Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham Petition for Writ of Certiorari

    I n  t h e

(£mtt ni %  Inttpft §>UUb
October T erm, 1966 

No.................

J oyce C. T horpe, 

— v.—
Petitioner,

H ousing A uthority of the 
City of Durham.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, III 
Charles Stephen R alston 
Michael Meltsner 
Charles H. J ones, J r. 
Sheila R ush J ones 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York

M. C. B urt
213% West Main Street 
Durham, North Carolina

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

E dward Y. Sparer 
Martin Garbus 
H oward T horkelson



I N D E X

Opinions B elow .................................................................  1

Jurisdiction .......................................................................  1

Question Presented.........................................    2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .....  2

Statement ........................................................................... 3

How the Federal Questions Were Raised and Decided 
Below..............................................................................  6

R easons poe Granting the W rit

The Question of the Right of Tenants of Public 
Housing to a Fair Hearing on the Reasons for 
Eviction Is of National Importance ........................ 7

Conflict Between the Decisions of This Court and 
a  Judgment Below as to the Right to a Hearing 

Necessitates Resolution of the Issue by This Court 14

Conclusion.................................................................................  20

A ppendix I ......................................................................... la
■M.

A ppendix II ......................................................................... 5 a

A ppendix III .....................................................................  11a

PAGE



11

Table of Cases

Brand v. Chicago Housing Authority, 120 F. 2d 786
(7th Cir. 1941) ..........................................................    19

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 ..............  7
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S.

715 ..................................................................................  16

Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 111. 2d 319,
122 N. E . 2d 522 (1954) ............................................  19

Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 .... 17

Detroit Housing Commission v. Lewis, 226 F. 2d 180
(6th Cir. 1955) .................................................    16

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 
150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 368 U. S. 930 .......15,17

Frost Trucking Co. v. R. R. Com., 271 IT. S. 583 ........... 17

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 IT. S. 335 .............................  7
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. :S. 474 .................................  14
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 .........................................  7

Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Au­
thority (E. D. Va., C. A. No. 4746, Sept. 7, 1966) .... 19 

Housing Authority of Los Angeles v. Cordova, 130 
Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P. 2d 215 (App. Dept., Superior
Ct., 1955)   .................................................................  19

Housing Authority of City of Pittsburgh v. Turner,
201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A. 2d 869 (Superior Ct. Pa. 
1963) ..............................................................................  19

PAGE

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and 
N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 8 8 ................................................ 15



Ill

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 
U. S. 123.......................................................................14,18

Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp.
174 (M. D. Tenn. 1961) ................................................  15

Kutcher v. Housing Authority of Newark, 20 N. J. 181,
119 A. 2d 1 (1955) ........................................................ 19

Kwong Hai Chew v. Golding, 344 U. S. 590 ..................  16

Lawson v. Housing Authority of City of Milwaukee,
270 Wise. 269, 70 N. W. 2d 605 (1955), cert, denied,
350 H. S. 882 (1955) .................................................... 19

Rudder v. United States, 226 F. 2d 51 (D. C. Cir. 
1955) .............................................................................16,19

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 TJ. S. 232 .... 15
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 ..................................... 17
Sherbert v. Yerner, 374 U. S. 398 ..................................  17
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551 ....... 14
Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, 336 F. 2d 630 (6th

Cir. 1964) ....................................................................... 16
Southern Railroad Co. v. Virginia ex rel. Shirley, 290 

U. S. 190 ....................................................................... 15

Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 ..................................  17

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S.
537 ..................................................................................  16

PAGE

Walton v. City of Phoenix, 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P. 2d 309 
(1949) ............................................................................ 19



Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. !S. 183 ................... ..........  17
Williams v. City of Ypsilanti (D. Mich., C. A. No.

28936)  .......................................................................... 19
Woods v. Wright, 334 F. 2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964) .......  15

F ederal Statutes and R egulations

28 U. S. C. §1257(3) .................   2

42 U. S. C. §1401 ............. ...........................................2,10,12

42 U. S. C. §1402 ............................................................10,13

42 IT. S. C. -§1409 ................................................................ 12

42 U. S. C. §1410 ................................. ..........................  12

42 U. S. C. §1411 ............................................................ 12,18

42 U. S. C. §1411e ............................................................  18

42 IT. S. C. §1415......................... .....................................  10

The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 552, 18 
U. S. C. §3006A ........................................................ . 7

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 508 .... 7

United States Housing Act of 1937 ............................. 10,12

Public Housing Administration, Consolidated Annual 
Contributions Contract, Part I, Sec. 206, Admission 
Policies, PHA 3010, p. 8 ............................................  12

State Statutes and R egulations 

Chap. 157, Art. 1, Gen. Stat. of North Carolina ....2, 3,10 

§157-2, Gen. Stat. of North Carolina .........................  10

iv

PAGE



V

§157-4, Gen. iStat. of North Carolina.............................  10

§157-9, Gen. Stat. of North Carolina ......................3,10,12
New York Housing Authority Regulations, 9N1287, 

§la(7) ............................................................................  11

PAGE

Other A uthorities

Bibliography of Selected Readings in Law and Poverty, 
in Conference Proceedings, National Conference on 
Law and Poverty (1965) ............................................  8

Conference Proceedings, The Extension of Legal Ser­
vices to the Poor (1964) ............................................  8

Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Over­
view, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 642 (1966) .............................  10

Handler, Controlling Official Behavior m Welfare Ad­
ministration, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 479 (1966) .................. 8

Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for 
General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 
Calif. L. Rev. 567 (1966) ............................................  9

O’Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits 
with Strings Attached, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 443 (1966) .. 9

Poverty, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights: A Sympo­
sium, 41 New York U. L. Rev. 328 (1966) ..............  8

Property Rights and the Low-Income Tenant: Law 
as an Instrument of Social Reconstruction. Institute 
for Policy Studies (mimeo) July, 1966 ............... ......  11

Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The 
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L. J. 1245 (1965) .... 8



VI

Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964) .....8,16

Schorr, How the Poor Are Housed, p. 215 “Poverty in 
America,” University of Michigan Press ..................  13

Seavey, Dismissal of Students: “Due Process,” 70 
Harv. L. Rev. 1406 (1957) ........................................  16

Symposium: Law of the Poor, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 319 
(1966) ............................. ..............................................  8

PAGE



I n  t h e

Bupxmx (£mxt iif %  Itttfrft States
October Term, 1966 

No.................

J oyce C. T horpe, 

—v.—
Petitioner,

H ousing A uthority of the 
City of Durham.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina en­
tered in the above case on May 25, 1966.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is 
reported at 148 S. E. 2d 290 (1966) and is set forth in Ap­
pendix A, infra, pp. la-4a. The findings of fact and conclu­
sions of law of the Superior Court of Durham County are 
unreported and are set forth in Appendix B, infra, pp. 
5a-10a.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
was entered on May 25, 1966. The time for filing this peti­
tion for writ of certiorari was extended by Mr. Justice



2

Brennan to and including October 21, 1966. The jurisdic­
tion of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1257 
(3), petitioner having asserted below and asserting here 
deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and stat­
utes of the United States.

Question Presented

Petitioner, a Negro, and her children have been tenants 
in a low-income housing project constructed with Federal 
funds and administered by an agency of the State of North 
Carolina pursuant to Federal regulations. The day after 
petitioner was elected as an official in a tenant’s organiza­
tion, the Housing Authority informed her that it was termi­
nating her lease.

Was petitioner denied rights guaranteed by the due proc­
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the First and 
Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States 
by the public housing authority’s refusal to accord her a 
hearing on the reasons for the eviction?

Constitutional and Statutory 
Provisions Involved

This petition involves the First, Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

This petition also involves sections of the United States 
Housing Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§1401 et seq. and 
portions of the North Carolina Housing Authorities Act, 
Chapter 157, General Statutes of North Carolina. These 
provisions are set forth in Appendix C, infra, pp. lla-30a.



3

Statement

Since November 11,1964, petitioner and her children have 
been tenants in MeDougald Terrace, a public low-rent hous­
ing project owned and operated by the Housing Authority 
of the City of Durham, North Carolina, under authority of 
state law and pursuant to a contract with the Federal Gov­
ernment (R. 12).1

Under North Carolina law the Housing Authority is a 
“ public body and a body corporate and politic, exercising 
public powers” (§157-9, Gen. Stat. of North Carolina) and 
has “ all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out 
and effectuate the purposes and provisions” (Ibid.) of the 
North Carolina Housing Authorities Law (Chapter 157, 
Article 1, Gen. Stat. of North Carolina). The Authority 
also has power “to manage as agent of any city or munici­
pality located in whole or in part within its boundaries any 
housing project constructed or owned by such city,” and 
“ to act as agent for the federal government in connection 
with the acquisition, construction, operation and/or man­
agement of a housing project” (§157-9, Gen. Stat. of North 
Carolina) (R. 12).

Petitioner has occupied the project under a lease agree­
ment (E. 18-25), whose initial term was f rom November 11 
to November 30, 1964, and which provided that it would 
thereafter be automatically renewed for successive terms 
of one month each (R. 18). On August 10, 1965, petitioner 
was elected president of the Parents’ Club, a group com­
posed of tenants of the project (E. 13). The following day,

_ 1 Following the judgment of the trial court below they have con­
tinued to remain in the premises under stays of the eviction order 
pending appeal.



4

August 11,1965, petitioner was notified that her lease would 
be cancelled effective August 31, 1965, at which time she 
would have to vacate the premises (R. 25), The Authority 
gave no reason for the eviction but merely cited the pro­
vision of the lease (R. 19) that permitted the landlord to 
cancel upon fifteen days notice (R. 25). Although petitioner 
requested a hearing to go into the reasons for her eviction, 
the request was denied (R. 5-6).

There was no provision in the lease which specifically 
either granted or denied the Authority the right to evict 
without cause and hearing. The lease did provide, however, 
that either party could terminate by giving written notice 
of such termination fifteen days prior to the last day of 
the term (R. 19). This provision was construed by the 
Authority to permit eviction without cause and without a 
hearing. The lease, prepared by the Housing Authority, 
further provided that the tenant could be evicted under 
certain circumstances, including: non-payment of rent (R. 
20); exceeding limits on family size or income (R. 22-23); 
misrepresentations of material facts in the tenant’s ap­
plication (R. 23); and membership in “an organization 
designated by the Attorney General of the United States as 
subversive” (R. 24).

On September 18, 1965, the Housing Authority instituted 
an action of ejectment against petitioner and her three 
children. The Justice of the Peace Court in Durham Town­
ship, on September 20, 1965, ordered defendant and her 
children evicted from the project upon a showing that the 
notice of eviction was duly served (R. 8-11). Petitioner ap­
pealed to the Superior Court of Durham County where 
additional evidence was taken in the form of stipulated 
testimony (R. 11-14).



5

Petitioner alleged that the ground for her removal was 
her involvement with the tenants’ organizing group (R. 15). 
The Authority denied this was the reason, but admitted 
refusing her a hearing prior to the institution of litigation. 
The Authority offered no proof concerning the reasons for 
the removal of petitioner and her children and did not ex­
plain why the notice to evict was sent out the day after 
petitioner was elected president of the tenants’ group (R. 
13-14). On the basis of the stipulations the Superior Court 
found that the reason for the eviction was not petitioner’s 
activities with the organizing group. The Court went on 
to find that the Housing Authority had not given her 
a hearing or a reason for the eviction (R. 5-6),2 and con­
cluded as a matter of law that the Authority had no duty 
to give petitioner a hearing or to communicate its reason 
for terminating the lease; it affirmed the eviction.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court of North Caro­
lina, and on May 25, 1966, that Court affirmed the order 
to evict. The Supreme Court held that the Authority was 
under no obligation to conduct a hearing or advise the ten­
ant of its reasons for terminating the lease, since its obliga­
tions to its tenants were the same as the obligations of a 
private landlord to its tenants. The Court cited as author­
ity a 1913 North Carolina decision construing a lease in a 
suit brought by a private landlord against his tenant for 
loss of rents. A stay of the eviction order was granted by 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina pending action by 
this Court on a petition for writ of certiorari.

2 The relevant stipulations were that the Housing Authority gave 
neither a hearing nor reason for the eviction (R. 12) ; that peti­
tioner alleged that the reason for the eviction was her participation 
in the organization of the Parents’ Club (R. 13); that the Director 
of the Housing Authority would testify that whatever the reason, 
if any, for the eviction it was not her activities in the tenants’ 
group; and that the court could make findings of fact based on 
these stipulations and petitioner’s affidavit (R. 13-14).



6

How the Federal Questions Were 
Raised and Decided Below

The question of whether the eviction without cause, ex­
planation, or hearing, of petitioner and her children, ten­
ants in a low-income housing project supported by federal 
funds and administered by the Authority pursuant to fed­
eral regulations, violated rights guaranteed to petitioner 
and her children by the Federal Constitution and statutes, 
was raised at the trials in the Justice of the Peace and 
Superior Courts by affidavit and motion to quash the evic­
tion proceeding (R. 14-18).:za

Following the entry of judgment by the Superior Court, 
petitioner made exceptions to the court’s judgment (R. 28- 
30), and gave notice of appeal (R. 31). Among the assign­
ments of error argued to the North Carolina Supreme 
Court was the following:

4. For that the Court erred in finding as a matter 
of law that the Housing Authority of the City of Dur­
ham did not owe duty to communicate or give the de­
fendant any reason for its termination of her lease, nor 
was it required or had any duty to hold a hearing on 
said subject. As shown by E xception # 4 . (R. 32.)

In its opinion, the Supreme Court held that, “ It is imma­
terial what may have been the reason for the lessor’s un­
willingness to continue the relationship of landlord and 
tenant after the expiration of the term as provided in the 
lease.” 148 S. E. 2d 290, at 292 (App., p. 4a). In finding

2a The Motion to Quash stated, in part:
That the tenant in a Public Housing Project has a right to 

her apartment and a deprivation of that right without a hear­
ing violates due process of law as guaranteed by the 14th 
Amendment (R. 17).



7

that the Authority was entitled to bring summary ejection 
proceedings against petitioner without granting a hearing 
or stating its reasons for eviction, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina necessarily rejected petitioner’s federal 
claims.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Tlie Question of the Right of Tenants of Public Hous­
ing to a Fair Hearing on the Reasons for Eviction Is of 
National Importance.

Introductory

In recent years there has been a growing awareness of 
and concern for the legal rights of the poor and the avail­
ability of legal services necessary to preserve them. This 
interest has been stimulated by decisions . of this Court,3 
and has been furthered by Federal legislation,4 national 
conferences,5 and, of course, the underlying economic and 
social factors. The initial focus of this interest was on the 
rights of criminally accused indigents. More recently, it

3 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. S. 12; and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335.

i E.g., The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 508, and 
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 552, 18 U. S. C. §3006A.

5 E.g., National Conference on Law and Poverty, Washington, 
D. C., June 23-25, 1965, under the Co-Sponsorship of the Attorney 
General and the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity; 
The Extension of Legal Services to the Poor, Washington, D. C., 
November 12, 13, 14, 1964, under the Sponsorship of the IJ. S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare; National Confer­
ence on Bail and Criminal Justice, Washington, D. C., May 27-29, 
1964 under the Co-Sponsorship of the U. S. Department of Justice 
and the Yera Foundation.



8

has shifted to encompass a variety of areas where legal 
institutions—whether by omission or commission—discrimi­
nate against the poor: landlord and tenant relationships, 
consumer fraud, the relation of the indigent to state ad­
ministration of public benefits, especially welfare and pub­
lic housing, family problems, and the absence of legal ser­
vices for poor clients. See, e.g., Symposium: Law of the 
Poor, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 319-1014 (1966); Bibliography of 
Selected Readings in Law and Poverty, in Conference Pro­
ceedings, National Conference on Law and Poverty (1965)4 
Conference Proceedings, The Extension of Legal Services 
to the Poor (1964); Reich, Individual Plights and Social 
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L. J. 1245 
(1965); Poverty, Civil Liberties, and Civil Bights: A Sym­
posium, 41 New York U. L. Rev. 328 (1966). One result of 
this concern for the legal rights of the poor has been the 
establishment of programs by both public and private or­
ganizations to give substance and reality to those rights.6

Among the wide range of legal questions to which atten­
tion is being given, one of the most important is that of 
the right of indigent persons to public benefits. See Reich, 
The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964); Reich, Indi­
vidual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal- 
Issues, 74 Yale L. J. 1245 (1965); Handler, Controlling Offi­
cial Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 Calif. L. Rev.

6 Thus, under the Economic Opportunity Act the Federal Gov­
ernment has begun to finance neighborhood legal offices devoted 
exclusively to providing free legal advice to the poor. Similar 
services are being provided by private organizations, such as 
Mobilization for Youth in New York City, and the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and the Center for Social 
Welfare Policy and Law of Columbia University, on a nation-wide 
scale. At the same time, organizations of the poor themselves have 
arisen in various cities, e.g., the West Side Organization in Chicago, 
and Rescuers from Poverty in Baltimore, Maryland.



9

479 (1966); Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence 
Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 
54 Calif. L. Eev. 567 (1966). One of the key issues in the 
right to public benefits is the one presented by the present 
case, i.e., whether the recipients of such benefits can be 
denied or deprived of them arbitrarily, or whether they are 
entitled to procedural protections. See, e.g., O’Neill, Un­
constitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings 
Attached, 54 Calif. L. Eev. 443, 474-478 (1966).

Thus, although this petition raises only a narrow question 
of what has been called social welfare or poverty law, that 
question is of substantial public importance since its reso­
lution has ramifications affecting the rights of recipients 
to all forms of welfare benefits. Moreover, even viewing 
the case solely as affecting the rights of persons in public 
housing, the issue is of great importance. According to 
information supplied by the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, there are approximately 
1,400 local housing authorities with low-rent projects 
throughout the United States. These authorities have been 
advised by the United States Public Housing Authority to 
draw up their tenant leases on a month-to-month basis, and 
it is the opinion of the Department that the local authori­
ties “perhaps without exception, have followed this recom­
mendation. This practice does permit evictions to be accom­
plished after the giving of a notice to vacate which does not 
state the reason therefor.” 7 Thus, the lease involved in

7 This information was supplied in a letter from Mr. Don Hum­
mel, Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance, 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, in response to an 
inquiry from one of the attorneys for petitioner. The partial text 
of the letter follows:

Concerning item 2, local authorities consistently have been
advised to draw their tenant leases on a month-to-month basis.



10

this case is substantially identical to that used by the hun­
dreds of state and municipal housing authorities adminis­
tering federally assisted low-income projects. See also, 
Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 
54 Calif. L. Rev. 642, 659-661 (1966).

Thousands of persons reside in these low-income proj­
ects, which generally provide the only decent housing avail­
able to them because of their poverty.8 To the poor, there­
fore, the terms of occupancy in these projects transcend 
economic discrimination and involve basic notions of dignity 
and responsibility in a free society:

The urban slum is one of the greatest social, political, 
economic, and moral problems facing the United States.

It is our opinion that authorities, perhaps without exception, 
have followed this recommendation. This practice does permit 
evictions to be accomplished after the giving of a notice to 
vacate which does not state the reason therefor. Local authori­
ties recently, however, have been urged that, in a private con­
ference, they should inform any tenants required to vacate of 
the reasons for such action.
Formerly there was a federal requirement (called the “ Gwinn 
Amendment” ) intended to exclude from tenancy in a low-rent 
project any person who- was a member of an organization 
designated as subversive by the Attorney General. This legis­
lation expired approximately ten years ago. Any local author­
ities which might now have a non-communist or similar oath 
clause in their leases do so because of their own local policy 
or possibly requirements of state law or simply because they 
have neglected to delete from their lease forms obsolete pro­
visions.

8 The United States Housing Act of 1937 and the North Carolina 
Housing Authorities Act (see text and notes, infra), under which 
the Housing Authority herein has been established and financed, 
both make it clear that the expenditure of funds for publicly owned 
housing is required because of the inability of the private sector to 
provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing for low-income families. 
42 U. S. C. §§1401, 1402; 1415(7) (App. pp. 11a, 12a, 18a-19a); 
§§157-2, 157-4, 157-9, Gen. Stat. of North Carolina (App. pp. 20a, 
21a-22a, 24a).



11

One major source of the problem is the lack of housing 
units for low-income families and the inadequacy of 
resources now devoted to building more. Another ag­
gravating factor is the increasing separation of the 
urban slumdweller from place of work or shopping 
facilities which are moving out from the center of the 
city. But there are important problems of the slum 
that have little to do with the quality or location of 
construction. They concern rather the legal and social 
organization of slum living. The poor, whether in pub­
lic or private housing do not share the same legal re­
lations as the rest of the society. While the sanctity 
and importance of the home is basic to the American 
ideology and tradition, and important safeguards sur­
rounding the home are written into the Constitution, 
the poor frequently have no rights of decision over 
where and under what conditions they live. On such 
basic questions as length of tenancy, repairs, privacy, 
admission or acceptance, it appears that there is one 
law for the middle class and another for the poor. Eco­
nomic discrimination is reflected not only in geographi­
cal divisions, but in legal ones. Property Rights and 
the Low-Income Tenant: Law as an Instrument of 
Social Reconstruction. Institute for Policy Studies 
(mimeo) July, 1966.

Since no other decent housing is available, an unbridled 
power by housing authorities to evict without reason or 
hearing is punishment of the severest kind, particularly 
since some housing authorities have promulgated regula­
tions preventing an individual from being considered as a 
tenant after he has once been evicted from a project. (See, 
e.g., New York Housing Authority Regulations, 9N1287, 
§la(7).)



12

Indeed, the existence and exercise of such a power is in 
conflict with the declared policy of the United States Hous­
ing Act of 1937 (42 U. S. C. §§1401 et seq.) under which 
the Housing Authority of Durham, and others throughout 
the country, was financed (R. 12).9 The purpose of fed­
erally supported low-income housing is set forth in 42 
U. S. C. §1401 (App. p. 11a):

It is declared to be the policy of the United States 
to promote the general welfare of the Nation by em­
ploying its funds and credit, as provided in this chap­
ter, to assist the several States and their political 
subdivisions to alleviate present and recurring unem­
ployment and to remedy the unsafe and insanitary 
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent,

9 Section 157-9, Gen. Stat. of North Carolina, establishes the 
Housing Authority as a “public body and a body corporate and 
politic, exercising public powers” necessary to carry out the pur­
poses of the North Carolina Housing Authorities Law (Appendix, 
pp. 24a, 25a). The Authority has power to manage any housing 
project owned by the city and, “ to act as agent for the federal 
government in connection with the acquisition, construction, opera­
tion and/or management of a housing project or any part thereof.” 
(§157-9, Gen. Stat. of North Carolina, App., p. 25a.) Having 
received Federal financial support and operating pursuant to its 
contract with the Federal Government (R. 12), the Authority must 
adopt and promulgate regulations for internal management (such 
as lease provisions) that are consistent with and reasonably related 
to the purposes of low-income housing (42 U. S. C. §§1401, 1410 
(g) (2) (App., pp. 11a, 17a) ; Public Housing Administration, Con­
solidated Annual Contributions Contract, Part I, Sec. 206, Admis­
sion Policies, PHA 3010, p. 8 (1964)). The Federal Act further 
provides that the Federal Public Housing Administration dis­
tributing the funds is authorized to lend all municipal Housing Au­
thorities an amount not in excess of 90 percent of the final develop­
ment cost of the project and also to make annual contributions over 
a period of years. Congress then appropriates funds to implement 
the contracts made by the federal agency and the tenants of the 
project are selected by the municipal authority subject to the loan 
or subsidy contract with the government. (42 U. S. C. §§1409, 1410 
and 1411.)



13

safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low in­
come, in urban and rural nonfarm areas, that are in­
jurious to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens 
of the Nation. * * * It is the policy of the United 
States to vest in the local public housing agencies the 
maximum amount of responsibility in the administra­
tion of the low-rent housing program, including re­
sponsibility for the establishment of rents and eligi­
bility requirements (subject to the approval of the 
Authority), with due consideration to accomplishing 
the objectives of this chapter while effecting economies.

Certainly, the absolute power conferred on the respon­
dent Authority by the court below to evict without a hear­
ing, and hence for no reason or at the unbridled whim of 
housing officials, runs directly contrary to the purposes of 
insuring low-income citizens a decent place to live and of 
promoting stability and security in the poor families the 
Act is intended to benefit. Cf., 42 U. S. C. §1402, App., 
p. 12a. (See, Schorr, How the Poor Are Housed, p. 215, 
“ Poverty in America,” University of Michigan Press.)

For these reasons, the question presented by this case 
is no less than whether thousands of persons are able to 
live at a minimum level of comfort and decency without 
being denied this right by arbitrary and unexplained ac­
tions of public agencies. In addition, the broader question 
is involved of the right of persons receiving any public 
welfare benefits to at least a bare m inim-mu of procedural 
protection before the very necessities for life are taken 
from them.



14

Conflict Between the Decisions of This Court and the 
Judgment Below as to the Right to a Hearing Necessi­
tates Resolution of the Issue by This Court.

The decisions of this Court make it clear that the fed­
eral and state governments may not act arbitrarily to deny 
persons benefits. One obligation imposed upon govern­
ment is that before it takes adverse action against persons 
it must conform to certain requirements of due process, 
the most basic of which is a hearing. In his concurring 
opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Mc­
Grath, 341 U. S. 123, at 171, Mr. Justice Frankfurter de­
scribed why the due process clause requires a hearing be­
fore valuable rights are denied:

Man being what he is cannot safely be trusted with 
complete immunity from outward responsibility in de­
priving others of their rights . . . That a conclusion 
satisfies one’s private conscience does not attest its 
reliability . . . Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking 
and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance 
of rightness.

In cases involving federal employment, even when na­
tional security has been involved, this Court has held that 
administrative action which denies governmental benefits 
would be approved only when an opportunity to influence 
the fact-finder and to explain adverse charges is accorded. 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474. And, in Slochower v. 
Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551, the Court reversed a 
state administrative determination on Fourteenth Amend­
ment grounds. Although the case is often considered with 
respect to the assertion of the privilege against self­
incrimination, the Court held that summary dismissal with­



15

out any inquiry when the privilege was claimed was a 
denial of due process:

This is not to say that Slochower has a constitu­
tional right to be an associate professor of German 
at Brooklyn College. The State has broad powers in 
the selection and discharge of its employees, and it 
may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower’s 
continued employment to be inconsistent with a real 
interest of the State. But there has been no such 
inquiry here. We hold that the summary dismissal of 
appellant violates due process of law. (350 U. S. at 
559.)10

See also, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 
232. In closely analogous cases, involving the expulsion 
of students from state colleges or high schools, lower fed­
eral courts have applied the above principles and required 
notice and a hearing. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of 
Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 368 
IT. S. 930; Woods v. Wright, 334 F. 2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964) ; 
Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174

10 Cf., Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and N. B. 
Co., 227 U. S. 88, 91. This Court, replying to the claim that a 
Commission’s order made without substantial supporting evidence 
was conclusive, declared:

. . .  A finding without evidence is arbitrary and baseless. 
And if the government’s contention is correct, it would mean 
that the Commission had a power possessed by no other officer, 
administrative body, or tribunal under our government. It 
would mean that, where rights depended upon facts, the 
Commission could disregard all rules of evidence and capri­
ciously make findings by administrative fiat. Such authority, 
however beneficently exercised in one ease, could be injuri­
ously exerted in another, is inconsistent with rational justice, 
and eomes under the Constitution’s condemnation of all arbi­
trary exercise of power.

See also Southern Railroad Co. v. Virginia ex rel. Shirley, 290 
U. S. 190.



16

(M. D. Tenn. 1961). See also eases collected in Reich, 
The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733, 783-84 (1964), and 
Seavey, Dismissal of Students: “Due Process,” 70 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1406 (1957).11

The court below apparently based its holding on the con­
cept that the Housing Authority of the City of Durham 
has the same status as any private landlord. This posi­
tion, however, is untenable, since it is clear that govern­
ment is not immunized from constitutional requirements 
because it occupies the relationship of landlord. See, Bur­
ton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715; 
Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, 336 F. 2d 630 (6th Cir. 
1964). As the Court of Appeals for the District of Co­
lumbia has said:

The government as landlord is still the government. 
It must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike private land­
lords, it is subject to the requirements of due process 
of law. Arbitrary action is not due process. Rudder 
v. United States, 226 F. 2d 51, 53 (D. C. Cir. 1955).

Thus, for example, a public housing authority could not 
discriminate on the basis of race. Detroit Housing Com­
mission v. Lewis, 226 F. 2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955). Nor, it 
seems, should it be differentiated from government acting 
in other capacities. It apparently could not bar occupancy

11 Similarly, although the due process clause does not require 
that an alien never admitted to this country be granted a hearing 
before being excluded, United States ex ret. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 
338 U. S. 537, 542, once an alien has been admitted to lawful resi­
dence in the United States and remains physically present here, it 
has been held that “although Congress may prescribe conditions 
for his expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may expel 
him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard.”  Kwong 
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 597-98.



17

for failure to take an oath, that was unconstitutionally 
vague, Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 
278, 288, or that barred membership in certain organiza­
tions, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 192. Govern­
ment has been disabled from imposing a religious oath, 
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488; it has been forbidden 
to condition the affording of benefits on performing acts 
that violate one’s religious principles, Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U. S. 398; it has been prohibited from requiring a citi­
zen to reveal all organizational affiliations, Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479.12 Yet, having been denied a hearing, 
petitioner cannot tell whether she was evicted for reasons 
that violate the holding of those cases.

The denial of the right to a hearing is even more 
abhorrent when, as in this case, it raises questions of sup­
pression of the right to speak and associate. Cf. Shelton 
v. Tucker, supra. On the face of it, petitioner’s expulsion 
following her election as president of a tenants’ associa­
tion warranted exploration at a hearing on whether she 
was expelled for that reason. Moreover, a provision in

12 Nor can the State successfully maintain the position that al­
though the petitioner may have had a right to a hearing, she waived 
that right by signing a lease with the provision involved herein 
(R. 19). To require that petitioner insist that her lease specifically 
contain a provision prohibiting her eviction without hearing or 
cause if she wishes to retain her constitutional rights is to nullify 
those rights themselves, especially where the State, as landlord, 
has all of the bargaining power and the low-income individual, as 
tenant, has none. A  State may not exact the surrender of federal 
constitutional rights as a price for the opportunity of living in a 
public housing project or as an exchange for any benefit it has to 
offer. See Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 
150, 156 (5th Cir. 1961), in which the Fifth Circuit held that a 
state college could not require that students renounce the right to 
due process upon expulsion as a condition to admittance; see also, 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479; Frost Trucking Co. v. B. B. Com., 
271 U. S. 583.



18

the lease barring tenants who belong to “ subversive or­
ganizations” is patently unconstitutional.13 See, Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 
123. There is no way of knowing, without a hearing, 
whether false evidence was considered against this peti­
tioner to the effect that she belonged to such an organiza­
tion and that she was evicted for such a reason. She has 
no knowledge of why she was evicted and has had no op­
portunity to defend against such a false charge, if indeed 
it was made. This contention is not entirely speculative 
for it is not uncommon to charge subversive conduct to 
persons engaged in protest movements of a totally legal 
and constitutional nature.

Against the foregoing reasons for requiring an adequate 
hearing and notice of reasons before eviction, the State 
has proposed no countervailing interest. Certainly, a pub­
lic housing authority may make regulations reasonably re­
lated to the proper management of the projects under its 
control. However, the rationality of such regulations must 
be determined in relation to the purposes of the govern­
mental activity involved.

An additional reason for review of the judgment of the 
court below exists in that a number of state and federal 
appellate courts have rendered conflicting decisions on the 
question raised herein. Thus, in addition to the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina in the present case, the Seventh 
Circuit and courts in Arizona and Pennsylvania have held

13 It should be noted that the ostensible federal statutory author­
ity for this lease provision, the so-called “ Gwinn Amendment” 
(67 Stat. 307, 42 U. S. C. §1411c), expired more than ten years 
ago. The continued inclusion of a prohibition against members of 
such organizations raises serious questions as to the validity of the 
entire lease.



19

that a governmental agency operating a housing project 
may act like a private landlord and evict summarily under 
the terms of a lease.14 On the other hand, the District of 
Columbia Circuit, together with courts in New Jersey, 
California, Wisconsin, and Illinois, have held that even 
when acting as a landlord the government still must fol­
low due process and hence cannot act arbitrarily.15 Be­
cause of the seriousness and importance of the question 
presented, it is imperative that this Court review the deci­
sion below and resolve these conflicting decisions.

14 Brand v. Chicago Housing Authority, 120 F. 2d 786 (7th Cir. 
1941) ; Walton v. City of Phoenix, 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P. 2d 309 
(1949) ; Housing Authority of City of Pittsburgh v. Turner, 201 
Pa. Super. 62, 191 A. 2d 869 (Superior Ct. Pa. 1963).

15 Rudder v. United States, 226 F. 2d 51 (D. C. Cir. 1955); 
Kutcher v. Housing Authority of Newark, 20 N. J. 181, 119 A. 2d 
1 (1955) ; Housing Authority of Los Angeles v. Cordova, 130 Cal. 
App. 2d 883, 279 P. 2d 215 (App. Dept., Superior Ct. 1955) ; 
Lawson v. Housing Authority of City of Milwaukee, 270 Wise. 
269, 70 N. W. 2d 605 (1955), cert, denied, 350 U. S. 882 (1955) ; 
Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 111. 2d 319, 122 N. E. 
2d 522 (1954). More recently, a district court has enjoined an 
eviction on a finding that its reason was the activities of the tenant 
in a tenant’s organization. Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority (E. D. Ya., C. A. No. 4746, Sept. 7, 1966). Anri 
in Williams v. City of Ypsilanti (D. Mich., C. A. No. 28936), a 
district court has issued a temporary restraining order barring a 
Michigan housing authority from evicting the plaintiff under a 
lease provision allowing termination if a woman who is the head 
of a household has an additional child.



20

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the petition for writ of cer­
tiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

J ack  G reenberg 
J am es M. N abrit , III 
Charles S teph en  R alston  
M ic h ael  M eltsner  
C harles H . J ones, J r .
S h e ila  R u sh  J ones 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York

M. C. B urt

213% "West Main Street 
Durham, North Carolina

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

E dward V . S parer 
M artin  G arbtjs 
H oward T horkelson



A P P E N D I C E S



APPENDIX I

Judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina

NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT 

S pring  T erm  1966 

No. 769—Durham

—-------------------------------------------------- .................................................... ............ ..........

H ousing  A u th o rity  of t h e  C it y  op D u r h a m ,

— v . —

J oyce C. T horpe .

Appeal by defendant from Bickett, J., October 1965 Civil 
Session of Durham.

The plaintiff instituted summary ejectment proceedings 
before H. L. Townsend, Justice of the Peace, to remove the 
defendant from Apartment No. 38-0 Ridgeway Avenue, 
McDougald Terrace, in the city of Durham. From a judg­
ment in favor of the plaintiff in the Court of the Justice 
of the Peace, the defendant appealed to the superior court 
where the matter was heard de novo by the court without 
a jury. The court made findings of fact, each of which is 
supported by stipulations or by the evidence in the record. 
The material facts so found may be summarized as follows:

The plaintiff, a corporation organized and operating 
under the laws of the State of North Carolina, is the owner 
of the tract of land known as the McDougald Terrace Hous­
ing Project in the city of Durham, which includes Apart­
ment No. 38-G Ridgeway Avenue. On 11 November 1964



2a

the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a lease con­
tract whereby the plaintiff leased to the defendant the said 
apartment for a term beginning 11 November 1964 and 
terminating at midnight 30 November 1964. The lease pro­
vided that it would be automatically renewed for successive 
terms of one month each. It further provided that the lease 
could be terminated by either party by giving to the other 
written notice of such termination 15 days prior to the 
last day of the term. There was no provision in the lease 
requiring the lessor to give to the lessee any reason for 
its decision to terminate the lease or requiring that any 
hearing be held by the plaintiff, or by any other person 
or agency, with respect to such decision.

The defendant occupied the apartment pursuant to the 
lease. On 12 August 1965 the plaintiff gave, and the defen­
dant received, a written notice that the lease was cancelled 
effective 31 August 1965 and that at such time the plaintiff 
would be required to vacate the premises. The plaintiff 
gave no reason to the defendant for its decision to termi­
nate the lease, advising the defendant that it was not re­
quired to do so. The defendant requested a hearing but 
the plaintiff did not conduct any hearing at which the de­
fendant was present. Whatever may have been the plain­
tiff’s reason for terminating the lease, it was neither that 
the defendant had engaged in efforts to organize the ten­
ants of McDougald Terrace nor that she was elected presi­
dent of a group which was organized in McDougald Ter­
race on 10 August 1965. The defendant refused to vacate 
the premises.

Upon these findings, the court concluded that the plain­
tiff terminated the lease as of 31 August 1965; that the 
occupancy of the premises by the defendant after such



3a

date was wrongful and in violation of the plaintiff’s right 
to possession; that there was no duty upon the plaintiff to 
give to the defendant any reason for its termination of the 
lease or to hold any hearing upon the matter; and that the 
plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the premises and 
the defendant was in wrongful possession thereof.

The court, therefore, gave judgment that the defendant 
be removed from the premises, that the plaintiff be put in 
possession thereof and that the plaintiff have and recover 
from the defendant $58.00 plus a reasonable rent for the 
premises from and after 1 November 1965 until the same 
are vacated, together with the costs of the action. From 
this judgment the defendant appeals.

M. 0. Burt, R. Michael F rank, Jack Greenberg, Sheila 
R ush, E dward Y. Sparer of Counsel for defendant 
appellant.

Daniel K. E dwards fo r  plaintiff appellee.

P er Curiam. The plaintiff is the owner of the apartment 
in question. The defendant has no right to occupy it except 
insofar as such right is conferred upon her by the written 
lease which she and the plaintiff signed. This lease was 
terminated in accordance with its express provisions at 
midnight 31 August 1965. With its termination, all right 
of the defendant to occupy the plaintiff’s property ceased. 
Since that date the defendant has been and is a trespasser 
upon the plaintiff’s land.

The defendant having gone into possession as tenant of 
the plaintiff, and having held over without the right to do 
so after the termination of her tenancy, the plaintiff was 
entitled to bring summary ejectment proceedings against 
her to restore the plaintiff to the possession of that which



belongs to it. G.S. 42-26; Murrill v. Palmer, 164 NC 50, 
80 SE 55. It is immaterial what may have been the reason 
for the lessor’s unwillingness to continue the relationship 
of landlord and tenant after the espiration of the term as 
provided in the lease.

Having continued to occupy the property of the plaintiff 
without right after 31 August 1965, the defendant, by rea­
son of her continuing trespass, is liable to the plaintiff for 
damages due to her wrongful retention of its property and 
for the costs of the action. G.S. 42-32; McGuinn v. McLain, 
225 NC 750, 36 SE 2d 377; Lee, North Carolina Law of 
Landlord and Tenant, § 18.

No Error.
Moore, J., not sitting.



5a

APPENDIX II

Judgment of the Superior Court of Durham County

This cause, coming on to be heard, and being heard be­
fore the undersigned, Honorable William Y. Bickett, Judge 
Presiding at the October Civil Term of Durham County 
Superior Court, upon plaintiff and defendant having ex­
pressly waived trial by jury, and having stipulated and 
agreed in open Court that this matter be heard without a 
jury by the Judge, and that the Judge find the facts upon 
stipulations made and affidavit filed, and render thereon 
conclusions of law and judgment in the cause; and the 
Court, after hearing argument of counsel and considering 
and weighing the stipulations made in this action and the 
affidavit filed therein, finds facts as follows:

(1) That the Housing Authority of the City of Durham 
is and was during all of the times involved in this action, 
and specifically on the 11th of November, 1964, and there­
after to the present date, a corporation organized and 
operating under and by virtue of the laws of the State of 
North Carolina—specifically, the Statute known and desig­
nated as the Housing Authorities Law of the State of 
North Carolina;

(2) That during said times, C. S. Oldham was the Execu­
tive Director of said Housing Authority of the City of 
Durham and charged with responsibility for management 
of the properties of the Housing Authority of the City of 
Durham located in the City of Durham;



6a

(3) That on the 11th day of November, 1964, and there­
after, continuously until this date, the Housing Authority 
of the City of Durham was and is the owner of real prop­
erty known as the McDougald Terrace Housing Project, 
located in the City of Durham, and specifically a dwelling 
apartment located in said housing project, designated and 
known as No. 38-G Ridgeway Avenue;

(4) That on the 11th day of November, 1964, the plain­
tiff and the defendant entered into and duly executed a 
lease contract, wherein the Housing Authority of the City 
of Durham leased to the defendant Apartment No. 38-G 
Ridgeway Avenue in said McDougald Terrace Project for 
the term beginning November 11, 1964, and terminating at 
Midnight November 30, 1964, at a rental of $19.33 for said 
term, payable in advance on the first day of said term; that 
said lease contract further provided that the rental for 
these premises would be based on the current family com­
position and family income as were represented to the man­
agement of the Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 
and would be in conformance with the approved current 
rent schedule which had been adopted by the Housing Au­
thority of the City of Durham for the operation of the 
project; that the lease further provided that the lease 
would be automatically renewed for successive terms of one 
month each at a rental of $29.00 a month, provided there 
was no change in the income or composition of the family 
and no violation of the terms of the lease; that the lease 
further provided that the rent should be payable in advance 
on the first day of each calendar month, and that the lease 
could be terminated by the tenant by giving to the Housing 
Authority of the City of Durham notice in writing of such 
termination fifteen (15) days prior to the last day of the



7a

term, and that management could terminate the lease by- 
giving to the tenant notice in writing of such termination 
fifteen (15) days prior to the last day of the term; that 
there was no provision in said lease whereby it was agreed 
that the Housing Authority of the City of Durham would 
give the defendant any reason for termination of said lease 
or that any reason for the termination of said lease was 
required, and there was no provision in said lease that 
any hearing should be held by the Housing Authority or 
any other agency or person with respect to any decision 
by the Housing Authority of the City of Durham to termi­
nate said lease and to give the defendant notice in writing 
of such termination, as was provided in the language of 
the lease;

(5) That the defendant, upon her execution of said lease, 
entered into and occupied said Apartment No. 38-Gf Bidge- 
way Avenue of the McDougald Terrace Project, owned by 
the Plaintiff, Housing Authority of the City of Durham 
and does now continue to occupy said dwelling apartment;

(6) That on the 12th day of August, 1965, the plaintiff, 
Housing Authority of the City of Durham, gave to the 
defendant, Joyce C. Thorpe, notice in writing as follows: 
“Your Dwelling Lease provides that the Lease may be 
cancelled upon fifteen (15) days’ written notice. This is 
to notify you that your Dwelling Lease will be cancelled 
effective August 31, 1965, at which time you will be re­
quired to vacate the premises you now occupy” ; and that 
the defendant duly received said notice to vacate on said 
date;

(7) That the defendant failed and refused to vacate said 
premises and continues to occupy same;



(8) That the Housing Authority of the City of Durham 
duly brought an action in summary ejectment before the 
Justice of the Peace Court in Durham County, and after 
hearing before said Court judgment was duly entered, re­
quiring the defendant Joyce C. Thorpe to vacate said prem­
ises and ordering any duly constituted officer of Durham 
County to remove the defendant from said premises;

(9) That the defendant gave notice of appeal to the 
Superior Court and posted bond, pursuant to the provisions 
of G. S. 42,-34;

(10) That the plaintiff Housing Authority of the City 
of Durham, acting through C. S. Oldham, its Manager and 
Executive Director, gave notice to the defendant to vacate 
said premises not because she had engaged in efforts to or­
ganize the tenants of McDougald Terrace, nor because she 
was elected President of a group organized in McDougald 
Terrace on August 10,1965; that these were not the reasons 
said notice was given and eviction undertaken;

(11) That the plaintiff Housing Authority of the City 
of Durham gave no reason to the defendant for giving her 
notice that the lease was being terminated at the end of 
the term, nor did the plaintiff or any of its agents or em­
ployees conduct a hearing at which the defendant was pres­
ent or invited to be present to inquire into reasons for 
terminating her lease;



9a

(12) That the defendant did request a hearing on this 
matter but had no hearing other than that before the Justice 
of the Peace in this eviction action and in this Court;

(13) That the plaintiff, through its agents and employees, 
did inform the defendant that the plaintiff was not required 
to give or assign reasons to the defendant for the termi­
nation of her lease, and has not given to her or communi­
cated to her any reason for so doing, other than that they 
desired to terminate her lease;

W herefore, the Court concludes, as a matter o f  law, as 
follows:

(1) That the defendant, during August of 1965, occupied 
the premises owned by the plaintiff Housing Authority of 
the City of Durham, known and designated as Apartment 
No. 38-Gr Ridgeway Avenue, McDougald Terrace, under 
and pursuant to the terms and provisions of a lease, where­
by she was tenant from month to month;

(2) That by giving the defendant written notice of ter­
mination of her lease on the 12th day of August, 1965, the 
plaintiff effectively terminated the tenancy of the lease of 
the defendant as of the 31st day of August, 1965;

(3) That the continued occupancy of said premises by 
the defendant after the 31st day of August, 1965, was with­
out right and was wrongful and against the express direc­
tion of the owner of said premises to vacate and in violation 
of said owner’s right to possession of said premises;

(4) That the Housing Authority of the City of Durham 
did not owe a duty to communicate or give to the defendant 
any reason for its termination of her lease, nor was it re­
quired or had any duty to hold a hearing on said subject;



10a

(5) That the Housing Authority of the City of Durham 
acted in conformity with and in accordance with the terms 
and provisions of the lease entered into with the defendant, 
and the provisions of the laws of the State of North Caro­
lina, in terminating her lease;

(6) That the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the 
premises described hereinabove, and that the defendant 
is in the wrongful possession thereof;

Now, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AHD DECREED that
the defendant be removed from the said premises known 
as Apartment No. 38-G Eidgeway Avenue, and the plain­
tiff put in possession thereof, and that the plaintiff 
have and recover from the defendant the sum of Fifty- 
eight and No/100 ($58.00) Dollars, and a further amount, 
if any, as reasonable rent for said premises from the 1st 
day of November, 1965, until the premises are vacated by 
the defendant, and the defendant shall pay the costs to be 
taxed by the Clerk.

This 26th day of October, 1965.

W illiam  Y. B ickett  
Judge Presiding.



11a

APPENDIX III

Federal and State Public Housing Statutes

SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES HOUSING ACT OP 1937

42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.

§ 1401. Declaration of policy

It is declared to be the policy of the United States to 
promote the general welfare of the Nation by employing 
its funds and credit, as provided in this chapter, to assist 
the several States and their political subdivisions to alle­
viate present and recurring unemployment and to remedy 
the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions and the acute 
shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families 
of low income, in urban and rural nonfarm areas, that are 
injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the citizens 
of the Nation. In the development of low-rent housing it 
shall be the policy of the United States to make adequate 
provision for larger families and for families consisting 
of elderly persons. It is the policy of the United States 
to vest in the local public housing agencies the maximum 
amount of responsibility in the administration of the low- 
rent housing program, including responsibility for the 
establishment of rents and eligibility requirements (subject 
to the approval of the Authority), -with due consideration 
to accomplishing the objectives of this chapter while effect­
ing economies.



12a

§ 1402. Definitions

When used in this chapter—

Low-rent housing; eligibility; continued occupancy

(1) The term “ low-rent housing” means decent, safe, and 
sanitary dwellings within the financial reach of families of 
low income, and developed and administered to promote ser­
viceability, efficiency, economy, and stability, and embraces 
all necessary appurtenances thereto. The dwellings in low- 
rent housing shall be available solely for families of low 
income. Except as otherwise provided in section 1421b of 
this title, income limits for occupancy and rents shall be 
fixed by the public housing agency and approved by the 
Administration after taking into consideration (A) the 
family size, composition, age, physical handicaps, and other 
factors which might affect the rent-paying ability of the 
family, and (B) the economic factors which affect the finan­
cial stability and solvency of the project.

(2) The term “ families of Ioav income” means families 
(including elderly and displaced families) who are in the 
lowest income group and who cannot afford to pay enough 
to cause private enterprise in their locality or metropolitan 
area to build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sani­
tary dwellings for their use. The term “ families” includes 
families consisting of a single person in the case of elderly 
families and displaced families, and includes the remaining 
member of a tenant family. The term “ elderly families” 
means families whose heads (or their spouses), or whose 
sole members, have attained the age at which an individual 
may elect to receive an old-age benefit under title II of 
the Social Security Act, or are under a disability as defined 
in section 423 of this Title, or are handicapped within the



13a

meaning of section 1701q of Title 12. The term “displaced 
families” means families displaced by urban renewal or 
other governmental action, or families whose present or 
former dwellings are situated in areas determined by the 
Small Business Administration, subsequent to April 1,1965, 
to have been affected by a natural disaster, and which have 
been extensively damaged or destroyed as the result of 
such disaster.

Slum

(3) The term “ slum” means any area where dwellings 
predominate which, by reason of dilapidation, overcrowd­
ing, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light 
or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors, 
are detrimental to safety, health, or morals.

Slum clearance

(4) The term “ slum clearance” means the demolition and 
removal of buildings from any slum area.

Development; office space for renewal functions

(5) The term “development” means any or all undertak­
ings necessary for planning, land acquisition, demolition, 
construction, or equipment, in connection with a low-rent 
housing project. The term “development cost” shall com­
prise the costs incurred by a public housing agency in such 
undertakings and their necessary financing (including the 
payment of carrying charges, but not beyond the point of 
physical completion), and in otherwise carrying out the 
development of such project. Construction activity in con­
nection with a low-rent housing project may be confined 
to the reconstruction, remodeling, or repair of existing 
buildings. In cases where the public housing agency is also



14a

the local public agency for the purposes of sections 1450- 
1452, 1453-1455, 1456-1460, and 1462 of this title, or in 
cases where the public housing agency and the local public 
agency for purposes of such sections operate under a com­
bined central administrative office staff, an administration 
building included in a low-rent housing project to provide 
central administrative office facilities may also include suf­
ficient facilities for the administration of the functions of 
such local public agency, and in such case, the Adminis­
tration shall require that an economic rent shall be charged 
for the facilities in such building which are used for the 
administration of the functions of such local public agency 
and shall be paid from funds derived from sources other 
than the low-rent housing projects of such public housing 
agency.

Administration

(6) The term “administration” means any or all under­
takings necessary for management, operation, maintenance, 
or financing, in connection with a low-rent-housing or slum- 
clearance project, subsequent to physical completion.

Federal project

(7) The term “ Federal project” means any project owned 
or administered by the Administration.

Acquisition cost

(8) The term “acquisition cost” means the amount pru­
dently required to be expended by a public housing agency 
in acquiring a low-rent-housing or slum-clearance project.



15a

Non-dwelling facilities

(9) The term “ non-dwelling facilities” shall include site 
development, improvements and facilities located outside 
building walls (including streets, sidewalks, and sanitary, 
utility, and other facilities).

Going Federal rate

(10) The term “going Federal rate” means the annual 
rate of interest (or, if there shall be two or more such 
rates of interest, the highest thereof) specified in the most 
recently issued bonds of the Federal Government having 
a maturity of ten years or more, determined, in the case 
of loans or annual contributions, respectively, at the date 
of Presidential approval of the contract pursuant to which 
such loans or contributions are made: Provided, That with 
respect to any loans or annual contributions made pur­
suant to a contract approved by the President after the 
first annual rate has been specified as provided in this 
proviso, the term “going Federal rate” means the annual 
rate of interest which the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
specify as applicable to the six-month period (beginning 
with the six-month period ending December 31, 1953) dur­
ing which the contract is approved by the President, which 
applicable rate for each six-month period shall be deter­
mined by the Secretary of the Treasury by estimating the 
average yield to maturity, on the basis of daily closing 
market bid quotations or prices during the month of May 
or the month of November, as the case may be, next pre­
ceding such six-month period, on all outstanding market­
able obligations of the United States having a maturity 
date of fifteen or more years from the first day of such 
month of May or November, and by adjusting such esti­



16a

mated average annual yield to the nearest one-eighth of 
one per centum: And provided further, That for the pur­
poses of this chapter, the going Federal rate shall be deemed 
to be not less than 2y2 per centum.

Public housing agency

(11) The term “public housing agency” means any State, 
county, municipality, or other governmental entity or pub­
lic body (excluding the Administration), which is author­
ized to engage in the development or administration of 
low-rent housing or slum clearance. The Administration 
shall enter into contracts for financial assistance with a 
State or State agency where such State or State agency 
makes application for such assistance for an eligible 
project which, under the applicable laws of the State, is 
to be developed and administered by such State or State 
agency.

State

(12) The term “ State” includes the States of the Union, 
the District of Columbia, and the Territories, dependencies, 
and possessions of the United States.

Public Housing Administration

(13) The term “Administration” means the Public Hous­
ing Administration.

Initiated

(14) The term “initiated” when used in reference to the 
date on which a project was initiated refers to the date of 
the first contract for financial assistance in respect to such 
project entered into by the Administration and the public 
housing agency.



17a

§ 1410. Annual contributions in assistance of low rent­
als—Authorisation

Jf. .v."vv 'A'

Maximum income limits; admission policies

(g) Every contract for annual contributions for any low- 
rent bousing project shall provide that—

(1) the maximum income limits fixed by the public 
housing agency shall be subject to the prior approval 
of the Administration and the Administration may re­
quire the agency to review and revise such limits if 
the Administration determines that changed conditions 
in the locality make such revisions necessary in achiev­
ing the purposes of the chapter;

(2) the public housing agency shall adopt and pro­
mulgate regulations establishing admission policies 
which shall give full consideration to its responsibility 
for the rehousing of displaced families, to the appli­
cant’s status as a serviceman or veteran or relation­
ship to a serviceman or veteran or to a disabled 
serviceman or veteran, and to the applicant’s age or 
disability, housing conditions, urgency of housing need, 
and source of income: Provided, That in establishing 
such admission policies the public housing agency shall 
accord to families of low income such priority over 
single persons as it determines to be necessary to avoid 
undue hardship; and

(3) the public housing agency shall determine, and 
so certify to the Administration, that each family in 
the project was admitted in accordance with duly 
adopted regulations and approved income limits; and



18a

the public housing agency shall make periodic reexam­
inations of the incomes of families living in the project 
and shall require any family whose income has in­
creased beyond the approved maximum income limits 
for continued occupancy to move from the project un­
less the public housing agency determines that, due 
to special circumstances, the family is unable to find 
decent, safe and sanitary housing within its financial 
reach although making every reasonable effort to do 
so, in which event such family may be permitted to 
remain for the duration of such a situation if it pays 
an increased rent consistent with such family’s in­
creased income.

*  -y. -V. -V- -V;W  W W W

§ 1415. Preservation of low rents
#  *  #  #  #

Local responsibilities and determinations

(7) In recognition that there should be local determina­
tion of the need for low-rent housing to meet needs not 
being adequately met by private enterprise—

(a) The Administration shall not make any contract 
with a public housing agency for preliminary loans 
(all of which shall be repaid out of any moneys which 
become available to such agency for the development 
of the projects involved) for surveys and planning in 
respect to any low-rent housing projects initiated after 
March 1, 1949, (i) unless the governing body of the 
locality involved has by resolution approved the ap­
plication of the public housing agency for such pre­
liminary loan; and (ii) unless the public housing



19a

agency has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Ad­
ministration that there is a need for such low-rent 
housing which is not being met by private enterprise; 
and

(b) The Administration shall not make any contract 
for loans (other than preliminary loans) or for annual 
contributions pursuant to this chapter with respect to 
any low-rent housing project initiated after March 1, 
1949, (i) unless the governing body of the locality in­
volved has entered into an agreement with the public 
housing agency providing for the local cooperation re- 
quired by the Administration pursuant to this chapter; 
(ii) unless the public housing agency has demonstrated 
to the satisfaction of the Administration that a gap 
of at least 20 per centum (except in the case of a dis­
placed family or an elderly family) has been left be­
tween the upper rental limits for admission to the 
proposed low-rent housing and the lowest rents at 
which private enterprise unaided by public subsidy is 
providing (through new construction and available 
existing structures) a substantial supply of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing toward meeting the need of 
an adequate volume thereof; and (iii) unless the public 
housing agency has demonstrated to the satisfaction 
of the Administration that there is a feasible method 
for the temporary relocation of the individuals and 
families displaced from the project site, and that there 
are or are being provided, in the project area or in 
other areas not generally less desirable in regard to 
public utilities and public and commercial facilities and 
at rents or prices within the financial means of such 
individuals and families, decent, safe, and sanitary 
dwellings equal in number to the number of and avail-



20a

able to such, individuals and families and reasonably 
accessible to their places of employment.

NORTH CAROLINA HOUSING AUTHORITIES LAW 

§ 157-1 et seq., Gen. Stat. of North Carolina

§ 157-2. Finding and declaration of necessity.—It is 
hereby declared that unsanitary or unsafe dwelling accom­
modations exist in urban and rural areas throughout the 
State and that such unsafe or unsanitary conditions arise 
from overcrowding and concentration of population, the 
obsolete and poor condition of the buildings, improper 
planning, excessive land coverage, lack of proper light, 
air and space, unsanitary design and arrangement, lack 
of proper sanitary facilities, and the existence of condi­
tions which endanger life or property by fire and other 
causes; that in such urban and rural areas many persons 
of low income are forced to reside in unsanitary or unsafe 
dwelling accommodations; that in such urban and rural 
areas there is a lack of safe or sanitary dwelling accom­
modations available to all the inhabitants thereof and that 
consequently many persons of low income are forced to 
occupy overcrowded and congested dwelling accommoda­
tions ; that these conditions cause an increase in and spread 
of disease and crime and constitute a menace to the health, 
safety, morals and welfare of the citizens of the State and 
impair economic values; that these conditions cannot be 
remedied by the ordinary operation of private enterprise; 
that the clearance, replanning and reconstruction of such 
areas and the providing of safe and sanitary dwelling ac­
commodations for persons of low income are public uses 
and purposes for which public money may be spent and 
private property acquired; that it is in the public interest



21a

that work on such projects be instituted as soon as possible; 
and that the necessity for the provisions hereinafter en­
acted is hereby declared as a matter of legislative deter­
mination to be in the public interest.

§ 157-4. Notice, hearing and creation of authority; can­
cellation of certificate of incorporation.—Any twenty-five 
residents of a city and of the area within ten miles from 
the territorial boundaries thereof may file a petition with 
the city clerk setting forth that there is a need for an 
authority to function in the city and said surrounding area. 
Upon the filing of such a petition the city clerk shall give 
notice of the time, place and purposes of a public hearing 
at which the council will determine the need for an author­
ity in the city and said surrounding area. Such notice shall 
be given at the city’s expense by publishing a notice, at least 
ten days preceding the day on which the hearing is to be 
held, in a newspaper having a general circulation in the 
city and said surrounding area, or, if there be no such 
newspaper, by posting such notice in at least three public 
places within the city,' at least ten days preceding the day 
on which the hearing is to be held.

Upon the date fixed for said hearing held upon notice 
as provided herein, an opportunity to be heard shall be 
granted to all residents and taxpayers of the city and said 
surrounding area and to all other interested persons. After 
such a hearing, the council shall determine:

(1) Whether insanitary or unsafe inhabited dwelling 
accommodations exist in the city and said surrounding 
area, and/or

(2) Whether there is a lack of safe or sanitary 
dwelling accommodations in the city and said surround­
ing area available for all the inhabitants thereof.



22a

In determining whether dwelling accommodations are 
unsafe or insanitary, the council shall take into considera­
tion the following: the physical condition and age of the 
buildings; the degree of overcrowding; the percentage of 
land coverage; the light and air available to the inhabitants 
of such dwelling accommodations; the size and arrange­
ment of the rooms; the sanitary facilities; and the extent 
to which conditions exist in such buildings which endanger 
life or property by fire or other causes.

If it shall determine that either or both of the above 
enumerated conditions exist, the council shall adopt a reso­
lution so finding (which need not go into any detail other 
than the mere finding) and shall cause notice of such deter­
mination to be given to the mayor who shall thereupon 
appoint, as hereinafter provided, five commissioners to act 
as an authority. Said commission shall be a public body and 
a body corporate and politic upon the completion of the 
taking of the following proceedings:

The commissioners shall present to the Secretary of State 
an application signed by them, which shall set forth (with­
out any detail other than the mere recital):

(1) That a notice has been given and public hearing 
has been held as aforesaid, that the council made the 
aforesaid determination after such hearing, and that 
the mayor has appointed them as commissioners;

(2) The name and official residence of each of the 
commissioners, together with a certified copy of the 
appointment evidencing their right to office, the date 
and place of induction into and taking oath of office, 
and that they desire the housing authority to become 
a public body and a body corporate and politic under 
this article;



23a

(3) The term of office of each of the commissioners;

(4) The name which is proposed for the corporation; 
and

(5) The location of the principal office of the pro­
posed corporation.

The application shall be subscribed and sworn to by each 
of said commissioners before an officer authorized by the 
laws of the State to take and certify oaths, who shall certify 
upon the application that he personally knows the com­
missioners and knows them to be the officers as asserted in 
the application,- and that each subscribed and swore thereto 
in the officer’s presence. The Secretary of State shall ex­
amine the application and if he finds that the name pro­
posed for the corporation is not identical with that of a 
person or of any other corporation of this State or so 
nearly similar as to lead to confusion and uncertainty he 
shall receive and file it and shall record it in an appropriate 
book of record in his office.

When the application has been made, filed and recorded, 
as herein provided, the authority shall constitute a public 
body and a body corporate and politic under the name pro­
posed in the application; the Secretary of State shall make 
and issue to the said commissioners a certificate of incor­
poration pursuant to this article, under the seal of the 
State, and shall record the same with the application.

If the council, after a hearing as aforesaid, shall deter­
mine that neither of the above enumerated conditions exist, 
it shall adopt a resolution denying the petition. After three 
months shall have expired from the date of the denial of 
any such petitions, subsequent petitions may be filed as 
aforesaid and new hearings and determinations made 
thereon.



24a

In any suit, action or proceeding involving the validity 
or enforcement of or relating to any contract of the author­
ity, the authority shall be conclusively deemed to have been 
established in accordance with the provisions of this article 
upon proof of the issuance of the aforesaid certificate by 
the Secretary of State. A copy of such certificate,, duly 
certified by the Secretary of State, shall be admissible in 
evidence in any such suit, action or proceeding, and shall 
be conclusive proof of the filing and contents thereof.

The Secretary of State is authorized and empowered to 
revoke or to cancel a certificate of incorporation previously 
issued to an authority or housing authority upon filing in 
his office a petition and resolution of the council and a peti­
tion and resolution of the authority and its members re­
questing such revocation or cancellation and when the Sec­
retary of State is satisfied that no indebtedness has been 
incurred or property acquired by said housing authority.

§ 157-9. Powers of authority.-—An authority shall con­
stitute a public body and a body corporate and politic, 
exercising public powers, and having all the powers neces­
sary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes 
and provisions of this article, including the following pow­
ers in addition to others herein granted:

To investigate into living, dwelling and housing condi­
tions and into the means and methods of improving such 
conditions; to determine where unsafe, or insanitary dwell­
ing or housing conditions exist; to study and make recom­
mendations concerning the plan of any city or municipality 
located within its boundaries in relation to the problem of 
clearing, replanning and reconstruction of areas in which 
unsafe or insanitary dwelling or housing conditions exist, 
and the providing of dwelling accommodations for persons



25a

of low income, and to co-operate witli any city municipal or 
regional planning agency; to prepare, carry out and oper­
ate housing projects; to provide for the construction, recon­
struction,. improvement, alteration or repair of any housing 
project or any part thereof; to take over by purchase, lease 
or otherwise any housing project located within its bound­
aries undertaken by any government, or by any city or 
municipality located in whole or in part within its bound­
aries; to manage as agent of any city or municipality lo­
cated in whole or in part within its boundaries any housing 
project constructed or owned by such city; to act as agent 
for the federal government in connection with the acquisi­
tion, construction, operation and/or management of a hous­
ing project or any part thereof; to arrange with any city 
or municipality located in whole or in part within its 
boundaries or with a government for the furnishing, plan­
ning, replanning, installing, opening or closing of streets, 
roads, roadways, alleys, sidewalks or other places or fa­
cilities or for the acquisition by such city, municipality,, 
or government of property, options or property rights or 
for the furnishing of property or services in connection 
with a project; to arrange with the State, its subdivisions 
and agencies, and any county, city or municipality of the 
State, to the extent that it is within the scope of each of 
their respective functions, (i) to cause the services cus­
tomarily provided by each of them to be rendered for the 
benefit of such housing authority and/or the occupants 
of any housing project and (ii) to provide and maintain 
parks and sewage, water and other facilities adjacent to 
or in connection with housing projects and (iii) to change 
the city or municipality map, to plan, replan, zone or rezone 
any part of the city or municipality; to lease or rent any 
of the dwelling or other accommodations or any of the



26a

lands, buildings, structures or facilities embraced in any 
housing project and to establish and revise the rents or 
charges therefor; to enter upon any building or property 
in order to conduct investigations or to make surveys or 
soundings; to purchase,- lease, obtain options upon, acquire 
by gift, grant, bequest, devise, or otherwise any property 
real or personal or any interest therein from any person, 
firm, corporation, city, municipality, or government; to 
acquire by eminent domain any real property, including 
improvements and fixtures thereon; to sell, exchange, trans­
fer, assign, or pledge any property real or personal or 
any interest therein to any person, firm, corporation, mu­
nicipality, city, or government; to own, hold, clear and 
improve property; to insure or provide for the insurance 
of the property or operations of the authority against such 
risks as the authority may deem advisable; to procure in­
surance or guarantees from a federal government of the 
payment of any debts or parts thereof secured by mort­
gages made or held by the authority on any property in­
cluded in any housing project; to borrow money upon its 
bonds, notes, debentures or other evidences of indebtedness 
and to secure the same by pledges of its revenues, and 
(subject to the limitations hereinafter imposed) by mort­
gages upon property held or to be held by it, or in any 
other manner; in connection with any loan, to agree to 
limitations upon its right to dispose of any housing project 
or part thereof or to undertake additional housing projects; 
in connection with any loan by a government, to agree to 
limitations upon the exercise of any powers conferred upon 
the authority by this article; to invest any funds held in 
reserves or sinking funds, or any funds not required for 
immediate disbursement, in property or securities in which 
savings banks may legally invest funds subject to their



27a

control; to sue and be sued; to have a seal and to alter 
the same at pleasure; to have perpetual succession; to make 
and execute contracts and other instruments necessary or 
convenient to the exercise of the powers of the authority; 
to make and from time to time amend and repeal bylaws, 
rules and regulations not inconsistent with this article, 
to carry into effect the powers and purposes of the author­
ity ; to conduct examinations and investigations and to hear 
testimony and take proof under oath at public or private 
hearings on any matter material for its information; to 
issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses or 
the production of books and papers and to issue commis­
sions for the examination of witnesses who are out of the 
State or unable to attend before the authority, or excused 
from attendance; and to make available to such agencies, 
boards or commissions as are charged with the duty of 
abating or requiring the correction of nuisances or like 
conditions, or of demolishing unsafe or insanitary struc­
tures within its territorial limits, its findings and recom­
mendations with regard to any building or property where 
conditions exist which are dangerous to the public health, 
morals, safety or welfare. Any of the investigations or 
examinations provided for in this article may be conducted 
by the authority or by a committee appointed by it, con­
sisting of one or more commissioners, or by counsel, or 
by an officer or employee specially authorized by the au­
thority to conduct it. Any commissioner, counsel for the 
authority, or any person designated by it to conduct an 
investigation or examination shall have power to admin­
ister oaths, to take affidavits and issue subpoenas or com­
missions. An authority may exercise any or all of the 
powers herein conferred upon it, either generally or with 
respect to any specific housing project or projects, through



28a

or by an agent or agents which it may designate, including 
any corporation or corporations which are or shall be 
formed under the laws of this State, and for such purposes 
an authority may cause one or more corporations to be 
formed under the laws of this State or may acquire the 
capital stock of any corporation or corporations. Any 
corporate agent, all of the stock of which shall be owned 
by the authority or its nominee or nominees, may to the 
extent permitted by law exercise any of the powers con­
ferred upon the authority herein. In addition to all of the 
other powers herein conferred upon it, an authority may 
do all things necessary and convenient to carry out the 
powers expressly given in this article. No provisions with 
respect to the acquisition, operation or disposition of prop­
erty by other public bodies shall be applicable to an au­
thority unless the legislature shall specifically so state.

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 
this article or in any other provision of law an authority 
may include in any contract let in connection with a project, 
stipulations requiring that the contractor and any sub­
contractors comply with requirements as to minimum wages 
and maximum hours of labor, and comply with any condi­
tions which the federal government may have attached to 
its financial aid of the project.

§ 157-29. Rentals and tenant selection.—It is hereby de­
clared to be the policy of this State that each housing 
authority shall manage and operate its housing projects 
in an efficient manner so as to enable it to fix the rentals 
for dwelling accommodations at the lowest possible rates 
consistent with its providing decent, safe and sanitary 
dwelling accommodations, and that no housing authority 
shall construct or operate any such project for profit, or



29a

as a source of revenue to the city. To this end an authority 
shall fix the rentals for dwellings in its projects at no 
higher rates than it shall find to be necessary in order to 
produce revenues which (together with all other available 
monies, revenues, income and receipts of the authority 
from whatever sources derived) will be sufficient

(1) To pay, as the same become due, the principal 
and interest on the bonds of the authority;

(2) To meet the cost of, and to provide for, main­
taining and operating the projects (including the cost 
of any insurance) and the administrative expenses of 
the authority; and

(3) To create (during not less than the six years 
immediately succeeding its issuance of any bonds) a 
reserve sufficient to meet the largest principal and in­
terest payment which will be due on such bonds in any 
one year thereafter and to maintain such reserve.

In the operation or management of housing projects an 
authority shall at all times observe the following duties 
with respect to rentals and tenant selection:

(1) It may rent or lease the dwelling accommoda­
tions therein only to persons who lack the amount of 
income which is necessary (as determined by the hous­
ing authority undertaking the housing project) to en­
able them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, 
safe and sanitary dwellings, without overcrowding;

(2) It may rent or lease the dwelling accommoda­
tions only at rentals within the financial reach of such 
persons;



30a

(3) It may rent or lease to a tenant dwelling accom­
modations consisting of the number of rooms (but no 
greater number) which it deems necessary to provide 
safe and sanitary accommodations to the proposed 
occupants thereof, without overcrowding; and

(4) It shall not accept any person as a tenant in 
any housing project if the person or persons who would 
occupy the dwelling accommodations have an annual 
net income in excess of five times the annual rental of 
the quarters to be furnished such person or persons 
except that in the case of families with three or more 
minor dependents, such ratio shall not exceed six to 
one; in computing the rental for this purpose of select­
ing tenants, there shall be included in the rental the 
average annual cost (as determined by the authority) 
to occupants of heat, water, electricity, gas, cooking 
range and other necessary services or facilities, 
whether or not the charge for such services and facili­
ties is in fact included in the rental.

Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as 
limiting the power of an authority to vest in an obligee 
the right, in the event of a default by the authority, to take 
possession of a housing project or cause the appointment 
of a receiver thereof, free from all the restrictions imposed 
by this section.



*

33