Requests from: Lani Guinier to: Donna Gloeckner

    I n  th e

i>uprntt? (Enurt 0! tty Unttefr Stairs
O ctober T er m , 1969 

No.............

M arion  E dward W il l ia m s , 

— v.—
Petitioner,

S tate oe I owa,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

J ack  G reenberg
M ic h a e l  M eltsner
E ric S ch n appbr
A n n  W agner

10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

O scar E . J ones
T ed W . R ockw ell

1205 East 33rd Street 
Des Moines, Iowa 50317

R obert A. W rig h t  
260 Key Building 
518 Grand Avenue 
Des Moines, Iowa 50309

W . L aw rence  O liver 
416 East 6th Avenue 
Des Moines, Iowa 50309

J am es B. M orris, J r .
225 Locust Street 
Des Moines, Iowa

Attorneys for Petitioner



Opinion Below 

Jurisdiction ...

I N D E X

PAGE

1

2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ..... 2

Question Presented ........................................... -............. 3

Statement _____ _______— ...............................................  4

How the Federal Question Was Raised and Decided 
Below ............................................................................. 11

R eason for G ran tin g  th e  W rit—

Certiorari Should Be Granted to Determine
Whether Petitioner Has Been Deprived of the 
Fair Warning to Which the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment Entitles Him When 
Sentenced to Two Years in Prison Pursuant to 
an Unforeseeable and Strained Construction of a
State Statute .............................................................  13

C onclusion  .............................-...... -.................. - ........... - ............... 22

A ppendix  :

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa ........................  la

1966 Code of Iowa .................................................. 18a
1962 Code of Iowa .............. ...................................  24a



11

A u th o rities  C ited

Cases: page

Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) ......................18,20

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) .......................... 21

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) ............ 19, 21

Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) ...............................  21

Statutes:

1962 Code of Iowa §204.8 ...............................................  19

1962 Code of Iowa §204.9(4) .....................   ..14,19,21
1966 Code of Iowa §204.5(1) .......................................... 20

1966 Code of Iowa §204.5(2) ..........       20
1966 Code of Iowa §204.6 ..........................    17
1966 Code of Iowa §204.6(3) .........................................  20
1966 Code of Iowa §204.8(3) ............      16

1966 Code of Iowa §204.8(4) .........................................  17

1966 Code of Iowa §204.8(5) ...........  5,7,8,9,12,13,16,
17,18, 20, 22

1966 Code of Iowa §204.9 ........................4, 6, 7, 8, 9,13,16,
17,18, 22

1966 Code of Iowa §204.17 ...........................................16,18

Authorities:

Amsterdam, Note, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 6 7 ........................ 21



I k  t h e

uprm * (Emtrt rtf tip Mutted States
October T er m , 1969 

No. ...........

M ariok  E dward W illiam s ,

— v.-

Petitioner,

S tate of I owa,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa, entered on 
October 14, 1969, affirming the judgment of the District 
Court of Polk County finding petitioner guilty of failure 
to keep proper records of narcotic drugs in violation of 
Section 204.9 of the 1966 Code of Iowa.

Opinion Below

The opinion below is reported at ——  Iowa ------ , 171
N.W.2d 521 and is set forth in the Appendix hereto, pp. 
la-17a, infra. There was no opinion in the court of first 
instance, the District Court of the State of Iowa in and 
for Polk County.



2

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa was en­
tered on October 14, 1969 (Appendix, pg, la, infra). 
On December 8, 1969, the Iowa Supreme Court denied a 
petition for rehearing without opinion.

Jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1257(3), petitioner having asserted below and asserting 
here deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
of the United States.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

This case involves the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States.

This case also involves the following Iowa statutes: 
§204.8(5) of Chapter 204 of the 1966 Iowa Code:

Except as otherwise provided, this chapter shall 
not apply to the administering, dispensing, or selling 
of any preparation containing not more than one grain 
(64.8 mg) of codeine, or any of its salts, per one fluid 
ounce (29.5729 c.c.) or per one avoirdupois ounce 
(28.3 gms.), when such pharmaceutical preparations 
of narcotic drugs are administered, dispensed, or sold 
by persons and under conditions prescribed by the 
board.
§204.9 of Chapter 204 of the 1966 Iowa Code:

Medical practitioners, manufacturers, wholesalers, 
pharmacies, pharmacists, hospitals, laboratories, and 
every person who purchases for resale or who sells 
narcotic drugs, shall keep such records as may be 
required by the board relating to receipt, manufac­
ture, inventory, distribution, including dispensing, ad­



3

ministering, sale, or other disposition, and informa­
tion as to narcotics stolen, lost, or destroyed. In every 
case the record of narcotic drugs received shall show 
the date of receipt, the name and address of the per­
son from whom received, and the kind and quantity 
of drugs received; the kind and quantity of narcotic 
drugs produced or removed from process of manu­
facture, and the date of such production or removal 
from process of manufacture. The record of all nar­
cotic drugs sold, administered, dispensed, or otherwise 
disposed of, shall show the date of selling, admin­
istering, or dispensing, the name and address of the 
person to whom, or for whose use, or the owner and 
species of animal for which the drugs were sold, ad­
ministered, or dispensed and the kind and quantity 
of drugs.

Every such record shall he kept for a period of five 
years from the date of the transaction recorded. The 
keeping of a record required by or under the federal 
narcotic laws containing substantially the same in­
formation as is specified by this chapter, shall con­
stitute compliance with this section, except that every 
such record shall contain a detailed list of narcotic 
drugs lost, destroyed, or stolen, if any, the kind and 
quantity of such drugs, and the date of the discovery 
of such loss, destruction, or theft.

Sections 204.5(1) (a), 204.5(2), 204.6(1), 204.6(3), 204.8, 
204.9, and 204.17 of Chapter 204 of the 1966 Code of Iowa 
are set out in full in the Appendix, pp. 18a-23a, infra.

Question Presented

Petitioner, a licensed pharmacist, was sentenced to two 
years in prison for failure to keep proper records of his



4

purchases and sales of two cough syrups, each of which con­
tains one grain or less of codeine per ounce. Prior to 1966, 
the Iowa Code provided that pharmacists must keep a 
record of purchases and sales of drug preparations such 
as the cough syrups, §204.9(4) of the 1962 Code of Iowa, hut 
this provision was repealed in 1966. Section 204.8(5) of 
Chapter 204 of the 1966 Code clearly provides that the 
chapter shall not apply to the administering, dispensing or 
selling of these cough syrups, and the Iowa Board of Phar­
macy Examiners, an agency of the State, furnishes a manual 
entitled “The Pharmacy Laws of Iowa” to all Iowa phar­
macists with the following notice prominently displayed 
on the inside of the manual’s cover: “Pharmacists Please 
Note: Preparations containing only one grain or less of 
Codeine per ounce are exempt under Iowa Law.”

Under these circumstances was the Iowa Supreme 
Court’s construction of the 1966 Code of Iowa to require 
pharmacists to keep a record of purchases and sales of 
these cough syrups so unforeseeable as to deprive petitioner 
of the fair warning that his conduct was criminal to 
which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment entitles him?

Statement

Petitioner, a licensed pharmacist, was indicted on June 5, 
1968, for failure to keep proper records of narcotic drugs 
in violation of §204.9 of the Iowa Uniform Narcotic Drug 
Act, Chapter 204 of the 1966 Code of Iowa (set forth at 
pg. 2, supra) (R. 3-4).1 The indictment was based on 
an audit conducted one and one half years earlier on

1 The following abbreviations are employed in this Statement in 
citations to the certified record: record in the trial court— R ; ap­
pellant’s brief in the Iowa Supreme Court—App. Br.; Iowa State’s



5

January 4, 1967, by the Iowa Board of Pharmacy Ex­
aminers at the Williams Prescription Pharmacy, which 
petitioner has owned and operated in Des Moines, Iowa, 
for approximately nine years2 (R. 4, 69-70). Petitioner 
was specifically charged with having failed to keep com­
plete records of his purchases and sales of Robitussin A-C 
and Elixir Terpin Hydrate and Codeine, two cough syrups 
containing not more than one grain of codeine per fluid 
ounce in combination with other non-narcotic medications, 
between July 1, 1966, and December 31, 1966 (R. 4, 15, 
43, 46, 70-71).

Prior to his trial, petitioner moved to quash the indict­
ment on the ground that Chapter 204 of the 1966 Code of 
Iowa specifically provides in §204.8(5) that the “ . . . chap­
ter shall not apply to the administering, dispensing, or 
selling of . . . pharmaceutical preparations of narcotic 
drugs” such as Robitussin A-C and Elixir Terpin Hydrate 
and Codeine (R. 8-9, 16-17). The trial court ruled that 
pharmaceutical preparations such as the cough syrups 
are exempt from the prescription requirement of Chap­
ter 204 but not from the record keeping requirement of

brief in the Iowa Supreme Court—St. Br.; petition for rehearing— 
Pet. Beh.; application of Iowa. Medical Society to appear as amicus 
curiae—App. I.M.8.;  brief of Iowa Medical Society amicus curiae—• 
Br. I.M.S.

2 On the date of his indictment, petitioner was one of the two 
black pharmacists who owned and operated pharmacies in the 
State of Iowa (Pet. Reh. 44). Petitioner has been active in the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People for 
almost twenty years, having served as a member of the Iowa State 
executive board of that organization. In the interim between the 
January, 1967 audit and his indictment one and one half years 
later, petitioner had strongly criticized the Des Moines City Council 
for neglecting the welfare of the black community in that city. 
In addition, in March, 1968, petitioner had sued a Des Moines police 
offieer for false arrest; that case is presently pending.



6

§204.9 and denied petitioner’s motion (R. 14). The court 
stated no reason or authority in support of its ruling.

Petitioner was brought to trial before a jury in the Dis­
trict Court for Polk County on September 30, 1968 (R. 15). 
The State failed to establish that petitioner had not kept 
proper records of his sales of the cough syrups.3 The 
State’s case against petitioner consisted solely of evidence 
that subsequent to the audit at petitioner’s pharmacy, in­
vestigators from the Board of Pharmacy Examiners ex­
amined the records of two drug wholesalers and found 
that petitioner had failed to produce several invoices con­
taining purchases of Robitussin A-C and Elixir Terpin 
Hydrate and Codeine at the time of the audit4 * (R. 32-33). 
The evidence was undisputed that the Board of Pharmacy 
Examiners never contacted petitioner subsequent to the 
date of the audit to inform him that his record of purchases 
of the cough syrups appeared to be incomplete6 (R. 42, 79). 
Petitioner first learned of this upon his indictment one 
and one half years after the audit.

At the close of the State’s evidence, petitioner moved for 
a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that the 
State had failed to establish a prima facie case and on 
the grounds previously stated in his motion to quash the

3 The only Board of Pharmacy Examiners’ investigator who testi­
fied admitted that he did not ask to see petitioner’s prescription files 
(R. 27-28, 35) and that a substantial number of sales of the cough 
syrups might be recorded in those files and therefore not appear in 
the audit upon which the indictment was based (R. 36). (See also 
petitioner’s testimony at R. 70-71.)

4 In its brief in the Iowa Supreme Court, counsel for the State 
stated:

“ Therefore, the fact that a complete audit of sales was not 
made is immaterial, as defendant, was guilty of not keeping 
records of purchases,” (St. Br. 15).

6 In fact the Board renewed petitioner’s pharmacist license twice 
during the interim between the audit and petitioner’s indictment 
(Pet. Reh. 45).



7

indictment (R. 67). In addition petitioner pointed out that 
§204.9 provides:

. . . [Pharmacists . . . shall keep such records as 
may be required by the board6 relating to receipt, 
manufacture, inventory, distribution, including dis­
pensing, administering, sale, or other disposition, and 
information as to narcotics stolen, lost, or destroyed 
(R. 67). (Emphasis added.)

The State’s evidence affirmatively established that the 
Board of Pharmacy Examiners had passed no rules or 
regulations requiring record keeping (R. 47, 67).

The State opposed the motion for a directed verdict of 
acquittal on the ground that the exemption provided in 
§204.8(5) is ineffective without some affirmative action by 
the Board. §204.8(5) provides that the pharmaceutical 
preparations shall be exempt from the application of 
Chapter 204 when “ . . . administered, dispensed, or sold 
by persons and under conditions prescribed by the board.” 
The attorney for the State argued:

I think a close reading of 204.8 Subparagraph 5, 
indicates that that exemption is conditional on the 
Board’s action. I apply the reverse of what Mr. Rock­
well [counsel for petitioner] says and say yes, no 
rules and regulations have been adopted setting forth 
conditions under which these items can be sold, and 
as long as no regulations or rules have been adopted 
in regard to these items, they are not exempt from 
204.9.

In other words, it says at the end of 204.8, Sub- 
paragraph 5, this exemption shall not apply unless 
there are conditions set forth by the Board (R. 68-69).

0 “Board” means the Board of Pharmacy Examiners. §204.1(16), 
1966 Code of Iowa.



8

Petitioner’s motion for a directed verdict was denied 
(R. 69).

At the close of all of the evidence, petitioner made a 
motion for a directed verdict which was denied (R. 84-85). 
The trial judge then instructed the jury, over petitioner’s 
objection, that the terms of §204.8(5) do not exempt the 
cough syrups from the record keeping requirement of 
§204.9 (R. 85):

Instruction No. 5. You are further instructed that 
there are certain preparations containing narcotics 
that are exempt from the provisions of Chapter 204 
of the 1966 Code of Iowa, and these are referred to 
as Class X  narcotics.7 Class X  narcotics, such as 
Robitussin A-C and Elixir Terpin Hydrate and Co­
deine are exempt from prescription requirements, but 
due to the narcotic content, are subject to being made 
of record, as provided in Section 204.9 (R. 89). (Em­
phasis added.)

On October 1, 1968, petitioner was found guilty of failure 
to keep proper records (R. 95) and on October 14 sen­
tenced to two years in the state penitentiary and a two 
thousand dollar fine (R. 100-101).

On October 14, 1969, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed 
petitioner’s conviction and sentence (Appendix, pg. la, 
infra,). Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing on Novem­
ber 12, 1969. On December 5, 1969, the Iowa Medical So­
ciety applied to the Iowa Supreme Court to appear as 
amicus curiae, stating:

7 “ Class X ” is a federal classification (see 26 C.F.R. §151.422(6)) 
employed to designate pharmaceutical preparations containing a 
narcotic drug which may be sold without a prescription. The term 
“ Class X ” appears nowhere in the Iowa Uniform Narcotic Drug 
Act, Chapter 204 of the 1966 Code of Iowa.



9

This is a case of first impression and the particular 
question involved in this appeal has never before been 
decided by the State of Iowa (App. I.M.S. 1).

On that same date, the Iowa Medical Society was granted 
permission to appear and file a Brief Amicus Curiae. In 
its Brief, the Medical Society stated:

In our view, the exemption in Section 204.8(5) ex­
tends to the record keeping requirements contained 
in Section 204.9. Accordingly, Williams would seem 
to have been sentenced to two years in the state peni­
tentiary, for failure to keep records which we believe 
the clear language of the applicable statute does not 
require. Further, although the Board of Pharmacy 
Examiners had the power under Section 204.8(5) to 
condition the exemption, the Board not only failed 
to condition the exemption, but also has acted affirma­
tively to lead pharmacists and others to believe that 
this exemptive provision was to be broadly construed.8 
(Br. I.M.S. 3). (Emphasis added.)

The Medical Society characterized the Iowa Supreme 
Court’s construction of the statute as a “questionable inter­
pretation of the law which is contrary to the clear and 
natural meaning of a reasonably unambiguous statute,” 
(Br. I.M.S. 4).

On December 8, 1969, the Iowa Supreme Court denied 
petitioner’s petition for rehearing without opinion.9 On

8 The affirmative action referred to by the Medical Society is the 
fact that the Iowa Board of Pharmacy Examiners, an official state 
agency, furnishes a manual entitled “ The Pharmacy Laws of Iowa” 
to all Iowa pharmacists with the following notice prominently dis­
played on the inside of the manual’s cover: “Pharmacists Please 
Note: Preparations containing only one grain or less of Codeine per 
ounce are exempt under Iowa Law.” (Br. I.M.S. 17).

9 Petitioner applied to the Iowa Supreme Court for a stay of 
incarceration pending review by this Court (Application in Iowa



10

January 15,1970, petitioner applied to the Honorable Byron 
White, Circuit Justice for the Eighth Judicial Circuit, for 
a stay of the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court issued 
on October 14, 1969, and a stay of petitioner’s incarceration 
pending review by the Supreme Court of the United States 
(Application for Order Directing Execution of Proce­
dendo). Justice White granted the State of Iowa until 
January 23, 1970, to file written objections to petitioner’s 
application (Ibid).

On January 19, 1970, petitioner applied to the District 
Court of Polk County for a hearing to consider him for a 
bench parole,10 and in addition for a temporary stay of 
incarceration until such time as his application for parole 
could be heard11 (Ibid) . On that same date, Judge Holliday 
of the District Court by ex parte order stayed petitioner’s 
incarceration until January 26, 1970, at which time peti­
tioner’s application for parole was to be heard (Order Di­
recting Execution of Procedendo).

On January 22, 1970, upon the application of the State 
of Iowa, a three-judge panel of the Iowa Supreme Court

Supreme Court for Temporary Stay) ; the application was denied 
and on December 17, 1969, petitioner was taken into custody (Order 
Directing Execution of Procedendo). On December 19, 1969, the 
District Court of Polk County granted petitioner a stay of in­
carceration until January 19, 1970, and petitioner was released 
from custody on his own recognizance (Ibid.).

10 A  bench parole is the Iowa equivalent of probation. 1966 Code 
of Iowa. No parole hearing had theretofore been held because 
Judge Holliday, who presided over petitioner’s trial, had errone­
ously believed that Iowa law did not permit a bench parole in 
petitioner’s case.

11 January 19 was the date on which the stay previously ordered 
by the District Court was to expire. A further stay was necessary 
because an Iowa court cannot grant a bench parole once a defendant 
has been imprisoned. §247.20, 1966 Code of Iowa. In addition to 
issuing the stay, Judge Holliday ordered the Polk County Attor­
ney’s Office to conduct a presentence investigation of petitioner.



11

held, with one judge dissenting, that the District Court 
had no jurisdiction to grant a stay {Ibid). The Court or­
dered that the District Court’s stay of petitioner’s incar­
ceration be set aside, and further ordered that petitioner 
be incarcerated in the penitentiary. On that same date, 
without prior notice to petitioner or his attorneys of the 
order of the Iowa Supreme Court, petitioner was taken 
into custody and transported to the state penitentiary. 
Petitioner’s incarceration in a penitentiary rather than in 
a county jail deprived the Polk County District Court of 
jurisdiction to consider petitioner for probation. §247.20, 
1966 Code of Iowa.

On January 27, 1970, Justice White ordered that execu­
tion and enforcement of petitioner’s sentence be stayed 
pending disposition of an appeal or petition for certiorari 
to this Court.

How the Federal Question Was Raised 
and Decided Below

Petitioner raised the objection that the Iowa Uniform 
Narcotic Drug Act, Chapter 204 of the 1966 Code of Iowa, 
expressly exempts the cough syrups from the Act’s appli­
cation including its record keeping requirement repeatedly 
throughout his trial.12 On each occasion, the trial court 
overruled petitioner’s objection. Petitioner alternately ob­

12 Petitioner relied on this ground in his motion to quash the 
indictment (R. 8-9) which was denied (R. 14), in his motion for 
a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the State’s evidence 
(R. 68) which was denied (R. 69), in his motion for a directed 
verdict at the close of all evidence (R. 85) which was denied (R. 
85), in his objections to instructions to the jury (R. 85) which were 
overruled (R. 85, 88-89), and in his motion for judgment notwith­
standing the verdict (R. 97) which was denied (R. 100).



12

jected that the record keeping provisions of the Act are 
ambiguous.13 The trial court also overruled this objection.

On appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court, petitioner reas­
serted these objections. In response to petitioner’s claim 
that the record keeping provisions of the Act are uncon­
stitutionally vague and indefinite, the Iowa Supreme Court 
applied the test promulgated by this Court in Connally v. 
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) :14

And a statute which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application violates the first essential 
of due process of law. (Opinion of Iowa Supreme 
Court, pg. 11a, infra.)

The Iowa Supreme Court then summarily held:

Applying the foregoing principles, we must reject 
the contention the statute is so vague and indefinite 
as to violate due process (pg. 11a, infra).

In response to petitioner’s objection that the Act clearly 
excepts the cough syrups from its requirements including 
that of record keeping, the Iowa Supreme Court noted 
that it was a problem of first impression and then con­
cluded :

The plain wording of that section [204.8(5)] says 
only narcotic preparations of a certain strength shall

13 Petitioner relied on this ground in his motion to quash the 
indictment (R. 16) and in his motion for a directed verdict at the 
close of the State’s evidence (R. 67).

14 In quoting the Connally rule verbatim, the Iowa Supreme 
Court did not cite Connally directly, but rather cited State v. 
Coppes, 247 Iowa 1057, 1061-62, 78 N.W.2d 10, 13-14 (1956), 
wherein the Iowa Supreme Court had also quoted the Connally 
rule verbatim and had cited Connally.



13

not be subject to the administering, dispensing and sell­
ing provisions of the chapter. It says nothing about any 
exemptions from record keeping, licensing or the 
penalty provisions of the chapter. Record keeping is 
entirely separate from administering, dispensing or 
selling.

We conclude the exemption provided in section 
204.8(5) does not apply to the record keeping require­
ments of section 204.9. (Opinion of Iowa Supreme 
Court, pp. 12a-13a, infra.)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari Should Re Granted to Determine Whether 
Petitioner Has Been Deprived of the Fair Warning to 
Which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Entitles Him When Sentenced to Two 
Years in Prison Pursuant to an Unforeseeable and 
Strained Construction of a State Statute.

Petitioner, a licensed pharmacist, was convicted of the 
felony of failure to keep proper records of his purchases 
of two cough syrups, each of which contains one grain or 
less of codeine per ounce, in violation of §204.9 of the 
1966 Code of Iowa, and sentenced to two years in the state 
penitentiary. Petitioner claims that he has been convicted 
as a felon pursuant to a strained and unforeseeable con­
struction of §204.9 by the Iowa Supreme Court, in viola­
tion of his constitutional right to fair warning of the con­
duct that §204.9 makes a crime.

On appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court, petitioner as­
serted that the clear language of the statute exempts the 
cough syrups from its record keeping requirement. Peti­
tioner’s understanding of the record keeping requirement



14

was affirmed by the Iowa Medical Society, which filed a 
brief amicus curiae in the Iowa Supreme Court in support 
of petitioner’s petition for rehearing. The Iowa Supreme 
Court noted that the question was one of first impression, 
and construed the statute to require the keeping of records 
of purchases and sales of the cough syrups.

Although the record keeping requirement of Chapter 
204 has been clarified by the Iowa Supreme Court in peti­
tioner’s case, at the time of the audit of petitioner’s phar­
macy on which petitioner’s conviction was founded, there 
were substantial reasons to believe that Iowa law did not 
require pharmacists to keep a record of purchases and 
sales of the cough syrups. Iowa narcotics law had been 
significantly revised in 1966. Prior to 1966, Chapter 204 
provided in §204.8 that the chapter shall not apply to the 
administering, dispensing, or selling of drug preparations 
containing not more than one grain of codeine per ounce 
except as otherwise provided; this provision was reenacted 
in 1966. However, in §204.9, the record keeping provision, 
the chapter provided prior to 1966:

(4) Every person who purchases for resale, or who 
sells narcotic drug preparations exempted by section 
204.8, shall keep a record showing the quantities and 
kinds thereof received and sold, or disposed of other­
wise, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 
five of this section.15 1962 Code of Iowa.

This provision was repealed in 1966.
Thus it appeared that pharmacists were no longer re­

required under the 1966 Code (effective July 4, 1966) to

15 This provision is contained in the Uniform Narcotics Drug Act 
(see 9B Uniform Laws Annotated §9(4), pg. 490), upon which 
Chapter 204 of the Iowa Code is modeled, and is contained in the 
laws of most other states which have adopted the Uniform Act 
(Br. I.M.S. 12, 22).



15

keep a record of purchases and sales of codeine-containing 
cough syrups.16 This conclusion was affirmed in a manual 
published for pharmacists by the Iowa Board of Phar­
macy Examiners, an official state agency. The manual, en­
titled “The Pharmacy Laws of Iowa” , contains the follow­
ing notice prominently displayed on the inside of its front 
cover:

Pharmacists Please Note:

Exempt narcotic classification:

Preparations containing only one grain 
or less of Codeine per ounce are ex­
empt under Iowa Law. Preparations 
containing other Opium derivatives in 
any amount are not exempt under Iowa 
Law even though they are exempt under 
Federal Law.17

This unqualified declaration of the Iowa Board of Phar­
macy Examiners that preparations such as the codeine- 
containing cough syrups are “exempt under Iowa law” is 
especially significant in light of the authority which Chap­

16 In its opinion the Iowa Supreme Court stated: “ It is inter­
esting to note defendant apparently knew and understood he was 
required to keep a record of his purchases and sales of Robitussin 
A-C as upon the request of the inspectors he without any protest 
or questions handed over to them some invoices and his registry 
book.” (Appendix, pg. 13a, infra.) The evidence was undisputed 
that petitioner’s “ registry book” was a record in compliance with 
federal law of persons who purchase the cough syrups without a 
prescription (R. 70-71, 79). That petitioner retained invoices 
because he believed he was required by state law to keep a record 
of purchases of cough syrups is debatable, in view of the undis­
puted evidence that the invoices contained purchases of many items 
in addition to the cough syrups (R. 64). There are many plausible 
reasons that the owner of a business such as a pharmacy would 
retain invoices covering his purchases of the preceding six months.

17 This notice has been contained in all editions of the manual 
published since at least 1966 (Br. I.M.S. 16).



16

ter 204 delegates to the Board. Section 204.8 authorizes 
the Board to prescribe conditions under which the exempt 
preparations may be sold, §204.8(5), or to terminate the 
exemption, §204.8(3). Section 204.9 provides that phar­
macists shall keep such records “as may be required by 
the board” . In 1966, the Board had promulgated no rules 
or regulations regarding record keeping or the exemption 
of codeine-containing cough syrups. In its brief amicus 
curiae, the Iowa Medical Society described the general 
reaction to the Board’s action:

. . . the Board not only failed to condition the exemp­
tion [under Section 204.8(5)], but also has acted af­
firmatively to lead pharmacists and others to believe 
that this exemptive provision was to be broadly con­
strued. (Br. I.M.S. 3).

In addition to the legislative history and the affirmative 
action of the Board of Pharmacy, Examiners, the terms of 
sections 204.8(5) and 204.9 viewed within the context of 
other provisions of Chapter 204 suggest that the keeping 
of records of purchases and sales of codeine-containing 
cough syrups is not required. The exemption provision, 
§204.8(5), states:

Except as otherwise provided, this chapter shall not 
apply to the administering, dispensing, or selling of any 
preparation containing not more than one grain (64.8 
mg.) of codeine . . . per . . . ounce.

Immediately following §204.8(5) is a cross-reference to 
§204.17(7). Section 204.17 proscribes procurement of nar­
cotic drugs by fraud or deceit, and in subsection 7 provides:

The provisions of this section shall apply to all trans­
actions relating to narcotic drugs under the provisions 
of section 204.8, in the same way as they apply to



17

transactions under all other sections. (Appendix, pg.
23a, infra.)

This is the only section in Chapter 204 which provides in 
express terms that it shall apply to preparations otherwise 
exempted by §204.8. That the legislature included this ex­
press provision in section 204.17 and included no such pro­
vision in section 204.9, the record keeping provision, sup­
ports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to 
require the keeping of records of codeine-containing 
preparations.

There is also evidenced by subsection 4 of §204.8 (pg. 
20a, infra), which sets forth the conditions to which phar­
maceutical preparations exempted from the chapter shall 
be subject. No condition is set forth in this subsection re­
garding the keeping of records.

Petitioner’s case reveals that if the exemption contained 
in §204.8(5) was not intended to exempt the codeine-con­
taining cough syrups from the record keeping requirement 
in §204.9, then there was significant confusion about what 
the exemption was intended to do. The Secretary to the 
Board of Pharmacy Examiners and Director of the Nar­
cotic Division testified for the State that the §204.8(5) ex­
emption applies only to the prescription requirement of 
§204.6 (pg. 18a, infra) (R. 42, 46). Counsel for the State 
argued before the trial court and on appeal to the Iowa 
Supreme Court that the exemption is ineffective without 
some affirmative action by the Board,18 because §204.8(5) 
provides that the codeine-containing preparations shall be 
exempt from the application of Chapter 204 when “ . . . ad­

18 A  pharmacist could have concluded justifiably, as the Iowa 
Medical Society argued to the Iowa Supreme Court, that the notice 
that codeine-containing preparations “are exempt” displayed prom­
inently on the Board’s own manual (see n. 8, supra) was such 
affirmative action. (Br. I.M.S. 17-18).



18

ministered, dispensed, or sold by persons and under condi­
tions prescribed by the board,”  (R. 68-69; St. Br. 80-31) 
(emphasis added). The State’s construction of the provi­
sion contradicted the testimony of its own expert witness 
that the exemption is effective insofar as the prescription 
requirement is concerned.

The Iowa Supreme Court did not delimit the scope of the 
exemption provided in §204.8(5), but the Court did declare 
that this exemption does not apply to the record keeping 
requirement of §204.9 (pg. 13a, infra). The court reasoned:

The plain wording of that section says only that nar­
cotic preparations of a certain strength shall not be 
subject to the administering, dispensing and selling 
provisions of the chapter. It says nothing about any 
exemption from record keeping, licensing or the penalty 
provisions of the chapter. Record keeping is entirely 
separate from administering, dispensing or selling. It 
is unreasonable to assume the legislature in the defini­
tion of narcotics included Robitussin A-C and Elixir 
Terpin Hydrate and Codeine as narcotics and then by 
section 204.8(5) took such preparations out of all pro­
visions contained in chapter 20419 (pg. 12a, infra).

Petitioner does not challenge the construction of Iowa law 
by the Iowa Supreme Court in this Court. Petitioner claims 
that, prior to the clarifying construction of the Iowa Su­
preme Court in his own case, sections 204.8(5) and 204.9 of 
the 1966 Code of Iowa “ . . . violated the requirement of the 
Due Process Clause that a criminal statute give fair warn­
ing of the conduct which it prohibits,” Bouie v. Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964). The question is not whether the

19 In view of the fact that the legislature expressly provided in 
§204.17(7) that §204.17 shall apply to drugs otherwise exempted 
by §204.8, this statement is incorrect.



19

construction of the Iowa Supreme Court is correct. The 
question is whether petitioner was hound to understand the 
record keeping provision according to the construction later 
announced by the Iowa Supreme Court “in advance of judi­
cial utterance upon the subject,” Lametta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451, 456 (1939).

The construction announced by the Iowa Supreme Court 
in petitioner’s case wTas unforeseeable.20 In the first place, 
the 1962 Code of Iowa provided in §204.8:

Except as otherwise in this chapter specifically pro­
vided, this chapter shall not apply to the following 
cases:

Administering, dispensing, or selling at retail of any 
medicinal preparation that contains in one fluid ounce 
. . . not more than one grain of codeine or of any of its 
salts. (Appendix, pg. 24a, infra.)

If the legislature considered record keeping “ entirely sep­
arate from administering, dispensing, or selling” , why did 
the legislature expressly provide in §204.9(4) of the 1962 
Code that: “Every person who purchases for resale, or 
who sells narcotic drug preparations exempted by sections 
204.8, shall keep a record . . . , ” (Appendix, pg. 25a, infra).

When subsection 4 of §204.9 was repealed in 1966, was 
petitioner bound to understand that records were none­
theless required? Was petitioner bound to understand 
that keeping records of his purchases and sales of the 
cough syrups was entirely separate from selling the prep­
arations, when the obligation to keep records arises only 
when he is sold these preparations by a drug wholesaler 
or when he sells the preparations to the public?

20 In its brief amicus curiae, the Iowa Medical Society stated: 
“Assume, however, that the court’s construction of this statute is 
correct. We nonetheless doubt that the average pharmacist would 
have been likely to reach the same conclusion.”  (Br. I.M.S. 23).



20

In the second place, according to the testimony of the 
State’s own witness, drug wholesalers accept telephone 
orders for these preparations and do not require official 
written orders21 (E. 51-52). Section 204.5(1) of the 1966 
Code (pg. 18a, infra) requires that wholesalers and manu­
facturers sell narcotic drugs only on official written orders. 
Written orders are apparently intended as a form of rec­
ord keeping, because “ each party to the transaction shall 
preserve his copy of such order for a period of five years,” 
§204.5(2), pg. 18a, infra. Was petitioner bound to under­
stand that he was required to preserve his copy of an 
official written order (although the Board of Pharmacy 
Examiners had not provided official order forms (R. 72)) 
because he was purchasing the cough syrups, while whole­
salers are not required to preserve these records because 
they are selling the cough syrups! Was petitioner bound 
to understand that §204.8(5) does exempt wholesalers from 
the requirement that they sell only on official written orders 
but does not exempt pharmacists from the requirement 
that they keep a record of sales of the cough syrups!

The confusion is compounded when one questions why 
these cough syrups may be sold without a prescription 
but a record of their sale must be kept. Prescription 
orders are a form of record keeping as they must be re­
tained for a period of five years “ so as to be readily ac­
cessible for inspection by any public officer,” §204.6(3), 
pg. 19a, infra. Was petitioner bound to understand that 
record keeping is entirely separate from selling but re­
taining prescription orders is not!

Whether this is a case where “  . . .  a statute precise on 
its face has been unforeseeably and retroactively expanded 
by judicial construction,” Bouie v. Columbia, supra, 352,

21 The Iowa Medical Society stated to the Iowa Supreme Court: 
“We have no doubt that this action by a wholesaler or manufacturer 
is both lawful and common practice in Iowa.” (Br. I.M.S. 13.)



21

or a case where an ambiguous statute has been retroac­
tively clarified by judicial construction, see cases cited in 
Amsterdam, Note, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 73-74 n. 34, the 
injury to petitioner is the same. He has been denied his 
right “ . . . to be informed as to what the State commands 
or forbids,” Lametta v. New Jersey, supra, 453.

Furthermore, the unqualified declaration that codeine- 
containing preparations are “exempt under Iowa law” 
prominently displayed in the manual of the Iowa Board of 
Pharmacy Examiners constitutes active misleading of a 
citizen by an agent of the State analogous to the misleading 
condemned in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965)22 
and in Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959).23 In the words 
of the Iowa Medical Society:

Certainly it is unseemly for the Board to tell phar­
macists and others that these preparations are exempt 
under Iowa law and then cause a pharmacist to be con­
victed as a felon for acting in accordance with the 
Board’s pronouncement. (Br. I.M.S. 17.)

In light of the repeal of subsection (4) of §204.9 in 1966, 
the fact that the Iowa Board of Pharmacy Examiners not 
only failed to use its authority to clarify the record keeping 
requirements of Chapter 204 but declared without qualifica­
tion that the codeine-containing preparations are exempt,

22 In Cox this Court held that although the lack of specificity in 
the word “near” may not render the challenged statute unconsti­
tutionally vague, demonstrators justifiably relied upon an admin­
istrative interpretation of how “near” the courthouse their demon­
stration might take place and that the Due Process Clause prevented 
conviction of the demonstrators. Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 568-69.

23 In Raley, contempt convictions were held violative of the Due 
Process Clause where a State Commission had affirmatively advised 
the appellants that they could invoke the privilege against self­
incrimination and refuse to answer the Commission’s questions. 
Raley v. Ohio, supra, 425-26.



22

and the terms of sections 204.8(5) and 204.9 viewed in the 
context of Chapter 204, the Iowa Supreme Court’s construc­
tion of §204.9 to require pharmacists to keep records of their 
purchases and sales of these cough syrups was so strained 
and unforeseeable as to deprive petitioner of the fair warn­
ing that his failure to keep such records was a felony, in 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reason the writ of certiorari should 
issue as prayed and the judgment of the Iowa Supreme 
Court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

J ack  Greenberg
M ic h a e l  M eltsner
E ric S ch n apper
A n n  W agner

10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

O scar E. J ones
T ed W . R ockw ell

1205 East 33rd Street 
Des Moines, Iowa 50317

R obert A. W righ t  
260 Key Building 
518 Grand Avenue 
Des Moines, Iowa 50309

W . L aw rence  Oliver 
416 East 6th Avenue 
Des Moines, Iowa 50309

J ames B. M orris, Jr.
225 Locust Street 
Des Moines, Iowa

Attorneys for Petitioner



APPENDIX



I n  t h e  S u prem e  C ourt op I owa 

F iled O ctober 14, 1969 

No. 148—53403

O p in io n  o f  S u p re m e  C ou rt o f  Iow a

S tate op I ow a ,

v .

Appellee,

M arion  E dward "William s ,
Appellant.

Appeal from Polk District Court—
Gibson C. Holliday, Judge.

Defendant appeals from judgment on a verdict finding 
him guilty of failure to keep proper records of narcotic 
drugs in violation of section 204.9, Code, 1966.—Affirmed.

Rockwell & Jones, of Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, Larry Seckington, 

Assistant Attorney General, and Ray Fenton, County At­
torney, for appellee.

M oore, J.
June 5, 1968 the Polk County grand jury returned an 

indictment charging Marion Edward Williams, a licensed 
pharmacist, with failure to keep proper records of narcotic 
drugs in violation of section 204.9, Code, 1966, to which, 
after an adverse ruling on his motion to quash or set aside 
the indictment, he entered a plea of not guilty. On trial a 
jury verdict of guilty was returned. October 14, 1968 the 
trial court entered judgment fining defendant $2000 and 
sentencing him to serve two years in the state penitentiary 
at Fort Madison. Defendant has appealed. We affirm.



2a

Defendant asserts tlie trial court erred in (1) overruling 
his motion to quash indictment, (2) allowing the witness 
Eaaz to testify regarding the accountability survey, (3) 
allowing exhibit 1 in evidence, (4) permitting the witness 
Crews to testify as to the law, (5) overruling his motion for 
directed verdict at the close of the State’s evidence, (6) over­
ruling his motion for directed verdict at close of all the 
evidence, (7) overruling his motion for judgment notwith­
standing the verdict or new trial, (8) submitting instruc­
tions 4 and 5 and (9) imposing the sentence which was im­
posed upon him.

Section 204.19, Code, 1966, makes it the duty of the board 
of pharmacy examiners, all peace officers and county attor­
neys to enforce all provisions of the Uniform Narcotics 
Drug Act, chapter 204, Code, 1966.

January 4, 1967 Virgil A. Eaaz and Clifford Wheeler, 
state pharmacy board inspectors, made an audit of Williams 
Prescription Pharmacy at 1103 University Ave. in Des 
Moines. On arrival they announced to defendant owner and 
operator of the pharmacy, they were there to conduct a 
class ‘X ’ narcotics audit. They told defendant they wanted 
his exempt registry signature book and all invoices cover­
ing the same items and they would physically count the on- 
hand individual items.

The audit, which is also referred to in the record as an 
accountability survey, covered four-ounce Eobitussin A-C 
(the C refers to codeine) and four-ounce Elixir Terpin Hy­
drate and Codeine for the period from July 1 to December 
31, 1966. The only invoices produced by defendant of pur­
chases of these two items were those from Des Moines Drug 
Company. They showed purchases on various dates be­
tween July 1 and December 31,1966 totaling 2328 four-ounce 
bottles Eobitussin A-C and 66 four-ounce bottles Elixir

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



3a

Terpin Hydrate and Codeine. The registry book showed 
sales of 1961 four-ounce bottles of Robitussin A-C and no 
sales of Elixir Terpin Hydrate and Codeine. After count­
ing the stock on hand the inspectors prepared and made a 
part of the pharmacy board’s records an audit report which 
is now exhibit 1 in the record.

As a follow-up on this audit or accountability survey Mr. 
Raaz checked invoices at Des Moines Drug and Iowa Drug 
Company in Des Moines for sale of the two items to de­
fendant during the six months period being investigated. 
He found at Des Moines Drug invoices dated 7-19-66, 7-22- 
66, 7-26-66, 7-28-66, 7-29-66, 11-18-66, 11-22-66, 11-23-66, 11- 
28-66, 11-30-66, 12-2-66, 12-6-66, 12-7-66, 12-13-66, 12-16-66, 
12-19-66,12-21-66,12-23-66,12-29-66, showing sales to defen­
dant of 546 bottles of Robitussin A-C making a total of 
2874. None of these invoices were shown to the inspectors 
by defendant. Nine of them showed purchases of Elixir 
Terpin Hydrate and Codeine. The record discloses defen­
dant paid cash for these purchases within two or three days 
after delivery. They totaled several hundred dollars.

Investigation at the Iowa Drug disclosed 29 invoices and 
defendant had purchased 1392 four-ounce bottles of Robi­
tussin A-C during the six months period involved. He had 
produced none of these invoices when the inspectors re­
quested all his invoices.

Thearl Hesecher, accountant for Des Moines Drug Com­
pany, identified the above listed invoices as part of the 
company’s regular business records and testified the drugs 
listed thereon had been paid for by defendant. Evidence of 
defendant’s purchase of the 1392 four-ounce bottles of Robi­
tussin A-C at the Iowa Drug Company was initially intro­
duced and fully developed on cross-examination of State’s 
witness Raaz.

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



4a

Class ‘X ’ narcotics is a federal classification of narcotic 
preparations which do not require a prescription to make 
a purchase thereof. The record, however, establishes fed­
eral regulations require a pharmacist keep a record of those 
to whom Class ‘X ’ narcotics are sold.

Paul Crews, secretary to the board of pharmacy exam­
iners and director of the narcotic division, a registered 
pharmacist since 1939, testified: “A class ‘X ’ narcotic con­
tains a narcotic medication within certain limitations of 
amounts, and also in combination with other drugs and 
medicine which are not narcotic. Neither Elixir Terpin 
Hydrate and Codeine or Robitussin A-C contains more than 
one grain of Codeine per fluid ounce. Codeine is a narcotic 
drug derived from the parent material gum opium. # # * 
Codeine is derived from this morphine base and codeine is 
classified as a narcotic drug. The usual dosage of Codeine 
depending upon the condition it is prescribed for, for an 
average adult, probably would be a fourth of a grain, and a 
physician may prescribe two, three, maybe up to a maximum 
of four doses a day for a short period of time, depending 
upon the existing condition. Robitussin A-C and Elixir 
Terpin Hydrate and Codeine contain either sixteen or eight 
times the normal dosage per four ounce bottle.”

On cross-examination by defendant’s counsel Crews testi­
fied Class ‘X ’ narcotics, one of which is Robitussin A-C, is 
exempt from prescription requirements but not exempt from 
other requirements. On redirect examination, over defen­
dant’s objection, Crews testified Robitussin A-C is exempt 
from prescription requirements under the Iowa law but all 
record keeping requirements must be maintained as to re­
ceipt of the drug at the time of purchase and at the time of 
the sale of the drug. He stated further the board had not 
as of 1966 adopted additional rules or instructions on record 
keeping requirements.

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



5a

I. The main thrust of defendant’s argument that the 
trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash, his mo­
tions for directed verdict, his motion for judgment notwith­
standing the verdict or for new trial as well as his exception 
to instructions 4 and 5 is that Code section 204.8(5) is the 
pertinent statute rather than section 204.9. It is defendant’s 
contention he was not required to keep records regarding 
his purchase and sale of the narcotic preparations, Robitus- 
sin A-C and Elixir Terpin Hydrate and Codeine. It is the 
State’s position prescriptions were not required for these 
items but that is the extent of the exemption regarding re­
sale thereof.

Code section 204.1(10) under definitions states: “ ‘Nar­
cotic drug’ means any of the following, alone, in combina­
tion, or mixed with other ingredients:

“ a. Opium, isonipecaine, cocoa leaves, or opiate.
“b. Any compound, manufacture, sale, derivative, or 

preparation of opium, isonipecaine, cocoa leaves, or opiate.”

Code section 204.8 provides: “Preparations exempted. 
1. The board may by regulation exempt from the applica­
tion of this chapter to the extent it determines to be con­
sistent with the public welfare, pharmaceutical preparations 
of narcotic drugs found by the board after due notice and 
opportunity for hearing.

“ a. Either to possess no addiction-forming or addiction- 
sustaining liability, or to possess such slight addiction­
forming or addiction-sustaining liability as to create little 
risk of improper use, and

“b. Not to permit recovery of a narcotic drug having 
such liability, with relative technical simplicity and degree 
of yield as to create a risk of improper use.

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



6a

“2. In exercising the authority granted in subsection 1 
of this section, the board, by regulation and without special 
findings, may grant an exempt status to such pharmaceutical 
preparations of narcotic drugs as are or may be determined 
to be exempt under the federal narcotics laws and regula­
tions and permit the administering, dispensing, or selling of 
such preparations under conditions and by persons the 
board may prescribe.

“3. If the board shall determine that any exempt prep­
aration does possess a degree of addiction liability that, in 
its opinion, results in abusive use, the board shall by regu­
lation publish its determination. The determination shall 
be final and the exempt status shall cease to apply to such 
preparation sixty days after the publication date of the 
determination.

“4. Pharmaceutical preparations of narcotic drugs ex­
empted from this chapter shall be subject to the following 
conditions:

“a. The preparation administered, dispensed, or sold, 
shall contain, in addition to the narcotic drug in it, some 
drug or drugs conferring upon it medicinal qualities other 
than those possessed by the narcotic drug alone.

“b. The preparation shall be administered, dispensed, or 
sold in good faith as a medicine, and not for the purpose of 
evading the provisions of this chapter.

“c. Only a pharmacist shall sell at retail or dispense such 
a preparation.

“5. Except as otherwise provided, this chapter shall not 
apply to the administering, dispensing, or selling of any

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



7a

preparation containing not more than one grain (64.8 mg.) 
of codeine, or any of its salts, per one fluid ounce (29.5729 
c.c.) or per one avoirdupoise ounce (28.3 gms.), when such 
pharmaceutical preparations of narcotic drugs are adminis­
tered, dispensed, or sold by persons and under conditions 
prescribed by the board.”

It appears without dispute the board of pharmacy ex­
aminers had not adopted any exemption from the applica­
tion of the provisions of chapter 204. The question pre­
sented is whether subdivision 5 of section 204.8 exempts 
from record keeping such narcotic preparations as described 
therein.

Code section 204.9 provides: “Records to be kept. Medi­
cal practitioners, manufacturers, wholesalers, pharmacies, 
pharmacists, hospitals, laboratories, and every person who 
purchases for resale or who sells narcotic drugs, shall keep 
such records as may be required by the board relating to 
receipt, manufacture, inventory, distribution, including dis­
pensing, administering, sale, or other disposition and in­
formation as to narcotics stolen, lost, or destroyed. In every 
case the record of narcotics drugs received shall show the 
date of receipt, the name and address of the person from 
whom received, and the kind and quantity of drugs received; 
the kind and quantity of narcotic drugs produced or re­
moved from process of manufacture, and the date of such 
production or removal from process of manufacture. The 
record of all narcotic drugs sold, administered, dispensed, 
or otherwise disposed of, shall show the date of selling, ad­
ministering, or dispensing, the name and address of the per­
son to whom, or for whose use, or the owner and species of 
animal for which the drugs were sold, administered, or 
dispensed and the kind and quantity of drugs.

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



8a,

“Every such, record shall he kept for a period of five 
years from the date of the transaction recorded. The keep­
ing of a record required by or under the federal narcotic 
laws containing substantially the same information as is 
specified by this chapter, shall constitute compliance with 
this section, except that every such record shall contain 
a detailed list of narcotic drugs lost, destroyed, or stolen, 
if any, the kind and quantity of such drugs, and the date of 
the discovery of such loss, destruction, or theft.”

It is the State’s position, with which the trial court agreed 
and so stated in instructions 4 and 5, that under section 
204.9 defendant was in every case required to keep a record 
of narcotic drugs received, the date of receipts, the name 
and address of the person from whom received and of those 
to whom sold.

The problem presented is of first impression before this 
court. Similar problems have, however, been considered in 
other jurisdictions.

In Merritt v. State, Ind., 198 N.E.2d 867, defendant was 
charged under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act of obtain­
ing an “exempt” narcotic drug, paregoric containing opium, 
by giving a false name and address. In affirming defendant’s 
conviction the Indiana court held the exemption ran only 
to purchase on prescription. At page 869 of 198 N.E.2d, the 
court said: “Viewing the Uniform Narcotic Act as a whole, 
it is obvious that it was the intent of the legislature that in 
certain instances it is not necessary to secure a physician’s 
prescription to buy certain narcotic drugs with a minimum 
content of opium therein specified, and that paregoric con­
taining less than two grains of opium was within that group 
and could be obtained without a prescription. However, it 
is also apparent that even though certain drugs containing 
a low percentage of a narcotic might be purchased without

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



9a

a physician’s prescription, the law still required that a rec­
ord be kept of the purchases and sales and to whom made.”

Continuing on page 870 the court says: “In other words, 
a narcotic drug of a certain percentage or less may be 
exempt from part of the provisions of the Uniform Nar­
cotic Act and not other provisions thereof. That, in our 
judgment, is the case here. The act does exempt paregoric 
containing two grains or less of opium from the provisions 
with reference to a physician’s prescription, etc., but does 
not exempt the seller of such a drug from the requirement 
of keeping a record of the sales nor the buyer from the 
penal provision when obtaining the same by use of deceit, 
fraud or the use of a false name. This appears to be the 
construction given in other states where similar questions 
have arisen. State v. Lee (1963), 62 Wash.2d 228, 382 P.2d
491; State v. Sanchez (1962), 13 Utah 2d 307, 373 P.2d 605.
# # #

“From reading the act as a whole, it would seem that the 
purpose of the act requiring the druggist to keep a record 
of the sales and to whom made is that an accurate record 
be kept in order to determine whether the exempt nar­
cotics are being used by an addict or diverted to an unlawful 
use and false names and addresses being used for that 
purpose.”

In State v. Sanchez, 13 Utah 2d 307, 373 P.2d 695, defen­
dant was convicted of obtaining a narcotic drug, paregoric, 
by fraud and deceit. In affirming the conviction the court 
held the statute providing that it shall not apply to ad­
ministering, dispensing or selling at retail of any medicinal 
preparation containing not more than one grain of codeine 
in one fluid ounce is limited to administering, dispensing 
or selling at retail has no application to obtaining by fraud 
or deceit, a narcotic drug.

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



In State v. Goodwin, 181 Neb. 616, 150 N.W.2d 135, de­
fendant’s conviction of attempting to obtain a narcotic 
drug, Eobitussin A-C, by misrepresentation under statutory 
provisions very similar to our chapter 204 was affirmed.

The Nebraska court at page 136, 150 N.W.2d, states:
“Eobitussin A.C. is a commercial cough syrup which may 
be purchased without a prescription, but the transcription 
must be recorded. The evidence is undisputed that an ounce 
of syrup contained less than one grain of codeine phos­
phate. * * *

“Eead literally or otherwise, the statutory language does 
not except transferees of the medicinal preparations from 
the penal section.” (citations)

For other authority supporting the conclusion the exemp­
tion of certain drugs from prescription requirements does 
not bar prosecution for violation of other provisions of the 
narcotic statutes see Eandle v. Calif. State Bd. of Phar­
macy, 240 Cal.App. 2d 254, 49 Cal. Eptr. 405, 17 A.L.E.3d 
1398; Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 570, 125 S.E.2d 
858; Schenher v. State, Ala., 90 So.2d 234; People v. Eow- 
lby, 51 Ill.App.2d 51, 201 N.E.2d 136.

Most of the authorities we have cited are reviewed in 
25 A.L.E.3d 1118, section 5, pages 1127-1130. Folenius v. 
Eckle, 109 Ohio App. 152, 164 N.E.2d 458, and Stone v. 
Sacks, Ohio App., 191 N.E.2d 185, on which defendant here 
heavily relies, are distinguished on the basis the drug 
paregoric is not considered a narcotic under the provisions 
of the then existing Ohio statutes. It is undisputed here 
that Eobitussin A-C and Elixir Terpin Hydrate and Co­
deine are narcotics under our statutory definitions.

II. Defendant strongly argues the provisions of chapter 
204 regarding record keeping requirements are so vague,

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



11a

indefinite and open to conjecture that enforcement violates 
the first essential of due process.

In Lever Brothers Co. v. Erbe, 249 Iowa 454, 467, 468, 
87 N.W. 2d 469, 478, we quote from State v. Coppes, 247 
Iowa 1057, 1061, 1062, 78 N.W.2d 10, 13, 14, these estab­
lished rules: “ That the terms of a penal statute creating 
a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those 
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render 
them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized require­
ment, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play 
and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague 
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the 
first essential of due process of law. (Citation.)

“ * * # The legislature * * * must inform the citizen with 
reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit, so 
that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct 
and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. * # * It is 
axiomatic that statutes creating and defining crimes cannot 
be extended by intendment. Purely statutory offenses can­
not be established by implication. * * * ”

However, a statute is not so vague and uncertain as to be 
void where the meaning of words used can be fairly ascer­
tained by reference to similar statutes, other judicial deter­
minations, reference to the common law, to the dictionary, 
or if the words themselves have a common and generally 
accepted meaning. Powers v. McCullough, 258 Iowa 738, 
746, 140 N.W.2d 378, 384, and citations.

Applying the foregoing principles, we must reject the 
contention the statute is so vague and indefinite as to violate 
due process.

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



12a

III. Defendant contends here, as he did before the trial 
conrt, that section 204.8(5) takes certain narcotic drugs 
entirely out of the purview of the chapter. We do not 
agree. The plain wording of that section says only that 
narcotic preparations of a certain strength shall not be 
subject to the administering, dispensing and selling provi­
sions of the chapter. It says nothing about any exemption 
from record keeping, licensing or the penalty provisions of 
the chapter. Record keeping is entirely separate from ad­
ministering, dispensing or selling. It is unreasonable to 
assume the legislature in the definition of narcotics included 
Robitussin A-C and Elixir Terpin Hydrate and Codeine 
as narcotics and then by section 204.8(5) took such prepara­
tions out of all provisions contained in chapter 204.

The next pertinent part of section 204.9 provides: “ In 
every case the record of narcotic drugs received shall show 
the date of receipt, the name and address of the person 
from whom received, and the kind and quantity of drugs 
received # (emphasis added). We are not impressed
with defendant’s argument that the board’s failure to pre­
scribe a particular form for keeping such a record provided 
him some excuse for not keeping a record.

“Every” means each one of all. 15 Words and Phrases, 
Perm. Ed., pages 792-794. It has substantially the same 
meaning as “all” which is later used in the same section. 
In Consolidated Preightways Corp. v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 
115, 121, 137 N.W.2d 900, 904, we say: “ The word ‘all’ is 
commonly understood and usually does not admit of an 
exception, addition or exclusion.” (citations).

The last paragraph of section 204.9 includes this: “ The 
keeping of a record required by or under the federal nar­
cotic laws containing substantially the same information as 
is specified by this chapter, shall constitute compliance with

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



13a

this section * * * The plain meaning of this phrase is 
that section 204.9 requires records to be kept as does the 
federal law.

It is interesting to note defendant apparently knew and 
understood he was required to keep a record of his pur­
chases and sales of Robitussin A-C as upon the request of 
the inspectors he without any protest or questions handed 
over to them some invoices and his registry hook. Both the 
prior and present statutes require keeping of records of 
narcotics bought by a pharmacist. We find nothing in the 
legislative history of the statute to support defendant’s 
claim he was not required to keep a record of such narcotics 
as Robitussin A-C or Elixir Terpin Hydrate and Codeine 
which are sold as a cough syrup.

We conclude the exemption provided in section 204.8(5) 
does not apply to the record keeping requirements of sec­
tion 204.9. Defendant’s assigned errors 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are 
not grounds for a reversal.

IV. Defendant’s assigned errors 2 and 3 are based on 
claimed lack of qualifications of the witness Raaz to conduct 
the audit or accountability survey. Defendant argues vig­
orously because Raaz had not attended an accountability 
survey school sponsored by the federal government until 
after completion of the audit he was not qualified to make 
the audit or prepare exhibit 1, the audit report which be­
came a part of the records of the pharmacy board. Assigned 
errors 2 and 3 are without merit. Raaz testified he had 
worked with Wheeler and other registered pharmacists and 
had attended many in-office critiques or instructions re­
garding the two items being audited and that the audit or 
survey was done by reviewing the invoices and registry 
produced by defendant and counting his stock on hand. The 
audit or survey consisted of simple mathematical calcula­

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



14a

tions and setting out the results thereof in a report to the 
hoard. Attendance of a federally sponsored accountability 
school would not be required to carry out such an audit or 
survey.

Y. Cross-examination of Paul Crews, secretary of the 
pharmacy board, by defendant’s counsel includes:

“Q. We have Eobitussin, which is a Class ‘X ’ exempt, 
right, for prescription? A. That is correct.

“Q. And you are telling me it has sixteen times more in 
it than a regular dosage of codeine? A. Your comparison 
here is not quite a fair one.

“Q. Well, that’s what I was thinking. That’s the com­
parison you made. A. For the reason you are referring 
to a single dose of codeine by itself, and this particular 
formulation has four grains of codeine in that four ounce 
bottle.

“Q. Mixed with other— A. Mixed with other medici- 
nals, right.

“ Q. That’s why it’s Class ‘X ’, and a prescription isn’t 
required, isn’t that right? A. It is exempt from the pre­
scription requirement only. It is not exempt from any of 
the other requirements.

“ Q. But it says it is a Class ‘X ’ exempt drug, doesn’t it? 
A. Meaning exempt from the prescription requirement.”

Crews’ redirect examination includes:
“Q. Mr. Crews, Class ‘X ’, that classification is a federal 

classification? A. That is correct.
“Q. And the term exempt, which is on the Eobitussin A-C, 

means exempt from prescription requirements? A. That 
is correct.

“ Q. Does that also mean exempt from record keeping 
under the Iowa rule ?

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



15a

“Mr. Rockwell: Objected to as calling for an opinion and 
conclusion of the witness, and for the further reason it is 
leading.

“The Court: He may answer, if he knows the answer.
“A. All other record keeping requirements must be main­

tained as to the receipts of the drug at the time of purchase, 
and at the time of the sale of the drug.”

Defendant asserts the trial court erred “ in permitting 
State’s witness, Paul Crews, to testify as to the the law” . 
The obvious answer to this contention is that defendant first 
on cross-examination inquired about the applicable law 
and thereby opened the door for further such inquiry on 
redirect. The trial court’s ruling was correct.

58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, section 562, page 315, states: “A 
party may not complain of incompetent evidence brought 
out on redirect examination of a witness, to explain incom­
petent testimony elicited on cross-examination.” Similar 
statements of the general rule are found in 98 C.J.S., Wit­
nesses, section 419b.

Hofacre v. Monticello, 128 Iowa 239, 245, 103 N.W. 488, 
490, states: “The matter was brought out on cross-exami­
nation, and plaintiff had the right to re-examine with re­
spect thereto. The question, no doubt, called for an opinion 
or conclusion of the witness, or rather for a comparison 
by him; but in view of the nature of the cross-examination 
and of the answer given by the witness we are not inclined 
to interfere with the discretion of the trial court in such 
matters.” We have consistently recognized this rule. Cast- 
ner v. Wright, 256 Iowa 638, 647, 127 N.W.2d 583, 588, 128 
N.W. 2d 885; State v. Finnegan, 244 Iowa 166, 172, 55 N.W. 
2d 223, 226; Glatstein v. Grand, 243 Iowa 541, 549, 51 N.W. 
2d 162, 168; State v. Rohn, 140 Iowa 640, 646, 119 N.W. 88, 
91.

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



16a

VI. Defendant’s remaining assigned error is “ The conrt 
erred in imposing the sentence which it imposed upon this 
defendant” . He argues he was sentenced pursuant to sec­
tion 204.20(4) which provides: “For violation of the pro­
visions of this chapter concerning the manufacturing, sell­
ing, administering to another person, or dispensing a nar­
cotic drug, the imposition or execution of sentence shall 
not be suspended and probation or parole shall not be 
granted until the minimum imprisonment herein provided 
for the offense shall have been served.”

The record discloses defendant was sentenced on the ver­
dict finding him guilty of failure to keep records in viola­
tion of section 204.9 and pursuant to section 204.20(1) 
which provides: “Any person violating any provision of 
this chapter, except as otherwise provided shall upon con­
viction be fined not more than two thousand dollars and 
shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary not less than 
two or more than five years. * # "We find nothing in 
the record indicating the trial court felt obliged to follow 
section 204.20(4).

Defendant does not specifically argue the penalty im­
posed is too severe but this must be inferred from his 
contention that section 204.20(4) was followed by the-trial 
court. It is our duty to carefully consider whether the 
punishment imposed is too severe. Code section 793.18. We 
have, however, consistently held that where the judgment 
imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum, it is only 
where an abuse of the trial court’s discretion in fixing pun­
ishment is shown that we will interfere. State v. DeBaad,
....... Iowa ......164 N.W.2d 108, 112; State v. Cupples,
260 Iowa 1192, 1197, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280; State v. Kulish, 
260 Iowa 138, 145, 148 N.Y.2d 428, 433.

The punishment imposed here is within the maximum 
under section 204.20(1). We must presume the trial court

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



17a

took all the facts developed in the course of the trial and 
the entire picture presented into consideration in fixing the 
sentence. State v. Kramer, 252 Iowa 916, 921, 922, 109 
N.W.2d 18, 21. We find no abuse of the court’s discretion.

Finding* no reversible error, the judgment of the trial 
court is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Rawlings, J., who takes no 
part.

Opinion of Supreme Court of Iowa



18a

1966  Code of Iowa 

(Chapter 204)
# * # # #

204.5 Sales on written orders.

!• A  duly licensed manufacturer or wholesaler may sell 
and propagate narcotic drugs to any of the following1 per­
sons, but only on official written orders:

a. To a manufacturer, wholesaler, pharmacist, or phar­
macy.

# # # # *
2. An official written order for any narcotic drug shall 

be signed in triplicate by the person giving said order or 
by his duly authorized agent. The original shall be pre­
sented to the person who sells or propagates the narcotic 
drug or drugs named therein. Upon the acceptance of such 
order by said person, each party to the transaction shall 
preserve his copy of such order for a period of five years 
in such a way as to be readily accessible for inspection by 
any public officer or employee engaged in the enforcement 
of this chapter. It shall be deemed a compliance with this 
subsection if the parties to the transaction have complied 
with the federal narcotic laws, respecting the requirements 
governing the use of order forms.

*  w  -fi-

204.6 Sales by pharmacists.

1. A pharmacist, in good faith, may sell or dispense 
narcotic drugs to any person upon a written prescription 
order of a medical practitioner properly executed, dated, 
and signed by the person prescribing on the day when 
issued and bearing the full name and address of the patient 
for whom, or of the owner of the animal for which, the



19a

drug is dispensed, and the full name, address, and registry 
number under the federal narcotic laws of the person pre­
scribing, if he is required by those laws to be so registered. 
If the prescription order is for an animal, it shall state the 
species of animal for which the drug is prescribed.

tF w  w  -Jr tF

3. The pharmacist dispensing an oral or written pre­
scription order under this section shall write the date of 
dispensing and his own signature on the face of the pre­
scription order. The oral or written prescription order 
shall be retained in a separate file by the proprietor of the 
pharmacy in which it is dispensed for a period of five years, 
so as to be readily accessible for inspection by any public 
officer or employee engaged in the enforcement of this 
chapter. The oral or written prescription order shall not 
be renewed.

# #  *  #  ^

204.8 Preparations exempted.

1. The board may by regulation exempt from the appli­
cation of this chapter to the extent it determines to be 
consistent with the public welfare, pharmaceutical prep­
arations of narcotic drugs found by the board after due 
notice and opportunity for hearing:

a. Either to possess no addiction-forming or addiction- 
sustaining liability, or to possess such slight addiction- 
forming or addiction-sustaining liability as to create little 
risk of improper use, and

b. Not to permit recovery of a narcotic drug having such 
liability, with relative technical simplicity and degree of 
yield as to create a risk of improper use.

1966 Code of Iowa



20a

2. In exercising the authority granted in subsection 1 
of this section, the board, by regulation and without special 
findings, may grant an exempt status to such pharmaceu­
tical preparations of narcotic drugs as are or may be deter­
mined to be exempt under the federal narcotic laws and 
regulations and permit the administering, dispensing, or 
selling of such preparations under conditions and by per­
sons the board may prescribe.

3. If the board shall determine that any exempt prepara­
tion does possess a degree of addiction liability that, in its 
opinion, results in abusive use, the board shall by regula­
tion publish its determination. The determination shall be 
final and the exempt status shall cease to apply to such 
preparation sixty days after the publication date of the 
determination.

4. Pharmaceutical preparations of narcotic drugs ex­
empted from this chapter shall be subject to the following 
conditions:

a. The preparation administered, dispensed, or sold, 
shall contain, in addition to the narcotic drug in it, some 
drug or drugs conferring upon it medicinal qualities other 
than those possessed by the narcotic drug alone.

b. The preparation shall be administered, dispensed, or 
sold in good faith as a medicine, and not for the purpose 
of evading the provisions of this chapter.

c. Only a pharmacist shall sell at retail or dispense such 
a preparation.

5. Except as otherwise provided, this chapter shall not 
apply to the administering, dispensing, or selling of any

1966 Code of Iowa



21a

preparation containing not more than one grain (64.8mg.) 
of codeine, or any of its salts, per one fluid ounce (29.5729
c.e.) or per one avoirdupois ounce (28.3 gms.), when such 
pharmaceutical preparations of narcotic drugs are admin­
istered, dispensed, or sold by persons and under conditions 
prescribed by the board. [C39, §3169.08; C46, 50, 54, 58, 62, 
§204.8; 61GA, ch. 195, §8]

Referred to in §204.17, subsection 7

204.9 Records to be kept. Medical practitioners, manu­
facturers, wholesalers, pharmacies, pharmacists, hospitals, 
laboratories, and every person who purchases for resale or 
who sells narcotic drugs, shall keep such records as may be 
required by the board relating to receipt, manufacture, 
inventory, distribution, including dispensing, administering, 
sale, or other disposition, and information as to narcotics 
stolen, lost, or destroyed. In every case the record of nar­
cotic drugs received shall show the date of receipt, the 
name and address of the person from whom received, and 
the kind and quantity of drugs received; the kind and 
quantity of narcotic drugs produced or removed from 
process of manufacture, and the date of such production or 
removal from processes of manufacture. The record of all 
narcotic drugs sold, administered, dispensed, or otherwise 
disposed of, shall show the date of selling, administering, 
or dispensing, the name and address of the person to whom, 
or for whose use, or the owner and species of animal for 
which the drugs were sold, administered, or dispensed and 
the kind and quantity of drugs.

Every such record shall be kept for a period of five years 
from the date of the transaction recorded. The keeping of 
a record required by or under the federal narcotic laws 
containing substantially the same information as is specified 
by this chapter, shall constitute compliance with this sec-

1966 Code of Iowa



22a

tion, except that every such record shall contain a detailed 
list of narcotic drugs lost, destroyed, or stolen, if any, the 
kind and quantity of such drugs, and the date of the dis­
covery of such loss, destruction, or theft. [C39, §3169.09; 
C46, 50, 54, 58, 62, §204.9; 61GA, ch. 195, §9]

m # * # #
204.17 Fraud or deceit.

1. No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain a narcotic 
drug or procure or attempt to procure the administration of 
a narcotic drug:

a. By fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge.

b. By the forgery or alteration of a prescription order 
or of any written order.

c. By the concealment of a material fact.

d. By the use of a false name or the giving of a false 
address.

2. Information communicated to a medical practitioner 
in an effort unlawfully to procure a narcotic drug, or un­
lawfully to procure the administration of any such drug, 
shall not be deemed a privileged communication.

3. No person shall willfully make a false statement in any 
prescription order, report, record, or order required by 
this chapter.

4. No person shall, for the purpose of obtaining a nar­
cotic drug, falsely assume the title of, or represent himself 
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, pharmacy, pharmacist, 
medical practitioner, or other authorized person.

1966 Code of Iowa



23a

5. No person shall make or utter any false or forged 
prescription order or false or forged written order.

6. No person shall affix any false or forged label to a 
package or receptacle containing narcotic drugs.

7. The provisions of this section shall apply to all trans­
actions relating to narcotic drugs under the provisions of 
section 204.8, in the same way as they apply to transactions 
under all other sections. [C39, §3169.17; C46, 50, 54, 58, 62, 
§204.18; 61GA, ch. 195, §17]

* # # # #

1966 Code of Iowa



24a

1962 Code of Iowa 

(Chapter 204)

UNIFORM NARCOTIC DRUG ACT
Section 204.8 Preparations Exempted.

Except as otherwise in this chapter specifically provided, 
this chapter shall not apply to the following cases:

Administering, dispensing, or selling at retail of any 
medicinal preparation that contains in one fluid ounce, or if 
a solid or semi-solid preparation, in one avoirdupois ounce, 
not more than one grain of codeine or of any of its salts.

The exemption authorized by this section shall be subject 
to the following conditions:

1. That the medicinal preparation administered, dis­
pensed, or sold shall contain, in addition to the narcotic 
drug in it, some drug or drugs conferring upon it medicinal 
qualities other than those possessed by the narcotic drug 
alone; and

2. That such preparation shall be administered, dis­
pensed, and sold in good faith as a medicine, and not for 
the purpose of evading the provisions of this chapter.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
quantity of codeine or of any of its salts that may be pre­
scribed, administered, dispensed, or sold, to any person or 
for the use of any person or animal, when it is prescribed, 
administered, dispensed, or sold in compliance with the 
general provisions of this chapter.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit any 
person to prescribe, administer, compound, dispense, or 
sell any of the preparations included herein, except those 
persons duly qualified under this chapter to engage in the 
distribution of narcotics.



25a

Section 204.9 Records To Be Kept.

1. Every physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other person 
who is authorized to administer or professionally use nar­
cotic drugs, shall keep a record of such drugs received by 
him and a record of all such drugs administered, dispensed, 
or professionally used by him otherwise than by prescrip­
tion. It shall, however, be deemed a sufficient compliance 
with this subsection if any such person using small quan­
tities of solutions or other preparations of such drugs for 
local application shall keep a record of the quantity, char­
acter and potency of such solutions or other preparations 
purchased or made up by him, and of the dates when pur­
chased or made up, without keeping a record of the amount 
of such solution or other preparation applied by him to 
individual patients.

2. Manufacturers and wholesalers shall keep records of 
all narcotic drugs compounded, mixed, cultivated, grown, 
or by any other process produced or prepared, and of all 
narcotic drugs received and disposed of by them in accord­
ance with the provisions of subsection 5 of this section.

3. Pharmacists and pharmacy owners shall keep records 
of all narcotic drugs received and disposed of by them, in 
accordance with the provisions of subsection 5 of this 
section.

4. Every person who purchases for resale, or wTho sells 
narcotic drug preparations exempted by section 204.8, shall 
keep a record showing the quantities and kinds thereof 
received and sold, or disposed of otherwise, in accordance 
with the provisions of subsection 5 of this section.

1962 Code of Iowa



26a

5. The record of narcotic drugs received shall in every 
case show the name and address of the person from whom 
received, and the kind and quantity of drugs received; the 
kind and quantity of narcotic drugs produced or removed 
from process of manufacture, and the date of such produc­
tion or removal from process of manufacture; and the rec­
ord shall in every case show the proportion of morphine, 
cocaine, or ecgonine contained in or producible from crude 
opium or coca leaves received or produced, and the propor­
tion of resin contained in or producible from the plant 
Cannabis sativa L., received or produced. The record of 
all narcotic drugs sold, administered, dispensed, or other­
wise disposed of, shall show the date of selling, administer­
ing, or dispensing, the name and address of the person to 
whom, or for whose use, or the owner and species of animal 
for which the drugs were sold, administered, or dispensed, 
and the kind and quantity of drugs. Every record shall 
be kept for a period of two years from the date of the 
transaction recorded. The keeping of a record required by 
or under the federal narcotic laws, containing substantially 
the same information as is specified above, shall constitute 
compliance with this section, except that every such record 
shall contain a detailed list of narcotic drugs lost, destroyed 
or stolen, if any; the kind and quantity of such drugs and 
the date of the discovery of such loss, destruction or theft.

6. Any person violating any of the provisions of this 
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon convic­
tion thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 687.7.

1962 Code of Iowa



MEUEN PRESS INC. —  N. Y. C. 219