Terrazas v. Clements Court Opinion
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January 4, 1984

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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Working Files - Schnapper. Terrazas v. Clements Court Opinion, 1984. ad83e5dc-e292-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/6c5ef45b-c8e8-47b6-aaaa-0cc3f38af3c0/terrazas-v-clements-court-opinion. Accessed May 14, 2025.
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t \ li E ir h i r I I F Louis TERRAZAS, W.E. Tucker, Linda Allison Frederick, Yerne DJ. Phillips and Ed Emmett, Plaintiffs, Jesue Rodriguez, et al., Plaintiffs-Intervenors, R.A. Deison, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs-I ntervenore, v. William P. CLEMENTS, Individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; et al., Defendants. Civ. No. 3-81-2205-R. United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division. Jan. 4, 1984. Hispanic voters brought action chal- lenging validity of reapportionment plan. The District Court, Randall, Circuit Judge, held that evidence established that such bloc voting as might exist in city did not operate under the challenged reapportion- ment plan, to deny Hispanics an equal op- portunity to participate in political process, that there was no possible district configur- ation of county that would eliminate the need for Hispanics to form coalitions with other racial or ethnic groups in order to have equal opportunity to participate in political process, that the plan aimed not at disadvantaging Hispanics but giving black and Hispanic populations a proportionate share of minority political influence in the districts, and that drafter of plan harbored no intent to discriminate; accordingly, the reapportionment plan did not dilute voting strength of Hispanics so as to deny them access to the political process and did not violate the Voting Rights Aet or the United States Constitution. Order eecordinglv. , TERRAZAS v. CLEMENTS , CltGuStl FSupp. l!2.!) (t9&0) 1329 l. Elections @12 / The Voting Rights Act and the Four- teenth Amendment offer related remedy for minority groups that suffer interfer-. ence with the right to vote as a result of voting practices or procedures in tle elec- toral system; to obtain either remedy, plaintiff must show that, in the totality of circumstances, political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in ques- tion, and that its members had less oppor- tunity than did other residents in district to participate in political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. Voting Rights Act of 1965, S 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 1973; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. L4. 2. Conetitutional Law e215.3 Elections @12 The failure of minority group to trans- late its voting strength into proportional representation does not establish a lack of access to the political process in violation of the Voting Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 5 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 19?3; U.S. C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 3. Elections el2 Both the constitutional jurisprudence and the Voting Rights Act have employed a group of objective evidentiary factors to measure the discriminatory effect of a vot- ing practice or procedure on minority vot- ers, including historical inquiries such as the effects of past discrimination, indicia of race or ethnic-conscious politics such as polarized voting, and formal obstaeles to minority success at the polls such as anti- single-shot voting requirements or majority vote rules. Voting Rights Act of 196b, S 2, as amended,.42 U,S.C.A. 5 l9?3; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 4. Constitutional Law e215.3 Elections @12 To find that an electoral system vio- lates the Constitution, cour+. must deter- mine that the discriminat(,r\ inrpact of the system derived from an irlr'nt to bring about that result; hou'ei t: plaintiff can L .-.,--, - . 581 FEpERAL SUPPLEMENT1330 establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act by showing a discriminatory result, which in turn can be proven through the aggregate of the objective factors' Voting Rights Act of 1965, S 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 19?3; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend' 14. 5. B1"s1gen5 6=12 When a minoritY grouP contends, un- der the Voting Rights Act, that electoral system disenfranchises them because their race or ethnicity has decisive political sig- nificance, objective factors provide indicia of how great a role race or ethnicity plays and how severe are the probable effects, and they offer a framework to distinguish unlawful electoral system in which consid- erations of race of ethnicity pervade poli- tics from a permissible electoral system in which racial and ethnic composition of the elected body simply does not mirror that of its constituency. Voting Rights Act of 1965; S 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. S 19?3. 6. Constitutional Law o-225.3(l) Elections G=l2 Under the constitutional test for voting dilution cases, court must go beyond the objective factors to assure itself that record independently satisfies the general equal protection standard that a facially neutral rule must derive from discriminato- ry purpose. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend' 14' 7. B1ug1i6ns @12 Provided that the districts are equally apportioned, single-member districts do not obviously dilute voting strength; only ref- erence to minority composition of the dis- triet and the manner in which the district lines are drawn can change such plans into devices with discriminatory results' Vot- ing Rights Aet of 1965, 5 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. S 19?3; U.S.C.A. Const'Amend' 14. ,. g1""1ien5 el2 A lack of proportional representation has no independent constitutional or statu- tory significance, and a court-ordered reme- dy for voting dilution would not necessarily warrant the design of a plan that ensures proportional rePresentation. g.'Elections c-I2 Reapportionment is a political process, and there is nothing illegitimate about con- sidering the political consequences of a re- districting plan; tenuousness, i.e., pretext, cannot be established as a factor militating against the plan simply by pointing out that the plan has political consequences that the drafters contemplated' Voting Rights Act of 1965, S 2, as amended,, 42 u.s.c.A. s 19?3. 10. States c=27(3) State can take race into account in drawing legislative districts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Voting Rights Act of 1965, S 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. s 1973. 11. Blsslisns cp12 In evaluating totality of circumstances to determine whether reapportionment plan so dilutes voting strength of minority vot- ers that they have lost their ability to par- ticipate politically, the court considers sev- eral issues: the feature of the electoral system that allegedly hinders minority vot- ers in their attempt to achieve a stronger political voice; extent to which ethnicity determines outcome of electoral contests; the result that the districts aehieve; and, for the purposes of the constitutional chal- lenge, the intent behind the line drawing. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 5 2, as amend- ed, 42 U.S.C.A. S i973; U.S.C.A. Const' Amend. 14. 12. Constitutional Law @225.3(l) g1"61isns €=12 Where the absence of proportional rep resentation results simply from the loss of elections rather than from a built-in bias against a minority group, that group's vot- ing strength has not been cancelled out in any constitutional sense, and the.same re- sult obtains under the Voting Rights Act' Voting Rights Act of 1965, S 2, as amend- ed, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 1973; U.S.C.A' Const' Amend. 14. 13. Constitutional Law €=225.3(3) MuniciPal CorPorations c=80 Evidence in Voting Rights -{ct suit es- tablished that such bloc voling as mrll el le pr p( di t} w v tl H b, ly oi p( R A s tt ti il S 3 B 3 S L A I I c I ( I s I I ( I I - -- .-;+l1*-jir - *- "hnnn.e,zes v.'cl,Elfi ENTS Judges. 1331 exist in citv did not*operate J:::'$:*'ffiX?lrm-on' R' {"y'George' Graves' lenged reapportionm",i';i;;-; q"1v H5- Doughertv' Hearon & Moodv' Austin' Tex'' oanics equal oppo*oniif to p""titip"tt in for Jefendant Chester R' Upham' frtiticat pro""r., ttut there was no possible Bob Slagle, III, pro se' il.t"i"t configuration that would eliminate Cullen Smith, ',arry O. Brady, Naman, the need foiHispanics to form coalitions Hr"*"fi, S,nii', &.,*",bavid Guinn, Michael with other racial groups to haYe equal op frtor"irorr, Baylor Law School, Waco, Tex', portunity to participate in political proce.ss' i"r-a"f*a""i David Dean. lhat the-ptan did not aim at disadvantaging Hispanics, and that diafter of plan har- William French Smith' U'S' Atty' Gen'' borednointenttoaiscrlminate;according-PaulHancock'RobertS'Berman'DavidS' ly, the plan did not air-r-t uoting strengih conningi,arn, III, u.s. Dept. of Justice, ofHispanicsSoaSt0denythemaccess.towast,in'gton,D.C.,amicuscuriaeDept.of oofiil.if oto.ess and did not violate Voting Justice' 'mtSi,.jr:'rfiI'Iill;"1"i;-rtl6lf Berore RANDALL, circuit Judge, and S 19?3: U.S'C.A. Const'Amend' 14' SANDERS and BUCHMEYER' District Thomas G. Crouch, Crouch & Jones' Pa- tricia A. Hill, Dallas, Tex', for senate plain- tiffs (CA 3-81-1946-R)' John N. McCamish, Jr', Pat DeelY' McCamish, Ingram, Martin & Brown' Inc'' irn ,q'nto"io, iex., for house plaintiffs (CA s-8i-2205-R). Randall B. Strong, Daniel R' Jackson' BayL*r, Tex., for Baytown plaintiffs (CA 3-81-2263-R). Joaquin G. Avila, Jose Garza' Norma V' Solis, iudith A' Sanders, Mexican American l,egal Defense and Educational Fund' San .g,niorio, Tex', Albert H' Kauffman' Dallas' C"*., Vit.nu S. Martinez, Morris J' P4l:t' ftf"*i."n American Legal Defense and Edu- ."lionut Fund, San Francisco' Cal'' for MALDEF intervenors' J. Richie Field, Crews, Field' Steele & Page, Conroe, Tex', for Montgomery Coun- ty intervenors. David R. Richards, Executive Asst' Attv' Gen., State of Tex', Steve Bickerstaff' C' noU"tt Heath, Martha E' Smiley' Bicker- staff, Heath & SmileY, Richard '' g"'' iII, 6r"y, Allison & Becker, Austin' Tex'' i"t a"f""a"nts Mark White' William P' Clem"nts, William P' Hobby' Bill Clayton' Bob Bul)ock and Bob Armstrong' l. Terrns dcfined in our opinion of March 24' ^'r"s: "'i, ;:,;;. ' Clcmenrs' 537 F'supp' ^514 iX.O.f.. , itat denied, 456 U'S' 9o2' 102 S'Ct' RANDALL, Circuit Judge: ln this opinion, we decide whether the State of Texas has violated section 2 of the Voti"g Rights AcL, 42 U'S'C'A' 5 1973 (W".iSrpp-.f983), or the fourteenth amend- ment to the United States Constitution in Ir"*irg the districts to elect members of it. t.iut House of Representatives from Oatta. County. Specifically, we consider the contention of a group of hispanic voters (the "MALDEF Intervenors") t that split- iine tt e Dallas hispanic population int'o if,rZ" ."putute districts cancelled out its voting strength. Only the seventeen gor.i ai.tti.ti in Dauas County created by the State's 1983 reapportionment plan (the ii1983 Hou." plan"), see Acl of May 20' 1983, ch. 185, igEB Tex'Sess'Law Serv' ?56 (Vernon), are direetlY at issue' I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. Originally, this action encompassed chal- lengei by a variety of parties to the reap- poriionr*rt plan (the "LRB House plan") ior the Texas House of Representatives "aopt"a in J981 !y tt'e l'egislative Redis- triciing Boa-rd (ttte "LRB")' On November O, fgAi, the House Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the W"stern District of Texas' The complaint 1745,72l.8d.2d 158 (1982)' u'ill be used herein as therein defined' J -_---- t:* i 581 FEDERAL SUPi'LEMENT ,r332 named as defendants various Texas oublic officials-the Governor, the Li[utenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Attor- ney General, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Comptroller of public Accounts and the Commissioner of the General Land Office (collectively, the "State Defendants"Falong with the chair- men of the State Democratic and Republi- can Parties. Allegedly, certain district lines in the LRB House ptan deliberately discriminated against black, hispanic and republican voters. The aetion was transferred to this Court, and consolidated with two other aetions: a parallel suit contesting the Senate reappor- tionment plan (the "LRB Senate plan',) and a separate attack on the LRB House plan filed by the Mayor and the City of Bay- town, Texas ("Baytown"). This Court also allowed two other groups of Texas voters to intervene. On January 4, 1g82, R.A. Deison, Jr. and other individuals, all claim- ing to reside in Montgomery County, Texas ("Montgomery County"), entered the Sen- ate and House eases to raise constitutional challenges. On January 6, 1982, the MAL DEF Intervenors joined the Senate and House actions to assert causes of action under the constitution and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The early history of these proceedings and a summary of the claims of each party appear in our earlier opinion, Terrazas a. Clemen.ts,58? F.Supp. 514 (N.D.Tex.), stay denied,4b6 U.S. 902, 102 S.Ct. 1745, 72 L.Ed.2d 158 (1982), and will not be repeated here. During the course of these proceedings, the Department of Justice, on January 24, 1982, objected to the LRB Senate and House plans under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. S 19?Bc (West Supp.1983). The plans were thus rendered unenforceable. Until the Department of Justice precleared the reapportionment plans, the parties'constitutional and statu- tory challenges remained nonjusticiable; thus, the progress of this litigation was suspended. When the Department of Jus- tice objected to the LRB Senate and House plans, this Court had alreadv conducted a hearing, on Januan' 18-23, 1982. which ad- dressed the merits of those plans. We gonducted a second hearing on Mafch 1-2, 1982, to reconsider those plans, along with other plans submitted by various parties, in order to select aceeptable temporary plans under which to conduct the 1g82 Texas eleetions. On March 11, lg82, this Court installed the LRB Senate plan and a modi- fied version of the LRB House plan as temporary courtordered plans. The lgg2 Texas elections were held under the tempo rary plans. In our opinion explaining the adoption of the temporary plans, this Court urged the Texas Legislature to adopt procedures to resolve the Department of Justice,s objee- tions to the LRB plans. Terrazas o. Clem- ents, 537 F.Supp. at 548. Ultimately, on May 16, 1983,, the Texas Senate approved a new Senate plan (the "1g88 Senate plan,,), and, on May 20, 1983, the Governor signed a bill adopting the 1988 House plan. The State submitted the 1988 plans to the De- partment of Justice; on August 1, lggg, the Department precleared the 1g8B House plan and on September 6, 1988, the Depart- ment precleared the 1983 Senate plan, thus freeing this Court to consider whatever issues remained outstanding. On September 21, 1983, this Court direct- ed the parties to file statements identifying the issues still in controversy. The order set out a schedule for submitting briefs and proposed findings. Although we be- lieved that the action could be determined on the basis of the previous record, we also extended an opportunity for an additional hearing, but required proffers of anticipa- ted evidence from any party who believed that the record required further develop ment. The schedule was to culminate in oral argument on November 21, 1g88. The response to this order demonstrated that only the MALDEF Interienors sought an adjudication of constitutional or statuto- ry elaims relating to the 1g8B House plan. Although the Senate Plaintiffs requested rulings and a hearing on the 1988 Senate plan, the House Plaintiffs filed nothing. Bavtou'n, which had partieipated in the -, TERRAZAS v. CI.EMENTS 1333 i ) t i Cltc r. 361 F.SuPP. 1329 (r9&l) January, 1g82 hearing, likewiJe failed to claim concerning thd West Texas districts file a statement of issues, a brief or pro- and supplemented the record only as tn the/ po."a finaingt' Montgomery County not allegedly discriminatory results of the Dal- only failed to respond to this Court's order' las County House districts' Uu[ trad also failed to appear at.any hear- Briefing preceded and fol]owed the No- *-^;'l;: ;::f :f i.]TIi,j''J**,o," ffi *jt Hf,ffiil11;;:*f #"";;ii and the MALDEF Intervenors, we sched- addressed the constitutional and statutory uled an evidentiary hearing for Novembet "rgr."nt". Although certain districts in ?li,J',ih$ #x'J:i";'rll:J"Ht S:,:[ tt'i tto"" pran have been artered since the Plaintiffs sought an adjudication of the LRB originally drew the lines in 1981' the lawfulness of the entire 1983 Senate plan' Dallas districts have remained unchanged'3 and, at least initially, the MALDEF lnter- Thus' on three occasions-at the January' venors asserted that the House districts for 1982 hearing on the merits' at the March' West Texas in the vicinity of Del Rio, as 1982 hearing on temporary plans' and at well as the Dallas Co"rty-hi.tricts, violated the November, 1983 hearing addressed pri- the constitution and section 2 of the Voting marily to section 2 of the voting Rights Rights Act.z Act-we have heard evidence on the pur- onthemorningofthehearing,theis.poseandeffectoftheDallasdistricting. SUES NATTOWEd fUTthCT. ThE HOUSC ANd II. THE DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICTS. Senate Plaintiffs appeared at the hearing and offered a stipulation to dismiss them Before we consider the merits' a review from the action. We accepted the stipula' of the Dallas County districts will place the tionand,onDecember22,lgsS,enteredxparties'claimsinperspective'Thisreview' consentdecreeestablishingthelg8Ssen-whichwillcomprisefindingsoffact'will ate plan ". ti," p.r*un.nt-plan for Texas set forth the following: a description of the Senatorial elections. fne ViRt OpF Inter- county population, a description of the dis- venors, on the other i,and, auanaoned their tribution of the hispanic population within 2. The MALDEF Intervenors stated that the fol- West Texas result in a discriminating [sic] lor.l'ingissuesoffactandlauremained:impactontheMexicanAmericanvotersof A. rssues or Fact -,.., ": ::-_",,."". ilifir"i:4,';'^:l'8";::: ;'$;T 2 or thc 1. Whether the totality of circumstances regarding T.*". uor"r.lihtp"*nuti'" ttitl 2' whether the Texas House of Represent- DistrictsinDallasCounryresultsintheinabil-atir,e[sic]DistrictsforDallasCountl'andz,or ilv of Mexican'Americans in Dallas County to West Texas dilute Mexican American voting elect candidates of their choice to the Texas strengrh in those respective areas in violalion kgisrature. rrsrr L,rurLr-rv "- ":^-" of the t+th Amendmenr to the United States 2'Whetherthelg83TexasHouseofRep.Constilution. ff:::'$,i;"J,?' il:'li,:T :e!1 {iii',.1i.';i.' l# ?::',T:: :' l:Y, J H :5;l; 3;; ts1i,"1'al$,;:' T.:'*', American voters rn l,j{*l*:iJ+:f*g:li:f :.',:: ff:'-; 3. Whther [sic] the totality of circumstanc- es regarding r.*u, io"t of Representatiue (Veinon Supp'1982)' but the Texas Supreme [sic] Districts for the Del Rio'/Wesi Texas area ioutt strttck dou'n the plan as violating Tex results in the inability of Mexican Americans Const' art'.Ill' $ 26' u'hich prohibits the unnec- in the Del nioZW"r, i.i.. ,.." ['e,f"tit'"ai essarv splitting of counties' Clements v Valles' dates of their choice to the Texas Legislature 620 S'W'2d l12' 11+15 (Tex'1981)' The LRB 4.Whetherthelg83TexasHouseofRep.thendreu.thcdistrictsthatgaverisctothis resenrative t.i.t '6iltri.t. f". thc D;l litigation' This Court temporarill' adopted thc Rio,/West Texas area u'ere adopted u'ith the LR-B Housc plan rvith minor modifications 10 intentofdiscriminatingagainslMcxtcanthedistricrsinlwocountiesafterlhcDe}rarl. American voters of Wesl Texas. nlenl of Juslic' obiected lo the original l-RR B. Issues of Lau, Yrcsr rs^al Housc plan. 'Jr! las-i ll.rrsc pla:r cQ:rsisi' ol l.WhethertheTexasHousco[Represcnt.thcLR-R}lt,us.P)allrvithtlrcc(,Lii.i.i)rdt.r(d ative [sic] Disrricts for Dallas Countl and''or -n6 1;srlirrrr' I I t I I I I I i i i I Ir I r i t I ) J i ; t : t e 1334 the county and a description of thq0ffect of the past, present and proposed district- ing plans on Dallas County's hispanies. A. Dallas County and its Hispanic Population. As in the State of Texas generally, the population of Dallas County grew between the 1970 and 1980 censuses. The 1970 county population of t,327,320 had, by 1980, grown to 1,556,390. The rate of growth in the county of 17.3%, however, lagged behind the 27.l% rate of growth in the State as a whole. Aecordingly, where- as the 1970 districting plan had allocated 18 districts to Dallas County, Dallas County's share of the 1980 State's House of Repre- sentatives districts declined. Thus, a "one- man, one-vote" reapportionment in 1980 would entitle the county to only 16.4 dis- tricts.{ In light of the Texas eonstitutional requirement of maintaining the integrity of county lines whenever the United States Constitution will permit iL, see Clements a. Valles,620 S.W.zd 112, 113-15 (Tex.1981), the drafters of the redistricting plans faced the choice of dividing Dallas County into 16 slightly overpopulated districts or 17 slight- ly underpopulated districts.5 The 1983 House plan ehooses the latter alternative, as have all the plans presently before us. The rate of growth in the county of the anglo, black and hispanic populations was not uniform. The minority populations in 4. The 1980 census sets the Texas population at 14,229,191. With 150 House districts, an ideally apportioned district would contaiD 94,861 per- 5. Dividing the county inlo 16 districts would result in districts containing approximately 97,- 284 persons. Dividing the county into 17 dis- tricts u'ould result in districts containing ap- proximately 91,561 persons. Although a deci' sion to apportion all of Dallas County into l6 or 17 districts necessarily creates districts varying 2.@ to 3.50,6 from the ideal, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly disapproved a split of Dallas Countl'and seven other counties in the original legislative plan, Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. l95a-7, because "[the State] failed to prove that thc retcntion of surplus populations within the boundaries oi thc eight counlies would resull in impermissiblc deviations." Clements v. Valles, 620 S.\\'.2c1 et i I 5. 58I FEDERALSUPPLEMENT iit '; - a Dallas County grew more rapidly than the anglo population. Thus, in 1970, the:black population of 220,357 comprised 76.6% of. the county population. By 1980, the black population had increased by 30.5% +e 287,- 541, and comprised 18.5% of. the eounty population. In 1970, the hispanic popula- tion of 88,652 comprised 6.7% of the county population. By 1980, the hispanic popula- tion had increased by 74.3% to 154,560, and comprised 9.9%, of the county population. Parenthetically, we note that the census method of identifying hispanics changed between the 1970 and 1980 censuses, so that the numbers given for 1970 and 1980 are not entirely comparable. See II Trial Transcript 414-15 (testimony of Dudley Po- ston). Theoretically, the 1980 combined minori- ty population would suffice to form almost five House districts. The black population alone could fill out slightly more than three districts. The hispanic population, on the other hand, could fill out slightly more than one and one half districts.6 Naturally, these calculations take no account of the geographic distribution of the minority pop, ulation in the county. The minority population, for the most part, forms communities in the central and southern portions of the City of Dallas. Approximately 48,000 blacks and hispanics, however, live scattered throughout the pre- dominately anglo communities in north Dal- 6. The exact number of districts to which the minority population would be entitled under this strictly proportional analysis depends on the method of calculation. The black popula- tion could fill out 3.03 "ideal" districts while the hispanic population could fill out 1.62 "ideal" districts. IV Trial Transcript 1090 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale). Assuming that these figures do not double count persons u'ho checked both black and hispanic on the census form, the combined minority population could fill out 4.66 "ideal" districts. In a l7-digrict apportion- menl of Dallas Countl, the black population could fill out 3.14 districts while the hispanic population could fill out 1.68 districts. Again, assuming no double count, the combined mi- nority population could fill our 4.82 districts. /d at l09l (lestimony of Paul Ragsdale). las p8l rut thr sor l tior the acc M/ ide 7. lr 1, o 3. ir rl n t) r h d p p, ir r( u a' n ti h h ci d 1r n c( rI ir n - .Jr*l.- t t .finnlzls v; CLEMENTS Clte s 3El F.SupP. 1329 (t9&{) r335 las county.? otherxiSe, the black and his- hood, known as "Little,,Mexico" consists of panicpopulationsaremingledipanareaanareaslightly'northwestofdowntown running along the line oi tfr" 1.rlnity Rir"r, Dallas and southeast- of love Field'ro A through downtown Dallas and intp ttre second neighborhood, called "New Little / southern part of th" c;;; ;;11"..;- Mexico" lies immediatelv northeast of Although the brack and hispanic popula- il:Hf,H'iki.X?',T,Jffi""'frt":: ;t#: tions live in close proximity to each other, as "El Poso," is located in the vicinity of the hispanic population in Dallas County, downtown Dallas.t2 Three additional according to testimony adduced by the neighborhoods, called "Los Altos l'a Va- MALDEF Intervenors, has formed Several jate," "[,os santos" and the "L,edbetter" identifiable neighborhoods.e One neighbor- area are located in west Dallas'r3 In addi- 7. Thus in the 1983 House plan, the six districts acknowledge may exist, result from shortcom- thar run along the norlhernmost part of Dallas ings in May's testimony' County have the following minority popula- tions: 10. &e VI Trial Transcript 92 (testimony of Joe Disrrict 98: 8,342 May)' May described the area as encompassing District 99: 8,062 parts of voting precincts 3303' 3304 and 3386' Disrricr l0l: 13,047 From the Dallas demographic map, this section District ll2: 4,313 of the county varies from 2Oo/o lo 8Oo/o hispanic, District 113: 6,079 and the northwestern portion of the area has a Districr 114: 8,467 mixed population of 20o/o to 40%o black. From l9g3 Joint Exh. 5. Aside from isolated pockets the statistical breakdowns of the plans, the cen- of 50oo persons in northeast Dallas Countl' and sus tracts in the area May has described have an 3500 persons in north Dallas Counly, the minor- hispanic population of about 4200. See 1983 ity population in north Dallas County is dis' Joint Exh. 5 (census tracts 4 01, 5, 18 & l9). persed. 8. Nearly 350,ooo blacks and hispanics reside- in tt. see VI Trial Transcript 87-88' May stated the seven districts or th. issi iouse plan thar thar the area consists of voting precincts 3312, run through central and sourhern Dalias coun- 1213, along wirh parts of voting precincts 3301, ty. In rhise districrs, there are the following 2254 and 33O7. &e 1983 P-l Exh' 10' The ririnority populations: Dallas demographic map indicates that this arca District 100: 71,568 is from 200lo to 600/o hispanic' The 1983-House District 103: 51,078 Plan statistical breakdown suggests that the area District lO4: 8,750 tontains approximately 14'000 hispanics' See District 107: 50,150 1983 Joint Exh' 5 (census tracts 8' 9' l0' 12' 15 Disrrict 108: 29,448 01' 15 02 & 24)' District I l0: 66,382 District lll: 70,163 12' See VI Trial Transcripl 90-91 (testimonl'of 1983 Joint Exh. 5. Joe May)' May offered no voting precinct num- 9. The testimony concerning hispanic neighbor- bers foi the "EI Poso" community' The map of hoods came principally from Joe Ma1', u'ho voting precincts with 40o/o or more hispanic drafted MALDEF's most recent alternati'e population' 1983 P-I Exh' 10' shou's no hispanic plan-the 'MAY-MALDEF" plan. For.lhe. most voiing precinct in the area May described' We part, May described the hispinic n-eighborhoods decline to speculate about the size and exact imprecisely. where he gave specific geog-raphic location of the "El Poso" community' refirents for the neighborhoods, the referents usualll'consistofvotingprecinctnumbers.Inls'SeeVITrialTrarrscriptg2-93'Thethree at leasl one instance, the area described does ncighborhoods' according to May' consist of nothaveahear,yhispanicpopulationconcentra.votingprecincts44l.land3353.Precinct3353' tion.Byreferringtoprecinctnunrbers,MalaccordingtoMay'formsthcdividinglinebe- has madc it difficult not'onl1'to gauge the exait tween the Los Santos and the Los Altos [: irirp"ri. p"p"fation of th.i" u.iu.l u,hich ue Vajate comnfunities' We note that high hispan- can derive only from the census iract break' ic-population voting-precincts lie adjacent to dou'n in the district statistical summaries, e'g', 3353' We assume for present purposes- that 1983 Joint Exh. 5, bui also to correlate theic thcse precincts are part of the same neighbor- n.igyborhu.ra, u'iih the black population con- hoc'ds' If so' according to the Dallas demo' cenlration, *.hich u,e could harle icrived fron, graphrc map, lhe Ledbetter area has over 800/o in. Outtur'a".ographic map. Anl,imprccisiotrs lrispanic p.pulation, and the other tu'o commu' in tlrc descriptions in this opinion' of thcs, rrrtics havc from 2oo/o to 80% hispanic popula' r.rr-rghboriro.ds, imprecisions uihich rvc rcaciilr ''tr r'ith a mixed black population of from 209'i' 58I FEDERAL SUPPLEMET{T a r336 tion, the area around Iove Field has a substantial hispanic population.tt Although these neighborhoods mav bepredominantly and idlntifiably hi.p"r;, they.form separate enclaves l,f frirp"r" population rather than one contiguou. t ir- panic community. In most instinces, the hispanie neighborhoods abut ".;;. ;;;;populations are a mixture of black and hispanic, predominately black o, f"ig"iy "r_glo. Generally, black areas are weiged between the three hispanic neighborho-ods north of downtown Dallas_Little Mexico, New Little Mexico and the "ru" n""i fou-" Field-and the three neighborhood. in *".i Dallas-l,edbetter, Los Santos una f,o. et- tos La Vajate. Moreover, the three hispan-ic neighborhoods within west Daflas,'ls ,? ?OY . .According ro rhe LRB House plan statistical breakdown, the Ledbetter ur., t "!-u.,nrspantc popularion of slightll. over 5600, see 1983 Joinr Exh. 5 (census tract 106), and the 31her rwg.communiries, combined, ;pp;;r-i; lur"-^1n- hispanic popularion of aboui 16,600.&e 1963-Jo_inr Exh. 5 (census tracts 2O, 42, 43,47,48,50.51, 52 & lor). 14. -About 350O hispanics live in the Love Fieldarea. &e 1983 Joinr Exh. 5 (census t.".r + 01. 15., With one exception, rhe neighborhoods ex.clustvel), abut other non.hispanic areas. Fol. low-ing is a list of the census tracts thar adjoin each neighborhood wirh tt. p..".","g" oi,i"predominate population group in "uj ..nru. 1rac1. T_he figures are derived- f."- f"ini-ixh.5, For lhe purpos€s of illustration, *. hur. ,."Jthe term "anglo', as a substitute fo. the exhiiir category "other," u,hich includes all those u,ho are neither black nor hispanic. We include rhis breakclown with the caveal that an] impreci. sions in, rhe descriprions of rhe tirpr.il ,i"ign.borhoods and the surrounding aieas deriies from the vagueness of the testim.-ony.or.".ning the locations of rhe hispanic ,.ighlorlooai.---' LITILE MEXICO [includes census tracrs 4 Ot, 5, I8 and t9l: rracts 4 03 (Love piefal tO-O Zirz, hispanic); 4 02 (st.7@A angto); 6 oi isi.l8v,anglo); 6 Ot (94.45or'u anglo); 7 Ot ia,.ei";,anglo); 17 o2 (92.62o7o black); 2r iSe.i8,r,a1g1o); and t00 (62.a6olo blacki. NEW LITILE MEXICO [includes census lra:ts..8, 9, tO, 12, l5 01, l5 O2, and 2al: rracri l- (split tract) (9020 1 anglo); I $q9q%-i" clo); 7 0l (62.660/0 anslol; 7 oz izs.as.r, u; 8lo); I I Ol (70.37oh anglo); l3 Ol (69.6404 anglo); t3 02 (tt)!oa anglo); u ioZ.tqbanglo); t6 (ez.s8o/o btack)J 2z or iii.is",.anslo); 22 02 (62.3so/o black); 23 iAO.iiiblack); 2-s (87.23o/o black); 26 iSz.iO"z.'Li".tll well as the three to the north of dgwntown Dallas, are not all contiguous to ure anoth- I er. For example, the Iedbettei area is isolated from the other two west Dallas neighborhoods; it adjoins a black area with less than 40% hispanic population on the east, anglo areas with less than 40% his- panic population on the south and north- west, a black area on the northeast, and an anglo area on the west. As the county demographic map illustrates, the hispanic population eonsists of six scattered areas rather than a cohesive whole.rs lgg3 p_I Exh. l0A. Indeed, the hispanic neighbor_ hoods are sufficiently dispersed such"that a serious question exists whether any single district could completely encompar. th"rnr.,. 81_(9O.33Vo anglo); and 122 03 (split tract) (650lo + anglo). LOS ALTOS LA VAJATE AND LOS SANTOS [includes census rracts 20, 42, 43,i7, A,'sq 51, 52, and t0ll: rracrs ZZ OZ QO.Sloi ^rrli'. .41 (94.95o/o black); 44 (66.33% ungtol;''ni (64.13Vo anglo); 46 (64.480/0 ^"Ad;' ;;(95.060lo black); Sf foe.SO"z anEioj; ;; (7.s.l7oh black); 62 (47.16oh ^"gt"l ii.ei"t" black); 63 02 (84.04oh anglo); i'00 G;.4;%black); 102 (89.o8o/o black)I ana rc4i;o.;;;;" black). LEDBETTER Iincludes census rracr l06l:tracts 100 (62.46o,b black); 105 (solir r.,.ir (60e^o-1 black); 107 (69.6904 ungfoi re3-gj \72.13_v: ansl o) ; I 5 I (90. t 3o/o angio; ;' "nJ r i i(87.75o/o anglo). LOVE FIELD [includes census tracr 4 03]:tracrs 4 0l (wesrern edge of Lirrle Mexico) \5_6.J6o/o hispanic); q -OZ (Sl.lOu" ini;, 2_2.08q0 black); 6 Ol (56.820/0 ungto); ii'O"j \7l9lY: black); 72 (67.460/o ^"4";;' ;; o;(_88.21% anglo); 98 02 (66.t1o/o lriili, -"rj l0O (62.460lo black). 15. One could debare whether the MAy_MAL- D!f, ylal acrually encompasses "f f tf,. f,irf"ni. neighborhoods in its hispanic aisrrict, ai'si.icil13. .The.answer dependi on how.r;;Ji;;:"nerghborhood," and we have heard no testimo.nl on this definitional question. W. nor., ho.^l- ever, thar the MAY_MALDEF plan splits uo six. 1::-...:ntr. rracrs jusl in drau,ing its hispanicolstrtct. In most instances it attemprs to eitract the "most hispanic,, block groupe fi.-if,.-.pfii census tracts. Whether or nol the plan succeedsin presening all the neighborto"a, *f,ii. .rt- :llfl-ur. meandering path rhrough the ciry ofualas ts not, in our r.ieu., crucial. We areforced to wonder just hou. much these arcastrut-\' constitute .,neighborhoods,,, as Ma\. tesri-tied, much less one cohesir.c,,communitr.,,, u,hen a plan musr dra* such fi"" l;;"-;'b;i;;l i/ I I i ( 1 I t ( 1 ( ! ( r I e o I 'd tr tl l \ a a a b Jt , .TERRAZAS v.. cLEMENTS Clre u 5Et F'SuPP. t329 (19&l) 0 l-- B. The Districting'Plans.' Partially as a consequence ofrdispersed nature of the hispanic populations, Dallas has never had an hispanic-dominated House district. With one exception, the proposed plans do not draw a district with an hispan- ic majority. One plan-the "MAY-MAL DEF" plan-creates a district with only a bare hispanic population majority. The voting age population for that district, how- ever, is only 43.66% hispanic. While the other plans that we have reviewed have in common their lack of a hispanic district, the plans differ substantially in their demo- graphic and political consequences. 1. The Preuious Plan. Before the 1980 census was taken, Dallas County was divided into 18 single-member House districts. The Texas Legislature had drawn the districts pursuant to the order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas after that court struck down a multi-member dis- trict plan for the county in 1971. See Gran:es u. Barnes, 343 F.Supp' 704 (W.D' Tex.19?2), affd in part and rer"d in part sub nom. White u. Regester, 412 U'S. ?55, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.zd 314 (1973). The Graoes plan had divided the predominately minority areas in and around the City of Dallas into six districts: 33C, 33F, 33G' 33K, 33N and 33O. These six districts were heavily populat- ed with minorities. District 33C consisted of portions of the black population in west Dallas and included the hispanic population around l,ove Field. District 33F, which lay to the south of District 33C, took in most of the area where, according to the MALDEF Intervenor's testimony, the "Los Altos La Vajate" and "[,os Santos" neighborhoods are located, together with adjacent black and anglo areas. Three districts, 33G' 33N and 33O, ran through the predominatelv black areas of south Dallas. Sec 1983 Joint Exh. 2. dcrcrmining if a particular group of hispanics living in roughlv thc samc area is indecd a part The Graaes plan con(ained four districts with substantial hispanic populations. These districts varied }rom one with 19.8% hispanic population to one with 31.3% his- / panic population. A more completc break' down of the minority populations in these districts appears in Table A. TABLE A Minority Population In Graves Plan House Districts (In Percentages) Black Hispanic Population Population 58.8 20.6 2,2 81.3 5?.9 8.0 3r.7 n.t 85.4 2.4 63.0 19.8 a. Black plus hirpanic adjusted to corr€ct double count for those who checked both. (Sourte: 1983 Joint Exh. 2) In 1980, these district configurations had resulted in the election of three black Rep- resentatives. Representative Sam Hudson was the incumbent elected from district 33C in west Dallas. II Trial Transcript 465-66 (testimonv of George Dillman); II Trial Transcript 539 (testimony of Lee Jackson). Representative Paul Ragsdale was the incumbent elected from district 33N in south Dallas. II Trial Transcript 539 (testimony of Lee Jackson); IV Trial Transcript 1082 (testimony of Paul Rags- dale). Representative Lanelle Cofer was the incumbent from district 33O in south Dallas. /d. While the Grares plan was in force, one other district, district 33G in u'est Dallas, had, on t*'o occasions, elected a black Representative. II Trial Transcript 539. 2. Thc 198J Hou.se Plan. Despite the grovvth tion in Dallas CountY census revealed that City of Dallf,s were populated. Together, tricts in central Dallas listed in Table A, supra, were approximately 160,000 persons of the ncighborhood. District Number 8:!C 88F 88G 88K 83N slo L {337 MinoritY r Population 7it.9 58.s 65.9 58.8 8?.8 82.8 of minoritv popula- generally, the 1980 the districts in the substantially under- the six minority dis- r338 58T FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT TABLE B ehort of the population necessarr for*six distrigt BBF; the district also extends for-"ideal" districts. District $C ;r;; f"ii ther west, "rJ i..iri". sma, porrions of $:f,"'#"J,::"';i'*ff"3"t:r:lYi* former diltric; iic""a 33o on trre eouth urately blz st ort of an '.ideal,, district. IV and east' .See 1983 Joint Exh. z; rsai p-i Trial Jtanseript 1089 fte.ti*ory or"p"rr Exh. 4. District l0?, in t"rg. ,""rureRagsdale). ' ----J includes former district BBK togethe" 'riti., Ih:.19?3 House plan, Iike aI of the plans a portion of former district iac. 198, submitted to this 6o"t, ""a""r" the minori- Joint Exh. 2; lgg3 p_I Exh. n. nist"iciiii tydominated areas in central and southern includes most of former district $N, ;; Dallas county into five districts.--;;: extends further south. l98B Joint B*r,. z; sence, the 1983 House plan dismantlJ; 1983 P-I Exh. 4. District rrr in.ludesof the Graaes districts in tfre CIW oiD"il most of former distriet BBG, part of fo".".to build up the minority popuration il;j;: district BBo, and an area to the west ofcent districts' District ttio- "r"orp"s.'* Dallas that had not formerly been a p* ;imost of the population of former dil"i;; I: .?*"r city disbicr 19$ J. Exh. 2;3BC in west Dalras and extends ,";;;;;; 198s p_r E*h: a; breakdown of theinto predominatelv blaek."."u. th"irr"*l.- minority poprl"tion and voting age popula_Iy comprised a paut of district aso. sr;ll tion appea"s r", ""J'"r the five minorityTrial Transcript 856 (tesrimony oi L; districG ,ra"r-ir,"-igs3 House pran in Ta-Jaekson); r98B Joint Exh. 2; rgsi p-i EJi bre B arong *ir['ii,."r"re information for4. District 108 consists in part "f f;;;; the three MALDEF plans. District 100 108 l07 u0 1u Minority r Pop. 75.47 67.06 50.76 70.09 70.65 Minority e VAP n.77 47.52 47.78 68.44 @.ai @.2, 56.65 53.63 6'/.&1 62.65 Likr plan d panie contai: Distrit co" arr panic ; total r which most o Vajate an hisl of the these d lations neither bined I upamr The < tricts, I election tives. merly < district dale, fo tion in incumh run, a I was elei 3. T) The Il three pi .,MALD DEF pla to creat Each pla of minor City of each pla politicall IandM con&rin a conpariron of Brack, Hispanic and Minority composition of selectedDallas Crcuty Dstricts under l&3 House plan LF.GEND: pop. = poprr"tiol MALDEF Plans (in pertentages) I. VAp = Votlng Age population lB3 House plsn Black PJ:] Hispanic HispanicroP' VAP pop vAp II. UALDEF I House plsn y 63.68 58.{i} a.fi $ D,.67 mB 42.iy 8?.4s 3{.31 z,37 llg 71.47 6s.1e 3.nlll 61.15 u.74 9.8s III. UALDEF. II House plan 100 6639 59.44lG n.u a.g6lfi i6A %i.atlr0 65.68 62.58ll1 65.?8 6r.?3 65a8 61.86 m.n 18.63 26.65 24.75 @.90 65.41 66.73 60.9r 12.49 85.54 29.01 3.57 10.10 10.39 9.6{ 40.30 34.51 4.75 m32 4.69 {.03 5.18 1.43 11.06 ?8.ts 28.98 56.G 23.81 55.&'g.%, ?8.18 8.56 ?5.50 10.98 75.U 36.50 64.98 19.46 fi.47 zu 74.6 8.O7 ?0.68 68.88 59.29 43.50 6.42 65.96 T iJ. --:- tL. . TERRAZAS.v. CL-EMENTS ' ClteuSEt F.SuPP. t321' (t9t4) F F ) T t t I D ! i. ! r r ; L b I F I t 110 111 118 III. UAY-UALDEF Hotrse Plcn l1p *8159 ) 16.61 tG 60.08 I 6.17 b {8.20 b b ?52sc b 74.53 c b ?1.17 c 43.66 65.61 c gether with a combined black and hispanic f,opulation majority. In the MAY-MAL bEF plrn, the hispanic district has a bare hispanic population majority together with a combined black and hispanic population majority. Although each of these plans achieves, at least in theory, an hispanic-dominated dis- trict by slightly different means, the line- drawing in each plan dealt with similar obstacles. The most serious problem, of course, arises because only twelve of the census tracts in Dallas County (143 04, 4 03, 30, 31 02, 33, 106, 4 01, 8, 10, 19, 24' 47) contain more than 50?i hispanic population' 1983 Joint Exh. 5. Even these twelve cen- sus tracts, which cumulatively contain slightly more than 21,000 hispanics, cannot alibe placed in a single contiguous district' Only one plan-the MAY-MALDEF plan- includes the four largest of these twelve trac[s in one district, and even that plan splits two of these tracts. Still another problem arises from the first. The MALDEF plans all attempt to unite in one district at least part of census tract 106, an 85'06'zl hispanic area contain- ing about 5600 hispanics, and census tract a 1g, a 6o.2lrt hispanic area containing about 3300 hispanics. 1983 Joint Exh' 5' To accomplish this union, the district must traverse an area that forms a part of 1983 House district 100, and that formerly was a part of district 33C from the Graues plan' Although rthe area--census tract 100-it- self contains a black population of onll 1446 persons, the area either adjoins or gives access to other areas (census tracts 6 Ot. ff OZ, 102 and split tract 10ir) that have adriitional black populations totaling ap- lrroxittiltelv 11,200 llersc'ns' No district co- rri'i; rrratic,rl for a irlr,r'I tiistlict that exclud- (-\i ('('trstls tract l(-'(l i"uiri join these other 8?3E b 7.15 dt.?g r 8.88 11.18 1429 51.13 a tinority equala black plur hirpanic, edjuetcd for thooe who checked both' b. lte MALDEF Intervenon hgve not supplied this infotmation' c Total not adjugt€d for thooe who checked both blE k and hispanic' (Source: 1983 Joint Exh. 2; 1988 P-I Exhs' 8A' S7') Like the Graues Plan, the 1983 House plan does not unite the six pockets of his- panic population. Two separate districts contain substantial hispanic populations' District 107-which contains "Little Mexi- co" and "New Little Mexico"-has an his- panic population comprising 29'01% of the Ltat aistti.t population. District 103- which contains the Ledbetter area, and most of the population in the Los Altos La Vajate and l,os Santos neighborhoodt-}1? an hispanic population comprising 35'54'i of theiotal ditt.i.t population' In both of these districts, the black and hispanic popu- lations eombine to form a majority' In neither district, however, does the com- bined black and hispanic population make up a majority of the voting age population' The configuration of the 1983 House dis- tricts, like Lhe Graaes plan, resulted in the election in 1982 of three black Representa- tives. Representative Sam Hudson, for- merly of district 33C, won re-election in district 100. Representative Paul Rags- dale, formerly of district 33N, won re-elec- tion in district 110. Although the black incumbent from former district 33O did not run, a black Representative, Jesse Oliver' was elected from district 111' 3. The MALDEF Plans' The MALDEF Intervenors have offered three plans-the "MALDEF I Plan," the "MALbEF Il plan" and the "MAY-MAL DEF plan"-that have a common objective: to create an hispanicdominated district' Each plan creates five districts in the areas of minority concentration in and around the City of Dallas. In one of the districts in each plan, hispanics would potentiallv be a politically decisive force. In the MALI)EF i and MALDEF II plans, the kev districts contain an hispanic population pluralitv to' 1340 58I FEDERAL.SUPPL'EMENT ? areas with the rest of district lOit. Inshort, the line draw make a .h"i;; ;;;;::: xffiJt",l,.T *hispanie populations. - Finally, the MALDEF plans all excludethe same predominately anglo ;;';.;;their hispanic-dominated O[tri.t".--f"rii_ mony adduced by the MALDEF Ir;;;_nors suggested that these affluent angloneighborhoods, which are a part of one of llr" y^":l strongly hispanic di.tri.t una".the 1983 House plan, h"d ;-;;;;;;; ::::lC propensity to oppose ,ino"ity ""nJio,"*aj I'hese areas, referred to as ,.Kes_ sler. Park" and ,,Stevens park,,, "Jirm-ii*predominately hispanic areas in west Dal-las. VI Trial Transcript 99, 102_08 (te;;- mony of Joe Mry); il. aL 66,78 (testimonv of Trinidad Garza,l.rt The three iliD;i plans cut a careful line around these anglo neighborhoods and move th", ir;;;;;;: dominately black district to the south. . The three plans also have in commontheir effect on the hispanic ;"r;;;l;;.rike the 1983 House plan, the'Md#; plans place parls of each of th" .ir.;;;;of hispanic population into at [r:.;-;;; separate districts. The three ptans aiifer fll:flr,. in their.respective perceno*".'ri nrspanrc population in the hispanic_do-mina t_ed districts and their effeci on ;l;;;;; black districts. The MAy_Meiorili", is- unique in that it embraces "t_Iea-;r, ;;;of the identifiable hispanic communltiel innorth Dallas and west Dallas. il;;;; achieves an hispanic population ,"io"ii.,, gnlv b-v creating a alstiici ,f,", .rn.-'rf,."'" tcntacle-like corridors through ,""rt "njcentral Dallas. A more complete break- 9:*l of the minority populations in ea.f,qrsulct appears in Table B. IiI. THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS. ^ The MALDEF Intervenors urge thisCourt to strike down the Dallas er;;;districts in the lgg3 House plan b;;;: they violate section 2 of the V",irg nigii. 1_.j ?, dituting hispanic votinf .i.-".,";;;and because the plan,s drafters .oni."_ ,r......t^r:n, the, descriprion of the neighborhood,wc as(Uill(.that the u.itnr t r,. i,,, .',.,,-,"' ."IJi'j'iii:,1'::il:J;l,.j;tJ: vened the constitution by purposefulty creatlng that ditution. ff," """fjgr*iffir";;the districts, in the MALDEF;;;;;; estimation, combine with politicai ;;il-tions in Dallas County to ensure ,hJ;; h.ispanic population "rjoy. 1"., oppoJuiti than others to elect-.iraia"t"r'J-ii,"ir" choice.. .Purportedly, the State dla;;#; llll y,,h,the transparent intent to protect tneumbents by harming Dallas hispanics. The Dallas districts, the MALDEF Inter-venors maintain, fragment a cohesive his_panre community. The plan allegedly joins hispanic neighborhoods to politicilty ilJ;anglo neighborhoods with the ";r;i;-;h";the,largest groups of f,i.puni. ,-ot ^"n*rrauas Uounty are rendered politicallv im_potent. As the MALDEF lnL*"no.. .""the matter, its alternative plans ""A1"."the ease with which the distiictinC ;;;;;i !y *.uld. have designed at least or'" air-t-"i.tln whreh hispanics could have turned anundesired ineumbent out of offi." anA ir-stalled a eandidate of their choice. The MALDEF Intervenors assert thatthe failure to draw such a di.t"i"t ;;.;';; regarded as discriminatory. past potiticai discimination and the lingering "fi".t_ "igeneral discrimination againsi trispanics have al legedly rendered tf,", pollti..it,'i"_ active. Aeeording to the MALDEF. irt""-venors, political polarization, evidenced U, otoc voting, leads to a predicLable result forhispanics-virtual disenfr"n.f,i."r"rt. - .i.one consequence, the MALDEF, Interve. loT polt out, no hispanic has ever ."*"a fl ,h"-'I'exas [,egislature as a Representa- tive of Dallas County. . The State, in the MALDEF Intervenors, vrew, can muster no policy adequate tojustify the impact of tlie tS8B i"ir.""pf# on hispanics. The sole lustlfication of iheplan- allegedly derives fro, incumb"n.r. While the MALDEF Intervenois'co;;;J that the State Defendants may legitimatelv consider the political effeets of """af.i."i- in$, the Ig8g House plan purportedlv aehieves its political ends Uy fi;;;;ili; hispanic neighborhoods identified as Los Alrosl-a Vajate and Los Sanros. gerr tion N MA] the gTAI tion. dict* ttcra is cr the I ofD astr lya gem( that the 1 Defe conti the r Ac distri ble < neigt hoodr nine ed, w In th DEF dence ryma: asser plain hispar er nal Mor view failed ty ele panics fendar olithic tion g status facto does r assert ness d ic canr Finr, uit ' : Ee- tof ,rs' rdi- tlre riB Eir the nct ics. tpnnez.l,s v. GIJMENTS l34t Cltc.r Stt F.SuPP' 132'!l (l9A{) gerrymandering a nitural hispanic popula- tion of State policy' " Incumbency' accord- tionconcentration'Iinctoth.estateD.efendants,providesonly Naturally, the Stat€ Defendants deny the a lart of the plan's'rationale' The State's MALDEF Intervenors' "tai"cte'ization of po"rio Ato allegedly.advances related int'er/ tireplan,sdesignandresult.Thegeo.ests_continuitywiththepreviousdistrict. graphic dispersion oi ii,"-t'i'p'nic popula- ing flan' and the preservation of Repre- ' tion, the state Defendants contend, contra- .Jnt tir.-.onstituent relationships' In ad- dicts any notion that the plan fragments- or dition, the state Defendants point out that ,,cracks,, any community of hispanics that the drafters had to consider the effect of is cohesive. FurttrermJre,-in if," view of the plan on black voters' The State De- the State Defendants, the political climate fendants allege that the MALDEF plans of Dallasisnotsointo.fitif"tohispanics jeopardizeblackinterests; allof theMAL ,. t outig" the state to construct artificial- bn-r pt"nt pair an anglo incumbent against ly a district that ensures loca) hispanic he- the most junior black Representative' 9n" d".*r. ir,e state Defendants also argue of the plans' the MAY-MALDEF plan' ii,"i tr.rl MALDEF Intervenors misconstrue eviscerates the district of yet another black ii" pt"n,. purpose. The plan, as the State Representative. The State Defendants as- o"t"na"nt. emphasize, aims at maintaining- '"'i thut this court should defer to the continuity and avoiding retrogression of legislative judgment about how best to re- the voting strength of blacks' solve these conflicting interests fairly' According to the state DefendanG' the Iv. THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS' li:"::',1":?;;:'L"'*'.'':fi,J":T;::r,:l?; Since the supreme court rirst roraved neighborhoods. The hispanic' neighbor- into the "political thicket" of reapportion- hoods, which are separated by as much as ment in the 1960s' courts have struggled nine miles, have allegedly been consolidat- with the task of developing manageable ed,wherepossible,inareasonablemanner'standardstodeterminewhentheprocessof ln the State Defend"nt uit*, the MAL line-drawing becomes invidiously discrimi- DEF Intervenors cannot, under the evi- natory' On one hand' courts have not tol- dence,arguethatthelg8SHouseplanger.eratedpoliticalsystemsthateffectivelyex- rymanders.Rather,theStateDefendantscludeminorityvotersfromthedemocratic assertthattheMALDEFlntervenorscom-processes'l':'^''!:'W'hitett'Regester'412 plainonlyoftheplan,sfai,luretomaximizeu.s.zss,?65-?0,93S.Ct.2332,2339-4|,37 hispanic voting ,*"ngih b., tarving up oth- L'Ed'zd 314 (19?3); ForLson t' Dorseg' 379 er natural popuiation patterns' U'S' 433' 439' 85 S'Ct' 498' 501' 13 L'Ed'zd Moreover, the State Defendants take the 401 (1965) (dictum); Zimmer t McKeilhe n' view that the MALDEF lntervenors have 485 F'zd 129?' 1304-0? (5th Cir'19711) (en failed to demonstrate tt"t tt'" Dallas Coun- bat'tc)' offd on other grounds sub norrt' ty electoral system -i. ,igg"a against his- Easl cairoll Parislt school Board t'' MQr' panics. Ti,e eviOenc", '"?lt tf'" St"te De- shalt' 424 U'S' 636' 96 S'Ct' 1083' 4? fendants,construction,establishesnomon-L.Ed.zd296(19?6).Yet,ontheotherhand. olithic polarizatlon in oloting among popula- courts have consistently eschewed the no- tion groups that mighi lra-n*ror* irispanic tion that the united States constitution status as u poprt"tion 'i"ofii i"" '' tt secures to any group of citizens the right facto withdrawal of the right to vote. Nor to obtain trolitical representation in propor- does the evidenee, if,. S"t. Defendants tion to its numbers ' E'g'' Whitcomb t" assert, sho'*' hispanit-potitit"r powerless- Chattis' 403 U'S' 124'156-57' 91 S'Ct' 1858' ness despite ttre frequent failure of hispan- 18?i-?6' 29 L'Ed'zd 363 (19?1)' In the ic candidates at the polls. p)'f,st,nt case. \4'e are presented u'ith two Finalh',theStateDefendantsdisagreevririalionso":hl:-:*:*"ofhou'todrawthe u.irlr tlrv IlALDEF Inter'en.rs' interlrretlr- lr: :'t'trvt't'n securing the right t'o partici- ter- his- 0ns tile hat in lm- lee lee )ri- let an in- |at be 18I of k ht- lr- by DT Is e- Dd L. a bo u:l l€ v. td ly t- b b' r342 pate politically and avoiding government by quota. ll,2l Section 2 of the Voting Rights Aet, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 lgTB, as amended in 1982, and the fourteenth amendment to the United Stst€s Constitution offer related remedies for minority groups that have suffered interferenee with their right to vote as a result of the voting practices or procedures in their eleetoral system.tE To obtain either remedy, a plaintiff must show that, in the totality of circumstances, ,,the political processes leading to nomination and eleetion were not equally open to par- ticipation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did oth- er residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legisla- tors of their choice." White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766, 93 S.Ct. at 2BB9; see 42 U.S.C.A. S 1973b. Under neither test does the failure of a minority group to translate its voting strength into proportional repre- sentation suffice to establish a lack of ac- cess. Whitcomb u. Chauis, 403 U.S. at 156-60, 9i S.Ct. at 187*77; 42 U.S.C.A. 1973b. t3l Both the constitutional jurispru- dence and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act have employed a group of objeetive evidentiary factors to measure the discrimi- natory effect of a voting praetice or proce- dure on minority voters. See White a. Regester, 412 U.S. at ?6G{9, 98 S.Ct. at 233941; Zimmer o. McKeithen, 48b F.2d at 1305-{6; S.Rep. No. 417,97th Cong.,2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in, tgSZ U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 177, 20G{7 (report of 18. Some courts have identified two separate the- ories under which a plaintiff might show rhat a redistricting plan discriminates invidiously. E.9., Zimmer t McKeithen, 485 F.2d ar 1304. According to these cases, a plaintiff may shou, either a "racially motivated gerrymander"- Gonillion v. Lighr/oot, 364 U.S. 339, 8l S.Cr. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d ll0 (1960) is the paradigmatic cas€-or an apportionment scheme that oper- ales lo cancel out the voting strength of a mi- noritl' group. E.9., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at?66-70,93 S.Cr. at 233941. The nvo lines of cases were theoretically dislinct because the lat- ter, or "dilution," line of cases did not, under earlier interpretations, require a sho*,ing of in- tent, *,hile a racial gerrymander did contem- 68I FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT -. Committee on the Judiciary endoraing lgg2t amendmer-'ts to the Voting nigl,t" e.ti The factols include historical inqri"l". "uii,as the effects of past discrimination, indicia of race or ethnicronscious polities Buch as polarized voting, and formal'obstacles to minority success at the polls such as anti- single shot voting requirements or majority vote rules. The objective factors aid in distinguishing mere political failure from unlawful deprivation of political participa- tion. t4l Despite the common purpose and evidentiary focus, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act demands a less exaeting burden of proof. To find that an electoral system violates the constitution, a court must de. termine that the discriminatory impact of the system derived from the intent to bring about that result. See Rogers a. Lodge, 458 U,S. 613,6t6-22,102 S.Ct. 3272,3275_ 78,73 L.Ed.Zd 1012 (1982); City of Mobite a. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-21, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 149${1, 64 L.Ed.zd 47 (1980)(plurali- ty opinion of Stewart, J.\; accord id. at 99-101, 100 S.Ct. at 1516-151? (White, J., dissenting). The objective factors in White and Zimmer may, but do not necessarily, support an inference of intent. Compare City of Mobile a. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 72- 74, 100 S.Ct. at 1502-1503 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.) (objective factors "far from proof" of discriminatory purpose) with Rogers a. Lodge,458 U.S. at 623-27, l0Z S.Ct. at 3279-81 (finding evidence, based principally on objeetive factors, sufficient to support inference of discriminatory in- plate a showing of intenr. See Zimmer v. McKeithen,485 F.2d ar 1304. We do not think that this distinction has clearly survived later developments in the law. Thus, some courts have treated what were es- sentially racial gerrymander claims as voting dilution cases. See e.g., Kirksey v. Board ol Supervisors, 554 F.2d t39, t4243 (5th CiO (en banc) (claim that single-member districr lines fragmented cohesive black community), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 512, 54 L.Ed.2d 454 (1977). Furthermore, a dilurion claim brought under the constitution musl no\^. in- clude proof of discriminatory intent. Rogers r,. lndge, 458 U.S. 613, 6tGI9, 102 S.Cr 3272, 3275-77,73 L.Ed.2d l0l2 (l982) tent). Ui Rights Ac lish a viol tory rcsu) through tl . tors. Seo No. 417 a, Cong. & I Althoug vant to bo ry inquiry different must discr tors under tests. Th how the r districts c voting pra A. The tsl Bef cases that of voting , quired a s. To harmor with the st protection Arlington ing Deuelt s.ct. 555, preme c/ou 19. Origina a cause ol ment. Se (filed Jan. fifteenth a presently s rality opin amendmer contempla pose. 446 (opinion o ion goes c ment exler from inter and vote. other Jusl greed with l0O S.Ct. a id. at 102, ing); id. a shall, J., d that the p: ment remi 619 n.6, l( nol arguecl I I i t ) h f.b b b h h nr > s t. tent). Under section 2 of the Voting intent requirement into the voting dilution Rights Act, howewr, a plaintiff can estab, line of cases for the Iirst time.m Section 2 lish a violation by showing thc diserimina- represents Congresl' judgment that focus- tory result, whieh in turn can be proven ing on intent diverts attention from thd through the aggregate of the objective fac- crucial issue-+quality of access. S.Rep. tors. See 42 U.S.C.A. 5 19?3(b); S.Rep. No. 41? at 16, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. No. 417 at 2$-30 & n. 118, 1982 U.S.Code News at 193. iIERAAZAS v. CLEMENIS ctr6 u 3tt r.bupp. tizs (lrsa) 1343 Originally, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act had merely tracked the wording of the fifteenth amendment,zr and the Supreme Court read its provisions as coextensive with the constitution. Bolden,446 U.S. at 60-61, 100 S.Ct. at 1495-1496 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). In June of 1982, Congress amended the Act to prohibit elec- toral systems that had invidious resulls even though the systems might not clearly have been installed in order to discriminate. The Act presently reads: (a) No voting qualification or prerequi- site to voting, standard, practice, or pro- cedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 19?3b(fl(2) of this title [which applies the Act's protection to members of any lan- in this case lo impose a standard different or more liberal than the fourteenth amendment or the Voting Rights Act. The MALDEF Interve- nors did not include the fifteenth amendment claim in their statement of issues of fact and law remaining in controversJ'. We do not there- fore consider the scope of thc fifteenth amend' ment separatel)'. 20. Lower courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, had rcad Arlingtott Heights and related cases as applying to voting dilution claims. See Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.zd 2O9,217- 25 (5th Cir.l978). 21. When enacted on August 6, 1965, the statute had read: No voting'qualification or prerequisite to vot- ing, or standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed b1' an1'State or political subdivi- sion to deny or abridge the right of any citi- zen of thc united states to vote on accounl of race or color. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Title I, S 2,79 Stat.437. I I I I I r ? Cong. & Ad.News at 20G{7 & n. 118. Although the objective factors are rele- vant to both the constitutional and statuto- ry inquiry, each test relies upon them for different inferences. Accordingly, we must discuss the significance of these fac- tors under the constitutional and statutory tests. This discussion will also eonsider how the configurations of single-member districts can constitute a discriminatory voting practice or procedure. A. The Section 2 Test. 15] Before Bolden and the lower court cases that anticipated its holding, the law of voting dilution had never expressly re- quired a showing of discriminatory intent. To harmonize the law of voting dilution with the standard prevailing in other equal protection cases,le see generally Village of Arlington Heights u. Metropolitan Hous- ing Deuelopment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.zd 450 (1977), the Su- preme Court in Bolden explicitly read an 19. Originally, the MALDEF Intervenors pleaded a cause of action under the fifteenth amend- ment. See Complaint in Intervention at 14 (filed Jan. 4, 1982). The application of the fifieenth amendmenl to voting dilution cases presently stands in an uncertain state. The plu- rality opinion in Bolden states that the fifteenth amendmenl, like the fourteenlh amendment contemplates a showing of discriminatory pur- pose. 446 U.S. at 61-62, l0o S.Ct. at 1496-1497 (opinion of Stewart, J.). Ultimately, the opin- ion goes on to state that the fifteenth amend- ment extends only to protecting black citizens from interference with their right lo register and vote. ld. at 65,100 S.Ct. at 1498. The onll other Justices who considered the issue disa- greed with the plurality analysis. Id al 85-86, l0O S.Ct. al l5O9-1510 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. ar lO2, l0O S.Ct. at 1517 (White, J., dissent- ing); rd at t25-35, 100 S.Ct. at l53l-36 (Mar- shall, J., dissenting). Rogers v. Lodge suggests rhat the precise scope of the fifteenth amend- ment remains an open question. 458 U.S. at 519 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. ar 3276 n.6. The parties have n(,t argued rhat lhe fifteenth amendment applies 1344 58I FEDERAL .SUPPLEMENT grlg_" minority], as provided in subsec_ tion 0) of this section. .. --"""" (b) A violation of subsection (a) of thissection is established if, based ;; d;totality of circumstanees, it is ,f,o*n tf,ri the political processes f"uairg t"-norlni- tion or eleetion in the StatJ r; ;;i;;l;;subdivision are not equally ,p;";';;;: ticipation by memberJ of a ciass ,f ;iti zens protected by subseetion (a) of this section in that its members h;; [;;opportunity than other members "f ;h; electorate to participate i, tfr. prfltL"l process and to elect representatives oitheir choice. The extent to which meml bers of a protected class have b;;; ;i;;; ed to office in the State or political subdi- vision is one circumstan.u thut mrr,-;; considered: proaided, fhat nottrins inthis section establishes a righl a; ;r;; members of a protected clasls "tuo"a in numbers equal to their proporti", i; d;population. 42 U.S.C.A. S 19Zg (West Supp.198B). . The-Janguage of the Act, whieh derives from -Wh.ite o. Regester,4lZ U.S. "t i66, 9; U:,T.!" House report endorsed an earlicr vcrsionor lhc seclion 2 amendment, H.n.f f f Z, SZihCong., tst Sess., which h.a in.o.por"r.J'u',:*' suhs" lesr wilhour rhc d"finiii",iri r.,"iilr'il,subsecrion (b) of thc final bill, ;"a'J,i.lrri'ri. caveal aboul proportional r"pr.r.n,o,iun.-'ft" rrnar language of thc bill resulted f.o. , .o.-promisc in the Senare Committee on rt. :Jili- 1_v. See S.Rep. No. 417 ar 3, 1982 t.aril; !ong. & Ad.Nervs ar 180 (hisrory "] ifr.; i,fil.Arguabl5,, the House Report is, u. u ,".rtr,-i"..a-uthoritalive on the meaning of the e.r.- i-rnthe Hcr-usr. floor debares f"ff"*i"g i"""," nlrls,age_.of tht' measurc, horvcver, ir app"ar.. fharthe House merelv vieu.ed ,r," ..rnpl"rnir" ir"- Euagc as a clarificarion "f rn" H,r,j."l o",-igii"iintenr. 128 Cong.Rec. H3gaa (dai11: ";. ;;:;;,t98l). 23. Thc dcvclopment of rhe constirutional iuris.prudcnce on voring dilurion h". ";; Ir;.:.:i;;; lnstances in uhich courts have a.guabl1,r".:isJ the meaning of earlier. cases. In the SuprcmeCnurr, for example, thc Bolden pi;;;lj,;;"b;;1:rj' announced thar ihc Wite r. Regcit", cas",which conlemporan. courts hud ,;,^"; ;.":resutts casc, required a shou,ing of discrinrin:r,torv inrcnr. See Bolden,416 U.S. "r eS_20,"i00 ?,S, ,i] ]tq?-,s01. (pluralirr opirrion ot st"r,,r,iJ..1. r.\'cn lhc author of rhc t,purion in Wttitt rl. R_egester apparcntl-r agr (.cd. 5", Orta"rr,"'lid U.S. ar l0l-O3, rUi S ir. ar rstT_18 (\\.hirc, i., S.Ct. at 2889, air4s at codifying pregolden case law. See H.R.Rep. N;.'zqt, iiti Cong., lst Sess. 29-80 (Hous" Co.m;Iil; on the Judiciary recommending ,,""suits'i amendment to section Z of the V;ti"" IrF .!:t)t_,, s.Rep. No. tn it rti. 27-28, tgBZ U.S.Code Cong. & ea.N"ru.li 192-202, 20446. Congress viewed pre- Bolden case law as evaluating tf," ai.cjmi natory nature of the electoral .y.t". inquestion solely on the basis of oU:".li"" criteria.23 ld., l9g2 U.S.Code Cong. &-Al. News at t96-202,20446. To "id ;, ;p;i; ing section 2, Congress enumerated typical objective factors derived *o^ wilir'"ii Zimmer: 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched tf,e rlghi oi il; members of the minority grouf t" "";;;_ter, to vote, or otherwise to p"rtl.ip"ti in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or politicalsubdivi- sion is racially polarized; dissenring). A panel of rhe Fifrh Circuil under-took a similar reinterprelalio n of Zf *rrrr- r,.M_cKeithen. See Neveir v. Sides, 571 F.2d at22U228. In both insrances, fellow ju;isi;;i;: crzed^r'hal the1. perceivcd ". "" ir;";:i.,;";.rec botde,z, 446 U.S. ar 103_4t, tO0 S.Cr. ar ].5-ll-39 (Marshall, J., disscnling); U"u",i, Sii I..-rO, u, 23r-38 (Wisdom, :., .p""liollr .""*r-rlngr. S C 2 4 Z C m Ultinratelv, thc rcasoning in l,lthite t. Regesterand Zintntcr t,. McKeitlu.n u,ill bear "ith;;;;;- 1"11. *l1l presenl purpos.r, ho.r", "..'C;;;;;;nas. madc clear its undcrstanding rhrt , ."orriundcr seclion 2.should applt Wie ^"a Li"rril)as purel\. "resulls,,cascs. Scc S.Rep. No. l7 ai28-n. Ilt, t982 U.S.Codc Cong. & Ad.N;; ;;20.5-06 n. I I I (.,This commirrei do", ,or ,i.fianr vicu of White as requiring plainriii,".*Ii s()mc objccliuc dcsign,rest that is, in cffccl, aversion of thc ,forcsecablc consequences, tcst oftort Iarv.") ( tJg Cong.Rcc. H3g4l (dailv ed.Junc 23. re82) (rcmaik, "f R;;. 'S";:";i.;;. L"I). Sec also S.Rep. No. qll 'ar lg_Zq, LISZU.S.Codc Cong. & Aj.Neu.s at t9e202 (revieu..ing prior casc lau. and Congressionuf'-rrl", standing of -Wite ). \4,hateveith" p..;";;;;; ::.1::l.l .o[ carll ,voring diturion .;r"r:;;';;, Longrcss has scl lh(. courts lo thc task of givingthcnr mcaning as .,rcs!rlls,, ? : :,:,:i i | " c:,, r' " i " "ili t. i ],li' ; of " i .f10" ",:i {{,1O7l-72 (6rh Cir.lgfi:) (r,t, ng€,ci t.; lnqrir"-int.,purp()sc undcr ;rnit r,L; , ,,(.tr(r1t 2). A I I I I ( I l .,] c ir , rrtnlz^ls v.'GLEIIENTSI 1345 Cltc u ttt FSuPP' t329 (t964) S.theextenttowhichthestateorpolit-"vhetherthepoliqyunderlyingthe ical subdivision has used unusuplly large state or political sub{ivision's use of such election districts, majority vote require- voting qualification"'prerequisite to vot- ments, anti-single shot provisions, or oth- "'g' It'na"td' practice or procedure is / ", ,oiing po"ti.". o, p'otedu'es that tenuous' may enhance the opportffi f* il;; S'Rep' No' 417 atzg' 1982 U'S'Code Crcng' ffi ; against,r; ;r,'Jlt,l *;ff " - - {,*#:,- ;r:'.:3; f TJil#: "fr :"r?;r'* 4. if there is a candidate slattng.pro- I." not an all-encompassing catalogue.of cess, whether the members of the mln:rl: tt " f""to."r that mark a system as discrim- ty group have been denied access to that i*rO, but rather guides for discerning process; *f,ethlt race or language unduly deter- ;' the extent to which the members of tin" ttt" outcome of political events' The the minority group in the state or politi- Senate report noted: cal subdivisi* b""' the effects of dis- The courts ordinarily have not used these crimination in such areas as education' i"tto"' nor does the committee intend ;;;Ity*;;' and health' which hinders ti't* to be used' as a mechanical "point- their ability to p"ttltip"L effectively in tountlng" device'-. The failure of the the political process; pi"intifis to.establish any particular fac- 6. whether political campaigns have [or is not rebuttab]e evidence of nondilu- been characterized by overt or subtle ra- tion' Rather' the provision requires the ciar appeals; ou"^':"""".=:,' ;m:;":ll#3AT::i'":::1,::rT; 7. the extent to which members of the if,o." '""f"u"nt factors in the particular minority group have been elected to pub- .r.", "f whether the voting strength of lic office in the jurisdiction. .i*rity voters is, in the language of S.Rep. No' 477 at 2v2g' 1982 U'S'Code io't"oi and Buras lu' Richardson' 384 Cong. & Ad.News at 206-0?; H'R'Rep' No' U'S' Ze' 86 S'Ct' 1286' 16 L'Ed'zd 376 221al30(footnotesomitted);cf'White'(1966)1"'minimizedorcaneelledout'" 412 U's' at ?66-?0' 93 s'ct' at 2339-41; S'Rep' No' 417 at29 n'-118' 1982 u'S'Code n**u' 485 F'zd at 1305' ln addition' cong' o Ad'News at 207 n' 118' congr".. cited two other factors that Thus, when a minority group-contends ;ifi;;-"" limited rele'ance: that an electoral system disenfranchises whether there is a significant lack of if,"* f".""te their race or ethnicity has responsivener. on tt " pita "i"f**a "f decisive political significance' the objective ficials to the particularized needs of the i".tor. provide indicia of how great a role members of the minority group. race or ethnicity plays,25 and how severe 24.Althoughthesefinaltwofactorsu,ereentitledtoshorvpretcxt.^See-Robinsonv.Commissiott. to u'eight under the tfri'i'zr*'n"' analvsis' ';'";;;';50s F'2d 674' 680 (5th cir'1974)' co.r*"i, explicitly accorded them less weight 25. Se*eral factors can confirm that race is at ;;;:;-;.ii;;2.'tn rh" case of unresponsive. -"ir."" i"ii," potitical system. Racial campaign' ness, the senate report disapproved the vieu ;;;- f* -'"xa*pl"' diiecrlv demonstrates that that unresponsi"n"" *ut-u'''essential element ;;tt; ;;'"; l;;''"' Likewiie' racial bloc voting of a voting dilution claim' and staled'' moreover' t"sg*ti1"1 minorit) candidates lose precisell that a showing of t"'pon'i'"ness did not negate ;;e;t; of lheir "t" s" Rogers v' Lodge"4'58 a plaintiffs.r"lm' s'n"p' No' atz ur zc n' iro' i'.i ; 623' loz s'cl' at 3279 ("without bloc 1982 u'SCode cong' a ia'Nervs at 207 n ll6' ioti"s tt'" minority candidates would not lose This sratement .orn,...'l'.onr.a.y sugg",tio: ;i";i;"s solely beta's" of their race")' Even in lodge v. Burron, olsilJ iis'8, tiis (srt' "i..i","f defear by minoritv candidates can Cir.l98l), afl'd sub """,'nZi"" ''' t"1s" ^!l! poin' tn.racial content in political contests; U.S.613, 102 S.Cr. tzlz,"iilEii,.zd IOl2il982). 'such evrdencc raiscs the common sense in[er' In the case of t""'o"t'"J''"''r* itt'"' u'eiglrt is ;;;; th'i i[b]"tu"" it is sensible to expect that consisrenr u,irh rhe .;r*!'t; ".fr,rri.-rro- ;i'l;r-.;-.";J blacks [or hispanics] would have intenr to results. il;*p;;;.1;;i prc,bxri\c [""n "r".,"a .. the .fact that none halc is weighr of a tenuous srat., pc;lic\.is ir. pr,,i..r,sit: irrfr,,,i,.t ,lt'idt"t" .f purposeful cxclusion " r346 58I FEDERAL,SUi'PLETIENT' are the probable effects.26 The objg'ctive factors offer a framework to distinguish an unlawful electoral system in which consid- erations of race or ethnicity pervade poli- tics to the serious detriment of the minori- ty, from a permissible electoral system in which the racial and ethnic composition of the elected body simply does not mirror that of its constituency. See generally S.Rep. No. 417 at 33, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 211.27 B. The Constitutional Stand,ard t6l The constitutional standard also in- quires into the extent to which raee and ethnicity mobilize the electorate and com- bine with a voting practice to dilute the minority's voting strength. The results of a voting practice, however, only begin the analysis. As the Supreme Court has em- phasized, only the most severely discrimi- natory results will suffiee to invalidate fa- cially neutral rules. ln Arlington Heights, for example, the Court stated: Determining whether invidious dis- criminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The im- pact of the official action-whether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," Wosh.in.gton a. Dauis, [426 u.s. 229, 242 [96 S.Cr. 2040, 2049, 48 L.Ed.zd 597 (19?6) Fmay provide an im- portant starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds Id. at 623-24, t02 S.Ct. at 3279. Although the infcrence of purpose may be of secondarl im- port under seclion 2, the inference of exclusion, purposcful or not, remains. 26. Some of the factors do not meaningfullf' ad- vance the inquiry inlo u'hether race is at issue, but do signal that the effects of any racial con- tent in politics u,ill be exaggerated. Thus, the existencc of a praclice such as an anti-single shot voting provision, or a majority vote re. quircmcnl does not, in itself, indicate that race has particular importance in the State or politi- cal subdivision that employs it. The practice, hou'cver, does have the potcntial to magnify the cffccts of race- or language-conscious politics. ()thcr factors, including a history of political clls.'irnirralion or thc socioeconomic effects of r'r j.. i.rl discrirrinalion, presumprivell explain other than race, emerges from the effect d the state action even when the golrern- ing legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo a. Hopkins,ll8 U.S. 356 [6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220] (1886); Guinn a. United States,238 U.S. 347 [35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 13a01 (1915); Lane a. Wilson, 30? U.S. 268 [59 S.Ct. 872, 88 L.Ed. 12811 (1939\; Gomillion a. Light- foot, 364 U.S. 339 [81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1960). The evidentiary in- quiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence. 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 564 (footnotes omitted). This "other evidence" may consist of an indirect showing that the decision-makers contemplated the discriminatory result. Thus, in Arlington Heights, the Court sug- gested that a plaintiff may demonstrate intent circumstantially through evidence of: (i) the historical background of the deci- sion; (2) the sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision; (3) procedural or substantive departures from normal de- cision-making; and (4) statements, includ- ing legislative or administrative history, re- flecting on the purpose of the decision. 1d. at 267-68,97 S.Ct. at 564-65. Clearly, some of the objective factors can perform "double duty," shedding light on both the result of a voting practice and its reduced minoritt' political participation. See Kirksel'v Board ol Supcrvbors,554 F.2d at 145 & n. 13 (past political discrimination); Mclntosh County NAACP v. Ciry o/ Darien, 6O5 F.2d 753, 759 (sth Cir.l979). Oncc again, rcduccd partici- palion can exacerbatc the effects of a racialll or ethnicalll' polarized elecloral process. 27. The opponents of the amendmcnts to section 2 principally contended that the Act would, de facto, require proportional repreientation, bc- cause lhe objectivc factors werc simply too mcaningless to allou courts adequately to assess rvhcn an electoral slslem was discriminalor-t', and not merely disproportionate. See Thc Vot- ing Rights Act: Report of the Subcorr.rnrittce on the Constilulion of the Scnate Commiuec on thc Judiciary,9Tth Cong., lst Scss. 37*38, reprinted in, 1982 U.S.Codc Cong. & Ad.Nes,s 278, 316-18. purp( 875, I ing d cY, I form cont€ ident wise of th ates electr out I ers o 3279. De tors tern ore show histo the d dure, tY, P 102 I ter, 41). fack LodS 327& howt tive indel prot/ rule pose at 1i J.). C. M and of s, dres orr of tl not cont Nev sing test f , TERRAZAS v. CLEME}'ITS 1347 F F E t6 p; 16 ?. lB t- 5 l!' fi 18 ,, d t s n 6 L t- E [: i- p I F t- .' Clte u 3tl FSuPP' f329' (t9t4) purpose. See Cross a. Boxter,r604 -F'zd inteni to apply sectiop 2's prohibition on ' 8?5, 880 n. 9 (5th Cir.19?9) (histo.ry of voL discrimination to all vbting practices' See ing discrimination). A";;';;t;Lte poti S'Rep' No' 41? at 30' 1982 U'S'Code Cong' / cy, for example, pro'id"' precisely the & Ad'News * 207 ' iii* "r circumstantial showing of intBnt The Supreme Court has seemingly treat- contemplated by the Artington-Heifuts-.9v- ed single-member districting plans as dis- identiary scheme' Polari"zed voting like- tinct flom atJarge systems' For example' wise elucidates the rtitt"tit"r backiround in Connor a' Finch' 431 U'S' 407' 422-25' ofthevotingpracticeorprocedure;itcre-9?S'Ct'1828'1837-39'52L'Ed'zd465 ates a political climate that "allows those (19??), the court intimated that the district- elected to ignore frninoriiii interests with- ing auttrority must purposefully draw lines outfearofpolitical"on."qr"n."r)'-Rog-to-canceloutminoritypoliticalstrengthin ersu.Lodge,458.U.S.ateZS,102S'Ct'atordertoviolatetheconstitution'The 3279. Court' however' decided Connor after Ar' Determining whether the objective fac-'#::"r:#^y![ ;l*rtS:ilT tIXIJ:}: [:;Hl;'ill?J;Y1i'i""Ty';ffi1*:3:: ence to rower court "utt'o'itv interpreting or a sufficiently strong circumstantia 1 Regester' Loyer courts have found that showing or intent, ;;;;". ;" brend. or [1;:iifr".[1*S1,3,'J,T'';; ,*;:,;::;, history"and an intensely local appraisal of b54 F.2d at 143. the design and impact" of the voting proce- dure "in light of tt" pa.t "na p'e'eii'"ali- Several of the "objective factors" apply ty, political and otherwis'e'" iee id' at 622' readily to single-member districts' For ex- 102 S.Ct. at 3278 (quoting White u' Reges- ample' a minority that votes in single-mem- ter, 4l2U.S. at ZOS-?0,-SS S'Ct' at 2339- beidistricts will be affected equally by any 41). Occasionally, evidence of the objective history of discrimjnation' and equally sus- factors will warrant relief. Rogers t. ceptibie to the effects of depressed socioe- Lod.ge,458 U.S. at 622-627, fOZ S'Ct' at conomic eircumstances' Likewise' racial 327u3281. Under the constitutional test' bloc voting will support the same inferenc- however,acourtmustgobeyondtheobjec-esofracialpoliticsandmaybearthesame tive faetors to a"srrre'ileir ii''t the record pio'p"tt for ensuring perpetual electoral independently ..titt'"t it't general equal iete"t' whether it occurs in an at-large or a protection standard tnui"-fu-"i"fly neutral single-member districting plan' rule must derive from discriminator]' pur- t71 The structure of a single-member p"...- r'la'n, nao ui' aL72-74' roo S'ct' alstricting plan' however' does not have the at 1502-1503 Or""riti opinion of Steu'art' tat" inl'"t"'t tendency to submerge the I\ Jo".. As the Eighth Circuit has noted: C- Speeial Problems of single-Member vote dilution occurs when an at-large Districts' " "lection plan is used to cancel out the Muchofthe..votingdilution,,caselarr.,votingstrengthofasubstantialminority and indeed most of the legislative historl' pop'Ltion' Typicallv' a relatively small of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act' ad- geograp}ic area of a municipality will be dresses the design ;;;;d'i "r i:]i:I: m,t':"3,1,r,L"T"1'lll",r?"Jl "*l::X ii,ilJ::}".Tff; $:11'oT;.,ffi":;::::r:: -":",i,v of a singre ,,,",nuu,. di.tricr if an not alu'a.v-s translate to'nto"t"Utu into the election-bv-district voting scheme was context of single-member districting' used instead of an at-large scheme' Nevertheless, .t rd;;.- for dealing with Pt,rl;irrs r'. citg of w'est Helena,6?5 F'2d single-meml'e. ai.tittt 'Jer the "result's" 'ri1 -lrr:; ri 2 (8th Cir'1982)' Provided that testarenecessaryrnlightofCongressionaltit.,ril',.t'ir.tsareequallyapportioned,sin. I I I I t I I i 58T FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTr348 L gle-member districts do not obviously dilute voting strength. Only refereace to the mi- nority composition of the district and the manner in which the district lines are drawn can change such plans into devices with discriminatory results. The minority composition of single-mem- ber districts may have the effect of cancel- ling out voting strength in two ways. First, district line-drawing may pack a mi- nority into homogenous districts, thus "wasting" its potential political strength. See Wright a. Rockefellea 376 U.S. 52, 57, 84 S.Ct. 603, 605, 11 L.Ed.2d 512 (1964). Alternatively, the district line-drawing might fragment minority groups among several districts, thus preventing the form- ation of a local majority. See Eobinson a. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir.19?a). While easy to state in the abstract, iden- tifying when "packing" or "fragmenting" deprives a- minority of access can present difficult problems. One difficulty stems from the uneertainty about what district configuration best sen'es the minority po- litical interest. For example, in Wright, the Court noted that there was disagree- ment between the minority plaintiffs and intervenors not only about u'hether concen- trated or dispersed districts were prefera- ble, but also over whether the concentrated or dispersed districts were constitutionally permissible. 376 U.S. at 57-58, 84 S.Ct. at 60H06. Moreover, the feasibility of con- centrated or dispersed districts ma]' varv depending on the pattern in u'hich minority group has settled. Whereas splitting up a cohesive minority population might, under the totality of the circumstances, cancel out minority political strength, Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 149-50, every movement of a cohe- 2E. Howard provides an illustration of the diffi- cultics that can occur with respect to single member districts. In a rcapportionmenl plau, thc county board of supervisors split a segment of a black majoritl- district lo combinc it with a u,hite majorit] district. The overall effect of the plan rvas to leave the former black dislricl u'ith a smaller but still substantial majoritl; thc for' mer u'hite district remained u'ith a smaller but still substantial majority'. In rejecting the dilu' tion claim, the coun noted: sive mihority population out of a single district does not dilute voting strength. Howard u. Adams County Board of Su- pentisors, 453 F.zd 455, 458-59 (5th Cir. l9'12).28 What will show the requisite dilution? In many cases, the ultimate conclusion has turned on purpose rather than results. 8.9., Robinson, 505 F.2d at 679. In Kirk- sey, the lead pre-Bolden case in which a plaintiff prevailed without a specific find- ing of purpose, the requisite dilution de- rived from: (1) the eohesiveness of the community; (2) the fragmentation of the community; (3) deviation from expected district lines; (4) a pattern of racial bloc voting; and (5) a history of discrimination. The result was a "predictable tendency" to cancel out and minimize the rninority vote. Kirksey,554 F.zd at 14?-51. V. THE OBJECTIVE F'ACTORS. We next consider the evidence on the objective factors. The MALDEF Interve- nors offered evidence on a history of offi- cial discrimination, the socioeconomic ef- fects of general discrimination, polarized voting, a lack of success by hispanic candi- dates, and a tenuous state policy. The discussion that follows, which will consti- tute findings of fact, will consider each of these factors. A. History of Official Discimination and the Lingering Effects o.[ Gener- al Discimination. We first consider two factors together: the history of official discrimination touch- ing on political participation and the linger- ing socioeconomic effects of general dis- crimination. In this case, MALDEF of- fered similar evidence with regard to both Inevitably, people of different racC\, nation- al origins, and contrasting tenets will be shift- cd under reapportionment plans to districts in which thel' ma] no longer be in the clear majoritl'. But rvhen, as hcrc, no racial moti- vation spau'ns a changc in thc voting arca of thosc complaining, and thc redistricting plan does not unconstituli(rnirl!r' dilutc lhc voting strenglh of lhe mit.ir,r'rt' !lr, t. is rro abridg'c ment of vc,tinE right:. Id. ar 459. of these drawn fr, overlap. litical par Although tion can that a f state po consider The M evidence and offic cipally, t judicial n In additir nesses d status oi nature o As th the Statr ed again u. Barnt affd in 412 U.S. (1973), I consider guage t official, ercise ol As the r Becau cial, I widesl custol dices, some can-A amou suffe from. discr, ofe healt Th politi is af 29. Set 2lli ( Iii' ' TERRAZAS V. CLEMENTS Cltc r.5El F.Sur. 132.!) (t9&r) r349 by a deficient I dngle bgth f su- n Cir. rtion? n has eults. Kirk- rich a find- n de- f the f the eeted bloc Ition. y" to vote. r the en-e- offi- c ef- rized andi- The rnsti- :h of ttiort m(r- Ltrer: ruch- rSer- dis- ' of- bottr Iion- 3hifr- Es in ilcar moli' la of .plan LrtIug idg.- of these faetors, and the irferences to be which has been fostered drawn from the presence of these factors education syst€m' overlap. Both faetors explain reduced po' litical participation by the minority group'8e Although a history of official discrimina' tion can support an additional inference- that a facially neutral rule continues a state policy of discrimination 30-we will consider that inference separately' The MALDEF Intervenors have offered evidence of discrimination-both private and official-through several means' Prin- cipally, they seek to rely on this Court's iuaiciat notice of the findings in prior case.s' in addition, statistical evidence and live wit- nesses described the present socioeconomic status of Dallas hispanics and the reduced nature of hispanic political activity' As the MALDEF Intervenors suggest, the State of Texas, in the past, discriminat- ed against its hispanic citizens' ln Graues a. Bintes,343 F.Supp. ?04 (W'D'Tex'1972)' affd in part sub nom. White u' Regester, 4i2 u.s. ?55, 93 s.ct. 2332, 3? L.Ed'zd 314 (19?3), for example, the court extensively considered the combined effeets of the lan- guage barrier, private discrimination, and ofti.i"t discrimination on the hispanics' ex- ercise of the franchise. Id. at 731 & n' 19' As the court stated: Because of long standing educational, so- cial, legal, economic, political and other widespread and prevaient restrictions' customs, traditions, biases and preju- dices, some of a socalled' de jure and some of a de .facto character, the Mexi- can-American population of Texas, which amounts to about 2011 , has historicalll' suffered from, and continues to suffer from, the results and effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the fields of education. employment, economics, health, Politics and others' There can be no doubt that the laek of political participation by Texas Chicanos is affected by a cultural incompatibility 29. See Perkins v. City of West Helena' 675 F '2d ar 211; Cross v' Barter,604 F'2d at 880-82 & n 9: KirkseY,554 F.2d at 143 & n 13' This cultural and language impediment, conjoined with the poll tax and the most restrictive voter registra- tion procedures in the nation have oper- ated to effectively deny Mexican-Ameri- cans access to the political process in Texas even longer than the Blacks were formally denied access by the white pri- mary' Id. at 728-31. In addition, the MALDEF Intervenors ask us to note that school au- thorities in parts of Texas have maintained dual school systems that segregated his- panic students from their anglo counter- p"ttt. See United States u. Teras, 342 F.Supp. 24 (E'D'Tex'19?1); Cisneros a' Corpus Christi Independent School Sys- tem, 324 F.Supp. 599 (S.D.Tex'19?0)' As the MALDEF Intervenors also sug- gest, the Dallas County hispanic population has not achieved educational levels compa- rable to either the anglo or black popula- tions. Thus, whereas only 18'7% of the black population and 9.9% of the anglo population have proceeded no further than Llementary school, 46.9% of the hispanic population has not gone beyond e)ementary sctool. Although the hispanic population, on the average, has higher income levels than the black population, the hispanic av- erage is nevertheless lower than the anglo average. VI Trial Transcript 149 (testimo- ny of Frederick Cervantes). The evidence aiso showed that mean housing values in predominately hispanic areas were signifi- cantly lower than the mean housing values for anglo areas. II Trial Transcript 404-06 (testimony of Dudley Poston)' On the ba- sis of tlris regord, we conclude that Dallas hispanics suffer serious socioeconomic dis- advantage. Several witnesses, both for the MALDEF Intervenors and the State Defendants, tes- 30. Cross v. Barter,604 F.2d at 880 n' 9; Kirksey v. Board ol Supervisors,554 F'2d at l'l-1-'14 58I FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT1350 tified that di'scrimination against hispanig4 has not only occurred in the past, but con- tinues at least in parts of Texas. 8.g., ly Trial Tlanscript 1117 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale). Still other witnesses testified about the feeling among hispanic candi- dates and voters in Dallas County that political action is futile. VI Trial Tran- seript 76, 82 (testimony of Trinidad Garua\. Moreover, the evidence shows that hispan- ics participate infrequently in politics as measured both by voter registration and turnout. For example, 1983 P-I Exh. S? supp. indicates that only about one-half of the hispanic voting age population in Dallas County regist€rs to vote. Accordingly, we conclude that discrimination and its socioe- conomic effects have decreased hispanic po- litical participation.3r Finally, we consider the offer by the MALDEF Intervenors of the findings of the Department of Justice on electoral practices in the November, 1982 elections. According to the findings, Dallas election officials ran short of ballots, and a dispro- portionately large number of the precincts affected were predominately minority. 1983 P-I exh. 34. In addition, notices warning of the consequences of illegal vot- ing were posted during the election, again largely in minority precincts. The findings allegedly bespeak continued official dis- crimination. While we might accept these findings to indicate that Dallas election officials were insufficiently solicitous of minority voters, we do not attach great weight to the find- ings as signifying intentional political dis- crimination. As the report indicates, the ballot shortage resulted from inaccurate computer forecasts of voter turnout. No discussion appears in the report concerning the prevalance of, or the reasons for, the notices concerning illegal voting. Whether these incidents constituted intentional dis- crimination within the meaning of the Ar- lington Heights intent test is a question that could spawn an entire satellite litiga- 31. As Congress and the courts havc recognized, a relationship presumptivell, exists betu,cen rc- duced politic:rl parricipation and discrimina. tion-relatr.ri soc jocc onlrmic disadvantagc. ,4/r,/r- tion.' Neither party offered testimony to explain. rebut or supplement the findingsl As a result, we do not accord to the finding significant weight on the issue of official discrimination. Although the State Defendants do not seriously contend that hispanic political partieipation is free from the effects of past diserimination, the State adduced evi- dence to show that the State has attempted to improve minority participation. We have heard testimony that voters may now register more easily in Texas than in most other states. II Trial Transcript 392 (testi- mony of George Pierce). Registration forms are, in addition, readily available in Spanish. Moreover, the State has attempt- ed to improve registration by organizing voter registration drives. IV Trial Tran- script 89G-91 (testimony of Mark White). Despite these changes, which represent laudable attempts by the State to reverse the effects of the former political alienation of minorities, we find that the combined effect of these two factors point to discrim- ination-related reductions in hispanic politi- cal participation. While the State undoubtedly has had a history of official discrimination against mi- norities, the evidence adduced in this case strongly suggests that official discrimina- tion against minorities has ended, at least in Dallas County. Further, the entire pro- cess by which, following the 1980 census, the State of Texas drafted and adopted redistricting plans, culminating in the 1983 House plan, far from evidencing official discrimination, convincingly evidences full minority access to the redistricting process and a willingness on the part of almost all involved in that process to consider and effectuate minority proposals. This sug- gests that the 1983 House plan does not continue any past policy of official discrimi- nation. Indeed, it represents a dramatic break with that policy. Detailed fact find- ings relating to the redistricting process toslt Cotttttt ^|AACP r. City ol Darien, 605 F.2d at 759; Cros.. r. Ba.\ter, 604 F.2d at 881: accord S.Rcp. \,, 1li ar 2c n. ll4, 1982 U.S.Code C(rng. & .':,. ',( \\: at 206-07 n. I14. are 8et case, ?t 52&-36, Nevertl of offic objectiv against rcsulter ipation B. I The 1 prove I througl witness other cr with po impress anglos DEF IT on one primarl 103, wi At le gested blocs: I onstrat panics most k patt€rn and hir spectiv, mary ir anglo i date g predon examin vinces exist ir Dallas r9$ I 32. Ser ien, 6 45. r partic requir that i discrir fects. 33. Tes StTlOItl past ( to the -.__---.&- fto 186. etc icisl not ical of evi- 't€dWe los' tost sti- ion rin lpt- ing an- !e). ent nse ion red im- titi- lsl ro !6S rl1 nd tg- rot la mi- lse Ba- BS. Bd 83 ial ull nl- tic rd- BS al "dHc TERRAZAS ". il,puBxrs l35l .' Clteu5ErF.SuPP't329 (t9&t) aresetforthinourearlieropinioninthisequalopportunitytoparticipateinthepolit. ezse, Terraz* o. ctr*inn;, ;5;;:i*p.-;, t"ut pro."r. or elect candidates of their iir3o, and are hereby incorporated herein' choice' t' Nevertheless, in spite of the recent history of otti.i"t concern for minority needs and 1: The Euidence' objectives, the history of disc-rimination Cross-examination by the Stat€ Defend: against hispanics is not remote 32 and has ants revealed serious methodological short- rJ.rft"a in reduced hispanic^political partic' Iorirg. in the polarization studies' Nota- ipation at the present time'33 UfV, Oi. Brischetto, the principal MA-LDEF B. Polarized or Bloc Voting' expert' made no effort in his studies to rhe MALDEF lntervenors att€mpted to H:"JlrH,::i;:.?":l,T r:lif:1il: prove polarized voting in Dallas Countl' tion, income, campaign issues or education' ittougt three techniques' First, exper' tll Trial Transcript 628-30 (testimony of witneJses offered studies of polarization.in noU".t Brischetto). Moreover, Dr' Bris- other counties. Second, witnesses familiar .t"tlo .on."aed that he selected for study with politics in Dallas County related their those electoral races that pitted hispanie impressions about polarization between "unaia",". against "formidable" anglo op- "ngto. and hispanics. Finally, the MAL p".iii", In-addition, for his most detailed '"f}:':iJJffii'Jjffi.""&,j"j"il:ffi: "u'"jv'i'' Dr' Brischetto chose onrv the primary in the 1983 Hou-se district, district mosi over*helmingly anglo or hispanic pre- ioa, *itt the greatest r,i,p"nr' population' :T"'f$1t[il;Tl.::ffii'':itX,'X ffil: At least superficially, this evidence sug- lations. ffixTl;1"l"ti:l"L::,:Jffi;:l?:Ji*# Nor are these methodorogicar choices onstrate that the voting of anglos and his- trivial in the circumstances of this case' panics in oth", part -of Texis polarizes; The testimony' for example' suggested that most lay witnesses agreed that they saw party affiliation has' to some extent' patterns of strong support among. anglos Lclipsed ttre i19gt11ce of bloc voting in and hispanics fo, candidates of th"i' '"' Teias politics' V Trial Transcript 1253 (tes- spective ethnic groups; and the 1982 pri- timony of Dave Richards)' and Dr' Bris- mary in question ,..ujt"a in victory for the chetto's data revealed at least one race rn anglo incumlent *itt' 1ie hispanic candi- which party' rather than ethnicity' appar- date garnering .rppo"t *ost stronglf in ently determined hispanic voting prefer- predominately i,irp*i" frecincts. -ilo." "n... III Trial Transcript 63;36 (testimo- examination of the evidence, however' con- ny of Robert-Brischetto)' Similarly' ana- vinces us that such bloc voting as maJ* lyzing ethnically homogeneous precincts in exist in Dallas does not operate' as the counly-wide elections does not reliably Dallas districts are -riructur"a under the *"".u.. the extent to which mixed anglo lg83Houseplan,todenyhispanicsanandhispanicpopulationsinsingle.member S2.SeeMclntoshCountyNAACPv.Cityo|Dar.ITrialTranscriprar204-o8(testimonr-ofFrank ien,603F.2d at 75e; "iii?[v, sii i'iA ^'1 ta+- N"*po't;' Thi minorirv population in Texas 45. Erasing rf,. inr..l,l'J'ii ,.ir..Jp;iii.rr has a younger age structure than the Anglo participation in tf,. f".?IiJa.-n.. rr.f, ur_ttti= foprt"i"n, lnd,,it a result, would have lower iequires an affirmat'ii-e1nt*r"g tv the state L-i"o"' even '"!'ithout reference to the effects of that inten'ening tutnti -rt""t ti"at the prior aitttirnin"tion' Education' however' is affected discrimination '"t ttt"*-it "a-ity r"tt'"t tr iy: u ttitroty of discrimination' Accordingly' fects' /d' J+'ile we acknou'ledge that some 'reduction in 33. Testimonl' suggested thar lo* \oler lurnout turn()ut rvould be expected in the hispanic popu- among hispani.. aiil'oi']"'it ''nri'"t' f'o- litJ;:rJ'r.Ti.t,'r';'rt;";'.;,'llil5i::1"'"::lJi; oast iiscriminarion Votcr lilrrr' 't'l a'c ordinp io the evidence, r'aries *ith agc :r'1': c'lueatioi.t' p:r: l lr' lllt trro objerctivc fact<'rrs' 1352 -58I FEDERAI .SUPPIEMENT , districts wilr vote, nor does it measrbe the racial popuration mixture. As Dr. charresvoting patterns in tri-ethnic pru.in.t^, .r.t, c;L;;fi, ;;;;ir". oiorrna expert testified: ;:":lf""ill"?:ff f#,y;r*"":,1'jliJ^'I Raciarrv porarized. voting wourd have il,'.*;'::H',:[; ::S#lfffi y,T:: Hi:,.HT:TIr ffiff"j; ;_;,]ti# containing an unquantifiable bias i, f"uol ized voting and you could still ;[.4; of electorlal .oniui^ that are Iikely to shov minority person . . . but it mighr-very the most r"r"r" por"ri zation. r well te that the person 1is1 el"ciJ "loni . .Jh"r! rechniques not onrv brur the reria- :G,nff fi"*ffilIir'T"Hili "T: bility of the resurts, but.arso, ,r"; .;iil- maybe twenty vores-twenty percent ofically, study eonditions that io ,ot piJr the votes in non-,ninority precincts ....in the Dallas House distriets. rr," rtrar". If the phenomenon exists you have tolook at onry the most extrem" .u*"., uoit, take into consideration any kind of pranin terms of electoral :.ont.E ""a poprf"_ you draw for future elections.tion pattern. The studies aeliUe"ate'ty imit the anarysis or comuin.a uu.f",a-iilp"# ix33i,l,.;::liil,rrlr3,,1;11"1:TilT:l[,iJ ;::il. 3:,# ',}i ;1lii'[h::ilJrii? in right or their methodorogy, .." not ",p"-154 (testimony of Fred"ru. i"-"rl-*j. cially persuasive in showir:g.that u, *i[ Further, to underscore what we view as il1,*o;"rilii?ji:k,.ril1,,ilfI ilf,:lthe unreliability of . the studies, *. "t.o panic- minoritv ,o u. to render the ballotsnote instances in which Dr. Brischetto stat- cast by hispanics meaningress.ed -conclusions that appear to be at oddswith common ."n.". ln onu irror..,"li. ,,J.|.:^]"i l1sti1onv on polarized voting 1980 Bexar County mayoral ru.", tt.'pr"- llxewlse does not persuade us that such vailing hispanic .rnalari" ran in an ;iil; polarized voting as may exist operates to ate that consisted of app.oxim "t"li-ioi deny hispanics an equal opporrrriry lo pr,' hispanic voting age population. The his- ticipate in the electoral -p.o.".. o" "-ru.tpanic candidate rJceivea ou". goz" or iti candidates of their choice. Severat wlil vote in hispanic districts, but also *..ir"j nesses related that anglo and hispanic vot- aboutBb?L of tt" uot" ln the most predomi_ ing.in Dallas County polarized, oi ttut ni.- nately anglo districts. III Trial T"";;r,pt panics-could not easily win elections in ttre 632-33- (testimony of Robert nr".i"tt,if. 1983.House district (103)_that has the larg- Nevertheless, Dr. Brisehetto .";;l;;; est hispanic poputation. II Trial Transcriit that the voting was polarized. In another 459,-6-0 (testimony of George Dillman); i'd. instance, the unsuecessrut lispanic canai at 547 (testimony of Lee Jackson); Iv i"iai date for a judgeship, who was a republican, Transcript 852 (testimonl' of Trinidad Gar- garnered onlf about 18% of the vote in z.a).; id' at 1103 (testimonv of Paul Rags- predominatell'ti.p"nl. precincts. In anglo dale); VI Trial Transcrlpt so-st tt".tirno'r" precincts, t" r".iir"a "preciselv ;;;;: of ,Joseph -Montemayor). Uncontradicted verse"-that is, overwhelmins' .rpp"a testimony, however, showed that black anJ Dr. Brischetto concluded that the results hispanic voting does not polarize, rna tl"l evinced polarization. td. aL 686. hispanic voters can, and regula4lv fr"r", whire the studies mav show that hispanic llr:'riff.'.1?ff ;;tlr:'"ii".'r",k, -:i candidates, depending on their party airitia- Charles C;;;;i); ,j"lt roga_g9, u2l (tes-tion, u'ill recei'e different degiees- or "up- timony of paur Ragsdare); vI Triar rran_port in hispanic and angro precincts, it script s4 (testimony of Joseph Montema_hardli- demonstrates that anglo ,oilng yor). other unconiradlcted testimonl.bl"'''- <'rtrr persistentll' defeat hisp1ni. ."nii showed that hispanic candidates ersewheredu','. r.. r,'eas with a significan[ etlnic ana i, T"*". i,""" ru..""a.a i, "le.to"rtes with comb great distri panic Llz5- gener zatior polar: or th hispar Finr prima tion, r ed hi: Garza the vr twent za ean majon regisli testifir else k script Eve' we w(. ing p:r succe$ single Garza his ou, line, p dorsen the Pr voter r tus as : to his most o trated even tl all the made i 64. D, centrat ceived precine precine' Garza 12.9r% vote, ar receivt, Iloreri',' SCL':l i rrinuz.ls v. cLEMEt'irs r:)53 . -Clte u 3Et FSuPP' 132'9 (19&f) combinedblackandhisfbnicpopulatiorrsnoaredifficulttoascertain,,becauseoflow creater than those in ir," t*o'rgg' house rolr ir-ort. vI Tri4l Transeript 14?' iirtri.tr(103and10?);i;th;iargesthis-rii-sz'154(testimonv'ofFrederickcer- oanic populations. Iv'-il"i Tr"anscript ;;;6. In ih" Ga'za-Wolens contest' for rlz*26(testimony or p"uii"g.Jale). The "*urnpi", no p-recinct had a turnout greater general testimony ". ";;;;;;anic polari- t,rr"r'io.bz" oi the registered voters' 1983 zation takes no "t"oon'"i"t'iil-I"gi"" or o' r*rt' 2' In addition' the turnout was not oolarization, the eftect oi ui".t popit"tio-nt o'"""ri-r, lo*' in minority precincts' Of H't"T;;;;"'r-;;r";"gj""J'pp"" t"' il;'.f;;; precincts-that had less than 15% hispanic candidates. io*out, ont *ut about 85%'black' one was Finally, we turn to the 1982 democratic uuo,t siz anglo, one was over 70"1, ang|o, primaryinHouseahtrittfOS'Inthatelec-andtheotherwasover?5%'anglo'ld' tion, anglo incumbent it u" wor.n. defeat- ri" ."r*, conclude that the election is ed his hispani. oppot'Int, t'inia"a 9?l'": pa'tituta'ty qTob?tl'"-of either voting pat- Garza received slightl]"m;"'h"" 3o\ 9f 't"'nt in tt'e districts generally or the pros- the vote. VI Trial tt'an'ctipt 59' . Of the pects for hispanic candidates' i*"rt, ,oti"g precincts in the district, Gar- To summarize, there is evidence in the ,"-Lil"a oity toor; each precinct.had .a ,";;J;i some anglo-minoritv polarization .*l*ir, of combined black and hispanic i, OJfrt County, althougtr not without oc- ""?i-t*i"Juot"tt' 1983 P-I Exh' 4' Garza t"ti*'l-l*"ks in the pattern' There is '*3ilrj"J,rr", he could have done nothing ,ir" .rr.ortial evidence that blacks and "i." t" change the outcome. VI Trial Tran- il;";i.. regularly form political coalitions, .."C-Oa+S (testimony of Trinidad Garza)' although that, too, rs not without excep- Even under the best of circumstances' tions' we would hesitate to generalize about vot- irg p"r*t". or the prospects for hispanic 2. The Significance of the Eoidence' ;;".;;t in district 103 on the basis of a single election' In the tut" of this election' Having established"what we might call Garza conceded on tro'tlexamination that t5t-"potiti'"tion profile" of Dallas county' his own filing for t"'it";,:^;;1t'e a"aa- "i-rtltt as presente-d. bv this record' we line, poor financing, f;iilt; to obtain en- ;;;' ;;;' to iG significance insofar as the dorsements-intt'ai'g1ii- trrdotttt"nt of l"itut ditttltts in the 1983 House plan are the Progressive voters k;;;;' a .black t*t"t*a' Aceording to the MALDEF In- voter organization-aJhit o[pont't'-t tt"- ;;;;tt' the configurations of the Da]las tus as a second term lncumueni contributed aitttittt under the 1983 House plan com- to his defea t' Id' uf og-zo' Moreover' ui" *itrt political conditions' especially po- most of Garza's campaign efforts tglt:.:- irtjr"a "'ii'e, in Dallas to ensure that the trated on minoritl' p"tl'nto' id at 60-6f i'itp"'i" popiiation enjoys less opportunity even though Garza testified that carrf ing iil'-"tr'ttt to elect candidates of their all the minority pr".in.,^ "'ould not have "toi.u. We disagree' ln fact' we are of made a difference in'tl" "i"tt'n ld' aL tot'"n*t'" that ihe very opposite is the OA.- Oespite his campaign strateg]' of con- case' cent ating on minority precincts' G.atza re-. The two districts that have substantial ;::i:fftl"rtTr'-t''r:i tlr: l"ii#;'"",il hispanic votieg age popuration under the precincrs with over fr;;;ct" population. igtis Hoo." -plan are 103 (52'48'l; anglo' Garza receir'"a "nv*ittJl?il; low of illogT ur"tx and 28'98'y' hispanic) and 107 12.g1%of the vote to a high of 44?l of the ii'no anglo' 24'157' black and 23'81% his- vote, and in half "r ii'"t"'p'"tlncts' Garza ;a-n-ic) Th'ese districLs were designed by received more than ;;;-;f' tt't 'ott .ld il^'t nugtaule' a long-time black represent- Ilr-ireover. tt","t"nJjntie ei"ction untl"t' t'it- fi'"' I)allas County' to be minority score that roting p"tlrns in Dallas ct,iri,i'. ;;;r,-.i districts, i'e', districts in which a 1354 substantial minority population could strongly influence, if not control, the candi- date who was elected. In our view, the ethnic eomposition in those districts is such that no single population group-anglo, black or hispanic-<an consistently outvot€ the other groups without forming coalitions or depending on substantial cross-over vot- ing. This means that neither of these dis- tricts can be described as a "safe" anglo seat, and it also means that each of the three population groups has the ability strongly to influence the identity of the candidate that is ultimately elected. Our conclusions in this respect are based on our conclusions with respect to Dallas polariza- tion, coalition and cross-over patterns, as well as on the design of the districts. To say that the Dallas districts under the 1983 House plan violate section 2 of the Voting Right Act, we would have to say first that it was possible to design a district providing for more than hispanic impact, i.e., a "safe'' hispanic district, and second that nothing short of a safe hispanic dis- triet would provide equal access to the po- litical process for hispanics. Taking the second requirement first, for reasons that are more fully spelled out throughout this opinion and are summarized in "The Totali- ty of the Circumstances," infra, we are persuaded that a safe hispanic district is not a necessary prerequisite to hispanic access to the political process. And as for the first requirement, we are of the opinion that the geographic and demographic evi- dence conclusively demonstrates that there is no possible district configuration in Dal- las County that will eliminate the need for hispanics to form coalitions with other ra- cial or ethnic groups if hispanics are to have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process or to elect candidates of their choice. The evidence on polariza- tion in this record does not indicate that such coalitions are either impossible or un- likely; indeed, the opposite is the case. The MALDEF Intervenors have offered a "best case" scenario for hispanic political hopes in the form of district 113 in the MAY-MALDEF plan. That plan can cre- ate a district that musters only a 43.6612 581 FEDERAI{ SUPPLEMENT minorityrof hispanic voting age population. Particularly in light of low hispanic voting registration, this voting age population could not independently determine the out- eome of eleetions in the district. In short, the district is an hispanic "impact" district, just as are districts 103 and 10? under the 1983 House plan, but it is an hispanic im- pact district created at a cost to black inter- ests that we cannot calculate in the ab- sence of voting age population information on adjoining districts which MALDEF failed to furnish. We cannot even ascertain whether this plan would preclear under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See generally Temazas a. Clements, 537 F.Supp. at 536 n. 27 (paragraph (ii)). Like districts 103 and 107 under the 1983 House plan, the hispanic population in district 113 forms a substantial voting age minority that could influence the political balance of power. To be sure, the hispanic population in district 113 of the MAY-MALDEF plan potentially has greater political influence than the hispanic populations in either dis- trict 103 of the 1983 House plan, which has a 28.98% hispanic voting age population, or district 10? of the 1983 House plan, which has a 23.81% hispanic voting age popula- tion. The present question, however, con- cerns whether polarized voting metamor- phoses the status of the substantial hispan- ic voting age population minorities in dis- tricts 103 and 107 of the 1983 House plan from a potential political force into a pow- erless minority unable to participate in the political process. We do not think so. Absent coalition voting with the black population, the hispanic population in dis- trict 113 of the MAY-MALDEF plan, dis- trict 103 of the 1983 House plan, and dis- triet 107 of the 1983 House plan corld not independently elect their own candidate in the face of monolithic anglo bloc voting. See VI Trial Transcript 155 (testimony of Frederick Cervantes); VI Trial Transcript 168-69 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale). When one considers the evidence of low minoritl' registration and voter turnout, even an hispanit-Lil:rck coalition in alrt t,f these distr / minority sr glo bloc v 16F66 (tes ably need of hispanit registratio: MALDEF ing age po House pla age popula House plar tion. The evic cate that Even if th particular constitutio not, any o tion groui opportunit choice. B results of district 10 will suppt black vok panic canr that the v one of tht electoral to embra, 34. As thr stated: The results nant ( The Su cases , and th tial sul That point. nities, exceed that tt access sults t Unfr comm tics d( Int atrd o ()(. ,-. t\ l'' TERRAZAS V. CLEMENTS ' Clte er Stl FSupp. t329 (tg8a) 1355 these districts would iot ensure I "safe" redesign the districting 1 plan to guarantee minority seat in the face of monolithic an- proportional representation. glo bloc voting, see Yl Trial Transcript In conclusion, the evidence of some an- 16ffi6 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale) (prob- glo-minority polarization does not support a ably need 70-75% hispanic district in light finding that the political process in Dallas of hispanic voting age population and low County is closed to hispanics as the dis- registration); district 113 under the MAY- tricts are configured under the 1983 House MALDEF plan has a 57.83% minority vot- plan. ing age population, district 103 of the 1983 House plan has a 41 .57%, minority voting age population, and district 107 of the 1983 House plan has a 47.78%' voting age popula- tion. The evidence, at any rate, does not indi- cate that monolithic bloc voting occurs. Even if the election of a candidate of any particular racial or ethnic group was the constitutional or statutory test, which it is not, any one of the racial or ethnic popula- tion groups in these three districts has an opportunity to elect the candidate of its choice. Both the expert testimony and the results of the 1982 democratic primary in district 103 suggest that some anglo voters will support hispanic candidates, and that black voters ma)', or may not, support his- panie candidates.3{ To say, on this record, that the voting strength of hispanics in any one of these districts will not influence the electoral process would require us simply to embrace the proposition that u'e must 34. As the Senate Committee on the Judiciarl' stated: The Subcommittee Report claims that the results tesl as-sunles "thal race is the predomi- nant determinant of political preference." The Subcommittee Report notes that in manl' cases racial bloc voting is not so monolithic, and that minority voters do receive substan' tial support from white voters. Thal statement is correct, but misses the point. It is true w'ith respecl to most commu- nities, and in those communities it u'ould be exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to sho$' that they were effectively excluded from fair access to the political process under the re- sults test. Unfortunately, hou'ever, there still are some communities in our Nation where racial poli- tics do dominate the electoral process. In the context of such racial bloc voting, and olher factors, a particular election meth- od can denl' minoritl' r'oters equal opportuni' l)' to participate meaningfullf in elections. not C. Success of Minority Candidates. As the MALDEF Intervenors point out, hispanics have enjoyed little success in Dal- las County eleetions. Presently, only two hispanics serve as elected officers on city councils or on school district boards of trus- tees. 1983 P-I Exhs. 24A, 25. No hispanic presently holds a county elected office. In the most recent elections for county of- fices, all four of the hispanic candidates lost. 1983 P-I Exh. 228. Since 1962, nine hispanic candidates have run for the Texas House of Representatives in Dallas Coun- ty. Six lost in primary elections and the remaining three lost in general elections. 1983 P-I Exh.23. t8l The State Defendants do not dis- pute this evidence, and the absence of many hispanic officeholders raises the in- ference that the electoral system must somehow disadvantage the hispanic popula- tion. One would expect greater hispanic Thc results lest. makes no assumptions otte wa.y or the other about the role of racial political considerations in a particular com' munity. If plaintiffs assert that thel- are de- nied fair access to the political process, in part, because of the racial bloc voting context within which the challenged election system works, the5'rvould have to prove it. Proponents of the "intent standard" how- ever, do presume that such racial politics no longer affect minoritl voters in America. This presumption ignores a regrettable realitl' established bl overwhelming evidence at the Senate and House hearings. These concfusions; based on a careful re- vieu' of the existing track record under the "results test" in the Committee amendmenl have convinced us that the questions raised by some about that test are satisfactoril;- ansuer' ed b1'that record. S.Rep. No. 417 at 33-34, 1982 U.S.Codr' Cong. & Ad.Ncss at 211-12 (emphasis in original) (foot' notes omitted). 1356 s8l FEDErAi supplnu'nur - repiesentation for a population group of its required of a'reapportionment.iran in asize. There are limits, of course, to the I dilution case. probative value of this inference. A lack of proportion"t ,"pr"r"nt"tion has no inde- (ri;'t{lrirr'r!rfrf;y"j3:#: e2?, e36 pendent constitutional or statutory signifi_ cance. llhite a. Regester,4l2 u.s. at ?65_ D. Tenuousness. 66, 93 s'ct. at 2339; whitcomb a. chaais, The MALDEF Intervenors challenged 403 U.S. at 160, 9l S.Ct. at 18?Z; Kirksegt, the State's policy through evidence thatihe 554 F.2d at 142-43; 42 U.S.C.A. 19?B(b). drafters eonsidered the political effects of Indeed, a court-ordered remedy for voting the plan. As several witnesses conceded, dilution would not necessarily warrant thi the LRB avoided pairing incumbent Repre- design of a plan that ensures proportional sentatives in a single district. IV Trial representation. As the Fifth ciieuit has filiffi:*rrrr,lfirurrJf.,,,ilrXl,, d"r #flI All other things being equal, it mav be House of Representatives was considering assumed that if, fr. ;;;; i; ;;;,.";; arterations to the LRB House plan, thl of a school ai.t.i.t,. i"ri;l;;"#;:j. Texas tegislative Councit anatyzei alterna- black, about B0 ;ur.;n;-;i ,fri ,.*ifr" tive districts that would oeate a Dallas staff at any giren ..h;;l .;";i; ;; b#: district with greater than 40%' population, Similarty, ""[r"ni ;"1;;;j-;t.;;;;;- but ultimatelv limited the analysis by set- tion, if i0 percent "f ,i" """ifif. ilfft ting guidelines that called for no pairing of labor in a plant,s vicinitv f. lf ".t. fi.""ij tncumbents. VI Trial Transcript 134 (testi- be expected tn"i S0 p";."r;;;;;ffi: monv of John Potter). Even the district tirrs labor rorce would u. u*r,.* '- l':,Lj$ff::,J,,i11,""11,,,Hr,ilIil:::?;' Voting is a different matter. The re- Ihe minoritv districts, reside near the bor-sulls follow from both the pattern of J... of their districts.districts and the voters, preferences. In employment and education, race mar not The MALDEF Intervenors urge that the be a factor in .naf,ing .h"i.".. -i, ,;rf r-, protection of incumbents.cannot justify di- while we mry a"ptoi" i;;-;";i;;J lution of a minoritv's voting strength. In- a factor by voters, it ;;.;;.";;;il; deed, the State Defendanls do not disagree forbidden. Any .r.1,- ;;; '[},il'';.".,i with that abstract statement of lau'. In- race serious .on.tit,iiin.,:;.ffi; :f# #,i$:"8:r#:l?.X,fil:f$#The necessary link between the percent- i"rentatiues did not, as a matter of fact,age of those eligible and the percentage p"ouia. the sole policy justification for notactuallv selected that exists in school i."*irg an hispanic district.cases and employment cases is missing in voting cases. Again, our conclusion is In general, the State Defendants offered that proportional- representation il ,;i testimony that the LRB plan took incum- appropriate in a court-ordered olan. bency into account only after the principal objectives of complying with the ,,on"_.un, one_vote', standard, section b of the Voting Rights Act and the Texas la*. requirementWe have recognized that race ma}, be of maintaining the integrity of county linesconsidered as a factor in determining had been ..iorp[.tui.- trV T.i"l T.un_whether a proposed apportionment is ac- script g93_9a, giS_tS, 9Bg (testimony ofceptable. "In the process of making . .. Mark White). In addition, the prineipala determination [about multimember dis- drafter of tire pl"n, -n"p""rentative paul trict^s]' a court need not be oblivious to Ragsdal.. testified that he avoided concen-the existence and rocation of minoritl, trating as much of the minority popurationvoting strength." But we have also held as possilri...into onl1.a few districts in orderthat "silft" se'ats for the minoritl' are not to crr,i.rr ' inl1,u.ti' -a,.t.i.t.--aistricts in l ; I ( ( ( ( I I I I I a t 1 T l c r i i: t a t t e t r t. n c b s A 4 I a r rnina r, ggo ,lenged hrt the rts of rceded, Repre- ' Trial Mark Texas dering n, the Iterna- Dallas .lation, )y set- {ng of (testi- listrict .bents; ose in e bor- et the ify di- r. In- agree,. In- ted to t Rep- ' fact, )r not ffered ncum- ncipal Fman, Toting :rnent ' lines Tran- ny of ncipal Paul mcen- htion order ts in .4:.. a:f ., ,. TERRA"*?."1;i,13TIJ,* whichasubstantialminor{typopulationcouldtakeraceirttoaccountindrawingthe could strongly innrence, "iU"l', r"ii*,t 1, Dallas districts to comply with the Votilts the type of candidate *il"lj. "i";;d' we R[h; L'n' United Je.u*h orsanizati6ns credit the testimony adduced by the state ,,.ic*"y, 430 _ujl 144, 91 s'ct' 996' 51 Defendants. L.Ed.zd 229 (197?). t9]TheevidencedoesnotpresentaThispolicybearsadirectrelationshipto pure "tenuousness" qu"Jon' Tilat is' the the manner in which the districts were MALDEF Intervenors t,'" not attacked " Jt"*n' The plan retained three districts neutral policy offered only as a pretext for *itt' soUtt'ntial black majorities' and the a discriminato.y .""tt'' See' generally- black districts took in largely the same Robinson ,. co**l.iiloners C-ourt' 505 areas that had comprised black districts in F.2d at 680 (,,equaliz"li;;-"i county'road ihe past. one of the districts, district 100 mileage"offeredas5ustificationfoifrag-consistsinpartofanareathatrunsdirect- mentingcohesiveblackpopulation)..Rath.lyb"t*""n.thehispanicneighborhoodsin er, the MALDEF Irt";;;;;' have focused o'"tt outtut and the hispanic neighborhoods ononlyapartoftheState,spolicywithoutinthenorthernandeasternportionsofthe devoting much evidence to [he legitimacy city of Dal]as' -we explicitly find credible oftheotherassertedpolicies.Reappor.thetestimonyofRepresentativePaulRags- tionment is a political process, and there-is iJ" tt"t the plan aimed not at disadvantag- nothing illegitimate a6o't to'sidering the iig hi'panict bu't at giving the black and political .on."qr"n.", of a redistricting hilpanic populations- a proportionate share plan. See Gaffney ''-Cu*ilngs' 412 U'S of ir'u minority political influence in the ?35, ?53, 93 S.Ct. zzi{ {zzt'"si l''pa'za Dallas districts' IV Trial Transcript 1092- 298 (19?3); Major o.-i"'n, 5?4 F'Supp' 93 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale)' 325, at 355 (E.D.La"1983)' Tenuousness' VI' THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUM- that is pretext, cannot be established as a STANCES' factor militating againsithe plan simply by tlll Having considered the evidence ad- p"i"ii,u ""t thJ oi.vious-ttrat ttte plan has dressed to the objective factors' we turn to politieal consequences that the drafters the issue whether the electoral scheme em- i"r[-pr*a' 'To tr'o* a tenuous State uoai"a in the 1983 House plan for Da]las ;;ij;;:"il MALDEF Intervenors must coun'v so dilutes the voting strength of demonstrate not onty- tt'ut tt'" status of t'itp'nit voters that -they have lost the abili- incumbent R"p'"'"ntltiol"t nua a place in ty L participate politically' In evaluating li" rin" drawing' but also that the other tire toLtity of circumstances we must con- asserted policies ao not' in t"t' support the sider several issues: the feature of the manner in which the lines *u'u-dtu*'' electoral system that allegedly hinders his- t10l We cannot conclude that compli- panic voters' in their attempt to achieve a ance with federal constitutional and statu- it'ong"t political voice; the extent to which tory standards are ;;ly;;;;;riy. related ethnic-ity determines.the outcome of Dallas to the district tlnes as irawn' Asihe earli "t"tto'ut contests; the result that the Dal- er findings show, the previous Dallas dis- las districts achieve; and' for the purposes tricts were sufficiently underpopulated to of the constitutional challenge' the intent require the loss "r " iir"rliv'district In behind,the line drawing' For reasons that the face of this diminution in potential mi- follow,' we conclude that the districting nority influer." in ii"-oauas'House dele- does not, designedly or otherwise' cancel gation, the State ,i"'tJ legitimately have out hispanic voting strength' t".n .on."tned with the issue of retrogres- sion under section s oi tt" voting Rights A. Tha Electoral scheme' Act.SeegenerattyBeeru.Llnitec]Slrrlc.s.Asourfinrlirigssuggest,theMALDEF 425 U.S. 130, 141, S6 S.C,. 135?. 13(jll 47 Inter\crroIS have not fairlS described thi' L.Ed.zd629(1976)-Moreover.ti,tStatelg8Sdistrictillgplan.Farfrom..cracking,. I cohesive hispanic community, thetistrict lines merely fail to string together dis- persed pockets of hispanic population to maximize its voting strength. The plan does not place the hispanic population in districts with a politically hostile, bloc_vot_ ing majority; the two largest groups of hispanic population reside in dlstricts (fOg and 107) that in part contain substantial black population and in part contain anglo population. The ethnic composition in those districts is such that no single popu- lation group-black, hispanic or anglo---can eonsistently outvote the other groups with- out forming coalitions or depending on sub- stantial eross-over voting. The circumstances in Dallas stand in marked contrast to the single-member dis_ tricting plan in Kirksey. As the Kirksey eourt summed up the matter: Plaintiffs proved a long history of de_ nial of access to the political process. That history of official action is one of purposeful and intentional discrimina- tion. The structure and the residual ef- fects of the past have been removed and replaced by current access. The supervi_ sors' reapportionment plan, though ra_ cially neutral, will perpetuate the denial of aceess. By fragmenting a geographi- cally concentrated but substantial black minority in a community where bloc vot_ ing has been a way of life the plan will cancel or minimize the voting strength of the black minority and will tend to sub- merge the interests of the black commu- nity. 554 F.zd at 151. Setting aside, for the moment, the influence of bloc voting and historical discrimination, we note the en- tirely different thesis behind the present action. The plan's drafters faced not a cohesive hispanic communitv but clusters of hispanic population loeated on either side of a predominately black House distriet drawn in response to a finding that blacks had been deprived of political aecess in Dallas. See White u. Regester,4l2 U.S. at 766-6?, 93 S.Ct. at 2BB9-40. Assuming that a hispanic district could even b; drau'r..-and the MAY-MALDEF plan, u'hrtl. 1.r's,. came to the attention of this 58I FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT Court and the parties after the redistrictins plocess was complete, is the onty pt"i.r "r"ipurporting to do se-the drafters would have to draw lines that would arguably fragment a cohesive black population. Ai the least, the drafters would have to re- draw-and the MAY-MALDEF plan did_ as predominately anglo the district of one black Representative. The record does not show a dispersal of hispanics accomplished through deviations from expected lines. See Robinson a. Conmissioners Court, bOb F.2d at 6?g. The district lines in the 19gB House plan are hardly a model of regularity, but they do roughly follow the lines of the plan from 1970s. In contrast, the district lines for the only majority hispanic district that this Court has seen in the course of these pro- ceedings deviate substantially from any lines one could imagine, much less from thl Iines one would expect. The configuration of district 113 in the MAY-MALDEF ptan graphically illustrates that the placement of the hispanic population into two districts does not result from fragmenting an his- panic community; instead, it illustrates the type of bizare district configurations to which the drafters would have to resort in order to unite the hispanic population. tl2l Without an unnatural district co- nfiguration in the 1g8B House plan that "fragments" or "packs" a cohesive minori_ ty population, the issue in this case trans_ forms. The MALDEF Intervenors seek, in essence, to compel adoption of a plan that manufactures an hispanic district by what_ ever means are necessary, not because the existing plan artificially thwarts creation of an hispanic district that ought to exist by virtue of the natural settlement patterns of Dallas hispanics, but rather because the hispanic population, a disadvantlged rhinor- ity group, has sufficient population poten_ tially to constitute a distinct district. We are aware of no case that has required such an exercise in political engineering. To the contrary, where the absence of pro- portional representation results simply from the loss of elections rather than a 1358 rrl tl I t1 S u. 81 si u pi l1 c( d, ti el ct p( el at ci dt qr w hi 1I AI nr Ii, ti, e\ w le ti, tl at lir S, hr in o, c( p( al TI in 1359 l I f ,oft I rg. le Iu :y ,lrr br bis lo P!' he bo bn firt lts tis pe ltr' iio "built-in bias" afainst " 'ino'[i";:il:"offi;'[":f voting-Bge population will be that group's voting strength has noi b"un ethnicity' : ,t"nirr"d out" in any constitutional sense' C. The Results of the System. / Wlr:rlr?i-'&l'3"Hi;::J,',';;t':: From the ob-servation that the make-up under the section 2 t€st unless the courts oi'ti'""'t"tli'i Datlas minority districts (see attaeh no meaning eitier to the congres :ilh *;ffmXfi:'::'?"fi"ii! ii*"i.ur"", against proportional represen- "iirrili, a d"cide eleetoral contests, the Lri*,-rz U.S.C.6. s 19?3(b), or to the ex- ;;;;i;;i", follows that those districts, even piiii'i"a1r""'ion of pre-Botdenraw' ;Jffi; ;h" thev"'cracked" an hispanic ;;;j;ffir;-d" not deprive hispanics. of ac- B. Ethnicity in rssue. :;L'',;ffi;;olitical p.ot"tt' As the evi- rrsl E'en if the disrrict rines courd fair- f;";k l,"Tt".:IL;rtriii.',.iH:T?Ji."fi: r, uJi"..riued as fragmenting an hispanic ."?;, t"r,l*ctuti'ety on their own voting J;;;;';r.;t i.t' ,t "i do not]the evidence .ir."r,i.-"ra readily-install whatever candi- does not point to u poritit"l tytt",, in which il;tilfi;tii"' .wr'1" the svstem should the ethnicity of tn" ''.urila"t. or !h: ;;i;r";;t" than-."gossamer possibilities of electorate determines-t;;;;;;;" of politi' ;ii;";;;ilt iuui"g into place and leaning cal events. unao'lttirv' iit "'ia"*t oi i;';;';;;;it"ttio'n"' Ki'rksev' 554 F'2d at polarized 'oting tnol;''J;;;ill differ- ;il";h" ;;;'tion. of a predominatelv hispan- ences in the levels ;"t;;;;;t among th'e it ditt'itt is not a' necessary condition to anglo and hispanic ;;.d;;; for hiJpanic ;:#";; .il political process' As the- candidates' tt'" t''jt'n'tJ:;;;;'"t' simplv iii*'ciit'it 635 6h'qerved in the context ol does not .r,o* tr,ai ihe' practical conse- r"."ai". in a racial vote dilution case: quences of such p"r"'ixiJ' * does exist The goal 9l ?ny remedv is to assure will be to,,submerg"'i#-ir*r..ts" of the i"f"Eri"" black minority participation in hispanic community ;i,;;;;, b54F.2d aL :inXX,;"|#;i""J[1?"'titffH:. 15f i;i";;il;;n oi tt'" inevitabilitv of such This failure in the evidence of polariza- a result' this court has concentrated tion derives t'o* toio too'""t' First' the ;p;;";;;; to the political process rath' evidence suggests ti"t ttt" anglo electorate "' th'n assurance of a particular result' will support hitp'#;;;;ia"?"t' albeit 'in It is because access is a more difficult lesser proportion* tt'un t-iJiitp"'it popula- concept to measure than is result that tion. Such ..o..-orjil'uo,ing, a.p"ra;ng on if,i. .orrt has emohasized that "[t]he the respecti". .ir.l "i ir,-. hispanic and pt"lr"- is. not- susceptible of simplistic anglo population', L'i'p*'-* :|1 :::::] !" ryS hou'ever seductive thev ma-v lirri oui of the voting strength of hrspantcs. appear. Second, but perhaps more importan,, L" Uniira Sta,tes t. Board of Superaisors qf have heard uu.ot,tiiy no "'id"nc" suggest- "r""iicl'y' 5?1 F'2d 951' 955 (5th cir' irg 1i,", hispanics face dilution as a result 19?8)' of black una nitffii't iJ"ti"il"' The Although' in the face of a stark record of combined uru.t # iiJp"ni. voting .age p* p"il""l failure of hispanics' the need poputations ,f th;';"i;;'"; districts (toe i;;;;fi;"ic district appears compelling' and 10?) fall bar;ly';o" -"t u majority' ii't "'ia""" does not show that the pattern The evidence "t uilx-iit"p"lt t"ul-;t6 "oi- oiii"ttotut defeat and the minoritv compo- ing, combined *#;;;;idence of some titi"' "i tt't Dallas districts combine to bar anglo support t"t rtitp"'it t"rriia"tt' a"lt rli'tp"'ltt rt"m the oolitical process' ln the not sulll)ort the proposition that the crucil,l ^rri."." of a denial of access' or discrimina' oolitical factor in elections fo' aitttitis-t"*'**t' the''failure to consolidate the .u.1, u. 103 and 10?' with o t"'gin*t u";: ' '';'i"tt;;t l';pulation may constitute a less po- bat pri- DS- ,in hat lat- &e rof by lof the lor- En- We red mg. Pro- rpli' na r360 advantsgeous political result, but not b; unlawful result. Thus, for example, in Howard a. Adams Countg Board of Su- pervisors,453 F.2d 455, 459 (Sth Cir.19?2), the Fifth Circuit noted: Inevitably, people of different raees, national origins, and contrasting tenets will be shifted under reapportionment plans into districts in whieh they may no Ionger be in the clear majority. But, when, as here, no racial motivation spawns a change in the voting area of those complaining, and the redistricting plan does not unconstitutionally dilute the voting strength of the minority, there is no abridgment of voting rights. Unless the record showed intent to discrim- inate against hispanics, thereby raising the question of the existenee of a constitutional violation, this Court must uphold the State's redistricting plan. D. Discriminatory Intent. In the absence of a discriminatory result, there must be some doubt whether a show- ing of intent eould even suffice. See Vol- lin a. Kimbel, 579 F.2d ?90, ?90 (4th Cir. 1975) (dilution requires "effective" intent to discriminate). Nevertheless, we will ex- plicitly make findings on intent. The record shows that Representative Ragsdale took primary responsibility for drafting the Dallas districLs that are nou, in force under the 1983 House plan. We have carefullv considered all of Representative Ragsdale's testimony as well as the lestimony of those who characterized his intent as discrimina- tory. Our evaluation both of his credibility and the facts upon which he relied leads us to conclude that he harbored no intent to discriminate. See generally Terrazas u. Clemenk, 537 F.Supp. at 536 n. 27 (para- graph (ii)). Just to consider two instances, we note that Representative Ragsdale's evaluation of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of uniting the hispanic community is fully borne out by our review of alternative plans. In addition, the concept of the "im- pact" district, which led Representative Ragsdale not to overconcentrate minority population in just a few districts, emerges as a legitimate objective in light of the 58I FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT testimony in this case. Even opposing wit- nessedconceded the validity of the conceft. E.9., U Trial Transcript 471-73 (testimony of George Dillman). Moreover, the minori- ty community in Dallas has clearly divided over the issue whether "safe" or "impaet', districts are preferable as a means of max- imizing minority political power. Id. at 562-$4 (testimony of Lee Jackson). We are unprepared to find that Representative Ragsdale intended to diseriminate against those who are not in a "safe" district when the testimony indicates that his objective was to obtain the most minority politieal influence possible by creating "impact" dis- tricts. VII. CONCLUSION. On the basis of the foregoing findings and conelusions, we hold that the 1988 House plan does not dilute the voting strength of Dallas hispanics so as to deny them access to the political process. The State has violated neither section 2 of the Voting Rights Act nor the United States Constitution. Judgment, accordingly, will be entered in favor of the State Defend- ants, and they are hereby ordered promptly to prepare a judgment in conformity with this opinion for entry by this Court. This Court retains jurisdiction of this case for the disposition of related matters including the entitlement, if any, to and the amount of attornev's fees. Herbert SELLERS v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al. Civ. A. No. 83-3962. ' United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania. Jan. 30, 1984. Derfendants irr lrction in which damages were sought ftil ailt,ged illegal conrlucr of defenda of defe reconsi< dismiss, and der VanArt claims litigatet by doct Mo 1. Fede Pla tion see ing ne. counts relitiga: tion unr ment o 6o(b), 2 2. Judg Iti "collate tobeb previou ly deter S( for defi 3. Juds CI:, in earli trine ol Marl sociater MarL & Soli, gan, \' willi Hitchn, Pa., fo. wi1li Fitzl,:,: Gen,'