United States v. Falk Brief on Motion to Quash Subpoena
Public Court Documents
September 7, 1971
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. United States v. Falk Brief on Motion to Quash Subpoena, 1971. 129ca463-c79a-ee11-be37-000d3a574715. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9746e1c5-1881-42c7-8a79-aa810c64ad67/united-states-v-falk-brief-on-motion-to-quash-subpoena. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V. NO. E.B.D. 71-165
JOHN DOE
(IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA:
RICHARD FALK, WITNESS)
BRIEF ON MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
JACK J. LEVINE, ESQUIRE
1427 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
215-563-1388
THOMAS G. SHAPIRO, ESQUIRE
73 Tremont Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
617-227-8420
FILED: September, 7, 1971
TABLE AND SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED IV
II. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
III. SUMMARY OF THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT ISSUE
A. Introduction
B. Richard Falk's scholarly activities relating to the
Vietnam War are uniquely dependent upon his access to
information which would not be available to him but
for the extraordinary trust and confidentiality which
has attached to his past professional activities.
C. Notwithstanding his other professional roles^his role
as a journalist, including television other media
activities, itself is central to his professional activities
and public value.
D. An equally significant scholarly function flows from his
sustained and frequent advisory contacts with members
of the United States Congress, and the confidentiality
and trust attached thereto.
E. His role as a legal scholar, and as an expert legal
consultant and witness with regard to judicial proceedings
involving the legal aspects of the Vietnam War depend
crucially on his confidential and intimate familiarity with,
and access to,the subject matter of this grand jury investi
gation, and his public value to our judicial system in this
capacity is arguably more important than whatever marginal
value he may serve as a grand jury witness.
11
13
F. Movant's mere appearance before this grand jury, coupled
as it is with no showing of compelling and overriding
governmental interest, will provide no benefit to the
grand jury and will irreparably interfere with his own
professional activities and similar activities by others. 15
a. Activities such as Movant's, in all pf his
abovementioned roles, provide an indispen^ble
and unique public value, which value is premised
upon absence of governmental intrusion. 15
b. A condition precedent to Movant's mere appearance
should be a showing by the government of compelling
and overriding national interest. 17
IV. ARGXJMENT 19A
I. The Professional And Public-Educational Activities Movant
Seeks To Preserve Are Protected By The First Amendment
Against Governmental Intrusion. 19a
A. Movant's journalistic activities, because they are
primarily concerned with the subject matter of the
Pentagon Papers, fall within the scope of Caldwell v.
United States. 434 F.2d 1081(1970), cert. granted
91 S. Ct. 1616(1971). 20
B. Notwithstanding the applicable scope of the journalist
privilege. Movant's activities as a professional
scholar and author are themselves cognizable under the
First Amendment, and, as such, are entitled to the
parameters of protection established by Caldwell, supra. 21
C. Movant's professional activities are protected against
this grand jury's intrusion unless and until the
Government demonstrates a national interest so compelling,
overriding, and unique to Movant that it outweighs the
public worth of his own and similar protected pursuits. 29
1 1
D. In the absence of compelling and overriding
need. Movant may not be compelled to appear
before the grand jury at all, as there is no
testimony he could give which would not be
within the bounds of the protective order
required under the rule of Caldwell, supra. 41
II. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)
and/or 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510(11), 2515, 2518(10) and
3504 Require The Government To Affirm Or Deny The Use Of
Wiretap And/Or Other Electronic Surveillance Upon The
Allegation By A Grand Jury Witness That Such Surveillance
Has In Fact Occurred 45
III. CONCLUSION 46
111
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Richard Falk is a nationally and internationally known
scholar and author whose studies of the nature and legality of the
Indo-China War are authoritative in the field. His recognizedly
pre-eminent activities as journalist, author and lawyer, as they
relate to the war, are uniquely and crucially dependent on the trust and
confidentiality which has attached to his efforts to secure accurate
and complete information, as well as write, counsel and consult with
others. The excellence of his work would not have resulted, nor will it
continue, but for these relationships, and that excellence has at once
been the source of, and impetus to, the consultation with him by others.
Therefore, the first issue before this Court is:
WHETHER, CONSISTENTLY WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT, A
PROFESSIONAL SCHOLAR AND AUTHOR-JOURNALIST MAY BE
COMPELLED TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY BEFORE A GRAND JURY
WHERE THE UNQUESTIONED EFFECT OF HIS APPEARANCE WILL
BE TO INFRINGE UPON AND DESTROY CONFIDENTIAL ASSOCIATIONS
AND RELATIONSHIPS WHICH ARE INDISPENSABLE TO THE QUALITY,
ACCURACY AND CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF HIS WRITING AND OTHER
PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC-EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS
In addition, Richard Falk has moved to quash his subpoena on
the grounds that he has allegedly been the object of unlawful wiretap
and/or other electronic surveillance. The second question is therefore:
IV
WHETHER A GRAND JURY WITNESS HAS STANDING UNDER
18 U.S.C., SECTIONS 2510(11), 2515, 2518(10) and
3504 AND/OR SILVERTHORNE LUMBER CO. v. UNITED STATES.
251 U.S. 385(1920) AND ITS PROGENY, TO DECLINE TO
APPEAR BEFORE A GRAND JURY ON THE GROUNDS THAT HIS
SUBPOENA, OR THE QUESTIONS TO BE PROPOUNDED TO HIM,
FLOWED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM UNLAWFUL WIRETAP
AND/OR OTHER ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.
V
I.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
On Monday, August 16, 1971, Richard Falk was subpoenaed
to appear before a federal grand jury then sitting in the District of
Massachusetts. This subpoena was made returnable on Friday, August 20,
10:00 A.M. On the morning of August 20, Professor Falk filed with this
Court a motion to quash this subpoena, at the same time requesting that
his appearance be stayed pending the filing of affidavits and brief, and
argument thereon. A stay pendente lite was granted by this Court on
August 20, and the matter set down for argument on September 10, 1971.
This Court also provided that such affidavits as the witness and the
government saw fit to submit would constitute the record in this case,
without further live testimony being required.
1. Professor Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law
and Practice at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs, Princeton, N.J. He also is a Research Associate and Member of the
Advisory Committee of the Center of International Studies, which is an
adjunct to the Woodrow Wilson School. He is a member of the Bar of the
State of New York and of the International Court of Justice, the Hague,
Netherlands. His Vita, as it is directly relevent to the issues here raised,
is attached hereto as Exhibit A(l).
II.
SUMMARY OF THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT ON
THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE
A.
INTRODUCTION
The record upon which Movant will rely consists of a series
2
of twenty-six affidavits, both his own and of others. His
affidavit is of course the keystone of the record, and reference to it
will be made in conjunction with references to those of the supporting
affidavits which either testify to the verity of the Falk affidavit or
lend particular credence because the affiant's own experiences and
concerns parallel those of Falk. Because Movant functions in a variety
of professional roles, all of which we contend are protected by the
First Amendment, there will of necessity be some overlap in the summation
of the record. Briefly stated, his contentions are threefold: First,
2. These affidavits have been collated, paginated, and filed with the
clerk of the Court, to be made part of the record in these proceedings.
Each affidavit has been given a letter designation, and this record has
been paginated serially. References to this record will be made by the
name of the affiant, the exhibit letter of his affidavit, and the page
number of the reference (e.g. Falk, A, p.lO). Where relevent, the pro
fessional capacity of the affiant will also be summarized.
It should be noted, as the Court is already aware, that these affidavits
were prepared with great haste, and that because a number of those solicited
for affidavits were on vacation (particularly members of Congress) Dr. Falk
was often unable to immediately locate them. See Falk, A, p.22. This
brief has been prepared on the basis of those affidavits in hands by
August 31, 1971. In the event that more material arrives, it will be filed
with the Clerk by September 10 and referred to during oral argument.
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that his professional performance, particularly as it relates to the
same subject matter covered by the "Pentagon Paperŝ " has uniquely
depended upon the use of information lathered from confidential sources;
Second, that others believe the absence of such sources would severely
damage his professional effectiveness in this narrow area; and Third,
that mere appearance by him before this particular grand jury would
unquestionably inflict the kind of damage referred to. See Falk, A,
pp. 1-2.
B. Movant's Scholarly Activities Relating To The Vietnam War
Are Uniguelv Dependent Upon His Access To Infoirmation Which
Would Not Be Available To Him But For The Extraordinary____
Trust And Confidentiality Which Has Attached To His Past
Professional Activities.
The work product of Richard Falk's activities, particularly
as they relate to the Vietnam War, are, under any measurement standard,
truly extraordinary. Continual testimony to this exists throughout the
3
record, and his own affidavit impressively recites the s\am total of
these efforts. The record is replete with testimony that this uniqueness
3. E.g. Richard J. Barnet, Co-Director of the Institute for Policy
Studies in Washington, D.C.: "He is one of the country's outstanding
students of international law and the leading expert on the legal aspects
of the Indo-China War. He plays an almost unique role as unofficial
advisor, scholar, and journalist, combining a comprehensive knowledge of
law and a sophisticated understanding of the relevent facts surrounding
United States involvement in Indo-China." Barnet, B, p. 29
- 3 -
is at once the sourcefor, and impetus to, consultation with him by other
4
professionals, and that, as Movant himself recites, at length, these
consultative and advisory roles are central to his professional standing.
4. "We...have continually called upon his seemingly unexhaustible services
as a resource pegsgn, as program advisor, and as a consultant in points
of intemaltional/ domestic law, particularly as they relate to the Vietnam
War. His access to a wide variety of materials, studies and documents
contribute jtowjLrd his rare eclectic approach to contemporary problem
solving. . ./Hi_s/writings and lectures are sought after by individuals and
groups nationwide, in the Congress of the United States and at international
conferences." Knopp, C, p. 3CL "His services as a professional consultant
and resource expert have been essential to our own understanding of issues
...". Mea.cham, D, _p̂ 31. "Professor Falk is one of the very few experts
in such /War relate^ mattery to whom we have wished to turn." Lauter, E,
p. 32 . "His contributions /to the conferences and seminars sponsored by
the Fund for New Priorities in Americ^ were perhaps the major reason for
the impact of our efforts." Meyers, F, p. 34 . "He is one_of 24 elected
Council members of /the Federation of American Scientist^ and is a
valued source of advise to us; his high, unique, and unblemished reputation
makes him a "special asset". Stone, G, p. 35-36.
- 4 -
There can be no doubt that, as Movant testifies, his
5
extensive writing and lecturing on America's involvement in the Vietnam
war has depended upon his access to real facts, or, he describes, "the
real state of affairs". Falk, A, 3. "In essence, this scholarly role
has depended upon getting at the real facts wherever possible". Falk,
A, 3. That the range of his contacts in ferreting out the truth encompasses
6
a wide variety of political opinion is supported by the record, as
is the fact that this unique ability to deal with both sides of the
political spectrum has enhanced his reliability amongst those who consult
7
him.
5. A partial catalogue of these writings is set forth at Falk, A, pp.4-5,
10-11. See also Falk Vita, Exhibit A(l).
6. E.g. Harold Feiveson, presently lecturer in the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, and formerly an
analyst for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:"Professor
Falk is one of the very few persons I know of with wide contacts both among
vigorous opponents of American defense policy and among present and past
members of the government who apply a more marginal and restrained criticism
to American foreign policy. He therefore brings to his writing and advice an
unusually broad perspective and an intimate familiarity with the positions
and attitudes of several diverse groups, a capacity that I and many of my
colleagues have found very useful." Feiveson, H, p, 39
7. "As a particular example, I was importantly influenced, while in the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and engaged in policy analysis of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, by Professor Falk's articulation of the special
attitudes of the underdeveloped countries toward international security".
Feiveson, H, p. 39 . "He has been an invaluable consultaht and source of
ideas, not least of all because his many contacts provide him with a deep
and broad knowledge of world affairs that enables him to be an excellent
judge of the merits of attempts by scholars to understand and interpret
current issues and events." Thatcher, I, p. 40
- 5 -
Central to the scholarly effort of seeking information about
the War, and central to the First Amendment claim here made, is the
need for absolute confidentiality and the trust and confidence built
thereupon. Two of the supporting affidavits before this court, one
written from the vantage point of book editor and the other from that of
a noted scholar and published author, focus directly on Movant's beliefs
in this regard:
Sanford G. Thatcher, Social Science Editor, Princeton,
University Press: "Many books today that deal with
matters of immediate national and international concern
could not have been written at all without the use of
information obtained through private interviews and
other confidential communications and this is perhaps
pre-eminently the case with investigations of the Vietnam
War and related issues which Professor Falk has chosen as
one of the primary focuses (sic) of his professional re
search." Thatcher, I, p. 40 . (Emphasis supplied).
Ronald Steel, journalist, author, teacher, and Member of
the Council on Foreign Relations: "In order for either a
scholar or a writer to conduct his role with integrity and
efficiency, it is absolutely essential that he feel free
to discuss matters of public interest with various individuals
who may, for various reasons, not wish their remarks to be
quoted publicly. The quest for truth relies upon trust and
access to information which may not be generally available
to the public. Not uncommonly, individuals, whether in
private life, government or business, seek to conceal wrong
doing, and it is the role of the responsible scholar or
journalist to ferret out the truth. To do so he must often
seek sources of information which would remain closed to him
were he not able to guarantee that they would be entirely
confidential." Steel, J, p. 41 • Emphasis supplied.
8.
Falk's own affidavit focuses repeatedly on this need for confidentiality.
- 6 -
8. At p. 3: "My understanding of such complex and controversial
current developments has depended upon having access to confidential in
formation and to various individuals in and out of government who would
not be able to discuss this sensitive subject matter with me if they
thought that I might be compelled to disclose it in the course of an
investigation of this type"; "Again, my sources of information depended
really upon an assurance on my part that the discharge of this professional
role would not be subject to the sort of scrutiny that is involved in
a proceeding of this type whose focus is upon how information relating to
the war was acquired." "Here, too, my capacity to report truthfully and
effectively depends upon maintaining contact of a confidential sort on
all sides."
At pp.4-5 Falk lists twenty (20) examples of his recent writings which
have "relied upon confidential information to inform its presentation."
At pp.9-10: "...my role as journalist and participant in community
affairs has depended on similar access to confidential information relating
to the war"; "As with any journalist, my success has depended on building
up and maintaining confidential sources of information and of convincing
editors that I have things of value to write about," citing examples and
and listing at pp. 10-11 examples of journalistic writings.
At p. 10, with explicit reference to the subject matter of this
grand jury: "I was invited (but declined) to participate_in an informal
Congressional conference devoted to /the Pentagon Paper^ and have been
asked by the weekly magazine Commonwealth to do a book review of the
Pentagon Papers. American Report, and several national newspapers and
magazines (New York Post, Philadelphia Inquirer, Time) invited my comment
on the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers when they became public. In each
of these settings my value as an interpreter of the news depended on my
access to information and on my reputation for confidentiality."
Other assertions of this need for confidentiality and trust, with
specific examples, can be found on virtually every page of Falk's affidavit.
- 7 -
as do virtually all of the other affidavits furnished in support of
9this contention.
9. E.g. "His professional contributions depend crucially upon his access
to confidential sources of information. Because of his reputation for
discretion he is able to talk regularly with individuals whose cooperation
is essential to an informed professional understanding of the crucial
problems with which Professor Falk is concerned as scholar, lawyer, and
journalist." He has been able to play his "invaluable role...only because
of the confidential character of the sources he has developed." Barnet,
B, p. 29 . (Emphasis supplied)
"On the basis of intense involvement in the fields of international
relations over the past fifteen years, it is my firmly held judgment that
responsible scholars and journalists must have access to information
where representations that confidentiality concerning the source of this
information is of paramount consideration in eliciting it." Mendlovitz,
K, p. 42 . Emphasis supplied.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the need for confidentiality,
and the extraordinary trust which Falk enjoys because of his ability to
preserve it, were his successful efforts to arrange the participation
in American television debates of the Paris negotiators for the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government. See
Teicholz, McGhee, and Cook, L, M and N, at pp, 44-51 ; and sections
dealing with Falk as journalist, infra, pp. 9-10 . Likewise, with regard
to his successful efforts to arrange private talks between these Paris
negotiators and Members of Congress. See Falk, A, pp.12-13.
- 8 -
C. Notwithstanding Movant's Other Professional Roles, His
Role As A Journalist. Including Television And Other
Media Activities, Itself Is Central To His Professional
And Public Value.
As is more fully discussed infra, p.20-21 a quite common
and natural occurrence is the welding of journalistic activities with
10
scholarly pursuits. All of the considerations of confidentiality and
trust discussed above apply with equal vigor to these journalistic
pursuits, recited in detail at Falk,A, pp. 9-11 (including list of
publications), 14 (with particular reference to television and radio,
and 15 (journalistic activities in the explicit context of the Pentagon
Papers).That Falk's contributions as a journalist are considered important
among his peers is illustrated not only by the extent to which the media
publish and utilize his work, but also by the recognition by his
colleagues that such efforts are an important role to which attaches
11
considerable public value. It seems fair to say that Falk's ability to
10. In addition to Falk's affidavit, several of the supporting affidavits
illustrate the role of journalism in the larger context of an academic
career. See, e.g.. Steel,J, p. 41:"Like Professor Falk I am both a scholar
and a journalist, a combination of careers which is true of a great many
people at a time when it is necessary for professional expertise to be
conveyed to the widest possible audience."
11. "Professor Falk's journalistic contribution on matters of world
peace have in my view been of immense importance to the American public
over the past four years." Mendlovitz, K, pp. 42-43 .See also, Teicholz,
Cook, McGhee, M, N, L, at pp. 44-51 .
- 9 -
to deal in confidence and trust with Vietnam veterans and North Vietnamese
and NLF negotiators, and journalistic efforts such dealings produce,
parallels the kind of contribution to public dialogue that Earl Caldwell
12 '
has made respecting the Black Panther Party.
In a more generalized sense, this can be said of virtually
all of Falk's journalistic efforts, relating as they do to a subject of
great controversy and the understandable reluctance of many of his sources,
particularly government officials, to make revelations which might later
come back to haunt them. Falk's articles, regarding such topics as war
crimes and individual responsibility therefor, and prisoners of war, of
necessity involve him in tracing the decision making process as it occurs
within the government. Informed judgments at these matters "must deal with
what responsible governmental officials knew at a given time what they
told the public and Congress, and how they acted as a consequence."
Falk, A, p. 17. It should be noted, most importantly, that the revelation
of this decision making process is the single most important aspect of
the Pentagon Papers and that informed commentary on the Vietnam War would
be markedly dependant upon the kind of information contained therein.
12. These contacts, particularly with veterans who have revealed to
Falk information relating to alleged war crimes (See Falk, A, p. 3, and
Lauter, E, p. 32 ), are precisely analagous to Caldwell and the Black
Panthers. Both kinds of contacts and transfer of information are infected
with the fear that confidences, once broken could quite probably lead to
some fomn of official retribution.
- 10 -
D. An Equally Significant Scholarly Function Flows From
Movant's Sustained And Frequent Advisory Contacts With
Members Of The United States Congress, And The Confidentiality
And Trust Attached Thereto.
Members of Congress, their respective staffs, and the staffs
of the respective Congressional Committees have in recent years placed
increased reliance upon the academic community in virtually all areas of
legislative concern. Nowhere has this been more true than in the field of
foreign policy, with virtually continual committee testimony being heard
and counsel solicited and given. As is the case with his other contribu
tions, Movant's activities here are remarkable. These activites are set
forth at length at Falk, A, pp. 8-9,12, and 17-18, and have included
publication of writing in the Congressional Record, confidential counseling
with members of the Senate, counseling with Congressional staffs on
matters relating directly to Vietnam (e.g. implications of SEATO treaty;
status of Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War), testimony and writing
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, arranging confidential contacts
between Senatccsand Paris negotiators, and counseling with Senators on the form
and/or advisability of particular pieces of legislation.
13. The confidentiality which attaches to such activities has arisen
in another context in these proceedings. See In Re Leonard Romberg, Witness,
No. . To the extent that they overlap, counsel for Professor Falk
specifically adopt those grounds set forth in support of the motion to
quash filed by Dr. Rodberg.
- 11 -
All of these efforts have been carried out with the utmost
attention to ascertaining and presenting accurately the facts about
the war as they may be known to Falk. One example in particular
illustrates the manner in which the gathering' of information, ituch
of it confidential, plays a subtle yet crucial role in this process:
"I was approached by Senator Harrison Williams
of New Jersey in early 1971 to prepare an advisory
report for him on whether to support an effort to
curb the power of the President in the area of war
and peace. The value of such a report depended on an
assessment of the war in which Presidential decisions
were made in the context of the Vietnam War. This kind
of information is precisely the sort covered by the _̂4
Pentagon Papers." Falk, A, p. 18 (Emphasis supplied).
The extraordinary subtlety and delicacy of contacts between academicians
and Congress is set forth in detail at Stone, G, pp. 35-39 . Such
delicacy is implied throughout those portions of Movant's affidavit
15dealing with Congressional contacts.
14. ^-pp. 13-14 infra,with regard to this decision making process.
15. Nowhere is this more apparent than with regard to channeling
information from Paris negotiators to American officials. See Falk, A,
p. 19. Also of significance is the indirect effect such information may
have on legislation. See Crown and Standard, 0, pp. 52, 55 » detailing the
affiants' belief that Falk's contacts in Paris contributed to the
passage of the "Mansfield Amendment".
- 12 -
E. Movant's Role As A Legal Scholar, And As An Expert
Legal Consultant and Witness With Regard To Judicial
Proceedings Involving The Legal Aspects Of The Vietnam
War Depend Crucially On His Confidential And Intimate
Familiarity With And Access To The Subject Matter Of
This Grand Jury Investigation, And His Value To Our
Judicial System In This Capacity Is Arguably More Important
Than Whatever Marginal Value He May Serve As A Grand Jury
Witness.
Let it first be said that "there are very few, if any, American
international law specialists who are able and willing to play this role.",
16Falk, A, 16, and his value must be measured in this context. Falk's
activities as legal advisor or defense witness is detailed at Falk, A,
16, and has centered primarily upon gathering, making available, and
testifying in open court to the character and legality of the war policies.
This activity has of course supplemented his other legal writings on the
war, as well as his work with the Lawyers Committee on American Policy
Toward Vietnam (See Crown, and Standard, 0, pp. 5 1-56.) and their wide
distribution of material to members of the bench and bar. It has likewise
been explicitly relied upon in several instances, most notably in this
judicial district (Falk, A, p. 17).
At the heart of this activity is unimpaired access to
facts:
"Let me stress that the inference of illegality relates
closely to the actions and intentions of leading policy
makers and that such an inference can be reliably made
only by access to just such information as was contained
- 13 -
in the Pentagon Papers. An informed judgment about
illegality must deal with what responsible
governmental officials knew at a given time, what
they told the public and Congress, and how they
acted as a consequence. To cut someone (sic)like
myself from such information is to reduce my
capacity to base legal conclusions on the best
available evidence. This information would no longer be available
if I am to be required to testify as to whether and
how I gained such information, from whom and when.
Unimpaired access is needed to assure my professional
competence. Falk, A, p. 17. (Emphasis supplied).
16. The value of this availability is set forth in the affidavit of
Paul Lauter, Executive Director of the United States Servicemen's
Fund: "In our work with the U.S. Servicemen's Fund we have come into
touch with servicemen or veterans who have, or believe they have,
committed war crimes or other violations of international or military law.
In pursuance of our corporate purpose to seek the well-being of such
serviceman and women, and in the public's interest in achieving justice,
we have sought out expert scholarly and legal advice to determine the
most appropriate course of action for such persons to pursue, consonant
with their consciences, mental health, the relevant law, and the
public interest. Professor Falk is one of the very few experts in such
matters to whom we have wished to turn. However, given the ambiguous
character of many war crimes statutes and precedents, the sometimes
uneven application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the
highly emotional character of these matters in the United States today,
absolute confidentiality and trust is essential to GI's and veterans
desirous of examining possibly illegal activities, in Vietnam and
elsewhere, in which they participated. It is my judgment as Executive
Director of the Fund that such GI's and veterans would be extremely
reluctant to discuss their cases with scholars who had been or were to
be interrogated by Grand Juries, regardless of what they did there.
Work on behalf of United States military personnel would thus be
significantly limited and, it may be, the causes of establishing clarity
in the legal obligations of military personnel and the public's interest
in seeing justice done would be, too."
- 14 -
F. Movant's Mere Appearance Before This Grand Jury,
Coupled As It Is With No Showing Of Compelling And
Overriding Governmental Interest, Will Provide No
Benefit To The Grand Jury And Will Irreparably____
Interfere With His Own Professional Activities And
Similar Activities By Others.
a. Activities such as Movant's in all of
his above-mentioned roles, provide an
indispensable and unique public value,
which value is premised upon absence of
governmental intrusions.
Those portions of the record which testify to public value
necessarily rest on the premise that governmental intrusion, including
the mere appearance under compulsion before a grand jury, will diminish
or destroy public rights. It is well to note here the assessment of such
dangers necessarily involves a balancing process, and that to the extent
that public value of a given individual's contribution may be large,
the balance is affected accordingly. Also noteworthy here is the fact
that the publication of the subject matter of this grand jury inquiry
has already been held to be of public value and non-injurious to the
national security. New York Times v. United States, 91 S. Ct. 2140(1971).
To the extent that a grand jury witness was not a direct participant in
whatever criminal activities attached thereto, the need to protect his
public value is accordingly enhanced.
None of the countless experts who have studied the Vietnam War
have contributed more to scholarly and public dialogue than Richard Falk.
- 15 -
Repeated and continual reference to this fact is made in the affidavits
before this Court, and it is made notwithstanding whatever partisan
17
views various scholars and journalists have expressed and with particular
18
reference to cited examples.
The right and need for the kind of work Falk has done to be
in the public domain is perhaps best expressed by W. Duane Lockard,
Chairman of the Department of Politics at Princeton University:
"I believe it to be in the public ingerest for access
by scholars and journalists to confidential sources to
be protected to as wide a degree as is reasonably
possible. It is always better to have more rather than
less public knowledge about dissident groups— both to
let their ideas be presented through responsible sources
and to permit thoughtful analysis of the social and
political phenomina involved. Professor Falk's analysis
as a scholar and his journalistic presentation of evidence
and argumentation would seem to me to be outstanding
examples of the kind of work that deserves precisely the
kind of protection in question here. If his scholarly
and other professional activity serves the cause of a
democratic and open society, as I would insist it does,
then it deserves protection because it is quite literally
in the public interest." Lockard, Q, p. 59 .(Emphasis supplied)
17. E.g. William J. McLung, Managing Editor of the University of
California Press: "The strength of his scholarship and its value to our
society has been based in part, I believe, on his relationship of trust
with both opponents and defenders of American policies in Vietnam and
elsewhere." McLung, p, p. 57 . See also, Feiveson, H, quoted, supra, fn. 6
18. E.g. "Professor Falks contribution to our discussions and to our
further research./involving project participated in by scholars from
around the world/ are considered by the entire group to have been particularly;
significant and we are aware that some of his contributions have been based
on information regarding which he assured confidentiality of source."
Mendlovitz, K, p. 42 . "His contributions to at least three of these
conferences and seminars /Fund for New Priorities in America/were perhaps
the ipajor reason for the impact of our efforts in the areas of concern."
- 16 -
This assessment is shared, either explicitly or implicitly by all of
19
the affidavits before this Court.
b. A condition precedent to Movant's mere
appearance should be a shoving by the
government of compelling and overriding
national interest.
This contention, in its legal implications, is set forth
more fully, infra, pp 41-44. No such showing has yet been made in
the record before this Court, and that is the only kind of showing which
18. (cont.) Meyers, F, p. 34 . See also the account of Falk's unique
role in television coverage of the Paris negotiations, McGhee, Teicholz,
Cook, L,M,N, pp. 44-51 ; and his role in arranging contacts between
Congress and Paris negotiators, Falk, A, pp 12-13.
19. E.g., Mendlovita, K, at p.42 : "In my judgment there is an over
riding public interest in making certain that scholars and journalists
are able to carry out this type of investigation. Furthermore, any
procedures, such as an appearance before the grand jury, which jeopardizes
this confidentiality would seriously curtail this source of information....
Professor Falk's journalistic contributions on matters of world peace have
in my view been of immense importance to the American public over the past
four years."
Crown and Standard, O, at pp. 53-56: "We earnestly believe that
Professor Falk's very appearance before a Grand Jury pursuing this kind of
investigation will irreparably breach and damage associations and have a
chilling effect on his relationships with such sources of information to
the detriment of the public's right to know the truth about this crucial
issue affecting the very lives of Americans." (Emphasis supplied).
Thatcher, I, at p. '40 : "Such interference with the public's right
to know is tantamount, in the effect it would have, to overt official
censorship... If the people who provide such information on the understanding
that they will not be identified as its source see that there is no protec
tion against disclosure because Grand Jury investigations of this kind can
compel scholars and journalists to betray the trust placed in them, then it
is inevitable that these sources of information will dry up, and the public
- 17 -
19. (con't.)
will be deprived of the possibility of learning more of the truth than
official sources choose to reveal...and they would have no access to...
any insights or information other than what the public record disclosed."
(Emphasis supplied).
Meyers, F, at p. 34 : "Expertise is vital to the continuing
education process in a free society.... I believe that the expertise of
Professor Falk clearly requires the kind of source material which he must
receive on a confidential basis. If this opportunity is removed from him
and other experts and scholars the damage will be far greater than only to
their expertise." (Emphasis supplied). _ _
Barnet, B, at p. 29 : "To interfere with /Falk‘S important
public service by compelling him to appear before a Grand Jury investigating
matters within his professional competence as lawyer, scholar and journalist
would be a disservice to the public."
- 18 -
could force Falk to testify beyond the confines of the kind of protective
order to which he is entitled. Furthermore, Falk states in his affidavit
that there is absolutely nothing as to whii h he could testify which would
not be proscribed by such an order. See Falk, A, p. 21 . Thus, on the
record as it now stands, this Court, by compelling mere appearance, would
essentially be compelling an act useless to the grand jury and damaging
to Falk. The damage,in this context, is not so much the danger of revealing
particular confidences before the grand jury which relate to the Pentagon
Papers, as a protective order would proscribe that. The damage is the
obvious and inevitable certainty, already spelled out in our summation of
the record, that sources of information concerning the war, particularly,
and foreign policy generally, would be inhibited for fear of an attempt to
compel disclosure before some future tribunal in some context as yet unknown.
We would ask this Court to bear in mind that fears and inhibitions of this
sort, particularly on the part of laymen and foreign sources (with whom
Falk deals regularly) do not ebb and flow as a function of the technical
distinction between "mere appearance" and "actual testimony". That the
government may seek to compel disclosures, not that such disclosures will
actually occur, sets these chilling fears in motion.
- 19 -
IV.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE PROFESSIONAL AND PUBLIC-EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES
MOVANT SEEKS TO PRESERVE ARE PROTECTED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION
The issue before this Court, quite apart from that of the
proper scope of a protective order, is whether any privilege at all
20
attaches to movant's professional activities. This question, to the
extent that it may relate to movant's non-journalistic activities,is
one of first impression. The related question, assuming a privilege,
of whether the government must, in advance of testimony, show a compelling
need for mere appearance before the grand jury was decided affirmatively
in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir., 1970), cert granted
21
91 S. Ct. 1616(1971).
20. Cf. Caldwell v. United States 434, F.2d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert, granted 91 S. Ct. 1616 (1971): "...before we can decide whether the
First Amendment requires more than a protective order delimiting the scope
of interrogation, we must first decide whether it requires any privilege
at all."
21. This is the clear holding of Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1089. Judge Jameson's
concurring opinion agrees with Judge Merrill on the proposition that where a
privilege attaches, the government could properly be required to show
compelling need even prior to the issuance of a subpoena. Caldwell, supra
at p. 1092. Clearly the Caldwell inspired Department of Justice guidelines
for subpoenas to the news media envisage this, fn. 3, at 1091.
- 19A -
A. Movant's Journalistic Activities, Because They Are
Primarily Concerned With The Subject Matter Of The
Pentagon Papers, Fall Within The Scope Of Caldwell v,
United States.
The record before the Court is clear and uncontradicted for
the proposition that Richard Falk's journalistic activities related to
the War entitle him to the kind of protection afforded Earl Caldwell.
See pp. 9-10 , supra. Nor should Falk suffer because his activities have
encompassed so much more than journalism, strictly defined . Indeed
precisely the opposite, for of all his activities, those related to
journalism have directly reached a more diverse kind of audience than his
scholarly and consultative pursuits, and,in fact, were intended to secure
this end. Researchers and academicians have assumed in our society many
of the functions formerly reserved to journalists as social and political
22
commentators. And where they utilize the mass media to impart their
commentary and expertise to the public they act within limits long protected
by the First Amendment. Caldwell, supra, at 1084. The very subject of
this grand jury investigation has been afforded similar sweeping protection.
New York Times v. United States, 91 S. Ct. 2140(1971). To argue, as the
22. Cf. Horowitz and Rainwater, "Sociological Snoopers and Journalistc
Moralizers," 7 Transaction 4,5 (May, 1970): "The intertwinings of journal
istic and sociological expertise are complex indeed and have been from the
early days of empirical American sociology." And see Steel, J, infra, at
fn. 10.
- 20 -
government must in this case, that national interest cannot prevent the
American public's access to this material but that that same national
interest somehow proscribes Falk's right to professionally assess its
significance seems disengen ous.
B. Notwithstanding The Applicable Scope Of The Journalist
Privilege, Movant's Activities As A Professional Scholar
And Author Are Themselves Cognizable Under The First____
Amendment, And, As Such, Are Entitled To The Parameters
Of Protection Established By Caldwell.
The sum total of Movant's scholarly activities has been a
virtually unending stream of books, articles, monographs and lectures
relating to American foreign policy in the context of the Vietnam War.
This work product is impressively recounted in the Falk affidavit, as
well as the crucial and unique role which confidence and trust have played
in this effort at "getting at the real facts" (Falk, A, 3) and "the best
available evidence" (Falk, A. 17). The primary goal of these efforts
has been to publish this material as widely as possible and in such a way
as to bring insightful and comprehensive information to professional
colleagues, the Congress, and the American public. On the record before
this Court there is no question but that, in his field, Richard Falk's
writings and commentary are authoritative, and that the subject matter of
the Pentagon Papers is vitally and intimately related to his work.
It is by now a commonplace that informed scholarship and the
processes of its distribution are protected by the First Amendment:
"...the State may not, consistently with the
spirit of the First Amendment contract the
spectrum of available knowledge. The right
- 21 -
of freedom of speech and press included not only
the right to utter or to print, but the right to
distribute, the right to receive, the right to
read...and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought,
and freedom to teach..-- indeed the freedom of the
entire university community...Without these periph^^al
rights, the specific rights would be less secure."
(Emphasis supplied).
Each of the steps in this progression from information collection
to publication and dissemination has been protected by the Court.
The freedom to publish and circulate news has long been established.
24
indeed, in the very context of Richard Falk's concern. New York Times v.
25United States, supra. The freedom to write and the freedom of the
26
public to receive information have more recently been perceived as
distinct rights. Moreover, the information gathering functions of
27
investigators are clearly protected by the First Amendment, and are the
23. Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. at 482-3. Citations omitted.
24. See, e.g.. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 713(1931); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 44(1937); Winters v. United States, 333 U.S. 507(1943);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60(1960).
25. See e.g.. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254(1964);
Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81(1967).
26. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141(1943); Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301(1965); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557(1969) .
27. Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575, 581(9th Cir. 1935), rev'd on
other grounds, 229 U.S. 269(1936). See also Providence Journal Co. v.
McCoy, 94 F.Supp 186, 195-196(D.R.I., 1950) aff'd on other grounds
190 F.2d 760(lst Cir. 1951).
- 22 -
factual and constitutional precondition of the ability to publish and
circulate.
All of these rights take on added import when interpreted
28
in light of the particular needs of the academic community. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in language so apposite to Falk's professional roles and
the record before this Court that it bears quotation at length, clearly
recognized this;
"Progress in the national sciences is not remotely
confined to findings made in the laboratory. Insights
into the mysteries of nature are b o m of hypothesis and
speculation. The more so is this true in the pursuit of
understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called
the social sciences, the concern of which is man and
society. The problems that are the respective preoccupa
tions of anthropology, economics, law, psychology,
sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely
departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division
of analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of holistic
perplexities. For society's good— if understanding be an
essential need of society— inquiries into these problems
speculations about them, must be left as unfettered as
possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into
this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise
government and the people's well-being, except for reasons
that are exigent and obviously compelling.
These pages need not be burdened with proof, based on
the testimony of a cloud of impressive witnesses, of the
dependence of a free society on free universities. This
means the exclusion of governmental intervention on the
intellectual life of a university. It matters little whether
28. The Supreme Court has recognized these needs as "almost self-
evident". Sweezv V. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250(1957): "Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire to study and to evalute, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die."
- 23 -
such intervention occurs avowedly or through action
that inevitably tends to check the ardor and fear
lessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile
and so indispensable for fruitful academic labor.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261-262(1957)
(Frankfurter, J, concurring).
This language, flowing as it did from a case involving refusal of a witness
(legislative) to give compelled testimony, is all the more relevent.
In Sweezy, as here, the government offered no evidence that
29
Professor Sweezy had himself, violated the law, but rather justified
30
compulsion with the assertion that he might lead them to others that had.
It is clear that the First Amendment "rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
31
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." This is
particularly so when such information is vitally relevent to issues of
national concern, posed, as with the Vietnam War, in times of
29. 354 U.S. at 261.
30. This Court has expressed an inclination to look to In Re Murtha, N.J.
Super. Ct., App Div. 7/6/71, for guidance on this question. Murtha is
discussed, infra, p. 39, but it is well to note here that the existence of a
First Amendment privilege was found lacking in that case. To the extent that
Falk protected by such a privilege, as we believe is clearly demonstrated,
Murtha is not authority for compelling his testimony in the absence of a
particularized governmental need therefor.
31. Associated Press v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 20(1945).
Cf. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603(1967): "Our
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us....That freedom is therefore a special con
cern of the First Amendment ....The classroom is peculiarly the "market place
of ideas". The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth..."
(citations omitted).
- 24 -
32
crisis. That this work ought to be encouraged in the university,
and that it ought not be interfered with by governmental intrusion,
is at the heart of the evolution of the legal concept of academic
33
freedom. Indeed, because of its devotion to scholarship and academic
inquiry, the university conforms to the "marketplace of ideas" concept
even more fully than does the public forum. For this reason the danger
of infringement is particularly circumscribed by the First Amendment,
Sweezy, supra.
As is the case with all constitutional protections,this
recognition of academic freedom has incorporated within it a judicial
evaluation that the activities to be protected are so valuable to society
that a compelling and overriding interest is the condition precedent for
governmental intrusion upon them. Certain observations about the value
of academic inquiry, of which Falk's activities are but an example, may
be useful to this Court. First, empirical academic research, the
gathering of reliable and relevant infomation, is crucial to its success
Second, issues which are created, as here, when the government seeks to
invade the confidentiality necessary to academic inquiry.cafinot be adequately
34
32. As the court.in Caldwell points out, the need "takes on special
urgency in times of widespread protest and dissent. In such times the
First Amendment protections exist to maintain communication with dissenting
groups and to provide the public with a wide range of information about
the nature of protest and heterodoxy." Caldwell, supra, at 1084-5.
See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102(1940); Associated Press v.
United States, supra, fn. 31.; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64(1964).
- 25
(Footnotes continued)
33. See, generally, "Developments in the Law of Academic Freedom,"
81 Har\t> L. Rev. 1045, 1048(1968), and sources there cited. This concept
of academic freedom is reflected not only in recognition of the need for
such freedom, but also in certain institutional arrangements designed to
protect it. See, e.g., C. Byse and L. Joughin, Tenure in American Higher
Education (1959).
34. Certainly Falk's affidavit is replete with references to how crucial
it is to him, particularly in the context of the Pentagon Papers. E.g,
Falk, A, 17.
Extensive literature supports the societal value of empirical
research in other contexts. For instance, a National Science Foundation
commission has noted its relevence to education, engineering, journalism
law, labor relations, medicine, and public health, mental health and
social work. Brim(Chairman), Knowledge Into Action; Improving the
Nation's Use of the Social Sciences (1969). U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, Toward a Social Report (1969); Staff of House of
Representatives Research and Technical Programs Sub. Comm. On Government
Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., "The Use of Social Research in Federal
Domestic Programs," 4 Parts (Comm. Print 1967); Orleans, "The Political
Uses of Social Research," 314 The Annals 28(1971); Lyons, "The President
and his Experts," 394 The Annals 36(1971); Beckman, "Congressional Informa
tion Processes for National Policy," 394 The Annals 84(1971); Reicken,
"The Federal Government and Social Science Policy," 394 The Annals 100(1971);
W. Bateman, An Experimental Approach to Program Analysis; Step Child in
The Social Sciences? (1969); Holt, "A System of Information Centers for
Research and Decision Making", 60 Am. Economic Rev. 149(1970).
For these and other sources counsel to Richard Falk are indebted
to Paul Nejelski, Esq., and Lindsey Miller Lerman, whose soon to be published
monograph entitled "Protection of Confidential Research Data" has generously
been made available to us.
- 26 -
framed in terms of the suppression of truth versus the professional
inconvenience which might result. When requests are made for confidential
information, two forms of truth are competing— judicial testimony versus
society's interest in access to competent and accurate information.
The evaluation of a particular request for confidential information must
thus recognize that but for the confidentiality which attaches to a scholar's
35
inquiries, society's interest would not be served. The government's
ability to close off a particular kind of inquiry by forcing such disclosure
is clearly an intimidating power, made even more dangerous by the fact that
it is only likely to be used, or for that matter necessary, when dealing
with critics or potential critics of government policy. Indeed the
36
particular stiuation of Richard Falk appears an apt lesson in this regard.
35. The peculiar irony of this is that but for this confidentiality, the
interest of this grand jury, whatever it may be,likewise cannot be served.
By compelling the disclosure of such confidences, and thus insuring that they
will not be made in the future, a grand jury would in effect choke off its
own ability to ascertain truth where, not as here, there really a compel
ling, overriding, and urgent need. See Caldwell, supra, at 1086, fn. 5 and
accompanying text.
The chilling effect which would be caused by the vulnerability of
research findings is at least partially aggravated by a growing suspicion
between the research community, especially academia, and government.
University criticism of the Vietnam War has emphasized that academia— like
the news media— represents an independent power which cannot be readily
manipulated by the government. In addition, the rejection or, at best,
indifference, with which the reports of Presidential Commissions have been
received, has discouraged researchers who have worked on or identified with
these projects. To the extent that compelled grand jury disclosure of
research confidences acts as a further disincentive, it must be avoided.
See Green, "The Obligations of American Social Scientists", 394 The Annals
13, 25(1971). See also Caldwell, supra, at 1086.
- 27 -
Footnotes continued
36. Cf., Grosjean v. American Press Co.. 297 U.S. 233, 250(1936);
"...since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints
upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity
afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave
concern."
- 28 -
Movant's Professional Activities Are Protected Against This
Grand Jury's Intrusion Unless And Until The Government______
Demonstrates National Interest So Compelling, Overriding, And
Unique to Movant, That It Outweighs The Public Worth Of His
Own and Similar Protected Pursuits.
The issue before this Court requires a judicial evaluation of
the strength of the government's objectives and the appropriateness of
37
its methods. The Court is thus faced with the task of articulating
justiciable standards with which to measure the amount of protection
37 A
Falk ought to be accorded. It is clear, however, that once a First
Amendment privilege is established, the parameters of protection set forth
in Caldwell v. United States, supra, ought expressly to be applicable.
This is true regardless of whether Falk's First Amendment privilege
attaches due to his journalistic pursuits, on the one hand, or his
activities as a scholar and author, on the other. In fact, this combination
of roles, fully documented in the record, makes his side of this balance
weigh even more.
The Court in Caldwell reached its result with full recognition
of the broad and unfettered scope of inquiry which grand juries have
traditionally exercised, 434 F.2d at 1085, and Professor Falk likewise
expresses such respect, Falk, A, 21. Caldwell also found guidance in the
37. Where, as here, the alleged abridgement of First Amendment interests
occurs as a by-product of otherwise permissible governmental action not
directed at the regulation of speech or press, "resolution of the issue always
involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public
interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown." Barenblatt v. U.S.
- 29 -
Footnotes continued
37. (cont.) , 360 U.S. 109, 126(1959); see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State
Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 50-57(1961); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,(1960)
NAACP V. Alabama ex rel. Pattersen, 357 U.S. 449, 460-467, (1958);
Kalven, "The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment.' " 1964, Sup. St. Rev. 191, 214-16(1964).
37 . As set forth infra, p. 38 , this balancing requires a showing by the
Government that it has no other sources of information which do not involve
an "equal degree of incursion upon First Amendment freedoms."
In assessing what "degree of incursion" is here present, the Court
must look not only to the general nature of the First Amendment freedom
asserted, but also to its relative strenth in the particular case. Thus,
the Court in Caldwell found that because of Caldwell's uniqueness, he was
entitled to a showing of "compelling and overriding national interest."
Falk's uniqueness to his own profession is at least equal to, if not
stronger than, Caldwell's; and, correspondingly, the same compelling urgency
ought to be shown by the Government in order to force his appearance.
Another way of expressing this is to say that the record before this Court
is at least as narrow as that before the Caldwell court; and the narrowness
of the record is the strongest reason for affording the protection sought.
See Caldwell, gupra, at 1090, discussed infra, p. 44
- 30 -
Supreme Court decisions regarding conflicts between First Amendment
interests and legislative investigatory needs, 434 F.2d at 1085-6, and
found, on a record notably similar to the record before this Court, that
the government's burden in the balancing process simply had not been met.
In the absence of compelling and overriding need, then, the government
cannot be permitted the power to "appropriate" protected "investigative
efforts" to its own behalf— to convert a witness, after the fact, "into
38
an investigative agent". 434 F.2d at 1086.
In order to demonstrate such need the government must, at the
least, establish the following:
(1) The information sought must be demonstrably relevant
to a clearly defined, legitimate subject of governmental inquiry. The
reason for demanding clear definition of the subject of the investigation
is plain. Like the requirement that legislation which may trench on
39
First Amendment interests meet "strict" standards of specificity, insis
tence on strict definition of the scope of an investigation assures that
38. This Court might bear in mind that the particular problem of protecting
academic and scholarly investigative confidences has already been recognized
and planned for in other contexts. One notable example are the guidelines
issued by the American Council on Education for their ^tudy of campus unrest;
"5. /the above named emplyees of the projecjt/ will explicitly
undertake to protect all confidential information, whether
recorded or not, that i.s revealed to them. They will specifically
agree to refuse to divulge confidential information to any______
person or group, including investigative agencies, committees,
and courts of law, even if they or their records should be_______
subpoenaed'̂
- 31 -
Footnotes continued.
38. (cont.)
"6.....we advise and counsel all researchers in
this study /presumably not including those named in
paragraph 5, supra/ to refuse to release or provide
any confidential information, even if directed to do
so by a subpoena or other court process from a legis
lative body or court of law. We will support with all
all legal means any such refusal."
Emphasis supplied. Advisory Committee A.C.E. Study on Campus Unrest,
"Statement on Confidentiality, Use of Results, and Independence," 165
Science 158, 159(July 11, 1969).
These guidelines are cited advisedly, as the investigation of campus
unrest would be quite likely to expose evidence of crimes which the
government would obviously be entitled to prosecute.
39. E.g. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151(1959); Cramp v. Board of
Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287— ^288(1961); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 432-433(1963); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200(1966).
- 32 -
the governmental body whose processes may intrude upon the First
Amendment has focused both upon its purposes and upon the question of
whether those purposes require the intrusion. See Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring, in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 203(1961). The
requirement is a safeguard against overbroad and formless investigations
which — like overbroad and formless laws — "lend themselves too readily
to the denial of /First Amendment_/ . . . rights." Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 486(1965). See particularly, Liveright v. Joint Committee,
279 F. Supp. 205, 215, 217 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). Finally, the requirement of
strict definition of the subject under investigation is indispensable to
enable first the subpoenaed witness and his counsel, and later the courts
themselves, to determine the point of proper balance between investigative
need and the privacy protected by the First Amendment. For all these
reasons, indefiniteness in the scope of governmental inquiry has consistently
been regarded as fatal to investigations in the First Amendment area.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178(1957); Sweezy v. New Hampsire, supra
Scull V. Virginia ex rel. Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activities,
359 U.S. 344(1959); Liveright v. Joint Committee, supra.
And, once the subject of an investigation has been adequately
defined, the use of compulsory process is required to be confined to matters
strictly relevant to that subject. Ordinarily, of course, the command that
grand jury subpoenas seek only evidence relevant to the jury's inquiry is
administered with considerable elasticity. E.g., In Re Grand Jury Subpoena
- 33 -
Duces Tecum, 203 F. Supp. 575, 579(S.D.N.Y. 1961). But that degree of
tolerance may not be indulged whereinquiry touches First Amendment interests,
for in these latter areas compulsory disclosure is forbidden unless it is
"demonstrated to bear a crucial relation to a proper governmental interest
or to be essential to the fulfillment of a proper governmental purpose."
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, supra, 372 U.S., at
549. See DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825(1956)
(2) It must affirmatively appear that the inquiry is likely to
turn up material information, that is; (a) that there is some factual basis
for pursuing the investigation, and (b) that there is reasonable ground to
conclude that the particular witness subpoenaed has information material
to it■ In the First Amendment area, even relevant inquiries may not be pur
sued without some solid basis for belief that they will be productive. For
example, Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 1963), condemned
a legislative investigation which purported to inquire into certain criminal
activities but also resulted in the disclosure of constitutionally protected
associations, saying that courts "can and should protect the activities of
the plaintiffs . . . in maintaining the privacy of their First Amendment
activities against irreparable injury unless and until there is a reasonably
demonstrated factual basis for assuming that they are guilty of the offenses
which the Committee is investigating."
- 34 -
"of course, a legislative investigation —
as any investigation — must proceed 'step by
step', . . . , but step by step or in totality,
an adequate foundation for inquiry must be laid
before proceeding in such a manner as will substantially
intrude upon and sev%ely curtain or inhibit constitu
tionally protected activities or seriously interfere
with similarly protected associational rights."
(Gibson V. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,
supra, 372 U.S., at 557.)
(3) The information sought must be unobtainable by means
less destructive of First Amendment freedoms. This requirement derives
from the pervasive First Amendment principle of the "narrowest effective
means," recognized in cases of compulsory disclosure of protected associa
tions, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488(1960); Louisiana ex rel.
Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296-297(1961), as in others, e.g.,
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18(1966). Simply stated, the principle
is:
"that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regula
tions may not be achieved by means which sweep un-
nec^sarily broadly and thereby invade the area of pro
tected freedoms. .../T /he power to regulate must be
so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible_end^ unduly
to infringe the protected freedom. ... '. . ./E/ven though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.' " (NAACP v. Alababa ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S,
288, 307-308(1964).)
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As applied to this grand jury investigation, this principle leads plainly
to the conclusion that the jury may not compel Falk's testimony, intruding
into and threatening destruction of his confidential relationships, if
it can find out what it wants to know from other sources that do not
40
implicate First Amendment concerns.
40. Compare In Re Murtha, 40 USLW 2052, discussed infra, p. 39
We think that Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), recognizes
this point. The case arose out of a defamation action brought by Judy
Garland against the Columbia Broadcasting System, predicated on the
complaint that CBS had made libelous statements against Miss Garland and
affirmatively induced their publication in newspapers and elsewhere. A
critical instance of the alleged defamation was a newspaper column by
Marie Torre containing statements about Miss Garland attributed to a CBS
"network executive." In pretrial proceedings, the two CBS executives whom
Miss Garland had named in her deposition as the likely sources of the Torre
story were deposed and denied all knowledge of it. Counsel for Garland
then deposed Marie Torre and inquired concerning her source; Miss Torre
refused to answer, clai'ming a First Amendment privilege; and she was held
in contempt.
The Second Circuit (per Judge Stewart, now Mr. Justice Stewart),
affirmed the contempt commitment, but only after accepting "at the outset
the hypothesis that compulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential
sources of information may entail an abridgment of press freedom by imposing
some limitation upon the availability of news." 259 F.2d, at 548. "What
must be determined is whether the interest to be served by compelling the
testimony of the witness in the present case justifies some impairment of
this First Amendment freedom."(Ibid) The court held that it did because the
Torre testimony "went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim" (I^., at 550)
in a case that was being prepared for trial. Torre was plainly the only
available source of the information sought from her, and accordingly the
Second Circuit emphasized "that we are not dealing. . . with a case where
the identity of the news source is of doubtful relevance or materiality"
(Id., at 549-550). The force of the Garland court's reservation is the
more apparent with regard to grand jury proceedings, for grand juries inquire
only to determine probable cause; and they therefore have no compelling
need for cumulative evidence — evidence from more than one source — which,
for a trial jury, might spell the difference of persuasion.
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40.(cont.)
Finally, Garland v. Torre appears to recognize — as we think
it must consistently with Shelton v. Tucker, supra; Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee, supra; and DeGregory v. Attorney
General of New Hampshire, supra — that governmental attempts to compel
disclosure of confidential associations may sometimes be forbidden by the
First Amendment even though the protected evidence is sought under pro
cedures and circumstances that meet the requirements we have
described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), in text supra. This is implicit
in the Second Circuit's approach of particularistic "balancing" of First
Ttoiendment freedoms against the justifications for compelled disclosure,
and in the court's recognition that Garland did not involve "the use of
judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confi
dential sources of news" (259 F.2d., at 549). The proviso implies, at the
least, a prohibition of compelling Falk to make disclosures whose broadly
destructive effect upon First Amendment freedoms palpably outweighs the
value of the uses to which a government investigation body may put them.
Cf. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217(1967).
As to this latter point, see also fn. 37A, supra.
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These established principles dictate the test that we set
forth in the motion to quash originally filed with this Court, namely,
that the government must show:
(1) Reasonable grounds to believe that Richard Falk has
information, which is
(2) Specifically relevant to an identified episode that this
Grand Jury has some factual basis for investigating as a possible violation
of designated statutes within its jurisdiction; and
(3) That the government has no alternative sources of the40A
same or equivalent information whose use would not entail an equal degree
of incursion upon First Amendment freedoms.
Is there, then, a sufficient governmental showing of compelling
and overriding need to force Richard Falk's appearance before the grand
41
jury? We have only a government representation that the grand jury is
investigating the alleged commission of a variety of statutory offenses all
of which presvimably relate to the Pentagon Papers. This broad assertion
plainly does not meet the test set out above.
First, let it be noted that the government is seeking to compel
Falk's appearance for the apparent purpose of testifying about the distri
bution and publication of materials whose distribution and publication may
41. Made, it should be noted, not in this case but on August 19, in the
matter of Stephen Popkin, who was later excused by the Government.
40A. See, infra, fn. 37A
- 38 -
not, consistent with the First Amencinent, be suppressed. New York Times v.
United States, supra. Nor has there been any demonstration that there has
been committed any crime other than that alleged to Daniel Ellsberg, or
that, assuming there has, Falk has some direct and immediate knowledge of
it, or that, assuming he does, such information would not be forthcoming
from someone else. In Re Murtha, N.J. Super. Ct., App Div. 7/6/71, in
which this Court has expressed interest, is instructive in these regards:
A murder had clearly occurred. Sister Murtha had voluntarily admitted to
the police that a direct, unambiguous admission had been made to her, and
42
she was the only person to whom the information had been given. And,
apart from all of this and most important of all, she had demonstrated no
First Amendment or other testimonal privilege which might protect these
43
revelations.
42. In Re Murtha. in this regard, is similar to Garland v. Torre, fn. 40
supra.
Worth mentioning in this context is the fact that, according to news
paper accounts, zerox copies of all or a portion of the Pentagon Papers
were distributed all over the country, with their "Top Secret" designation
removed. Even if the government asserted, or in fact could prove, that some
of these copies had come into Falk's possession, this is no evidence what
soever that he was a party to or had any knowledge of who originally dis
tributed them, or, depending on how he received them, who his own source was,
For the government to invade Falk's First Amendment privilege in pursuit of
such marginal ends seems, quite frankly, an attempt to cut off his nose to
spite their face.
43. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 129-132(1959) where,
again, no testimonial privilege was found. Barenblatt, involved legislative
investigation of alleged Communist infiltration of educational institutions.
It is clearly distinguishable from Falk's situation in that Barenblatt made
- 39 -
43. (cont.)
only the broadest of objections to the right of Congress to inquire into
his "political" and "religious" beliefs or any "personal or private affairs"
or "associational activities". 360 U.S. at 114. We are not arguing, as
Barenblatt did, that a witness is immune from process merely because he is
a teacher. Falk has particularized in great detail the narrow degree of
his concern and has made the kind of record on this issue that was found
lacking in Barenblatt("Finally, the record is barren of other factors which
in themselves might sometimes lead to the conclusion that the individual
interests at stake were not subordinate to those of the state". 350 U.S.
at 134.).
- 40 -
In The Absence Of Compelling And Overriding Need, Movant
May Not Be Compelled To Appear Before The Grand Jury At
All, As There Is No Testimony He Can Give Which Would Not
Be Within The Bounds Of The Protective Order Required Under
The Rule Of Caldwell.
Caldwell holds that where a First Amendment privilege attaches,
the government must show a compelling and overriding national interest
44
for testimony prior to the witnesses appearance. In making this deter
mination the Court was clearly influenced by the witness' sworn assertion
that there was nothing to which he could testify that was not protected
by the District Court's protective order. 434 F.2d at 1089. Movant
believes that the record in this case is virtually identical in its sum
to that made by Mr. Caldwell and that, accordingly, he is entitled to
44. The Court of Appeals in Caldwell went further than the District Court,
as District Judge Zirpoli had held only that Caldwell was entitled to a
protective order prior to testifying. On appeal, the Court held that once
it is found that the witness is entitled to such an order, and he asserts
that the order protects virtually all of his potential testimony, "the
cost to the public of excusing his attendance is so slight" as to obviate the
necessity of mere appearance. 434 F.2d at 1089.
- 41 -
45
findings of fact similar in nature to District Judge Zirpoli's and a
disposition on the "mere appearance" issue similar to that made by the
Ninth Circuit. In support of this contention. Movant asserts under oath
45. Judge Zirpoli's order made inter alia, the following factual findings:
"(1) That the testimony of Earl Caldwell sought to
be compelled by the subpoena...will relate to
activities of members of the Black Panther Party;
"(2) That Mr. Caldwell's knowledge of those activities
derived in substantial part from statements and
information given to him, as a professional
journalist...within the scope of a relationship of
trust and confidence;
"(3) That confidential relationships of this sort are
commonly developed and maintained by professional
journalists, and are indispensable to their work of
gathering,analyzing and publishing the news."
"(4) That compelled disclosure of information received by
a journalist within the scope of such confidential
relationships jeopardizes those relationships and
thereby impairs the journalist's ability to gather,
analyse and publish the news...
"(5) That the Government has shown no compelling and
overriding national interest in requiring Mr. Caldwell
to give testimony before the grand jury that would
invade and jeopardize his confidential relationships..."
On the basis of these findings an order was entered, providing, in pertinent
part:
"(1) That if and when Earl Caldwell is directed to appear before
the grand jury pursuant to the subpoena of March 16, 1970,
he shall not be required to reveal confidential associations,
sources,or information received, developed or maintained by
him as a professional journalist in the course of his
efforts to gather news for dissemination to the public
through the press or other news media;
- 42 -
45. cont.
"(2) That specifically without limiting paragraph (1),
Mr. Caldwell shall not be required to answer ques
tions concerning statements made to him or informa
tion given to him by members of the Black Panther
Party unless such statements or information were
given to him for publication or public disclosure "
provided, however, that:
"the Court will entertain a motion for modification of
this order at any time upon a showing by the Govern
ment of a compelling and overriding national interest
in requiring Mr. Caldwell's testimony which cannot be
served by any alternative means . . . "
- 4 3 -
46
that he has read the protective order entered by Judge Zirpoli and that
there is no testimony he could give which would not be protected by a
similar order were one to be entered in this case. Falk, A, p. 21
The kind of damage which may be done by Falk's appearance is
outlined at pp. 17-19 , supra. The broad aspects of this threat are
discussed at Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1087-1089. The holding of Caldwell
on this point is explicitly narrow, and the terms of its narrowness, set
forth at 1090, are worth our attention: Richard Falk, like Caldwell, is
clearly unique in his field. He enjoys an incomparable trust and confidence
in dealing with matters of extreme sensitivity and national importance.
To the extent that an individual qualifies for the protection now sought
on his behalf, he clearly stands at the top of the list.
46. Although it was not asked to do so, the Ninth Circuit specifically
affirmed the terms of this order.
- 44 -
II.
SILVERTHORNE LUMBER CO. v. UNITED STATES, 251 U.S. 385
(1920) AND 18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 2510(11), 2515, 2518(10)
AND 3504 REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT TO AFFIRM OR DENY THE
USE OF WIRETAP AND/OR OTHER ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
UPON THE ALLEGATION BY A WITNESS THAT SUCH SURVEILLANCE
HAS IN FACT OCCURRED.
Movant has moved for a hearing purusant to 18 U.S.C., Section
3504, and specifically requested that:
(1) If the Government refuses to affirm or deny Movant's
allegation, the subpoena be quashed; or
(2) If the government affirms Movant's allegation, the
subpoena be quashed; or
(3) If the Government denies Movant's allegation. Movant
be permitted an opportunity to present evidence that the Government's
denial, while no doubt made in good faith, is inaccurate.
The Government has neither affirmed nor denied Movant's allega
tion, a procedure required by those Circuits which have upheld witness
standing under Section 3504, independent of and prior to whatever evidence
the witness may wish to introduce. In Re Egan, Third Circuit, en banc,
filed May 28, 1971, Slip Opinion, at p. 33; In Re Evans, D.C. Circuit,
46
filed July 23, 1971.
46. The opinion filed in the Evans case was not paginated. This holding
appears on the last page of Judge Bazelon's opinion.
- 45 -
III.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above stated reasons. Movant respectfully
requests that his subpoena be quashed.
Respectfully submitted.
/s/ Jack J. Levine
Jack J. Levine
1427 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
215-563-1388
Thomas G. Shapiro
73 Tremont Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
617-227-8420
Attorneys for Movant
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