Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Support of Ruling on Desegregation Area and Development of Plan

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs

- V 8 -

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., 

Defendants

-and-

DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL NO. 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

Defendant- 
In tervenor

-and-

DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al.,

Defendant- 
In tervenor

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 35257

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
In Support of Ruling

On Desegregation Area And Development of Plan

On the basis of the entire record in this action, 
including particularly the evidence heard by the Court 
from March 28 through April 14, 1972, the Court now 
makes the following Supplementary Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law.

Introduction

1. On September 27, 1971, this Court issued its Ruling on Issue of
Segregation. On October 4, 1971, this Court issued from the bench guidelines 
to bind the parties in the submission of plans to remedy the constitutional 
violation found, i.e., school segregation; and in particular this Court noted



that the primary objective before us was to develop and implement a plan 
which attempts to "achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegre­
gation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation." On 
November 5, 1971, this Court reiterated these requirements by written order 
that the Detroit Board of Education submit a plan for the desegregation 

of its schools within 60 days" and "that the State defendants submit a 
metropolitan plan of desegregation within 120 days." In response to these 
orders hearings were held, and thereafter rulings issued, on Detroit-only 
plans (see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-only Plans 
of Desegregation, March 28, 1972) and on the propriety of considering 
remedies which extended beyond the corporate geographic limits of the City 
of Detroit. (Ruling on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to 
Accomplish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit,
March 24, 1972.) Between March 28, 1972, and April 14, 1972, hearings were 
held on metropolitan proposals for desegregation of the Detroit public 
schools.

2. From the initial ruling on September 27, 1971, to this day, the
basis of the proceedings has been and remains the violation*. . de.jure schoo 
segregation. Since Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the remedy for such illegal segregation is desegre­
gation. The racial history of this country is writ large by constitutional 
adjudication from Dred Scott v. Sanford to Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown. The 
message in grown was simple: the Fourteenth Amendment was to be applied full
force in public schooling. The Court held that "state-imposed" school 
segregation immeasurably taints the education received by ail children in
the public schools; perpetuates racial discrimination and a history of public 
action attaching a badge of inferiority to the black race in a public forum 
which importantly shapes the minds and hearts of succeeding generations of 
our young people; and amounts to an invidious racial classification. Since 
Brown the Supreme Court has consistently, and with increasing force, held 
that the remedy upon finding dejure segregation is prompt and maximum 
actual desegregation of the public schools by all reasonable, feasible, and 
practicable means available. This Court finds that there is nothing in the 
law, wisdom, or facts, and the particular circumstances and arguments,
presented in this case which suggest anything except the affirmance of these 
principles in both fact and law.

- 2 -



3. The task before this Court, therefore, is now, and since 
September 27, 1971, has always been, how to desegregate the Detroit public 
schools. The issue, despite efforts of the intervenors to suggest a new 
rationale for a return to the discredited "separate but equal" policy,^
is not whether to desegregate. That question should be, and has been, 
foreclosed by the prior and settled commands of the Supreme Court and the 
Sixth Circuit.

4. In the most recent set of hearings, several issues were addressed 
generally, including appropriate methods of pupil reassignment to desegre­
gate schools; quality and capacity of school facilities; transportation 
needs incident to school desegregation; the effects of new school construc­
tion, and judicially established controls thereon, on any plan of desegrega­
tion; the reassignment of faculty and restructuring of facilities incident 
to pupil reassignment to accomplish school desegregation; appropriate and 
necessary interim and final administrative and financial arrangements; 
appropriate community, parental, staff, and pupil involvement in the desegre­
gation process; and attention to individual, cultural, and ethnic values,

^In the main such proof entirely misses the point: the violation
here found has to do with school segregation caused in substantial part 
by force of public authority and action; yet the intervening defendants' 
questions and offer of proof speak mainly to educational theory and recent 
and sometimes contradictory research about narrowly measured educational 
effects, mostly on achievement test scores, of quite limited beginings of 
racial, or socio-economic integration of various types and as compared with 
the effects of dollar or other resource inputs and continued segregation.
This Court does not understand, however, that such research, from the Coleman 
report to its many reanalyses, formed the primary bases for the Brown decision 
or any of its progeny. See, e.g., Brunson v. Bd, of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 
826 (4th Cir. 1970) (J. Sobeloff, concurring) In a context similar to newly 
intervening defendants' objections to desegregation, the Supreme Court in 
Swann specifically held that such factors constitute an impermissible limit 
upon the duty to desegregate. 402 U.S. at ______ FN.8. Citation to such
research, either in support or rejection of school desegregation, misses 
the primary point: insofar as pupil assignments are concerned, the system
of public schooling in every state must be operated in a racially non-dis­
criminatory, unified fashion; until that objective is met, the very system of 
public schooling constitutes an invidious racial classification. The adoption 
of an education theory having the effect of maintaining a pattern of dejure 
segregation is therefore clearly impermissible. (Whether such theories, 
research, or evidence on educational quality or inequality form the basis for 
requiring judicial intervention and relief in the absence of a finding of 
dejure segregation is a question this Court need not face. )

In any event, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, on 
June 19, 1970, that greater, not less, desegregation is the proper manner to 
alleviate the problem of disparity in achievement. Monroe v. Board of 
Commissioners, Jackson, Tenn.,427 F.2d. 1005, 1008(C.A. 6.1970)

- 3 -



respect, dignity and identity. /See, generally, Hearings re Metropolitan 
Plans, 1 Tr. 1 - 1 1  Tr. l603; M.2, M.8, M.10, P.C.2 (Desegregation Plansj/
But the primary question addressed by these hearings, in the absence of 
submission of a complete desegregation plan by the state, remains the determin­
ation of the area necessary and practicable effectively to eliminate ’’root 
and branch" the effects of state-imposed and supported segregation and to 
desegregate the Detroit public schools. /P.M.3-5> 6, 10-12; M.ll, 12, 14;
M.5; and see also, e.g., 4 Tr. 587(colloquy), 7 Tr. 990-993(colloquyj/

Supplementary Findings of Fact 

A. The Desegregation Area

5. The State Board of Education filed six (6) "plans" (M.3-M.8)
without recommendation or preference ^M-9; 1 Tr. 9-12(colloquy); Porter 
Deposition, 3/23/72, p. 83/; intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., filed 
a proposal for metropolitan desegregation which included most of the tri­
county area ^1-2; 1 Tr. 13-2 Tr. 23l/; the defendant Detroit Board of Edu­
cation filed a proposal for metropolitan desegregation which included the 
entire tri-county area M.ll, M.12, M.14; 3 Tr. 398-6 Tr. 850; 9 Tr.
1323-14247. At the hearing plaintiffs presented a modification /P.M. 12;
8 Tr. 1145-9 Tr. 1322; 9 Tr. 1424-1450; 10 Tr. 1460-14627 of the three 
proposals /p.M.4(State Proposal) and M.5; P.M.5(CCBE Proposal) and M.2;
P.M.6(Detroit Board Proposal) and M.10-M-147 which actually described areas 
within which pupil desegregation was to be accomplished.

6.1 In the consideration of metropolitan plans of desegregation of the ,
Detroit public schools, the State defendants stand as the primary defendants.
They bear the initial burden of coming forward with a proposal that promises
to work. In the context of this case, they represent the "school authorities"

3to whom equity Courts traditionally have shown deference in these matters.
Yet in its submission without recommendation of six (6) "plans" the State 
Board of Education has failed to meet, or even attempt to meet, that burden

2In the context of this hearing, the defendant Detroit Board of Education 
is not in a position to act as the usual "school authority" primarily responsible 
for suggesting an appropriate desegregation area simply because its authority 
does not extend beyond the geographic limits of the City of Detroit. The compe­
tence, knowledge of local conditions, and expertise of those schoolmen who 
helped prepare the Detroit Board's proposal, however, may be utilized and 
given appropriate weight.

3in Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, #K88-71, Judge Fox pointed out 
the primary responsibility of the state: ''The State of Michigan is represented
by two entities, but the entity is an agent of the State . . . /T/he Constitu­
tion says something about your ^the State's7 responsibility. The Court went on 
to order the State to take an active role. Pre-trial order and transcript,
May 1, 1972.

- 4 -



and none of the other State defendants has filled the void. ^/Compare 1 Tr. 

12(colloquy); 2 Tr. 320(colloquy); see also 1 Tr. 8-12 (colloquy );M-9/

6.2 The State Board refused to make any recommendation to the Court 
about the appropriate area for desegregation. (M.9) la State Defendant 
Porter’s words, the State Board "didn’t make a decision, period." (Porter 
Deposition, 3/23/72, p.83) Defendants Milliken and Kelly merely filed objections 
to all six (6) plans.

6.3 Three of the State "plans" merely proposed concepts alternative to 
maximum actual desegregation ^One-way busing-M.4; Magnet-M.6; 2 Tr, 237*239 
(Pierce); and Neighborhood based or part-time desegregation-M.jfJ. The 
Racial Proportion Plan described a statistical method of determining the 
number of transfers involved in achieving a particular racial ratio in each 
school once an area of desegregation had been chosen. £ . 3; 2 Tr. 234(Pierce_)7 
The Equal Educational Opportunity and Quality Integration Plan was admitted
to be a non-plan [2 Tr. 240-242(Pierce_}7 and- described criteria for education 
which, in whole or part, might, or might not, be applicable to any school system. 
(M.8)

6.4 Only one State "plan," the Metropolitan District Reorganization 
Plan (M.5, Exhibit B), attempted to describe an area within which desegrega­
tion should occur, called the "initial operating zone" (sometimes referred to 
hereafter as the "State Proposal"). ^1.5, P» l6> 2 Tr. 249-250(PierceJ^
That "plan," however, was primarily concerned with discussing a new governance 
structure for the desegregation area. Pupil reassignment was mentioned only 
in passing /M.5, p. 17; 2 Tr. 2 6 o ( P i e r c a n d  no foundation was laid by State 
defendants for the particular area of desegregation described, /cf. 2 Tr.
320(colloquy)/ Further, it suffered from the default of the state defendants 
by their stubborn insistence that under their selfserving, and therefore 
selflimiting, view of their powers they were free to ignore the clear order 
of this Court and abdicate their responsibility vested in them by both the 
Michigan and Federal Constitution for supervision of public education and equal 
protection for all citizens. The fact that this might proceed from the tactics 
and advice of counsel in no way minimizes the default. (See Ruling on Issue
of Segregation)

From the very limited evidence in the record in support of the 
area in that state proposal, the primary foundation appears to be the particular 
racial ratio attained in that plan, approximately 65$ black, 35$ white, with 
the provision that the area could be expanded if "•shite flight" ensued.
/porter deposition 3/23/72, pp. 70-71; M.5, PP. H-12, 16; 2 Tr. 248-249



(PierceJ7 In the absence of any other persuasive foundation, such area
is not based on any definable or legally sustainable criteria for either 
inclusion or exclusion of particular areas; and the concept of an "initial 
operating zone" raises serious practical questions, which should be avoided 
if a more permanent solution is now possible. In short, the area described 
by the "initial operating zone" does not appear to be based primarily on 
relevant factors, like eliminating racially identifiable schools; accomplish­
ing maximum actual desegregation of the Detroit public schools; or avoiding, 
where possible, maintaining a pattern of schools substantially disproportionate 
to the relevant school community’s racial composition by force of deliberate 
action by public authority. Nor, on the evidence in this record, is the 
"initial operating zone" based on any practical limitation of 
reasonable times and distances for transportation of pupils. (Porter 
Deposition, 3/23/72, pp. 70, 76-77) These factors seem to have played 
little part in the creation of the "initial operating zone" and are re­
flected less in its result. (Compare, e.g., P.M.4 with P.M.8 and M.l6).

6.5 At the hearings, moreover, the State defendants did not purport
to present evidence in support, or even in opposition, to the State Proposal. 
/Cf. 1 Tr. 9-12(colloquy); 2 Tr. 320(colloquy]/ The State, despite prodding 
by the Court, presented only one witness, who merely explained what appeared 
on the face of the various State "Plans" submitted. /Cf. 1 Tr. 12(colloquy);
2 Tr. 320(colloquy); See 2 Tr. 233-261(PierceJ/ Ike state's cross examina­
tion of witnesses was of no assistance to the Court in ascertaining any pre­
ference, legal or educational. Put bluntly, State defendants in this hearing 
deliberately chose not to assist the Court in choosing an appropriate area 
for effective desegregation of the Detroit public schools. Their resistance 
and abdication of responsibility throughout has been consistent with the other 
failures to meet their obligations noted in the Court's earlier rulings.
Indeed, some of the submissions spoke as clearly in opposition to desegregation 
as did the legislature^ advised by the same counsel in committee, in Sec. 12 
of Act 48 ruled unconstitutional by the 6th Circuit.

6.6 In such circumstances little weight nor deference can be given to 
the unsupported submission of the State Board of Education. In light of the 
available alternatives and the facts produced at the hearing bearing on the 
issue, the Court finds that State defendants offered no basis for ruling 
that the "initial operating zone" is the appropriate area within which to 
desegregate effectively the Detroit public schools.

IT "

— 6 -



7. Similarly, the newly intervening, defendant school districts did

not attempt at the hearing to assist the Court in determining which area 
was appropriate to accomplish effective desegregation. They were given the 
opportunity, by express written order and several admonitions during the 
course of the hearings, to assist the Court in the task at hand but chose in 
their best judgment instead, in the main, to suggest their view that separate 
schools were preferable. The failure of the group of 40 districts to even 
comment that the Court should exclude certain districts under any number of 
available rationales may in part be explained by the awkward position chosen 
by them and their counsel of having single representation for districts on 
different sides of the various suggested perimeters. /See, e.g., Ruling 
and Order on Petitions for Intervention, S7b; 4 Tr. 585-587(colloquy); 7 Tr. 
977-979, 990-994(colloquyJ7

8. The plans of intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., and the
defendant Detroit Board of Education are similar. With slight variations 
they include the entire tri-county, metropolitan Detroit area, with that 
area divided into several regions or clusters to make the planning for 
accomplishing desegregation more manageable. (M.2; M.10, 11, 12, & 14) 
Although both have as their main objective desegregation ^.10; M.2, 2 Tr. 
200(MorsheadJ7, their larger area arises primarily from a heavy emphasis 
on such factors as white flight and an appropriate socio-economic balance 
in each cluster and school.^ (M.2; M.10)

“The Detroit Board plan places heavier reliance on white flight and 
socio-economic factors /M.10, pp. 2, 5, 14, 15, 25J t while 
the Magdowski proposal in addition places an emphasis on maintaining a mini­
mum percentage black in each school. /M.2 pp. 8-9; 1 Tr. 37(MorsheadJ/
These considerations in no way determine the Court's choice of a desegrega­
tion area necessary to meet constitutional requirements. In fairness, how­
ever, it also should be noted that the desegregation area, which'/Gourt deems 
to best meet constitutional requirements, also happens, in the main, to 
meet the other concerns expressed in these two proposals. (That the 
Board's interest in socio-economic integration is largely met by racial 
desegregation is not surprising. There is uncontroverted evidence in the 
record, and the Court so finds, that there is a high correlation between 
blacks and persons of a low socio-economic status, the result, in the main, 
of the cumulative effects of past ?,nd present racial discrimination including 
discrimination in education. [§ Tr. 1328(Rankin); 37 Tr. Hearings re Issue 
of Segregation 4148-4154, 4160, 4173> 4174, 4 Tr. Hearings re Intra-City 
Plans 450(Guthrie_)7) At some point hereafter, of course, school authorities 
with responsibility for implementation and operation of the racially-unified, 
non-dlscriminatory school system contemplated, or parts thereof, may and should 
include in its plan other educational goals and needs whether or not they are 
required by the law or any Court. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. at IC,.



9. The authors of the Detroit Board and Magdowski plans readily admit

that the regions or clusters for pupil reassignment which involve Mr. Clemens 
and Pontiac are not directly related to desegregation of the Detroit public 
schools and may be disregarded without any substantial adverse effect on 
accomplishing our objective. jj> Tr. 439-440, 471-472(Rankin); 1 Tr. 30 
(Morshead); 6 Tr. 930 (Flynnjj No other party has expressed any disagree­
ment with that view. And the Court finds that these two regions or clusters, 
for purposes of pupil reassignment, need not be included at this time in the 
desegregation area.

10. With the elimination of these two clusters there are, then, three
basic proposals to be considered for the desegregation area: the State
Proposal (P.M.4); the Detroit Board Proposal (P.M.6; M.12), and the proposal 
of defendant-intervenors Magdowski, et al., (P.M.5) (hereafter CCBE Proposal).
In addition, as noted, plaintiffs filed a modification of these three pro­
posals (P.M.10-11) (hereafter Plaintiffs' Proposal).

11, Each of these proposals starts from the same two premises: (l)
the tri-county area constitutes the relevant school community v?hich can serve
as an initial benchmark in beginning the evaluation of how to effectively(a;
eliminate the racial segregation of Detroit schools;|but in some instances 
reasonable time and distance limitations for pupil transportation, and in 
other instances the actual area required to eliminate the pattern of 
racially identifiable schools, limit the actual area within which pupil 
reassignment should occur. In terms of proof, putting aside arguments of 
impotence by the State Board, (it is interesting that the State Board is 
deemed to have such power and control that the May 3 Detroit papers indicate

the passage by the Michigan Senate of a constitutional, amendment to strip
the Board of power) there was absolutely no contradictory evidence on these
two criteria. /See, e.g., M.10-12; M.2; M.5, p.6; P.M.10-12, 8 Tr. 1168-1174,
ll8l, H 65-II66(Foster)/ The entire tri-county area includes areas, pupils, and
schools in 86 school districts; it includes approximately one million students,
of whom approximately 20$ are black. (M.5, Exhibit B; M.14) Based on the

4evidence concerning school and non-school factors, and reasonable time 
and distance limitations for pupil transportation, the Court finds that

■^See Findings 40-42 infra.



both premises are accurate.^

13. The State Proposal includes the areas, pupils and school in 36 
school districts; approximately 550,000 students are included of whom
36$ are black. (M.5) The Detroit Board Proposal (excluding clusters 8 and 
12 ) includes the areas, pupils, and schools in 69 school districts; approxi­
mately 2 50,000 students are included, of wham 25# are minority.^ (M.14) 
The CCBE Proposal includes the areas, pupils, and schools in some 62 school 
districts; approximately 777,000 students are included of wham 197,000 
(25.4#) are black. (M.2) Plaintiffs’ Proposal includes the areas, pupils,
and schools in 54 school districts; approximately 780,000 students are 
included, of whom 197,000 (25.3#) are black (P.M.12).

14. The State Proposal approaches what may be considered a substantial, 
disproportion in the context of this case. It is to be remembered that 
within any desegregation area, the racial composition of desegregated 
schools will vary from the area’s racial mix. (See, e.g., P.C.3; M.17) 
Given the variations in school plant, demographic and geographic factors, 
limiting the desegregation area to the State Proposal would result in some 
schools being substantially disproportionate in their racial, composition to 
the tri-county area, and other schools racially identifiable, all without 
any justification in law or fact. This finding is supported by the lack of 
any apparent justification for the desegregation area described by the 
State Proposal except a desire to achieve an arbitrary racial ratio. (See 
Finding 6.4 supra.)

15.1 Transportation of children by school bus is a common practice 
throughout the nation, in the state of Michigan, and in the tri-county area. 
(See, e.g. Wagner Deposition, 3/22/1972 and exhibits thereto; M.4) Within 
appropriate time limits it is a considerably safer, more reliable, healthful 
and efficient means of getting children to school than either car pools or 
walking, and this is especially true for younger children. (See, e.g.,

5The interplay of these two factors summarizes two other guideposts 
or starting points: maximum feasible desegregation and eliminating racially
identifiable schools. Factors such as time and distance 1imitationsjtogether 
with the rough definitions of substantial disproportion with the relevant 
school community’s pupil racial composition, in turn largely determine the 
meaning of "eliminating racially identifiable schools" and what constitutes 
"maximum feasible desegregation," in the particular circumstances here present ana 
in the context of a prior finding of segregation.

^The Detroit Board Proposal contemplates desegregation on a "minority"- 
white basis. The proof in this cause, however, has been aimed at the segregation 
of black children and white children; similarly the remedy has been so defined, 
argued, and in the main presented by parties. The Court finds, therefore, that 
the area, and further planning, should, in the main, be confined to a black- 
white breakdown.

- 9 -



Wagner Deposition, 3/22/1972 pp. 33“3^; Tr. re Hearings Intra-City Plans 140, 
156-157(Kuthy); Tr. re Intra City Plans 408-409(Smith); See also Findings

one hour, and up to one and one half hours, one-way on the bus ride to 
school each day. /See, e.g., Exhibit 5, Wagner Deposition, 3/22/1972;
"First Report," State Defendants' Survey of Tri-County Transportation/
Consistent with its interest in the health, welfare and safety of children 
and in avoiding impingement on the educational process, state educational 
authorities routinely fund such transportation for school children. /See, 
e.g., Exhibit 6, Wagner Deposition, 3/22/1972 and Hain, "The Law of Desegre­
gation," 18 Mich. School Bd. J. 18 (Dec. 17, 1 9 7 1 Such transportation of 
school children is a long-standing, sound practice in elementary and secon­
dary education in this state and throughout the country /E.g., Tr. re Intra­
City Plans 333-334(Foster); Tr. re Intra City Plans 140, 156-157(KuthyJ/
And the Court finds such transportation times,used by the state and recommended 
here, are reasonable in the circumstance here presented and will not endanger 
the health or safety of the child nor impinge on the educational process. For 
school authorities or private citizens to now object to such transportation 
practices raises the inference not of hostility to pupil transportation but 
rather racially motivated hostility to the desegregated school at the end of 
the ride.

15.3 The Plaintiffs Proposal made reference to P.M.8, based on the TALUS
regional transportation and travel times study. Although there was dispute 
over the meaning of the study, such studies are deemed sufficiently reliable 
that major governmental agencies customarily rely on their projection for a 
variety of planning functions Jj Tr. 1086(SmithJ/. When used by the plaintiffs, 
P.M.8, in conjunction with the Detroit Board's survey of maximum school to 
school travel times (M.l6), served as a rough guide line within which the 
plaintiffs' modification of other proposals attempted to stay in an effort to

‘̂ Compared to private modes of transportation, school bus travel is 
exceptionally safe: in 1968, the National Safety Council found school buses
4 times safer than ordinary buses, and 40 times safer than private cars. 
Inequality in Education, Vol. 11, p. 19, March, 1972; "Facts About School 
Buses,n School Management (Magazine), Apri], 1971, p. H.

15.2 In Michigan and the tri-county area, pupils often spend upwards of



V

to provide maximum desegregation without any more transportation time than is 
required to desegregate. This court finds that the utilization of these 
two factors, and the lower travel time estimates which should result, is a 
reasonable basis for the modification in the circumstances of this case.
The Court's duty and objective is not to maximize transportation but to 
maximize desegregation and within that standard it will always be reasonable 
to minimize transportation. To that end the Court has accepted the more 
conservative perimeter for the desegregation area suggested as a modifica­
tion by plaintiffs because it provides no less effective desegregation.

15.4 Based on these criteria, the State Proposal is too narrowly drawn. 
(Compare P.M.4 with P.M.8 and M.l6)

15.5 Based on these criteria, parts of the Detroit Board Proposal are 
too sweeping (Compare P.M.6 with P.M.8 and M.l6)

15.6 Based on these criteria, the CCBE proposal and the Plaintiffs'
7Proposal, roughly approximate the area so described. (Compare P.M.8 and 

M.16 with P.M.5 and P.M.ll)

16. There is general agreement among the parties, and the Court so
finds, that on the west the areas, schools, and pupils in the Huron

O
Van Buren, Northville, Plymouth, and Novi districts (l) are beyond the 
rough 40-minute travel time line (Compare P.M.8 and M.l6 with P.M.6 and P.M.2)- 
(2) are not necessary to effectively desegregate schools involved in the 
regions and clusters abutting those schools; and/, at this writing, are not 
otherwise necessary, insofar as pupil assignment is concerned, to provide an 
effective remedy now and hereafter /Cf. 10 Tr. 1523-1^5(Henrickson); see 
Findings 37-39 below./

17. In the southwest the school districts of Woodhaven, Gibralter,
Flat Rock, Grosse lie and Trenton are within the reasonable time and 
distance criteria set forth above (Compare P.M.2 with P.M.8). These 
virtually all-white districts are included in the Detroit Board 
Proposal but excluded from the Plaintiffs' modification

7
# To the Southwest, Plaintiffs' Proposal falls on the side of less 

time in transit than the 40-minute guideline because inclusion of more area 
is PQ'fc required to desegregate. (See Finding 17, infra.)

Moreover, in the main, the areas, schools, and pupils in these districts 
not as fully members of the greater Detroit school community: many are 

less urban; they are the furthest in terms of time, distance, and contact 
from the Detroit area's economic and social activities; and many are more 
oriented, if anything, to urban areas other than Detroit, for example, the
P^M 2rbMrii/YPSilanti area* ^  Tr* 8 9 3 - 8 9 7 9  Tr* 1338-1339(Nankin);

- 11 -



\

(P.H.6, P.M.ll; and P.M.ll, P.M.12) The areas, schools and pupils in such

school districts are similarily not necessary to effectively desegregate. 
(Clusters 13, 14, and 15 in Plaintiffs* proposal are 20.5$, 24.4$, and 
22.7$ black respectively, P.M.12) There is nothing in the record which suggests 
that these districts need be included in the desegregation area in order 
to disestablish the racial identifiability of the Detroit public schools.
From the evidence, the primary reason for the Detroit School Board's interest 
in the inclusion of these school districts is not racial desegregation 
but to increase the average socio-economic balance of all the schools in 
the abutting regions and clusters 0  Tr. 1405-1408, 1422-1423(Rankin); 10 
Tr. 1523-1525(Henrickson); Compare P.M.12 with M.l̂ j/. In terms of what this 
Court views as the primary obligation established by the Constitution —  
racial desegregation— the Court deems the proper approach is to be more 
conservative: the Court finds it appropriate to confine the desegregation
area to its smallest effective limits. This Court weighs more heavily -the 
judicially recognized concern for limiting the time and distance of pupil 
transportation as much as possible, consistent with the constitutional 
requirement to eliminate racially identifiable schools, than a concern for 
expanding the desegregation area to raise somewhat the average socio­
economic balance of a relatively few clusters of schools.^ /Compare 9 Tr.
1412-1413 (Ranking

18.1 To the north and northeast, the only major disagreement among the 
Detroit Board Proposal and Plaintiffs* modification relates to the areas, 
schools, and pupils in the Utica School District. (Compare P.M.ll and P.M.12 
with M.14 and P.M.6) This district is a virtually all-white, long, relatively • 
narrow area extending several miles in a north-south direction away from the 
City of Detroit. (P.M.12; P.M.2) Only the southern part of the district is 
within the rough, TALUS 40-minute travel time line. (Compare P.M.8 with P.M.2 
and P.M.6. See also M.l6)

18.2 Once again, the Detroit Board argues that Utica should be included 
in order to raise the average socio-economic balance of the abutting clusters 
and schools. 0  tr. 1402-1404(Rankin); M.19, Cluster”27 In this instance,

9'The Court notes, however, that the range of average socio-economic 
status for the various regions or clusters in Plaintiffs' Proposal is similar 
to that in the Detroit Board Proposal: based on the Michigan Assessment the
range in Plaintiffs' Proposal happens to be 44.7 to 53.7, while in the Detroit 
Board Proposal the range is 46.3 bo 53> and only three of the 15 clusters of 
schools in Plaintiffs' Proposal fall below 46.3. j/m .11 and M.19. See also
9 Tr. 1416-1423(Rankin}/

- 12 -



however, the overall racial composition of the cluster, 27.0$ black, may 
tend toward disproportionate black relative to the tri-county starting 
point. (P.M.12, Cluster 3)

18,3 Mr. Henrickson, the planner for the Board, also suggested that
Cluster 3 of Plaintiffs’ Proposal, because of its omission of Utica, might 
present some problems, which he admitted could be solved, in designing a 
plan of pupil reassignment for the desegregation of schools. (10 Tr* 
1151-1152 and See Finding 21 below. )

18.4 In light of these relevant, and competing, considerations the
question presented by the Utica situation is close; however, at this writing,
the Court determines that the areas, schools, and pupils in the Utica School
District need not be included, and therefore, should not be included in the

10desegregation area.

19. The Court finds that the appropriate desegregation area is described
by Plaintiffs' modification of the three primary proposals. Within that 
area the racial identifiability of schools may be disestablished by imple­
mentation of an appropriate pupil desegregation plan. The area as a whole is 
substantially proportionate to the tri-county starting point. Within the 
area it is practicable, feasible, and sound to effectively desegregate all 
schools without imposing any undue transportation burden on the children 
or on the state's system of public schooling. The time or distance children 
need be transported to desegregate schools in the area will impose no risk to 
the children's health and will not significantly impinge on the educational 
process.

B. Clusters

20. The Detroit Board Proposal makes use of l6 regions or clusters
(M.ll; M.14). These clusters range from 36,000 to 105,000 pupils and from 
17.5$ to 29.7$ "minority." (M.ll; M.14) The clusters are arranged along 
major surface arteries and utilize the "skip," or noncontiguous zoning,

10Because of the closeness of the question, particularly as it relates 
to any problems which m y  arise hereafter in establishing a pupil desegrega­
tion plan, the Court feels that some opportunity should be given to the 
expert team to suggest a modification of this tentative resolution. See 
also Finding 21 below.

- 13 -



technique to minimize the time and distance any child need spend in transit. 
/Compare P.M.2 and P.M.3; and see, e.g., 3 Tr. 424-425(Rankin)/ The use of 
these clusters basically subdivides the planning for pupil reassignment within 
the desegregation area into a series of smaller, manageable and basically 
independent plans. /E.g. 6 Tr. 808(Henrickson); 9 Tr. 1329-1330(Rankin)/
Thus, although as the new intervenors rather disingenuously suggest devising 
a desegregation plan for a system with some 800,000 pupils has never been 
attempted, the practical and manageable reality is that desegregation plans 
for systems with from 36,000 to 100,000 pupils has been done and such plans 
have been implemented. /E.g. 6 Tr. 808 (Henrickson); 9 Tr. 1297-1300(Foster}7

21.1 Plaintiffs' Proposal uses the same cluster technique and the same
clusters, modified to fit the desegregation area. /Compare P.M.10 and 12 
with M.11 and P.M. 3; See also 8 Tr. 1155-1167(Foster); 10 Tr. 1506-1507 
(HenricksonJ7 The 15 clusters range from 27,000 to 93,000 pupils and from
20.5$ to 30.8$ black.(P.M.12) Only three relevant objections were raised, 
by Mr. Henrickson, to the clusters as modified. (10 Tr. 1507-1521)

21.2 First, Cluster 4 was challenged as "concealing" a "problem," 
namely effective desegregation of other schools resulting from the omission 
of Utica from Plaintiffs' modification. /l0 Tr. 1511-2,512 (Henrickson)/
On cross-examination Mr. Henrickson admitted that the "problem" of actual 
pupil desegregation for these other schools could be "solved," that all 
schools within Cluster 4 could be effectively desegregated, and that Cluster 
4 was smaller than the Detroit Board Cluster 6. (10 Tr. 1516-1517) The 
objection was thus narrowed to the possibility that a suburban high school 
constellation feeder pattern might have to be split between two Detroit high 
school constellation feeder patterns in order to desegregate. /Io Tr.
1517(HenricksonJ/ Several of the Detroit Board’s clusters, however, also 
contain two Detroit high school feeder patterns (M.ll; M.14)

21.3 This objection, splitting an existing feeder pattern, was raised
directly in reference to Cluster 12. (10 Tr. 1517-151®) In neither instance,
however, did Mr. Henrickson suggest that the time or distance of ti’anspor- 
tation involved was too long or that it would present administrative diffi­
culty in devising a pupil assignment plan for either cluster. (10 Tr. 1518-1520) 
The objection relates solely to a matter of administrative convenience,
namely the use of existing feeder patterns in preparing pupil assignments 
/5 Tr. 765-766(HenricksonJ/ For example, Mr. Henrickson previously admitted

- 14 -



that in drawing a pupil assignment plan, an alternative to use of existing 
feeder patterns would be to "wipe the slate clean/’ and disregard existing 
feeder patterns. (5 Tr. 766) In fact one of the State plans suggested use 
of census tracts as an alternative (M.5, p. 17).11 And more importantly, 
on numerous occasions in the past Mr. Henrickson himself has reassigned plrts 
of one feeder pattern to another school in order to relieve overcrowding 
and/or accomplish desegregation. (5 Tr. 765; 10 Tr. 1518) The objection 
to such practice, therefore, is admittedly insubstantial.

21.4 The third objection relates to the exchange of Detroit Northern 
for Detroit Murray in Clusters 6 and 15 requiring that the students trans­
ported, if they proceed on their entire journey by way of the expressway, 
encounter an interchange which tends to be rather slow-moving. (10 Tr.
1507-1510) Such transportation time and distance, however, is well within 
the rough criteria for reasonableness and is shorter than or comparable to 
the maximum trips required in the Detroit Board’s clusters. (10 Tr. 1518-1520) 
In other instances, Mr. Henrickson admitted that pupils in the Detroit pro­
posal might also have to travel through similar interchanges. (l0 Tr. 1514-1515) 
Moreover, the objection to this particular increase in travel time must be 
weighed against the apparent general decrease in time which would be required 
in Plaintiffs’ modified clusters as compared with the Detroit Board’s clusters. 
(10 Tr. 1518-1528; and compare P.M. 10 with P.M. 3 ) In any event the desegre­
gation team, based on its investigation of all aspects of pupil assignment, 
remains free to suggest a modification of these clusters in order to reduce 
the time and number of children requiring transportation.

21.5 With that caveat, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ modification of 
the Detroit Board’s clusters provides a workable, practicable, and sound 
framework for the design of a plan to desegregate the Detroit public schools,

C. Pupil Assignment and Transportation

22.1 Examples of various methods of pupil assignment to accomplish de­
segregation have been brought to the attention of the Court by the parties: 
pairing, grouping, and clustering of schools; various strip, skip, island * S

i r  -  —
q TJ t , COffimon practice in other cases is the use of "pupil locator" mans
S Northcross y. School Board of City of Memphis _____F?2d_____  (6th Cir

- 15 -



and non-contiguous zoning; various lotteries based on combinations of present 
school assignment, geographic location, name, or birthday. /See e.g. E»C.2,3,
4, 5; M.12; M.17; P.M.10; 5 Tr. 463-467, 10 Tr. 15l8(Henrickson); M.5, P. 1l7 
Judicious use of these techniques— coupled with reasonable staggering of 
school hours and maximizing use of existing transportation facilities— can 
lead to maximum actual desegregation with a minimum of additional transpor­
tation. /P.C.2, 3; 15 Tr. 763-767(Henrickson); 4 Tr. 445-457(Rankin); M.17;
2 Tr. Hearings re Intra-City Plans 123, 151-152, 159(Kuthy); Wagner Deposition, 
3/22/72 pp. 24-24, et. seqJ

22.2 Quite apart from desegregation, under any circumstances, transporta­
tion for secondary pupils living more than l-l/2 miles, and elementary pupils 
living more than 1 mile from school, is often demanded by parents and should be 
provided. (P.C.2; cf. Wagner Deposition, 3/22/72, pp. 32-33, 90-91) Moreover, 
it is essential to the effectiveness of any desegregation plan that trans­
portation be provided free to all students requiring it under that criteria. 
/E.g., P.C.2; Brewer v. Norfolk Board of Education____F.2d_____ (April, 1972)
(4th Cir.J7

23.1 In the recent past more than 300,000 pupils in the tri-county area 
regularly rode to school on some type of bus (P.M.19); this figure excludes 
the countless children who arrive at school in car pools, which are many, 
many times more dangerous than riding on the school bus. (Wagner Deposition,
3/22/1972, p. 33)

23.2 Throughout the state approximately 35-4°$ of &H  students arrive
at school on a bus. (Wagner Deposition, 3/22/72, p. 20) In school districts 
eligible for state reimbursement of transportation costs in the three affected 

"counties, the percent of pupils transported in 1969-70 ranged from 42 to 52$. 
(M-4, pp. 31-34)

23.3 In comparison approximately 40$, or 310,000, of the 780,000 
children within the desegregation area will require transportation in order 
to accomplish maximum actual desegregation. Tr. 452-454(Rankin); 5 Tr.
694, 697, 744-745(Henrickson); M.lj/

23„4 Hence, any increase in the numbers of pupils to be transported upon
implementation of a complete desegregation plan over the number presently 
transported, relative to the state and the tri-county area, should be minimal. 
Indeed, any increase may only reflect the greater numbers of pupils who

- 16 -



would be transported in any event but for the state practice, which affected 
the segregation found in this case, and which denies state reimbursement to 
students and districts wholly within city limits regardless of the distance 
o f the child from the school to which assigned. (Ruling on Issue of 
Segregation at 14.) The greatest change is the direction of the buses.

24. There is uncontradictdd evidence that the actual cost of trans­
portation for a two-way plan of desegregation should be no greater than" JO
50 to 60 dollars per pupil transported, J comparable to the present costs 
per pupil throughout the state. f~ Tr. Hearings re Intra City Plans,
346(Foster); ____ Tr. Hearings re Intra City Plans 417(Smith); Wagner
Deposition, 3/22/1972, pp. 56-57 and Exhibit 1; M.4 p. 297 Increases in 
the total costs of pupil transportation upon the public fisc in the tri-county 
area, therefore, will result primarily from providing all children requiring 
transportation a free ride instead of imposing the costs of transportation 
for many on the families.in districts which are ineligible for state reim­
bursement and which fail to provide transportation. (Cf. Exhibit 1, Wagner 
Deposition, 3/22/72; M4, p. 29)

25. By multiple use of buses, careful routing, and economies of scale 
resulting from a comprehensive system of pupil transportation, it may be 
possible to achieve savings in per pupil costs. 5  .g., Wagner Deposition, 
3/22/72, pp. 24-25 et seq.; 2 Tr. Hearing re Intra City Plans 123, 151-152, 
159(Kuthy_)7 For example in 1969-1970 many school districts in the tri-county 
area which used the same bus for even two loads per day lowered their par 
pupil costs to §40 or less. (Exhibit 1, Wagner Deposition, 3/22/72) In a 12

12For years these city-contained school districts, which includes some 
suburban districts in the desegregation area, as well as the Detroit Public 
Schools, have demanded without success that this inequitable state practice 
be changed so that all districts could be reimbursed on the same basis for 
pupil transportation. (Wagner Deposition, 3/22/72, pp. 32-33> 90-91)

13ijhe figure almost twice that which appears in several of the State 
"plans" (e.g. M.4, Appendix C) was based on the assumption that busing 
would be "one-way" with black children being assigned to suburban schools. 
Mr. Wagner, the state official in charge of pupil transportation, provided 
the information on which that estimate was based and also informed his 
superiors that a two-way plan of desegregation and transportation would 
cost much less per pupil. The State defendants did not bring this important 
fact to the Court's attention in any of their submissions; it was uncovered 
and fully explored in the deposition of Mr. Wagner taken by plaintiffs. 
(Wagner Deposition, 3/22/72, pp. 56-60)

- 17 -



\

coordinated, urban pupil transportation system it may be possible to raise 
the bus use factor to three or more. (3 Hearings re Intra-City Plans 3^7•
See also "First Report" State Survey and Evaluation)

26.1 3n  the tri-county area in the recent past there were approximately 
1,800 buses (and another 100 smaller vans) used for the transportation of 
pupils. (P.M. 19; See also M.4, p. 35) Assuming a rough average of 50 
pupils per bus carrying three loads of students per day, this transportation 
fleet may prove sufficient to carry some 270,000 pupils.

26.2 Various public transit authorities now transport an additional
60,000 pupils on their regular public runs. (P.M.19)

26.3 The degree to which these plausible bus-use factors can be realized 
to their maximum^and whether these public transit facilities may be fully 
utilized in a plan of desegregation, must be answered upon careful investi­
gation by a team of experts.

26.4 There is no disagreement among the partieSj and the Court so finds, 
that additional transportation facilities, at least to the number of 350 
buses, will have to be purchased to meet the increase in the number of students 
who should be provided transporation for either an interim or
final plan of desegregation.

26.5 For all the reasons stated heretofore— including time, distance, 
and transportation factors— desegregation within the area described is physi­
cally easier and more practicable and feasible, than desegregation efforts 
limited to the corporate geographic limits of the City of Detroit, ^Compare 
Findings and Conclusions on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation p. 3, pp.3-6; 
and see, generally, 2 Tr. Hearings re Intra-City Plans 119, et seq.(Kuthy)7

27. The issue of transportation of kindergarten children, and their
inclusion in part or in full in the desegregation plan, may require further 
study. There was general agreement among the experts who testified that
kindergarten, but for "political" considerations, should be included, if 
practicable, in the desegregation plan. /See, e.g., 2 Tr. 210-211(Morshead);
6 Tr. 900-902(Flynn); 8 Tr. 1177(FosterJ/ Kindergarten, however, is 
generally a half-day program. Transportation of kindergarten children for 
upwards of 45 minutes, one-way, does not appear unreasonable, harmful, or 
unsafe in any way. In the absence of some compelling justification, which 
does not yet appear, kindergarten children should be included in the final 
plan of desegregation.

- l8 -



t

28. Every effort should be made to insure that transportation and
reassignment of students to accomplish desegregation is "two-way" and 
falls as fairly as possible on both races, (e.g. P.C. 2; M.2; M.10; M.4 p.iii) 
Although the number of black and white children transported and reassigned at 
the outset will be roughly equal, it is inevitable that a larger proportion of 
black children will be transported for a greater proportion of their school 
years than white children, if transportation overall is to be minimized.
/3 Tr. 454-455(Rankin)/ To mitigate this disproportion, every effort should 
be made at the outset to randomize the location of particular grade centers. 
/E.g., P.C.2; M.17; 3 Tr. 454(Rankin); 8 Tr. 1176-1177(FosterJ/ la the 
short term^ full utilization of vastly undercapacity inner-city schools may 
also help to mitigate the disproportion for some black children jZ Tr.
768-769(Henricksonjjj and in the long term, new school capacity, consistent 
with other constitutional commands and the overall needs of the desegregation 
area and the surrounding areas, should be added in Detroit,in relative 
proximity to concentrations of black student residence. jZ Tr. 770-771
(Henricksonj/

D. Restructuring of Facilities and Reassignment of Teachers

29. In the reassignment of pupils to accomplish desegregation, there is
uncontroverted evidence, and the Court so finds, that facilities must be 
substantially reallocated and faculty substantially re-assigned by reason of
the clustering, pairing and grouping of schools. /E.g., ____ Tr. re Intra
City Plans 586-587(Rankin); 9 Tr. 1345-1348(Rankin); 5 Tr. 782(Henrickson] J

30* In order to make the pupil desegregation process fully effective
there is uncontroverted evidence, and the Court so finds, that it is essential 
to integrate faculty and staff end to insure that black faculty and staff
representation at every school is more than token. /~E.g., P.C.2; ____ Tr.
re Intra-City Plans, 312, 353(Foster); _____Tr. re Intra-City Plans 495-496
(Guthrie); M.10, p. 33-34; M.4, p. 22; M.5, p. 20; M.2; 9 Tr. 1342-1343,
3 Tr. 470-471(Rankin); 5 Tr. 782(Henricksonj/

31. In the desegregation area approximately 16$ of the faculty and 12$
of the principals and assistant principals are black. (P.M.l8) In this con­
text "token" means roughly less than 10$ black. /9 Tr. 1348-1350(Rankin)7 
Moreover, where there is more than one building administrator in any school, 
a bi-racial administrative team is required wherever possible. (P.C.2)



32. There is uncontroverted testimony that every effort should he made 
to hire and promote, and to increase such on-going efforts as there may he 
to hire and promote, additional black faculty and staff. Because of the 
systematic and substantial under-employment of hlack administrators and teachers 
in the tri-county area, (P.M.l8) an affinnative program for black employment 
should he developed and implemented. /P.C.2; M.10; 9 Tr. 1351-1352(RankinJ/

33. The rated capacity of classrooms in the Detroit public schools is 32; 
in some of the suburban districts the average rated capacity is as low as 24 
or 25. /5 Tr. 770(HenricksonJ7 Utilization should be redetermined on a uni­
form basis.

35. In respect to faculty and staff, school facilities, and the
utilization of existing school capacity, normal administrative practice in 
handling the substantial reallocation and reassignment incident to pupil 
desegregation should produce schools substantially alike. /See, e.g.,
5 Tr. 782(HenricksonJ/

36.1 In the circumstances of this case, the pairing, grouping and 
clustering of schools to accomplish desegregation with minimum transportation 
often requires use of grade arrangements such as k-4, k-5 or even k-6.
(E.g., P.C.2; M.17) In so planning pupil reassignments, it is sometimes 
necessary, and often as administratively practicable, to include grades
k-8 or even k-9 to achieve the maximum actual desegregation with the m-in-iimur; 
transportation/E.g., 8 Tr. 1176(Foster); 9 Tr. 1335-1338(Ranking; and 
each of Mr. Henrickson’s plans and examples of pupil desegregation are so 
constructed. (P.C.2; M.17; M.l8) And none of Mr. Henrickson*s plans or 
examples is limited to grades 4-6. (EC.2; M.17; M.l8) /Grade structures in
most elementary schools in the desegregation area is a basic k-6; however, 
almost all other combinations are found. They differ within and among 
various districts. (P5.M. 13, 14jj

36.2 In the reassignments of pupils and teachers and the reallocation 
of equipment and facilities required to accomplish desegregation, the ele­
mentary grades and schools present relatively few administrative difficulties, 
while the high school grades and facilities present the greater difficulties , 
particularly with respect to scheduling and curriculum. (Detroit Board 
Witnesses)

- 20 -



3^.3 For these reasons, if it develops that interim choices must be 
made because of the impossibility of immediate desegregation of all grades, 
schools, and clusters in the desegregation area, the weight of the evidence 
is, and the Court so finds, that desegregation should begin first at the 
earliest grades for entire elementary school groupings throughout as many 
clusters as possible. /Cf., 6 Tr. 909(Flynn); 9 Tr. 1391-1392(Rankin)/

E. School Construction

37. Relative to suburban districts the Detroit public schools, as a 
whole, are considerably over-capacity. 0  Tr. 770(llenrickson); See also 
Finding 33 supra7 To alleviate this overcrowding, equalize rated capacity 
and minimize and equalize transportation burdens borne by black pupils in 
the City, needed new school capacity, consistent with other requirements of 
a desegregation plan, should be added on a priority basis in the City of 
Detroit. 0  Tr. 770-771(HenricksonJ/

38. Relevant to the Court's choice of a desegregation area more
limited than the Detroit Board Proposal is the testimony, elicited on 
cross-examination from two of the primary authors of that proposal, related 
to the effects of controlling new school construction. 0  Tr. 1023-1024 
(Flynn); 5 Tr. 768(Henricksonj/ The broader area in the Detroit proposal 
was chosen without any real consideration of the impact of controlling 
school construction in an area larger than the desegregation area. 0  Tr. 
1023(Flynnj7 Upon reflection, both Dr. Flynn and Mr. Eenrickson admitted 
that closely scrutinizing and limiting the addition of capacity to areas .
outside the desegregation area might lead them to re-evaluate the need, in the 
context of maintaining now and hereafter a unitary system, to include an area as 
sweeping as recommended by the Detroit Board proposal. 0  Tr. 1023(Flynn);
5 Tr. 769-770(Henrickson)7

39.2 In our Ruling on Issue of Segregation, pp. 8-10, this Court found
that the "residential segregation throughout the larger metropolitan area is 
substantial, pervasive and of long standing" and that "governmental actions 
and inaction at all levels, Federal, State and local, have combined with 
those of private organisations, such as loaning institutions and real estate 
associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of 
residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area." We also

rI

- 21 -



noted that this deliberate setting of residential patterns had an important 
effect not only on the racial composition of inner-city schools but the 
entire School District of the City of Detroit. Ruling on Issue of Segregation 
at Just as evident is the fact that suburban school districts in the
main contain virtually all-white schools. (E.g., P.X. l8l, 182, 185; P.M.
13, P.M.14) The white population of the city declined and in the suburbs 
grew; the black population in the city grew, and largely, was contained 
therein by force of public and private racial discrimination at all levels.
(E.g. P.X. 16A-16D; P.X.184; P.M.15. See also Puling on Issue of Segregation. )

39.3 We also noted the important interaction of school and residential
segregation: "Just as there is an interaction between residential patterns and
the racial composition of the schools, so there is a corresponding effect on the 
residential pattern by the racial composition of schools." Ruling on Issue of 
Segregation at 10. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenherg, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21(1971):
"People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in 
response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence 
the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have 
important impact on composition of inner city neighborhoods."

39.4 Within the context of the segregatory housing market, it is obvious 
that the white families who left the city schools would not be as likely to 
leave in the absence of schools, not to mention white schools, to attract,
or at least serve, their children.14 Tr. 769-770(Henricksonj/ Inmigrating 
families were affected in their school and housing choices in a similar manner. 
Between 1950 and 1969 in the tri-county area, approximately 13,900 "regular 
classrooms," capable of serving and attracting over 400,000 pupils, * 
were added in school districts which were less than 2$ black in their pupil 
racial composition in the 1970-71 school year. (P.M. 14; P.14.15)

39.5 The precise effect of this massive school construction on the 
racial composition of Detroit area public schools cannot be measured. It is

14This phenomenon was noted in Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21(See 39*3 supra.) 
The principle was long known, and actively, supported by the F.H.A. For 
example, consider that public agency's early understanding in its 1936 
manual that white subdivision developments require white schools: "if the
children of people living in such area are compelled to attend school where 
the majority or a good number of the pupils represent a far lover level of 
society or an incompatible racial element, the neighborhood under consideration 
will prove far less stable and desirable than if the condition did not exist." 
(P.X. 56B)

14,1This figure assumes 30 children/regular classroom. Although rated 
capacities may be lower, the figure for regular classrooms does not include 
several types of instructional, recreational, laboratory, and other rooms 
which add overall pupil capacity to schools. (P.M.15)

- 22 -



clear, however, that the effect has been substantial.^4*^ Unfortunately, 
the State, despite its awareness of the important impact of school con­
struction and announced policy to control it (P.X. 19), acted "in keeping, 
generally, with the discriminatory practices which advanced or perpetuated 
racial, segregation in these schools," Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 15; 
see also id,, at 13.

39.6 In addition to the interim reewOLuation of new school construction
required in the order, pursuant to the State Board's own requirements, the 
final plan will consider other appropriate provisions for future construction 
throughout the metropolitan area.

F. Governance, Finance, and Administrative Arrangements

40.1 The plans submitted by the State Board, the Detroit Board, and
the intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., discuss generally possible

15governance, finance, and administrative arrangements which may be appro­
priate for operation of an interim or final plan of desegregation. (M.2;
M.5; M.10) Without parsing in detail the interesting, and sometimes sensible, 
concepts introduced by each plan, it is sufficient to note that each con­
templates overlaying some broad educational authority over the area, creating 
or using some regional arrangement (with continued use or eventual redrawing 
of existing districts), and considerable input at the individual school 
level. The Court has made no decision in this regard and will consider the 
matter at a subsequent hearing. 14 15

14*^Ehe resulting pattern is unmistakable: "Residential segregation within
the city and throughout the larger metropolitan area is substantial, perva­
sive and of long standing. Black citizens are located in separate and distinct 
areas within the city and are not generally found in the suburbs. While the 
racially unrestricted choice of black persons and economic factors may have 
played some part in the development of this pattern of residential segrega­
tion, it is, in the main, the result of past and present practices and customs 
of racial discrimination, both public and private, which have and do restrict 
the housing opportunities of black people. Perhaps the most that can be said 
is that all of them /various governmental units7 , including school suthorities, 
are, in part, responsible for the segregated condition which exists." Ruling 
on Issue of Segregation 8 and 10. Moreover, an examination of PX l8l, 182 
and 185 shows that black children often remain isolated in predominately 
black schools in the few suburban school districts with any numbers of black 
pupils. In the last several weeks the local press has reported that the 
United States Office of Education cut off funds for one such district.

15Included in this set of arrangements are contract relationships of 
various types concerning personnel, property, and debts.

- 23 -



40.2 Each concept needs to he "fleshed-out" in the hard prospect of 
implementation of a final plan of desegregation and what is necessary and 
essential, and only that, for the successful operation of that plan of school 
desegregation now on an interim basis and hereafter on a permanent footing.

41.1 There are now some 86 school districts in the tri-county area of 
varying size, numbers of pupils, shapes, and wealth. (E.g., P.M.2; P.M. 13;

M.13)

41.2 In another context, the State Board of Education found each related 
to a "metropolitan core city" (Detroit) as "city," "town," or "urban fringe" 
districts. (M.1 3 )

41.3 The boundaries of these school districts in general bear no relation­
ship to other municipal, county, or special district governments, needs or 
services. /E.g. M.2; 2 Tr. Hearings re Intra-City Plans(Marz); 8 Tr. 898-9 
(Flynn); Porter Deposition, 3/23/72 p. 95-57.7

41.4 Some educational services are already provided to students on an
interdistrict, county, inter-county, or metropolitan basis (E.g., Porter
Deposition, 3/23/72, p. 93-95; See also Wagner Deposition, 3/22/72 pp. 10-16);
and many support services are provided by the intermediate school districts and
the State Department of Education, /E.g. Porter Deposition, 3/23/72, pp.
93-95; M.10, p. 22-23; 5 Tr. 656(Rankin j7 For various reasons many pupils
already cross school district lines to attend school or receive educational

15,1services. (E.g., Porter Deposition, 3/23/72, pp. 93-95)

42.1 In many respects— patterns of economic life, work, play, popula­
tion, planning, transportation, health services — the tri-county area con­
stitutes a rough series of interrelated communities constituting, in the 
view of the United States Census Bureau, a single standard metropolitan 
statistical area. /E.g., 2 Tr. Hearings re Intra City Plans(Marz); 2 Tr. 
Hearings re Intra City Plans(Kuthy); See also 6 Tr. 893(Flynn)/

42.2 Local units of government in the metropolitan area have in many 
instances joined together for the purpose of providing better solutions to 
problems confronting them. In such instances various units of government 
have either disregarded .local boundaries or have concluded that the problems 
were such as to call for a metropolitan solution. In some cases they have 
created overlay organizations. SEMC00, recreational authorities, a metro­
politan sewage system, SUITA, and the Detroit Water System are examples of 
these metropolitan approaches. /E.g., 2 Tr. Hearings re Intra City Plans 
(Marz); (Kuthyj/

' I5T* For years black children in the Carver School District were assigned 
to black schools in the inner city because no white suburban district (or 
white school in the city) would take the children. /8 Tr. Hearings re 
Issue of Segregation 885; 11 Tr. Hearings re Issue of Segregation 1259-60 
(1959 Boundary Bui do Book); D rudder Depositions 3/ll/71, p. 1 3 , 6/?8/71,
P. 48.7



Inched, the State defendants at this very moment are attempting in 
state court to strike down one irrationality, and discriminatory effect, of 
the existing school district arrangement, i.e., finance, apparently in the 
hope of moving to a virtual state-wide assumption of costs. (Cf. M.8;
Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 14 . )

43. In such circumstances there has been no showing that the existing
school district boundaries are rationally related to any legitimate puipose; 
and the Court finds that the particular welter of existing boundaries for 
86 school districts is not necessary to the promotion of any compelling 
state interest.

44. on the basis of the present accord, the Court is of the view that the
shifts in faculty, staff, resources and equipment and the exchanges of pupils 
necessary to accomplish maximum actual desegregation may be made, at least on 
an interim basis, by contractual agreements or otherwise among and between 
the existing school districts. /E.g. 3 Tr.(Rankin); 8 Tr. 1178-1179(Foster);
2 Tr. 217(Morshead_)7 The Court has serious reservations, however, whether

such procedures will inevitably threaten the continuing effectiveness of a plan 
of desegregation over the long-term. ^E.g., 8 Tr. ll8o(Foster); M .5/ On 
these issues more evidence and further hearings will be necessary before 
reaching a final decision.

45. The State defendants, and in particular the State Board of Education
which is charged with the primary responsibility for public education in 
Michigan, are the primary parties to be charged with responsibility to under­
take that vital inquiry and return with recommendations about those governance, 
fianancial, and administrative arrangements which are necessary and essential 
to t}- successful implementation of a plan of desegregation on an interim and 
continuing basis.

G. Involvement of Affected Persons and Communities and Protection 
Against Racial Discrimination in the Desegregation Process

Ccurt }las received uncontroverted evidence in the plans filed by 
every party and in testimony, and advice in several briefs amicus curia.e, 
and the Court finds, that the following additional factors are essential to 
implementation and operation of an effective plan of desegregation in the 
circumstances of this case:

(a) Biracial councils made up of the parents and staff, and where 
appropriate pupils, should be set up at each school; the per­
sons most affected must be encouraged and given every opportunity 
to participate in the implementation of desegregation.

- 25 -



(c)

(b) Curriculum content, and all curriculum materials and student 
codes, must be re-evaluated and reflect the diversity of
s ^ o L  r ^Ural backSrouDds the children now in the schools. Insofar as possible, those immediately affected

f C<1SiCr  at ^  individual school levellhouS participate in that process.

In-service training for faculty and staff for multi-ethnic
hr an relations Should be required; we must, 

all, rely primarily on our teachers and children to
nreSrt’inUt'bU^^, dfial With the diversity of students present in the desegregated school.

The entire grading, reporting, counselling, and testing 
program should be reviewed in light of desegregated schools 
comparea to traditional schools and to avoid imposing the 
effects of past discrimination on the children.' Tracing
^ s H o t ' b e ^ n 6" 7  1 teSt> * *  racial^!fects
are substantSi’i'12^ '  schools a pattern of classes whichS L t a n t i a H y  disproportionate in their racial composition 

relevant school or grade mix should be closely
comnellin^ 7* ^ intained only if necessary to promote a compelling educational objective.

/pee, e.g., K.5; M.8; M.10; P.C.2; and the testimony m  various hearings 
on remedy of Guthrie, Foster, Rankin, Flynn, and KorsheadJ

(a)

■ 111 “akln« m e  flndlnS above, we remind the parties that this
“r s ash is to enforce constitutional rights not to act as a school-

m s  er; the Court's task is to protect the constitutional rights here found

“  ; s r ie intrusio0 int° * •  — -  possihie
vithin whi h° r  1TC 13 t0 eStabllEh 4110 SiHiSia constitutional framework 
"  iCh Of public schools may operate now and hereafter
t h e " b T  aT  Uaifled’ noa-dlE=rl“ibatoiy fashion. Within that framework 
the body politic, educators, parents, and most particularly the children

“  opportunity to experiment and secure a high J a m ,
I c L  er atl0nal °PPOTt"nlty- experience has proven that
specific goals, deadlines and methods of reporting and review must be re­
quired in all desegregation cases to insure compliance.

K. Timing

« '  r 7  bU1'Jen rei5aiOS Slth Stote defendants to show why desegrega. 
tren lor all schools, grades, classrooms, and pupils in the desegregat on
area should not proceed now, l.e., in the context of this litigation for 

f^r T  T  tGCT‘ ^  deSlED “ d f^e-ntation of desegregation ^lans
« n t  of C l  ln ”  ClUSterS' ^ ClUdinE P“P U  - s l a n t s ,  necessary reassigi 

y &nd rcstructuring of facilities, planning and acquiring the ' 
needed transportation facilities--!, conceded by all parties to be a mjaor
un ,ra g. /See, e.g., 8 Tr. U7T(Fosterj7 Yet next fall will already

- 26 -



be a full year, not just four or six or even eight weeks, Cf. Carter v. West 
Feliciano Parish School BA., 396 U.S. 290(1970), after the initial ruling 
by this Court of the need for maximum feasible desegregation "now." In such 
circumstances the burden to prove the infeasibility of implementation of 
complete relief is high.

49.1 The desegregation team, therefore, must make every effort to plan 
to implement as much actual desegregation, for as many clusters, schools, 
grades, classrooms, and students as possible.

49.2 At a minimum, there is agreement among, and uncontroverted evidence 
from, the experts that desegregating several grades, and more particularly 
entire elementary schools, within many;if not all, clusters may be accomplished 
in the fall. /See, e.g., 8 Tr. 1177(Foster); 9 Tr. 1333-1338(Rankin); M.2?

49.3 la view of findings 36.1 to 36.3 supra, if hard choices must be
made for the fall, any interim plan should attempt to desegregate grades
k-6, k**8, or k-9 in as many entire clusters as possible; and, in the absence
of some other showing, there appears no reason why a complete plan may not

1 c
be implemented at mid-year or at the very latest by fall 1973.

50. A heavy burden rests with those who seek delay in any way, shape, 
kind, degree or extent to convince the Court that maximum actual desegrega­
tion cannot proceed effectively forthwith.

51. In view of the time constraints, the need to discharge this burden 
forthwith, the State defendants’ default in assisting this Court to determine 
the appropriate desegregation area, and the State defendants' asserted and 
evident lack of available planning capacity suited to the task, the Court 
finds that some additional entity must be charged with the task of preparing 
a pupil assignment plan to accomplish maximum actual desegregation and a 
transportation plan within the framework this day established. To that end
a team of skilled experts, broadly representative of all the parties and 
interests (including State defendants), appointed by the Court and assigned 
that task, is requir d to discharge effectively and pre :ptly these two tasks.

These findings are made on the basis of the present record and are 
subject to modification based on evidence which may be developed once the 
specific problems of actual desegregation are faced in the planning process.

- 27 -



52. State Defendants remain charged with the duty, however, of coining
forward with other necessary reports and plans concerning those governance, 
administrative, and financial arrangements necessary and essential to the 
implementation of an effective plan of desegregation on an interim and on-going 
basis.

I. The Plan

53. Based on the entire evidence amassed in this case, the Court
finds that an educationally sound, administratively feasible, constitutionally 
adequate, practicable and effective plan of desegregation may be developed, 
implemented and operated hereafter for the desegregation area as set forth 
in findings 1-52 above.



Conclusions of Law

1 . The Court has continuing jurisdiction of this action for all 
purposes, including the granting of effective relief. Bradley v. Milliken,
Ruling on Issue of Segregation, September 27, 1971; Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, March 28, 1972.

2. A dejure segregation violation having been found, the minimum 
remedy is maximum actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities 
of the situation. Bradley v. Milliken, Oral Order, October 4, 1971; Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation,
March 28, 1972; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483(1954), 349 U.S. 
294(1954); Green v. County School ?.a„, 391 U.S. 430(1968); Alexander v.
Holmes County Bd. of Ed., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Carter v. West Feliciano School 
Bd. 396 U.S. 290(1570); Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenberg Bd. of Ed., 402 
U.S. 1(1971); Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile, 402 U.S.
33(1971); Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 573, cert, 
den. 925. Ct. 233(1971).

3. The remedial obligation rests with school authorities; but where in any 
way they fail, or are unable because of the circumstances of the case, to 
fulfill any part of the obligation promptly and fully, the Court has broad 
equity power, and the duty, to insure that demonstrable progress be made now; 
that a schedule for planning be adopted forthwith; and that necessary planning 
be specifically ordered and immediately undertaken (including by a master or 
expert team appointed by the Court) in order that a constitutionally adequate plan 
may be fashioned and finally ordered implemented as soon as possible. Swann
ve Charlotte-Hecitlenberg Board of Education. 311 F.Supp. 265(W.D.H.C. 1970), 
aff'd 402 U.S. l(l97l); Carter v. West Feliciano School Bd., 396 U.S. 226, 
227-228(1969), 396 U.S. 290(1970); Acree v. County Board of Education,
Ho. 72-121l(5th Cir. March 3 1, 1972); Rule 53, F.R.Civ.P.; P.A.R.C. 
v. Pennsylvania. 334 F. Supp. 1247, 1266-7 (E.D.Pa. 1971) Only then 
will the Court in -this case be apprised fully of the practicalities 
of the situation, and what is reasonable and feasible, in order 
that a final order may issue. School authorities, of course, will he 
given an opportunity to (l) raise relevant objections, (2 ) make suggestions 
for modifications, (3 ) or present an alternative plan of desegregation; and 
their judgment and expertise will be considered end given appropriate weight 
hy the Court.

- 29 -



4. Funds must either be raised or reallocated, where necessary, to
remedy the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights and to insure 
that no such unconstitutional neglect recurs again. Shapiro v, Thomason.
397 U.S. 254, 265-266(1970); Boddie v. Connecticut. 91 S.Ct. 780, 788(19 7 1); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12(1956); Graham v. Richardson. 403 U.S. 365, 
374-375(1971); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 197(1971); Griffin v. Prince 
Edvard County, 377 U.S. 218(1964); Hoosier v. Evans, 314 F.Supp 316, 320-321 
(D.St. Croix, 1970); United States v. School District 151. 301 F.Supp. 201, 
232(N.D.111. 1969), aff’d as modified, 432 F.2d 1147(7th Cir. 1970), cert, 
den. 402 U.S. 943(1971); Plaquemines Parish School Board v, U.S., 415 F.2d
319(5th Cir. 1970); Bradley v. Richmond, _____F.Supp._____(April 1971);
Brewer v. Norfolk. No. 71-1900 (4th Cir., March 7, 1972)(Slip. op. at pp. 
7-8). It would be a cruel mockery of constitutional law If a different 
rule were to be applied to school desegregation cases. After all schooling 
is this nation's biggest industry and the most important task of government 
left to the states by the Constitution. In this case, were a different rule 
to be applied, it would constitute a gigantic hypocrisy: After all the
treasure which has been spent over the years creating and maintaining the 
segregated condition, the relatively small amounts of money required to undo 
that segregation can be found. The law, surely, requires at least that.
And the application of the commands of Swann does require that in almost 
every school desegregation case which has been brought to this Court's 
attention.

5. In the substantial reassignment of faculty and restructuring of
facilities required by the clustering, pairing, and grouping of schools to 
accomplish pupil desegregation, normal administrative practice should lead to 1 
schools with substantially like facilities, faculty and staff, and equipment. 
Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 18-20. Moreover, special care should be taken in 
the necessary reassignment of faculty to avoid creating or maintaining the 
racial identification of schools "simply by reference to the racial composi­
tion of teachers and staff." Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 18. In any event, 
the equitable discretion of the court is broad enough to insure that those 
aspects of faculty desegregation and equalisation of facilities which are 
essential to the effective operation of a desegregation plan are included in
the planning and final order, Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 15; U.S. v, Montgomery
County Board Q-' Ed., 395 U.S. 225(1969); Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 329-330 
(1944); and no contract, union agreement or otherwise, or Board policy or 
practice may impede these Fourteenth Amendment obligations. U.S. v. Greenwood 
Municipal Separate School District, 406 F.2d 1086, 1094(5th Cir.), cert. den. 
395 U.S. 907(1969); Berry y, Benton Harbor, _____F.Supp._____(W.D.Mich. 1971).



6. The Federal Courts have repeatedly rejected plans exempting the 
lower grades from integration, relying less on educational data than upon 
the hard legal fact that segregation at any age is a denial of the equal 
protection of the law. See e.g., United States v, Jefferson County Bd, 
of Educ., 372 F.2d 836(9th Cir., 1966), aff’d. on rehearing en banc, 380
F. 2d 385(5th Cir. 1967). To leave grades K through 3 exempt from a desegre­
gation plan is not to eliminate segregation "root and branch." Grean v.
County School Board of Hew Kent County, 391 U.S. 430(1968).

7. The consistent application of settled constitutional law invests 
this Court with the equitable power, and the duty, to order preparation, 
and thereafter implementation^of a practicable and sound plan which embodies 
the principles set forth in these findings and conclusions and the attached 
memorandum and order. See, generally, Ruling on Propriety of Considering a 
Metropolitan REmedy to Accomplish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the 
City of Detroit, March 24, 1972; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
Detroit-only Plans, March 24, 1972; oral ruling on offers of proof, 10 Tr. 
1485-1492, April 13, 1972; and the cases cited therein.

8. School construction practices throughout the metropolitan area have 
added to and reinforced the pattern of segregation referred to. Although 
there were vacant seats throughout the city to which students could have been 
assigned at lesser cost and with the achievement of integration, continued 
sums were expended for construction of new schools designed to service 
particular areas of racial concentration, and such schools opened as and have 
continued to be racially identifiable in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Swann v, Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ.. 40 U.S. 1, 18-20(1971); United 
States v. School Dist. 151. 404 F.2d 1125, 1132-33(7th Cir. 1968); Davis v. 
School Dist. of Pontiac, 309 F.Supp. 734, 7*1-42(E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd
443 F.2d. 573(6th Cir. 1971); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd, of Educ,, 311 
F.Supp. 501, 517-18(C.D. Cal. 1970); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School 
Dist., Civ. No. C-70-L33l(N.D. Cal. April 28, 1971); Brewer va School Board 
of the City of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37, 42(4th Cir. 1968); ef. Sloan v, Tenth,
School Dist. of Wilson County, ____F.2d____, (6th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Board of Educ, of P,,lk County. ____F.2d____(5th Cir. 1968); Kelley v,_
Altheimor, ____F.2d____(8th Cir. 1967); Bradley v. School Bd., ___ F.Supp
(E.D. Va. 1971); Clark v. Board of Edue. of Little Rock, 401 U.S. 971(1971).

- 31 -



9. The legal effects of racially discriminatory confinement to a 
school district are not different from the effects of such containment within 
a district. E.g., Lee v. Macon County Board of Education. 448 F.2d 746(5th 
Cir. 1971); Haney v. County Board Sevier, 410 F.2d 920(8th Cir. 1969), 429
F.2d 364(8th Cir. 1970).

10. Where the actions of state defendants and local school authorities 
throughout the metropolitan area have had the natural, foreseeable, and actual 
effect of building upon, taking advantage of, and encouraging racially segre­
gated demographic patterns deliberately fixed by governmental action at all 
levels with the effect of creating and maintaining racial segregation in the 
public schools, there is a present obligation to eliminate the continuing 
effects of such violation; and the District Court has the duty, upon default 
by school authorities, to intervene to secure compliance with the Constitution 
pursuant to the sound exercise of traditional equity powers consistent with 
the practicalities of the local situation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg,
402 U.S. 1, 15-16, 20-21, 31-32(1971). Cf. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, p. 5, Conclusion 4. In devising 
remedies where state-imposed segregation has been established, it is the 
responsibility of school authorities and district courts to see to it that 
future school construction and abandonment is not used and does not serve to 
perpetuate or re-establish the violation. Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 21.

11. Moreover, where the State, and nam defendants, are substantially 
implicated in the segregation violation found and are ultimately responsible 
for public schooling throughout the state, the consistent application of 
constitutional principles requires that this Court take all steps necessary 
and essential to require them to desegregate the Detroit public schools 
effectively and maintain, now end hereafter, a racially unified, non-discrimin­
atory system in the absen-e of a showing that the judicial intervention here 
contemplated will frustrate the promotion of a legitimate and compelling state 
policy or interest. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575(1964); Hunter v. City 
of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. l6l, 178-179(1907); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 
204,212-213(1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 633 
(l9o9); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244-45(1970); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488(1906); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439,
442;Swann v. Chariot.,e-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. l(l97l); Davis v. Bd. of School 
Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33(1971); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 292, 30U (1955); Monroe v.
Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450, 4-59(1968).

- 32 -



Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM E. CALDWELL 
Ratner, Sugarmon & Lucas 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103

NATHAI'JIEL R. JONES 
General Counsel, N.A.A.C.P.
1790 Broadway
New York, New York 10019

E. WHETHER McCROOM 
3245 Woodbum Avenue 
Cincinnati, Ohio 45207

JACK GREENBERG 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

J. HAROLD FLANNERY
PAUL R. DIMOND
ROBERT PRESSMAN
Center for Law & Education
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify 

served upon all counsel 

pre-pald.

that a copy of the foregoing has been 

of record by United States mail, postage

May 5, 1972