Terrazas v. Clements Court Opinion

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Louis TERRAZAS, W.E. Tucker, Linda
Allison Frederick, Yerne DJ. Phillips

and Ed Emmett, Plaintiffs,

Jesue Rodriguez, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors,

R.A. Deison, Jr., et al.,
Plaintiffs-I ntervenore,

v.

William P. CLEMENTS, Individually and
in his official capacity as Governor of
the State of Texas; et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 3-81-2205-R.

United States District Court,
N.D. Texas,

Dallas Division.

Jan. 4, 1984.

Hispanic voters brought action chal-
lenging validity of reapportionment plan.
The District Court, Randall, Circuit Judge,
held that evidence established that such
bloc voting as might exist in city did not
operate under the challenged reapportion-
ment plan, to deny Hispanics an equal op-
portunity to participate in political process,
that there was no possible district configur-
ation of county that would eliminate the
need for Hispanics to form coalitions with
other racial or ethnic groups in order to
have equal opportunity to participate in
political process, that the plan aimed not at
disadvantaging Hispanics but giving black
and Hispanic populations a proportionate
share of minority political influence in the
districts, and that drafter of plan harbored
no intent to discriminate; accordingly, the
reapportionment plan did not dilute voting
strength of Hispanics so as to deny them
access to the political process and did not
violate the Voting Rights Aet or the United
States Constitution.

Order eecordinglv.

,

TERRAZAS v. CLEMENTS
, CltGuStl FSupp. l!2.!) (t9&0)

1329

l. Elections @12 /
The Voting Rights Act and the Four-

teenth Amendment offer related remedy
for minority groups that suffer interfer-.
ence with the right to vote as a result of
voting practices or procedures in tle elec-
toral system; to obtain either remedy,
plaintiff must show that, in the totality of
circumstances, political processes leading
to nomination and election were not equally
open to participation by the group in ques-
tion, and that its members had less oppor-
tunity than did other residents in district to
participate in political processes and to
elect legislators of their choice. Voting
Rights Act of 1965, S 2, as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. 5 1973; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
L4.

2. Conetitutional Law e215.3
Elections @12

The failure of minority group to trans-
late its voting strength into proportional
representation does not establish a lack of
access to the political process in violation of
the Voting Rights Act or the Fourteenth
Amendment. Voting Rights Act of 1965,
5 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 19?3; U.S.
C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

3. Elections el2
Both the constitutional jurisprudence

and the Voting Rights Act have employed a
group of objective evidentiary factors to
measure the discriminatory effect of a vot-
ing practice or procedure on minority vot-
ers, including historical inquiries such as
the effects of past discrimination, indicia of
race or ethnic-conscious politics such as
polarized voting, and formal obstaeles to
minority success at the polls such as anti-
single-shot voting requirements or majority
vote rules. Voting Rights Act of 196b, S 2,
as amended,.42 U,S.C.A. 5 l9?3; U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.

4. Constitutional Law e215.3
Elections @12

To find that an electoral system vio-
lates the Constitution, cour+. must deter-
mine that the discriminat(,r\ inrpact of the
system derived from an irlr'nt to bring
about that result; hou'ei t: plaintiff can

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581 FEpERAL SUPPLEMENT1330

establish a violation of the Voting Rights

Act by showing a discriminatory result,

which in turn can be proven through the

aggregate of the objective factors' Voting
Rights Act of 1965, S 2, as amended, 42

U.S.C.A. 5 19?3; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend'
14.

5. B1"s1gen5 6=12

When a minoritY grouP contends, un-

der the Voting Rights Act, that electoral

system disenfranchises them because their
race or ethnicity has decisive political sig-

nificance, objective factors provide indicia

of how great a role race or ethnicity plays

and how severe are the probable effects,

and they offer a framework to distinguish

unlawful electoral system in which consid-

erations of race of ethnicity pervade poli-

tics from a permissible electoral system in

which racial and ethnic composition of the

elected body simply does not mirror that of
its constituency. Voting Rights Act of
1965; S 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. S 19?3.

6. Constitutional Law o-225.3(l)
Elections G=l2

Under the constitutional test for voting

dilution cases, court must go beyond the

objective factors to assure itself that
record independently satisfies the general

equal protection standard that a facially
neutral rule must derive from discriminato-

ry purpose. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend' 14'

7. B1ug1i6ns @12

Provided that the districts are equally

apportioned, single-member districts do not

obviously dilute voting strength; only ref-

erence to minority composition of the dis-

triet and the manner in which the district
lines are drawn can change such plans into

devices with discriminatory results' Vot-

ing Rights Aet of 1965, 5 2, as amended, 42

U.S.C.A. S 19?3; U.S.C.A. Const'Amend'

14.

,. g1""1ien5 el2
A lack of proportional representation

has no independent constitutional or statu-

tory significance, and a court-ordered reme-

dy for voting dilution would not necessarily

warrant the design of a plan that ensures

proportional rePresentation.

g.'Elections c-I2
Reapportionment is a political process,

and there is nothing illegitimate about con-

sidering the political consequences of a re-

districting plan; tenuousness, i.e., pretext,

cannot be established as a factor militating
against the plan simply by pointing out
that the plan has political consequences

that the drafters contemplated' Voting
Rights Act of 1965, S 2, as amended,, 42

u.s.c.A. s 19?3.

10. States c=27(3)

State can take race into account in

drawing legislative districts to comply with
the Voting Rights Act. Voting Rights Act
of 1965, S 2, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.

s 1973.

11. Blsslisns cp12

In evaluating totality of circumstances

to determine whether reapportionment plan

so dilutes voting strength of minority vot-

ers that they have lost their ability to par-

ticipate politically, the court considers sev-

eral issues: the feature of the electoral

system that allegedly hinders minority vot-

ers in their attempt to achieve a stronger
political voice; extent to which ethnicity

determines outcome of electoral contests;

the result that the districts aehieve; and,

for the purposes of the constitutional chal-

lenge, the intent behind the line drawing.

Voting Rights Act of 1965, 5 2, as amend-

ed, 42 U.S.C.A. S i973; U.S.C.A. Const'

Amend. 14.

12. Constitutional Law @225.3(l)
g1"61isns €=12

Where the absence of proportional rep
resentation results simply from the loss of

elections rather than from a built-in bias

against a minority group, that group's vot-

ing strength has not been cancelled out in
any constitutional sense, and the.same re-

sult obtains under the Voting Rights Act'
Voting Rights Act of 1965, S 2, as amend-

ed, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 1973; U.S.C.A' Const'

Amend. 14.

13. Constitutional Law €=225.3(3)

MuniciPal CorPorations c=80

Evidence in Voting Rights -{ct suit es-

tablished that such bloc voling as mrll

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"hnnn.e,zes v.'cl,Elfi ENTS

Judges.

1331

exist in citv did not*operate J:::'$:*'ffiX?lrm-on' R' {"y'George' 
Graves'

lenged reapportionm",i';i;;-; q"1v H5- Doughertv' Hearon & Moodv' Austin' Tex''

oanics equal oppo*oniif to p""titip"tt in for Jefendant Chester R' Upham'

frtiticat pro""r., ttut there was no possible Bob Slagle, III, pro se'

il.t"i"t configuration that would eliminate 
Cullen Smith, 

',arry 
O. Brady, Naman,

the need foiHispanics to form coalitions Hr"*"fi, S,nii', &.,*",bavid Guinn, Michael

with other racial groups to haYe equal op 
frtor"irorr, Baylor Law School, Waco, Tex',

portunity to participate in political proce.ss' i"r-a"f*a""i David Dean.
lhat the-ptan did not aim at disadvantaging

Hispanics, and that diafter of plan har- William French Smith' U'S' Atty' Gen''

borednointenttoaiscrlminate;according-PaulHancock'RobertS'Berman'DavidS'
ly, the plan did not air-r-t uoting strengih conningi,arn, III, u.s. Dept. of Justice,

ofHispanicsSoaSt0denythemaccess.towast,in'gton,D.C.,amicuscuriaeDept.of
oofiil.if oto.ess and did not violate Voting Justice'
'mtSi,.jr:'rfiI'Iill;"1"i;-rtl6lf 

Berore RANDALL, circuit Judge, and

S 19?3: U.S'C.A. Const'Amend' 14' SANDERS and BUCHMEYER' District

Thomas G. Crouch, Crouch & Jones' Pa-

tricia A. Hill, Dallas, Tex', for senate plain-

tiffs (CA 3-81-1946-R)'

John N. McCamish, Jr', Pat DeelY'

McCamish, Ingram, Martin & Brown' Inc''

irn ,q'nto"io, iex., for house plaintiffs (CA

s-8i-2205-R).

Randall B. Strong, Daniel R' Jackson'

BayL*r, Tex., for Baytown plaintiffs (CA

3-81-2263-R).

Joaquin G. Avila, Jose Garza' Norma V'

Solis, iudith A' Sanders, Mexican American

l,egal Defense and Educational Fund' San

.g,niorio, Tex', Albert H' Kauffman' Dallas'

C"*., Vit.nu S. Martinez, Morris J' P4l:t'
ftf"*i."n American Legal Defense and Edu-

."lionut Fund, San Francisco' Cal'' for

MALDEF intervenors'

J. Richie Field, Crews, Field' Steele &

Page, Conroe, Tex', for Montgomery Coun-

ty intervenors.

David R. Richards, Executive Asst' Attv'

Gen., State of Tex', Steve Bickerstaff' C'

noU"tt Heath, Martha E' Smiley' Bicker-

staff, Heath & SmileY, Richard 
'' 

g"''
iII, 6r"y, Allison & Becker, Austin' Tex''

i"t a"f""a"nts Mark White' William P'

Clem"nts, William P' Hobby' Bill Clayton'

Bob Bul)ock and Bob Armstrong'

l. Terrns dcfined in our opinion of March 24'
^'r"s: "'i, ;:,;;. ' Clcmenrs' 537 F'supp' 

^514
iX.O.f.. , itat denied, 456 U'S' 9o2' 102 S'Ct'

RANDALL, Circuit Judge:

ln this opinion, we decide whether the

State of Texas has violated section 2 of the

Voti"g Rights AcL, 42 U'S'C'A' 5 1973

(W".iSrpp-.f983), or the fourteenth amend-

ment to the United States Constitution in

Ir"*irg the districts to elect members of

it. t.iut House of Representatives from

Oatta. County. Specifically, we consider

the contention of a group of hispanic voters

(the "MALDEF Intervenors") t that split-

iine tt e Dallas hispanic population int'o

if,rZ" ."putute districts cancelled out its

voting strength. Only the seventeen

gor.i ai.tti.ti in Dauas County created by

the State's 1983 reapportionment plan (the

ii1983 Hou." plan"), see Acl of May 20'

1983, ch. 185, igEB Tex'Sess'Law Serv' ?56

(Vernon), are direetlY at issue'

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

Originally, this action encompassed chal-

lengei by a variety of parties to the reap-

poriionr*rt plan (the "LRB House plan")

ior the Texas House of Representatives

"aopt"a 
in J981 !y tt'e l'egislative Redis-

triciing Boa-rd (ttte "LRB")' On November

O, fgAi, the House Plaintiffs filed suit in

the United States District Court for the

W"stern District of Texas' The complaint

1745,72l.8d.2d 158 (1982)' u'ill be used herein

as therein defined'

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581 FEDERAL SUPi'LEMENT ,r332

named as defendants various Texas oublic
officials-the Governor, the Li[utenant
Governor, the Secretary of State, the Attor-
ney General, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Comptroller of public
Accounts and the Commissioner of the
General Land Office (collectively, the
"State Defendants"Falong with the chair-
men of the State Democratic and Republi-
can Parties. Allegedly, certain district
lines in the LRB House ptan deliberately
discriminated against black, hispanic and
republican voters.

The aetion was transferred to this Court,
and consolidated with two other aetions: a
parallel suit contesting the Senate reappor-
tionment plan (the "LRB Senate plan',) and
a separate attack on the LRB House plan
filed by the Mayor and the City of Bay-
town, Texas ("Baytown"). This Court also
allowed two other groups of Texas voters
to intervene. On January 4, 1g82, R.A.
Deison, Jr. and other individuals, all claim-
ing to reside in Montgomery County, Texas
("Montgomery County"), entered the Sen-
ate and House eases to raise constitutional
challenges. On January 6, 1982, the MAL
DEF Intervenors joined the Senate and
House actions to assert causes of action
under the constitution and section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. The early history of
these proceedings and a summary of the
claims of each party appear in our earlier
opinion, Terrazas a. Clemen.ts,58? F.Supp.
514 (N.D.Tex.), stay denied,4b6 U.S. 902,
102 S.Ct. 1745, 72 L.Ed.2d 158 (1982), and
will not be repeated here.

During the course of these proceedings,
the Department of Justice, on January 24,
1982, objected to the LRB Senate and
House plans under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. S 19?Bc (West
Supp.1983). The plans were thus rendered
unenforceable. Until the Department of
Justice precleared the reapportionment
plans, the parties'constitutional and statu-
tory challenges remained nonjusticiable;
thus, the progress of this litigation was
suspended. When the Department of Jus-
tice objected to the LRB Senate and House
plans, this Court had alreadv conducted a
hearing, on Januan' 18-23, 1982. which ad-

dressed the merits of those plans. We
gonducted a second hearing on Mafch 1-2,
1982, to reconsider those plans, along with
other plans submitted by various parties, in
order to select aceeptable temporary plans
under which to conduct the 1g82 Texas
eleetions. On March 11, lg82, this Court
installed the LRB Senate plan and a modi-
fied version of the LRB House plan as
temporary courtordered plans. The lgg2
Texas elections were held under the tempo
rary plans.

In our opinion explaining the adoption of
the temporary plans, this Court urged the
Texas Legislature to adopt procedures to
resolve the Department of Justice,s objee-
tions to the LRB plans. Terrazas o. Clem-
ents, 537 F.Supp. at 548. Ultimately, on
May 16, 1983,, the Texas Senate approved a
new Senate plan (the "1g88 Senate plan,,),
and, on May 20, 1983, the Governor signed
a bill adopting the 1988 House plan. The
State submitted the 1988 plans to the De-
partment of Justice; on August 1, lggg,
the Department precleared the 1g8B House
plan and on September 6, 1988, the Depart-
ment precleared the 1983 Senate plan, thus
freeing this Court to consider whatever
issues remained outstanding.

On September 21, 1983, this Court direct-
ed the parties to file statements identifying
the issues still in controversy. The order
set out a schedule for submitting briefs
and proposed findings. Although we be-
lieved that the action could be determined
on the basis of the previous record, we also
extended an opportunity for an additional
hearing, but required proffers of anticipa-
ted evidence from any party who believed
that the record required further develop
ment. The schedule was to culminate in
oral argument on November 21, 1g88.

The response to this order demonstrated
that only the MALDEF Interienors sought
an adjudication of constitutional or statuto-
ry elaims relating to the 1g8B House plan.
Although the Senate Plaintiffs requested
rulings and a hearing on the 1988 Senate
plan, the House Plaintiffs filed nothing.
Bavtou'n, which had partieipated in the



-,

TERRAZAS v. CI.EMENTS 1333

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Cltc r. 361 F.SuPP. 1329 (r9&l)

January, 1g82 hearing, likewiJe failed to claim concerning thd West Texas districts

file a statement of issues, a brief or pro- and supplemented the record only as tn the/
po."a finaingt' Montgomery County not allegedly discriminatory results of the Dal-

only failed to respond to this Court's order' las County House districts'

Uu[ trad also failed to appear at.any hear- 
Briefing preceded and fol]owed the No-

*-^;'l;: 
;::f :f i.]TIi,j''J**,o," ffi *jt Hf,ffiil11;;:*f #"";;ii

and the MALDEF Intervenors, we sched- 
addressed the constitutional and statutory

uled an evidentiary hearing for Novembet 
"rgr."nt". 

Although certain districts in

?li,J',ih$ #x'J:i";'rll:J"Ht S:,:[ tt'i tto"" pran have been artered since the

Plaintiffs sought an adjudication of the LRB originally drew the lines in 1981' the

lawfulness of the entire 1983 Senate plan' Dallas districts have remained unchanged'3

and, at least initially, the MALDEF lnter- Thus' on three occasions-at the January'

venors asserted that the House districts for 1982 hearing on the merits' at the March'

West Texas in the vicinity of Del Rio, as 1982 hearing on temporary plans' and at

well as the Dallas Co"rty-hi.tricts, violated the November, 1983 hearing addressed pri-

the constitution and section 2 of the Voting marily to section 2 of the voting Rights

Rights Act.z Act-we have heard evidence on the pur-

onthemorningofthehearing,theis.poseandeffectoftheDallasdistricting.
SUES NATTOWEd fUTthCT. ThE HOUSC ANd II. THE DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICTS.

Senate Plaintiffs appeared at the hearing

and offered a stipulation to dismiss them Before we consider the merits' a review

from the action. We accepted the stipula' of the Dallas County districts will place the

tionand,onDecember22,lgsS,enteredxparties'claimsinperspective'Thisreview'
consentdecreeestablishingthelg8Ssen-whichwillcomprisefindingsoffact'will
ate plan ". ti," 

p.r*un.nt-plan for Texas set forth the following: a description of the

Senatorial elections. fne ViRt OpF Inter- county population, a description of the dis-

venors, on the other i,and, auanaoned their tribution of the hispanic population within

2. The MALDEF Intervenors stated that the fol- West Texas result in a discriminating [sic]

lor.l'ingissuesoffactandlauremained:impactontheMexicanAmericanvotersof
A. rssues or Fact 

-,.., ": ::-_",,."". ilifir"i:4,';'^:l'8";::: ;'$;T 
2 or thc

1. Whether the totality of circumstances

regarding T.*". uor"r.lihtp"*nuti'" ttitl 2' whether the Texas House of Represent-

DistrictsinDallasCounryresultsintheinabil-atir,e[sic]DistrictsforDallasCountl'andz,or
ilv of Mexican'Americans in Dallas County to West Texas dilute Mexican American voting

elect candidates of their choice to the Texas strengrh in those respective areas in violalion

kgisrature. 
rrsrr L,rurLr-rv "- 

":^-" 
of the t+th Amendmenr to the United States

2'Whetherthelg83TexasHouseofRep.Constilution.

ff:::'$,i;"J,?' il:'li,:T :e!1 {iii',.1i.';i.' l# ?::',T:: :' l:Y, J H :5;l; 3;;

ts1i,"1'al$,;:' T.:'*', 
American voters rn 

l,j{*l*:iJ+:f*g:li:f :.',:: ff:'-;
3. Whther [sic] the totality of circumstanc-

es regarding r.*u, io"t of Representatiue (Veinon Supp'1982)' but the Texas Supreme

[sic] Districts for the Del Rio'/Wesi Texas area ioutt strttck dou'n the plan as violating Tex

results in the inability of Mexican Americans Const' art'.Ill' $ 26' u'hich prohibits the unnec-

in the Del nioZW"r, i.i.. ,.." ['e,f"tit'"ai essarv splitting of counties' Clements v Valles'

dates of their choice to the Texas Legislature 620 S'W'2d l12' 11+15 (Tex'1981)' The LRB

4.Whetherthelg83TexasHouseofRep.thendreu.thcdistrictsthatgaverisctothis
resenrative t.i.t 

'6iltri.t. f". thc D;l litigation' This Court temporarill' adopted thc

Rio,/West Texas area u'ere adopted u'ith the LR-B Housc plan rvith minor modifications 10

intentofdiscriminatingagainslMcxtcanthedistricrsinlwocountiesafterlhcDe}rarl.
American voters of Wesl Texas. nlenl of Juslic' obiected lo the original l-RR

B. Issues of Lau, 
Yrcsr rs^al 

Housc plan. 'Jr! las-i ll.rrsc pla:r cQ:rsisi' ol

l.WhethertheTexasHousco[Represcnt.thcLR-R}lt,us.P)allrvithtlrcc(,Lii.i.i)rdt.r(d
ative [sic] Disrricts for Dallas Countl and''or -n6 1;srlirrrr'

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1334

the county and a description of thq0ffect
of the past, present and proposed district-
ing plans on Dallas County's hispanies.

A. Dallas County and its Hispanic
Population.

As in the State of Texas generally, the
population of Dallas County grew between
the 1970 and 1980 censuses. The 1970

county population of t,327,320 had, by
1980, grown to 1,556,390. The rate of
growth in the county of 17.3%, however,
lagged behind the 27.l% rate of growth in
the State as a whole. Aecordingly, where-
as the 1970 districting plan had allocated 18

districts to Dallas County, Dallas County's
share of the 1980 State's House of Repre-
sentatives districts declined. Thus, a "one-
man, one-vote" reapportionment in 1980

would entitle the county to only 16.4 dis-

tricts.{ In light of the Texas eonstitutional
requirement of maintaining the integrity of
county lines whenever the United States
Constitution will permit iL, see Clements a.

Valles,620 S.W.zd 112, 113-15 (Tex.1981),

the drafters of the redistricting plans faced
the choice of dividing Dallas County into 16

slightly overpopulated districts or 17 slight-
ly underpopulated districts.5 The 1983

House plan ehooses the latter alternative,
as have all the plans presently before us.

The rate of growth in the county of the
anglo, black and hispanic populations was
not uniform. The minority populations in

4. The 1980 census sets the Texas population at
14,229,191. With 150 House districts, an ideally
apportioned district would contaiD 94,861 per-

5. Dividing the county inlo 16 districts would
result in districts containing approximately 97,-
284 persons. Dividing the county into 17 dis-
tricts u'ould result in districts containing ap-
proximately 91,561 persons. Although a deci'
sion to apportion all of Dallas County into l6 or
17 districts necessarily creates districts varying
2.@ to 3.50,6 from the ideal, the Texas Supreme
Court explicitly disapproved a split of Dallas
Countl'and seven other counties in the original
legislative plan, Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. l95a-7,
because "[the State] failed to prove that thc
retcntion of surplus populations within the
boundaries oi thc eight counlies would resull in
impermissiblc deviations." Clements v. Valles,
620 S.\\'.2c1 et i I 5.

58I FEDERALSUPPLEMENT

iit '; 
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a

Dallas County grew more rapidly than the
anglo population. Thus, in 1970, the:black
population of 220,357 comprised 76.6% of.

the county population. By 1980, the black
population had increased by 30.5% +e 287,-
541, and comprised 18.5% of. the eounty
population. In 1970, the hispanic popula-
tion of 88,652 comprised 6.7% of the county
population. By 1980, the hispanic popula-
tion had increased by 74.3% to 154,560, and
comprised 9.9%, of the county population.
Parenthetically, we note that the census
method of identifying hispanics changed
between the 1970 and 1980 censuses, so
that the numbers given for 1970 and 1980
are not entirely comparable. See II Trial
Transcript 414-15 (testimony of Dudley Po-
ston).

Theoretically, the 1980 combined minori-
ty population would suffice to form almost
five House districts. The black population
alone could fill out slightly more than three
districts. The hispanic population, on the
other hand, could fill out slightly more than
one and one half districts.6 Naturally,
these calculations take no account of the
geographic distribution of the minority pop,
ulation in the county.

The minority population, for the most
part, forms communities in the central and

southern portions of the City of Dallas.
Approximately 48,000 blacks and hispanics,
however, live scattered throughout the pre-

dominately anglo communities in north Dal-

6. The exact number of districts to which the
minority population would be entitled under
this strictly proportional analysis depends on
the method of calculation. The black popula-
tion could fill out 3.03 "ideal" districts while the
hispanic population could fill out 1.62 "ideal"
districts. IV Trial Transcript 1090 (testimony of
Paul Ragsdale). Assuming that these figures do
not double count persons u'ho checked both
black and hispanic on the census form, the
combined minority population could fill out
4.66 "ideal" districts. In a l7-digrict apportion-
menl of Dallas Countl, the black population
could fill out 3.14 districts while the hispanic
population could fill out 1.68 districts. Again,
assuming no double count, the combined mi-
nority population could fill our 4.82 districts. /d
at l09l (lestimony of Paul Ragsdale).

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.finnlzls v; CLEMENTS
Clte s 3El F.SupP. 1329 (t9&{)

r335

las county.? otherxiSe, the black and his- hood, known as "Little,,Mexico" consists of

panicpopulationsaremingledipanareaanareaslightly'northwestofdowntown
running along the line oi tfr" 1.rlnity Rir"r, Dallas and southeast- of love Field'ro A

through downtown Dallas and intp ttre second neighborhood, called "New Little /

southern part of th" c;;; ;;11"..;- Mexico" lies immediatelv northeast of

Although the brack and hispanic popula- il:Hf,H'iki.X?',T,Jffi""'frt":: ;t#:
tions live in close proximity to each other, as "El Poso," is located in the vicinity of
the hispanic population in Dallas County, downtown Dallas.t2 Three additional

according to testimony adduced by the neighborhoods, called "Los Altos l'a Va-

MALDEF Intervenors, has formed Several jate," "[,os santos" and the "L,edbetter"

identifiable neighborhoods.e One neighbor- area are located in west Dallas'r3 In addi-

7. Thus in the 1983 House plan, the six districts acknowledge may exist, result from shortcom-

thar run along the norlhernmost part of Dallas ings in May's testimony'

County have the following minority popula-
tions: 10. &e VI Trial Transcript 92 (testimony of Joe

Disrrict 98: 8,342 May)' May described the area as encompassing

District 99: 8,062 parts of voting precincts 3303' 3304 and 3386'

Disrricr l0l: 13,047 From the Dallas demographic map, this section

District ll2: 4,313 of the county varies from 2Oo/o lo 8Oo/o hispanic,

District 113: 6,079 and the northwestern portion of the area has a

Districr 114: 8,467 mixed population of 20o/o to 40%o black. From

l9g3 Joint Exh. 5. Aside from isolated pockets the statistical breakdowns of the plans, the cen-

of 50oo persons in northeast Dallas Countl' and sus tracts in the area May has described have an

3500 persons in north Dallas Counly, the minor- hispanic population of about 4200. See 1983

ity population in north Dallas County is dis' Joint Exh. 5 (census tracts 4 01, 5, 18 & l9).
persed.

8. Nearly 350,ooo blacks and hispanics reside- in tt. see VI Trial Transcript 87-88' May stated

the seven districts or th. issi iouse plan thar thar the area consists of voting precincts 3312,

run through central and sourhern Dalias coun- 1213, along wirh parts of voting precincts 3301,

ty. In rhise districrs, there are the following 2254 and 33O7. &e 1983 P-l Exh' 10' The

ririnority populations: Dallas demographic map indicates that this arca

District 100: 71,568 is from 200lo to 600/o hispanic' The 1983-House

District 103: 51,078 Plan statistical breakdown suggests that the area

District lO4: 8,750 tontains approximately 14'000 hispanics' See

District 107: 50,150 1983 Joint Exh' 5 (census tracts 8' 9' l0' 12' 15

Disrrict 108: 29,448 01' 15 02 & 24)'

District I l0: 66,382
District lll: 70,163 12' See VI Trial Transcripl 90-91 (testimonl'of

1983 Joint Exh. 5. Joe May)' May offered no voting precinct num-

9. The testimony concerning hispanic neighbor- bers foi the "EI Poso" community' The map of

hoods came principally from Joe Ma1', u'ho voting precincts with 40o/o or more hispanic

drafted MALDEF's most recent alternati'e population' 1983 P-I Exh' 10' shou's no hispanic

plan-the 'MAY-MALDEF" plan. For.lhe. most voiing precinct in the area May described' We

part, May described the hispinic n-eighborhoods decline to speculate about the size and exact

imprecisely. where he gave specific geog-raphic location of the "El Poso" community'

refirents for the neighborhoods, the referents

usualll'consistofvotingprecinctnumbers.Inls'SeeVITrialTrarrscriptg2-93'Thethree
at leasl one instance, the area described does ncighborhoods' according to May' consist of

nothaveahear,yhispanicpopulationconcentra.votingprecincts44l.land3353.Precinct3353'
tion.Byreferringtoprecinctnunrbers,MalaccordingtoMay'formsthcdividinglinebe-
has madc it difficult not'onl1'to gauge the exait tween the Los Santos and the Los Altos [:
irirp"ri. p"p"fation of th.i" u.iu.l u,hich ue Vajate comnfunities' We note that high hispan-

can derive only from the census iract break' ic-population voting-precincts lie adjacent to

dou'n in the district statistical summaries, e'g', 3353' We assume for present purposes- that

1983 Joint Exh. 5, bui also to correlate theic thcse precincts are part of the same neighbor-

n.igyborhu.ra, u'iih the black population con- hoc'ds' If so' according to the Dallas demo'

cenlration, *.hich u,e could harle icrived fron, graphrc map, lhe Ledbetter area has over 800/o

in. Outtur'a".ographic map. Anl,imprccisiotrs lrispanic p.pulation, and the other tu'o commu'

in tlrc descriptions in this opinion' of thcs, rrrtics havc from 2oo/o to 80% hispanic popula'

r.rr-rghboriro.ds, imprecisions uihich rvc rcaciilr ''tr r'ith a mixed black population of from 209'i'



58I FEDERAL SUPPLEMET{T
a

r336

tion, the area around Iove Field has a
substantial hispanic population.tt

Although these neighborhoods mav bepredominantly and idlntifiably hi.p"r;,
they.form separate enclaves l,f frirp"r"
population rather than one contiguou. t ir-
panic community. In most instinces, the
hispanie neighborhoods abut 

".;;. ;;;;populations are a mixture of black and
hispanic, predominately black o, f"ig"iy 

"r_glo. Generally, black areas are weiged
between the three hispanic neighborho-ods
north of downtown Dallas_Little Mexico,
New Little Mexico and the 

"ru" 
n""i fou-"

Field-and the three neighborhood. in *".i
Dallas-l,edbetter, Los Santos una f,o. et-
tos La Vajate. Moreover, the three hispan-ic neighborhoods within west Daflas,'ls

,? 
?OY . .According ro rhe LRB House plan

statistical breakdown, the Ledbetter ur., t 
"!-u.,nrspantc popularion of slightll. over 5600, see

1983 Joinr Exh. 5 (census tract 106), and the

31her 
rwg.communiries, combined, ;pp;;r-i;

lur"-^1n- hispanic popularion of aboui 16,600.&e 1963-Jo_inr Exh. 5 (census tracts 2O, 42, 43,47,48,50.51, 52 & lor).

14. -About 
350O hispanics live in the Love Fieldarea. &e 1983 Joinr Exh. 5 (census t.".r + 01.

15., With one exception, rhe neighborhoods ex.clustvel), abut other non.hispanic areas. Fol.
low-ing is a list of the census tracts thar adjoin
each neighborhood wirh tt. p..".","g" oi,i"predominate population group in 

"uj ..nru.
1rac1. T_he figures are derived- f."- f"ini-ixh.5, For lhe purpos€s of illustration, *. hur. ,."Jthe term "anglo', as a substitute fo. the exhiiir
category "other," u,hich includes all those u,ho
are neither black nor hispanic. We include rhis
breakclown with the caveal that an] impreci.
sions in, rhe descriprions of rhe tirpr.il ,i"ign.borhoods and the surrounding aieas deriies
from the vagueness of the testim.-ony.or.".ning
the locations of rhe hispanic ,.ighlorlooai.---'

LITILE MEXICO [includes census tracrs 4 Ot,
5, I8 and t9l: rracts 4 03 (Love piefal 

tO-O Zirz,
hispanic); 4 02 (st.7@A angto); 6 oi isi.l8v,anglo); 6 Ot (94.45or'u anglo); 7 Ot ia,.ei";,anglo); 17 o2 (92.62o7o black); 2r iSe.i8,r,a1g1o); and t00 (62.a6olo blacki.
NEW LITILE MEXICO [includes census
lra:ts..8, 9, tO, 12, l5 01, l5 O2, and 2al: rracri
l- (split tract) (9020 1 anglo); I $q9q%-i"
clo); 7 0l (62.660/0 anslol; 7 oz izs.as.r, u;
8lo); I I Ol (70.37oh anglo); l3 Ol (69.6404
anglo); t3 02 (tt)!oa anglo); u ioZ.tqbanglo); t6 (ez.s8o/o btack)J 2z or iii.is",.anslo); 22 02 (62.3so/o black); 23 iAO.iiiblack); 2-s (87.23o/o black); 26 iSz.iO"z.'Li".tll

well as the three to the north of dgwntown
Dallas, are not all contiguous to ure anoth-

I er. For example, the Iedbettei area is
isolated from the other two west Dallas
neighborhoods; it adjoins a black area with
less than 40% hispanic population on the
east, anglo areas with less than 40% his-
panic population on the south and north-
west, a black area on the northeast, and an
anglo area on the west. As the county
demographic map illustrates, the hispanic
population eonsists of six scattered areas
rather than a cohesive whole.rs lgg3 p_I
Exh. l0A. Indeed, the hispanic neighbor_
hoods are sufficiently dispersed such"that a
serious question exists whether any single
district could completely encompar. th"rnr.,.

81_(9O.33Vo anglo); and 122 03 (split tract)
(650lo + anglo).
LOS ALTOS LA VAJATE AND LOS SANTOS
[includes census rracts 20, 42, 43,i7, A,'sq
51, 52, and t0ll: rracrs ZZ OZ QO.Sloi ^rrli'.
.41 

(94.95o/o black); 44 (66.33% ungtol;''ni
(64.13Vo anglo); 46 (64.480/0 

^"Ad;' ;;(95.060lo black); Sf foe.SO"z anEioj; ;;
(7.s.l7oh black); 62 (47.16oh 

^"gt"l ii.ei"t"
black); 63 02 (84.04oh anglo); i'00 G;.4;%black); 102 (89.o8o/o black)I ana rc4i;o.;;;;"
black).
LEDBETTER Iincludes census rracr l06l:tracts 100 (62.46o,b black); 105 (solir r.,.ir
(60e^o-1 black); 107 (69.6904 ungfoi re3-gj
\72.13_v: ansl o) ; I 5 I (90. t 3o/o angio; ;' 

"nJ 
r i i(87.75o/o anglo).

LOVE FIELD [includes census tracr 4 03]:tracrs 4 0l (wesrern edge of Lirrle Mexico)
\5_6.J6o/o hispanic); q -OZ (Sl.lOu" ini;,
2_2.08q0 black); 6 Ol (56.820/0 ungto); ii'O"j
\7l9lY: black); 72 (67.460/o 

^"4";;' ;; o;(_88.21% anglo); 98 02 (66.t1o/o lriili, -"rj
l0O (62.460lo black).

15. One could debare whether the MAy_MAL-
D!f, ylal acrually encompasses 

"f 
f tf,. f,irf"ni.

neighborhoods in its hispanic aisrrict, ai'si.icil13. 
.The.answer dependi on how.r;;Ji;;:"nerghborhood," and we have heard no testimo.nl on this definitional question. W. nor., ho.^l-

ever, thar the MAY_MALDEF plan splits uo six.
1::-...:ntr. rracrs jusl in drau,ing its hispanicolstrtct. In most instances it attemprs to eitract
the "most hispanic,, block groupe fi.-if,.-.pfii
census tracts. Whether or nol the plan succeedsin presening all the neighborto"a, *f,ii. .rt-
:llfl-ur. meandering path rhrough the ciry ofualas ts not, in our r.ieu., crucial. We areforced to wonder just hou. much these arcastrut-\' constitute .,neighborhoods,,, 

as Ma\. tesri-tied, much less one cohesir.c,,communitr.,,,
u,hen a plan musr dra* such fi"" l;;"-;'b;i;;l

i/
I

I

i

(

1

I

t
(

1

(

!
(

r
I

e

o

I
'd

tr

tl
l
\
a

a

a

b
Jt



, .TERRAZAS v.. cLEMENTS
Clre u 5Et F'SuPP. t329 (19&l)

0
l--

B. The Districting'Plans.'

Partially as a consequence ofrdispersed
nature of the hispanic populations, Dallas
has never had an hispanic-dominated House

district. With one exception, the proposed

plans do not draw a district with an hispan-

ic majority. One plan-the "MAY-MAL
DEF" plan-creates a district with only a

bare hispanic population majority. The

voting age population for that district, how-

ever, is only 43.66% hispanic. While the

other plans that we have reviewed have in

common their lack of a hispanic district, the
plans differ substantially in their demo-

graphic and political consequences.

1. The Preuious Plan.

Before the 1980 census was taken, Dallas

County was divided into 18 single-member

House districts. The Texas Legislature
had drawn the districts pursuant to the

order of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas after
that court struck down a multi-member dis-

trict plan for the county in 1971. See

Gran:es u. Barnes, 343 F.Supp' 704 (W.D'

Tex.19?2), affd in part and rer"d in part
sub nom. White u. Regester, 412 U'S. ?55,

93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.zd 314 (1973). The

Graoes plan had divided the predominately

minority areas in and around the City of
Dallas into six districts: 33C, 33F, 33G'

33K, 33N and 33O.

These six districts were heavily populat-

ed with minorities. District 33C consisted

of portions of the black population in west

Dallas and included the hispanic population

around l,ove Field. District 33F, which lay

to the south of District 33C, took in most of
the area where, according to the MALDEF
Intervenor's testimony, the "Los Altos La

Vajate" and "[,os Santos" neighborhoods

are located, together with adjacent black

and anglo areas. Three districts, 33G' 33N

and 33O, ran through the predominatelv

black areas of south Dallas. Sec 1983

Joint Exh. 2.

dcrcrmining if a particular group of hispanics
living in roughlv thc samc area is indecd a part

The Graaes plan con(ained four districts
with substantial hispanic populations.

These districts varied }rom one with 19.8%

hispanic population to one with 31.3% his- /
panic population. A more completc break'
down of the minority populations in these

districts appears in Table A.

TABLE A

Minority Population In Graves Plan House Districts
(In Percentages)

Black Hispanic
Population Population

58.8 20.6

2,2 81.3

5?.9 8.0

3r.7 n.t
85.4 2.4

63.0 19.8

a. Black plus hirpanic adjusted to corr€ct double count

for those who checked both.

(Sourte: 1983 Joint Exh. 2)

In 1980, these district configurations had

resulted in the election of three black Rep-

resentatives. Representative Sam Hudson

was the incumbent elected from district
33C in west Dallas. II Trial Transcript
465-66 (testimonv of George Dillman); II
Trial Transcript 539 (testimony of Lee

Jackson). Representative Paul Ragsdale

was the incumbent elected from district
33N in south Dallas. II Trial Transcript
539 (testimony of Lee Jackson); IV Trial
Transcript 1082 (testimony of Paul Rags-

dale). Representative Lanelle Cofer was

the incumbent from district 33O in south

Dallas. /d. While the Grares plan was in

force, one other district, district 33G in
u'est Dallas, had, on t*'o occasions, elected

a black Representative. II Trial Transcript
539.

2. Thc 198J Hou.se Plan.

Despite the grovvth

tion in Dallas CountY

census revealed that
City of Dallf,s were
populated. Together,

tricts in central Dallas listed in Table A,

supra, were approximately 160,000 persons

of the ncighborhood.

District
Number

8:!C

88F
88G

88K
83N
slo

L

{337

MinoritY r
Population

7it.9

58.s
65.9

58.8

8?.8
82.8

of minoritv popula-
generally, the 1980

the districts in the
substantially under-

the six minority dis-



r338 58T FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

TABLE B

ehort of the population necessarr for*six distrigt BBF; the district also extends for-"ideal" districts. District $C ;r;; f"ii ther west, 
"rJ i..iri". sma, porrions of

$:f,"'#"J,::"';i'*ff"3"t:r:lYi* former diltric; iic""a 33o on trre eouth
urately blz st ort of an '.ideal,, district. IV and east' .See 1983 Joint Exh. z; rsai p-i
Trial Jtanseript 1089 fte.ti*ory or"p"rr Exh. 4. District l0?, in t"rg. ,""rureRagsdale). ' ----J 

includes former district BBK togethe" 
'riti.,

Ih:.19?3 House plan, Iike aI of the plans 
a portion of former district iac. 198,

submitted to this 6o"t, 
""a""r" the minori- 

Joint Exh. 2; lgg3 p_I Exh. n. nist"iciiii
tydominated areas in central and southern includes most of former district $N, ;;
Dallas county into five districts.--;;: extends further south. l98B Joint B*r,. z;
sence, the 1983 House plan dismantlJ; 1983 P-I Exh. 4. District rrr in.ludesof the Graaes districts in tfre CIW oiD"il most of former distriet BBG, part of fo".".to build up the minority popuration il;j;: district BBo, and an area to the west ofcent districts' District ttio- 

"r"orp"s.'* 
Dallas that had not formerly been a p* ;imost of the population of former dil"i;; I: .?*"r city disbicr 19$ J. Exh. 2;3BC in west Dalras and extends ,";;;;;; 198s p_r E*h: a; breakdown of theinto predominatelv blaek."."u. th"irr"*l.- minority poprl"tion and voting age popula_Iy comprised a paut of district aso. sr;ll tion appea"s r", ""J'"r the five minorityTrial Transcript 856 (tesrimony oi L; districG ,ra"r-ir,"-igs3 House pran in Ta-Jaekson); r98B Joint Exh. 2; rgsi p-i EJi bre B arong *ir['ii,."r"re information for4. District 108 consists in part 

"f f;;;; the three MALDEF plans.

District

100
108

l07
u0
1u

Minority r
Pop.

75.47
67.06

50.76
70.09

70.65

Minority e

VAP

n.77
47.52

47.78

68.44

@.ai

@.2,
56.65
53.63

6'/.&1

62.65

Likr
plan d
panie
contai:
Distrit
co" arr
panic 

;

total r

which
most o
Vajate
an hisl
of the
these d
lations
neither
bined I
upamr

The <

tricts, I

election
tives.
merly <

district
dale, fo
tion in
incumh
run, a I

was elei

3. T)

The Il
three pi
.,MALD

DEF pla
to creat
Each pla
of minor
City of
each pla
politicall
IandM
con&rin a

conpariron of Brack, Hispanic and Minority composition of selectedDallas Crcuty Dstricts under l&3 House plan

LF.GEND: pop. = poprr"tiol 

MALDEF Plans (in pertentages)

I.

VAp = Votlng Age population

lB3 House plsn

Black 
PJ:] Hispanic HispanicroP' VAP pop vAp

II. UALDEF I House plsn

y 63.68 58.{i} a.fi
$ D,.67 mB 42.iy 8?.4s 3{.31 z,37
llg 71.47 6s.1e 3.nlll 61.15 u.74 9.8s

III. UALDEF. II House plan

100 6639 59.44lG n.u a.g6lfi i6A %i.atlr0 65.68 62.58ll1 65.?8 6r.?3

65a8 61.86
m.n 18.63
26.65 24.75
@.90 65.41
66.73 60.9r

12.49

85.54

29.01

3.57

10.10

10.39 9.6{
40.30 34.51
4.75 m32
4.69 {.03
5.18 1.43

11.06 ?8.ts
28.98 56.G
23.81 55.&'g.%, ?8.18
8.56 ?5.50

10.98 75.U
36.50 64.98
19.46 fi.47
zu 74.6
8.O7 ?0.68

68.88
59.29

43.50

6.42
65.96



T
iJ. --:-
tL.

. TERRAZAS.v. CL-EMENTS
' ClteuSEt F.SuPP. t321' (t9t4)

F
F
)
T
t
t
I
D

!
i.

!
r
r
;
L
b

I
F

I

t

110

111

118

III. UAY-UALDEF Hotrse Plcn

l1p 
*8159 ) 16.61

tG 60.08 I 6.17

b {8.20 b

b ?52sc
b 74.53 c

b ?1.17 c

43.66 65.61 c

gether with a combined black and hispanic

f,opulation majority. In the MAY-MAL
bEF plrn, the hispanic district has a bare

hispanic population majority together with

a combined black and hispanic population

majority.

Although each of these plans achieves, at

least in theory, an hispanic-dominated dis-

trict by slightly different means, the line-

drawing in each plan dealt with similar

obstacles. The most serious problem, of

course, arises because only twelve of the

census tracts in Dallas County (143 04, 4

03, 30, 31 02, 33, 106, 4 01, 8, 10, 19, 24' 47)

contain more than 50?i hispanic population'

1983 Joint Exh. 5. Even these twelve cen-

sus tracts, which cumulatively contain

slightly more than 21,000 hispanics, cannot

alibe placed in a single contiguous district'

Only one plan-the MAY-MALDEF plan-
includes the four largest of these twelve

trac[s in one district, and even that plan

splits two of these tracts.

Still another problem arises from the

first. The MALDEF plans all attempt to

unite in one district at least part of census

tract 106, an 85'06'zl hispanic area contain-

ing about 5600 hispanics, and census tract

a 1g, a 6o.2lrt hispanic area containing

about 3300 hispanics. 1983 Joint Exh' 5'

To accomplish this union, the district must

traverse an area that forms a part of 1983

House district 100, and that formerly was a

part of district 33C from the Graues plan'

Although rthe area--census tract 100-it-
self contains a black population of onll

1446 persons, the area either adjoins or

gives access to other areas (census tracts 6

Ot. ff OZ, 102 and split tract 10ir) that have

adriitional black populations totaling ap-

lrroxittiltelv 11,200 llersc'ns' No district co-

rri'i; rrratic,rl for a irlr,r'I tiistlict that exclud-

(-\i ('('trstls tract l(-'(l i"uiri join these other

8?3E b 7.15

dt.?g r 8.88

11.18 1429 51.13

a tinority equala black plur hirpanic, edjuetcd for thooe who checked both'

b. lte MALDEF Intervenon hgve not supplied this infotmation'

c Total not adjugt€d for thooe who checked both blE k and hispanic'

(Source: 1983 Joint Exh. 2; 1988 P-I Exhs' 8A' S7')

Like the Graues Plan, the 1983 House

plan does not unite the six pockets of his-

panic population. Two separate districts

contain substantial hispanic populations'

District 107-which contains "Little Mexi-

co" and "New Little Mexico"-has an his-

panic population comprising 29'01% of the

Ltat aistti.t population. District 103-
which contains the Ledbetter area, and

most of the population in the Los Altos La

Vajate and l,os Santos neighborhoodt-}1?
an hispanic population comprising 35'54'i

of theiotal ditt.i.t population' In both of

these districts, the black and hispanic popu-

lations eombine to form a majority' In

neither district, however, does the com-

bined black and hispanic population make

up a majority of the voting age population'

The configuration of the 1983 House dis-

tricts, like Lhe Graaes plan, resulted in the

election in 1982 of three black Representa-

tives. Representative Sam Hudson, for-

merly of district 33C, won re-election in

district 100. Representative Paul Rags-

dale, formerly of district 33N, won re-elec-

tion in district 110. Although the black

incumbent from former district 33O did not

run, a black Representative, Jesse Oliver'

was elected from district 111'

3. The MALDEF Plans'

The MALDEF Intervenors have offered

three plans-the "MALDEF I Plan," the

"MALbEF Il plan" and the "MAY-MAL
DEF plan"-that have a common objective:

to create an hispanicdominated district'

Each plan creates five districts in the areas

of minority concentration in and around the

City of Dallas. In one of the districts in

each plan, hispanics would potentiallv be a

politically decisive force. In the MALI)EF

i and MALDEF II plans, the kev districts

contain an hispanic population pluralitv to'



1340 58I FEDERAL.SUPPL'EMENT ?

areas with the rest of district lOit. Inshort, the line draw
make a .h"i;; ;;;;::: xffiJt",l,.T *hispanie populations.

- 
Finally, the MALDEF plans all excludethe same predominately anglo ;;';.;;their hispanic-dominated O[tri.t".--f"rii_

mony adduced by the MALDEF Ir;;;_nors suggested that these affluent angloneighborhoods, which are a part of one of
llr" y^":l strongly hispanic di.tri.t una".the 1983 House plan, h"d ;-;;;;;;;
::::lC propensity to oppose ,ino"ity 

""nJio,"*aj I'hese areas, referred to as ,.Kes_
sler. Park" and ,,Stevens park,,, 

"Jirm-ii*predominately hispanic areas in west Dal-las. VI Trial Transcript 99, 102_08 (te;;-
mony of Joe Mry); il. aL 66,78 (testimonv
of Trinidad Garza,l.rt The three iliD;i
plans cut a careful line around these anglo
neighborhoods and move th", ir;;;;;;:
dominately black district to the south.

. 
The three plans also have in commontheir effect on the hispanic ;"r;;;l;;.rike the 1983 House plan, the'Md#;

plans place parls of each of th" .ir.;;;;of hispanic population into at [r:.;-;;;
separate districts. The three ptans aiifer
fll:flr,. in their.respective perceno*".'ri
nrspanrc population in the hispanic_do-mina t_ed districts and their effeci on ;l;;;;;
black districts. The MAy_Meiorili",
is- unique in that it embraces 

"t_Iea-;r, ;;;of the identifiable hispanic communltiel innorth Dallas and west Dallas. il;;;;
achieves an hispanic population ,"io"ii.,,
gnlv b-v creating a alstiici ,f,", .rn.-'rf,."'"
tcntacle-like corridors through ,""rt 

"njcentral Dallas. A more complete break-
9:*l of the minority populations in ea.f,qrsulct appears in Table B.
IiI. THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS.

^ 
The MALDEF Intervenors urge thisCourt to strike down the Dallas er;;;districts in the lgg3 House plan b;;;:

they violate section 2 of the V",irg nigii.
1_.j ?, dituting hispanic votinf .i.-".,";;;and because the plan,s drafters .oni."_
,r......t^r:n, the, descriprion of the neighborhood,wc as(Uill(.that the u.itnr

t r,. i,,, .',.,,-,"' ."IJi'j'iii:,1'::il:J;l,.j;tJ:

vened the constitution by purposefulty creatlng that ditution. ff," 
"""fjgr*iffir";;the districts, in the MALDEF;;;;;;

estimation, combine with politicai ;;il-tions in Dallas County to ensure ,hJ;;
h.ispanic population 

"rjoy. 1"., oppoJuiti
than others to elect-.iraia"t"r'J-ii,"ir"
choice.. 

.Purportedly, the State dla;;#;
llll y,,h,the transparent intent to protect
tneumbents by harming Dallas hispanics.

The Dallas districts, the MALDEF Inter-venors maintain, fragment a cohesive his_panre community. The plan allegedly joins
hispanic neighborhoods to politicilty ilJ;anglo neighborhoods with the 

";r;i;-;h";the,largest groups of f,i.puni. ,-ot 
^"n*rrauas Uounty are rendered politicallv im_potent. As the MALDEF lnL*"no.. .""the matter, its alternative plans 

""A1"."the ease with which the distiictinC ;;;;;i
!y *.uld. have designed at least or'" air-t-"i.tln whreh hispanics could have turned anundesired ineumbent out of offi." anA ir-stalled a eandidate of their choice.

The MALDEF Intervenors assert thatthe failure to draw such a di.t"i"t ;;.;';;
regarded as discriminatory. past potiticai
discimination and the lingering 

"fi".t_ "igeneral discrimination againsi trispanics
have al legedly rendered tf,", pollti..it,'i"_
active. Aeeording to the MALDEF. irt""-venors, political polarization, evidenced U,
otoc voting, leads to a predicLable result forhispanics-virtual disenfr"n.f,i."r"rt. 

- 
.i.one consequence, the MALDEF, Interve.

loT polt out, no hispanic has ever ."*"a
fl ,h"-'I'exas [,egislature as a Representa-
tive of Dallas County.

. 
The State, in the MALDEF Intervenors,

vrew, can muster no policy adequate tojustify the impact of tlie tS8B i"ir.""pf#
on hispanics. The sole lustlfication of iheplan- allegedly derives fro, incumb"n.r.
While the MALDEF Intervenois'co;;;J
that the State Defendants may legitimatelv
consider the political effeets of 

"""af.i."i-
in$, the Ig8g House plan purportedlv
aehieves its political ends Uy fi;;;;ili;

hispanic neighborhoods identified as Los Alrosl-a Vajate and Los Sanros.

gerr
tion

N
MA]
the
gTAI

tion.
dict*
ttcra

is cr
the I

ofD
astr
lya
gem(

that
the 1

Defe
conti
the r

Ac
distri
ble <

neigt
hoodr
nine
ed, w
In th
DEF
dence

ryma:
asser
plain
hispar
er nal

Mor
view
failed
ty ele
panics

fendar
olithic
tion g
status
facto
does r

assert
ness d
ic canr

Finr,
uit ' :



Ee-
tof
,rs'
rdi-
tlre
riB
Eir
the
nct
ics.

tpnnez.l,s v. GIJMENTS l34t
Cltc.r Stt F.SuPP' 132'!l (l9A{)

gerrymandering a nitural hispanic popula- tion of State policy' 
" 

Incumbency' accord-

tionconcentration'Iinctoth.estateD.efendants,providesonly
Naturally, the Stat€ Defendants deny the a lart of the plan's'rationale' The State's

MALDEF Intervenors' "tai"cte'ization 
of po"rio Ato allegedly.advances related int'er/

tireplan,sdesignandresult.Thegeo.ests_continuitywiththepreviousdistrict.
graphic dispersion oi ii,"-t'i'p'nic popula- ing flan' and the preservation of Repre- 

'

tion, the state Defendants contend, contra- .Jnt tir.-.onstituent relationships' In ad-

dicts any notion that the plan fragments- or dition, the state Defendants point out that

,,cracks,, any community of hispanics that the drafters had to consider the effect of

is cohesive. FurttrermJre,-in if," view of the plan on black voters' The State De-

the State Defendants, the political climate fendants allege that the MALDEF plans

of Dallasisnotsointo.fitif"tohispanics jeopardizeblackinterests; allof theMAL

,. t outig" the state to construct artificial- bn-r pt"nt pair an anglo incumbent against

ly a district that ensures loca) hispanic he- the most junior black Representative' 9n"
d".*r. ir,e state Defendants also argue of the plans' the MAY-MALDEF plan'

ii,"i tr.rl MALDEF Intervenors misconstrue eviscerates the district of yet another black

ii" pt"n,. purpose. The plan, as the State Representative. The State Defendants as-

o"t"na"nt. emphasize, aims at maintaining- 
'"'i thut this court should defer to the

continuity and avoiding retrogression of legislative judgment about how best to re-

the voting strength of blacks' solve these conflicting interests fairly'

According to the state DefendanG' the Iv. THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS'

li:"::',1":?;;:'L"'*'.'':fi,J":T;::r,:l?; Since the supreme court rirst roraved

neighborhoods. The hispanic' neighbor- into the "political thicket" of reapportion-

hoods, which are separated by as much as ment in the 1960s' courts have struggled

nine miles, have allegedly been consolidat- with the task of developing manageable

ed,wherepossible,inareasonablemanner'standardstodeterminewhentheprocessof
ln the State Defend"nt uit*, the MAL line-drawing becomes invidiously discrimi-

DEF Intervenors cannot, under the evi- natory' On one hand' courts have not tol-

dence,arguethatthelg8SHouseplanger.eratedpoliticalsystemsthateffectivelyex-
rymanders.Rather,theStateDefendantscludeminorityvotersfromthedemocratic
assertthattheMALDEFlntervenorscom-processes'l':'^''!:'W'hitett'Regester'412
plainonlyoftheplan,sfai,luretomaximizeu.s.zss,?65-?0,93S.Ct.2332,2339-4|,37
hispanic voting ,*"ngih b., tarving up oth- L'Ed'zd 314 (19?3); ForLson t' Dorseg' 379

er natural popuiation patterns' U'S' 433' 439' 85 S'Ct' 498' 501' 13 L'Ed'zd

Moreover, the State Defendants take the 401 (1965) (dictum); Zimmer t McKeilhe n'

view that the MALDEF lntervenors have 485 F'zd 129?' 1304-0? (5th Cir'19711) (en

failed to demonstrate tt"t tt'" Dallas Coun- bat'tc)' offd on other grounds sub norrt'

ty electoral system 
-i. 

,igg"a against his- Easl cairoll Parislt school Board t'' MQr'

panics. Ti,e eviOenc", '"?lt 
tf'" St"te De- shalt' 424 U'S' 636' 96 S'Ct' 1083' 4?

fendants,construction,establishesnomon-L.Ed.zd296(19?6).Yet,ontheotherhand.
olithic polarizatlon in oloting among popula- courts have consistently eschewed the no-

tion groups that mighi lra-n*ror* irispanic tion that the united States constitution

status as u poprt"tion 'i"ofii 
i"" '' tt secures to any group of citizens the right

facto withdrawal of the right to vote. Nor to obtain trolitical representation in propor-

does the evidenee, if,. S"t. Defendants tion to its numbers ' E'g'' Whitcomb t"

assert, sho'*' hispanit-potitit"r powerless- Chattis' 403 U'S' 124'156-57' 91 S'Ct' 1858'

ness despite ttre frequent failure of hispan- 18?i-?6' 29 L'Ed'zd 363 (19?1)' In the

ic candidates at the polls. p)'f,st,nt case. \4'e are presented u'ith two

Finalh',theStateDefendantsdisagreevririalionso":hl:-:*:*"ofhou'todrawthe
u.irlr tlrv IlALDEF Inter'en.rs' interlrretlr- lr: :'t'trvt't'n securing the right t'o partici-

ter-
his-
0ns

tile
hat
in

lm-
lee
lee
)ri-
let
an
in-

|at
be
18I

of
k
ht-

lr-
by

DT

Is
e-
Dd

L.

a
bo

u:l

l€

v.
td
ly
t-
b
b'



r342

pate politically and avoiding government by
quota.

ll,2l Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Aet, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 lgTB, as amended in
1982, and the fourteenth amendment to the
United Stst€s Constitution offer related
remedies for minority groups that have
suffered interferenee with their right to
vote as a result of the voting practices or
procedures in their eleetoral system.tE To
obtain either remedy, a plaintiff must show
that, in the totality of circumstances, ,,the

political processes leading to nomination
and eleetion were not equally open to par-
ticipation by the group in question-that its
members had less opportunity than did oth-
er residents in the district to participate in
the political processes and to elect legisla-
tors of their choice." White v. Regester,
412 U.S. at 766, 93 S.Ct. at 2BB9; see 42
U.S.C.A. S 1973b. Under neither test does
the failure of a minority group to translate
its voting strength into proportional repre-
sentation suffice to establish a lack of ac-
cess. Whitcomb u. Chauis, 403 U.S. at
156-60, 9i S.Ct. at 187*77; 42 U.S.C.A.
1973b.

t3l Both the constitutional jurispru-
dence and section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act have employed a group of objeetive
evidentiary factors to measure the discrimi-
natory effect of a voting praetice or proce-
dure on minority voters. See White a.
Regester, 412 U.S. at ?6G{9, 98 S.Ct. at
233941; Zimmer o. McKeithen, 48b F.2d
at 1305-{6; S.Rep. No. 417,97th Cong.,2d
Sess. 28-29, reprinted in, tgSZ U.S.Code
Cong. & Ad.News 177, 20G{7 (report of

18. Some courts have identified two separate the-
ories under which a plaintiff might show rhat a
redistricting plan discriminates invidiously.
E.9., Zimmer t McKeithen, 485 F.2d ar 1304.
According to these cases, a plaintiff may shou,
either a "racially motivated gerrymander"-
Gonillion v. Lighr/oot, 364 U.S. 339, 8l S.Cr.
125, 5 L.Ed.2d ll0 (1960) is the paradigmatic
cas€-or an apportionment scheme that oper-
ales lo cancel out the voting strength of a mi-
noritl' group. E.9., White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
at?66-70,93 S.Cr. at 233941. The nvo lines of
cases were theoretically dislinct because the lat-
ter, or "dilution," line of cases did not, under
earlier interpretations, require a sho*,ing of in-
tent, *,hile a racial gerrymander did contem-

68I FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

-. Committee on the Judiciary endoraing lgg2t 
amendmer-'ts to the Voting nigl,t" e.ti
The factols include historical inqri"l". 

"uii,as the effects of past discrimination, indicia
of race or ethnicronscious polities Buch as
polarized voting, and formal'obstacles to
minority success at the polls such as anti-
single shot voting requirements or majority
vote rules. The objective factors aid in
distinguishing mere political failure from
unlawful deprivation of political participa-
tion.

t4l Despite the common purpose and
evidentiary focus, section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act demands a less exaeting burden
of proof. To find that an electoral system
violates the constitution, a court must de.
termine that the discriminatory impact of
the system derived from the intent to bring
about that result. See Rogers a. Lodge,
458 U,S. 613,6t6-22,102 S.Ct. 3272,3275_
78,73 L.Ed.Zd 1012 (1982); City of Mobite
a. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-21, 100 S.Ct.
1490, 149${1, 64 L.Ed.zd 47 (1980)(plurali-
ty opinion of Stewart, J.\; accord id. at
99-101, 100 S.Ct. at 1516-151? (White, J.,
dissenting). The objective factors in White
and Zimmer may, but do not necessarily,
support an inference of intent. Compare
City of Mobile a. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 72-
74, 100 S.Ct. at 1502-1503 (plurality opinion
of Stewart, J.) (objective factors "far from
proof" of discriminatory purpose) with
Rogers a. Lodge,458 U.S. at 623-27, l0Z
S.Ct. at 3279-81 (finding evidence, based
principally on objeetive factors, sufficient
to support inference of discriminatory in-

plate a showing of intenr. See Zimmer v.
McKeithen,485 F.2d ar 1304.

We do not think that this distinction has
clearly survived later developments in the law.
Thus, some courts have treated what were es-
sentially racial gerrymander claims as voting
dilution cases. See e.g., Kirksey v. Board ol
Supervisors, 554 F.2d t39, t4243 (5th CiO (en
banc) (claim that single-member districr lines
fragmented cohesive black community), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 512, 54 L.Ed.2d
454 (1977). Furthermore, a dilurion claim
brought under the constitution musl no\^. in-
clude proof of discriminatory intent. Rogers r,.

lndge, 458 U.S. 613, 6tGI9, 102 S.Cr 3272,
3275-77,73 L.Ed.2d l0l2 (l982)

tent). Ui
Rights Ac
lish a viol
tory rcsu)
through tl

. tors. Seo

No. 417 a,

Cong. & I
Althoug

vant to bo

ry inquiry
different
must discr
tors under
tests. Th
how the r

districts c

voting pra

A. The

tsl Bef
cases that
of voting ,

quired a s.

To harmor
with the st
protection
Arlington
ing Deuelt
s.ct. 555,
preme c/ou

19. Origina
a cause ol
ment. Se
(filed Jan.
fifteenth a

presently s

rality opin
amendmer
contempla
pose. 446
(opinion o
ion goes c
ment exler
from inter
and vote.
other Jusl
greed with
l0O S.Ct. a

id. at 102,
ing); id. a

shall, J., d
that the p:
ment remi
619 n.6, l(
nol arguecl



I
I

i

t
)
h
f.b
b
b
h
h
nr

>

s
t.

tent). Under section 2 of the Voting intent requirement into the voting dilution
Rights Act, howewr, a plaintiff can estab, line of cases for the Iirst time.m Section 2
lish a violation by showing thc diserimina- represents Congresl' judgment that focus-
tory result, whieh in turn can be proven ing on intent diverts attention from thd
through the aggregate of the objective fac- crucial issue-+quality of access. S.Rep.
tors. See 42 U.S.C.A. 5 19?3(b); S.Rep. No. 41? at 16, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.
No. 417 at 2$-30 & n. 118, 1982 U.S.Code News at 193.

iIERAAZAS v. CLEMENIS
ctr6 u 3tt r.bupp. tizs (lrsa)

1343

Originally, section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act had merely tracked the wording of the
fifteenth amendment,zr and the Supreme
Court read its provisions as coextensive
with the constitution. Bolden,446 U.S. at
60-61, 100 S.Ct. at 1495-1496 (plurality
opinion of Stewart, J.). In June of 1982,

Congress amended the Act to prohibit elec-
toral systems that had invidious resulls
even though the systems might not clearly
have been installed in order to discriminate.
The Act presently reads:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequi-
site to voting, standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision in a

manner which results in a denial or
abridgment of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of
race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section
19?3b(fl(2) of this title [which applies the
Act's protection to members of any lan-

in this case lo impose a standard different or
more liberal than the fourteenth amendment or
the Voting Rights Act. The MALDEF Interve-
nors did not include the fifteenth amendment
claim in their statement of issues of fact and
law remaining in controversJ'. We do not there-
fore consider the scope of thc fifteenth amend'
ment separatel)'.

20. Lower courts, including the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, had rcad Arlingtott Heights
and related cases as applying to voting dilution
claims. See Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.zd 2O9,217-
25 (5th Cir.l978).

21. When enacted on August 6, 1965, the statute
had read:

No voting'qualification or prerequisite to vot-
ing, or standard, practice or procedure shall
be imposed b1' an1'State or political subdivi-
sion to deny or abridge the right of any citi-
zen of thc united states to vote on accounl of
race or color.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Title I, S 2,79
Stat.437.

I
I
I
I
I
r
?

Cong. & Ad.News at 20G{7 & n. 118.

Although the objective factors are rele-
vant to both the constitutional and statuto-

ry inquiry, each test relies upon them for
different inferences. Accordingly, we
must discuss the significance of these fac-
tors under the constitutional and statutory
tests. This discussion will also eonsider
how the configurations of single-member
districts can constitute a discriminatory
voting practice or procedure.

A. The Section 2 Test.

15] Before Bolden and the lower court
cases that anticipated its holding, the law
of voting dilution had never expressly re-
quired a showing of discriminatory intent.
To harmonize the law of voting dilution
with the standard prevailing in other equal
protection cases,le see generally Village of
Arlington Heights u. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Deuelopment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97

S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.zd 450 (1977), the Su-
preme Court in Bolden explicitly read an

19. Originally, the MALDEF Intervenors pleaded
a cause of action under the fifteenth amend-
ment. See Complaint in Intervention at 14
(filed Jan. 4, 1982). The application of the
fifieenth amendmenl to voting dilution cases
presently stands in an uncertain state. The plu-
rality opinion in Bolden states that the fifteenth
amendmenl, like the fourteenlh amendment
contemplates a showing of discriminatory pur-
pose. 446 U.S. at 61-62, l0o S.Ct. at 1496-1497
(opinion of Stewart, J.). Ultimately, the opin-
ion goes on to state that the fifteenth amend-
ment extends only to protecting black citizens
from interference with their right lo register
and vote. ld. at 65,100 S.Ct. at 1498. The onll
other Justices who considered the issue disa-
greed with the plurality analysis. Id al 85-86,
l0O S.Ct. al l5O9-1510 (Stevens, J., concurring);
id. ar lO2, l0O S.Ct. at 1517 (White, J., dissent-
ing); rd at t25-35, 100 S.Ct. at l53l-36 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Rogers v. Lodge suggests
rhat the precise scope of the fifteenth amend-
ment remains an open question. 458 U.S. at
519 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. ar 3276 n.6. The parties have
n(,t argued rhat lhe fifteenth amendment applies



1344 58I FEDERAL .SUPPLEMENT

grlg_" minority], as provided in subsec_
tion 0) of this section. .. 

--""""
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of thissection is established if, based ;; d;totality of circumstanees, it is ,f,o*n tf,ri
the political processes f"uairg t"-norlni-
tion or eleetion in the StatJ r; ;;i;;l;;subdivision are not equally ,p;";';;;:
ticipation by memberJ of a ciass ,f ;iti
zens protected by subseetion (a) of this
section in that its members h;; [;;opportunity than other members 

"f ;h;
electorate to participate i, tfr. prfltL"l
process and to elect representatives oitheir choice. The extent to which meml
bers of a protected class have b;;; ;i;;;
ed to office in the State or political subdi-
vision is one circumstan.u thut mrr,-;;
considered: proaided, fhat nottrins inthis section establishes a righl a; ;r;;
members of a protected clasls 

"tuo"a 
in

numbers equal to their proporti", i; d;population.
42 U.S.C.A. S 19Zg (West Supp.198B).

. The-Janguage of the Act, whieh derives
from 

-Wh.ite 
o. Regester,4lZ U.S. 

"t 
i66, 9;

U:,T.!" House report endorsed an earlicr vcrsionor lhc seclion 2 amendment, H.n.f f f Z, SZihCong., tst Sess., which h.a in.o.por"r.J'u',:*'
suhs" lesr wilhour rhc d"finiii",iri r.,"iilr'il,subsecrion (b) of thc final bill, ;"a'J,i.lrri'ri.
caveal aboul proportional r"pr.r.n,o,iun.-'ft"
rrnar language of thc bill resulted f.o. , .o.-promisc in the Senare Committee on rt. :Jili-
1_v. See S.Rep. No. 417 ar 3, 1982 t.aril;
!ong. & Ad.Nervs ar 180 (hisrory 

"] ifr.; i,fil.Arguabl5,, the House Report is, u. u ,".rtr,-i"..a-uthoritalive on the meaning of the e.r.- i-rnthe Hcr-usr. floor debares f"ff"*i"g i"""," nlrls,age_.of tht' measurc, horvcver, ir app"ar.. fharthe House merelv vieu.ed ,r," ..rnpl"rnir" ir"-
Euagc as a clarificarion 

"f rn" H,r,j."l o",-igii"iintenr. 128 Cong.Rec. H3gaa (dai11: 
";. ;;:;;,t98l).

23. Thc dcvclopment of rhe constirutional iuris.prudcnce on voring dilurion h". 
";; Ir;.:.:i;;;

lnstances in uhich courts have a.guabl1,r".:isJ
the meaning of earlier. cases. In the SuprcmeCnurr, for example, thc Bolden pi;;;lj,;;"b;;1:rj' announced thar ihc Wite r. Regcit", cas",which conlemporan. courts hud ,;,^"; ;.":resutts casc, required a shou,ing of discrinrin:r,torv inrcnr. See Bolden,416 U.S. 

"r eS_20,"i00

?,S, ,i] ]tq?-,s01. 
(pluralirr opirrion ot st"r,,r,iJ..1. r.\'cn lhc author of rhc t,purion in Wttitt rl.

R_egester apparcntl-r agr (.cd. 5", Orta"rr,"'lid
U.S. ar l0l-O3, rUi S ir. ar rstT_18 (\\.hirc, i.,

S.Ct. at 2889, air4s at codifying pregolden
case law. See H.R.Rep. N;.'zqt, iiti
Cong., lst Sess. 29-80 (Hous" Co.m;Iil;
on the Judiciary recommending ,,""suits'i
amendment to section Z of the V;ti""
IrF .!:t)t_,, s.Rep. No. tn it rti.
27-28, tgBZ U.S.Code Cong. & ea.N"ru.li
192-202, 20446. Congress viewed pre-
Bolden case law as evaluating tf," ai.cjmi
natory nature of the electoral .y.t". inquestion solely on the basis of oU:".li""
criteria.23 ld., l9g2 U.S.Code Cong. &-Al.
News at t96-202,20446. To 

"id 
;, ;p;i;

ing section 2, Congress enumerated typical
objective factors derived *o^ wilir'"ii
Zimmer:

1. the extent of any history of official
discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched tf,e rlghi oi il;
members of the minority grouf t" 

"";;;_ter, to vote, or otherwise to p"rtl.ip"ti in
the democratic process;

2. the extent to which voting in the
elections of the state or politicalsubdivi-
sion is racially polarized;

dissenring). A panel of rhe Fifrh Circuil under-took a similar reinterprelalio n of Zf *rrrr- r,.M_cKeithen. See Neveir v. Sides, 571 F.2d at22U228. In both insrances, fellow ju;isi;;i;:
crzed^r'hal the1. perceivcd 

". "" ir;";:i.,;";.rec botde,z, 446 U.S. ar 103_4t, tO0 S.Cr. ar
].5-ll-39 (Marshall, J., disscnling); U"u",i, Sii
I..-rO, 

u, 23r-38 (Wisdom, :., .p""liollr .""*r-rlngr.

S

C

2
4

Z
C

m

Ultinratelv, thc rcasoning in l,lthite t. Regesterand Zintntcr t,. McKeitlu.n u,ill bear 
"ith;;;;;-

1"11. *l1l presenl purpos.r, ho.r", "..'C;;;;;;nas. madc clear its undcrstanding rhrt , ."orriundcr seclion 2.should applt Wie 
^"a 

Li"rril)as purel\. "resulls,,cascs. Scc S.Rep. No.  l7 ai28-n. Ilt, t982 U.S.Codc Cong. & Ad.N;; ;;20.5-06 n. I I I (.,This commirrei do", ,or ,i.fianr vicu of White as requiring plainriii,".*Ii
s()mc objccliuc dcsign,rest that is, in cffccl, aversion of thc ,forcsecablc 

consequences, tcst oftort Iarv.") ( tJg Cong.Rcc. H3g4l (dailv ed.Junc 23. re82) (rcmaik, 
"f R;;. 

'S";:";i.;;.

L"I). Sec also S.Rep. No. qll 'ar 
lg_Zq, LISZU.S.Codc Cong. & Aj.Neu.s at t9e202 (revieu..ing prior casc lau. and Congressionuf'-rrl",

standing of -Wite ). \4,hateveith" p..;";;;;;
::.1::l.l .o[ 

carll 
,voring diturion .;r"r:;;';;,

Longrcss has scl lh(. courts lo thc task of givingthcnr mcaning as .,rcs!rlls,,

? : :,:,:i i | 
" 

c:,, r' 
" 
i 

" 
"ili t. i ],li' ; of " i .f10" ",:i {{,1O7l-72 (6rh Cir.lgfi:) (r,t, ng€,ci t.; lnqrir"-int.,purp()sc undcr ;rnit r,L; , ,,(.tr(r1t 2).

A
I

I

I

I

(

I

l
.,]

c
ir



, rrtnlz^ls v.'GLEIIENTSI 1345
Cltc u ttt FSuPP' t329 (t964)

S.theextenttowhichthestateorpolit-"vhetherthepoliqyunderlyingthe
ical subdivision has used unusuplly large state or political sub{ivision's use of such

election districts, majority vote require- voting qualification"'prerequisite to vot-

ments, anti-single shot provisions, or oth- "'g' 
It'na"td' practice or procedure is /

", 
,oiing po"ti.". o, p'otedu'es that tenuous'

may enhance the opportffi f* il;; S'Rep' No' 417 atzg' 1982 U'S'Code Crcng'

ffi ; against,r; ;r,'Jlt,l *;ff " 

- - {,*#:,- ;r:'.:3; f TJil#: "fr :"r?;r'*
4. if there is a candidate slattng.pro- I." not an all-encompassing catalogue.of
cess, whether the members of the mln:rl: 

tt 
" 

f""to."r that mark a system as discrim-

ty group have been denied access to that i*rO, but rather guides for discerning

process; *f,ethlt race or language unduly deter-

;' the extent to which the members of tin" ttt" outcome of political events' The

the minority group in the state or politi- Senate report noted:

cal subdivisi* b""' the effects of dis- The courts ordinarily have not used these

crimination in such areas as education' i"tto"' nor does the committee intend

;;;Ity*;;' and health' which hinders ti't* to be used' as a mechanical "point-

their ability to p"ttltip"L effectively in tountlng" device'-. The failure of the

the political process; pi"intifis to.establish any particular fac-

6. whether political campaigns have [or is not rebuttab]e evidence of nondilu-

been characterized by overt or subtle ra- tion' Rather' the provision requires the

ciar appeals; 
ou"^':"""".=:,' 

;m:;":ll#3AT::i'":::1,::rT;
7. the extent to which members of the if,o." 

'""f"u"nt factors in the particular

minority group have been elected to pub- .r.", "f 
whether the voting strength of

lic office in the jurisdiction. .i*rity voters is, in the language of

S.Rep. No' 477 at 2v2g' 1982 U'S'Code io't"oi and Buras lu' Richardson' 384

Cong. & Ad.News at 206-0?; H'R'Rep' No' U'S' Ze' 86 S'Ct' 1286' 16 L'Ed'zd 376

221al30(footnotesomitted);cf'White'(1966)1"'minimizedorcaneelledout'"
412 U's' at ?66-?0' 93 s'ct' at 2339-41; S'Rep' No' 417 at29 n'-118' 1982 u'S'Code

n**u' 485 F'zd at 1305' ln addition' cong' o Ad'News at 207 n' 118'

congr".. cited two other factors that Thus, when a minority group-contends

;ifi;;-"" limited rele'ance: that an electoral system disenfranchises

whether there is a significant lack of if,"* f".""te their race or ethnicity has

responsivener. on tt " 
pita "i"f**a "f decisive political significance' the objective

ficials to the particularized needs of the i".tor. provide indicia of how great a role

members of the minority group. race or ethnicity plays,25 and how severe

24.Althoughthesefinaltwofactorsu,ereentitledtoshorvpretcxt.^See-Robinsonv.Commissiott.
to u'eight under the tfri'i'zr*'n"' analvsis' 

';'";;;';50s F'2d 674' 680 (5th cir'1974)'

co.r*"i, explicitly accorded them less weight 25. Se*eral factors can confirm that race is at

;;;:;-;.ii;;2.'tn rh" case of unresponsive. -"ir."" i"ii," potitical system. Racial campaign'

ness, the senate report disapproved the vieu ;;;- f* 
-'"xa*pl"' 

diiecrlv demonstrates that

that unresponsi"n"" *ut-u'''essential element ;;tt; ;;'"; l;;''"' Likewiie' racial bloc voting

of a voting dilution claim' and staled'' moreover' t"sg*ti1"1 minorit) candidates lose precisell

that a showing of t"'pon'i'"ness did not negate ;;e;t; of lheir "t" 
s" Rogers v' Lodge"4'58

a plaintiffs.r"lm' s'n"p' No' atz ur zc n' iro' i'.i ; 623' loz s'cl' at 3279 ("without bloc

1982 u'SCode cong' a ia'Nervs at 207 n ll6' ioti"s tt'" minority candidates would not lose

This sratement .orn,...'l'.onr.a.y sugg",tio: ;i";i;"s solely beta's" of their race")' Even

in lodge v. Burron, olsilJ iis'8, tiis (srt' 
"i..i","f 

defear by minoritv candidates can

Cir.l98l), afl'd sub """,'nZi"" ''' 
t"1s" ^!l! poin' tn.racial content in political contests;

U.S.613, 102 S.Cr. tzlz,"iilEii,.zd IOl2il982). 'such evrdencc raiscs the common sense in[er'

In the case of t""'o"t'"J''"''r* itt'"' u'eiglrt is ;;;; th'i i[b]"tu"" it is sensible to expect that

consisrenr u,irh rhe .;r*!'t; ".fr,rri.-rro- 
;i'l;r-.;-.";J blacks [or hispanics] would have

intenr to results. il;*p;;;.1;;i prc,bxri\c [""n "r".,"a 
.. the .fact that none halc is

weighr of a tenuous srat., pc;lic\.is ir. pr,,i..r,sit: irrfr,,,i,.t ,lt'idt"t" .f purposeful cxclusion "



r346 58I FEDERAL,SUi'PLETIENT'

are the probable effects.26 The objg'ctive
factors offer a framework to distinguish an
unlawful electoral system in which consid-
erations of race or ethnicity pervade poli-
tics to the serious detriment of the minori-
ty, from a permissible electoral system in
which the racial and ethnic composition of
the elected body simply does not mirror
that of its constituency. See generally
S.Rep. No. 417 at 33, 1982 U.S.Code Cong.
& Ad.News at 211.27

B. The Constitutional Stand,ard

t6l The constitutional standard also in-
quires into the extent to which raee and
ethnicity mobilize the electorate and com-
bine with a voting practice to dilute the
minority's voting strength. The results of
a voting practice, however, only begin the
analysis. As the Supreme Court has em-
phasized, only the most severely discrimi-
natory results will suffiee to invalidate fa-
cially neutral rules. ln Arlington Heights,
for example, the Court stated:

Determining whether invidious dis-
criminatory purpose was a motivating
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent as may be available. The im-
pact of the official action-whether it
"bears more heavily on one race than
another," Wosh.in.gton a. Dauis, [426
u.s. 229, 242 [96 S.Cr. 2040, 2049, 48
L.Ed.zd 597 (19?6) Fmay provide an im-
portant starting point. Sometimes a
clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds

Id. at 623-24, t02 S.Ct. at 3279. Although the
infcrence of purpose may be of secondarl im-
port under seclion 2, the inference of exclusion,
purposcful or not, remains.

26. Some of the factors do not meaningfullf' ad-
vance the inquiry inlo u'hether race is at issue,
but do signal that the effects of any racial con-
tent in politics u,ill be exaggerated. Thus, the
existencc of a praclice such as an anti-single
shot voting provision, or a majority vote re.
quircmcnl does not, in itself, indicate that race
has particular importance in the State or politi-
cal subdivision that employs it. The practice,
hou'cver, does have the potcntial to magnify the
cffccts of race- or language-conscious politics.
()thcr factors, including a history of political
clls.'irnirralion or thc socioeconomic effects of
r'r j.. i.rl discrirrinalion, presumprivell explain

other than race, emerges from the effect
d the state action even when the golrern-
ing legislation appears neutral on its
face. Yick Wo a. Hopkins,ll8 U.S. 356

[6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220] (1886);

Guinn a. United States,238 U.S. 347 [35
S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 13a01 (1915); Lane a.

Wilson, 30? U.S. 268 [59 S.Ct. 872, 88
L.Ed. 12811 (1939\; Gomillion a. Light-
foot, 364 U.S. 339 [81 S.Ct. 125, 5

L.Ed.2d 1101 (1960). The evidentiary in-
quiry is then relatively easy. But such
cases are rare. Absent a pattern as
stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo,
impact alone is not determinative, and
the Court must look to other evidence.

429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 564 (footnotes
omitted).

This "other evidence" may consist of an
indirect showing that the decision-makers
contemplated the discriminatory result.
Thus, in Arlington Heights, the Court sug-
gested that a plaintiff may demonstrate
intent circumstantially through evidence of:
(i) the historical background of the deci-
sion; (2) the sequence of events leading up
to the challenged decision; (3) procedural
or substantive departures from normal de-
cision-making; and (4) statements, includ-
ing legislative or administrative history, re-
flecting on the purpose of the decision. 1d.

at 267-68,97 S.Ct. at 564-65.

Clearly, some of the objective factors can
perform "double duty," shedding light on
both the result of a voting practice and its

reduced minoritt' political participation. See
Kirksel'v Board ol Supcrvbors,554 F.2d at 145
& n. 13 (past political discrimination); Mclntosh
County NAACP v. Ciry o/ Darien, 6O5 F.2d 753,
759 (sth Cir.l979). Oncc again, rcduccd partici-
palion can exacerbatc the effects of a racialll or
ethnicalll' polarized elecloral process.

27. The opponents of the amendmcnts to section
2 principally contended that the Act would, de
facto, require proportional repreientation, bc-
cause lhe objectivc factors werc simply too
mcaningless to allou courts adequately to assess
rvhcn an electoral slslem was discriminalor-t',
and not merely disproportionate. See Thc Vot-
ing Rights Act: Report of the Subcorr.rnrittce on
the Constilulion of the Scnate Commiuec on thc
Judiciary,9Tth Cong., lst Scss. 37*38, reprinted
in, 1982 U.S.Codc Cong. & Ad.Nes,s 278, 316-18.

purp(
875, I

ing d

cY, I
form
cont€
ident
wise
of th
ates
electr
out I
ers o

3279.

De
tors
tern
ore
show
histo
the d

dure,
tY, P
102 I
ter,
41).
fack
LodS
327&
howt
tive
indel
prot/
rule
pose

at 1i

J.).

C.

M
and
of s,

dres
orr
of tl
not
cont
Nev
sing
test



f
,

TERRAZAS v. CLEME}'ITS 1347

F
F
E
t6
p;
16

?.

lB

t-
5
l!'
fi
18

,,
d
t

s

n
6

L
t-

E

[:

i-

p

I
F

t-

.' Clte u 3tl FSuPP' f329' (t9t4)

purpose. See Cross a. Boxter,r604 -F'zd 
inteni to apply sectiop 2's prohibition on '

8?5, 880 n. 9 (5th Cir.19?9) (histo.ry of voL discrimination to all vbting practices' See

ing discrimination). A";;';;t;Lte poti S'Rep' No' 41? at 30' 1982 U'S'Code Cong' /

cy, for example, pro'id"' precisely the & Ad'News * 207 '

iii* "r 
circumstantial showing of intBnt The Supreme Court has seemingly treat-

contemplated by the Artington-Heifuts-.9v- ed single-member districting plans as dis-

identiary scheme' Polari"zed voting like- tinct flom atJarge systems' For example'

wise elucidates the rtitt"tit"r backiround in Connor a' Finch' 431 U'S' 407' 422-25'

ofthevotingpracticeorprocedure;itcre-9?S'Ct'1828'1837-39'52L'Ed'zd465
ates a political climate that "allows those (19??), the court intimated that the district-

elected to ignore frninoriiii interests with- ing auttrority must purposefully draw lines

outfearofpolitical"on."qr"n."r)'-Rog-to-canceloutminoritypoliticalstrengthin
ersu.Lodge,458.U.S.ateZS,102S'Ct'atordertoviolatetheconstitution'The
3279. Court' however' decided Connor after Ar'

Determining whether the objective fac-'#::"r:#^y![ ;l*rtS:ilT tIXIJ:}:

[:;Hl;'ill?J;Y1i'i""Ty';ffi1*:3:: ence to rower court 
"utt'o'itv 

interpreting

or a sufficiently strong circumstantia 1 Regester' Loyer courts have found that

showing or intent, ;;;;". ;" brend. or [1;:iifr".[1*S1,3,'J,T'';; ,*;:,;::;,
history"and an intensely local appraisal of 

b54 F.2d at 143.
the design and impact" of the voting proce-

dure "in light of tt" pa.t 
"na 

p'e'eii'"ali- Several of the "objective factors" apply

ty, political and otherwis'e'" iee id' at 622' readily to single-member districts' For ex-

102 S.Ct. at 3278 (quoting White u' Reges- ample' a minority that votes in single-mem-

ter, 4l2U.S. at ZOS-?0,-SS S'Ct' at 2339- beidistricts will be affected equally by any

41). Occasionally, evidence of the objective history of discrimjnation' and equally sus-

factors will warrant relief. Rogers t. ceptibie to the effects of depressed socioe-

Lod.ge,458 U.S. at 622-627, fOZ S'Ct' at conomic eircumstances' Likewise' racial

327u3281. Under the constitutional test' bloc voting will support the same inferenc-

however,acourtmustgobeyondtheobjec-esofracialpoliticsandmaybearthesame
tive faetors to a"srrre'ileir ii''t the record pio'p"tt for ensuring perpetual electoral

independently ..titt'"t it't general equal iete"t' whether it occurs in an at-large or a

protection standard tnui"-fu-"i"fly neutral single-member districting plan'

rule must derive from discriminator]' pur- t71 The structure of a single-member

p"...- r'la'n, nao ui' aL72-74' roo S'ct' alstricting plan' however' does not have the

at 1502-1503 Or""riti opinion of Steu'art' tat" inl'"t"'t tendency to submerge the

I\
Jo".. As the Eighth Circuit has noted:

C- Speeial Problems of single-Member vote dilution occurs when an at-large

Districts' 
" 

"lection 
plan is used to cancel out the

Muchofthe..votingdilution,,caselarr.,votingstrengthofasubstantialminority
and indeed most of the legislative historl' pop'Ltion' Typicallv' a relatively small

of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act' ad- geograp}ic area of a municipality will be

dresses the design ;;;;d'i "r i:]i:I: m,t':"3,1,r,L"T"1'lll",r?"Jl "*l::X
ii,ilJ::}".Tff; $:11'oT;.,ffi":;::::r:: -":",i,v of a singre ,,,",nuu,. di.tricr if an

not alu'a.v-s translate to'nto"t"Utu into the election-bv-district voting scheme was

context of single-member districting' used instead of an at-large scheme'

Nevertheless, .t rd;;.- for dealing with Pt,rl;irrs r'. citg of w'est Helena,6?5 F'2d

single-meml'e. ai.tittt 'Jer 
the "result's" 'ri1 -lrr:; ri 2 (8th Cir'1982)' Provided that

testarenecessaryrnlightofCongressionaltit.,ril',.t'ir.tsareequallyapportioned,sin.

I
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I
I
t

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I
i



58T FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTr348
L

gle-member districts do not obviously dilute
voting strength. Only refereace to the mi-
nority composition of the district and the
manner in which the district lines are
drawn can change such plans into devices
with discriminatory results.

The minority composition of single-mem-
ber districts may have the effect of cancel-
ling out voting strength in two ways.
First, district line-drawing may pack a mi-
nority into homogenous districts, thus
"wasting" its potential political strength.
See Wright a. Rockefellea 376 U.S. 52, 57,
84 S.Ct. 603, 605, 11 L.Ed.2d 512 (1964).

Alternatively, the district line-drawing
might fragment minority groups among
several districts, thus preventing the form-
ation of a local majority. See Eobinson a.

Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 679
(5th Cir.19?a).

While easy to state in the abstract, iden-
tifying when "packing" or "fragmenting"
deprives a- minority of access can present
difficult problems. One difficulty stems
from the uneertainty about what district
configuration best sen'es the minority po-

litical interest. For example, in Wright,
the Court noted that there was disagree-
ment between the minority plaintiffs and
intervenors not only about u'hether concen-

trated or dispersed districts were prefera-
ble, but also over whether the concentrated
or dispersed districts were constitutionally
permissible. 376 U.S. at 57-58, 84 S.Ct. at
60H06. Moreover, the feasibility of con-

centrated or dispersed districts ma]' varv
depending on the pattern in u'hich minority
group has settled. Whereas splitting up a
cohesive minority population might, under
the totality of the circumstances, cancel out
minority political strength, Kirksey, 554

F.2d at 149-50, every movement of a cohe-

2E. Howard provides an illustration of the diffi-
cultics that can occur with respect to single
member districts. In a rcapportionmenl plau,
thc county board of supervisors split a segment
of a black majoritl- district lo combinc it with a

u,hite majorit] district. The overall effect of the
plan rvas to leave the former black dislricl u'ith
a smaller but still substantial majoritl; thc for'
mer u'hite district remained u'ith a smaller but
still substantial majority'. In rejecting the dilu'
tion claim, the coun noted:

sive mihority population out of a single
district does not dilute voting strength.
Howard u. Adams County Board of Su-
pentisors, 453 F.zd 455, 458-59 (5th Cir.
l9'12).28

What will show the requisite dilution?
In many cases, the ultimate conclusion has

turned on purpose rather than results.
8.9., Robinson, 505 F.2d at 679. In Kirk-
sey, the lead pre-Bolden case in which a

plaintiff prevailed without a specific find-
ing of purpose, the requisite dilution de-

rived from: (1) the eohesiveness of the
community; (2) the fragmentation of the
community; (3) deviation from expected
district lines; (4) a pattern of racial bloc
voting; and (5) a history of discrimination.
The result was a "predictable tendency" to
cancel out and minimize the rninority vote.
Kirksey,554 F.zd at 14?-51.

V. THE OBJECTIVE F'ACTORS.

We next consider the evidence on the
objective factors. The MALDEF Interve-
nors offered evidence on a history of offi-
cial discrimination, the socioeconomic ef-
fects of general discrimination, polarized

voting, a lack of success by hispanic candi-

dates, and a tenuous state policy. The

discussion that follows, which will consti-
tute findings of fact, will consider each of
these factors.

A. History of Official Discimination
and the Lingering Effects o.[ Gener-
al Discimination.

We first consider two factors together:
the history of official discrimination touch-

ing on political participation and the linger-
ing socioeconomic effects of general dis-

crimination. In this case, MALDEF of-
fered similar evidence with regard to both

Inevitably, people of different racC\, nation-
al origins, and contrasting tenets will be shift-
cd under reapportionment plans to districts in
which thel' ma] no longer be in the clear
majoritl'. But rvhen, as hcrc, no racial moti-
vation spau'ns a changc in thc voting arca of
thosc complaining, and thc redistricting plan
does not unconstituli(rnirl!r' dilutc lhc voting
strenglh of lhe mit.ir,r'rt' !lr, t. is rro abridg'c
ment of vc,tinE right:.

Id. ar 459.

of these
drawn fr,
overlap.
litical par
Although
tion can
that a f
state po

consider

The M
evidence
and offic
cipally, t
judicial n

In additir
nesses d
status oi
nature o

As th
the Statr
ed again
u. Barnt
affd in
412 U.S.
(1973), I
consider
guage t
official,
ercise ol
As the r

Becau
cial, I
widesl
custol
dices,
some
can-A
amou
suffe
from.
discr,
ofe
healt

Th
politi
is af

29. Set
2lli (

Iii' '



TERRAZAS V. CLEMENTS
Cltc r.5El F.Sur. 132.!) (t9&r)

r349

by a deficient

I
dngle
bgth
f su-
n Cir.

rtion?
n has
eults.
Kirk-
rich a

find-
n de-

f the
f the
eeted

bloc
Ition.
y" to
vote.

r the
en-e-
offi-
c ef-
rized
andi-
The

rnsti-
:h of

ttiort
m(r-

Ltrer:
ruch-

rSer-

dis-
' of-
bottr

Iion-
3hifr-
Es in
ilcar
moli'
la of
.plan
LrtIug
idg.-

of these faetors, and the irferences to be which has been fostered

drawn from the presence of these factors education syst€m'

overlap. Both faetors explain reduced po'

litical participation by the minority group'8e

Although a history of official discrimina'

tion can support an additional inference-
that a facially neutral rule continues a

state policy of discrimination 30-we will
consider that inference separately'

The MALDEF Intervenors have offered

evidence of discrimination-both private

and official-through several means' Prin-

cipally, they seek to rely on this Court's

iuaiciat notice of the findings in prior case.s'

in addition, statistical evidence and live wit-

nesses described the present socioeconomic

status of Dallas hispanics and the reduced

nature of hispanic political activity'

As the MALDEF Intervenors suggest,

the State of Texas, in the past, discriminat-

ed against its hispanic citizens' ln Graues

a. Bintes,343 F.Supp. ?04 (W'D'Tex'1972)'

affd in part sub nom. White u' Regester,

4i2 u.s. ?55, 93 s.ct. 2332, 3? L.Ed'zd 314

(19?3), for example, the court extensively

considered the combined effeets of the lan-

guage barrier, private discrimination, and

ofti.i"t discrimination on the hispanics' ex-

ercise of the franchise. Id. at 731 & n' 19'

As the court stated:

Because of long standing educational, so-

cial, legal, economic, political and other

widespread and prevaient restrictions'

customs, traditions, biases and preju-

dices, some of a socalled' de jure and

some of a de .facto character, the Mexi-

can-American population of Texas, which

amounts to about 2011 , has historicalll'

suffered from, and continues to suffer

from, the results and effects of invidious

discrimination and treatment in the fields

of education. employment, economics,

health, Politics and others'

There can be no doubt that the laek of

political participation by Texas Chicanos

is affected by a cultural incompatibility

29. See Perkins v. City of West Helena' 675 F '2d ar

211; Cross v' Barter,604 F'2d at 880-82 & n 9:

KirkseY,554 F.2d at 143 & n 13'

This cultural and language

impediment, conjoined with the poll tax

and the most restrictive voter registra-

tion procedures in the nation have oper-

ated to effectively deny Mexican-Ameri-

cans access to the political process in

Texas even longer than the Blacks were

formally denied access by the white pri-

mary'

Id. at 728-31. In addition, the MALDEF

Intervenors ask us to note that school au-

thorities in parts of Texas have maintained

dual school systems that segregated his-

panic students from their anglo counter-

p"ttt. See United States u. Teras, 342

F.Supp. 24 (E'D'Tex'19?1); Cisneros a'

Corpus Christi Independent School Sys-

tem, 324 F.Supp. 599 (S.D.Tex'19?0)'

As the MALDEF Intervenors also sug-

gest, the Dallas County hispanic population

has not achieved educational levels compa-

rable to either the anglo or black popula-

tions. Thus, whereas only 18'7% of the

black population and 9.9% of the anglo

population have proceeded no further than

Llementary school, 46.9% of the hispanic

population has not gone beyond e)ementary

sctool. Although the hispanic population,

on the average, has higher income levels

than the black population, the hispanic av-

erage is nevertheless lower than the anglo

average. VI Trial Transcript 149 (testimo-

ny of Frederick Cervantes). The evidence

aiso showed that mean housing values in

predominately hispanic areas were signifi-

cantly lower than the mean housing values

for anglo areas. II Trial Transcript 404-06

(testimony of Dudley Poston)' On the ba-

sis of tlris regord, we conclude that Dallas

hispanics suffer serious socioeconomic dis-

advantage.

Several witnesses, both for the MALDEF

Intervenors and the State Defendants, tes-

30. Cross v. Barter,604 F.2d at 880 n' 9; Kirksey

v. Board ol Supervisors,554 F'2d at l'l-1-'14



58I FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT1350

tified that di'scrimination against hispanig4
has not only occurred in the past, but con-
tinues at least in parts of Texas. 8.g., ly
Trial Tlanscript 1117 (testimony of Paul
Ragsdale). Still other witnesses testified
about the feeling among hispanic candi-
dates and voters in Dallas County that
political action is futile. VI Trial Tran-
seript 76, 82 (testimony of Trinidad Garua\.
Moreover, the evidence shows that hispan-
ics participate infrequently in politics as
measured both by voter registration and
turnout. For example, 1983 P-I Exh. S?
supp. indicates that only about one-half of
the hispanic voting age population in Dallas
County regist€rs to vote. Accordingly, we
conclude that discrimination and its socioe-
conomic effects have decreased hispanic po-
litical participation.3r

Finally, we consider the offer by the
MALDEF Intervenors of the findings of
the Department of Justice on electoral
practices in the November, 1982 elections.
According to the findings, Dallas election
officials ran short of ballots, and a dispro-
portionately large number of the precincts
affected were predominately minority.
1983 P-I exh. 34. In addition, notices
warning of the consequences of illegal vot-
ing were posted during the election, again
largely in minority precincts. The findings
allegedly bespeak continued official dis-
crimination.

While we might accept these findings to
indicate that Dallas election officials were
insufficiently solicitous of minority voters,
we do not attach great weight to the find-
ings as signifying intentional political dis-
crimination. As the report indicates, the
ballot shortage resulted from inaccurate
computer forecasts of voter turnout. No
discussion appears in the report concerning
the prevalance of, or the reasons for, the
notices concerning illegal voting. Whether
these incidents constituted intentional dis-
crimination within the meaning of the Ar-
lington Heights intent test is a question
that could spawn an entire satellite litiga-

31. As Congress and the courts havc recognized,
a relationship presumptivell, exists betu,cen rc-
duced politic:rl parricipation and discrimina.
tion-relatr.ri soc jocc onlrmic disadvantagc. ,4/r,/r-

tion.' Neither party offered testimony to
explain. rebut or supplement the findingsl
As a result, we do not accord to the finding
significant weight on the issue of official
discrimination.

Although the State Defendants do not
seriously contend that hispanic political
partieipation is free from the effects of
past diserimination, the State adduced evi-
dence to show that the State has attempted
to improve minority participation. We
have heard testimony that voters may now
register more easily in Texas than in most
other states. II Trial Transcript 392 (testi-
mony of George Pierce). Registration
forms are, in addition, readily available in
Spanish. Moreover, the State has attempt-
ed to improve registration by organizing
voter registration drives. IV Trial Tran-
script 89G-91 (testimony of Mark White).
Despite these changes, which represent
laudable attempts by the State to reverse
the effects of the former political alienation
of minorities, we find that the combined
effect of these two factors point to discrim-
ination-related reductions in hispanic politi-
cal participation.

While the State undoubtedly has had a
history of official discrimination against mi-
norities, the evidence adduced in this case
strongly suggests that official discrimina-
tion against minorities has ended, at least
in Dallas County. Further, the entire pro-
cess by which, following the 1980 census,
the State of Texas drafted and adopted
redistricting plans, culminating in the 1983
House plan, far from evidencing official
discrimination, convincingly evidences full
minority access to the redistricting process
and a willingness on the part of almost all
involved in that process to consider and
effectuate minority proposals. This sug-
gests that the 1983 House plan does not
continue any past policy of official discrimi-
nation. Indeed, it represents a dramatic
break with that policy. Detailed fact find-
ings relating to the redistricting process

toslt Cotttttt 
^|AACP 

r. City ol Darien, 605 F.2d at
759; Cros.. r. Ba.\ter, 604 F.2d at 881: accord
S.Rcp. \,, 1li ar 2c n. ll4, 1982 U.S.Code
C(rng. & .':,. ',( \\: at 206-07 n. I14.

are 8et
case, ?t
52&-36,
Nevertl
of offic
objectiv
against
rcsulter
ipation

B. I
The 1

prove I

througl
witness
other cr

with po
impress
anglos
DEF IT
on one
primarl
103, wi

At le
gested
blocs: I

onstrat
panics
most k
patt€rn
and hir
spectiv,
mary ir
anglo i

date g
predon
examin
vinces
exist ir

Dallas
r9$ I
32. Ser

ien, 6
45. r
partic
requir
that i

discrir
fects.

33. Tes
StTlOItl
past (
to the

-.__---.&-



fto
186.

etc
icisl

not
ical

of
evi-

't€dWe
los'
tost
sti-
ion
rin
lpt-
ing
an-
!e).
ent
nse

ion
red

im-
titi-

lsl
ro

!6S

rl1

nd
tg-

rot

la
mi-

lse
Ba-

BS.

Bd
83
ial
ull

nl-

tic
rd-

BS

al

"dHc

TERRAZAS ". il,puBxrs l35l
.' 

Clteu5ErF.SuPP't329 (t9&t)

aresetforthinourearlieropinioninthisequalopportunitytoparticipateinthepolit.
ezse, Terraz* o. ctr*inn;, ;5;;:i*p.-;, t"ut pro."r. or elect candidates of their

iir3o, and are hereby incorporated herein' choice' t'
Nevertheless, in spite of the recent history

of otti.i"t concern for minority needs and 1: The Euidence'

objectives, the history of disc-rimination Cross-examination by the Stat€ Defend:

against hispanics is not remote 32 and has 
ants revealed serious methodological short-

rJ.rft"a in reduced hispanic^political partic' Iorirg. in the polarization studies' Nota-

ipation at the present time'33 UfV, Oi. Brischetto, the principal MA-LDEF

B. Polarized or Bloc Voting' expert' made no effort in his studies to

rhe MALDEF lntervenors att€mpted to H:"JlrH,::i;:.?":l,T r:lif:1il:
prove polarized voting in Dallas Countl' tion, income, campaign issues or education'

ittougt three techniques' First, exper' tll Trial Transcript 628-30 (testimony of

witneJses offered studies of polarization.in noU".t Brischetto). Moreover, Dr' Bris-

other counties. Second, witnesses familiar .t"tlo .on."aed that he selected for study

with politics in Dallas County related their 
those electoral races that pitted hispanie

impressions about polarization between 
"unaia",". 

against "formidable" anglo op-

"ngto. 
and hispanics. Finally, the MAL p".iii", In-addition, for his most detailed

'"f}:':iJJffii'Jjffi.""&,j"j"il:ffi: 
"u'"jv'i'' Dr' Brischetto chose onrv the

primary in the 1983 Hou-se district, district mosi over*helmingly anglo or hispanic pre-

ioa, *itt the greatest r,i,p"nr' population' :T"'f$1t[il;Tl.::ffii'':itX,'X ffil:
At least superficially, this evidence sug- lations.

ffixTl;1"l"ti:l"L::,:Jffi;:l?:Ji*# Nor are these methodorogicar choices

onstrate that the voting of anglos and his- trivial in the circumstances of this case'

panics in oth", part 
-of 

Texis polarizes; The testimony' for example' suggested that

most lay witnesses agreed that they saw party affiliation has' to some extent'

patterns of strong support among. anglos Lclipsed ttre i19gt11ce of bloc voting in

and hispanics fo, candidates of th"i' '"' 
Teias politics' V Trial Transcript 1253 (tes-

spective ethnic groups; and the 1982 pri- timony of Dave Richards)' and Dr' Bris-

mary in question ,..ujt"a in victory for the chetto's data revealed at least one race rn

anglo incumlent *itt' 1ie hispanic candi- which party' rather than ethnicity' appar-

date garnering .rppo"t *ost stronglf in ently determined hispanic voting prefer-

predominately i,irp*i" frecincts. 
-ilo." 

"n... 
III Trial Transcript 63;36 (testimo-

examination of the evidence, however' con- ny of Robert-Brischetto)' Similarly' ana-

vinces us that such bloc voting as maJ* lyzing ethnically homogeneous precincts in

exist in Dallas does not operate' as the counly-wide elections does not reliably

Dallas districts are 
-riructur"a 

under the *"".u.. the extent to which mixed anglo

lg83Houseplan,todenyhispanicsanandhispanicpopulationsinsingle.member

S2.SeeMclntoshCountyNAACPv.Cityo|Dar.ITrialTranscriprar204-o8(testimonr-ofFrank
ien,603F.2d at 75e; 

"iii?[v, sii i'iA 
^'1 

ta+- N"*po't;' Thi minorirv population in Texas

45. Erasing rf,. inr..l,l'J'ii ,.ir..Jp;iii.rr has a younger age structure than the Anglo

participation in tf,. f".?IiJa.-n.. rr.f, ur_ttti= foprt"i"n, lnd,,it a result, would have lower

iequires an affirmat'ii-e1nt*r"g tv the state L-i"o"' even '"!'ithout reference to the effects of

that inten'ening tutnti 
-rt""t ti"at the prior aitttirnin"tion' Education' however' is affected

discrimination '"t 
ttt"*-it "a-ity 

r"tt'"t tr iy: u ttitroty of discrimination' Accordingly'

fects' /d' J+'ile we acknou'ledge that some 'reduction 
in

33. Testimonl' suggested thar lo* \oler lurnout turn()ut rvould be expected in the hispanic popu-

among hispani.. aiil'oi']"'it ''nri'"t' 
f'o- litJ;:rJ'r.Ti.t,'r';'rt;";'.;,'llil5i::1"'"::lJi;

oast iiscriminarion Votcr lilrrr' 't'l a'c ordinp

io the evidence, r'aries *ith agc :r'1': c'lueatioi.t' p:r: l lr' lllt trro objerctivc fact<'rrs'



1352 -58I FEDERAI 
.SUPPIEMENT ,

districts wilr vote, nor does it measrbe the racial popuration mixture. As Dr. charresvoting patterns in tri-ethnic pru.in.t^, .r.t, c;L;;fi, ;;;;ir". oiorrna expert testified:
;:":lf""ill"?:ff f#,y;r*"":,1'jliJ^'I Raciarrv porarized. voting wourd have

il,'.*;'::H',:[; ::S#lfffi y,T:: Hi:,.HT:TIr ffiff"j; ;_;,]ti#
containing an unquantifiable bias i, f"uol 

ized voting and you could still ;[.4;
of electorlal .oniui^ that are Iikely to shov minority person . . . but it mighr-very
the most r"r"r" por"ri zation. 

r well te that the person 1is1 el"ciJ 
"loni

. .Jh"r! rechniques not onrv brur the reria- :G,nff fi"*ffilIir'T"Hili 
"T:

bility of the resurts, but.arso, ,r"; .;iil- maybe twenty vores-twenty percent ofically, study eonditions that io ,ot piJr the votes in non-,ninority precincts ....in the Dallas House distriets. rr," rtrar". If the phenomenon exists you have tolook at onry the most extrem" .u*"., uoit, take into consideration any kind of pranin terms of electoral 
:.ont.E ""a 

poprf"_ you draw for future elections.tion pattern. The studies aeliUe"ate'ty imit
the anarysis or comuin.a uu.f",a-iilp"# ix33i,l,.;::liil,rrlr3,,1;11"1:TilT:l[,iJ
;::il. 3:,# ',}i ;1lii'[h::ilJrii? in right or their methodorogy, .." not 

",p"-154 (testimony of Fred"ru. i"-"rl-*j. cially persuasive in showir:g.that u, *i[
Further, to underscore what we view as il1,*o;"rilii?ji:k,.ril1,,ilfI ilf,:lthe unreliability of 

. 
the studies, *. "t.o panic- minoritv ,o u. to render the ballotsnote instances in which Dr. Brischetto stat- cast by hispanics meaningress.ed 

-conclusions that appear to be at oddswith common ."n.". ln onu irror..,"li. ,,J.|.:^]"i l1sti1onv on polarized voting
1980 Bexar County mayoral ru.", tt.'pr"- llxewlse does not persuade us that such
vailing hispanic .rnalari" ran in an ;iil; polarized voting as may exist operates to
ate that consisted of app.oxim 

"t"li-ioi 
deny hispanics an equal opporrrriry lo pr,'

hispanic voting age population. The his- ticipate in the electoral 
-p.o.".. 

o" 
"-ru.tpanic candidate rJceivea ou". goz" or iti candidates of their choice. Severat wlil

vote in hispanic districts, but also *..ir"j nesses related that anglo and hispanic vot-
aboutBb?L of tt" uot" ln the most predomi_ 

ing.in Dallas County polarized, oi ttut ni.-
nately anglo districts. III Trial T"";;r,pt panics-could not easily win elections in ttre
632-33- (testimony of Robert nr".i"tt,if. 1983.House district (103)_that has the larg-
Nevertheless, Dr. Brisehetto .";;l;;; est hispanic poputation. II Trial Transcriit
that the voting was polarized. In another 

459,-6-0 (testimony of George Dillman); i'd.
instance, the unsuecessrut lispanic canai at 547 (testimony of Lee Jackson); Iv i"iai
date for a judgeship, who was a republican, 

Transcript 852 (testimonl' of Trinidad Gar-
garnered onlf about 18% of the vote in z.a).; id' at 1103 (testimonv of Paul Rags-
predominatell'ti.p"nl. precincts. In anglo 

dale); VI Trial Transcrlpt so-st tt".tirno'r"
precincts, t" r".iir"a "preciselv ;;;;: of 

,Joseph -Montemayor). Uncontradicted
verse"-that is, overwhelmins' .rpp"a testimony, however, showed that black anJ
Dr. Brischetto concluded that the results 

hispanic voting does not polarize, rna tl"l
evinced polarization. td. aL 686. hispanic voters can, and regula4lv fr"r",

whire the studies mav show that hispanic llr:'riff.'.1?ff ;;tlr:'"ii".'r",k, 
-:i

candidates, depending on their party airitia- Charles C;;;;i); ,j"lt roga_g9, u2l (tes-tion, u'ill recei'e different degiees- or "up- timony of paur Ragsdare); vI Triar rran_port in hispanic and angro precincts, it script s4 (testimony of Joseph Montema_hardli- demonstrates that anglo ,oilng yor). other unconiradlcted testimonl.bl"'''- <'rtrr persistentll' defeat hisp1ni. ."nii showed that hispanic candidates ersewheredu','. r.. r,'eas with a significan[ etlnic ana i, T"*". i,""" ru..""a.a i, 
"le.to"rtes 

with

comb
great
distri
panic
Llz5-
gener
zatior
polar:
or th
hispar

Finr
prima
tion, r
ed hi:
Garza
the vr
twent
za ean

majon
regisli
testifir
else k
script

Eve'
we w(.
ing p:r

succe$
single
Garza
his ou,
line, p
dorsen
the Pr

voter r

tus as :

to his
most o

trated
even tl
all the
made i
64. D,
centrat
ceived
precine
precine'
Garza
12.9r%
vote, ar
receivt,
Iloreri','
SCL':l i



rrinuz.ls v. cLEMEt'irs r:)53

. -Clte u 3Et FSuPP' 132'9 (19&f)

combinedblackandhisfbnicpopulatiorrsnoaredifficulttoascertain,,becauseoflow
creater than those in ir," t*o'rgg' house rolr ir-ort. vI Tri4l Transeript 14?'

iirtri.tr(103and10?);i;th;iargesthis-rii-sz'154(testimonv'ofFrederickcer-
oanic populations. Iv'-il"i Tr"anscript ;;;6. In ih" Ga'za-Wolens contest' for

rlz*26(testimony or p"uii"g.Jale). The 
"*urnpi", 

no p-recinct had a turnout greater

general testimony ". ";;;;;;anic 
polari- t,rr"r'io.bz" oi the registered voters' 1983

zation takes no "t"oon'"i"t'iil-I"gi"" 
or o' r*rt' 2' In addition' the turnout was not

oolarization, the eftect oi ui".t popit"tio-nt o'"""ri-r, lo*' in minority precincts' Of

H't"T;;;;"'r-;;r";"gj""J'pp"" t"' il;'.f;;; precincts-that had less than 15%

hispanic candidates. io*out, ont *ut about 85%'black' one was

Finally, we turn to the 1982 democratic uuo,t siz anglo, one was over 70"1, ang|o,

primaryinHouseahtrittfOS'Inthatelec-andtheotherwasover?5%'anglo'ld'
tion, anglo incumbent it u" wor.n. defeat- ri" ."r*, conclude that the election is

ed his hispani. oppot'Int, t'inia"a 9?l'": pa'tituta'ty qTob?tl'"-of either voting pat-

Garza received slightl]"m;"'h"" 3o\ 9f 
't"'nt in tt'e districts generally or the pros-

the vote. VI Trial tt'an'ctipt 59' . Of the pects for hispanic candidates'

i*"rt, ,oti"g precincts in the district, Gar- To summarize, there is evidence in the

,"-Lil"a oity toor; each precinct.had .a ,";;J;i some anglo-minoritv polarization

.*l*ir, of combined black and hispanic i, OJfrt County, althougtr not without oc-

""?i-t*i"Juot"tt' 
1983 P-I Exh' 4' Garza t"ti*'l-l*"ks in the pattern' There is

'*3ilrj"J,rr", he could have done nothing ,ir" .rr.ortial evidence that blacks and

"i." 
t" change the outcome. VI Trial Tran- il;";i.. regularly form political coalitions,

.."C-Oa+S (testimony of Trinidad Garza)' 
although that, too, rs not without excep-

Even under the best of circumstances' tions'

we would hesitate to generalize about vot-

irg p"r*t". or the prospects for hispanic 2. The Significance of the Eoidence'

;;".;;t in district 103 on the basis of a

single election' In the tut" of this election' Having established"what we might call

Garza conceded on tro'tlexamination that t5t-"potiti'"tion profile" of Dallas county'

his own filing for t"'it";,:^;;1t'e a"aa- 
"i-rtltt 

as presente-d. bv this record' we

line, poor financing, f;iilt; to obtain en- ;;;' ;;;' to iG significance insofar as the

dorsements-intt'ai'g1ii- trrdotttt"nt of l"itut ditttltts in the 1983 House plan are

the Progressive voters k;;;;' a .black t*t"t*a' Aceording to the MALDEF In-

voter organization-aJhit o[pont't'-t tt"- ;;;;tt' the configurations of the Da]las

tus as a second term lncumueni contributed aitttittt under the 1983 House plan com-

to his defea t' Id' uf og-zo' Moreover' ui" *itrt political conditions' especially po-

most of Garza's campaign efforts tglt:.:- irtjr"a "'ii'e, in Dallas to ensure that the

trated on minoritl' p"tl'nto' id at 60-6f i'itp"'i" popiiation enjoys less opportunity

even though Garza testified that carrf ing iil'-"tr'ttt to elect candidates of their

all the minority pr".in.,^ "'ould 
not have 

"toi.u. 
We disagree' ln fact' we are of

made a difference in'tl" "i"tt'n 
ld' aL tot'"n*t'" that ihe very opposite is the

OA.- Oespite his campaign strateg]' of con- case'

cent ating on minority precincts' G.atza re-. 
The two districts that have substantial

;::i:fftl"rtTr'-t''r:i 
tlr: l"ii#;'"",il hispanic votieg age popuration under the

precincrs with over fr;;;ct" population. igtis Hoo." 
-plan 

are 103 (52'48'l; anglo'

Garza receir'"a "nv*ittJl?il; 
low of illogT ur"tx and 28'98'y' hispanic) and 107

12.g1%of the vote to a high of 44?l of the ii'no anglo' 24'157' black and 23'81% his-

vote, and in half "r 
ii'"t"'p'"tlncts' Garza ;a-n-ic) Th'ese districLs were designed by

received more than ;;;-;f' tt't 'ott .ld il^'t nugtaule' a long-time black represent-

Ilr-ireover. tt","t"nJjntie ei"ction untl"t' t'it- fi'"' I)allas County' to be minority

score that roting p"tlrns in Dallas ct,iri,i'. ;;;r,-.i districts, i'e', districts in which a



1354

substantial minority population could
strongly influence, if not control, the candi-
date who was elected. In our view, the
ethnic eomposition in those districts is such
that no single population group-anglo,
black or hispanic-<an consistently outvot€
the other groups without forming coalitions
or depending on substantial cross-over vot-
ing. This means that neither of these dis-
tricts can be described as a "safe" anglo
seat, and it also means that each of the
three population groups has the ability
strongly to influence the identity of the
candidate that is ultimately elected. Our
conclusions in this respect are based on our
conclusions with respect to Dallas polariza-
tion, coalition and cross-over patterns, as

well as on the design of the districts.

To say that the Dallas districts under the
1983 House plan violate section 2 of the
Voting Right Act, we would have to say
first that it was possible to design a district
providing for more than hispanic impact,
i.e., a "safe'' hispanic district, and second
that nothing short of a safe hispanic dis-

triet would provide equal access to the po-

litical process for hispanics. Taking the
second requirement first, for reasons that
are more fully spelled out throughout this
opinion and are summarized in "The Totali-
ty of the Circumstances," infra, we are
persuaded that a safe hispanic district is
not a necessary prerequisite to hispanic
access to the political process. And as for
the first requirement, we are of the opinion
that the geographic and demographic evi-
dence conclusively demonstrates that there
is no possible district configuration in Dal-
las County that will eliminate the need for
hispanics to form coalitions with other ra-
cial or ethnic groups if hispanics are to
have an equal opportunity to participate in
the political process or to elect candidates
of their choice. The evidence on polariza-
tion in this record does not indicate that
such coalitions are either impossible or un-

likely; indeed, the opposite is the case.

The MALDEF Intervenors have offered
a "best case" scenario for hispanic political
hopes in the form of district 113 in the
MAY-MALDEF plan. That plan can cre-

ate a district that musters only a 43.6612

581 FEDERAI{ SUPPLEMENT

minorityrof hispanic voting age population.
Particularly in light of low hispanic voting
registration, this voting age population
could not independently determine the out-
eome of eleetions in the district. In short,
the district is an hispanic "impact" district,
just as are districts 103 and 10? under the
1983 House plan, but it is an hispanic im-
pact district created at a cost to black inter-
ests that we cannot calculate in the ab-
sence of voting age population information
on adjoining districts which MALDEF
failed to furnish. We cannot even
ascertain whether this plan would preclear
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
See generally Temazas a. Clements, 537

F.Supp. at 536 n. 27 (paragraph (ii)). Like
districts 103 and 107 under the 1983 House
plan, the hispanic population in district 113

forms a substantial voting age minority
that could influence the political balance of
power.

To be sure, the hispanic population in
district 113 of the MAY-MALDEF plan
potentially has greater political influence
than the hispanic populations in either dis-
trict 103 of the 1983 House plan, which has

a 28.98% hispanic voting age population, or
district 10? of the 1983 House plan, which
has a 23.81% hispanic voting age popula-

tion. The present question, however, con-
cerns whether polarized voting metamor-
phoses the status of the substantial hispan-
ic voting age population minorities in dis-
tricts 103 and 107 of the 1983 House plan
from a potential political force into a pow-

erless minority unable to participate in the
political process. We do not think so.

Absent coalition voting with the black
population, the hispanic population in dis-

trict 113 of the MAY-MALDEF plan, dis-

trict 103 of the 1983 House plan, and dis-

triet 107 of the 1983 House plan corld not
independently elect their own candidate in
the face of monolithic anglo bloc voting.
See VI Trial Transcript 155 (testimony of
Frederick Cervantes); VI Trial Transcript
168-69 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale).
When one considers the evidence of low
minoritl' registration and voter turnout,
even an hispanit-Lil:rck coalition in alrt t,f

these distr
/ minority sr

glo bloc v

16F66 (tes

ably need
of hispanit
registratio:
MALDEF
ing age po

House pla

age popula
House plar
tion.

The evic

cate that
Even if th
particular
constitutio
not, any o
tion groui
opportunit
choice. B
results of
district 10

will suppt
black vok
panic canr

that the v
one of tht
electoral
to embra,

34. As thr
stated:

The
results
nant (

The Su

cases ,
and th
tial sul

That
point.
nities,
exceed
that tt
access
sults t

Unfr
comm
tics d(

Int
atrd o
()(. ,-.

t\ l''



TERRAZAS V. CLEMENTS
' Clte er Stl FSupp. t329 (tg8a)

1355

these districts would iot ensure I "safe" redesign the districting 
1

plan to guarantee

minority seat in the face of monolithic an- proportional representation.
glo bloc voting, see Yl Trial Transcript In conclusion, the evidence of some an-
16ffi6 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale) (prob- glo-minority polarization does not support a

ably need 70-75% hispanic district in light finding that the political process in Dallas
of hispanic voting age population and low County is closed to hispanics as the dis-

registration); district 113 under the MAY- tricts are configured under the 1983 House
MALDEF plan has a 57.83% minority vot- plan.
ing age population, district 103 of the 1983

House plan has a 41 .57%, minority voting
age population, and district 107 of the 1983

House plan has a 47.78%' voting age popula-

tion.

The evidence, at any rate, does not indi-
cate that monolithic bloc voting occurs.

Even if the election of a candidate of any
particular racial or ethnic group was the

constitutional or statutory test, which it is
not, any one of the racial or ethnic popula-

tion groups in these three districts has an

opportunity to elect the candidate of its
choice. Both the expert testimony and the
results of the 1982 democratic primary in

district 103 suggest that some anglo voters
will support hispanic candidates, and that
black voters ma)', or may not, support his-

panie candidates.3{ To say, on this record,

that the voting strength of hispanics in any

one of these districts will not influence the

electoral process would require us simply
to embrace the proposition that u'e must

34. As the Senate Committee on the Judiciarl'
stated:

The Subcommittee Report claims that the
results tesl as-sunles "thal race is the predomi-
nant determinant of political preference."
The Subcommittee Report notes that in manl'
cases racial bloc voting is not so monolithic,
and that minority voters do receive substan'
tial support from white voters.

Thal statement is correct, but misses the
point. It is true w'ith respecl to most commu-
nities, and in those communities it u'ould be

exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to sho$'
that they were effectively excluded from fair
access to the political process under the re-

sults test.
Unfortunately, hou'ever, there still are some

communities in our Nation where racial poli-
tics do dominate the electoral process.

In the context of such racial bloc voting,
and olher factors, a particular election meth-
od can denl' minoritl' r'oters equal opportuni'
l)' to participate meaningfullf in elections.

not

C. Success of Minority Candidates.

As the MALDEF Intervenors point out,

hispanics have enjoyed little success in Dal-

las County eleetions. Presently, only two
hispanics serve as elected officers on city
councils or on school district boards of trus-
tees. 1983 P-I Exhs. 24A, 25. No hispanic
presently holds a county elected office. In
the most recent elections for county of-
fices, all four of the hispanic candidates
lost. 1983 P-I Exh. 228. Since 1962, nine
hispanic candidates have run for the Texas
House of Representatives in Dallas Coun-

ty. Six lost in primary elections and the

remaining three lost in general elections.

1983 P-I Exh.23.

t8l The State Defendants do not dis-

pute this evidence, and the absence of
many hispanic officeholders raises the in-

ference that the electoral system must
somehow disadvantage the hispanic popula-

tion. One would expect greater hispanic

Thc results lest. makes no assumptions otte
wa.y or the other about the role of racial
political considerations in a particular com'
munity. If plaintiffs assert that thel- are de-

nied fair access to the political process, in
part, because of the racial bloc voting context
within which the challenged election system
works, the5'rvould have to prove it.

Proponents of the "intent standard" how-
ever, do presume that such racial politics no
longer affect minoritl voters in America.
This presumption ignores a regrettable realitl'
established bl overwhelming evidence at the
Senate and House hearings.

These concfusions; based on a careful re-
vieu' of the existing track record under the
"results test" in the Committee amendmenl
have convinced us that the questions raised by
some about that test are satisfactoril;- ansuer'
ed b1'that record.

S.Rep. No. 417 at 33-34, 1982 U.S.Codr' Cong. &
Ad.Ncss at 211-12 (emphasis in original) (foot'
notes omitted).



1356 s8l FEDErAi supplnu'nur -
repiesentation for a population group of its required of a'reapportionment.iran in asize. There are limits, of course, to the I dilution case.
probative value of this inference. A lack
of proportion"t ,"pr"r"nt"tion has no inde- (ri;'t{lrirr'r!rfrf;y"j3:#: e2?, e36

pendent constitutional or statutory signifi_
cance. llhite a. Regester,4l2 u.s. at ?65_ D. Tenuousness.

66, 93 s'ct. at 2339; whitcomb a. chaais, The MALDEF Intervenors challenged
403 U.S. at 160, 9l S.Ct. at 18?Z; Kirksegt, the State's policy through evidence thatihe
554 F.2d at 142-43; 42 U.S.C.A. 19?B(b). drafters eonsidered the political effects of
Indeed, a court-ordered remedy for voting the plan. As several witnesses conceded,
dilution would not necessarily warrant thi the LRB avoided pairing incumbent Repre-
design of a plan that ensures proportional sentatives in a single district. IV Trial
representation. As the Fifth ciieuit has filiffi:*rrrr,lfirurrJf.,,,ilrXl,, d"r #flI

All other things being equal, it mav be House of Representatives was considering
assumed that if, fr. ;;;; i; ;;;,.";; arterations to the LRB House plan, thl
of a school ai.t.i.t,. i"ri;l;;"#;:j. Texas tegislative Councit anatyzei alterna-
black, about B0 ;ur.;n;-;i ,fri ,.*ifr" tive districts that would oeate a Dallas
staff at any giren ..h;;l .;";i; ;; b#: district with greater than 40%' population,
Similarty, 

""[r"ni ;"1;;;j-;t.;;;;;- but ultimatelv limited the analysis by set-
tion, if i0 percent 

"f 
,i" """ifif. ilfft 

ting guidelines that called for no pairing of
labor in a plant,s vicinitv f. lf 

".t. fi.""ij 
tncumbents. VI Trial Transcript 134 (testi-

be expected tn"i S0 p";."r;;;;;ffi: monv of John Potter). Even the district
tirrs labor rorce would u. u*r,.* '- l':,Lj$ff::,J,,i11,""11,,,Hr,ilIil:::?;' Voting is a different matter. The re- Ihe minoritv districts, reside near the bor-sulls follow from both the pattern of J... of their districts.districts and the voters, preferences. In
employment and education, race mar not The MALDEF Intervenors urge that the
be a factor in .naf,ing .h"i.".. 

-i, 
,;rf r-, protection of incumbents.cannot justify di-

while we mry a"ptoi" i;;-;";i;;J lution of a minoritv's voting strength. In-
a factor by voters, it ;;.;;.";;;il; deed, the State Defendanls do not disagree
forbidden. Any .r.1,- ;;; 

'[},il'';.".,i with that abstract statement of lau'. In-
race serious .on.tit,iiin.,:;.ffi; :f# #,i$:"8:r#:l?.X,fil:f$#The necessary link between the percent- i"rentatiues did not, as a matter of fact,age of those eligible and the percentage p"ouia. the sole policy justification for notactuallv selected that exists in school i."*irg an hispanic district.cases and employment cases is missing in
voting cases. Again, our conclusion is In general, the State Defendants offered
that proportional- representation il ,;i testimony that the LRB plan took incum-
appropriate in a court-ordered olan. bency into account only after the principal

objectives of complying with the ,,on"_.un,
one_vote', standard, section b of the Voting
Rights Act and the Texas la*. requirementWe have recognized that race ma}, be of maintaining the integrity of county linesconsidered as a factor in determining had been ..iorp[.tui.- trV T.i"l T.un_whether a proposed apportionment is ac- script g93_9a, giS_tS, 9Bg (testimony ofceptable. "In the process of making . .. Mark White). In addition, the prineipala determination [about multimember dis- drafter of tire pl"n, 

-n"p""rentative 
paul

trict^s]' a court need not be oblivious to Ragsdal.. testified that he avoided concen-the existence and rocation of minoritl, trating as much of the minority popurationvoting strength." But we have also held as possilri...into onl1.a few districts in orderthat "silft" se'ats for the minoritl' are not to crr,i.rr ' inl1,u.ti' 
-a,.t.i.t.--aistricts 

in

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rnina

r, ggo

,lenged
hrt the
rts of
rceded,
Repre-
' Trial

Mark
Texas
dering
n, the
Iterna-
Dallas
.lation,
)y set-
{ng of
(testi-
listrict
.bents;
ose in
e bor-

et the
ify di-
r. In-
agree,. In-
ted to
t Rep-
' fact,
)r not

ffered
ncum-
ncipal
Fman,
Toting

:rnent
' lines
Tran-
ny of
ncipal

Paul
mcen-
htion
order
ts in

.4:.. 
a:f

.,

,. TERRA"*?."1;i,13TIJ,*

whichasubstantialminor{typopulationcouldtakeraceirttoaccountindrawingthe
could strongly innrence, 

"iU"l', 
r"ii*,t 1, Dallas districts to comply with the Votilts

the type of candidate *il"lj. "i";;d' 
we R[h; L'n' United Je.u*h orsanizati6ns

credit the testimony adduced by the state ,,.ic*"y, 430 _ujl 144, 91 s'ct' 996' 51

Defendants. L.Ed.zd 229 (197?).

t9]TheevidencedoesnotpresentaThispolicybearsadirectrelationshipto
pure "tenuousness" qu"Jon' Tilat is' the the manner in which the districts were

MALDEF Intervenors t,'" not attacked " 
Jt"*n' The plan retained three districts

neutral policy offered only as a pretext for *itt' soUtt'ntial black majorities' and the

a discriminato.y .""tt'' See' generally- black districts took in largely the same

Robinson ,. co**l.iiloners C-ourt' 505 areas that had comprised black districts in

F.2d at 680 (,,equaliz"li;;-"i county'road ihe past. one of the districts, district 100

mileage"offeredas5ustificationfoifrag-consistsinpartofanareathatrunsdirect-
mentingcohesiveblackpopulation)..Rath.lyb"t*""n.thehispanicneighborhoodsin
er, the MALDEF Irt";;;;;' have focused o'"tt outtut and the hispanic neighborhoods

ononlyapartoftheState,spolicywithoutinthenorthernandeasternportionsofthe
devoting much evidence to [he legitimacy city of Dal]as' -we 

explicitly find credible

oftheotherassertedpolicies.Reappor.thetestimonyofRepresentativePaulRags-
tionment is a political process, and there-is iJ" tt"t the plan aimed not at disadvantag-

nothing illegitimate a6o't to'sidering the iig hi'panict bu't at giving the black and

political .on."qr"n.", of a redistricting hilpanic populations- a proportionate share

plan. See Gaffney ''-Cu*ilngs' 
412 U'S of ir'u minority political influence in the

?35, ?53, 93 S.Ct. zzi{ {zzt'"si l''pa'za Dallas districts' IV Trial Transcript 1092-

298 (19?3); Major o.-i"'n, 5?4 F'Supp' 93 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale)'

325, at 355 (E.D.La"1983)' Tenuousness' VI' THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUM-

that is pretext, cannot be established as a STANCES'

factor militating againsithe plan simply by tlll Having considered the evidence ad-

p"i"ii,u ""t 
thJ oi.vious-ttrat ttte plan has dressed to the objective factors' we turn to

politieal consequences that the drafters the issue whether the electoral scheme em-

i"r[-pr*a' 
'To tr'o* a tenuous State uoai"a in the 1983 House plan for Da]las

;;ij;;:"il MALDEF Intervenors must coun'v so dilutes the voting strength of

demonstrate not onty- tt'ut tt'" status of t'itp'nit voters that 
-they 

have lost the abili-

incumbent R"p'"'"ntltiol"t nua a place in ty L participate politically' In evaluating

li" rin" drawing' but also that the other tire toLtity of circumstances we must con-

asserted policies ao not' in t"t' support the sider several issues: the feature of the

manner in which the lines *u'u-dtu*'' electoral system that allegedly hinders his-

t10l We cannot conclude that compli- panic voters' in their attempt to achieve a

ance with federal constitutional and statu- it'ong"t political voice; the extent to which

tory standards are ;;ly;;;;;riy. related ethnic-ity determines.the outcome of Dallas

to the district tlnes as irawn' Asihe earli "t"tto'ut 
contests; the result that the Dal-

er findings show, the previous Dallas dis- las districts achieve; and' for the purposes

tricts were sufficiently underpopulated to of the constitutional challenge' the intent

require the loss "r " 
iir"rliv'district In behind,the line drawing' For reasons that

the face of this diminution in potential mi- follow,' we conclude that the districting

nority influer." in ii"-oauas'House dele- does not, designedly or otherwise' cancel

gation, the State ,i"'tJ legitimately have out hispanic voting strength'

t".n .on."tned with the issue of retrogres-

sion under section s oi tt" voting Rights A. Tha Electoral scheme'

Act.SeegenerattyBeeru.Llnitec]Slrrlc.s.Asourfinrlirigssuggest,theMALDEF
425 U.S. 130, 141, S6 S.C,. 135?. 13(jll 47 Inter\crroIS have not fairlS described thi'

L.Ed.zd629(1976)-Moreover.ti,tStatelg8Sdistrictillgplan.Farfrom..cracking,.



I cohesive hispanic community, thetistrict
lines merely fail to string together dis-
persed pockets of hispanic population to
maximize its voting strength. The plan
does not place the hispanic population in
districts with a politically hostile, bloc_vot_
ing majority; the two largest groups of
hispanic population reside in dlstricts (fOg
and 107) that in part contain substantial
black population and in part contain anglo
population. The ethnic composition in
those districts is such that no single popu-
lation group-black, hispanic or anglo---can
eonsistently outvote the other groups with-
out forming coalitions or depending on sub-
stantial eross-over voting.

The circumstances in Dallas stand in
marked contrast to the single-member dis_
tricting plan in Kirksey. As the Kirksey
eourt summed up the matter:

Plaintiffs proved a long history of de_
nial of access to the political process.
That history of official action is one of
purposeful and intentional discrimina-
tion. The structure and the residual ef-
fects of the past have been removed and
replaced by current access. The supervi_
sors' reapportionment plan, though ra_
cially neutral, will perpetuate the denial
of aceess. By fragmenting a geographi-
cally concentrated but substantial black
minority in a community where bloc vot_
ing has been a way of life the plan will
cancel or minimize the voting strength of
the black minority and will tend to sub-
merge the interests of the black commu-
nity.

554 F.zd at 151. Setting aside, for the
moment, the influence of bloc voting and
historical discrimination, we note the en-
tirely different thesis behind the present
action. The plan's drafters faced not a
cohesive hispanic communitv but clusters
of hispanic population loeated on either side
of a predominately black House distriet
drawn in response to a finding that blacks
had been deprived of political aecess in
Dallas. See White u. Regester,4l2 U.S. at
766-6?, 93 S.Ct. at 2BB9-40. Assuming
that a hispanic district could even b;
drau'r..-and the MAY-MALDEF plan,
u'hrtl. 1.r's,. came to the attention of this

58I FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

Court and the parties after the redistrictins
plocess was complete, is the onty pt"i.r 

"r"ipurporting to do se-the drafters would
have to draw lines that would arguably
fragment a cohesive black population. Ai
the least, the drafters would have to re-
draw-and the MAY-MALDEF plan did_
as predominately anglo the district of one
black Representative.

The record does not show a dispersal of
hispanics accomplished through deviations
from expected lines. See Robinson a.
Conmissioners Court, bOb F.2d at 6?g.
The district lines in the 19gB House plan
are hardly a model of regularity, but they
do roughly follow the lines of the plan from
1970s. In contrast, the district lines for
the only majority hispanic district that this
Court has seen in the course of these pro-
ceedings deviate substantially from any
lines one could imagine, much less from thl
Iines one would expect. The configuration
of district 113 in the MAY-MALDEF ptan
graphically illustrates that the placement
of the hispanic population into two districts
does not result from fragmenting an his-
panic community; instead, it illustrates the
type of bizare district configurations to
which the drafters would have to resort in
order to unite the hispanic population.

tl2l Without an unnatural district co-
nfiguration in the 1g8B House plan that
"fragments" or "packs" a cohesive minori_
ty population, the issue in this case trans_
forms. The MALDEF Intervenors seek, in
essence, to compel adoption of a plan that
manufactures an hispanic district by what_
ever means are necessary, not because the
existing plan artificially thwarts creation of
an hispanic district that ought to exist by
virtue of the natural settlement patterns of
Dallas hispanics, but rather because the
hispanic population, a disadvantlged rhinor-
ity group, has sufficient population poten_
tially to constitute a distinct district. We
are aware of no case that has required
such an exercise in political engineering.
To the contrary, where the absence of pro-
portional representation results simply
from the loss of elections rather than a

1358

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1359

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he
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firt
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tis
pe
ltr'
iio

"built-in bias" afainst " 'ino'[i";:il:"offi;'[":f 
voting-Bge population will be

that group's voting strength has noi b"un ethnicity' :

,t"nirr"d out" in any constitutional sense' C. The Results of the System. /

Wlr:rlr?i-'&l'3"Hi;::J,',';;t':: From the ob-servation that the make-up

under the section 2 t€st unless the courts oi'ti'""'t"tli'i Datlas minority districts (see

attaeh no meaning eitier to the congres :ilh *;ffmXfi:'::'?"fi"ii!
ii*"i.ur"", against proportional represen- 

"iirrili, 
a d"cide eleetoral contests, the

Lri*,-rz U.S.C.6. s 19?3(b), or to the ex- ;;;;i;;i", follows that those districts, even

piiii'i"a1r""'ion of pre-Botdenraw' ;Jffi; ;h" thev"'cracked" an hispanic

;;;j;ffir;-d" not deprive hispanics. of ac-

B. Ethnicity in rssue. :;L'',;ffi;;olitical p.ot"tt' As the evi-

rrsl E'en if the disrrict rines courd fair- f;";k l,"Tt".:IL;rtriii.',.iH:T?Ji."fi:
r, uJi"..riued as fragmenting an hispanic ."?;, t"r,l*ctuti'ety on their own voting

J;;;;';r.;t i.t' ,t "i 
do not]the evidence .ir."r,i.-"ra readily-install whatever candi-

does not point to u poritit"l tytt",, in which il;tilfi;tii"' .wr'1" 
the svstem should

the ethnicity of tn" 
''.urila"t. or !h: ;;i;r";;t" than-."gossamer possibilities of

electorate determines-t;;;;;;;" of politi' ;ii;";;;ilt iuui"g into place and leaning

cal events. unao'lttirv' iit "'ia"*t 
oi i;';;';;;;it"ttio'n"' Ki'rksev' 554 F'2d at

polarized 'oting 
tnol;''J;;;ill differ- ;il";h" ;;;'tion. of a predominatelv hispan-

ences in the levels ;"t;;;;;t among th'e it ditt'itt is not a' necessary condition to

anglo and hispanic ;;.d;;; for hiJpanic ;:#";; .il political process' As the-

candidates' tt'" t''jt'n'tJ:;;;;'"t' simplv iii*'ciit'it 635 6h'qerved in the context ol

does not .r,o* tr,ai ihe' practical conse- r"."ai". in a racial vote dilution case:

quences of such p"r"'ixiJ' * does exist The goal 9l ?ny 
remedv is to assure

will be to,,submerg"'i#-ir*r..ts" of the i"f"Eri"" black minority participation in

hispanic community ;i,;;;;, b54F.2d aL :inXX,;"|#;i""J[1?"'titffH:.
15f i;i";;il;;n oi tt'" inevitabilitv of such

This failure in the evidence of polariza- a result' this court has concentrated

tion derives t'o* toio too'""t' First' the ;p;;";;;; to the political process rath'

evidence suggests ti"t ttt" anglo electorate 
"' th'n assurance of a particular result'

will support hitp'#;;;;ia"?"t' albeit 'in It is because access is a more difficult

lesser proportion* tt'un t-iJiitp"'it popula- concept to measure than is result that

tion. Such ..o..-orjil'uo,ing, a.p"ra;ng on if,i. .orrt has emohasized that "[t]he

the respecti". .ir.l "i 
ir,-. hispanic and pt"lr"- is. not- susceptible of simplistic

anglo population', L'i'p*'-* :|1 :::::] !" ryS hou'ever seductive thev ma-v

lirri oui of the voting strength of hrspantcs. appear.

Second, but perhaps more importan,, L" Uniira Sta,tes t. Board of Superaisors qf

have heard uu.ot,tiiy no 
"'id"nc" 

suggest- "r""iicl'y' 5?1 F'2d 951' 955 (5th cir'

irg 1i,", hispanics face dilution as a result 19?8)'

of black una nitffii't iJ"ti"il"' The Although' in the face of a stark record of

combined uru.t # iiJp"ni. voting .age p* p"il""l failure of hispanics' the need

poputations ,f th;';"i;;'"; districts (toe i;;;;fi;"ic district appears compelling'

and 10?) fall bar;ly';o" 
-"t 

u majority' ii't "'ia""" 
does not show that the pattern

The evidence "t 
uilx-iit"p"lt t"ul-;t6 "oi- oiii"ttotut defeat and the minoritv compo-

ing, combined *#;;;;idence of some titi"' "i 
tt't Dallas districts combine to bar

anglo support t"t rtitp"'it t"rriia"tt' a"lt rli'tp"'ltt rt"m the oolitical process' ln the

not sulll)ort the proposition that the crucil,l ^rri."." 
of a denial of access' or discrimina'

oolitical factor in elections fo' aitttitis-t"*'**t' the''failure to consolidate the

.u.1, u. 103 and 10?' with o t"'gin*t u";: ' '';'i"tt;;t l';pulation may constitute a less

po-

bat
pri-

DS-

,in
hat
lat-
&e
rof
by

lof
the
lor-
En-
We
red
mg.

Pro-
rpli'
na



r360

advantsgeous political result, but not b;
unlawful result. Thus, for example, in
Howard a. Adams Countg Board of Su-
pervisors,453 F.2d 455, 459 (Sth Cir.19?2),
the Fifth Circuit noted:

Inevitably, people of different raees,
national origins, and contrasting tenets
will be shifted under reapportionment
plans into districts in whieh they may no
Ionger be in the clear majority. But,
when, as here, no racial motivation
spawns a change in the voting area of
those complaining, and the redistricting
plan does not unconstitutionally dilute
the voting strength of the minority, there
is no abridgment of voting rights.

Unless the record showed intent to discrim-
inate against hispanics, thereby raising the
question of the existenee of a constitutional
violation, this Court must uphold the
State's redistricting plan.

D. Discriminatory Intent.
In the absence of a discriminatory result,

there must be some doubt whether a show-
ing of intent eould even suffice. See Vol-
lin a. Kimbel, 579 F.2d ?90, ?90 (4th Cir.
1975) (dilution requires "effective" intent
to discriminate). Nevertheless, we will ex-
plicitly make findings on intent. The
record shows that Representative Ragsdale
took primary responsibility for drafting the
Dallas districLs that are nou, in force under
the 1983 House plan. We have carefullv
considered all of Representative Ragsdale's
testimony as well as the lestimony of those
who characterized his intent as discrimina-
tory. Our evaluation both of his credibility
and the facts upon which he relied leads us
to conclude that he harbored no intent to
discriminate. See generally Terrazas u.
Clemenk, 537 F.Supp. at 536 n. 27 (para-
graph (ii)).

Just to consider two instances, we note
that Representative Ragsdale's evaluation
of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
uniting the hispanic community is fully
borne out by our review of alternative
plans. In addition, the concept of the "im-
pact" district, which led Representative
Ragsdale not to overconcentrate minority
population in just a few districts, emerges
as a legitimate objective in light of the

58I FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

testimony in this case. Even opposing wit-
nessedconceded the validity of the conceft.
E.9., U Trial Transcript 471-73 (testimony
of George Dillman). Moreover, the minori-
ty community in Dallas has clearly divided
over the issue whether "safe" or "impaet',
districts are preferable as a means of max-
imizing minority political power. Id. at
562-$4 (testimony of Lee Jackson). We are
unprepared to find that Representative
Ragsdale intended to diseriminate against
those who are not in a "safe" district when
the testimony indicates that his objective
was to obtain the most minority politieal
influence possible by creating "impact" dis-
tricts.
VII. CONCLUSION.

On the basis of the foregoing findings
and conelusions, we hold that the 1988
House plan does not dilute the voting
strength of Dallas hispanics so as to deny
them access to the political process. The
State has violated neither section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act nor the United States
Constitution. Judgment, accordingly, will
be entered in favor of the State Defend-
ants, and they are hereby ordered promptly
to prepare a judgment in conformity with
this opinion for entry by this Court.

This Court retains jurisdiction of this
case for the disposition of related matters
including the entitlement, if any, to and the
amount of attornev's fees.

Herbert SELLERS
v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
et al.

Civ. A. No. 83-3962. '
United States District Court,

E.D. Pennsylvania.

Jan. 30, 1984.

Derfendants irr lrction in which damages
were sought ftil ailt,ged illegal conrlucr of

defenda
of defe
reconsi<
dismiss,
and der

VanArt
claims
litigatet
by doct

Mo

1. Fede

Pla
tion see

ing ne.
counts
relitiga:
tion unr
ment o

6o(b), 2

2. Judg

Iti
"collate
tobeb
previou
ly deter

S(
for
defi

3. Juds

CI:,

in earli
trine ol

Marl
sociater

MarL
& Soli,
gan, \'

willi
Hitchn,
Pa., fo.

wi1li
Fitzl,:,:
Gen,'