Draft Memorandum by Alfieri
Working File
January 1, 1982 - January 1, 1982
Cite this item
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Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Draft Memorandum by Alfieri, 1982. ebb43893-ef92-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/7c6c2d59-f5af-4a0c-9f43-0f335898f3d3/draft-memorandum-by-alfieri. Accessed December 05, 2025.
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I. THE OVERBROAD TERI'IS OF SECTION L7.23-I ARE UI\COIISTITUTIONAL
FOR FAILURE TO },IEE[ THE STRICT STANDARDS OF STATUTORY PRECISION
AND SPECIFICITY REQUIRED OF LAWS THAT POTENIIALLY OVERREACH
FEDERALLY PROTECTED ACT]VITY.
(1) On its face, seciion 77-23-7 prohibits four earegories
of vottng conduct. These categories include voting more
than once, depositlng more than one ba11ot for the same
office, knowi-ngly attempting to vote when not entitled to
do sor and any kind of i1lega1 or fraudulent voting.
(Z) By definition, t!" exercise of the political franchise
and the effective provision of voter assistance constitute
voting-related conduct. This conduct is inext.ricably
linked to the acts of political expression and association.
These acts are protecced agalrist abridgernent under the ? \
Firsr Amen )ee,Shel-l-u. r.,.Tr.Lev , gGq L.9. { ,t1 ,\t9.gq(r:) ;dment -rr)'
Lig' {qh ,4uolc'r (rqs$'
Since First Amendment "freedoms are delicate and vulnerable,
as well as supremely precious in our socieEy.", NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 ( 1963), they are ',prorecred nor
only against heavy-handed frontal attackr but also from
being stifled by more subtle governmental interferenee."
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (tq0O).
(a) Because of the conceptual link between voting-related
activity and First Arnendment f reedorns, State aetion which
potentially infringes upon the personal exercise of voting
rights wi11, by logical extension, potentially impinge upon
2
the individuar enjoyrnent of First Amendment freedoms. This
potential incursion violates the fundamental axiorn that
"regulatory measures ... no matter how sophisticated,
cannot be employed in purpose or in effect to stifle,
penallze, or curb the exercise of First Arnendment rights."
Loutsiana ex re1. Grenilliql_y_,__MAg!, 366 U.S. 293, 297 (1961)
(U) Because "(b)road prophylactic n:1es" in the First Amendment
area are "suspect", "government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity.'r Button, 371 U.S. at 438,
433 (citrations omirted) ,/dfua-lx ef YedLq,-#Eta
*leYtse.,
A@n#*ffit&ile^ t b*'l,,statutes abuttin8 upon Firs t Arnendrnent
freedoms 'rtntJst be drawn with 'precision' and m.rst be narrowly
'tailored' to serve their legitimate obJectives." D:nn v.
Blgmsrein, 405 U.S. 330, 343.,.(lgl2)(cirations omitred) .
. precision of ree,rhti." *h&*#f,3..,r"" srarures AM,*u
borderrhq oh
^Y.oeGfuBr protected spheres of First Arnendment libercy "evoke
constitutional doubts of the utrnost gravity. " ShuttlesworEh
y. Citv of Birmineha8, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965). These doubts
largely coneerrr the constitutional vice of statutory over-
breadth. This vice is "inherent in a penal statute
which does not aim speciflcally at evils within the allorvable
area of State control,but, on the contrary, sweeps within
its ambit other activities that in ordinary circurnstances
constitute an exercise of ..." First Amendment liberty.
Thorrlh:lll v. Alabama, 310 U.S , 88, 97 -98 ( 1939) .
(3) Section l7-23-L is a penal statute directed at rhe "evil',
of voter fraud. It is settled that "the prevention of such
fraud is a legitimate and compelling government goaI." Dunn,
405 U.S. at 345. The legitimacy of this goal derives from
the importance of preserving the "integrity" of the State
elecroral process.'Cousins v. Wigod_a, 419 u.s. 477 , 491 ( 197 5)
Arguably, the State of Alabama, in prorm:lgating section 17 -
23-1, ft&y have undertaken to serf/e this valid sovereign
interesE. If.so, it has failed decisively.
(a) Section 17 -23-L fails properly to advance Alabarna's
legitimate State interest because its literal terms are
instinct with tfre d.,botent,iaI-{,r for reaching and punishing
protected First AmednmenE conduct. Courts will condemn a
statute as "impermissibly overbroad if it permits punish-
ment of activity fairly within the protection of the United
States Constitution." Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise
v. State of Florida, 499 F. Supp, 346, 353 (lt.p. F1a. 1980),
aff 'd 673 F.2d 1213 ( lltfr Cir. 1982).
(u) Section Ll -23-l is insrincr with rhe ,porenrial*'for
overreaching beeause its general language is neither precise
nor speelfic. This dual structural flaw is best illustrated
by the phrase "i1lega1 or fraudulent voting". On its face,
this phrase contains two operative termsr i11ega1 and fraudu-
1ent. Although these terms represent core statutory eoncepts,
section 17 -23-l fails to infuse them with meaningful substan-
tive content. Their undefined quality gives rise to the
prciblem of overbreadth. -
4
(c) section 17-23-l suffers from real and substantial over-
breadth. This overbreadth is demonstrated in two distinct
ways' First, the statute is substantially overbroad because
basic First Amendment activities are open to eonstmction
as "i11ega1 or' fraudulent" voting-related conduct. Since
these aetrvities encompass an infinite variety of private
as well as public forms of expression and association, the
statute's potential for impermissible application is virtually
Ltnbounded. Second, the statute is substantially overbroad
because its criminal "penalty,, is significant in regard to
severity of punishmenr ("q,i^pr-igon*nnt ir. a- parnitot^*igr1 &r -^rt
New york v. Ferber, 50 r'*:rl*i^#;,T6#?;y:#",)fr:;)..
(d) Furthermore, section 17 -23-1 is fatally overbroad because
less drastic alternative means of promoting Alabama,s State
interest exist. "rf the state has open to it a less drastic
way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose
a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exerclse of
fundarnental personal liberties.', @ , 4!4
u's' 51 ' 59 (1973). Accordr Aladdin's_cast1e, rnc. v. city
of }"lesquire, 630 F.2d lOZg, 1038 n. 13 ( Stfr C ir. 19g0) r Reeves
v. l"tcConn, 631 F.2d 377, 3g3 (5th Cir. 1980); @
of opel0usas, 659 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5trr cir. 1gg1). A less
drastic alternative means is available in a more artfullv
speci{-r'caily r-,nlo,*^{\, Idrawn statute aimed at a narrow range of sb6btf*a{voting_ -
related conduct exclusive of essentially innocent expression
and association.
(4) Section t7 -23-1's 4potentiaL&. impact on protected spheres
of expression and association creates the danger of First
Amendment chilling effect. Appreciation of the "chi11,' on
primary conduct caused by "toleratirg, in the area of First
Arnendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute suscep-
tible of sweeping and improper application.", Button, 371
U.S. at 433, lies at the heart of the overbreadth doctrine.
Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1971). See
also, leFlorq v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1970).
Courts have long recognized that "1avJS which are overbroad
tend to 'chi1l' the exercise of important First Amendment
rights". Purple Onion, I!g. v. Jaekson, 511 F. Supp , 1207,
L219 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
(a) Sect,ion t7 -23-l Benerates a chilling effect because it
hangs , like .the Sword of Darnocles, over the heads of voters
as well as individuals engaged in voter assistance, threaten-
ing them with prosection and punishment if they participate
in 1awfu1 Ffrst Amendment aetivities. Since the mere threat
of statute-based sanctions may deter the exercise of First
Amendment rights "almost as potently as the actual applica-
tion of sanctions.", Button, 377 U.S. at 433, the chilling
effect generated by the threat of prosecution and punishment
,r.ro"r{ao"tube cannot be gainsaid.
o{^t) A.Vd Si€aCY?$odEb A?t*ye}.dglr1r1(ax(-,Plqf. eges'ttrod sffiL-sn
oycrtlh:eedcls.
( 5) The State courts of Alabama have not constn:ed section
17 -23-t so as ro cure g.t^:!"J.til|f,-o""r. inrirmiry or
overbreadth. In fact, the Alabama courts have left the
stacuters key provision wholly intact (i.e. "illegal or
fraudulent, voting"). The full extent of their constrLrction
amounts to .the facile observation that courts, where inter-
preting the phrase "i11ega1 or fraudulent voting", "rnay rely
on the remainder of the statute to provide a clear statement
of what condqct is proscribed." tr{ilder_v. State, 401 So.2d
151 , 160 (efa. Crim.App.), cert. depr.ed,401-So.2d L67
(eta. legl) , cerE. denied , 4s4 u.s . ,*z1lllJ,lJ""., rhe
remainder of the statute does not provide a "cLear statement'r
of prohibited eonducE. The absence of such a statement is
attributable to the uncertain mens rea element embedded in
the statute. This scienter-based uncertainty stems both
from the inconsistent use of language in the body of the
the statute and from the ambiguous results'of the Alabama
Supreme Court's historical efforts to constnre the statute.
See, e.B. , I,lilson v. $tate, 52 A1a. 299 ( 1aZ S;; Gordon v.
State, 52 Ala. 308 ( 1AZ S; . This uncertainty persists because
recent Alabama courE decisions have failed to determine
whether or not a scienter requirement may be generally
implied under the circumstances of voting. See, €.A. r
Bozeman v. State, 401 So.2d 167 (Rta. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, 401 So.2d 171 (ara. 1981), cerr._denied, 454 U.S.
1058 (1982); lrlilder v. State, 401 So.2d 151 (efa. Crim. App.),
cerc. denied, 401 So.2d t67 (efa. 1981), cert. d-enied, 454
u.s . 1057 ( 1982) .
(6) Because the First Amendment rightd of political expression
and association are intimately tied to the exercise of the
political franchise and to the extension of voter, assistance'
fivs+ O-erdr,er.t
secgion l7 -23-L is susceptibl! of application to fituWv&,
freedoms. This susceptibility is a form of statutory authori-
zatlon enabllng the State of Alabama to punish, by criminaL
sanction, eonstitutionally protected activity. The potential
for punishrnent under section L7--23-l poses' a real and sub-
stantial threat to the free exercise of political expression
and association. Since the threat of punishment fflA cause,
individuals to refrain from engaging in politieal acts of
expression and association, section t7'23-l e@ operate,
to chil1 the exercise of vital First Amendment rights.*
of frr/.iowt?-??- |
Because^this statute-induced chilling effect, twd*Wt@
is impermissibly overbroad and therefore invalid on its face.
v. l,l/ilsoh , 4os U'S ' {tstszr (rz) '