Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief on Justiciability

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CV89-03609778 

MILO SHEFF, et al, : SUPERIOR COURT 

VS. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD/ 
NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al. : JANUARY 27, 1994 

PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON JUSTICIABILITY 

Introduction 
  

On two occasions prior to the trial in this matter, this Court considered and rejected 

defendants’ contentions that questions of justiciability should preclude the Court from 

considering the plaintiffs’ claims. During oral argument on December 16, 1993, the Court 

again raised the question of justiciability in relation to legislation which the Connecticut 

General Assembly passed. This legislation, which Plaintiffs believe is wholly inadequate to 

address the problems raised in the complaint and which is described in detail in section III, 

infra, sets forth a desegregation planning process and represents the only change in the 

procedural posture of the case since the Court's earlier decisions on justiciability.! 

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that neither the passage of Public Act 93-263 nor any 

evidence adduced at trial affects the justiciability of this case or in any way renders it moot. 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs contend that the legislation in 

  

'As Plaintiffs’ pointed out in their post-trial brief, the educational situation for students 
in the Hartford school system has not been static - even the relatively short time since the 
trial was conducted has seen a worsening of the problems raised in the complaint. PIs’ 
Reply Brief, August 16, 1993 pp. 24-42. As a result, the goals sought by plaintiffs have 
become even more distant. 

 



question does not deprive this Court of the authority to decide plaintiffs’ claims. This 

action creates an actual case or controversy among or between the parties under the 

Connecticut Constitution which the parties are entitled to have this Court resolve. Further, 

plaintiffs believe that the act does not preclude the Court from fashioning a remedy in the 

event that it decides the issue of liability in plaintiffs’ favor. 

Because they believe that the act does not impose a legal or factual impediment to 

a decision on liability and, if appropriate, remedy, plaintiffs request that the Court proceed 

with oral argument and decision. 

I AN ACT PASSED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF TRIAL 
DOES NOT ADDRESS THE CLAIMS RAISED BY 
PLAINTIFFS AND DOES NOT DIVEST THE COURT OF 
AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER THOSE CLAIMS. 

In its order denying the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiffs’ complaint, this 

Court correctly decided that " the plaintiffs have stated a justiciable claim because their 

pleadings present a "substantial question or issue in dispute. . . which requires settlement 

between the parties." May 18, 1990 Memorandum of Decision On The Defendants’ Motion 
  

to Strike, page 11. Later, in its decision denying defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, the Court refused to revisit the issue of justiciability because the issue had been 

completely explored earlier and the law of the case dictated that the Court’s earlier decision 

should be permitted to stand. February 24, 1992, Memorandum of Decision On the 

Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment, page 11, 12. 

In the oral argument of December 16, 1993, the Court raised sua sponte the question 

  

of justiciability. It is plaintiffs’ understanding that the Court’s concern about the issue  



arose solely as a result of the passage of Public Act 93-263 and not because the factual 

presentation at trial showed that the Court's earlier decisions were wrongly decided. 

Specifically, the Court focussed on the effect of the Public Act in light of controlling 

precedent on the issue of justiciability. Under the controlling case law: 

Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy 
between or among the parties to the dispute. . . ; (2) that the 
interests of the parties be adverse. . . ; (3) that the matter in 
controversy be capable of being adjudicated by the judicial 
power. . .; and (4) that the determination of the controversy 

will result in practical relief to the complainant. 

Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 674; 480 A.2d 476 (1984) quoting from State v. 

Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 111-12, 445 A.2d 304 (1982). The plaintiffs understand that the 

Court is concerned only with the effect of the new legislation with regard to question (3), 

which is commonly referred to as a "political question" determination. This memorandum 

therefore concentrates on the "political question” doctrine and its inapplicability in the 

instant case. 

The authority to decide the plaintiffs’ complaint is not reserved to the 

legislature and is not a "political question." 
  

In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), a principle source for Connecticut law 

on the "political question” issue, the Court distinguished the question of justiciability from 

the consideration of federal jurisdiction. The Court held that justiciability is properly 

decided by examining the appropriateness of the general subject matter for judicial 

consideration: 

In the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause 
is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather the Court’s  



  

inquiring necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether 
the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach 
judicially determined, and whether protection for the right 
asserted can be judicially molded. 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 198. 

The Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the standard used in Baker v. Carr for 

determining the existence of a "political question." Under this approach the question is 

subdivided into six inquiries: 

1) 

2) 

3) 

4) 

5) 

6) 

"whether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department”, 

"the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"; 

"the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for non-judicial discretion"; 

“the impossibility of a Court's undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government”; 

"an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made”; 

"the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question. 

Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 93 Conn. 670, 680-81, 480 A.2d 476, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 

186, 217. 

The six inquiries are not wholly discrete but instead revolve around the issue of 

  

whether the subject matter is appropriate for judicial inquiry as opposed to a decision by 

other branches of government. All six of the inquiries in essence address the doctrine of 

separation of powers which confides general categories of power variously to the legislative, 

executive or judicial branches of government. 

 



  

Pellegrino’s language demonstrates that the "political question" doctrine asks whether 

a particular subject area is inherently inappropriate for judicial inquiry and whether it 

involves other subject areas where the judiciary previously exercised judicial power: 

Although it is widely assumed that the judiciary, as the ultimate 
arbiter of the meaning of constitutional provisions, must 
determine every constitutional claim presented and provide 
appropriate relief, some constitutional commands fall outside 
the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial action. 
  

193 Conn. at 679, (thus, constitutional commands, as opposed to legislative or executive 

  

commands, may render an issue nonjusticiable.) 

This Court has already determined that this case is justiciable under the first two 

categories (whether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to a 

coordinate political department and whether there is a lack of judicially discoverable and 

manageable standards for resolving it) and in so doing it, fundamentally distinguished 

Pellegrino, in which the Court ruled that plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable from Horton 

v. Meskill, where the court adjudicated the claims. 

In Pellegrino, the Court found that because the constitution committed the 

appointment of judges to the legislature, the judiciary could not usurp that function without 

manifesting a lack of respect for a coordinate branch of government. Thus, plaintiffs’ claims 

were nonjusticiable. 193 Conn. at 681. In contrast, the Court in Horton v. Meskill, 172 

Conn 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton I) found that the subject matter of legislative 

compliance with Article Eighth, § 1 is not a matter that is textually committed to the 

legislative branch. See Pellegrino, 193 Conn. 673, 480 A.2d 476, 483. 

 



  

Whatever the effect of the enactment of Public Act 93-263% there is no question 

that it does not constitutionally commit the issue of legislative compliance with Article 

Eighth, § 1 to the legislature.’ The Supreme Court decided in Horton I that legislative 

compliance with that section of the constitution is justiciable. The fact that the Legislature 

has enacted a statute on a subject matter related to the litigation does not deprive the 

judiciary of jurisdiction. If the rule were otherwise, Horton I would never have been 

decided on the merits. Once the Legislature enacted a statute on the subject of school 

finance reform, as it did in 1975 while the appeal was pending (see 172 Conn. at 636), the 

Supreme Court would have found the case nonjusticiable at that point. The Supreme 

Court did not do so but instead sustained the trial court’s declaratory judgment. 

b. It Is Well Established That Educational Discrimination 

Claims Are Justiciable. 

Pellegrino, Horton I and a host of cases in other state and federal courts have held 

actions like the instant one justiciable. In fact, in the legions of cases in both federal and 

state courts which have dealt with issues similar to those in this case, plaintiffs are unaware 

of a single case which has ever hinted that school desegregation or equity cases are 

  

See Section III, infra for a discussion of the reasons that plaintiffs believe the act 
promises to be ineffective. 

*Although, as discussed in Section IV supra, the Court has framed its inquiry in terms 
of the "political question" doctrine, that doctrine is inapplicable. Plaintiffs believe that the 
Court's inquiry regarding the effects of Public Act 93-263 raises the question of mootness. 
Mootness, of course, arises when an action or occurence after the initiation of litigation 
ends the controversy between the parties. Here, no such action or occurence exists. 
Plaintiffs’ claims of unconstitutional racial and economic segregation remain unresolved; 
the facts underlying the claims remain unchanged. 

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nonjusticiable either in principle or in light of legislative or executive action. To the 

contrary, even when courts have elected to defer to state or local governmental bodies on 

questions of remedy, those courts deferred for policy reasons unrelated to justiciability. 

Their authority to consider actions in which a case or controversy existed was not in issue. 

The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Pellegrino and the history of continuing 

judicial involvement in Horton I and its progeny establish beyond peradventure that claims 

of violations of Article Eighth, §1 are justiciable.* 

Other state courts, faced with similar issues of the relative roles of legislatures and 

the judiciary, have also held that the judiciary must ultimately determine whether systems 

of public education are operating in a constitutional manner. 

The issue before us - the constitutionality of the system of statutes that 
created the common schools - is the only issue. To avoid deciding the case 
because of "legislative discretion,” "legislative function," etc., would be a 

derogation of our constitutional duty. To allow the General Assembly (or, 

  

‘Pellegrino’s consideration of Horton v. Meskill makes clear that the Court recognizes 
a distinction between deferring to the state legislature on questions of remedy and having 
the authority to consider questions of liability and remedy: 

[I]mplicit in that decision to stay the hand of the judicial department in order 
to give the legislative branch an opportunity to solve the problem of unequal 
educational financing was the assumption that, if necessary, appropriate relief 
could be fashioned by a court within its constitutional bounds . . . In Horton 
the court had before it various statutory grants for public schools and it 
concluded that those legislative provisions for financing education in the state 
violated the provisions of the Connecticut constitution . . . Rather than enjoin 
the defendants from implementing the existing statutory financing schemes 
. . . the court chose to defer any such action until the legislature had 
considered the matter further . . . The case was clearly one where a judicial 
remedy could have been applied. . . . 

Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 193 Conn. 683, 480 A.2d 476, 483 (citation omitted). 

o 

 



in point of fact, the Executive) to decide whether its actions are 
constitutional is literally unthinkable. 

Rose v. The Council for Better Education, 790 S.W. 2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989). 

Other state courts have also uniformly held that the discretion afforded legislatures 

in public education policy formulation does not render the issue of constitutionality 

nonjusticiable. See Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979) (rejecting contention that 

legislative discretion in public school system precludes court action); Dupree v. Alma School 

District No. 30 of Crawford County, et al., 651 S.W. 2d 90 (Ark. 1983) (despite weight given 

to legislative action, court had authority to decide constitutionality of state educational 

system); Robinson V. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976)(same); Washakie County School 

District v. Hershler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980) (same). 

Federal Court school desegregation cases also conclusively establish that the 

judiciary is ultimately responsible for the resolution of constitutional claims even if some 

deference is initially due state and local government at the remedial stage.” The post- 

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 873 (1954) (Brown I), cases have repeatedly | 

reaffirmed, in effect, justiciability by adjudicating liability and remedy issues in the face of 

a range of actions taken by legislative bodies and other governmental entities. 

In Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), the Supreme Court 

considered the question of remedy a year after its decision in Brown I holding that racial 

discrimination in public education was unconstitutional. Before deciding Brown II, the 

  

“The fact that these cases involve issues of the relationship between federal courts and 
state governmental entities does not affect the analysis that follows. Like justiciability, the 
concept of federalism implicates the separation of powers between different governmental 
entitities as well as the deference owed coordinate branches of government. 

8  



  

Court invited presentations from the Attorney General of the United States as well as the 

attorneys general of all states which had required or permitted racial discrimination in 

public education. Id. at 288-89. During these presentations, the Court learned that a 

number of states and/or communities, including some not parties to the litigation, had 

already begun to take action to address constitutional violations: 

The presentations also demonstrated that substantial steps to eliminate racial 
discrimination in public schools have already been taken, not only in some 
of the states appearing as amici curiae, but in other states as well. 
Substantial progress has been made in the District of Columbia and in the 
communities in Kansas and Delaware involved in this litigation. 

Id 

Notwithstanding the progress made by some states and localities and a policy of 

deferring to local authorities, the Court made perfectly clear that jurisdiction to oversee 

compliance with the Brown I decision would remain with the local courts and not with 

other governmental entities:* 

[T]he courts require that the defendants make a prompt and 
reasonable start toward full compliance . . . Once such a start 
had been made, the courts may find that additional time is 
necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The 
burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is 
necessary to the public interest and is consistent with good 
faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, 

  

°In spite of the Court's clear assertion of continuing jurisdiction, most of the criticism 
levelled at the remedial plan set forth in Brown II comes not because commentators believe 
that the Court usurped authority properly left to other branches of government but because 
the Court failed to order remedial actions that made clear that dilatory tactics would not 
be tolerated and that meaningful relief would have to be achieved rapidly. See e.g. Lasky, 
"Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in Nullification," 63 Colum. L. 

Rev. 1163, 1171 (1963). As a result, at least one generation of school children failed to 
realize the benefit of their duly adjudicated constitutional right. That danger exists here, 
where Public Act 93-263 does not guarantee any relief to the plaintiff school children. 

9 

 



  

the courts may consider problems related to administration, 
arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the 
school transportation system, personnel, revision of school 

districts and attendance areas in compact units to achieve a 
system of determining admission to the public schools on a 
nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which 
may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will 
also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may 
propose to meet these problems . . . During this period of 
transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases. 

Id 

The subsequent history of school desegregation cases makes clear that the duty to 

decide and adequately address violations of constitutional rights pursuant to the equal 

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment remains firmly within the authority of the 

judiciary regardless of actions taken by state and local governments. A brief examination 

of some of the seminal cases reflects the broad authority of the federal courts to rule on 

matters involving the constitutionality of public school systems. 

In the wake of Brown II, federal courts repeatedly revisited the question of the 

constitutionality of actions by state and local authorities and the courts’ authority to create 

remedies. At no time did the courts conclude that their review was circumscribed by 

considerations which in any way resembled the doctrine of justiciability. In Raney v. Bd. 

of Educ. of the Gould Dist., 391 U.S. 443 (1968), the Court specifically examined the 

authority, and obligation, of district courts to retain jurisdiction when local governmental 

authorities had taken steps to address complaints of discrimination. Raney reversed the 

judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals which upheld the district court’s dismissal 

of a school desegregation lawsuit because the school district had voluntarily adopted a 

desegregation plan, holding: 

10 

 



  

[T]he District Court’s dismissal of the complaint was an improper exercise of 
discretion. Dismissal will ordinarily be inconsistent with the responsibility 
imposed on the district courts by Brown II, 349 U.S., at 299-301 [which] 

contemplated that the better course would be to retain jurisdiction until it is 
clear that disestablishment has been achieved. We agree with the observation 
of another panel of judges of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 
another case that the district courts "should retain jurisdiction in school 
segregation cases to insure (1) that a constitutionally acceptable plan is 
adopted, and (2) that it is operated in a constitutionally permissable fashion 
so that the goal of a desegregated, non-racially operated school system is 
rapidly and finally achieved. 

Id. at 449, quoting Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 483, 489 (8th Cir. 1967). 

Further examples of courts retaining jurisdiction abound. In Green v. School Board 

of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) the Court considered the history of legislative and 

administrative actions taken by government entities in discharge of their constitutional 

obligations. At the same time, the Court elucidated the obligations of the courts: 

The obligation of the district courts, as it has always been, is to assess the 
effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation . . . . Moreover, 
whatever plan is adopted will require evaluation in practice, and the court 
should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has 
been completely removed. 

Id. at 439. 

Later, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14, 

  

"See e.g. Locket v. Muscogee, 342 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1965) in which plaintiffs challenged 
the constitutionality of a school system which had undertaken steps to desegregate prior 
to initiation of litigation. In Lockett, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial of 
injunctive relief based upon a finding that the board was operating in good faith. Despite 
the good faith finding, neither the Fifth Circuit nor the district court questioned the need 
or appropriateness of retaining jurisdiction over the matter to assure constitutional 
compliance. Id. Thus the mere fact that a defendant acted to resolve the segregation in 
dispute did not deprive the court of its authority to adjudicate the issue. 

11 

 



  

(1971) the Court returned to the question of constitutional compliance by local authorities 

and judicial authority: 

The failure of local authorities to meet their constitutional obligations 
aggravated the massive problem of converting from the state-enforced 
discrimination of racially separate school systems . . . If school authorities 
fail their affirmative obligations under these holdings, judicial authority may 
be invoked. Once a right and violation have been shown, the scope of a 
district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth 
and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. 

Id. at 14-5. In a wide variety of cases, courts have explored the extent to which particular 

remedies fall within the authority of courts. See e.g. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) 

(holding that a local government with taxing authority may be ordered to levy taxes in 

excess of the limit set by state statute when required to aid in the remedy of a 

constitutional violation). 

Even in instances when courts have been found to exceed the scope of their 

authority in creating remedies, see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)(Milliken I) 

(holding that order of interdistrict relief exceeded the scope of violation) or there has been 

a finding of no constitutional violation, see Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education, 

458 U.S. 527 (1977) (finding constitutional an amendment to California Constitution 

limiting relief available to state court to relief that could be granted by a federal court 

deciding Fourteenth Amendment violation), there has never been a question that courts 

had the jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims raised. No 

In summary, the clear and unanimous voice of the state and federal courts 

considering the issue makes clear that cases like the instant one are justiciable. 

12 

 



  

C. The issues raised in plaintiffs’ complaint do not fall within any of the 

areas considered to be nonjusticiable in either Pellegrino v. O’Neill or 

Baker v. Carr. 

  

  

  

Notwithstanding the existence of a substantial body of law directly governing the 

justiciability of constitutional claims concerning public education, general principles defining 

the boundaries of justiciability dictate that this Court should proceed to determine the issue 

of liability and, if it rules in plaintiffs’ favor, oversee the implementation of a remedy. The 

Connecticut Constitution does not specifically reserve to the Legislature the consideration 

of claims such as those raised by the plaintiffs. Neither Public Act 93-263 nor any other 

previous legislation could have that effect. In light of the fact that there are clearly 

judicially discoverable and manageable standards that govern the resolution of such claims, 

it is necessary to see if any other part of Pellegrino dictates a finding of nonjusticiability. 

Plaintiffs respectfully contend that the claims raised in the instant lawsuit are clearly not 

encompassed within the extremely narrow areas deemed nonjusticiable by Pellegrino and 

Baker v. Carr. 

In considering the question of whether the judiciary had the authority to increase 

the number of state judges and to appoint judges to fill any newly created positions, the 

Pellegrino Court carefully considered subject matters that were held to be nonjusticiable. 

Much of that consideration involved an examination of United States Supreme Court 

decisions dealing with the "political question” doctrine in the federal courts. In both the 

state and federal courts, the subject areas which fall within the ambit of cases rendered 

nonjusticiable because of the "political question” doctrine are extremely narrow. 

13 

 



Before Baker, reapportionment of state legislatures had long been thought to be a 

political question. Baker ruled to the contrary and held that the case was justiciable under 

the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

In reaching its decision, the Court examined its precedents in order to discover 

which types of cases had been held to be political questions and therefore nonjusticiable. 

An attempt to articulate a set of standards to determine the existence of a "political 

question” lead the Court to conclude that there was no hard and fast rule, and that courts 

must instead determine on a case-by-case basis whether individual circumstances fall within 

the scope of previously decided cases: 

Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that 
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate 

exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court 
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. To demonstrate this requires no 
less than to analyze representative cases and to infer from the analytical 
threads that make up the political question doctrine. 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211. 

The representative cases considered by the Court involved very narrow subject 

matter areas, none of which are remotely comparable to school desegregation, that were 

generally inappropriate for judicial inquiry under one or more of the six categories it had 

identified. For example, the subject matter of foreign relations generally involves an area 

  

*In his article discussing the utility of the "political question" doctrine, Professor Henkin 
suggested that the effect of Baker and subsequent cases was to substantially narrow rather 
than expand the areas in which the political question doctrine applied: 

But even as the Supreme Court was restating the doctrine and 
rooting it "prominently” in textual interpretation, the Court was 
also cutting away the principal candidates for which Professor 

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implicating most of the six categories. 369 U.S. at 211-13.° The subject matter of war 

obviously implicates most of the six categories. 369 U.S. at 213-14. The subject matter of 

the vitality of enactments implicates the respect due another branch of government and the 

need for finality and certainty. 369 U.S. at 214-15. The subject matter of the status of 

Indian tribes implicates most of the six criteria. 369 U.S. at 215-17. Similarly, the subject 

matter of the republican form of government surely implicates most of the six criteria. 369 

U.S. at 218-26. See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849) (declining to resolve 

a conflict between competing parties claiming to constitute the government of Rhode Island 

and placing the guarantee clause beyond judicial reach) 

Pellegrino examined a number of other federal cases and added the discipline of the 

militia and the President’s discharge of his or her responsibility to execute law faithfully to 

the list set forth in Baker. Pellegrino 193 Conn. 679, at 679-80, 480 A.2d at 481-82. Having 

examined a range of cases involving the "political question”, the Court in Baker v. Carr 

then sought to apply the analytical threads derived from the cases to see whether any of 

  

Weschler would apply it. 

Henkin, "Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?", 85 Yale Law Journal 597, 604 
(1976). 

*Significantly, even within the narrow areas outlined above, the court recognized that 
no easy conclusions regarding justiciability could be drawn. So for example, even though 
it might easily be supposed that all cases dealing with foreign relations were beyond 
consideration by the courts, a number of cases belied that general theory. See e.g, The 
Three Friends (United States v. The Three Friends), 166 U.S. 1, 41 L.Ed. 897 (1896) 
(although recognition of belligerency abroad is in the province of executive, court may be 
called upon to interpret ambiguous executive proclamations to determine if statutes 
designed to assure American neutrality have become operative); Re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 34. 

L.Ed. 222 (1890) (executive's statements regarding a person’s status as a representative of 
a foreign government can be construed by courts to determine the court’s jurisdiction). 

15 

 



  

& » 

them "caught" the apportionment issue and held that none did. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 

211. 

Similarly, none of the threads captures the instant case. All of the subject matter 

areas identified were extremely limited and are easily distinguishable from the subject 

matter of this lawsuit. 

Equally distinguishable from the subject matter of this case is the area carved out 

as nonjusticiable by Pellegrino: a court-ordered increase in the number of state judges. 

Pellegrino places specific subject areas beyond the reach of the judiciary, eg judicial 
  

appointments. Given all of the indications that the court viewed the "political question" 

issue very narrowly,’ it is difficult to believe that it would endorse a reading of 

justiciability so narrow as to preclude consideration of the claims raised by plaintiffs. 

d. The Doctrine Of Separation Of Powers Would Be Subverted 
By A Finding Of Nonjusticiability. 

As discussed above, justiciability involves a determination that certain matters have 

been constitutionally reserved for either the legislature or the executive branch. Plaintiffs 

contend that to hold that enactment of Public Act 93-263 somehow deprives this Court of 

its authority to consider plaintiffs’ claims would violate the constitutionally ordained scheme 

  

'®The various opinions in the case make clear that most of the court regarded the non- 
justiciable issue as being extremely narrow. The decision didn’t even purport to place all 
issues dealing with the judiciary off limits to the state courts. Four out of five justices 
believed that the judiciary has the inherent power to direct payments from the state 
treasury for the maintenance of the judiciary in the event that the legislature does not 
appropriate the money. 

16 

 



  

of separation of powers in which the judiciary and not the legislature is duty-bound to 

decide this case. 

In light of the clear justiciability of the case, this court’s obligation to decide the 

issues raised in plaintiffs’ complaint is clear: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the 

judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175, 2 L.Ed. 

60, 73 (1803). Having brought to the Court the weighty question of the constitutionality 

of the racially and economically isolated schools, the plaintiffs are entitled to a 

determination of the merits of those claims. The Court is not relieved of its duty by 

legislative action that cannot interpret the constitution and that does not resolve the 

controversy between the parties. 

II. THE NEW SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
PLANNING PROCESS LAW DOES NOT MAKE THIS 
SUIT NONJUSTICIABLE 

Plaintiffs believe that Public Act 93-262 is ineffectual and fails to address in any 

meaningful way the issues raised in this lawsuit. In summary, plaintiffs contend that its 

shortcomings include the fact that it is voluntary in relation to the questions of diversity and 

student assignment, that it fails to provide adequate enforcement mechanisms, that it lacks 

clearly articulated racial and economic goals, that it does not address inequities in 

resources, that it does not provide enhancements for urban schools, that it does not provide 

assurances of adequate funding or that any steps be implemented at a suitably rapid pace. 

Plaintiffs look forward to the opportunity to fully present their reasons for so thinking at 

a later point in this litigation. A detailed examination of this issue would be inappropriate 

for the purposes of this brief. However, in order to fully appreciate the dimensions and 

17 

 



  

the effect of an erroneous ruling that the legislation renders this action nonjusticiable, it 

is necessary to consider briefly the terms of the act itself and its origin. 

a. The Continuing Legacy of State Inaction 
  

The newly enacted Public Law 93-263, An Act Improving Educational Quality 

and Diversity, is the latest attempt in nearly three decades of failures by the state to act in 

a manner that addresses the overwhelming racial segregation and economic isolation of 

school children in Connecticut." Plaintiffs’ school desegregation remedial expert, Dr. 

William Gordon, aptly observed that Connecticut has been a leader in studying the problem 

of segregation, but a failure in taking constructive action. (Gordon II. pp. 4-5). One only 

has to look at the most recent failures since the inception of this lawsuit to realize that the 

hollow promises made by the state have borne little fruit. Shortly after the Sheff lawsuit 

was filed in 1989, the State Board of Education and Governor William O’Neill 

implemented one of the recommendations in the Tirozzi II report to create the Governor's 

Commission on Quality and Integrated Education to study voluntary solutions. (See 

citations in Pls’ Post-Trial Brief, p. 80). Yet at trial, Elliot Williams, the chief official at 

the Department of Education in charge of urban and priority school districts, conceded that 

the state had failed to implement the recommendations in the Governor's Commission 

Report, and failed to fund interdistrict cooperative projects beyond a mere token level. 

  

'' The historical sequence of reports, studies, and recommendations created or received 
by the state is included in PIs’ Exs. 1-90 and represented graphically in Pls’ Ex. 488 
(timeline). Further see Pls’ Post-Trial Brief, Sect. IIl., pp. 64-86, for a summary of the 
thirty year history of the state’s inaction. 

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(See citations in Pls’Post-Trial Brief, pp. 80-83). Instead of bicoming a glimmer of hope 

in resolving the complex inequities, the Report was merely placed on the shelf with the 

many others that had come before. 

It is in this context, therefore, that the actions of Governor Weicker and the 

Educational Quality and Diversity Act must be placed. From the release of the Governor’s 

Commission Report in 1990, until Defendant Weicker spoke in January of 1993, the state 

legislature and the Governor were virtually silent in tackling the issues raised in this lawsuit. 

When Givenor Weicker finally delivered his legislative address at the same time as plaintiffs 

were presenting their shocking evidence of gross inequities in educational opportunities and 

segregation among school districts, a glimmer of hope was rekindled that the state would 

finally take action. But any promise that racial and economic isolation would cease and 

educational enhancements would at long last be targeted Hartford’s schools soon became 

illusory after the specifics of the "Weicker bill" were unveiled. Rather than insisting that 

relief must finally be afforded, Governor Weicker merely took the well-known path of least 

resistance: another call for another planning process to develop another set of 

recommendations for some future generation of urban school children. 

The history of Public Act 93-263 reflects a frustrating tale of three bills. The first 

bill introduced by Governor Weicker, while containing racial goals, limited funds for 

interdistrict schools and transportation, and some penalties, failed to contain the most 

essential components for change - a clear mandate. The Education Committee further 

weakened the Governor's bill by deleting the racial goals and substituting theundefined 

term "diversity". In addition, the Education Committee’s bill provided no money but relied 

19 

 



upon the good will of a future legislature and a new governor. The Education Committee’s 

bill also dropped all meaningful sanctions (except for the vague requirement that towns 

plan in "good faith"). In the end, the Education Committee’s bill became the new school 

desegregation planning law, P.A. 93-263. Meanwhile, the legislature significantly bypassed 

the third and most effective proposal submitted by the Black and Hispanic Legislative 

Caucus that contained not only racial and poverty goals, sanctions and other disincentives, 

but enhancements for city schools that were conspicuously ignored in any form by the other 

two proposals. 

b. The Governor's Bill 

Last January 1993, during the middle of this trial, defendants Governor Lowell 

Weicker and Commissioner of Education Vincent Ferrandino suddenly announced the 

Governor's proposed school desegregation bill, "An Act Concerning Quality Integrated 

Education.” (See attached Appendix "A"). The Governor’s bill was modest at best. While 

containing concrete racial goals for desegregation of school districts'?, financial incentives 

for school districts to participate!’ and legal penalties for districts that failed to reduce the 

racial isolation." It was clearly lacking in several key components which could have 

  

'? Racially isolated school means (A) the children of color are less the than 25% or 
more than 75% or (B) the percentage of children of color is less than or greater than a 
range of plus or minus 50% of the regional minority student average. (Governor's Bill No. 
832, Sect. 1(3)). 

'* (See generally An Act Concerning Magnet Schools, Interdistrict Schools and An 
Interdistrict Student Attendance Program, Appendix "B"). For example the state would 
approve up to six magnet school building projects (Sec. 1), approve up to twelve 
interdistrict school building projects (Sec. 2), and pay for the transportation of students to 
magnet or interdistrict schools (Sec. 3). 

"Id. at Sec. 4.  



  

insured meaningful relief for the children of Hartford. Most importantly, it lacked any 

mandates to the various school districts to desegregate, or any meaningful mechanism for 

compelling compliance by the districts. Other negative aspects of this proposal included 

an unreasonably long timetable of two years, no funding for implementation, no 

enhancements for the large urban school districts, no goals for reduction of poverty 

concentration in the schools and only a perfunctory recommendation of six magnet schools 

for the entire state. In summary, the Governor's proposal gave the local districts too much 

room to wriggle around the problem. 

C Public Act 93-263 
  

After this trial ended in February, 1993 amidst much speculation in the public about 

the potential impact of a decision by this court, the General Assembly proceeded to debate 

a bill which emerged from the Education Committee, as a modification of the Weicker bill 

and which was eventually enacted as Public Act 93-263 on July 1, 1993." The Act shall 

more accurately be referred to in this brief as the "school desegregation planning process 

law" because in the words of Representative Nancy Wyman, the Co-Chair of the Education 

Committee and a principal author of the legislation, 

  

'* The trial testimony in this case ended on February 26, 1993. P.A. No. 93-263 passed 
in the House of Representatives on May 27, 1993 and in the Senate on June 4, 1993. The 
General Assembly approved the act on June 28, 1993, the same day that the defendants 
filed their post-trial brief. At the oral argument held on December 16, 1993, this Court 
introduced the Act and the transcript of the debate in the General Assembly as Court 
Exhibit 1. 

21 

 



“... the only thing that this legislation has been asked to do with any 

kind of sanctions is to have those both at the local and regional level 

sit down and speak to each other, develop some kind of plan." 

(Court Ex. 1, House Debate, 5/27/93, p. 350-351). 

The new desegregation planning law simply describes a series of planning deadlines 

for a process that is voluntary. Public Act 93-263 watered down the Governor’s proposals 

to leave the new act with no mandates, no money and no racial or ethnic goals. The new 

act requires a wait of more than a year to determine if a new legislature with a new 

governor in the 1995 session will approve funding for any of the desegregation proposals 

that emerge from the end of the planning process. (Ct. Ex. 1, Sec. 2(f), 3(f)). Much later 

in 1996, school districts may apply to the commissioner for competitive grants to improve 

the quality of education. (Id. at Sec. 5(a)(b), Sec. (6), Sec. 7(a)(b), et. seq.). The most 

glaring inadequacy in the new desegregation planning process law is the voluntary opt-out 

provision for any school district that decides to refuse to participate in a plan passed by the 

region. Even the Co-Chair of the Education Committee, who would be expected to be an 

avid supporter of the bill, described it in a way that betrays modest expectations: 

If it [the plan] fails in your town and you choose not to implement it, and the 
region passes it, then your town does not have to be part of the plan. (Added 
words in brackets). 

(Court Ex. 1, House Debate, p. 351). 

The likelihood of passage of a proposed plan is burdened by the provision that both 

the municipal legislature and the board of education in a district must vote in favor of the 

plan to count as an affirmative vote for that municipality. (Court Ex. 1, Sec. 3(e)).  



  

The prognosis for a successful outcome for the desegregation planning process law 

is particularly grim when the history of education "reform", which the plaintiffs addressed 

in detail in the course of the trial, is considered. Central to that history is the concept of 

"voluntary" participation by school districts. The historical record of "voluntary" 

desegregation measures in Connecticut shows that this proposal is indeed nothing new 

under the sun. In 1966, the State Board of Education adopted a policy which stated "that 

the high concentration of minority group children in urban schools produces special 

problems on providing quality education.”", and the State Board "would help local boards 

of education to remove the impediments to learning. . ." by encouraging "cooperative efforts 

to this end among local boards of education. . . .") PIs’ Ex. 8). In fact, the state’s efforts 

at voluntary school desegregation through the development of cooperative programs on the 

local level have failed miserably for the past thirty years. Just as in the past, Public Act 93- 

263 vests all power for developing a plan in elected officials - the mayor or first select 

person and the chairperson of the board of education. (Court Ex. 1, P.A. 93-263, Sec. 1(4), 

Sec. 3(e)). The lesson learned from the history in this state is bleak, local politics has 

never produced any change in the inequality of educational opportunities between urban 

and suburban schools in Connecticut in the past nor have local town officials and board of 

education members ever confronted the problem of disparities in educational opportunities 

between neighboring school districts. 

Quite frankly, the new school desegregation planning law really mandates all talk, 

but no action. The only mandate to do anything is to "participate in good faith in regional 

" planning..." or the state board of education may withhold state funds paid to the district. 

23 

 



  

(Id. at Sec. 4). At the end of the desegregation planning process nearly two years after its 

adoption, no one really knows what will happen. Representative Knierim expressed this 

frustration during the debates: 

... We have no idea where this process is going to take us...we 
know our situation is urgent...we know that we’re being sued 
on the theory that our school system is unconstitutional...if we 
adopt an amendment like this, we haven’t done anything to 
address those problems. We've merely set forth the plan 
process and who really knows what’s going to come out of 
that? ..[T]his will perpetuate the problem we already 
know...there is no force or money or law behind this. 

(Court Ex. 1, House Debate, 5/27/93, pp. 310-315). 

Thus, plaintiffs are not alone in having low expectations for the new law. Other elected 

officials expressed disappointment with the plan’s prospects in unequivocal language best 

summarized by Representative Wollenberg: 

We are going to plan ... . Politically, we are going to tell our constituents, 
desegregation plan passes. It is phony... We are fooling them, again. 
Another sham on the people of the State of Connecticut. 

(Court Ex. 1, House Debate, 5/27/93, p. 622). 

d. I'he Hyslop Proposal 

A particularly disturbing development during the course of debate on this act was 

the lost opportunity by the legislature to actually pass legislation which could have allowed 

some definite and meaningful relief to the children in Connecticut who were performing 

the worst and needed help the most. The Black and Hispanic Caucus of the General 

Assembly through its Chairperson, Representative Wade Hyslop, introduced a proposed 

  

'* Similar objections and reservations were raised by Representative Dimeo. (Court Ex. 
1, House Debate, 5/27/93, p.457-58, 461-62. 

24 

 



  

substitute bill to that of the Education Committee which ameliorated some of the flaws of 

the Governor’s and Education Committee’s Bill. (See Hyslop Bill, attached Appendix "C"). 

This bill set stricter racial balance guidelines; defined poverty concentration as more than 

thirty percent of students from families who are eligible for AFDC or qualify for free or 

reduced lunch and sought the elimination rather than the mere reduction of racially 

isolated and poverty concentrated schools together with the elimination of disparities of 

resources and student outcomes. In addition, it set an earlier timetable for 

implementation for September, 1994. (Hyslop proposal at Sec. 5(c)). To achieve these 

objectives, the Hyslop proposal contained a combination of sanctions and enhancements. 

The bill provided for withholding state funds to local districts which not only failed to 

participate in planning, but failed to implement a plan approved by the state board of 

education. Furthermore, it withheld reimbursement for school construction unless the 

proposed schools enhanced racial balance and equity. (Id. at Secs. 7; 11(a), (d)). Further, 

the bill included incentive funding for the full cost of capital expenditures for interdistrict 

schools and the provision of educational enhancements to districts if thirty percent or more 

of the students failed to meet the standard for remedial assistance on the state-wide 

mastery tests. (Id. at Sec. 9). This bill not only contained clearly articulated goals but it 

also called for concrete action to achieve these goals in the form of the potential for the 

loss of funds for non-compliance and the possibility of receiving incentive funds for taking 

affirmative steps to remedy racial isolation and inequity in education. In short, the Hyslop 

bill stood in stark contrast to its counterparts to demonstrate what could have been 

 



accomplished had the legislature shown a real commitment to the educational problems 

present in the state and the will to take effective steps to deal with those problems." 

Given the general considerations of justiciability outlined above and the manifest and 

overwhelming weaknesses of the bill, plaintiffs believe that a serious injustice would be 

done by derailing litigation at this late stage. Granting the Legislature the power to render 

an otherwise justiciable law suit nonjusticiable merely by passing a statute which suggests 

that local government officials consider the possibility of reform raises extremely disturbing 

questions about the balance of power between the branches of government in Connecticut 

and the possibility for private citizens to ever gain meaningful relief in the state courts. Put 

simply, such a doctrine would, in effect, give the legislature a trump card with which it 

could automatically end ongoing litigation merely by enacting legislation which bears some 

relation to the litigation and holds out some possibility, no matter how small, of offering 

some remedy. The Connecticut Constitution could not have intended such a result and 

such a result should not be permitted in this case. 

IV. THE ENACTMENT OF PUBLIC ACT 93-236 DOES NOT 
ADEQUATELY ADDRESS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 
AND. ACCORDINGLY DOES NOT RENDER SUCH 
CLAIMS MOOT. 

During the oral argument of December 16, 1993, the Court raised questions about 

the effect of the enactment of Public Act 93-236 given the fact that both the legislation and 

statements made by the Governor suggested acquiescance to the plaintiffs’ claims. In its 

  

"Plaintiffs do not mean to suggest that the Hyslop Bill adequately addresses all of their 
claims nor do they believe that the bill, if enacted, would have preempted this Court of 
jurisdiction to address this lawsuit. Instead, plaintiffs include a discussion of its provisions 
only to highlight the considerable shortcomings of the legislation that was enacted. 

26  



  

questions, the Court suggested that the legislature might divest the court of jurisdiction to 

decide the lawsuit by acquiescing in the claims raised by plaintiffs in their complaint. The 

question of justiciability has been examined in some detail above. 

The questions raised by the Court suggest, though, that the Court’s concerns 

extended beyond justiciability to include the issue of mootness. A question is "moot" when 

it presents no actual controversy or where the issues have ceased to exist. See eg 

Delevieluse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 439 A.2d 1055 (1981). To the extent that the Court’s 

questions implicate the doctrine of mootness, plaintiffs contend that all of the issues which 

existed prior to the enactment of Public Act 93-236 continue in full force today and that 

accordingly the doctrine of mootness does not apply. Plaintiffs believe this is the case not 

only because of the legislation’s limited scope but, in addition, because the legislation does 

not address even the limited areas within its compass in a way which can be considered 

comprehensive. 

a. The Scope Of Public Act 93-236 Is More Limited 

Than The Scope Of The Claims In Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint And Could Therefore Not Dispose Of 

All Such Claims. 

  

  

Plaintiffs would be surprised to hear that either the Governor or the Legislature 

intended to accede to all of the claims contained in their complaint.”® Even if the 

  

"*Plaintiffs would, of course, be delighted if it were the Governor's and Legislature’s 
intent to concede liability. Even the unlikely agreement of the defendants would not be 
sufficient by itself to terminate the case because it would leave the plaintiffs with no 
enforceable right as a result of the agreed-upon violations. The only way that that result 
could be achieved, short of a determination by this Court that defendants are liable for 
constitutional violations, would be for the parties to enter into a court ordered consent 

27 

 



  

. » 

defendants were in complete agreement as to the need to take action to improve education 

in Connecticut and enacted Public Act 93-236 to address that need, plaintiffs’ complaint 

is much broader in scope than the legislation such that the legislation could not render all 

of the plaintiffs’ claims moot. 

In their complaint, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Hartford school 

system and those of the surrounding area because they were segregated on the basis of race 

and ethnicity, deprived of equal opportunity to a free public education, deprived of a school 

system which would provide Hartford schoolchildren with a minimally adequate education 

as measured by state standards. To the extent that Public Act 93-263 addresses any of the 

concerns in the complaint, it appears to address only the issue of diversity (without 

bothering to define the term) and that only through voluntary measures. No mention is 

made of claims of deprivations of the right to a minimally adequate education or of the 

claims of students who would continue to suffer from racial and ethnic and economic 

segregation as the result of the failure of school districts to participate in voluntary 

desegregation plans. Accordingly, the legislation cannot be regarded as having even 

attempted to address these concerns and plaintiffs must be afforded the opportunity to 

pursue relief judicially. 

Because of the overwhelming limitations inherent in the statute, the enactment of 

Public Act 93-326 has left the plaintiffs in virtually the same position they were in at the 

time the case was originally filed. To hold that this empty legislation would have the effect 

  

agreement. Absent that, plaintiffs would be sacrificing their legal rights for an 
unenforceable promise. 

28 

 



  

of rendering their claims moot would result in an enormous injustice to the plaintiff class 

and would negate all of the time and effort expended to date in this matter with no 

assurance that relief would ever be adequately granted. If, as the plaintiffs believe will 

happen, the Public Act results in no meaningful relief, then all the parties will find 

themselves back at square one, compelled to repeat the exhaustive proceedings which have 

occurred to date. The cost in terms of both human and financial resources would be 

enormous. However large this waste would be, it would be dwarfed by the loss caused by 

continued deprivation of educational opportunities secured by the Constitution. This loss 

could never truly be compensated. 

It would be truly ironic if legislation which, however misguided, had as its goal the 

improvement of educational opportunity deprived this Court of jurisdiction to consider the 

claims of 26,000 Hartford children who are subjected to the multiple layers of 

overwhelming racial, ethnic and economic segregation and who are deprived of adequate 

educational resources. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs request that this Court leave its earlier 

holdings regarding justiciability intact and proceed to consideration of the claims of liability 

and remedy raised during the trial. 

29 

 



  

  

      

  

Resp fully Submitted, 

Jo 
7 I 

Briireiy 
versity or Connecticut 
School of Law 

5 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

toll Utes 
  

Sandra Del Valle 
Ken Kimerling 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense 

and Education Fund 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

He lew dershka/) 
  

Helen Hershkoff / 
Adam Cohen 

American Civil Liberties 

Union Foundation 

132 West 43 Street 
New York, NY 10036 

of APR 
  

Wesley/ W. Horton 
Kimberly A. Knox 
Moller, Horton & Rice 

90 Gillett Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

AD To 
  

Definis Parker 
Ted Shaw 

NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

  

 



  

  

Wilfred Rodriguez 
Hispanic Advocacy Project 
Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 
Bartford, CT 06112 

[laatte She 
Martha Stone 

Connecticut Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation 

32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT 06106 

WY re 
Philip D. Tegeler 
Connecticut Civil Liberties 

Union Foundation 
32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT 06106 

  

  

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

This is to certify that one copy of the foregoing has been 

mailed postage prepaid to John R. Whelan and Martha Watts, Assistant 

Attorney Generals, MacKenzie Hall, 110 Sherman Street, Hartford, CT 

06105 this 2+ day of January, 1994. 

Ohare =) es 
  

Dennis Parker       
 



  

APPENDIX A 

 



APPENDIX A 

STATE OF CONNECTICUT 

8ill No. 
Page 1 

Referred to Committee on 

LCO No. 2732 
Introduced by REQUEST OF THE GOVERNOR PURSUANT TO JOINT RULE 9 

General Assembly 

January Session, A.Dey 1993 

AN ACT CONCERNING QUALITY INTEGRATED EDUCATION, 

Be It enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in 
General Assembly convened: 

Section 1, (NEW) As used in sections 1 to 7y Inclusive, of 
this act: 

(1) “Commissioner” means the commissioner of education; 
(2) "Education reglons” means regions of the state designated 

Oy the commissioner of education for education planning pursuant 
“ts the provisions of sections 1 to 7, Inclusive, of this act; 

(3) "Racially isolated school” means 3 public school building 
(A) the minority student Population enrolled is less than 

twenty-five per cent or greater than seventy-five per cent or (B) 
the percentage of minority students is less than or greater than 
3 france of plus or minus fifty per cent of the regional minority 
student average} 

(4) "Minority student® Means a student who is enrolled on 
Uctodber first in 3 public schoo! and is identified under federal 
law and regulations as being within 3 federally recogni 2ed 
nonwhite racial group; 

(5) "Regional minority student 3verage™ means the number 
obtained by dividing (A) the total number of minority students 
enrolled in public schools in the education region by (8) the 
total number ef students enrolled in the public schools jn such 
region; and 

LCO No. 2732  



Bill Noe. Page 2 

te) "Significant reduction in racial isolation” means annual 

progress acceptable to the state board of education (A) in 

decreasing the percentage of students in an education planning 

region who are educated in a racially isolated school or (B) in 

increasing the percentage of students in an education region who 

participate significantly in an integrated educational 

experience. 

Seco 2 (NEW) The commissioner of education shall designate 

education regions within the state. Regional education planning 

councils established pursuant to section 4 of this act shall 

develop regional education plans, in accordance with the 

provisions of sections 1 to 7, inclusive, of this act, to provide 

for a significant reduction in racial isolation and promote 2a 

quality integrated learning environment for public school 

students in each such education region. The development of such 

plans Is 3 necessary part of a local or regional board of 

education's obligation to provide a suitable program of 

educational experiences and (Is deemed to be an educational 

interest of the state within the meaning of section 10-43 of the 

general statutes. 

Sec. J. (NEW) (a) On or before July 1, 1993, each local and 

regional board of education shall establish an advisory 

committee. The committee shall (1) discuss how Its district can 

contribute to providing for a significant reduction in racial 

isolation and promoting a quality Integrated learning environment 

for public school students (in the education region, (2) assess 

the district's needs and options in reaching such goals, and (3) 

report the results of such assessment to the regional planning 

council established pursuant to section 4 of this act, not later 

than December 31, 1993. 

(db) The committee shall represent the diversity ot the 

community and shall include; but not be limited to: The 

superintendent of the local or regional board of education, 

members of such board of education, the director of any regional 

vocational technical school located In the school district, the 

LCO No. 2732  



  

Bill No. Page 3 

chief elected official and the chief financial officer of the 71 

municipality, the head of the town's legislative body, parents, 72 

representatives of the exclusive bargaining unit for teachers and 73 

administrators, public and private colleges and universities, - 74 

civic organizations, business leaders and members of the general 79 iy 

public. 76 

{c) The committee shall meet at least monthly beginning July 77 

ly, 1793 and shall hold at least one public hearing on the results 78 

. of its assessment prior to submission of its report to the 1S 

regional planning council. 80 

Sec. 4. INEW) (3) There shall be a .regional education 81 

planning council for each education region which shall develop a e2 

regional plan to provide for EK significant reduction in racial 83 

isolation in each school district and school building in the 84 

education region and to promote a quality Integrated learning 85 

anv ir onneht for all of its public school students. Each council 8¢€ 

shall be composed of the chz2irpersons of the local and rei onal 87 

boards of education; three community leaders appointed by the 88 

governor, one superintendent appointed by the Connecticut 89 

Association of Public School Superintendents, two representatives 90 

of the exclusive bargaining units for teachers to be jointly 91 

appointed by the Connecticut Education Association and the 92 

Connecticut State Federation of Teachers, one administrator 93 

jointly appointed by the Elementary and Middle School Principals’ 94 5 3 

Association of Connecticut, the Connecticut Association of 95 

Schools and the Connecticut Federation of School Administrators, 96 

and one parent appointed by the Parent-Teacher Association of 97 

Connecticut, All members of the council shall reside within the 98 

region and shall serve without compensation. 9a 

; (dt) Each regional education planning council shall elect Its 100 

own chalrperson and such other officers as the council deems 101 

necessary, The first meeting of the council shall be held not 102 

later than July 15, 1993. Commencing January l, 1994, the council 103 

shall meet at least once each calendar month and at such other 104 

times as the ch2irperson ceems necessary or upon the regusst of a 105 

 



  

Bill No. Page 4 

ma jority of the members of the council until a plan approved 106 

pursuant to section 6 of this act is submitted to the state 107 

department of education. Following approval of the plan by the 108 

state board of educationy the council shall meet at least once 109 

annually to evaluate the progress of its approved plan and shall, : 110 

not later than August first of any yeary submit a report of its 111 

findings to the commissioner, The council shall also meet 3s 112 

’ necessary to monitor such plan, consider amendments to such plan 113 

and produce any successor plan which shall be required every five 114 

years following approval of the initial plan. 115 

(c) The commissioner shall designate a facilitator to assist 116 

the activity of the codncil. Within the limits of available 117 

appropriations, each Pegion shall be eligible to receive a 118 

one-time planning grant in an amount not to exceed fifty thousand 119 

dollars, The regidnal educational service center located in the 120 

education region shall, at the direction of the commissioner, 121 

serve as the fiscal agent for the council. : 122 

Sec. So (NEW) (2a) Not later than August 1, 1994, each 123 

regional“ education planning council shall subait for state board 124 

of edvc?tion approval, {in such form and manner as prescribed by 125 

the cosxissionery 3a five-year plan to provide for a significant 126 ; 

reduction In racial isolation and to promote 3 quality integrated = 127 

learning environment for public school students. To adopt such a 128 
J 

plan, or amendments to such 2a plan, two-thirds of the council 129 

shall be present and shall vote affirmatively. Each council shall 130 2 fo 

hold at least two public hearings on its plan, or amendments to 131 

such plan, prior to the adoption of the plan, or amendments, by 132 

the council. 133 fT 

(db) Each regional plan shall: fl) Describe goals and 134 

timeframes that provide for a significant reduction In racial 135 

» isolation; (2) address educational quality through consideration 136 

of program Issues such as curriculum and student assignment, 137 ‘ 

finance, facilities and equipment, transportation, students with 138 bl 

special needs, staff training for managing racial Eiversity, 139 a! 

recruitment, retention and assignment of a diverse staff, student 140 ow 

IN Na. 27% ~y 
« 

 



Bill Noe. Page 5 

  

instruction on the value of racial diversity and participation in 

a multi-cultural society, and collaboration among social service 

agencies; (3) describe goals and timeframes for significantly 

reducing the concentration of economically disadvantaged 

students; (4) maintain, or recommend modification of, local and 

regional school board control over student assignment, 

proarammaticy, fiscal and personnel operations within the school 

district; and (5) maintain, or recommend modification of, 

multi-district collaborative efforts which were in operation 

prior to the development of the plan and which cross the 

boundaries of education regions if they enhance quality and 

integrated education. 

(c) Each council shall consider the following enrollment 

arrangesents in the development of Its plan: (1) Magnet schools; 

(2) interdistrict schools; (3) regional vocational-technical and 

vocational-agricultural- programs; (4) voluntary interdistrict 

student attendance programs; (35) any other enrol iment 

arrangements that provide for 3a significant reduction in racial 

isolation and promote 3 quality Integrated learning environment 

for public school students; and (6) any other activity that has 

significant quality contact hours of Integrated educational 

exper lences such as integrated summer school programs, 

extra-curricular activities, paired schools, interactive 

telecommunications among schools, Joint fleld trips, special 

joint projects, and regional early childhood centers, 

Sec. 6. (MEW) (a) Not later than sixty days following 

submission of a plany or any amendments to such a plan, in 

accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of section 5 of 

this act, the state board of education, upon recommendation of 

the commissioner, shall take action on any such plan, or 

amendments. If such plan, or amendments, are not approved, the 

state board of education shall state in writing Its reasons, and 

shall direct the commissioner to notify the council. Within sixty 

calendar days from the date of state board act lon reject ing such 

141 

142 

143 

144 

145 

146 

147 

148 

149 

150 

151 

152 

153 

154 

155 

156 

157 

158 

159 

160 

161 

162 

163 

164 

165 

166 

167 

168 

169 

170 

171 

172 

173 

174 

 



  

Bill Noe. Page 6 

plan or amendments, the regional council shall resubmit 2 revised 

plan to the state board of education. 

(db) Upon approval by the state board of education of the 

regional council's plan, each local! and regional board of 

education located within such region shall be responsible for the 

implementation of the plan. 

te) Implementation of the approved plans shall begin as ‘soon 

as sans ibis but in no case later than September 19935. 

Sec. 7 (NEW) The department of education shall monitor and 

evaluate the implementation of the regional plans. The department 

of education shall report annually to the state board of 

education on progress toward the significant reduction in racial 

Iscliation in each reglon. If the state board of education 

determines that a regional plan Is not being implemented or is 

not accomplishing a significant reduction in racial isolation, it 

may requirs amendsent of such plisn by the council in accordance 

with sections 5 and 6 of this act. 

Sec. 8. This act shall take effect July 1, 1993. 

STATEV.ENTY OF PURPOSE: Te implement the governor's budget 

preposal. 

(Proposed deletions ares enclosed in brackets. Proposed 

additions are al! capitalized or wunderiinsd where appropriate, 

except that when the entire text of 3 Bill or resolution or a 

section thereof Is neswy; It Is net capltel ized or underlined.) 

195 

196 

198 

199 

200 

201 

 



  

APPENDIX B 

 



. » APPENDIX B 

STATE UF CONNECTICUT 3 

Bit! Noe. 4 

Referred to Committee on 

LCO No. 27133 

Introduced by REQUEST OF THE GOVERNOR PURSUANT TO JOINT RULE 9 

General Assembly 

January Sessiony A,Dey 1993 

AN ACT CONCERNING MAGNET SCHUOLS, INTERODISTRICT SCHOOLS AND AN 

INTERDISTRICT STUDENT ATTENDANCE PROGPAM, 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in 

General Assembly convened: 

Section l. (NEW) (a) For purposes of this section? 

(1) “Applicant” means any single or combination of local 

boards of education, regional boards of education, regional 

educational service centers, or cooperative committees 

established pursuant to section 10-1583 of the general statutes; 

(2) "Magnet school™ means 2a school (A) which is approved by 

the state board of education through an application process 

prescribed by the commissioner, (B) which offers a special 

curriculum capable of attracting 3 substantial number of students 

of different racial backgrounds, (C) which provides for the 

voluntary enrollment of students, and (D) which meets such other 

conditions as the commissioner may require. 

(3) "Home district™ wmeans the school district where each 

student attending a state board of education approved magnet 

schoo! would otherwise be entitied to free school privileges, 

{b) Each applicant approved by the state board of education 

to operate 3a magnet school shall be eligible to receive a grant 

in an amount equal to the net eligible cost to such district or 

regional educational service center of constructing, acquiring, 

renovating, equipping or leasing facilities to be used primarily 

3s 2 magnet school. Such grant shall be in accordance with 

LCO Nn. 2713)  



  

Bill No. Page 2 

chapter 173 of the dshaial statutesy unless the applicant applies 37 

to the commissioner for a waiver of any of the provisions of said 3R 

chapter and the commissioner in his discretion grants such 3% 

waiver. Grant payments shall be made based on cost estimates as, 40 

such costs are incurred, but the final progress payment shall not 41 ! 

be made until such building project is complete and the magnet 42 

schoo! Is operating as approved. The state board of education may 43 

; 2pprove up to six magnet school building projects in each fiscal h4 

year. If a magnet school building applicant fails to operate in 45 

: substantial compliance with its approved plan of operation, the 46 

state board of education Is authorized to obtain an order from a 47 

judge of the superior court requiring the transfer of title to a 48 

magnet schoo! facility, lease, or equipment to the state board of 49 

education. 50 | 

(c) Each home district shall be eligible to receive annually, 51 . 

subject to an appropriation therefor, for the benefit of each 52 : 

child who is enrolled in a3 magnet school, an amount equal to 53 

twenty-five per cent of the foundation, as defined in subdivision 54 

(7) of section 10-262f of the general statutes, for each such 55 a 

child. 56 : 

{(d)] The state board of education may approve upon 57. : 

recommendation of the commissioner up to six applications for 58 

magnet school bullding projects each year for Inclusion on the 59 

board's construction priority list In accordance with section 60 Ta 

10-283 of the general statutes. The state board of education may 61 ike 

also 2pprove additional magnet schools solely for the purpose of 62 

receiving 21d pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. 63 

Sec. 2. (INEW) (a) For purposes of this section, 64 

a "interdistrict schocl™ means a school which is operated by two or . 65 

more school districts; regional educational service centers or a 66 

“iz combination thereof. 67 

(t) An application for an Interdistrict school shall be 68 ak 

submitted In such form and manner as determined by the x) Mg 

commissioner and shall Include: 70 

 



Bill Noo. Page 3 

  

(1) A writ) agreement between two or more participatiflly 71 

school districts agreeing to enroll students in the interdistrict 72 

school! for a xinimum period of ten years; 73 

(2) A plan for enrollment which promotes 2 quality integrated 74 

learning environment; and 75 

(3) Such other requirements as the commissioner shall deem 76 

nNecessarye 77 

(c) The state board of education may approve, upon 78 

recommendation of the commissioner, up to twelve applications for 79 

: interdistrict school building projects each year for inclusion on 80 

the board's construction priority list in accordance with section 81 

10-283 of the general statutes. 82 

(d) A local or regional board of education or regional 83 

educational service center, or combination thereof, approved by 84 

the state board of education to operate an interdistrict school 85 

shall be eligible to receive a grant, in accordance with the 86 

provisions of chapter 173 of the general statutes, in an amount 87 

equal to the net eligible cost to such district or regional 83 

educational service center of constructing, acquiring, 89 

renovating, equipping or leasing facilities to be used 90 : . 

exclusively as an Interdistrict school provided the application 91 

Ler such 2 grant is filed with the commissioner of education not 92 

later than June 30, 1999. The state board of education may 93 : 

approve up to twelve Interdistrict schools in each fiscal year. 94 : 

Crant payments shall be ®made based on cost estimates as such 95 

costs are Incurred, but the final progress payment shall not be 96 

made until! such bullding project Is complete and the school is 97 

operating as approved. If such 3 school falls to operate in 98 

substantial compliance with Its approved plan of operation, the 99 

state board of education Is authorized to obtain an order from a 100 

: Judge of the superior court requiring the transfer of title to an 101 

interdistrict school facility, lease, or equipment to the state 102 

; board of education. 103 

LCO No. 2733 

 



  

Bill Noe Page 4 

Sec. 3. veil) ar A local or regional board of cducatiofffly 104 

which transports 2a child for whom it Is responsible by law for 

educating to another school district for the purpose of the 

child's participation in a magnet school, as defined in section 1 

of this act, or an interdistrict school, as defined in section 2 

of this act, shall be eligible to receive 2 grant equal to thes 

efficient and economical costs of transporting such child. 

(b) Grants under this section shall be contingent on 

documented costs of providing such transportation. Eligible local 

and regional boards of education shall submit applications for 

grants under this section to the commissioner of education. 

Applications shall be submitted in such form and at such times as’ 

the commissioner shall prescribe. Grant payments pursuant to this 

section shall be made as follows: One-half of the estimated 

eligible transportation costs in October and one-half of such 

costs In May. 

(c) Each local and regional board of education participating 

in the grant program shall prepare 3 financial statement of 

expenditures which shall be submitted to the department on or 

before Septemter first of the fiscal year immediately following 

each fiscal year In which the school district participates in the 

rant program, Based on such statement, any underpayment or 

overpayment =ay be calculated and adjusted by the state 

department of education In any subsequent year's grant. If the 

commissioner finds that any grant recipient uses such grant for 

purposes which are not In conforsity with the purposes of this 

section; the commissioner may require repayment of the grant to 

the state. 

Sec. 4, Subsection (3) of section 10-2852 of the general 

statutes Is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu 

thereof: | 

(a) The percentage of school bullding project grant money a 

local board of education may be eligible to recelve, under the 

provisions of section 10-286 shall be determined as follows: (1) 

Each town shall be ranked in descending order from one to one 

LCO No. 2733 

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Billi NG rege 5 

hundred sixty-nifffaccording to such town's adjusted equalize 

net grand list per capita, as defined In section 10-261; (2) 

based upon such ranking, a percentage of not less than forty nor 

more than eighty shall be determined for each town on a 

continuous scaley except that (A) for school building projects 

authorized by the gererad assembly during the fiscal year ending 

June 30, 1991, for all such projects so authorized thereafter and 

for grants approved pursuant to subsection (b) of section 10-283 

for which application Is made on and after July 1, 1991, the 

percentage of schoo! building project grant money a local board 

of education may be eligible to receive, under the provisions of 

section 10-286 shall be determined as follows: [((A)] []1) Each 

town shall be ranked In descending order from one to one hundred - 

sixty-nine according to such town's adjusted equalized net grand 

list per capltay as defined in section 10-261; ((B)) (jl) based 

upon such ranking, a percentage of not less than twenty nor more 

than eighty shall be determined for each town on a continuous 

scale AND (B)] FOR SCHOOL BUILDING PROJECTS TO CONSTRUCT, PURCHASE 

OR EXTEND A BUILDING TO BE USED FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL PURPOSES FOR 

WHICH APPLICATION 1S MADE ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 1993, THE 

PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOL BUILOING PROJECT GRANT MONEY A LOCAL BOARD 

OF EDUCATION MAY BE ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 

SECTION 10-286, SHALL BE CETERMINED AS FOLLOWS: (1) EACH TOWN 

SHALL BE RANKED IN DESCENDING ORDER FROM ONE TO ONE HUNDRED 

SIXTY=-NINE ACCORDING TO SUCH TOWN'S ADJUSTED EQUALIZED NET GRAND 

LIST PER CAPITA, AS DEFINED IN SECTION 10-261; (il) BASED UPON 

SUCH RANKING, A PERCENTAGE OF NOT LESS THAN TEN NOR MORE THAN 

FORTY SHALL BF DETERMINED FOR EACH TOWN ON A CONTINUOUS SCALE. 

Seco. 5. Section 10-283 of the general statutes is repealed 

and the following Is substituted In lleu thereof: 

ta) Each town or reglonal school district shall be eligible 

to apply for and accept grants as provided In this chapter. Any 

town desiring a grant for a public school buliding project may, 

by vote of its legislative body, authorize the board of education 

of such town to apply to the commissioner of education and to 

LCO Ko. 2733 

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Bill No. Page 6 

accept or Mer. WB grant for the town. Any regional servo lll 174 

board may vote to authorize the supervising agent of the regional 

school district to apply to the commissioner of education for and 

| 

to accept or reject such grant for the district. Applications for 

such g3rants 

superintendent 

under this ch 

of schools of 

apter shall be made by 

such town or regional sch 

district on the form provided and in the manner prescribed by 

coemiss loner of education. 

the, 

ool 

the 

ft) Grant applications for school building projects shall be 

reviewed by the commissioner 

categories for 

of education on the basis 

building projects and standards for sch 

construction established by the state board of education 

accordance with this section, provided grant applicatt 

of 

col 

in 

ons 

submitted for purposes of subsection (3a) of section 10-65; [or] 

section 10-76e OR SECTION 1 OF 2 OF.THIS ACT shall be revie 

annually by the commissioner on the basis of the educatio 

needs of the applicant. 

{gl Each project FOR WHICH APPLICATION IS FILED WITH 

COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 31, 1992: sh 

be assicned to a category on the basis of whether such project 

primarily required 

existing facilities to prov 

programs pursuant to this 

facilities in compliance with 

Secondary Education Act of 19 

compliance cannot be provided 

the correction of code violat 

addressed within existing p 

facilities or alter existing 

- Instructional programs pursua 

comparable facllities among sc 

grade level or levels within 

project is otherwise expliciti 

pursuant to this section; and 

existing facilities to provide 

LCC Neo 2733 

to: {l1) Create: new facilities or al 

wed 

nal 

THE 

is 

ter 

ide for mandatory instructional 

chapter, for physical educat 

Title 1X of the Elementary 

72 where such programs or s 

within existing facilities or 

ions which cannot be reasona 

rogram space; (2) create 

facilities to enhance mandat 

nt te this chapter or prov 

hools to all students at the s 

the school district unless s 

y . included In another categ 

(3) create new facilities or al 

supportive services; provided 

ion 

and 

uch 

for 

bly 

new 

ory 

ide 

ame 

uch 

ory 

ter 

in 

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» Bill No. Page 7 » 

no event shall such supportive services include swimming pools, 

auditoriums, outdoor athletic facilities, tennis courts, 

elementary school playgrounds, site improvement or garages or 

storage, parking or general recreation areas. 

{d)l EACH PROJECT FOR WHICH AN APPLICATION IS FILED WITH Tug 

COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION ON AND AFTER JANUARY 1, 1993, SHALL BE 

ASSIGNED TO A CATEGORY CN THE BASIS OF WHETHER SUCH PROJECT IS 

PRIMARILY REQUIRED TO: (1) CONSTRUCT, ACQUIRE, RENOVATE, EQUIP OR 

LEASE FACILITIES TO BE USED EXCLUSIVELY AS A MAGNET SCHOOL, AS 

DEFINED IN SECTION 1 OF THIS ACT, OR AS AN INTERODISTRICT SCHOOL, 

AS DEFINED IN SECTION 2 UF THIS ACT; (2) CREATE NEW FACILITIES OCR 

ALTER EXISTING FACILITIES TO PROYIDE FOR MANDATORY INSTRUCTIONAL 

PROGRAMS PURSUANT TO THIS CHAPTER, FOR PHYSICAL EDUCATION 

FACILITIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE IX OF THE ELEMENTARY AND 

SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF 1972 WHERE SUCH PROGRAMS OR SUCH 

COMPLIANCE CANNOT BE PROVIDED WITHIN EXISTING FACILITIES OR FOR 

THE CORRECTION OF CODE VIOLATIONS WHICH CANNOT BE REASONABLY 

ADDRESSED WITHIN EXISTING PROGR AM SPACE; (3) CREATE NEW 

FACILITIES OR ALTER EXISTING FACILITIES TO ENHANCE MANDATORY 

INSTRUCTIONAL PROGRAMS PURSUANT TO THIS CHAPTER OR PROVIDE 

COMPARAPLE FACILITIES AMONG SCHOOLS TC ALL STUDENTS AT THE SAME 

GRADE LEVEL OR LEVELS WITHIN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT UMLESS SUCH 

PROJECT 1S OTHERWISE EXPLICITLY INCLUDED IN ANOTHER CATEGORY 

PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION, AND (4) CREATE NEw FACILITIES OR ALTER 

EXISTING FACILITIES TO PROVIDE SUPPORTIVE SERVICES, PROVIDED IN 

NO EVENT SHALL SUCH SUPPORTIVE SERVICES INCLUDE SWIMMING POOLS, 

AUDITORIUNS, OUTDOOR ATHLETIC FACILITIES, TENNIS COURTS, 

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PLAYGROUNDS, SITE IMPROVEMENTS OR GARAGES OR 

STORAGE, PARKING OR GENER2L RECREATION AREAS. 

{g]l All applications submitted prior to the first day of July 

in any year shall be reviewed promptly by the commissioner and 

the amount of the grant for which such project Is eligible shall 

be estimated. The commissioner shall annually prepare 2 listing 

of all such eligible projects fisted by category together with 

the amount of the estimated grants therefor including an estimate  



  

Bill No. Page 8 

of the grant Ke. of interest cost and shall submit WN 244 

same to the governor and the general assembly on or before the 

fifteenth day of December, except as provided in section 10-283a, 

with a request for authorization to enter into grant commitments. 

The general assembly shall annually authorize the commissioner to, 

enter into grant commitments on behalf of the state in accordance’ 

with the commissioner's categorized listing for such projects as 

the general assembly shall determine. The commissioner may not 

enter into any such grant commitments except pursuant to such 

legislative authorization. The state board of education shall 

issue regulations to carry out the duties of the board and the 

commissioner under this section. Any regional school district 

which assumes the responsibility for competion of a3 public 

schoo! bullding project shall be eligible for a grant pursuant to 

subdivision (5) or (6), as the case may bey, of subsection (a) of 

section 10-286, when such project Is completed and accepted by 

such regional school district. 

{{) For the purpose of any final grant calculation completed 

during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1984, and for each fiscal 

year thereafter, in computing the amount of 2 state grant for a 

schoo! building project involving the construction of a new 

school facility or the purchase or lease of a facility for which 

a grant app Vicat ion is submitted within five years after any 

abandonment, sale, lease, demolition or redirection of use of any 

school facility constructed or rencvated with state assistance, 

the commissioner of education shall deduct from the net eligible 

cost of such school! bullding project any grant amounts paid or 

due on the abandoned, scld, leased, demolished or redirected 

facility from the date such facility was abandoned, sold, leased, 

demolished or redirected. No such deduction shall be made for any 

grant which was pald or Is being paid pursuant to subsection (b) 

of this section, subsection (a) of section 10-65 or section 

10=-76e. 

LCO No. 2733 

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QO... No. Page 9 ® 

  

((b)) {g)l Notwithstanding the application date requirements 277 

of this section, the commissioner of education may approve 27R 

applications for grants pursuant to subdivision (9) of subsection 27% 

(a) of section 10-286 and for grants to assist school building 260 

pro jects to remedy damage from fire and catastrophe or to correct. 281 

safety; health and other code viclations at any time within the 282 > 

limit of available grant authorization and make payments thereon 283 

: within the limit of appropriated funds. 284 

Sec. €. Subsection (a) of section 10-284 of the general 285 > 

. statutes is repealed and the following is substituted In lieu 286 : 

thereof: 287 

(a) The commissioner of education shall have authority to 288 

receive; review and approve applications for state grants under 289 

this chapter, INCLUDING GRANTS FOR MAGNET SCHOOLS AS DEFINED IN 290 

SECTICN 1 OF THIS ACT AND INTERDISTRICT SCHOOLS AS DEFIMED IN 291 

SECTION 2 OF THIS ACT; or to disapprove any such application if 292 

(1) It does not comply with the requirements of the state fire 293 

marshal or the department of health services, (2) it is not 294 

accompanied by 3 life-cycle cost analysis approved by the 295 

commissioner of public works pursuant to section 16a-38, (3) it 296 : 

does not comply with the provisions eof sections 10-290d and 297 2 

10-291 or (4) it does not meet the standards or school bullding 298 . 

priorities established by the state board of edutstions 299 

Secs 7. INEW) There shall be a voluntary Interdistrict 300 

student attendance prograr to enable any pupil to attend a public 301 

school! In a district in which the pupil! does not reside; subject 302 

to the restrictions contained In sections 7 te 12, Inclusive, of 303 

this act. 304 

Seco. 8B. (NEW) Any local or regional board of education may 305 

participate In the voluntary IiInterdistrict student attendance 306 

program provided such board adopts, by resolution, specific 307 i 

standards for the acceptance and rejection of applications for 308 ir te 

pupl! attendance. Such standards (1) may include the capacity of 309 0p dai 

2 program, class, grade level or school building, (2) may not 310 2 

include an appllicant®®s previous academic achievement, athletic or 11 

 



  

Bill No. Page 10 

other extracurricular ability, physical or mental disabilities, 312 

Englkish proficiency level or previous disciplinary proceedings, 313 

and (J) and shall also include such additional standards as may 314 

be reouired by the commissioner of education. Nothing in sections. 315 

7 to 12, inclusive, of this act shall be construed to require 2 316 

school district to add teachers or classrooms cor in any way 317 

exceed the requirements and standards established under state or 31R 

: federal law. ; 319 

Sece 9. (NEW) For a pupil to attend 3a school in a 320 

participating district in which the pupil does not reside, the 321 

parent or guardian of the pupil shall subsit an application to 322 

. the district In which attendance Is requested. After consultation 323 

with the pupil’s school! district of residence and within sixty 324 

days of the receipt eof such an application, 2a narticipat ing 325 

district shall notify the parent or guardian and the resident 326 

district in writing of the acceptance or rejection of the 327 

aoplication. If an application is rejected, the participating 32R 

district shall state (In the notification letter the reasons for 329 

rejection. 330 

Seco. 10. (NEW) A participating district shall accept credits 331 

toward graduation that were awarded by another district. If a 332 

nonresident pupil in the program meets the participating 333 

district's graduation requirements, such district shall grant 334 

such pupil a diploma. 33% 

Sec. 11. (NEW) For purposes of educational equalization aid 336 

grants calculated in accordance with section 10-262h of the 337 

general statutes, pupils attending participating districts under 338 

the provisions of this act shall be counted as resident students, 333 J 

as defined In subdivision (19) of section 10-262f of the general 340 : 

statutes, In the town in which they reside. The resident district 341 

shall pay to the participating district for the benefit of each 342 

pupil for whom it is responsible by law for educating and who Is 343 

attending school In a participating district an amount equal to Re ius 

twenty-five per cent of the foundation, as defined In subdivision 345 

(7) of section 10-2621 of the general statutes, for cach such 346 

. LCC No. 2733 >see 
‘ ee 

 



  

child, except that if the honresident pupil attending schoo! in 3 Participating district is a child requiring specliat education, the resident district shall Pay to the Participating district one hundreg Per cent of the actuaj} Costs of educating sych child. Receiving districts may not charge tuition for Pupils who attend such districts in Accordance with the Provisions of sections 7 to 12, inclusive, of this act. 

Sec. 12, (NEW) a pupil attending , Participating district under the voluntary interdistrice student Attendance Program shal} Bt rednonsinrs for transportation to the Participating district. Resident districts and Participating districts may transport pupils Participating in the Program who reside within their district or » geographicatyy 3d jacent Schoo | district and shall pe reinvurses for the costs of such efficient and economical! transportation annually in accordance with the Provisions of section 10-266m of the genera} statutes, 4S 3mended by cection 13 of this act. 

Sec. 13. Section 10-266m of the generat Statutes |g repealed and the following is sSubstituteg in Jjeu thereof: 
A local of regional board of education Providing transportation in accordance with the Provisions gor sections 10-54, 10-97, 10-273a, 10-277, 10-280a, (ang) 10-281 anp SECTION 12 OF THIS ACT shai be reimbursed for percentage of Such transportation costs as follows: 

(a) The percentage of pupil | transportation costs feimbursed to 3 locas board of education shall oe determined by (1) ranking each town jn the state in descending order from one tq one hundred Sixty-nine According to such town's 3djusted etqual ized het grand Ilist per Capita, ,¢ defined |p section 10-261; (2) based upon such ranking, ang hotwithstanding the provisions of section 2-322, » Percentage of not less than Zero nor more than sixty shag be determined for each town on 3 continuous scale, €xcept that any such Percentage shall pe increased by twenty Percentage points |n accordance with section 10-97, where applicable, 

 



® » : 

  

Bill No. Page 12 

(b) The percentage of pupil transportation costs reimbursed 3E2 

to a regional board of education shall be determined by its IB 

ranking. Such ranking shall be determined by (1) multiplying the Ju4 

total population, as defined in section 10-261, of each town br 385 

the district by such town's ranking, as determined In subsection 356 

(a) of this sectiony (2) adding together the figures determined 387 

: under (1), and (3) dividing the total computed under (2) by the 38A4 

total population of all towns In the district. The ranking of 3a° 

; each regional board of education shall be rounded to the next 390 

higher whole number and each such board shall receive the same 391 

reimbursement percentage as would 3 town with the same rank, ‘392 

provided such percentage shall be increased in the case of a 353 

secondary re3lonal school district by an additional five 394 2 

percentage points and, in the case of any other regional school 395 ! 

district by an additional ten percentage points, 396 

Sec. 14. This act shall take effect July 1, 1993. 397 

STATEMENT oF PURPOSE: To implement the governor's budget 400 

proposal. 401 

(Proposed deletions are enclosed In bDrackets. Proposed 403 

additions are 211 capitalized or underlined where appropriate, 404 i 

except that when the entire text of a3 bill or resolution or a 405 ite 

section thereof Is new) It Is not capitalized or underlined.) 406 Nz 

*- 

 



  

APPENDIX C 

 



ie C 

STATE OF CONNECTICUT 

1CO No. B483 

General Assembly - 

January Session, A.D., 1993 

Offered by REP. EHYSLOP, 39th DIST. : 

REP. JACKSON-BROOKS, 95th DIST. 

REP. SELLERS, 140th DIST. 

. KIRKLEY-BEY, 5th DIST. 

COLEMAN, 1st DIST. 

BEAMON, 72nd DIST. 

NEWTON, 124th DIST. 

FIGUEROA, 3rd DIST. 

. SANTIAGO, 130th DIST. 

. GARCIA, 128th DIST. 

GARCIA, 4th DIST. 

. HARP, 10th DIST. 

To Subst. House Bill No. 6103 File No. 726 Cal. No. 554 

Entitled "AN ACT IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL QUALITY AND DIVERSITY." 

Strike everything after the enacting clause and insert the 

following in lieu thereof: 

nsection 1. (NEW) As used in sections 1 to 15, inclusive, of 

this act: 

(1) "Commissioner”™ means commissioner of education. 

(2) "Region" means each area of the state listed by town 

pursuant to section 14 of this act. 

(3) "Racially isolated school” means a public school building 

where (A) the minority student population enrolled is less than 

twenty-five per cent or greater than sixty per cent or (B) the 

percentage of minority students is less than or greater than a 

1LCO No. B483  



  

PF ad oO 

Amendment 0 2 

range of plus or minus fifty per cent of the regional minority 

student average. 

(4) "Poverty concentrated school” means a public school 

building where more than thirty per cent of the students (A) come 

from families who are eligible for aid to families with dependent 

children or (B) qualify for free Or reduced price lunches 

pursuant to federal law and regulations. s 

(5) "Minority student” means a student who is enrolled on 

October first in a public school and is identified under federal 

law and regulations as being within a federally recognized 

nonwhite racial group. 

(6) "Significant reduction in racial isolation and poverty 

concentration” means annual progress acceptable to the state 

board of education (A) in decreasing the percentage of students 

in an education planning region who are educated in racially 

isolated and poverty concentrated schools or (B) in increasing 

the percentage of students in an education region who participate 

significantly din a racially and economically integrated 

educational experience. 

(7) "Education and Community Improvement Plan" or "plan" 

means a metropolitan regional plan to (A) improve the quality of 

school performance and student outcomes through initiatives which 

include, but are not limited to, magnet schools and programs, 

interdistrict and regional schools and programs, regional 

vocational-technical schools, regional vocational-agricultural 

programs, interdistrict student attendance including but not 

limited to public school choice, early childhood education and 

parent education, summer school, extra-curricular activities, 

student community service, paired schools, teacher and 

administrator exchange and interactive telecommunications; (B) 

reduce barriers to opportunity including, but not limited to, 

poverty, unemployment, health, and_ the lack _of housing and _ 

transportation; (C) enhance student diversity and awareness of 

diversity: (D) eliminate racially isolated and poverty 

concentrated schools within each region; (E) eliminate 

1.CO No. B483 

 



  

PE at 

% Amendment rolff)s 

disparities in resources and outcomes among students in each 

region and among regions; and (F) address the programmatic needs 

of limited English proficient students with quality bilingual 

programs both in the city schools and schools in surrounding 

communities. Any such plan may include requests for waivers of 

specific state statutory or regulatory mandates which may be 

granted by the commissioner for good cause shown upon application 

by one or more local or regional boards of education. 

Sec. 2. (NEW) (a) On or before July 1, 1993, each local and 

regional board of education shall establish an advisory 

committee. The committee shall (1) discuss how its district can 

contribute to providing for a significant reduction in racial 

isolation and poverty concentration and promoting a quality 

integrated learning environment for public school students in the 

education region, (2) assess the district’s needs and options in 

reaching such goals, and (3) report the results of such 

assessment to the regional planning council established pursuant 

to section 3 of this act, not later than December 31, 1993. 

(b) The committee shall represent the diversity of the 

community and shall include, but not be limited to: The 

superintendent of the local or regional board of education, one 

member of such board of education, the director of any regional 

vocational technical school located in the school district, the 

chief elected official and the chief financial officer of the 

municipality, the bead of the town’s legislative body, a parent 

from each organized parent organization within the community, two 

representatives of the exclusive bargaining unit for teachers and 

administrators, a representative from public and from private 

colleges and universities, civic organizations, and one business 

leader. 

(c) The committee shall meet at least monthly beginning July 

1, 1993, and shall hold at least one public hearing on the 

results of its assessment prior to submission of its report to 

the regional planning council. 

LCO No. 8483 

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® Amendment P 4 

Sec. 3. (NEW) (a) There shall be a regional education 

planning council for each education region which shall develop an 

education and community improvement plan to provide for a 

significant reduction din racial isolation and poverty 

concentration in each school district and school building in the 

education region and to promote a quality integrated learning 

environment for all of its public school students. 

(b) The regional education planning council shall be 

representative of the diversity of the region, and shall consist 

of three community leaders appointed by the governor, two 

superintendents appointed by the Connecticut Association of 

Public School Superintendents, two representatives of the 

exclusive bargaining units for teachers to be jointly appointed 

by the Connecticut Education Association and the Connecticut 

State Federation of Teachers, two administrators jointly 

appointed by the [Elementary and Middle School Principals’ 

Association of Connecticut, the Connecticut Association of 

Schools and the Connecticut Federation of School Administrators, 

and two parents appointed by the Parent-Teacher Association of 

Connecticut. At least one parent, one teacher, one administrator, 

one community leader, and one superintendent shall be from the 

central city within the region. All members of the council shall 

reside within the region and shall serve without compensation. 

(c) Each regional education planning council shall elect its 

own chairperson and such other officers as the council deems 

necessary. Commencing July 15, 1993, the council shall meet at 

least once each calendar month and at such other times as the 

chairperson deems necessary Or upon the request of a majority of 

the members of the council until a plan adopted pursuant to 

section 5 of this act is submitted to the state board of 

education. Following approval of the plan by the state board of 

education, the council shall meet at least once annually to 

evaluate the progress of its approved plan and shall, not later 

than August first annually, submit a report of its findings to 

the commissioner. 

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(4d) The commissioner shall designate a facilitator to assist 

the activity of the council. The commissioner shall also employ 

and assign to each council an appropriate number of desegregation 

experts, educational enhancement experts, and demographers for 

the purpose of providing technical expertise “to each council. 

Each region shall be eligible to receive a one-time planning 

grant in an amount not to exceed fifty thousand dollars. The 

regional educational service center located in the education 

region shall, at the direction of the commissioner, serve as the 

fiscal agent for the council. : 

Sec. 4. (NEW) (a) Not later than March 1, 1994, each regional 

education planning council shall submit for state board of 

education approval, in such form and manner as prescribed by the 

commissioner, a five-year plan to provide for a significant © 

reduction in racial isolation and poverty concentration and to 

promote a quality integrated learning environment for public 

school students. To adopt such a plan, Or amendments to such a 

plan, two-thirds of the council shall be present and shall vote 

affirmatively. Each council shall hold at least two public 

hearings on its plan, OI amendments to such plan, prior to the 

adoption of the plan, or amendments, by the council. 

(b) Each regional plan shall: (1) Describe goals and time 

frames that eliminate "racially isolated schools" and "poverty 

concentrated schools"; (2) address educational quality through 

consideration of program issues such as curriculum and student 

assignment, finance, facilities and equipment, transportation, 

students with special needs, staff training for managing racial 

diversity, recruitment, retention and assignment of a diverse 

staff, student instruction on the value of racial diversity and 

participation in a multi-cultural society, and collaboration 

among social service agencies; (3) maintain, or recommend 

modification of, local and regional school board control over 

student assignment, programmatic, fiscal and personnel operations 

within the school district; (4) maintain, or recommend 

modification of, multi-district collaborative efforts which were 

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in operations prior to the development of the plan and which 

cross the boundaries of education regions if they enhance quality 

and integrated education; (5) address the programmatic needs of 

limited English proficient students with quality bilingual 

programs both in the city schools and schools in surrounding 

communities; (6) eliminate disparities in resources and outcomes 

among students in the region; (7) address housing and health 

conditions that are harmful to students enrolled in poverty 

concentrated schools and which impede their academic performance; 

and (8) include provisions which will significantly increase the 

pumbers of students presently enrolled in racially isolated and 

poverty concentrated schools moving to surrounding towns. 

(c) Each council shall consider the following enrolment 

arrangements in the development of its plan: (1) Magnet schools; 

(2) interdistrict schools; (3) regional vocational-technical and 

vocational-agricultural programs; (4) voluntary and mandatory 

interdistrict student attendance programs; (5) any other 

enrolment arrangements that provide for a significant reduction 

in racial isolation and poverty concentration and promote a 

quality integrated learning environment for public school 

students; and (6) any other activity that has significant quality 

contact bours of integrated educational experiences such as 

integrated summer school programs, extra-curricular activities, 

paired schools, interactive telecommunications among schools, 

joint field trips, special joint projects, and regional early 

childhood centers. 

Sec. 5. (NEW) (a) Not later than sixty days following 

submission of a plan, or any amendments to such a plan, the state 

board of education, upon recommendation of the commissioner, 

shall approve any such plan or amendments, if such plan or 

amendments satisfy the goals as set forth in subdivision (7) of 

section 1 of this act and subsection (b) of section 4 of this 

act. If the state board of education disapproves such plan or 

amendment, it shall state in writing its reasons, and shall 

direct the commissioner to notify the council. Within forty-five 

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pM Amendment £3 7 

calendar days from the date of state board actio rejecting such 

plan or amendments, the regional council shall resubmit a revised 

plan to the state board of education. 

(b) Upon approval by the state board of education of the 

regional council’s plan, each local and regional board of 

education located within such region shall be responsible for the 

implementation of the plan. 

(c) Implementation of the approved plans shall begin as soon 

as possible, but in no case later than September 1994. 

Sec. 6. (NEW) The department of education shall monitor and 

evaluate the implementation of the regional plans. The department 

shall report annually to the state board of education on progress 

toward the significant reduction in racial isolation and poverty 

concentration in each region. If the state board of education 

determines that a regional plan is not being implemented, or is 

not accomplishing a significant reduction in racially isolated 

and poverty concentrated schools, or eliminating disparities in 

resources and outcomes, it may require amendments of such plan by 

the council in accordance with section 5 of this act. 

Sec. 7. (NEW) Notwithstanding any provisions of the general 

statutes to the contrary, the state board of education may 

withhold from the total sum which is paid from the state treasury 

an amount which it deems to be equitable from any town or school 

district in a region which the state board of education 

determines has failed to participate in local and regional 

planning and pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this act, and has 

failed to implement a plan approved by the state board of 

education pursuant to section 5 of this act. 

Sec. B. Subsection (a) of section 10-74d of the general 

statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu 

thereof: 

(a) The state department of education shall within available 

appropriations maintain a grant program for the purpose of 

assisting local and regional boards of education with the 

establishment of interdistrict cooperative programs, INCLUDING 

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Amendment {| 8 

MAGNET SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR GRANTS PURSUANT TO 

SECTIONS 9 TO 11, INCLUSIVE, OF THIS ACT. 

Sec. 9. (NEW) (a) For the fiscal year in ending June 30, 

1994, and each fiscal year thereafter, the department of 

education shall provide the appropriate resources for educational 

enhancements to each school district in which thirty per cent or 

more of the students failed to meet or exceed: the standard for 

remedial assistance on state-wide mastery examinations pursuant 

to section 10-14n of the general statutes, measured as an average 

for the most recent prior three years, in order to improve the 

quality of school performance and student outcomes. 

(b) The commissioner may approve, in accordance with section 

5 of this act, programs pursuant to this section if he finds the 

program is likely to increase student performance as measured by 

state-wide mastery examination results or enhance student 

awareness of diversity. Programs which may be eligible for grants 

pursuant to this section include, but are not limited to, early 

childhood education and extended-day kindergarten; parent 

involvement in the education of children and in the schools; 

reduction in class size; tutoring and mentoring of students; 

after-school academic programs; lengthening the instructional 

school day; lengthening the instructional school year; and 

drop-out prevention programs. 

Sec. 10. (NEW) (a) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1994, 

and for each fiscal year thereafter, two Or more local or 

regional boards of education may, in accordance with a regional 

plan pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of this act, or otherwise on an 

interdistrict basis, apply to the commissioner, pursuant to 

section B of this act, for a grant. Such grants shall be limited 

to regional plans or other interdistrict proposals which include 

at least one school district in which fifteen per cent or more of 

the students failed to meet or exceed the standard for remedial 

assistance on state-wide mastery examinations pursuant to section 

10-14n of the general statutes, measured as an average for the 

most recent prior three years and shall be for the purpose of 

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improving school performance and student outcomes and enhancing 

student diversity and awareness of diversity. Plans and proposals 

pursuant to this section may include, but need not be limited to, 

the initiatives which may be included in a regional plan. 

Applicants for such grants may also request technical assistance 

and waivers of specific state statutory or regulatory mandates 

which may be granted by the commissioner for good cause. 

Sec. 11. (NEW) (a) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1994, 

and each fiscal year thereafter, the state shall reimburse school 

districts for the full cost of any capital expenditures for the 

purchase, construction, including equipment, extension, 

replacement, leasing Or major alteration of interdistrict school 

facilities in accordance with this section. The local or regional 

board of education for the school district in which such facility 

is to be located shall receive a lump sum payment for the 

facility equal to the highest percentage rate determined pursuant 

to section 10-285a of the general statutes multiplied by the 

estimated eligible project costs, provided (1) the districts file 

an application for a school building project, in accordance with 

section 10-283 of the general statutes by the date prescribed by 

the commissioner, (2) final plans and specifications for the 

project are approved pursuant to sections 10-291 and 10-292 of 

the general statutes and (3) the districts submit to the 

commissioner, in such form as the commissioner prescribes, and 

the commissioner approves a plan for the operation of the 

facility which shall include but not be limited to: A description 

of the educational programs to be offered, the completion date 

for the project and written commitments from the districts that 

such districts shall participate in the school. The commissioner 

shall notify the secretary of the state bond commission when the 

provisions of subdivisions (1) to (3), inclusive, of this 

subsection have been met. 

(b) The districts shall be eligible to receive a final grant 

in an amount equal to the difference between the final eligible 

project costs and the amount paid pursuant to subsection (a) of 

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Amendment | 10 

this section, provided within three years after completion of the 

school project students from one or more additional school 

districts as described in the plan approved by the commissioner 

of education pursuant to subsection (a) of this section are 

participating in the school. 

(c) If the school building ceases to be used for the purpose 

for which the final grant was provided, title to the building 

shall revert to the state unless the commissioner of education 

decides otherwise for good cause. 

(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of the general 

statutes to the contrary, the state shall not reimburse school 

districts for capital expenditures unless the expenditures 

enhance racial balance and educational equality. 

Sec. 12. (NEW) (a) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1994, 

and each fiscal year thereafter, a local or regional board of 

education which transports a child for whom it is responsible to 

another school district for the purpose of participating in a 

magnet school or other interdistrict school attendance program, 

shall be eligible to receive a grant equal to one hundred per 

cent of the reasonable cost of transporting such child. 

(b) Grants under this section shall be contingent on 

documented costs of providing such transportation. Eligible local 

and regional boards of education shall submit applications for 

grants under this section to the commissioner of education in 

such form and at such times as he prescribes. Grants pursuant to 

this section shall be paid in October based on one-half of the 

estimated eligible transportation costs and in May based on 

one-half of such costs. 

(c) Each local and regional board of education participating 

in the grant program shall prepare a financial statement of 

expenditures which shall be submitted to the department of 

education on or before September first of the fiscal year 

immediately following each fiscal year in which the school 

district participates in the grant program. Based on “such 

statement, any underpayment or overpayment may be calculated and 

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adjusted by the state department of education in the grant for 

any subsequent year. : 

Sec. 13. (NEW) Nothing in this act shall be deemed to 

prohibit one or more local or regional boards of education from 

(1) developing and implementing interdistrict programs at any 

time during local or regional planning pursuant to sections 2, 3 

and 4 of this act or (2) developing and implementing 

interdistrict programs across the regions established pursuant to 

section 14 of this act. 

Sec. 14. (NEW) The regions for purpose of sections 1 to 13, 

inclusive, of this act are: 

(1) Cheshire, Chester, Clinton, Cromwell, Deep River, Durham, 

East Haddam, East Bampton, Essex, Haddam, Killingworth, Madison, 

Meriden, Middlefield, Middletown, Old Saybrook, | Portland, 

Wallingford and Westbrook. 

(2) Ansonia, Bethany, Branford, Derby, East Haven, Guilford, 

BEamden, Milford, New BEaven, North Branford, North Haven, Orange, 

West Haven and Woodbridge. 

(3) East Lyme, Groton, ledyard, Lyme, Montville, New London, 

North Stonington, Old lyme, Preston, Salem, Stonington and 

Waterford. 

(4) Andover, Ashford, Bozrah, Brooklyn, Canterbury, Chaplin, 

Colchester, Columbia, Coventry, Eastford, Franklin, EHampton, 

Hebron, lebanon, Lisbon, Mansfield, Marlborough, Norwich, 

Scotland, Sprague, Tolland, Willington and Windham. 

(5) Beacon Falls, Bethlehem, Middlebury, Naugatuck, Oxford, 

Plymouth, Prospect, Seymour, Southbury, Thomaston, Waterbury, 

Watertown, Wolcott and Woodbury. 

(6) Bethel, Bridgewater, Brookfield, Danbury, New Fairfield, 

New Milford, Newtown, Ridgefield, Roxbury, Sherman and 

Washington. 

(7) Bridgeport, Easton, Fairfield, Monroe, Redding, Shelton, 

Stratford, Trumbull and Weston. 

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® Amendment @: 12 

(8) Darien, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, 

Westport and Wilton. 

(9) Avon, Bloomfield, Bolton, Canton, East Granby, East 

Hartford, East Windsor, Ellington, Enfield, Glastonbury, Granby, 

Bartford, Manchester, Rocky Hill, Simsbury, South Windsor, 

Suffield, Vernon, West Hartford, Wethersfield, Windsor and 

Windsor Locks. - 

(10) Berlin, Bristol, Burlington, Farmington, Harwinton, New 

Britain, Newington, Plainville and Southington. 

Sec. 15. (NEW) The commissioners of education, housing and 

health services shall develop a plan no later than January 1, 

1994, and request funding for fiscal year 1994-95 for the purpose 

of accomplishing the following: (1) Identifying and improving 

housing, health, and other neighborhood conditions that are 

detrimental to the personal growth and impede academic 

performance of students enrolled in racially isolated and poverty 

concentrated schools; and (2) providing opportunities to 

significantly increase the numbers of students enrolled in 

racially isolated and poverty concentrate schools who can move to 

surrounding towns. 

Sec. 16. Sections 10-266p to 10-266r, inclusive, of the 

general statutes are repealed. 

Sec. 17. This act shall take effect from its passage except 

that section 16 shall take effect July 1, 1995." 

LCO No. 8483