 8a, 9a).1 Group II consists of 10 persons
from three states who are citizens of the United States,
over 21 years of age, and eligible to vote in their respective
1 Mrs. Lampkin of Pennsylvania is deceased.
2
states but unable to do so because of denial or abridge
ment of their right to vote (JA 9a, 10a). Appellants join
together in bringing this action on their own behalf and
on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (JA 6a,
7a).
When this action was commenced, defendants were
Luther Hodges and Richard M. Scammon. On February
10, 1965, the district court ordered John T. Connor, Secre
tary of Commerce, and A. Ross Eckler, Director of the
Bureau of the Census, substituted as party defendants
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1) (JA 59a).
The jurisdiction of the district court was also invoked
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1343 to redress the deprivation
under color of state law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom and usage of rights, privileges and immunities
secured to appellants by §2 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment and 2 IT. S'. C. §6 and also secured to appellants who
are citizens of the states of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Illinois, Ohio and California by the equal protec
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu
tion of the United States.
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §§2201 and 22022 in that there is an actual
controversy now existing between parties to this action
as to which they seek judgment (JA 7a).
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §1291. This appeal is from a final decision of
the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
2 The district court found that, as appellants “ do not seek an injunction
to restrain the enforcement, operation, or execution of any act of Congress,
a three-judge district court need not be convened” (emphasis supplied)
(JA 62a).
3
Notice of appeal to this Court was filed April 19, 1965
(JA 79a).
bia, an order entered March 29, 1965, granting appellees’
motion to dismiss the complaint (JA 78a).
Statement of the Case
The complaint was filed May 28, 1963, seeking a declara
tion that appellees, who are charged with the duty of ap
portioning representatives among the states, are required
to: (1) take all necessary and proper steps to prepare to
compile figures as to the denial and abridgement of the
right to vote at the next decennial census in accordance
with §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and 2 U. S. C. §6;
and (2) prepare, compile, compute, and transmit an ap
portionment based on said figures (JA 7a, 21a, 22a).
Appellants sought alternative relief declaring unconsti
tutional statutes governing apportionment of representa
tives to the extent they provide for an apportionment
which is not in accord with §2 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment (JA 22a).
Two classes of appellants joined in this action. The
first (Group I) consisted of 15 citizens of the States of
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Missouri, Illinois, Ohio and
California (JA 8a, 9a). A citizen of Pennsylvania, Mrs.
Lampkin, is deceased. Each is a registered voter in his
or her state who seeks relief from the failure of appellees
to take any action to enforce §2 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment and 2 U. S. C. §6 {Ibid,.). Each asserts that the
failure of appellees to administer their duties to appor
tion in a constitutional manner results in his or her con
gressmen representing more persons than congressmen
from states which deny or abridge the right to vote as
specified in §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that
4
Ms or her state would receive at least one additional
representative in congress if §2 is enforced, thereby re
sulting in an increase in the value of each appellants’ vote
(JA 19a, 21a).
The second class (Group II) of appellants consists of
ten Negro citizens of the United States and the states of
Mississippi, Virginia and Louisiana. Each of the ten is in
all respects eligible to vote except that his or her right
to vote has been denied in a manner which would reduce
the basis of apportionment for his or her state if §2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment and 2 U. S. C. §6 were im
plemented (JA 9a-12a).3 Each group II appellant alleges
that his or her state would lose at least one representative
in congress on the basis of an apportionment executed by
appellees in accordance with §2 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment and 2 U. S. C. §6 and asserts the “ right to receive
the protection of the reduction imposed by §2 of the Four
teenth Amendment” in order “to redress and deter denial
and abridgement of the right to vote for reasons other
than those specified in the Amendment” (JA 20a).
8 Appellants Lundy and Banks are disfranchised by the requirement of
the State of Virginia that voters make handwritten application to register
(JA 9a-10a). Appellant Harris is disfranchised by Virginia’s requirement
that he pay a poll tax to vote (JA 10a). Appellant Mason is disfranchised
by Virginia’s requirement that he apply to register in his own handwriting
and by the poll tax requirement (JA 10a). Appellant Gillis is disfran
chised by Virginia’s requirement that he apply to register in his own hand
writing and by the state’s poll tax requirement (JA 10a, 11a).
Appellants Laura McGhee, Robinson, William McGhee and Hancock are
disfranchised by the requirement of the State of Mississippi that they pass
a constitutional interpretation test in order to vote, which they are unable
to pass. Laura McGhee, William McGhee and Hancock are also disfran
chised by the requirement of the State of Mississippi that they pay a poll
tax (JA 11a, 12a).
Appellant Tureaud alleged that her right to vote had been denied and
abridged by the requirement of the State of Louisiana that persons seeking
to register answer questions on a registration form without error of any
kind, the purpose and effect of such requirement being to deny and abridge
the right to vote of Negro citizens on the basis of race (JA 12a).
0
Appellee Secretary of Commerce of the United States
is charged with duties under law to take a decennial census
of population of the United States for purposes of ap
portioning representatives. A statement showing the num
ber of representatives in congress to which each state is
entitled and a tabulation of population is prepared, de
cennially, under his direction, and transmitted to the Presi
dent, who in turn transmits the apportionment to congress,
2 U. S. C. §2a, 13 U. S. C. §141 (b), (JA 13a, 1.4a). Ap
pellee Director of the Bureau of the Census has been
delegated duties by the Secretary to prepare the state
ment showing the number of representatives to which each
state is entitled and the tabulation of population as re
quired for apportionment (JA 13a, 14a). Each state is
entitled to the number of representatives shown in this
statement unless legislation to the contrary is enacted,
2 U. S. C. §2a.
On February 28, 1963, plaintiff Lampkin wrote to then
Secretary Hodges complaining of the failure of the Depart
ment of Commerce to take any action to carry out §2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment in the face of widespread
denial of the right to vote in many southern states. She
pointed out that the Department has not taken any action
through the Census Bureau to obtain such information as
would be necessary to enforce the law in this regard and
requested that Secretary Hodges advise her whether there
is any present intention to enforce these provisions (JA
14a).
In reply, Mrs. Lampkin received a letter dated March 8,
1963, from then Director of the Census, Richard M. Scam-
mon, which stated (JA 14a, 15a):
Even though the Constitution provides for certain
functions and activities, this does not necessarily insure
their being carried out unless Congress gives specific
6
legislative authority. Even then, unless necessary
funds are appropriated by Congress for the specific
activity, there is no way any government agency may
proceed to carry out the necessary job. As you may
no doubt know, the funds appropriated to government
agencies are available only to carry out the projects
specifically described in the appropriation request.
I appreciate your interest, and will inform you if
there are any proposals concerning Article 14, Sec
tion 2.
The Bureau of the Census last attempted to comply with
the requirements of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
preparing the apportionment of representatives in 1870.
No steps have been taken nor, it is alleged, do appellees
intend to take any steps to have census enumerators or
others compile figures as to denial and abridgement of
the right to vote at the next decennial census in accordance
with §2 (JA 15a).
On the basis of statistics, reports and information as to
disfranchisement in the hands of appellees, and other offi
cers of the United States, as well as reported opinions of
United States courts, appellees know or shoidd know it is
likely and probable that the states in which Group I appel
lants reside would each receive at least one additional
representative in congress, and the states where Group IT
appellants reside would lose at least one representative in
congress if the apportionment allocates representatives in
accordance with §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment (JA
19a, 20a).4
4 Appellants allege that: “ It is readily possible, by means of the census,
to make inquiries to provide a count of persons who (1) did or did not
register in preceding elections, (2) did or did not vote in preceding elec
tions, and (3) did not register or vote respectively at preceding elections
for specific reasons, including denial and abridgement of the right to vote
7
“ There is overwhelming evidence that denial and abridge
ment of the right to vote by certain of the states exists to
an extent that constitutionally requires loss of Represen
tatives in Congress by those states and a gain of Repre
sentatives by other states which do not deny and abridge
the right to vote” (JA 17a, 18a). For example:
(1) Requirements that a poll tax be paid in order
to register to vote in Federal and State elections in the
State of Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and
Virginia, deny and abridge the right to vote of white
and non-white persons to such an extent as should
result in the loss of Representatives in Congress by
these States and proportionate gain by others.
(2) In 1960 in the State of Louisiana approximately
465,556 non-whites over 21 years of age (69.1% of the
total), in contrast to approximately 396,108 whites over
21 years of age (27% of the total) were not registered
to vote. A substantial number of persons not regis
tered to vote in Louisiana were disfranchised by the
requirement that they pass a constitutional interpreta
tion test and literacy test to register. Moreover, a sub
stantial number of persons have been disfranchised by
arbitrary and discriminatory practices which disfran-
by the states. Modern statistical knowledge and techniques possessed by
appellees are adequate to secure the information required with a high degree
of reliability and accuracy. Specific questions to be asked and procedures
to be employed would not be more complicated than those employed in
many inquiries now being- conducted by the Bureau of the Census. The
results of such inquiries would be as reliable, accurate, and valid as data
the Bureau of the Census and the United States now employ and rely upon
for many purposes required by law and for other reasons of public impor
tance. In order to insure a high degree of accuracy and reliability, specific
questions and procedures to be employed should be developed in accord
ance with prevailing census techniques (for example, on the basis of pre
test operations and sample survey checks for accuracy) well in advance of
the actual census period” (JA 15a, 16a).
8
ehise 11011-whites. The great difference between the
percentage of eligible registered non-whites and whites
compels the conclusion that the requirements for regis
tration are administered with the purpose and effect of
disfranchising large numbers of 11011-whites.
(3) The United States Civil Rights Commission and
. the Department of Justice have in their custody data
which establish conclusively that in every southern
state with educational or other requirements for voting
numerous white persons vote regardless of their abil
ity to meet these requirements whereas numerous non
whites are consistently denied and abridged the right
to vote by these educational and other requirements.
(4) According to the 1959 report of the United
States Civil Rights Commission there were 158 coun
ties with a majority Negro population located in Ala
bama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Missis
sippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.
Fifty-one of these counties have 3 percent or less
Negro registration. Forty-one others have less than
10 percent Negro registration. Only 11 had more than
30 percent Negro registration, and the remainder had
between 10 and 30 percent Negro registration (JA
18a, 19a).
As appellees have a duty under 2 U. S. C. §2a, 13 U. S. C.
§§4, 5, 11, 21, 141 and other provisions of law to prepare,
decennially, the statement showing the number of repre
sentatives to which each state is entitled, they are required
by §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, and 2 U. S. C. §6, to take
all necessary and proper steps at the next census to com
pile figures as to denial and abridgement of the right to
9
vote and to base apportionment on these figures. To the
extent, if any, that 2 U. S. C. §2a, 13 IT. S. C. §§4, 5, 11, 21,
141, and other provisions of law direct appellees to appor
tion representatives without employing the reduction
formula of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, they are in
violation of the Constitution of the United States (JA 16a,
17a, 21a, 22a).
On February 4, 1964, appellees filed a motion to dismiss
or in the alternative for summary judgment and submitted
in support of the motion the affidavit of Mr. Scammon.
Appellees based their motion on the grounds that: (1)
appellants lack standing to sue; (2) the complaint fails
to state a justiciable controversy in that it raises a “ politi
cal question,” and (3) the complaint did not state a cause
of action for which equitable relief is available.
In response, appellants urged that the factual allega
tions of the complaint insofar as they related to determi
nation of “ standing,” “ justiciability,” and “want of equity”
must be taken as admitted. Viewed in such posture the
arguments put by appellees were insufficient as a matter
of law. Appellants also submitted the affidavit of Dr. A. J.
Jaffe which they alleged raised issues of fact, the existence
of which required denial of the motion for summary
judgment (JA 33a).5
5 Mr. Seammon’s affidavit stated that:
It would not be possible within the framework of the present opera
tions of the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau to ascertain accu
rately those disfranchised within the meaning of Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment (JA 26a).
In opposition, appellants submitted the affidavit of Dr. Jaffe which stated
that the Bureau of the Census has met and overcome measurement prob
lems no less difficult than those posed by determining the extent of denial
or abridgement of the right to vote and expressing the view that an
accurate count of the disfranchised could be made for purposes of enforc
ing §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Appended to Dr. Jaffe’s affidavit
are the results of a sample apportionment calculated by use o f existing
10
The parties submitted extensive briefs and the cause
was argued before the district court January 27, 1965. On
March 29, 1965, the district court granted appellees’ motion
to dismiss (JA 78a). In an opinion filed with the order,
the court found that neither Group I nor Group II appel
lants had standing to sue in that the injury they suffered
was remote and speculative (JA 62a-69a).
The court also found that, if appellants had standing,
summary judgment would be granted in favor of appellees
(JA 69a-77a). The sole controversy would be a “question
of legal authority without involving a factual dispute” (JA
70a). After considering pertinent apportionment and cen
sus statutes, the court held that appellees do not have to
comply with §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and 2 U. S. C.
§6 when they apportion representatives among the states
(JA 76a). The court also found that the failure of appor
tionment and census statutes to direct appellees to comply
with §2 does not render them unconstitutional and, there
fore, denied appellants’ prayer for alternative relief (JA
76a, 77a).
Notice of appeal from the March 29, 1965, order of the
district court was filed April 19, 1965 (JA 79a).
statistics.) At oral argument counsel for appellees conceded that as a
practical matter only adequate appropriations stand in the way of enforce
ment of §2.
Appellants contended in the district court that the affidavits of Dr. Jafife
and Mr. Scammon raised a disputed issue of material fact precluding sum
mary judgment. The district court apparently sought to put the conflict
raised by the affidavits to one side when it treated summary judgment as
a question of whether appellees are required to enforce §2 when they
apportion.
11
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved
This case involves the following constitutional and stat
utory provisions, the text of which is set forth in an
appendix, infra, pp. 45-52:
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution of
the United States
Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution of
the United States
Article 14, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United
States
2 U. s. c. §2a
2 u. s. c. §6
13 IT. s. c.
13 U. s. c. §5
13 U. s. c. §6
13 U. s. c. §11
13 U. s. c. §12
13 u. s. c. §13
13 u. s. c. §14
13 u. s. c. §21
13 u. s. c. §141
42 u. s. c. §2000f
Statement of Points
Appellants intend to rely upon the following points on
appeal:
1. That the district court erred in dismissing the com
plaint on the ground that appellants lack standing.
2. That the district court erred in finding that if ap
pellants have standing appellees would nevertheless be
entitled to summary judgment.
12
3. That the district court erred in finding that appellees
are not required to enforce §2 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment and 2 U. S. C. §6.
4. That the district court erred in finding appellants
are not entitled to alternative relief declaring unconstitu
tional 2 U. S. C. §2a and 13 U. S. C. §§4, 5, 11, 21, 141 to
the extent they provide for preparation, compilation, com
putation and transmittal of an apportionment of repre
sentatives which is not in accordance with §2 of the Four
teenth Amendment.
Summary of Argument
1. The district court erred in concluding that appellants
who are registered voters in their respective states lack
standing. Voters always have been held a divisible class
with standing to sue. Voters assert a substantial interest
when they seek to protect the full weight of their right to
vote. Recent reapportionment cases, particularly Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U. 8. 1, put the standing of appellants be
yond question. In Wesberry, as here, the injury stems
from a discrepancy between the value of appellants’ votes
and the value of the votes of other persons. The injury
to appellants caused by failure to implement §2 of the Four
teenth Amendment is demonstrable. Significantly, the
standing of a taxpayer to challenge the apportionment of
taxes among the states has never been challenged. As
apportionment of taxes and of representatives are consti
tutionally linked, the standing of voters to challenge the
apportionment of representatives cannot properly be de
nied.
Negro citizens whose right to vote has been denied or
abridged also have standing. The primary purpose of §2
is to protect their right to vote. For members of the class
the Amendment seeks to protect, §2 itself confirms stand
ing. Implementation of §2 will clearly vindicate their right
to vote by inducing states which deny or abridge the
franchise to cease.
The district court insisted that appellants demonstrate
with absolute certainty that their injury would be redressed
if <§,2 were implemented. But the standing doctrine does
not and cannot require such a showing. Only a “ reasonable
likelihood” of success is necessary, and appellants have
demonstrated that they are likely to enhance the value of
their vote and deter denial and abridgment of the right to
vote. The use of the standing doctrine by the district court
presents the danger that an explicit constitutional provi
sion will be rendered nugatory.
2. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that if a state denies or abridges the right to vote, “ the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced.” Legis
lative history shows that those determining the basis of
apportionment are constitutionally bound to implement §2.
Census-takers did so in 1870. Changes made in census
procedure since 1870 strengthen appellees authority to
implement §2, for the aim of the present reapportionment
statute is to provide a constitutional method of decennial
apportionment.
Appellees contend that when they apportion they are
not required to deduct from the basis of representation
the number of citizens whose right to vote has been denied
or abridged. But if appellees are not authorized to make
that deduction, then it follows that they are required to
include such persons in the basis of representation in plain
disregard of §2. Such a result is not, however, necessary
for existing apportionment statutes may be construed in
accordance with §2.
14
ARGUMENT
I.
Appellants Have Standing To Sue.
There are two classes of appellants in this action. The
first (Group I) consists of citizens of the states of Massa
chusetts, Missouri, Illinois, Ohio, California, and Penn
sylvania who seek relief from debasement and dilution
of his or her vote arising from appellees’ failure to en
force §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and 2 U. S. C. §6
alleging, in effect, that the failure of appellees to carry
out their duty to apportion in a constitutional manner
results in appellants’ congressmen representing more
persons than congressmen from states which deny or
abridge the right to vote. Each appellant alleges that
his or her state would receive at least one additional
representative in congress if the relief sought is granted
(JA 17a-20a).
The second class (Group II) of appellants consists of
ten Negro citizens of the United States and the states
of Mississippi, Virginia, and Louisiana who have had their
right to vote denied or abridged.6 Each alleges that his
or her state would lose at least one representative in
congress on the basis of an apportionment executed in
accordance with §2 and each alleges the “ right to receive
the protection of the reduction imposed by §2 of the Four
teenth Amendment” in order “ to redress and deter denial
and abridgment of the right to vote for reasons other
than those specified in the Amendment.” (JA 9a-lla, 20a).
6 Certain o f the allegations of group II appellants reflect discriminatory
practices which have been affected by recent court decisions. As most of
the discriminatory practices complained of are still in force, appellants
do not intend to discuss here the present status of each group II appellant.
As regards both classes, the district court found the
complaint alleged only “ remote, fluctuating and uncertain”
injury (,JA 69a) and concluded appellants lacked standing
under the doctrine of a taxpayer suit, Froihingham v.
Mellon, 262 IT. S. 447 (1923). For numerous reasons set
forth below appellants believe the district court misapplied
the standing doctrine and improperly granted motion to
dismiss.
First. Voters have consistently been held to be a divisi
ble class with standing to sue. Long before Baker v. Carr,
369 U. 8. 186, the Supreme Court recognized the standing
of private persons to bring an action in federal court as
citizens and voters.1 In Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 361, 7
7 In Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, the Supreme Court held that a claim
asserted under the equal protection clause challenging the constitutionality
of a state’s apportionment of seats in its Legislature on the ground that
the right to vote of certain citizens was debased and diluted presented a
justiciable controversy requiring adjudication on the merits by the federal
courts. In Baker, the Court intimated no view as to the proper constitu
tional standards for evaluating the validity of state legislative apportion
ments, but squarely held that formulation of these standards under the
equal protection clause could not be avoided by doetrines such as “ stand
ing,” “ political question,” or “want of equity.”
In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, the Court held the Georgia county
unit system, applicable in state-wide primary elections, unconstitutional
because it diluted the weight of votes of Georgia voters merely because
of residence. The Court also held that the plaintiffs in Gray had standing
to sue, that the controversy was justiciable, and that equitable relief was
appropriate. Id. at 373-75.
In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, the Court held that constitutional
challenges of congressional districting plans present justiciable questions
and cannot be dismissed for want of equity. The Court determined that
the constitutional test for validating congressional districting- schemes was
one of substantial equality of population among the various districts estab
lished for the election of members of the House o f Representatives.
In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, the Court held that the equal pro
tection clause requires substantial equality of legislative representation for
all citizens in a state regardless o f where they reside, and that the seats in
both houses of a bicameral legislature must, under the equal protection
clause, be apportioned substantially on a population basis. Relying on
Group I Appellants Have Standing To Sue
16
the Court reviewed the merits of, and granted relief in,
a suit by a Minnesota “citizen, elector and taxpayer” to
enjoin the holding of a congressional election pursuant to
a state redistricting statute which violated the federal
requirement that redistricting be carried out by the state’s
lawmaking power, including the approval of the governor.
Similarly, in Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U. S. 375, 379, the
Court reviewed on the merits a suit, brought by “ citizens
and voters” of New York for a writ of mandamus to the
state Secretary of State to certify that representatives
are to be elected according to districts defined in a resolu
tion of the state legislature. See also Davis v. Ohio, 241
IT. S. 565; Carroll v. Becker, 285 U. S. 380. In Wood v.
Broom, 287 U. S. 1, the Court considered an attack on
Mississippi’s congressional districts because they were not
compact, contiguous, and nearly as equal in population
as practicable, which was brought by a “ complainant,
alleging that he was a citizen of Mississippi, a qualified
elector under its laws.” Id. at 4.8
Baker v. Carr, supra, the Court held that claimed dilution or debasement
of the right to vote through malapportionment presents a justiciable
controversy, and that the equal protection clause provides manageable
standards for lower courts to determine the constitutionality of a state
legislative apportionment scheme. See also WMCA, Inc. v. Lomezo, 377
U. S. 633; Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tames, 377
U. S. 656; Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S.
695; Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U. S. 713.
8 In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, which involved the constitution
ality of Illinois’ congressional districts, the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Black, in which Justice Douglas and Murphy joined, stated that
“ appellants had standing to sue, since the facts alleged show that they have
been injured as individuals.” Id. at 568. Mr. Justice Rutledge, while not
explicitly adverting to this issue, in effect assumed standing to exist by
basing his concurrence in the result entirely on the ground of want of
equity. Thus, a majority of the seven-member Court found or assumed
that the plaintiff-voters had standing. The other three members o f the
Court concluded that the wrong resulting from improper congressional
apportionment was not suffered by individual voters. Id. at 552. This
conclusion was based on the characterization o f the action as raising a
17
Second. Appellants assert a substantial interest when
they seek to protect the full weight of their right to vote.
This is made clear by decisions of the Supreme Court in
United Stales v. Classic, 313 IT. S. 299, United States v.
Saylor, 322 U. S. 385; and Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371.
See also Smith v. Allwright, 321 IT. S. 649. In Classic, the
right to vote for representative in congress was found
to include the right to have the vote honestly counted.
In Saylor and Siebold, the Court held that the Constitu
tion protects voters against a dilution of the weight of
their votes caused by stuffed ballot boxes. Recent Supreme
Court cases demonstrate conclusively the critical impor
tance attached to the right to vote. As Justice Stewart
stated in Carrington v. Rash, 380 IT. S. 89, 96:
“We deal here with matters close to the core of our
constitutional system.”
The right to vote, he went on, is one which the court is
always “zealous to protect.” And the Court said in Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U. S. at 375 “ . . . appellee, like any person
whose right to vote is impaired (Smith v. Allwright
(U. S.), supra; Baker v. Carr, supra (369 U. S. at pp.
204-208)) has standing to sue.”
Third. The Standing of persons suffering an indistin
guishable injury has been upheld. In Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U. S. 1, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
Georgia congressional apportionment under which one
congressional district had three times the population of
another. Plaintiff-voters in Wesberry claimed that “these
population disparities deprived them and voters similarly
situated of a right under the Federal Constitution to have
wholly nonjustieiable, “political question.” On the other hand, these jus
tices suggested that individual voters have standing to redress “ a private
wrong.”
18
their votes for Congressmen given the same weight as the
votes of other Georgians.” Id. at p. 3. In upholding this
claim, the Supreme Court, of necessity, rejected the lack
of standing argument relied upon by the district court,
for it held that “ in debasing the weight of appellants’
votes, the State has abridged the right to vote for members
of Congress . . . and that it was error to dismiss this suit.”
Id. at p. 4.9
The plaintiff-voters in Wesberry claimed injury due to
a disparity in population of congressional districts and the
relief to which they were entitled decreased the number of
inhabitants of their congressional districts. Here, appel
lant-voters also claim relief which will result in a reduction
of the number of persons represented by a single repre
sentative in the House. In both cases, inequality stems
from a discrepancy between the value of plaintiffs’ votes
for their representatives and the value of the votes of
other persons for their representatives. The only dif
ference is that in this case the “ other persons” are citizens
of other states, whereas in Wesberry they were citizens
of the same state. There is no authority which suggests
that this distinction, which the district court relied upon
to distinguish Wesberry, has anything whatsoever to do
with a party’s standing. Devaluation and dilution of the
9 The voters with standing in Wesberry v. Sanders alleged debasement
and dilution of their votes for representatives in congress just as the voters
found to have standing in Baker v. Carr, supra, alleged debasement and
dilution of their votes for state legislators. Likewise, the Group I appel
lants here allege that their votes for representatives in congress have been
debased or diluted by the apportionment of representatives in congress.
To the extent standing ( “ that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumi
nation of difficult constitutional questions,” (369 U. S. at 204)) was
present in Baker, supra, and Wesberry, supra, it must be present here,
for those cases stand for the proposition that debasement and dilution of
the right to vote is sufficient injury to satisfy the requirements of the
standing doctrine.
19
vote of persons for their representative— the injury which
gives rise to standing—is present in both cases.
It is urged that this injury would be shared by all the
nation’s voters— except those in thinly populated states
represented by Group II appellants. This is akin to saying
that the Georgia and Tennessee plaintiffs in Wesberry and
Baker had no standing because their injury was shared
by all of those states’ voters—except those in the thinly
populated areas. But, the Supreme Court, of course, has
held that voters complaining of debasement and dilution
of their vote have standing to sue without any factual
inquiry as to whether, and to what extent, particular voters
would increase the value of their votes. Nothing could
be more remote from the finding of standing on the plead
ings in Baker, supra, than the district court’s dismissal
of the complaint, without a hearing, in the face of detailed
allegations that appellants would increase the value of
their votes if relief is granted. Cf. Conley v. Gibson,
355 IT. S. 41.
In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 the Court could
say, without considering the case on the merits, that the
injury to plaintiff was so remote, fluctuating, and uncer
tain that no basis was afforded for an appeal to a court
of equity. The Court could dismiss the case on the plead
ings, for that plaintiff-taxpayer could never prove to what
extent she had been injured by the operation of the chal
lenged statute. Given the nature of the plaintiff’s con
tention, this conclusion was quite plausible. She argued
that the effect of the appropriations complained of would
be to raise her taxes in the future and thereby take her
property without due process of law. But there was no
way she could prove that the disbursement by the Treasury
of monies already appropriated by Congress would in
crease taxes in the future. It seems hard to conceive of a
20
set of calculations that could have been used to prove a
contention that taxes would be increased following passage
of the legislation attached. No one can predict the complex
political decisions of the executive and the congress that
are usually involved in tax increases. The Court, there
fore, dismissed the complaint because plaintiff was not
entitled to the opportunity to prove what could not be
proven satisfactorily.
Appellants are, however, fully able to establish that it
is “likely and probable [their states] would receive at
least one additional Representative in Congress” (JA 19a)
for “ There is overwhelming evidence that denial and abridg
ment of the right to vote by certain of the states exists
to an extent that constitutionally requires loss of Repre
sentatives by those states and gain of Representatives by
other states which do not deny and abridge the right to
vote” (JA 18a). The basis of this conclusion is alleged in
detail (JA 18a, 19a), and appellants should have the op
portunity to offer this proof. In the affidavit of Dr. Abram
Jaffe, the record already reflects evidence which suggests
that such a change as is alleged will take place (JA 52a-
57a). Most important, the Department of Justice has
amassed and recently submitted to the congress an enor
mous body of evidence which establishes beyond a doubt
that, in southern states, where voting is dependent on tests
or devices which would be considered denial or abridgment
of the right to vote under §2 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment, extremely low electoral participation is prevalent.10
10 For example, in the Presidential, election of 1964 ballots were cast by
62% of the American electorate. Only 17 states fell below the national
average. In 9 of these 17 states fewer than 50% of the persons of voting
age voted in the presidential election. Of these 9 states, 7 employed tests
or devices which resulted in denial or abridgment of the right to vote. A
survey of registration data conducted by the Department in six of these
states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and
Virginia) indicates that a large proportion o f non-whites of voting age
21
As of 1964, the Department had brought approximately
70 voting cases in the states of Mississippi, Louisiana,
Alabama, Tennessee and Georgia and found “ a systematic
effort to use tests or devices to disfranchise Negroes.”
See Hearings, Comm, on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. First
Sess. on S. 1564, pp. 1148-1155.
As set forth in §2 itself, appellants’ injury is shared
by inhabitants of states which do not deny or abridge the
right to vote in sufficient numerical proportion, to lose
representatives in congress and it is not shared by in
habitants of those states where the right to vote is bur
dened to such an extent as to require loss of representa
tives.
In a memorandum in opposition to appellees motion to
dismiss in the district court, appellants described the man
ner in which §2 operated, as follows:
The results of an apportionment in accordance with
the provisions of §2 are dependent totally on patterns
of denial and abridgment of the franchise throughout
the country. An apportionment consistent with §2 may
result in a small number of states gaining Repre
sentatives, a small number losing, and a large num
ber remaining the same; or a small number of states
may lose a large number of Representatives each and
a large number of states may gain a small number of
Representatives each. It may or may not be limited
to inhabitants of a “ few thinly populated states” (De
fendants’ Memo, p. 7) depending on whether and to
what extent such states deny or abridge the right to
vote and whether and to what extent other, more
are not registered to vote. See Hearing before the Committee on the Judici
ary of the United States Senate, 89th Congress, First Session on S. 1564,
pp. 1175-1181, 1448-1455.
22
populous, states deny or abridge the right to vote
(JA 65a).
The district court implied—without so finding—that this
general description of the way §2 operates was a conces
sion that appellants do not actually mean what they say
when they allege that it is “ ‘likely and probable’ that the
states in which Group I plaintiffs reside would each re
ceive ‘at least one additional Representative in Congress’ ”
(JA 65a). The use of this paragraph in the opinion of
the district court does violence to its language and is an
unjustified attempt to go behind the explicit allegations
of the complaint. It is also subject to a more fundamental
error in that it fails to distinguish between a general de
scription of how §2 works and the application of §2 to any
particular apportionment.
In short, §2 is “speculation” in the sense that it depends
on actual patterns of denial and abridgment of the fran
chise. Different states may at different times suffer from
its reduction formula because they deny or abridge the
right to vote. But appellants directed themselves expressly
to a particular set of voting patterns and practices in
which they, as well, it appears, as the Department of
Justice, see clear evidence that certain states deny the
right to vote more than others. In this context, it is im
possible to say that appellants cannot prove they will
gain representatives if §2 is enforced.
Fourth. A line of cases almost as old as the Constitution
itself refutes the notion that appellants may be denied
standing to sue on the basis of the treatment accorded a,
taxpayer in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. 8. 447. These
cases establish the standing of a taxpayer to challenge the
apportionment of taxes among the states. No less can be
accorded the voter challenging apportionment of repre
sentatives.
23
Art. I, §2, Cl. 3 of the Constitution provides that “Repre
sentatives and direct taxes” shall be apportioned among
the several states. In addition, Art. I, §9, Cl. 4, states:
No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless
in proportion to the census or enumeration herein
before directed to be taken.
Thus, the Constitution contains an explicit prohibition of
certain forms of taxation and links it to apportionment
of persons among the several states as revealed by the
census. A taxpayer’s challenge of the failure of Congress
to apportion taxes on the basis of population was per
mitted as early as 1796. Hylton v. United States, 3 Dali.
171.11
During the century following the Hylton decision, the
Supreme Court “sustained successively as ‘excise’ or
‘duties’ a tax on an insurance company’s receipts for
11 Congress levied a tax upon carriages which was not apportioned
among the several states. The background of the famous litigation is set
forth in Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of America, pp.
317, 318 (Washington, 1953). The United States Supreme Court upheld
the tax on the ground that no tax ought to be classified as “ direct” which
could not be conveniently apportioned and this tax was o f that character.
Justice Patterson, a member of the Constitutional Convention, set forth
the purpose of the constitutional requirement that direet taxes be appor
tioned as follows:
The provision was made in favor of the southern states. They pos
sessed a large number of slaves; they had extensive tracts of territory,
thinly settled and not very productive. A majority of the states had
but a few slaves and several of them a limited territory, well settled,
and in a high state of cultivation. The southern states, if no provision
had not been introduced in the Constitution, would have been wholly
at the mercy of the other states. Congress in such case might tax
slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily, and land in every part of the union
after the same rate or measure; so much a head in the first instance,
and so much an acre in the second. To guard them against imposition
in these particulars was the reason of introducing the clause in the
Constitution which directs that representatives and direct taxes shall
be apportioned among the states according to their respective numbers
(3 Dali, at 177).
24
premiums and assessments, a tax on the circulating notes
of state banks, an inheritance tax on real estate and finally
a general tax on incomes.” See Corwin, The Constitution
of the United States of America 319 (Washington, 1953).
In all of these cases taxpayers were permitted to challenge
the failure of congress to apportion among the states.
While the taxpayers did not prevail, their standing to sue
was unchallenged.
In more recent years numerous suits have been brought
by individual taxpayers alleging that congress had vio
lated Art. I, §2, Cl. 3, by failing to apportion taxes among
the several states according to their respective numbers.
In Bromley v. McCaugkn, 280 U. S. 124, the plaintiff al
leged that a provision of the Revenue Act of 1924, im
posing a tax on gifts, violated Art. I, §2, Cl. 3 and Art. I, §9,
Cl. 4. Again, the Court did not question plaintiff’s stand
ing to sue although it denied his contention on the merits.
Accord: Helvering v. Independent L. Ins. Co., 292 U. S.
371; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103; Brushaber
v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U. 8. 1; Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co.
v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 230
U. 8. 107; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 43.
One of the most significant of these taxpayer’s cases,
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, dem
onstrates that apportionment of taxes and of representa
tion among the states are constitutionally linked in a man
ner which makes them indistinguishable as far as standing
to challenge an apportionment is concerned.
In the Pollock case, stockholders of the defendant com
pany sought to have a tax on incomes declared unconsti
tutional. They contended that the tax was a direct tax
which was invalid because not apportioned among the
several states. The Court’s comprehensive opinion analyzes
constitutional debates to show that provisions for appor
tionment of representatives and taxes according to popula
tion were part of the same compromise arrived at to
secure the Constitution’s adoption. This compromise pro
vided for “ establishment of the same rule for the appor
tionment of taxes as for regulating the proportion of
Representatives” (157 U. S. at 563).12
The framers of the Constitution considered apportion
ment of taxes and of representatives part of the same prob
lem and intended both apportionments to be governed by
the same principle. As a result of this historical identity, it
must follow that a citizen-voter’s interest in constitutional
apportionment of representatives is as great as a citizen-
taxpayer’s interest in the constitutional apportionment of
federal taxes. Secondly, insofar as the taxpayer who is re
quired to pay a direct tax which has not been apportioned is
unconstitutionally burdened in comparison to taxpayers in
other states, the voter who lives in a state not denying or
abridging the right to vote is burdened and his vote is
diluted. Since the Supreme Court has granted the citizen-
taxpayer standing to challenge the alleged unconstitutional
apportionment of taxes since 1796, no objection can be
raised to the standing of citizen-voters to challenge an un
constitutional apportionment of representatives.
12 “ Thus was accomplished one of the great compromises of the Constitu
tion resting on the doctrine that the right of representation ought to be
conceded to every community on which a tax is to be imposed, but erystal-
izing' it in such a form as to allay jealousies in respect of the future bal
ance of power; to reconcile conflicting views in respect of the enumeration
of slaves; and to remove the objection that, in adjusting a system of
representation between the states regard should be had to their relative
wealth, since those who were to "be most heavily taxed ought to have a
proportionate influence in the government. The compromise, in embracing
the power of direct taxation, consisted not simply in including part of the
slaves in the enumeration of population, but in providing that as between
state and state such taxation should be proportioned to representation.”
157 U. S. at 563.
25
26
Fifth. In addition to Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S.
447, the court below relied on three totally inapposite cases
as precedent for denial of standing here: Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Dillon, 335
F. 2d 292 (1964); United States v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94
(D. D. C. 1964). The first two cases involved attempts to
enjoin lawful economic competition, and the third was an
effort to reverse a decision of administrative officials exer
cising legitimate discretion. The Court in Ickes could find
no invasion of a legal right, since petitioner was merely pro
testing the financial loss he would incur from lawful compe
tition which would follow the use by municipalities of
proposed loans and grants. The company had no right to be
immune from lawful municipal competition. The Dillon
case involved the same issue. Nor is United States v.
Stewart, supra, precedent for denial of standing, for it
merely holds that there is no standing to challenge govern
ment officers when they decline to relieve the lawful, if
harsh, consequences of an inadvertent error.
Finally, the standing doctrine does not and cannot require
a showing of certainty of injury. In NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U. S. 451 459, 460, for example, Justice Harlan found
that “the reasonable likelihood that the Association itself
through diminished financial support and membership may
be adversely affected . . . is a further factor pointing towards
our holding that petitioner has standing to complain . . . on
behalf of its members” 357 U. S. 451 at 459-460 (emphasis
supplied). In the instant case, there is undoubtedly a “ rea
sonable likelihood” that appellants’ votes have been debased
and that implementation of §2 will redress the injury they
have suffered.
Group II Appellants Have Standing To Sue
The district court also concluded that Group II appellants
were without standing. Group II appellants asserted that
“they as well as others in their states have suffered and will
continue to suffer the denial or abridgment of their right
to vote for reasons other than participation in rebellion or
other crime” (JA 66a), and that they resided in states which
would lose at least one representative if Section 2 were en
forced (JA 19a, 20a). The Court found that even if appel
lees were compelled to reapportion in accordance with §2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment appellants’ right to vote would
not be vindicated because such an apportionment would
only result in allocating seats in the House of Representa
tives to other states. Group II appellants “would find them
selves in the same position that they are in at this time,” and
for this reason are not injured by failure to enforce §2
(JA 66a).
The distinct court was plainly wrong in finding that en
forcement of §2 would leave appellants unchanged. The
holding that Group II appellants are without standing also
seriously misconceives the nature of §2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
If §2 is implemented, quite clearly a powerful deterrent
will have been brought to bear against states which deny
and abridge the right to vote. Officials denying or abridg
ing the right to vote would be put on notice that absent an
end to such offensive practices, the number of representa
tives would be reduced to reflect denial and abridgment of
the right to vote. It is difficult to conceive of a more potent
sanction which appellants could invoke to end discrimina
tion against them. Compared to it, a cut-off of federal
funds (threat of which has often been sufficient to obtain
compliance with the Constitution, cf. 42 IT. S. C. §2000d,
2000d-l) is only a minor sanction, for representatives
28
determine whether, and for what purpose, funds are allo
cated.13
To assert the standing of Group II appellants, one need
not, however, establish with certainty that offending states
will end denial or abridgment of the right to vote, rather
than risk loss of representatives. The standing doctrine
does not and cannot require a showing of certainty of suc
cess or it will be converted into an inarticulate and mislead
ing device for determining the merits of a controversy.
Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 451, 459, 460. Here, it
is apparent that states which deny and abridge the franchise
may well end such practices. Group II appellants, therefore,
have a great stake in the outcome of a controversy over
appellees legal duties with respect to §2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The standing of appellants, however, is established by
still more fundamental circumstances, for the legislative
history of §2 makes clear that the primary purpose of the
Amendment was to protect the right to vote of Negroes in
states where they would otherwise be denied the right to
vote. See infra pp. 53-60. The legislative history of §2
shows it was conceived as a means to protect the Negro by
confronting the states with alternatives: abandon policies
which deny and abridge the franchise to a substantial num
ber of persons or enjoy fewer representatives in congress.
Thus, appellants are members of the class §2 was adopted to
13 It is, of course, probable that offending states will abolish denial or
abridgment of the right to vote if threatened with enforcement of §2. For
proof of this, one need only weigh the important economic interests in
volved in the loss of representation in congress, or glance at the legislative
history of Apportionment Act of 1929 which reveals the concern of legis
lators over the consequences of the mathematical formula employed to
apportion. Indeed, so great was the controversy over this formula that in
1920 congress was unable to apportion, a failure which led to the present
automatic reapportionment procedure of 2 U. S. C. <$2a, see infra, pp.
32, 33.
29
The possibility that a state might prefer to lose seats in
Congress rather than enfranchise those whose voting rights
are denied is, however, not argument for failure to enforce
§2 for the simple reason that §2 by its terms confers such a
choice. In rejecting the standing of Group II appellants,
the district court really rejected the alternatives set out by
the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
It was said by the appellees in the district court that
Group II appellants merely want to deter action by local
officials; and, therefore, their injury is direct only insofar
as local officials are concerned and does not demonstrate an
injury by the appellee federal officials. This position seems
to have been adopted in part by the district court which held
that “ insofar as that right has been denied or abridged it
resulted from the alleged action of state officials; but they
are not parties to this suit” (JA 67a).
There are two critical errors in this position. First, while
appellants “merely” seek to deter state action which denies
and abridges the right to vote, it is incorrect to characterize
their injury as “ indirect” rather than “ direct” (and draw
a significant consequence therefrom) because they seek re
lief from federal rather than state officials. The “injury”
arising from denial and abridgment of their right to vote
is the same whether relief is granted against state or federal
officials.
Secondly, appellants are not seeking enforcement of a
duty owed to them by federal officials “ indirectly” . On the
contrary, apportionment of representatives among the
states is and always has been an exclusively federal respon
sibility under the Constitution, see §2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Art. I, §2, Cl. 3 of the Constitution, which
protect. If they cannot invoke its remedy it is difficult to
see who could have “ standing.”
30
Congress has delegated to appellee federal officials. Appel
lants seek redress against these officials for their failure to
protect them in a manner clearly contemplated by the
framers of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the
framers of §2 determined that apportionment was a federal
responsibility which could not be carried out without re
dressing denial or abridgment of the right to vote. The
method of deterrence which appellants seek to implement is
no more or less “ indirect” than §2 itself. To argue that
§2 cannot be enforced by appellants because they have not
suffered “direct” injury is, therefore, to ignore the nature
of the constitutional provision of which enforcement is
sought.
II.
Appellees Are Required by § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to Deduct From the Basis of a State’s
Representation the Number of Citizens Whose Right
to Vote Has Been Denied or Abridged by That State.
Any Other Interpretation of Present Apportionment
Statutes Would Render Them Unconstitutional.
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the consti
tutional authority for the apportionment of representa
tives among the several states. Its first sentence directs that
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers” and replaces
the three-fifths compromise of Article I, §2, Cl. 3. Its second
sentence provides the manner in which “the basis of repre
sentation therein shall be reduced.” Congress has legislated
in detail regarding the apportionment authorized by §2. See
2 U. S. C. §§2a, 6; 13 IT. S. C. §§5, 6, 11, 13, 21 and 141.
Appellees contended below that they are “neither author
ized nor required” when they conduct this apportionment to
31
deduct from the basis of apportionment the number of
citizens whose right to vote has been denied or abridged and
the district court adopted their view. In short, the district
court held that appellees may enforce the first sentence of
§2 while ignoring the second, modifying, sentence of the
Amendment. But if appellees are not authorized to deduct
the disfranchised, then it follows that they are required to
include such persons in the basis of representation (JA 72a,
74a). Such a requirement squarely conflicts with the lan
guage and history of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
would be invalid, see infra pp. 53-60. This result, however,
is neither necessary nor appropriate.
Applicable Apportionment and Census Statutes Should
Be Construed So As Not To Conflict IWith § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Appellees have ample power and authority under existing
law to apportion in a constitutional manner by complying
with the requirements of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A comprehensive statutory scheme reflects the aim of the
framers of the 1929 Census and Apportionment Act to en
sure automatic and constitutional decennial apportionment.
2 U. S. C. §2a provides for the transmission to congress of
a statement showing the number of persons in each state
and the number of representatives to which each state is
entitled. 13 U. S. C. §4 provides that the Secretary of Com
merce shall carry out the functions and duties of Title 13
of the United States Code and authorizes him to delegate
his authority. 13 U. S. C. §5 directs the Secretary to prepare
the schedules and inquiries for the census. 13 U. S. C. §§6,
12, 13 authorizes the Secretary to utilize the resources of
other departments of government or private agencies as
may be necessary in conducting the census. 13 U. S. C. §§11,
14 authorize the appropriation of such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the census. 13 U. S. C. §21 provides
32
for a Director of the Census who shall perfom duties as may
be imposed by the Secretary of Commerce. 13 U. S. C. §141
authorizes a decennial census of population, unemployment
and housing and directs that the tabulation of total popula
tion as required for the apportionment of representatives
shall be completed within eight months and reported by the
Secretary to the President.
Consistent with the well-established principles of our
judicial system, see Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Authority,
297 U. S. 288, 348 (Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting), appel
lants urge that these statutes be construed to preserve their
constitutionality by construction in conformity with the re
quirements of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation
enacted by Congress is invariably construed to preserve its
constitutionality, see, for example, the decision of the dis
trict court in Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D. C.
1960), where a statute which did not explicitly incorporate
a constitutional guarantee was construed to do so. See also
Phelps v. United States, 274 U. S. 343, 344; Knight Tem
plars S Masons’ Life Go. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 205;
Missouri P. R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 446.
The legislative history of the present apportionment stat
ute (Act of June 18, 1929, 2 U. S. C. § 2a, 46 Stat. 26, as
amended 54 Stat. 162; 55 Stat. 761) supports a construction
consistent with §2. The basic intention of its framers, to
'which all other intentions were subsidiary, must serve as
a guide to construction. It. was to provide a constitutional
and nonpolitical method of apportioning representatives
which would insure decennial apportionment.
Until 1929, Congress had been unable to pass a reappor-
tionment act on the basis of the 1920 Census. Twice during
the 1920’s the House passed apportionment measures and
twice the Senate failed to approve them. This failure not
only had disfranchised millions of Americans, but it bla
tantly disregarded the requirement of Art. I, §2, Cl. 3 of the
Constitution that representatives be apportioned decen
nially. The Congress which passed the Census and Appor
tionment Act of 19,29, removing from Congress continuing
duties and obligations of reapportionment and placing them
solely in the hands of the executive, had these considerations
foremost in its mind.
In order to avoid the kind of political impasse which had
resulted in failure to apportion since the 1910 census, every
function of the Congress with respect to apportionment—
except the power to amend—was delegated to the executive.
Significantly, it was on this ground that the Bill was most
vociferously attacked. For example, Senator Swanson, an
opponent of the Bill, saw the only issue as whether it is “a
wise thing for Congress to surrender its power of apportion
ment. . . ” 71 Cong. Record 1328.14 Other Senators suggested
two defects in the B ill: First, that it covered future appor
tionment perpetually, and second, that it delegated what
was seen as a congressional function, 71 Cong. Record
1330-33.
These criticisms were answered by reference to the
obligation to apportion contained in Art. 1, §2, Cl. 3 and
the disfranchisement of thirty million Americans which
had been caused by the failure of Congress to apportion
since 1911. Undoubtedly, it was to remedy this evil that
the Act was approved. See e.g. 71 Cong. Record 1325.
14 Representative Fenn, Chairman of the Committee on the Census,
stated “ The main . . . opposition advanced against this proposed legislation
is that Congress ought not to divest itself of any authority or power con
ferred upon it by the Constitution in the reapportionment of Congress.”
Report to accompany H. R. 11725, Committee on the Census, 70th Cong.
2d Sess. No. 2010, p. 6.
34
The report of the Senate Committee on Commerce on
the Bill put the matter plainly:
The need for legislation of this type is confessed
by the record of the past nine years during which
Congress has refused to translate the 1920 Census
into a new apportionment. . . . As a result great
American constituencies have been robbed of their
rightful share of representation, not only in the
Congress itself but also in the Presidential Electoral
College. On the prospective basis of the next census,
more than 30,000,000 people are relatively disfran
chised as a result of this lapse in a fundamental con
stitutional function. Already we have had two
presidencies and four Congresses elected out of an
anticonstitutional source. On the basis of census esti
mates, it is safe to say that reapportionment, with the
present size of the House maintained, would affect
23 seats in the House of Representatives and 23 votes
in the Presidential Electoral College. So large a
factor of misrepresentation is a travesty upon repre
sentative democracy, a flagrant mockery of constitu
tional equalities, an ugly hazard to domestic tranquil
ity, and an insufferable affront to victimized states.
Despite the progressive development of this tres
pass during recent years, Congress has failed to
correct the situation. The Senate has refused either
to accept reapportionment initiated by the House or
to originate such legislation itself. There is no con
vincing reason to anticipate that the same influences
and considerations which have prevented constitu
tional apportionment in the past will not prolong
these defects indefinitely. As entrenched inequities in
crease, their voluntary correction proportionately be
comes less easy and less likely. Thus, it becomes
evident that the protection of the roots of our repre
sentative Government requires an enabling act paral
leling and authenticating Article 1 of the Constitution
(S. Rep. No. 2, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. pp. 2-4 (1929)).
The Act was written to fit any subsequent decennial
emergency which might arise. It was intended to be—and
has become—a permanent contribution to our representa
tive institutions. The legislative history of the Act
indicates, therefore, a paramount congressional purpose to
effect apportionment on a constitutional basis. Given this
goal, the Act must be construed in light of §2 of the Four
teenth Amendment and 2 U. S. C. §6 and appellees’ duty
to prepare, compile, compute and transmit the apportion
ment of representatives in accordance with the terms of
the Constitution should be acknowledged. As the overrid
ing purpose of the Congress which passed the Census and
Apportionment Act of 1929 was to make the apportion
ment process automatic and remove it from congressional
politics, it would be ironic, indeed, for the courts to refuse
to construe the Act in accordance with the plain terms of
the Constitution.
The district court, however, construed 2 U. S. §2a(a)
to provide for the inclusion of the disfranchised in the
basis of apportionment of representatives, contrary to §2
of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the statute directs
the President to transmit the “whole number of persons
in each State” which “Necessarily . . . includes the dis
franchised” (JA 72a). In concluding that the language
of 2 U. S. C. §2a compels such a conclusion the court
ignored a critical portion of the text, for the statute au
thorizes two separate sets of data—a tabulation of the
number of persons in each state, and a calculation of “ the
36
number of Representatives to which each state would be
entitled. . . . ” The court’s fear that calculation of dis
franchisement would prevent transmittal to Congress of the
“whole number of persons in each State” is unfounded.
The effects of disfranchisement will show up not in that
tabulation, but in the statement which the statute expressly
authorizes, of “ the number of Representatives to which
each state would be entitled.”
Likewise, there is no support for the suggestion in the
district court’s opinion that no statutory provision imposes
a duty on appellees with respect to apportionment, since
§2a places “ responsibility” on the President to transmit
to Congress the number of representatives to which states
is entitled (JA 72a). Appellees concede that as a matter
of law they are obliged to execute and, as a matter of fact
do execute the apportionment of representatives. (Com
pare JA 24a, 25a, 70a with JA 13a, 14a). While it is the
President who transmits the figures to congress, he is
merely a conduit for a statement prepared, compiled and
computed by the Secretary and Bureau of the Census. In
addition, as the legislative history of the 1929 Act, 2
U. S. C. §2a, makes clear, the President was substituted
for the Secretary only for formal purposes.16 Appellants
alleged and will prove, if given the opportunity, that ap
pellees and not the President prepare the apportionment
of representatives to which each state is entitled (JA 13a,
14a).
The district court also concluded that “Congress in 1929
denied defendants the authority plaintiffs now claim for
16 Senator Vandenberg, manager of the Bill, substituted the President
for the Secretary of Commerce on the floor of the Senate April 18, 1929.
See 71 Cong. Record, 107-108.
these officials” (JA 74a). The court cites the failure of
three Tinkham amendments which sought to enforce §2
in the House as evidence for this conclusion (JA 73a).
But the legislative history of these amendments does not
support the conclusion that congress considered and then
rejected enforcement of §2. Failure of the legislature to
act may mean many things or nothing at all, and even the
rejection by Congress of a particular provision after ex
tended debate (not the case here) should not be taken to
mean congress approved the opposite position. Girouard
v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69, 70. Congress in 1929
was primarily concerned with establishing a method
of decennial apportionment which would conform to the
Constitution. The legislative history of these amendments
reveals only that congress may just as well have thought
them redundant, an unnecessary restatement of appellees
preexisting constitutional duty. Indeed, appellees concede
as much in their Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss in the district court (p. 17, n. 6), when they refer
to 2 U. S. C. §6 (the provision which explicitly directs that
§2 be enforced) as follows:
This provision, which had already been on the books
for more than 50 years when Congressman Tinkham
offered his amendment to the 1929 census and appor
tionment bill, would have made that amendment
entirely superfluous.
The district court also found support for its conclusion
that appellees have not been directed to implement §2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment in language found in Saunders
v. Wilkins,10 152 F. 2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945), cert, denied 16
16 In Saunders v. Wilkins, an action was brought against the Secretary
of State of Virginia to recover damages under 42 U. 8. C. §1983 for fail
ure to certify the plaintiff as a candidate for election as a Representative-
38
328 U. S. 870; Dennis v. United States,17 84 IT. S. App. D. C.
51, 171 F. 2d 986 (1948) aff’d 339 U. S. 162; and United
at-large in the House. Plaintiff argued that, through the poll tax imposed
by the state, 60% of the population of citizens over 21 years o f age of
Virginia were deprived of the franchise and that, consequently, represen
tation of Virginia in the House of Representatives should be reduced from
9 to 4 under the provisions of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For this
reason, the four Representatives legitimately accruing to Virginia would
have to be elected at large, pursuant to 2 U. S. C. §2a(c). Plaintiff sought
damages for the failure of the Secretary of State to certify him as a
candidate. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal
o f the suit on the ground that the issue presented by this suit was non-
justieiable, a political question that the court in that case could not decide.
The heart of the Saunders holding is that the suit was brought against
a single state official who did not have the power and authority to enforce
§2, for §1? does not require only that some states lose Representatives, but
that others gain. In no way could the Secretary of State of Virginia
effectuate apportionment among the states, for his jurisdiction was obvi
ously limited to Virginia. As stated by the Fourth Circuit:
It is quite clear that we lack the means o f deciding whether or not
Virginia is entitled to nine Representatives in Congress upon the in
formation before us . . . we have no means of knowing the effect
upon the suffrage of the restrictions imposed by the statutes of other
states in the form of poll taxes or other qualifications for voting. We
could not say, even if the question lay within our power, whether
Virginia is entitled to nine out of the total number of four hundred
and thirty-five Representatives provided by Congress without ascer
taining the number to which other states are entitled when the pro
visions of the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment are taken
into consideration. (152 F. 2d at 238) (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be noted that Saunders was decided prior to Baker v. Carr,
supra, Gray v. Sanders, supra, and Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, and to
the extent the language of the court sanctions judicial noninterference with
the electoral process it is, of course, modified by those eases.
17 In Dennis v. United States, 171 F. 2d 986 (D. C. Cir., 1948), §2 was
raised “ collaterally as an unsound defense in a criminal case,” 171 F. 2d
at 993, charging failure to respond to a congressional committee subpoena.
The idea seems to have been that members of the committee would have
lost their seats if §2 had been enforced, and, therefore, the subpoena was
illegal. The court pointed out that this reasoning would invalidate all acts
of Congress, not merely the specific subpoena attacked, and held that “ the
validity of the apportionment act of 1941 cannot be attacked in a collateral
proceeding.” Ibid. To the extent the court in Dennis may have suggested
that Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over apportionment, the ease is
also disposed of by Wesberry, 376 U. S. at pp. 3, 4.
39
States v. Sharrow,18 309 F. 2d 77 (2nd Cir., 1962), cert,
denied 372 U. S. 949. These cases, however, do not offer
fruitful guidance to the Court in dealing with the issues
raised in this case for they dealt with §2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment collaterally or under the assumption, which
Wesherry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, has shown to be un
founded, that its implementation was not properly a judi
cial question. In these cases the Secretary of Commerce
or Director of the Census were not parties and the ques
tion of their authority was tangential.
Apportionment In Accordance With § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment Is Constitutionally Required
Only one census, the Ninth Census of 1870, has attempted
to compile the data needed to implement §2 of the Four
teenth Amendment. Significantly, the census-takers of 1870
acted without express Congressional authorization, and
under the belief that §2 alone required them to investigate
abridgments of the right to vote.
18 United States v. Sharrow, supra, also involved an attempt to raise §2
as a defense to a criminal charge. Sharrow refused to answer questions on
a census form and was indicted under 13 I). S. C. §221 (a). He defended
on the ground that if the Census Act did not provide for enumeration in
accordance with §2, it was unconstitutional and, therefore, he was not
required to answer any questions on the form. The opinion sheds no light
on the major question presented here; whether existing law requires appel
lees to enforce §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This issue was not posed
because §2 was introduced into Sharrow by the back door. The view that
the “Fourteenth Amendment” does not “prescribe that Census-Takers as
certain information relative to disfranchisement” 309 F. 2d at 79-80 does
not explain or reflect consideration by the court of the fact that “ census”
has been delegated the duty to apportion pursuant to §2. The authority
cited for this conclusion does not support it. United States v. Moriarity,
106 F. 886 (S. D. N. Y. 1901), only holds that the Census can inquire
into matters other than population. The reference to the Report of the
Ninth Census establishes the contrary of the proposition for which it was
cited, for the disfranchisement inquiries of the Ninth Census were taken
on the authority of §2 without specific congressional direction, see infra
pp. 40, 41.
40
During the preparations for the Ninth Census it ap
peared that Congress might expressly provide that the
census compile data on denial of the right to vote. The
House census committee, under the chairmanship of James
Garfield, drew up a list of the various state laws which
operated to exclude citizens from voting in order to assist
the census takers. More specifically, it recommended that
the census schedules contain a column listing “male citizens
of the United States twenty-one years of age, whose right
to vote is denied or abridged on other grounds than rebel
lion or other crime.” H. R. Rep. No. 3, 41st Cong. 2d Sess.
52-53 (1869-1870); Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. 2d Sess. 36-38
(1869-1870); Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History
and Present Status of The Fourteenth Amendment, 30
Fordham L. Rev. 93, 108-109 (1961). But when the House
was ready to vote on a final census bill, Garfield proposed
that this voting section be deleted and that Congress deal
with the voting problem separately in the next session.
Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. 2d Sess. 125 (1869-1870). His
proposal was accepted and the House census bill contained
no instructions to the census takers with regard to denial
or abridgment of the right to vote.
In the Senate, the Committee on the Revision of Laws
proposed that the Secretary of the Interior be directed
“to so change the [census] schedules and blanks to be used
in enumerating the inhabitants of the United States in
1870 as to make the same conform to the Constitution of
the United States.” Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. 2d Sess. 1078
(1869-1870). Senator Conkling, the reporter for the Com
mittee, conceded that this provision was probably unneces
sary, since the Secretary of the Interior was already bound
to follow and implement the new amendments in taking
the census. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. 2d Sess. 1079 (1869-
1870). The provision was never approved, and, according
41
to Garfield, this was because the Senators realized “ that it
would he the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to make
the schedules conform to changes in the organic law with
out any new act of Congress” (emphasis supplied). Cong.
Globe, 42nd Cong. 2d Sess. 82-83 (1871-1872). The Secre
tary of the Interior evidently accepted this interpretation,
for*, despite the absence of statutory instructions, he di
rected the census takers to list in separate tables the total
number of adult males in the United States and the num
ber of “male citizens of the United States of twenty-one
and upward whose right to vote is denied or abridged on
other grounds than rebellion or other crime.” Zuckerman,
op. cit. p. 110; Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong. 2d Sess. 82-83
(1871-1872).
The post-war, 1870 Census, by the Secretary of the In
terior’s own admission, Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong. 2d Sess.
42 (1871-1872), proved so inaccurate and unreliable that
no changes could be made in congressional representation
pursuant to §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Zuckerman,
op. cit. pp. 111-114. The crucial point remains, however,
that both the Senate and the Secretary of the Interior be
lieved census takers were constitutionally bound to provide
data for the implementation of §2 even without express
direction by Congress.
Thus, the language, history and plain meaning of §2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the over-all statu
tory scheme for reapportionment, authorize and require
the appellees to implement §2. If this statutory scheme
contemplated apportionment based solely on population,
no account being taken of those disfranchised in each state,
then it would be in conflict with §2. Appellants do not seek
such a result but it must follow if appellees are not re
quired to implement §2 when they apportion. The consti
tutional injunction of Art. 14, §2 is clear:
42
But when the right to vote . . . is denied . . . or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall
be reduced. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
The district court disregarded the mandatory language
of §2 and the manner it was implemented in 1870 by failing
to find any conflict between the Amendment and an appor
tionment which ignores disfranchisement (JA 76a). In so
doing the court does not suggest the theory on which Con
gress is permitted to destroy the effect of the second,
modifying, sentence of §2 while implementing the first
sentence when language and history, see infra pp. 53-60,
demonstrate they were meant to be read as one. Such a
construction of §2 runs against the very nature of a written
constitution for “it cannot be presumed that any clause
in the Constitution is intended to be without effect”
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174. Rather than per
mit such a result, this Court should construe the prevail
ing apportionment and census scheme to enforce the man
date of the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed
by its framers to insure universal suffrage and to deter
denial and abridgment of the right to vote. Almost one
hundred years after adoption, its great goal, so funda
mental to the health of the demoei*atic process, is far from
being realized. As the President’s Commission on Reg
istration and Voting Participation, of which Mr. Seammon
was chairman, put i t :
. . . the plain fact remains that citizens of other
democracies vote in greater relative numbers than
Americans. The United States, leader of the free
world, lags behind many other free countries in voter
participation (Report of the President’s Commission
43
on Registration and Voting Participation, November
1963, p. 8).
I f §2 is implemented, Americans may well be free to vote
without the archaic and anti-democratic restrictions which
now serve to limit voting; and the wisdom of the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment will prevail.
CONCLUSION
W herefore, appellants p ra y that the ju dgm en t below
be reversed .
Respectfully submitted,
W illiam B . B ryant
615 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
J ack Greenberg
J am es M. N abrit , III
M ich ael M eltsner
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York
Attorneys for Appellants
R ichard L. B an k s
W illiam R . M in g , J r .
S. W. T ucker
A. P. T ureaud
A. W. W illis , J r .
M argaret B ush W ilson
Of Counsel
APPENDIX
C onstitution of th e U nited S tates
Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3. Apportionment of repre
sentatives and taxes.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this
Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall
be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Tears, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made
within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress
of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.
The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for
every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least
one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be
made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to
chuse [sic] three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and
Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York
six, New7 Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one,
Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South
Carolina five, and Georgia three.
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be layed unless
in proportion to the Census or Enumeration hereinbefore
directed to be taken.
Article 14, Section 2. Apportionment of representatives.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned
among the several States according to their respective
A p p e n d i x o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d S t a t u t o r y
P r o v i s i o n s I n v o l v e d
46
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when
the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male in
habitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U nited S tates S tatutes
2 U.S.C. §2a. Reapportionment of Representatives; time
and manner; existing decennial census figures as basis;
statement by President; duty of clerk.
(a) On the first day, or within one week thereafter,
of the first regular session of the Eighty-second Con
gress and of each fifth Congress thereafter, the Presi
dent shall transmit to the Congress a statement show
ing the whole number of persons in each State, ex
cluding Indians not taxed, as ascertained under the
seventeenth and each subsequent decennial census of
the population, and the number of Representatives to
which each State would be entitled under an appor
tionment of the then existing number of Representa
tives by the method known as the method of equal
proportions, no State to receive less than one Member.
Appendix of Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions Involved
(b) Each State shall be entitled, in the Eighty-third
Congress and in each Congress thereafter until the
taking effect of a reapportionment under this section
or subsequent statute, to the number of Representa
tives shown in the statement required by subsec
tion (a) of this section for a State to receive less than
one Member. It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the
House of Representatives, within fifteen calendar days
after the receipt of such statement, to send to the ex
ecutive of each State a certificate of the number of
Representatives to which such State is entitled to un
der this section. In case of a vacancy in the office of
Clerk, or of his absence or inability to discharge this
duty, then such duty shall devolve upon the Sergeant
at Arms of the House of Representatives; and in case
of vacancies in the office of both the Clerk and the
Sergeant at Arms or the absence or inability of both
to act, such duty shall devolve upon the Doorkeeper
of the House of Representatives.
(c) Until a State is redistricted in the manner pro
vided by the law thereof after any apportionment, the
Representatives to which such State is entitled under
such apportionment shall be elected in the following
manner: (1) If there is no change in the number of
Representatives, they shall be elected from the dis
tricts then prescribed by the law of such State, and if
any of them are elected from the State at large they
shall continue to be so elected; (2) if there is an in
crease in the number of Representatives, such addi
tional Representative or Representatives shall be
elected from the State at large and the other Repre-
Appendix of Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions Involved
48
sentatives from the districts then prescribed by the
law of such State; (3) if there is a decrease in the
number of Representatives but the number of districts
in such State is equal to sxich decreased number of
Representatives, they shall be elected from the dis
tricts then prescribed by the law of such State; (4) if
there is a decrease in the number of Representatives
but the number of districts in such State is less than
such number of Representatives, the number of Repre
sentatives by which such number of districts is ex
ceeded shall be elected from the State at large and the
other Representatives from the districts then pre
scribed by the law of such State; or (5) if there is a
decrease in the number of Representatives and the
number of districts in such State exceeds such de
creased number of Representatives, they shall be
elected from the State at large.
2 U.S.C. §6. Reduction of representation.
Should any State deny or abridge the right of any of
the male inhabitants thereof, being twenty-one years of
age, and citizens of the United States, to vote at any elec
tion named in the amendment to the Constitution, article 14,
section 2, except for participation in the rebellion or other
crime, the number of Representatives apportioned to such
State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number
of such male citizens shall have to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
13 U.S.C. §4. Functions of Secretary; delegation.
The Secretary shall perform the functions and duties
imposed upon him by this title or he may delegate any of
Appendix of Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions Involved
49
them to such officers, employees, bureaus or agencies of
the Department of Commerce as he designates.
13 U.S.C. §5. Schedules; number, form, and scope of
inquiries.
The Secretary shall prepare schedules, and shall deter
mine the inquiries, and the number, form, and subdivisions
thereof, for the statistics, surveys, and censuses provided
for in this title.
13 U.S.C. §6. Requests to other departments and of
fices for information, acquisition of reports from govern
mental and other sources.
(a) The Secretary, whenever he deems it advisable,
may call upon any other department or office of the
Government for information pertinent to the work
provided for in this title.
(b) The Secretary may acquire by purchase or other
wise from States, counties, cities, or other units of
government, or their instrumentalities, or from private
persons and agencies such copies of records, reports,
and other material as may be required for the efficient
and economical conduct of the censuses and surveys
provided for in this title.
13 U.S.C. §11. Authorization of appropriations.
There is authorized to be appropriated, out of the Trea
sury of the United States, such sums as may be necessary
to carry out all provisions of this title.
Appendix of Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions Involved
50
13 U.S.C. §12. Mechanical and electronic development.
The Secretary is authorized to have conducted mecha
nical and electronic development work as he determines is
needed to further the functions and duties of carrying out
the purposes of this title and may enter into such develop
mental contracts as he may determine to be in the best
interest of the Government.
13 U.S.C. §13. Procurement of professional services.
The Secretary shall have authority to contract with
educational and other research organizations for the pre
paration of monographs and other reports and materials
of a similar nature.
13 U.S.C. §14. Reimbursement between appropriations.
Subject to limitations applicable with respect to each
appropriation concerned, each appropriation available to
the Bureau may be charged, at any time during a fiscal
year, for the benefit of any other appropriation available to
the Bureau, for the purpose of financing the procurement
of materials and services, or financing activities or other
costs, for which funds are available both in the financing
appropration so charged and in the appropriation so
benefited; except that such expenses so financed shall be
charged on a final basis, as of a date not later than the
close of such fiscal year to the appropriation so benefited,
with appropriate credit to the financing appropriation.
13 U.S.C. §21. Director of the Census; duties.
The Bureau shall be headed by a Director of the Census,
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
Appendix of Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions Involved
51
consent of the Senate. The Director shall perform such
duties as may be imposed upon him by law, regulations,
or orders of the Secretary.
13 U.S.C. §141. Population, unemployment, and hous
ing.
(a) The Secretary shall, in the year 1960 and every
ten years thereafter, take a census of population, un
employment, and housing (including utilities and
equipment) as of the first day of April, which shall
be known as the census date.
(b) The tabulation of total population by States as
required for the apportionment of Representatives
shall be completed within eight months of the census
date and reported by the Secretary to the President
of the United States.
42 U.S.C. §2000f.
The Secretary of Commerce shall promptly conduct a
survey to compile registration and voting statistics in
such geographic areas as may be recommended by the
Commission on Civil Rights. Such a survey and compila
tion shall, to the extent recommended by the Commission
on Civil Rights, only include a count of persons of voting
age by race, color, and national origin, and determination
of the extent to which such persons are registered to vote,
and have voted in any statewide primary or general elec
tion in which the Members of the United States House of
Representatives are nominated or elected, since January 1,
1960. Such information shall also be collected and com
piled in connection with the Nineteenth Decennial Census,
Appendix of Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions Involved
52
and at such other times as the Congress may prescribe.
The provisions of section 9 and chapter 7 of title 13, United
States Code, shall apply to any survey, collection, or com
pilation of registration and voting statistics carried out
under this title: Provided, however, that no person shall
be compelled to disclose his race, color, national origin or
questioned about his political party affiliation, how he
voted, or the reasons therefore [sic], nor shall any penalty
be imposed for his failure or refusal to make such dis
closure. Every person interrogated orally, by written sur
vey or questionnaire or by any other means with respect
to such information shall be fully advised with respect to
his right to fail or refuse to furnish such information.
Appendix of Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions Involved
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, effective
December 18, 1865, abolished slavery in the United States
and rendered nugatory that portion of Article 1, §2, Cl. 3
of the Constitution which provided that only three-fifths of
the whole number of slaves would be counted in deter
mining the basis of apportionment. Unless the Thirty-
ninth Congress took action to amend the Constitution, the
Thirteenth Amendment would swell the representation of
the former slave states in the House of Representatives
because of a Negro population which was not permitted to
vote.1 No result could have been less to the liking of the
post-Civil War, Republican dominated, Thirty-ninth Con
gress. The driving motive behind attempts to frame what
was to become the Fourteenth Amendment became, there
fore, either to reduce former slave state representation
in Congress or insure enfranchisement of the Negro in
order to offset the threatened increase of representation
in the House.2
Several proposals basing representation in Congress on
the number of legal voters were introduced in the Thirty-
ninth Congress, First Session, in December, 1865,3 and
A p p e n d i x o f Legislative H i s t o r y P e r t a i n i n g to
S e c t i o n 2 o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t
1 “With emancipation, the former slave states would gain an additional
twelve Representatives.” See Zuekerman, “A Consideration of the History
and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 30 Ford-
ham Law Review 93, 94 (1961).
2 “ The vision of thirty Representatives from the South, based upon a
Negro population which was totally denied the right to vote, did not rest
well with the majority of members of the Thirty-ninth Congress.” Ibid.
“ The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Four
teenth Amendment,” 46 Cornell Law Quarterly 108, 109 (1960).
3 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 10.
54
referred to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. These
resolutions were opposed successfully by Representatives
from New England where the number of voters was dispro
portionately small in comparison with population in gen
eral.4
On January 12, 1866, Representative Morrill of Vermont,
moved in the Joint Committee to substitute a more indirect
scheme for original proposals which based representation
on the number of voters. His proposal stated:5
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several states which may be included within
this Union according to their representative number of
persons, deducting therefrom all of any race or color
whose members or any of them are denied any of the
Civil rights or privileges.
A number of amendments were made and a final draft
which passed the Committee by a majority of 12 to 2 read:6
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
states which may be included within this Union ac
cording to their respective numbers, counting the num
ber of persons in each state, excluding Indians not
taxed: Provided that whenever the elected franchise
shall be denied or abridged in any state on account of
Appendix of Legislative History Pertaining to
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
* Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Recon
struction, 41, 45. See also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141, 357
(1866).
5 Kendrick, op. cit., supra, at 42.
6 Kendrick, op. cit., supra, p. 58.
0 0
race or color all persons therein of such race or color
shall be excluded from the basis of representation.7
Objections to this formulation developed rapidly in the
ensuing course of House debate. Chief among these was
the feeling that the phrase “ on account of race or color”
was too easily avoided by the imposition of property or
educational qualifications.8 A general consensus quickly
developed that the proposed amendment would not affect
educational or property restrictions on voting, not aimed at
race, and that these, would not cause a reduction in repre
sentation.9 Despite the general uneasiness over this mat
ter, the proposed amendment was passed by the House by
the required two-thirds vote, 120 to 46, on February 1,
1866.10
As consideration passed to the Senate, the objections
raised in the House fell upon more fertile ground. Con
siderable fear was expressed that the amendment would
be rapidly eviscerated by state property and education as
voter qualifications. These legislators took the position
that the dominant white race by imposing educational and
property qualifications for voting would disfranchise a suf
ficient number of Negroes to retain control of the former
slave states and, thereby, retain a greater proportion of
7 “ Citizens of the United States in each State” was struck and replaced
with “ persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed” for the reason
that representation in many larger states was based on aliens. The exclu
sion of “ Indians not taxed” apparently was enacted to conform with Art.
I, § 2, which excluded them from the basis of apportionment. Zuckerman,
op. cit., supra, at 97.
8 See, for example, the remarks of Rep. Jencks, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 376; Rep. Baker at p. 385.
9 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 357-58.
10 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 538.
Appendix of Legislative History Pertaining to
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
56
power in the National Government than they ever before
possessed.11 For this reason, after extensive debate, the
proposal failed to obtain the necessary two-third’s majority
March 9, 1866. The vote was 25 in favor and 22 opposed.12
After the failure of the Senate to accept the proposed
amendment, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of the
House again considered proposals for apportionment on
March 9, 1866. On April 28, 1866, the Committee approved
a measure, 12 to 3, which was with minor alteration to
become §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and to replace
Art. I, §2, Cl. 3 as the constitutional provision governing
apportionment among the states. It provided that:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several states which may be included within this Union
according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each state excluding In
dians not taxed. But whenever in any state the elective
franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male
citizens not less than 21 years of age, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other
crime, the basis of representation in such state shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens not less than 21 years of age.13
This draft differed from the earlier version approved by
the Committee by not containing the words “ on account of
race or color” as a limitation on the types of denial or
abridgement covered by the proposed amendment.
Appendix of Legislative History Pertaining to
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
11 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 673-764, 1224-1232.
12 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1289.
13 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2468.
57
In addition, the earlier version provided that if any in
dividuals of a particular race were excluded from the
franchise, all members of the same race would be eliminated
from the basis of representation. The new formulation
employed a proportional test: that proportion of the in
jured who are excluded from the ballot shall also be ex
cluded from the basis of representation. It was felt that
the enforcement of this formula would provide considerable
incentive for the states to provide equality of education
and opportunity in order to qualify the ex-slaves for the
ballot as rapidly as possible and thus enlarge the state’s
basis of representation.14 15
The report of the Joint Committee filed in the House on
April 30, 1866, stated that the three-fifth’s compromise of
Art. I, §2, Cl. 3 had been abrogated by the Thirteenth
Amendment and, therefore, that the powers of the insur
rectionary states would be greatly increased if the Con
stitution were not amended. The Committee did not be
lieve that advantages derived from the former slaves
should be available to former masters. Secondly, the Com
mittee continued, “ rights of these persons by whom the
basis of representation had been increased should be recog
nized by the general government.” 16 As the states would
not consent to surrendering their power over the regulation
of the franchise, utilization of a reduction formula was
recommended:
Political power should be possessed in all the states
exactly in proportion as the right of suffrage should
be granted without distinction as to color or race.
14 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2502, 2511, 2540.
15 Committee Report, Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction,
p. X III.
Appendix of Legislative History Pertaining to
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
58
The people in each state should be permitted “ all to par
ticipate” in government in order to afford “a full and ade
quate protection to all classes of citizens since all would
have through the ballot box the power of self-protection.”
On the basis of these principles the Committee stated it
had proposed the amendment which failed in the Senate
and was proposing an amendment in another form in order
to meet these ends.16
The debate in the House was introduced by Thaddeus
Stevens who considered §2 “ the most important in the
Article.”
If any State shall exclude any of her adult male citizens
from the elective franchise, or abridge the right to
representation in the same proportion, the effect of
this provision will be either to compel the States to
grant universal suffrage or so to shear them of their
power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority
in the national government, both legislative and ex
ecutive.17
There can be no doubt that the framers of §2 believed
that they had devised a workable and forceful means of
insuring equal political rights for all citizens. For example,
in the Senate, Senator Howard, who was serving as floor
manager of the Bill was asked:
If the Senator will pardon me for a moment, I wish
to inquire whether his attention was called to the fact
that if any state excluded any person, say as Massa
Appendix of Legislative History Pertaining to
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
16 Ibid.
17 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong1., 1st Sess., 2459.
59
chusetts does, for want of intelligence, this provision
cuts down the representation of that state.
Senator Howard replied:
Certainly it does. No matter what may be the occa
sion of the restriction, it follows out the logical theory
upon which the government was founded, that numbers
shall be the basis of representation, the only true, prac
tical, republican principle. If, then, Massachusetts
should so far forget herself as to exclude from the
right of suffrage all persons who do not believe with
my honorable friend who sits near me (Senator Sum
ner) on the subject of negro suffrage, she would lose
her representation in proportion to that exclusion. If
she should exclude all persons of what is known as
the orthodox faith she loses representation in propor
tion to that exclusion. No matter what may be the
ground, whether a want of education, a want of prop
erty, a want of color, or a want of anything else, it is
sufficient that the person is excluded from the category
of voters and the state loses representation in propor
tion. The principle applies to everyone of the state in
precisely the same manner and, sir, the true basis of
representation is the whole population. It is not prop
erty, it is not education, for great abuses would arise
from the adoption of one or the other of these two
tests. Experience has shown that numbers and num
bers only is the only true and safe basis; while nothing
is clearer than that property qualifications and educa
tional qualifications have an inevitable aristocratic
tendency—a thing to be avoided.18
Appendix of Legislative History Pertaining to
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
18 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2767.
60
There are numerous similar statements in the records
on the proposed amendment in the House. See, for ex
ample, remarks of Rep. Miller, Cong. Globe, 39th Congress,
1st Session, p. 2502; Rep. Eliot, at p. 2511; Rep. Farns
worth, at p. 2540.
On June 8, 1866, proposed amendment was passed by the
Senate with only slight changes, 33 to 11. The only change
was the addition of the words: “For the choice of electors
for President and Vice President of the United States,
representatives, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
state or the members of the Legislature thereof,” inserted
to insure that the penalty could not be invoked when a
group of citizens was excluded from purely local elections.
The House concurred in this amendment, 120 to 32.
The Fourteenth Amendment was proclaimed in force on
July 28, 1868, after ratification by three-fourths of the
states.
Appendix of Legislative History Pertaining to
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
MEILEN PRESS INC. — N. Y. C .o « g § j» 2 ,,