Correspondence from Guinier to Parker, Atwell, and Derfner

    No. 

  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1999 

  

JAMES B. HUNT, JR. et al., 

Petitioners, 

and 

ALFRED SMALLWOOD, et al., 

Petitioner-Intervenors, 

V. 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, et al., 

Respondents. 

  

APPLICATION TO STAY DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA PENDING APPEAL 

  

To the Honorable William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States and Circuit 

Justice for the Fourth Circuit: 

On March 7, 2000. the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina issued an 

order declaring North Carolina’s Twelfth Congressional District unconstitutional and enjoining 

the State of North Carolina from using the district in future elections. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the 

Rules of this Court, Alfred Smallwood, David Moore, William M. Hodges, Robert L. Davis, Jr., 

Jan Valder, Barney Offerman, Virginia Newell, Charles Lambeth and George Simkins (“the 

Smallwood Intervenors”), by their undersigned attorneys, respectfully move for an order staying 

the district court’s order pending their appeal. A copy of the district court’s opinion, containing 

 



  

its order and injunction, is contained in Appendix 1 of the State of North Carolina’s emergency 

stay application and a copy of the district court’s judgment in the case is attached hereto as 

Appendix A. The Smallwood Intervenors have filed notice of appeal from the district court order. 

See Appendix B. 

Today, the Smallwood Intervenors have also filed a motion for a stay in the district court, 

attached hereto as Appendix C. However, the district court has not yet acted on this motion, nor 

the request filed by the State on March 10, 2000. As discussed below, the Circuit Justice or this 

Court should stay the district court’s order because of the irreparable harm to voters (especially 

minority voters), as well as to the State and candidates, which would result if no stay is granted 

and because petitioners and petitioner-intervenors are likely to be successful on the merits. In an 

effort to avoid duplicating the State’s emergency application for a stay, the Smallwood 

Intervenors provide additional reasons below for granting a stay and adopt the Statement of the 

Case and Statement of the Facts filed by the State in its emergency stay application. 

ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR GRANTING A STAY 

I. Irreparable Harm will Result to the Interests of the Public and to the State if a Stay 

is not issued and the Risk of Harm to Plaintiffs is Insignificant 

The three-judge court majority’s remedy in this case, ordering the State to redraw the 

Twelfth Congressional District virtually on the eve of the scheduled primary election, is clearly 

incorrect as indicated by Judge Thornburg in dissent. See Cromartie v. Hunt, No. 4:96-CV-104- 

BO(3), slip op. at 20-22 (E.D.N.C. March 7, 2000) (Thornburg, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part). The injury from disrupting election processes is significant and has been 

frequently recognized by this Court and the federal trial courts. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 

 



  

533, 585 (1964), this Court cautioned that 

under certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and 

a State’s election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations might 

justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief in a 

legislative apportionment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme 

was found invalid. . . . [A] court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of 

a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, 

and . . . can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of the election process 

which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make 

unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements 

of the court's decree. 

These principles have guided federal trial courts in both reapportionment and vote dilution cases.’ 

The people of North Carolina have a legitimate interest in holding their primary election 

on the scheduled date and would suffer from a delay in the timetable. See, e.g., Chisom v. 

Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1190 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing the uncertainty that delay introduces 

into election process). The district court issued its injunction when the election process for the 

2000 Congressional elections was already well under way. The filing period for Congressional 

  

'See, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 932 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (preliminary injunction denied to 

avoid harming public interest where elections scheduled in a few months, even though court found 

likelihood of success on Shaw claim and irreparable injury to plaintiffs), Cardona v. Oakland Unified 

School District, 785 F. Supp. 837, 843 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (court refused to enjoin election where 

primary “election machinery is already in gear,” including the passage of deadline for candidates to 

establish residency and start of candidate nominating period); Republican Party of Virginia v. Wilder, 

774 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Va. 1991) (injunction denied in case with “uncertain cause of action with 

only possible irreparable harm” and where time for election was close and there was danger of low 

voter turnout if election postponed); Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1981) (three- 

judge court) (use of malapportioned plan not enjoined where elections were two months away), 

Shapiro v. Maryland, 336 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Md. 1972) (court refused to enjoin election where 

candidate filing deadline was imminent and granting relief would disrupt election process and 

prejudice citizens, candidates and state officials); Sincock v. Roman, 233 F. Supp. 615 (D. Del. 1964) 

(three-judge court) (per curiam) (enjoining election would result in disruption in ongoing election 

process which would cause confusion and possible disenfranchisement of voters); Meeks v. Anderson, 

229 F. Supp. 271, 274 (D. Kan. 1964) (three-judge court) (court held malapportioned districts 

unconstitutional but concluded that the “ends of justice” would “best be served” by permitting 

elections to proceed) 

 



candidates began on January 3, 2000 and ended on February 7, 2000. Primary election voting is 

scheduled to begin on March 18, 2000 when the absentee voting period begins. The citizens who 

filed notices of candidacy, including 43 Congressional candidates, have raised and spent large 

amounts of money for their campaigns and continue to raise and spend funds campaigning for the 

contested primary races. 

The State has already taken most of the various administrative steps necessary to hold an 

election at the public expense. Candidates, North Carolina election officials and voters (including 

the Smallwood Intervenors) will suffer significant, substantial and irreparable harm from the 

disruption of this election process, such as low voter turnout, voter confusion, additional burdens 

on candidates, and increased costs.* 

These harms prompted the three-judge district court in the predecessor litigation in Shaw 

v. Hunt to deny injunctive relief to plaintiffs in 1996, where only a few months remained before 

the general election. As political scientist Dr. Bernard Grofman’ testified in that case, altering the Y B 

  

2See Cardona, 785 F. Supp. at 842-43 (1992) (denying relief due to proximity of election); Banks v. 

Board of Educ. of Peoria, 659 F. Supp. 394,398 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (“the candidates had already begun 

campaigning, forming committees to raise funds, making decisions about political strategy, and 

spending money for publicity purposes”), Knox v. Milwaukee County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 581 

F. Supp. 399, 405 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (“candidates' election reports have been filed, campaign 

committees organized, contributions solicited, . . . literature distributed); Martin v. Venables, 401 F. 

Supp. 611, 621 (D. Conn. 1975) (denying relief where parties had selected their endorsed candidates 

and time for challengers to qualify for primaries had passed); Dobson v. Mayor and City Council of 

Baltimore, 330 F. Supp. 1290, 1301 (D. Md. 1971) (disrupting election schedule would mean present 

candidates would lose, in large measure, the benefit of their campaigning to date); Kiahr v. Williams, 

313 F. Supp. 148, 152 (D. Ariz. 1970) (redistricting where filing deadline was less than two months 

away would involve serious risk of confusion and chaos), aff'd sub nom. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 

113 (1971). 

3Dr. Grofman has been accepted as an expert in the areas of political participation and voting rights 

by numerous federal district courts. His work has also been often cited by federal courts in cases 

related to districting, including Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) and Shaw v. Reno, 509 

4  



State's regular election calendar, conducting congressional elections without statewide races on 

the ballot, and conducting elections in close proximity to each other all contribute to low voter 

turnout. See Expert Witness Declaration in Shaw v. Hunt, Bernard N. Grofman, Ph.D., July 24, 

1996, at 6, attached hereto as Appendix D. According to Dr. Grofman, this result is exacerbated 

for minority groups, such as African Americans, because they tend to be poorer and less well 

educated than their white counterparts, and, consequently, tend to have lower levels of political 

participation. See id. at 9. This analysis caused Dr. Grofman to conclude in Shaw that “even if 

it were technically feasible that a new congressional plan could be drawn (either by the legislature 

or by the [district] court) and implemented within the next few months, any attempt to hold 

primary elections between now [July 24, 1996] and the November 5, 1996, election date under 

that plan would result in primary elections with especially low turnout,” id. at 12, and would be “a 

potential source of considerable voter confusion.” Id. at 13. 

The three-judge district court in Shaw accordingly refused to disrupt North Carolina’s 

election process on remand from this Court’s 1996 decision even after a finding by this Court that 

the Congressional plan was unconstitutional. The decision of the Shaw district court to permit 

elections to proceed even under a plan found unconstitutional is supported by precedent of this 

Court. See Reynolds, quoted supra, 377 U.S. at 585 (“[U]nder certain circumstances, such as 

where an impending election is imminent and a State’s election machinery is already in progress, 

equitable considerations might justify a court withholding the granting of immediately effective 

relief in a legislative apportionment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme was 

found invalid”). See also Watkins v. Mabus, 502 U.S. 954 (1991); Republican Party of Shelby 

  

U.S. 630 (1993).  



  

County v. Dixon, 429 U.S. 934 (1976); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971). 

The same undesirable effects, especially for minority voters, will inevitably result if the 

order of the court below is not stayed. The order will nullify the efforts of candidates to date and 

result in lower voter participation and considerable confusion in any rescheduled elections. 

These harms are exacerbated by the timing and scope of the district court decision. This 

presents a separate, but related basis for granting a stay in this case. This Court issued its decision 

in Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. __, 119 S. Ct. 1545 (1999) in May, 1999. However, despite 

the urgency of the State’s election schedule, the district court did not issue its discovery schedule 

until August 23, 1999, three months after this Court’s decision. In its order, the court set 

discovery to conclude on an expedited basis by October 2, 1999 and scheduled the case for trial in 

November, 1999. Despite making it very clear during the trial that it understood the time 

pressures of the State’s election schedule and that candidates would begin filing for offices in 

January, the court waited over three months to issue its opinion after expediting trial. In the time 

that the trial court took to issue its opinion, candidates filed to run in and the State proceeded to 

prepare for the May 2, 2000 primary. While this case presents complex issues that may require 

significant time to analyze, the role of the district court in contributing to the potential electoral 

disruption in this case presents another reason for a stay. 

Moreover, the district court’s decision is coming on the eve of the 2000 redistricting. In 

just over one year, the Census Bureau will release the 2000 Census data and the State will begin 

the redistricting process, a process that inevitably will result in at least some Congressional 

districts being redrawn. To require the State to engage in the disruptive process now only to 

repeat it in another year would be unduly burdensome and duplicative. Moreover, redistricting 

 



  

now would require the use of 1990 data which is less accurate and less reflective of North 

Carolina’s year 2000 population. Rather than engaging in a disruptive redistricting process that 

will invariably produce districts drawn according to inaccurate data, the Circuit Justice or this 

Court should act consistent with well-established precedent to allow the State to proceed apace 

with the 2000 elections under the current plan. 

Indeed, given the timing of this case, the irreparable injury to the public and the 

Smallwood Intervenors far outweighs that of the plaintiffs in this case. In City of Alexandria, the 

Fourth Circuit concluded that “the public interest would be served by granting the stay” in that 

case “even though plaintiffs as a practical matter may suffer a binding and final defeat through the 

granting of the stay. . . .” City of Alexandria, 719 F.2d at 700. The court interpreted 

“irreparable injury” “to mean more than any injury that cannot be wholly recompensated or 

eradicated. Both the extent of injury and the consequences over the long ferm must likewise be 

taken into account.” Id. (emphasis added). As the next redistricting cycle is imminent, granting a 

stay would not permanently prevent plaintiffs from acquiring the remedy they seek: a new 

redistricting plan. If during or after the 2000 redistricting cycle, plaintiffs are not satisfied with 

the new plan, they may participate in the process of creating a more palatable plan or challenge 

the constitutionality of the plan subsequently. The reasoning of the court in Dickinson v. Indiana 

State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1991) is instructive: 

The district court also concluded that, on equitable grounds, the pending 1991 

redistricting (based on the 1990 census) makes entry of relief inappropriate. The 

district court did not err in making this finding. The legislative reapportionment is 

imminent, and Districts 49 and 51 may well be reshuffled. The legislature should 

now complete its duty, after which the plaintiffs can reassess whether racial bias 

still exists and seek appropriate relief. 

 



  

Furthermore, this is consistent with the most recent decisions of district courts that have 

considered constitutional challenges to redistricting plans late in the decade. See, e.g., Maxwell v. 

Foster, No. 98-1378, slip op. at 7 and 8 (W.D. La. Nov. 24, 1999) (district court granting State 

of Louisiana’s motion for summary judgment and finding that “rapid-fire reapportionment 

immediately prior to a scheduled census would constitute an undue disruption of the election 

process, the stability and continuity of the legislative system and would be highly prejudicial, not 

only to the citizens of Louisiana, but to the state itself”), attached hereto as Appendix E. 

Therefore, the long-term harm to plaintiffs is not as significant as the current injury to the public 

and the State if this stay is not granted. 

IL Movants are Likely to Succeed on the Merits 

Judge Thornburg is correct in his analysis of the merits of this case. See Cromartie v. 

Hunt, No. 4:96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 3-19 (E.D.N.C. March 7, 2000) (Thornburg, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). In moving for a stay, it is not the Smallwood 

Intervenors’ burden to show a certain probability of success on the merits, but only a reasonable 

probability. See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 405 U.S. 1201, 1203 (“Justices of this Court have 

consistently required that there be a reasonable probability that four members of the Court will 

consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction.” 

(emphasis added)); Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. 1981) (“on motions for a stay 

pending appeal the movant need not always show a “probability” of success on the merits; instead, 

the movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is 

involved and show that the balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay”). The 

existence of a well-reasoned dissent indicates a substantial chance that defendants will prevail on 

 



  

the merits. 

For the reasons Judge Thornburg states, the court below should not have applied strict 

scrutiny to the North Carolina General Assembly’s decision to create the Twelfth Congressional 

District. The district court was incorrect as a matter of law to declare the Twelfth Congressional 

District unconstitutional. This provides a sound basis to conclude that the Defendants and 

Defendant-intervenors will succeed on the merits. In addition, as discussed above, the timing and 

scope of the district court’s remedy is also at issue and provides an independent basis for 

Defendants and Defendant-intervenors’ success on the merits in this case. 

 



CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Smallwood Intervenors respectfully request that the 

Circuit Justice or this Court stay the district court order declaring North Carolina’s Twelfth 

Congressional District unconstitutional and enjoining the State of North Carolina from using the 

district in future elections. They also join in the State’s Emergency Application for Stay Pending 

Appeal of the Decision of the Three-Judge Court for the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of North Carolina. 

ADAM STEIN 

Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins 

Gresham & Sumter, P.A. 

312 West Franklin Street 

Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516 

(919) 933-5300 

This 13th day of March, 2000. 

Respectfully submitte 

  

ELAINE R. ove 
Director-Counsel and President 

NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 

NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 

New York, New York 10013 

(212) 219-1900 

TODD A. COX 
NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. 

1444 1 Street, N.W., 10th Floor 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 682-1300 

 



  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1999 

  

JAMES B. HUNT, JR. et al., 

Petitioners, 

and 

ALFRED SMALLWOOD, et al., 

Petitioner-Intervenors, 

V. 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, et al., 

Respondents. 

  

APPENDIX TO 

APPLICATION TO STAY DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA PENDING APPEAL 

  

Judgment in Cromartie v. Hunt, 

No. 4:96-CV-104-BO(3) (E.D.N.C. March 7, 2000) APPENDIX A 

Defendant-Intervenors’ Notice of Appeal APPENDIX B 

Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Stay and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Stay APPENDIX C 

Expert Witness Declaration in Shaw v. Hunt, 
Bernard N. Grofman, Ph. D, July 24, 1996 APPENDIX D 

Maxwell v. Foster, No. 98-1378 (W.D. La. Nov. 24, 1999) APPENDIX E  



  

APPENDIX A 

 



03/13/2000 12:55 FAX egy FERGUSON STEIN @002/003 

  

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ~~ -- 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA [:_ _ 

EASTERN DIVISION 
[MAR 3 2000 

DA 1 ve. LAWEL, CLERK 
us DISTRICT COURT 
ARE “TOINA 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, THOMAS 

CHANDLER MUSE, R. O. EVERETT, 

J. H. FROELICH, JAMES RONALD 

LINVILLE, JOEL K. BOURNE, 

LOIS WEAVER, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. JUDGMENT 
——— ———  — — en. 

No. 4:96-CV-104- BO(3) | 
— ~ : — ———— —— 3 ® 

) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 

—)- 
JAMES B. HUNT, IR, in his official ) 

capacity as Governor of the State of North ) 

Carolina, DENNIS WICKER in his ) 

official capacity as Lieutenant Governor ) 

of the State of North Carolina, HAROLD ) 

BRUBAKER, in his official capacity as ) 

Speaker of the North Carolina House of ) 

Representatives, ELAINE MARSHALL, in ) 

her official capacity as Secretary of the ) 

State of North Carolina, THE NORTH ) 

CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ) 

ELECTIONS, an official agency of the ) 

State of North Carolina, LARRY LEAKE, ) 
S. KATHERINE BURNETTE, FAIGER ) 

BLACKWELL, DOROTHY PRESSER, ) 

and JUNE YOUNGLBOOD, in their ) 

official capacity as members of the ) 

the North Carolina Board of Elections, ) 

) 

) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 

Defendants. 

ALFRED SMALLWOOD, DAVID 

MOORE, WILLIAM M. HODGES, 

ROBERT L. DAVIS, JR., JAN VALDER, 

BARNEY OFFERMAN, VIRGINIA 

NEWELL, CHARLES LAMBETH, 

and GEORGE SIMKINS, 

Defendant-Intervenors     
   



    

    

   
03/13/2000 12:55 FAX 9199674953 # FERGUSON STEIN (1003/7003 

i 

  

| 

Decision by Three—Judge Court. This action came to trial before the Court. The issues have been 
tried or heard and a decision has been rendered. 

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this court finds that the 1997 Plan's 

Twelfth District continues to be unconstitutional as presented. Defendants are enjoined from using 
the unconstitutional District 12 in future elections. The 1997 Plan's First District does not violate 

the Constitution and may thus be used in future elections. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, as stated in open court, 

movant Norman Pritnus’ motion to appear as Amicus Curiae 1s DENIED. 

This Judgment Filed and Entered on March 8, 2000, and Copies To: 

—_— —- |__Rohinson Everett, Esq.  ————— eee — NoPHRAR- PHAGES rn er scree trees 

P.O. Box 586 136 Gardner St. 

Durham, NC 27702 New London, CT 06320 

Martin McGee, Esq. 

P.O. Box 810 | 
Concord, NC 28026-0810 

Tiare B. Smiley, Esq. 

P. O. Box 629 

Raleigh, NC 27602 

Adam Stein, Esq. 

312 West Franklin St. 

Chapel Hill, NC 27516 

Robert Hunter, Esq. 

P. O. Box 20570 

Greensboro, NC 27420 

March 8, 2000 DAVID W. DANIEL, CLERK 

  

    (BY) Deputy Clerk     
  

 



APPENDIX B 

 



   

  

03/13/2000 14:45 FAX 9199674953 p 
i @oo5 

        

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 

RALEIGH DIVISION 

Civil Action No. 4:96-CV-104 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, ef al. 

Plaintiffs, 

V. 

JAMES B. HUNT, JR, et al., 
DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS’ 

Defendants, NOTICE OF APPEAL 

and 

ALFRED SMALLWOOD, et al, 

Defendant-Intervenors. 

) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 

=) 
  

Notice is hereby given that Alfred Smallwood, David Moore, William M. Hodges, Robert 

L. Davis, Jr., Jan Valder, Barney Offerman, Virginia Newell, Charles Lambeth and George 

Simkins, Defendant-Intervenors, hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from 

March 8, 2000 Judgment and the March 7, 2000 order declaring North Carolina’s Twelfth 

Congressional District unconstitutional and enjoining the State of North Carolina from using the 

district in future elections. 

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 usc. Sec. 1233. 

This the 13" day of March, 2000. 

 



  

    

  

03/13/2000 14:46 FAX 9199674953 
      

@006 

Respectfully Submitted, 

oH 
ALAINE R JONES 
Director-Counsel and President 

NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 

NAACP Legal Defense and 

* Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 

New York, New York 10013 

(212) 219-1900 

  

TODD A. COX 

NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. 

1444 1 Street, N.W., 10th Floor 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 682-1300 

ADAM STEIN 

Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins 

Gresham & Sumter, P.A. 

312 West Franklin Street 

Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516 

(919) 933-5300 

 



03/13/2000 14:46 FAX 9199674953 ® 4 [d007 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that true and correct copies of Defendant-Intervenors’ Notice of Appeal 

have been served by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following: 

Edwin M. Speas, Jr. 

Chief Deputy Attorney General 

Tiare B. Smiley 

Special Deputy Attomey General 

North Carolina Department of Justice 

Post Office Box 629 

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-0629 

Robinson O. Everett 

Everett & Everett 

Post Office Box 586 

Durham, North Carolina 27702 

This 13th day of March, 2000. 

JE Sh 
Adam Stein 
  

 



APPENDIX C 

 



   
03/13/2000 14:45 FAX 9199674953 

oo © » gi             

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 

RALEIGH DIVISION 

Civil Action No. 4:96-CV-104 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, et al. ) 

) 
Plaintiffs, ) 

) 
A 

v. ) 
) 

JAMES B. HUNT, JR, et al., ) 

) DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS’ 

Defendants, ) MOTION FOR STAY 

) 
and ) 

) 
) 

ALFRED SMALLWOOD, et al., ) 

) 
Defendant-Intervenors. ) 

) 
  

Pursuant to Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Alfred Smallwood, David 

Moore, William M. Hodges, Robert L. Davis, Jr., Jan Valder, Barney Offerman, Virginia 

Newell, Charles Lambeth and George Simkins (“the Smallwood Intervenors”), by their 

undersigned attorneys, respectfully move this Court for a stay of its March 8, 2000 Judgment and 

March 7, 2000 order declaring North Carolina’s Twelfth Congressional District unconstitutional 

and enjoining the State of North Carolina from using the district in future elections on the 

grounds set forth in the attached memorandum. 

 



   

  

03/13/2000 14:45 FAX 9199674953 
® 

4 @003 
      

WHEREFORE, the Smallwood Intervenors pray that their motion for stay be granted. 

This 13th day of March, 2000. 

Respectfully submitted, 

0. She 
ELAINE R. JOKE 
Director-Counsel il President 

NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 

NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 

New York, New York 10013 

(212) 219-1900 

  

TODD A. COX 

NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. 

1444 1 Street, N.W., 10th Floor 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 682-1300 

ADAM STEIN 

Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins 

Gresham & Sumter, P.A. 

312 West Franklin Street 

Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516 

(919) 933-5300 

 



              03/13/2000 14:45 FAX 9199674953 % @o04 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that true and correct copies of Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Stay 

have been served by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following: 

Edwin M. Speas, Jr. 

Chief Deputy Attorney General 

Tiare B. Smiley 

Special Deputy Attorney General 

North Carolina Department of Justice 

Post Office Box 629 

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-0629 

Robinson O. Everett 

Everett & Everett 

Post Office Box 586 

Durham, North Carolina 27702 

This 13th day of March, 2000. 

  

IN 

 



      

03/13/2000 14:46 FAX 9199674953 % A @008 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 

RALEIGH DIVISION 

Civil Action No. 4:96-CV-104 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, et al. 

Plaintiffs, 

V. 

) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 

JAMES B. HUNT, JR., et al., ) 

) MEMORANDUM IN 

Defendants, ) SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT- 

) INTERVENORS’ MOTION FOR 

) STAY 

) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 

and 

ALFRED SMALLWOOD, et al, 

Defendant-Intervenors. 

  

Alfred Smallwood, David Moore, William M. Hodges, Robert L. Davis, Jr., Jan Valder, 

Barney Offerman, Virginia Newell, Charles Lambeth and George Simkins (“the Smallwood 

Intervenors™), by their undersigned attorneys, respectfully submit this memorandum of law in 

support of their motion for a stay of this Court’s March 7, 2000 order declaring North Carolina’s 

Twelfth Congressional District unconstitutional and enjoining the State of North Carolina from 

using the district in future elections. 

INTRODUCTION 

On March 7, 2000, this Court issued an opinion declaring North Carolina’s Twelfth 

Congressional District unconstitutional and enjoining the State of North Carolina from using the 

district in future elections. As discussed below, this Court’s order should be stayed because of 

the irreparable harm to voters (especially minority voters), as well as to the State and candidates,  



   
03/13/2000 14:46 FAX 9199674953 @o09 

2 - 

which would result if no stay is granted and because Defendants and Defendant-intervenors are 

likely to succeed on the merits in their appeals. In an effort to avoid duplication, the Smallwood 

Intervenors adopt and rely on the reasons advanced by the State of North Carolina for granting 

stay and adopt its Statement of the Case and Statement of the Facts. 

ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR GRANTING A STAY 

9 The Standard for Evaluating a Motion for a Stay 

In the Fourth Circuit, federal courts weigh four factors in considering a motion for a stay. 

[A] party seeking a stay must show (1) that he will likely prevail on the merits of 

the appeal, (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is denied, (3) that 

other parties will not be substantially harmed by the stay, and (4) that the public 

interest will be served by granting the stay. 

Long v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 977, 979 (4th cir. 1970) (citations omitted). See also Belk v. 

Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Ed., 1999 us. App. LEXIS 34574; City of Alexandria v. Helms, 

719 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1983). These “‘factors contemplate individualized judgments in each 

case,’ and thus cannot be rigidly applied.” Belk, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34574 * 4 (citing Hilton 

v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 777, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724, 107 S. Ct. 2113 (1987)). The irreparable 

harm to the parties are the most important factors for courts to weigh and should be considered 

first. See id. 

II. Irreparable Harm will Result to the Interests of the Public and to the State if a Stay 

is not issued and the Risk of Harm to Plaintiffs is Insignificant 

This Court’s remedy in this case, ordering the State to redraw the Twelfth Congressional 

District, is clearly incorrect as indicated by Judge Thornburg in dissent. See Cromartie v. Hunt, 

No. 4:96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 20-22 (E.D.N.C. March 7, 2000) (Thornburg, J., concurring 

in part and dissenting in part). The injury from disrupting election processes is significant and 

has been frequently recognized by the Supreme Court and the federal trial courts. In Reynolds v. 

 



   
03/13/2000 14:46 FAX 9199674953 do10 

Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964), the Supreme Court cautioned that 

under certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent 

and a State’s election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations 

might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief in 

a legislative apportionment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme 

was found invalid. . . . [A] court is entitled to and should consider the proximity 

of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election 

laws, and . . . can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of the election 

process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make 

unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements 

of the court's decree. 

These principles have guided federal trial courts in both reapportionment and vote dilution 

cases.’ | 

The people of North Carolina have a legitimate interest in holding their primary election 

on the scheduled date and would suffer from a delay in the timetable. See, e.g, Chisom v. 

Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1190 (Sth Cir. 1988) (recognizing the uncertainty that delay introduces 

into election process). The district court issued its injunction when the election process for the 

2000 Congressional elections was already well under way. The filing period for Congressional 

  

'See, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 932 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (preliminary injunction denied 

to avoid harming public interest where elections scheduled in a few months, even though court 

found likelihood of success on Shaw claim and irreparable injury to plaintiffs); Cardona v. 

Oakland Unified School District, 785 F. Supp. 837, 843 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (court refused to enjoin 

election where primary “election machinery is already in gear,” including the passage of deadline 

for candidates to establish residency and start of candidate nominating period); Republican Party 

of Virginia v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Va. 1991) (injunction denied in case with 

“uncertain cause of action with only possible irreparable. harm” and where time for election was 

close and there was danger of low voter turnout if election postponed); Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F. 

Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1981) (three-judge court) (use of malapportioned plan not enjoined where 

elections were two months away); Shapiro v. Maryland, 336 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Md. 1972) (court 

refused to enjoin election where candidate filing deadline was imminent and granting relief 

would disrupt election process and prejudice citizens, candidates and state officials); Sincock v. 

Roman, 233 F. Supp. 615 (D. Del. 1964) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (enjoining election 

would result in disruption in ongoing election process which would cause confusion and possible 

disenfranchisement of voters); Meeks v. Anderson, 229 F. Supp. 271, 274 (D. Kan. 1964) (three- 

judge court) (court held malapportioned districts unconstitutional but concluded that the “ends of 

justice” would “best be served” by permitting elections to proceed) 

 



  

03/13/2000 14:47 FAX 9199674953 

Re 

candidates began on January 3, 2000 and ended on February 7, 2000. Primar 

scheduled to begin on March 18, 2000 when the absentee voting period begins 

filed notices of candidacy, including 43 Congressional candidates, have rais 

amounts of money for their campaigns and continue to raise and spend fung 

the contested primary races. 

The State has already taken most of the various administrative steps n 

election at the public expense. Candidates, North Carolina election o 

(including the Smallwood Intervenors) will suffer significant, substantial an 

from the disruption of this election process, such as low voter turnout, 

additional burdens on candidates, and increased costs. 

These harms prompted the district court in Shaw v. Hunt to deny 

plaintiffs in that case in 1996, where only a few months remained before the g 

political scientist Dr. Bernard Grofman® testified in that case, altering the Stat 

calendar, conducting congressional elections without statewide races o 

conducting elections in close proximity to each other all contribute to low 

  

2See Cardona, 785 F. Supp. at 842-43 (1992) (denying relief due to proximity 

v. Board of Educ. of Peoria, 659 F. Supp. 394, 398 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (“the can 
begun campaigning, forming committees to raise funds, making decisia 

strategy, and spending money for publicity purposes”); Knox v. Milwauk 
Election Comm'rs, 581 F. Supp. 399, 405 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (“candidates’ el 

been filed, campaign committees organized, contributions solicited, . . . lite 

Martin v. Venables, 401 F. Supp. 611, 621 (D. Conn. 1975) (denying relief 

selected their endorsed candidates and time for challengers to qualify for prix 
Dobson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 330 F. Supp. 1290, 13 
(disrupting election schedule would mean present candidates would lose, in 

benefit of their campaigning to date); Klahr v. Williams, 313 F. Supp. 148 
(redistricting where filing deadline was less than two months away would inv 
confusion and chaos), aff'd sub nom. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 113 (1971). 

"Dr. Grofman has been accepted as an expert in the areas of political partic 

rights by numerous federal district courts. His work has also been often cited 

cases related to districting, including Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 ( 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 

do11 

y election voting 1s 

. The citizens who 

jed and spent large 

Is campaigning for 

ecessary to hold an 

fficials and voters 

d irreparable harm 

voter confusion, 

injunctive relief to 

eneral election. As 

e’s regular election 

n the ballot, and 

voter turnout. See 

of election); Banks 

didates had already 
ns about political 
ree County Bd. of 
ection reports have 

rature distributed); 
' where parties had 

naries had passed); 
01 (D. Md. 1971) 
large measure, the 

, 152 (Ariz. 1970) 
plve serious risk of 

ipation and voting 

by federal courts in 

1986) and Shaw v.   
 



  

03/13/2000 14:47 FAX 9199674953 @o12 

Expert Witness Declaration in Shaw v. Hunt, Bernard N. Grofman, Ph.D., July 24, 1996, at 6, 

attached hereto as Exhibit 1. According to Dr. Grofman, this result is exacer 

groups, such as African Americans, because they tend to be poorer and less 

their white counterparts, and, consequently, tend to have lower levels of poli 

See id at 9. This analysis caused Dr. Grofman to conclude in Shaw tha 

technically feasible that a new congressional plan could be drawn (either by th 

the [district] court) and implemented within the next few months, any attem 

elections between now [July 24, 1996] and the November 5, 1996, election d 

would result in primary elections with especially low turnout,” id. at 12, 

potential source of considerable voter confusion.” Id. at 13. 

The district court in Shaw accordingly refused to disrupt North ( 

process on remand from this Court's 1996 decision even after a finding by 1 

that the Congressional plan was unconstitutional. The decision of the Sha 

permit elections to proceed even under a plan found unconstitutional ha 

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585 (“[U]nder certain circumstances, such as where an 

is imminent and a State’s election machinery is already in progress, equit 

might justify a court withholding the granting of immediately effective rel 

apportionment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme was fo; 

also Watkins v. Mabus, 502 U.S. 954 (1991); Republican Party of Shelby Cag 

U.S. 934 (1976); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108 (1971). 

The same undesirable effects, especially for minority voters, will iney 

Court’s order is not stayed. The order will nullify the efforts of candidates 

lower voter participation and considerable confusion in any rescheduled electi 

  

‘These harms are exacerbated by the particular timing of this Court’s deci 

OI1S. 

5100. 

bated for minority 

well educated than 

tical participation. 

t “even if it were 

ie legislature or by 

pt to hold primary 

ate under that plan 

and would be “a 

Carolina’s election 

he Supreme Court 

w district court to 

s precedent. See 

impending election 

ible considerations 

ief in a legislative 

ind invalid”). See 

unty v. Dixon, 429 

itably result if this 

y» date and result in 

4 

Trial in this   matter concluded December 1, 2000. In the time that this Court took to 

Congressional candidates filed to run in and the State proceeded to prepare 

primary. This is a complicated case, requiring significant time to analyze. 

this Court in contributing to the potential electoral disruption in this cas 

granting a stay. 

  

issue its opinion, 

2 the May 2, 2000 

owever, the role of 

e counsels toward 

 



03/13/2000 14:47 FAX 9189674953 

> 

In addition, the timing of the resolution of this case presents a separat 

for granting a stay in this case. This Court’s decision is coming on thg 

redistricting. In just over one year, the Census Bureau will release the 2000 C 

State will begin the redistricting process, a process that inevitably will resu 

Congressional districts being redrawn. To require the State to engage in the 

now only to repeat it in another year would be unduly burdensome and dupl 

redistricting now would require the use of 1990 data, which is by now |{ 

reflective of North Carolina’s year 2000 population. Rather than engagi 

redistricting process that will invariably produce districts drawn according 

this Court would be consistent with well-established precedent to allow the St 

the 2000 elections under the current plan. 

Indeed, given the timing of this case, the irreparable injury to t 

Smallwood Intervenors far outweighs that of the plaintiffs in this case. In Cif 

Fourth Circuit concluded that “the public interest would be served by grantir 

case ‘“‘even though plaintiffs as a practical matter may suffer a binding and f 

ER the granting of the stay. . . .” City of Alexandria, 719 F.2d at 700. Th 

3% ¢«¢ 

“irreparable injury” “to mean more than any injury that cannot be wholly 

eradicated. Both the extent of injury and the consequences over the long fer 

taken into account.” Id. (emphasis added). As the next redistricting cycle 1s 

a stay would not permanently prevent plaintiffs from acquiring the remedy 

redistricting plan. If during or after the 2000 redistricting cycle, plaintiffs ar 

the new plan, they may participate in the process of creating a more palatabl 

the constitutionality of the plan subsequently. The reasoning of the court in J} 

State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1991) is instructive: 

The district court also concluded that, on equitable grounds, the pe 

redistricting (based on the 1990 census) makes entry of relief inappro 

district court did not err in making this finding. The legislative reap; 
is imminent, and Districts 49 and 51 may well be reshuffled. The 

A013 

e, but related basis 

a 
Vv eve of the 2000 

lensus data and the 

It in at least some 

disruptive process 

cative. Moreover, 

naccurate and not 

ng in a disruptive 

to inaccurate data, 

ate to proceed with 

he public and the 

) of Alexandria, the 

1g the stay” in that 

inal defeat through 

e court interpreted 

recompensated or 

m must likewise be 

imminent, granting 

they seek: a new 

e not satisfied with 

e plan or challenge 

ickinson v. Indiana 

nding 1991 

priate. The 
portionment 
+ legislature    



   

  

03/13/2000 14:47 FAX 9199674953 ® » do14 

should now complete its duty, after which the plaintiffs can reassess whether 

racial bias still exists and seek appropriate relief. 

Furthermore, this is consistent with the most recent decisions of district courts that have 

considered constitutional challenges to redistricting plans late in the decade. See, e.g., Maxwell 

v. Foster, No. 98-1378, slip op. at 7 and 8 (W.D. La. Nov. 24, 1999) (district court granting State 

of Louisiana’s motion for summary judgment and finding that “rapid-fire reapportionment 

immediately prior to a scheduled census would constitute an undue disruption of the election 

process, the stability and continuity of the legislative system and would be highly prejudicial, not 

only to the citizens of Louisiana, but to the state itself”), attached hereto as Exhibit 2. Therefore, 

the long term harm to plaintiffs is not as significant as the current injury to the public and the 

State if this stay is not granted. 

IL. Movants are Likely to Succeed on the Merits 

Judge Thornburg is correct in his analysis of the merits of this case. See Cromartie v. 

Hunt, No. 4:96-CV-104-BO(3), slip op. at 3-19 (E.D.N.C. March 7, 2000) (Thornburg, J. 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). In moving for a stay, it is not the Smallwood 

Intervenors’ burden to show a certain probability of success on the merits, but only present a 

substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and the equities weigh in 

favor of a stay. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. 1981); see also, Wildman v. 

Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1992); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. 

Von Raab, 808 F.2d 1057, 1059 (5th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Baylor Univ., 711 F.2d 38, 39 (5th Cir. 

1983). The existence of a well-reasoned dissent indicates a substantial chance that defendants 

will prevail on the merits. 

For the reasons Judge Thornburg states, this Court should not have applied strict scrutiny 

to the North Carolina General Assembly’s decision to create the Twelfth Congressional District. 

This Court was incorrect as a matter of law to declare the Twelfth Congressional District 

unconstitutional. This provides a sound basis to conclude that the Defendants and Defendant- 

 



   
03/13/2000 14:47 FAX 9199674353 ® 

@o015 

intervenors will succeed on the ments. In addition, as discussed above, even if District Twelve 

is unconstitutional, the timing and scope of this Court’s remedy is also at issue and provides an 

independent basis for Defendants and Defendant-intervenors’ success on the merits in this case. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Smallwood Intervenors’ motion for stay should be 

granted and they join in the State’s Emergency Application for Stay Pending Appeal of the 

Decision of the Three-Judge Court for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

North Carolina. 

This 13th day of March, 2000. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Cl. 
ELAINE R. JONES 
Director-Counsel and President 

NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 

NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 

New York, New York 10013 

(212) 219-1900 

  

TODD A. COX 

NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. 

1444 1 Street, N.W., 10th Floor 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 682-1300 

ADAM STEIN 

Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins 

Gresham & Sumter, P.A. 

312 West Franklin Street 

Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516 

(919) 933-5300 

 



   
03/13/2000 14:48 FAX 9199674953 @016 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that true and correct copies of Defendant-Intervenors’ Memorandum 1n 

Support of Motion for Stay have been served by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the 

following: 
Edwin M. Speas, Jr. 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 

. Tiare B. Smiley 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
North Carolina Department of Justice 

Post Office Box 629 
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-0629 

Robinson O. Everett 

Everett & Everett 

Post Office Box 586 

Durham, North Carolina 27702 

Ag. CL 
Adam Stein? 

This 13th day of March, 2000. 

  

 



  

APPENDIX D 

 



  

sm—— 

Expert Witness Declaration in Shaw v. Hunt 

Bernard N. Grofman, Ph. D. 

  

1. Iam a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, 

Irvine, where I have taught since 1976. I received a B.S. in 

Mathematics from the University of Chicago in 1966 and 

a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 1972. 

2. Most of my research has been on topics related to political 

representation and voung. In 1991-93, 1 served as chair of the 

Section on Representation and Electoral Systems of the American 

Political Science Association. [ have authored or co-authored one 

book and over 160 articles and research notes, and edited or co- 

edited eleven books. Among these are Representation and 

Redistricting Issues, 1982; Choosing an Electoral System, 1984; 

Electoral [aws and their Political Consequences, 1986; Political 

Gerrymandering and the Courts, 1990; Controversies in Minority 
  

Votng, 1992; Minority Voting and the for Voting E ity, 

1992; iet Revolution in the Sou 

Act, 1965-1990, 1994; Legislative Term Limits, 1996; and Elections 

in Kor Tai und Single Non-Transf le Vote, 

197 forthcoming. I have received numerous research grants from 

the National Science Foundation, and grants from major private 

foundations such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation 

and the Liberty Fund to support my research. A full listing of my 

 



research and other activities is contained in my c.v. appended to this 

Declarauon. 

3. I am a specialist in comparative election methods, voting rights, 

voter turnout, and political science methodology for the study of 

elections and constituency boundary drawing. I have been accepted 

as expert in these areas by numerous federal district courts over the 

past fourteen years, beginning with my testimony in Carstens v. 

Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Col. 1982), a Colorado congressional 

redistricting case and continuing with testimony in cases such as 

Gingles v. Edmisten heard sub nom Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 

30 (1986), and Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 
  

918 F. 2d 768 (1990). I have served as a consultant to the US. 

Department of Justice on a number of occasions in cases throughout 

the country, to state governments in Indiana and Rhode Island, to 

the City of Boston, to various major civil rights organizatuons, to 

Republican state party organizations (in Hawaii, Colorado, and 

Wisconsin), to Democratic state party organizations (in Rhode Island), 

and to the Republican National Committee (in cases in California and 

North Carolina). In 1990 I served as chief voting rights consultant 

to the New York City Districting Commission when new city council 

districts were being drawn. A list of the most important cases in 

which I have testified is appended as the last pages on my C.V. 

4. My work has been often cited by federal courts in cases related to 

districting, including the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g., in Thornburg v. 

Gingles 478 U.S. at notes 12, 14 and 21, and in Shaw v. Reno in  



      

both the Opinion of the Court and in one of the dissents). 

  

In Flateau 

v, Anderson, 537 F. Supp. 257 (S. D. N. Y. 1982), I served as chief 

voting rights consultant to the Special Master appointed by the 

southern Federal District Court in New York to prepare 1980s 

congressional and legislative plans for that state. [ have received 

conference funding from the Federal Judicial Center for a 1994 

conference on "The Civil Rights Act of 1964" held at their 

Washington headquarters, and I have been an invited lecturer at two 

continuing education sessions for federal judges organized by the 

Federal Judicial Center. I have also received conference funding 

from the American Bar Association Special Committee on Elecuon 

Law for a 1980 conference on "Voter Turnout.” 

5. In 1992, under the auspices of the Republican National Committee, 

I provided a declaration for the plaintiffs in Pope et al. v. Blue et al, 
  

Civ. No 3:92CV71 (W.D.. N.C.) in which I analyzed various features of 

the North Carolina congressional districts whose lines were enacted 

into law in 1991. A major part of my testimony dealt with conuguity 

and shape, geographic reach, and community of interest aspects of 

the districts. In my declaration I asserted that the plan as a whole 

was a crazy patchwork quilt and that voter confusion was inevitable 

in that several of the district boundaries could not be specified in 

simple, commonsense terms based on recognizable geographic 

referents. I asserted that such non-cognizability of district lines 

damaged the realistic possibility of fair and effective representation. 

In particular, I criticized Congressional District 12 in considerable 

detail, arguing that it was so distorted and tortuous as to lack a 

 



    

o © oo ® ; 
rational state purpose. In 1996, Congressional District 12 was found 

to be unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court -- for 

reasons distinct from, but still closely related to, those specified in 

my Pope v. Blue affidavit. 
  

6. I have been asked by the counsel for the Gingles intervenors to 

discuss the likely consequences for voter turnout and voter confusion 

of possible alternative election arrangements for the 1996 elections 

to the U.S. House of Representatives in North Carolina. [ hope that 

evidence bearing on the feasibility and likely effects of implementing 

alternatve election calendars can be useful to this court, recognizing 

full well that, when a constitutional violation has been found, the 

issues of the appropriate balancing of competing harms and benefits 

is a legal judgment for the court to make. However, before I can 

discuss the implications of various specific alternative electoral 

arrangements for congressional elections in North Carolina, some 

general background on what political scientists have learned about 

turnout in different types of elections is required. 

7. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that elections held at times other than the 

regular election calendar tend to have low turnout. 

8. It is a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that elections which do not have presidental 

races on them tend to have lower turnout than those that do. 

 



    

9. It is a well-established proposition in the political science 

  

literature on turnout that elections which do not have top-of-the 

ticket races (e.g., statewide contests) on them tend to have lower 

turnout than those that do. 

.10. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that, at least since the 1970s, primary elections 

tend to have lower turnout than the corresponding general election. 

11. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that runoff elections tend to have lower turnout 

than the original electon resulting in the runoff. 

12. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that the more frequently voters are called to 

the polls within a given relatively short time frame, the lower, 

ceteris paribus, will average turnout in those elections be, i.e., voters 

suffer from a kind of election fatgue if they have to partcipate in 

multiple elecuons within a short time period. 

13. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that, ceteris paribus, the presence of multiple 

elections contests on the same date tends to increase turnout, while 

the fact that there is only a single office on a ballot will tend to 

decrease turnout. 

 



    

o® » 
14. These seven factors (elections off the regular 23 calendar, 

elections which do not include a presidental contest, elections 

which do not have statewide races on them, primary elecuons, , 

runoff elections, frequency of elections, elections with only a single 

office on the ballot) have a cumulative impact in reducing turnout. 

The more of these factors that are present, ceteris paribus,! the 

lower the voter turnout that can be expected relative to elections in 

which those factors are not present. The cumulative impact of these 

factors can lead to dramatic differences in levels of turnout among 

different elections within the same electoral constutuency. 

15. These general propositons are supported by evidence from North 

Carolina. For example, focusing just on the 1990s congressional 

districts that are at issue in this case, we can compare turnout in 

primaries with turnout in general elections. Our expectation is that 

turnout in primaries will, on average, be less than that in general 

elections. In 1992 there were Democratic primaries (but no 

Republican primaries) in 2 districts (CD1 and CD8) with an average 

turnout of 80,733 : both Democratic primaries and Republican 

primaries in 1 district (CD12), with a turnout of 56,318 in the 

Democratic primary and a turnout of 8,687 in the Republican 

  

I There are, of course, other factors that affect turnout rates. For example, it is 

also a well-established proposition in the political science literature on 

turnout that elections that are uncontested (or essentially so) tend to have 

very low turnout for office, i.e., few voters bother to cast a ballot in 

uncontested elections even though the effort to do so is minimal since they are 

already in the polling booth. In general, turnout among those at the polls is 

lower, ceteris paribus, in contests that are not expected to be very competitive. 

Moreover, jurisdictions in which, for a long time, most of the elections taking 

place are noncompetitive, tend to have depressed registration and turnout. 

 



  

primary; and Republican primaries (but no Democratic primaries) in 

3 districts (CD2 , CDS and CD7 ) with an average turnout of 17,122. 

In the 1992 general election in these six districts, turnout more than 

quadrupled compared to that in the primaries (1,137,439 in the 

general election, as compared to 277,837 in the primaries).2 

Similar results are obtained when we examine the 1994 

congressional primaries. In 1994 there were Democratic primaries 

(but no Republican primaries) in 4 districts (CD2, CDS, CD8 and CD11) 

with an average turnout of 53,074 ; both Democratic primaries and 

Republican primaries in 1 district (CD9) , with a turnout of 20,457 in 

the Democratic primary and a turnout of 35,313 in the Republican 

primary; and Republican primaries (but no Democratic primaries) in 

2 districts (CD4 and CD7) with an average turnout of only 11,825. In 

comparison, total turnout in these seven districts in the 1994 general 

elecdons was 1,004,540, as compared to a primary turnout in the 

same districts of only 291,716, i.e., general election turnout was more 

than triple that in the primaries in those congressional districts in 

which primary elections took place. 

16. In like manner, we find, as expected, that turnout in runoff 

primaries in North Carolina is lower than that in the first round of 

such primaries. Again we focus on congressional elections. In the 

Republican primary runoff election in CD 9 required in 1994, turnout 

was only 25, 991 as compared to 35, 313 in the first round, and one 

  

Zn the 1992 general elections, turnout was 173,262 in CD1, 211,569 in CD2, 
223,679 in CDS, 163,101 in CD7, 185,004 in CDS, and 180,824 in CD12. 

 



of the two candidates actually received 1,616 fewer votes in the 

runoff than he had in the first round despite the fact that three 

candidates had been dropped from the race. In the Democratic 

primary runoff election in CD 7 required in 1996, turnout was only 

31,153 as compared to 52,684 in the first round, In the Republican 

primary runoff election in CD 7 required in 1996, turnout was only 

9,982 as compared to 19,198 in the first round, In the Republican 

primary runoff election in CD 8 required in 1996, turnout was only 

5,321 as compared to 22,797 in the first round. 

17. In like manner, we find, as expected, that turnout in a non- 

presidental year, 1944, is considerably less than that in a 

presidental election year such as 1992 (despite population growth in 

North Carolina in the intervening two years): 1,588,154 as compared 

0 2,516,725. 

18. In North Carolina there are very few elections held off the 

regular electuon cycle. The one example of such a contest that has 

been brought to my attention, is a special election for State Senate 

district held on March 28, 1995, resulting from a tied election. In the 

special election total turnout was lower than in the comparable 

general election: only 20,746 as compared to a turnout for office of 

29, 975 in the 1994 general election in that same district, exactly as 

expected. This is a dropoff of 28%. Moreover, evidence from other 

states is also fully and strongly consistent with the expectation that 

elections held off the regular election cycle are characterized by 

especially low turnout compared to elections of the same type held at  



  

regularly scheduled times, especially if there are few or no other 

contests on the ballot at the same time. 

19. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature on turnout that, in general, groups that are low in income 

and education tend to register and vote at lower rates than do groups 

that are higher in income and educaton. 

20. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature that minority groups such as blacks and Hispanics of 

Mexican descent tend to be lower in income and educaton than non- 

Hispanic whites and to have lower levels of political participation 

among their eligible voters.. 

21. In North Carolina, as throughout the country, African-American 

voters tend to identify with the Democrauc party. 

22. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature that, in general, voters who register Democratic or identfy 

with the Democratic party tend to be lower in income and education 

than voters who register Republican or identify with the Republican 

party and that voters identified with the Democrat party tend to 

have lower levels of registration and political participation than 

voters identified with the Republican party. 

23. Itis a well-established proposition in the political science 

literature that, in general, low turnout elections have a lower 

 



    

® & ® » 10 

proportion of their electorate coming from groups that are low in 

income and educaton than do high turnout elecdons. Here, we are 

referring not to the absolute levels of turnout in groups but to 

changes in relative turnout across different types of elections. In 

other words, the greatest difference in turnout among groups occurs 

in low turnout elections, such that groups that are generally low in 

turnout form an even smaller portion of the voters in low turnout 

elections than they do in elections with higher turnout. 

24. Having reviewed evidence on the general implicatdons of 

alternatve election schedules on voter turnout, I now turn to the 

consideration of specific election calendar alternatives for North 

Carolina congressional elections. The first elecion proposal I 

consider is one which would require that a remedial plan and new 

primary election calendar be put into effect prior to the November 3, 

1996 elecdons. 

25. There are cridcal issues of feasibility in adopting and 

implementing a new congressional plan and scheduling primary 

elections under it prior to the November 5, 1996 regular election 

date that are especially grave within North Carolina as compared to 

other states facing similar election calendar questions. Because the 

plan would of necessity dramatcally change district configurations 

throughout much of the state because of CD 12's geographic stretch, it 

is very likely that, because of what redistricting specialists call 

"ripple effects," remedying the problem with CD12 would, for all 

practical purposes, require a compiete new plan for the entre state. 

 



  

11 

o ® oo © 
At minimum, in addition to the need to redo the lines for District 12 

itself to assure a constitutional plan, a number of the districts that 

are adjacent to the meandering lines of the present District 12 would 

also need to be significantly reconfigured. The need for a "whole 

state" revised congressional plan (or at least something quite close to 

a "whole state" plan) in North Carolina contrasts markedly with the 

situation in other states. For example, in Texas, the congressional 

districts that have been found unconstitutional are largely or wholly 

within two metropolitan areas (two in Houston, and one in Dallas) 

and only relatively minimal redrawing is necessary outside of these 

metropolitan areas to correct constitutional problems; indeed, two- 

thirds (and possibly more) of the congressional districts in Texas can 

be left completely unchanged. If, as might be expected under the 

deference and comity principles laid down in cases such as Upham v, 

Seamon, 456 US. 37 (1982), this court permits the North Carolina 

legislature an opportunity to devise a constitutional remedy plan, but 

then requires that it do so in time for that plan to be reviewed by 

this court for constitutionality early enough for it stll to be feasible 

to schedule a primary election prior to the November 5, 1996 

election, this will place a very difficult and perhaps impossible 

burden on the legislature. * 

  

3The argument for permitting the North Carolina legislature an opportunity to 
redraw the plan(and a reasonable time period in which to do so) is enhanced 
by the simple fact that it was not until a month ago that there was any federal 
court finding of unconstitutionality of the 1990s congressional lines in North 
Carolina. This is in total contrast to the situation in states such as Texas, 
Lousiana, or Georgia. Moreover, unlike jurisdictions found guilty of other 
types of voting rights violation (e.g., Section 2 vote dilution) in this instance, 
North Carolina, cannot be said to have acted in a fashion that might disqualify 
them from any deference from the court. Features of the plan found 
unconstitutional can be traced at least in part 10 a misunderstanding of what 

 



  

2 

o © eo © : 

26. The well-established propositions on turnout enumerated in 

earlier paragraphs above argue for the conclusion that, even if it 

were technically feasible that a new congressional plan could be 

drawn (either by the legislature or by this court) and implemented 

within the next few months, any attempt to hold new primary 

elections between now and the November 5, 1996 election date 

under that plan would result in primary elections with especially low 

turnout. First, the primaries would be off the regular cycle. 

Second, they would have no other contests on the ballot with them. 

Third, even if state law requiring runoff elections in primaries were 

overridden and plurality winners chosen as primary victors even if 

they did not receive 40 percent or more of the vote, this election 

calendar would still require an electorate to come to the polls three 

dmes (and in some cases four times, where runoffs had already 

occurred) within a six month period. Moreover, and perhaps most 

importantly, turnout among African-American voters in these off- 

cycle primaries without other contests on the ballot could be 

expected to be lower, probably considerably lower, than turnout in 

regularly scheduled primaries, and the proportion of the primary 

electorate that was African-American could be expected to decline. 

Given levels of racially polarized voting previously found by federal 

courts in North Carolina, such a decline in African-American turnout 

  
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 actually required and to a desire to redress past 

electoral discrimination against African-Americans and the candidates of 

their choice. Moreover, the standard under which the unconstitutionality was 

found was one which was not clearly enunciated until well after the 

congressional lines were drawn and it took time for that standard to be further 

clarified by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 

 



  

might well affect the result of some primary elections, especially 

those within the Democratic party. 

27. Even if a new congressional plan could be drawn and 

implemented within the next few months, any attempt to hold new 

primary elections between now and the November 5, 1996 election 

date under that plan, seeking to implement a plan too precipitously 

is a potential source of considerable voter confusion. Unlike the 

situation in states such as Texas where changes in district lines to 

remedy constitutional violations can be "localized," in North Carolina, 

as noted previously, any new congressional plan that met 

constitutional standards would of necessity involve dramatic 

changes in a number of district configurations throughout much of 

the state. Moreover, under this accelerated schedule, the time for 

campaigning (and for acquainting citizens with the new district 

configuradons) would almost certainly be curtailed. 

28. Courts have generally been reluctant to interfere with an 

ongoing electoral process even in situations where a constitutional or 

Voting Rights Act violation has been found. Over the course of some 

dozen plus years of redistricting involvement, insofar as I can recall, 

I have only once been personally involved in a case where an 

election calendar that was already close to completion was not 

permitted to come to a natural end, namely Garza v. Los Angeles 

County Board of Supervisors . In Garza, in 1990 Judge Kenyon stayed 

a runoff election in a district challenged under Section 2 of the 

Votng Rights Act, and eventually ordered an entire new election and 

13 

 



runoff in 1991 when that district was redrawn+ after a finding of a 

statutory violation.> However, that case presents a number of 

factual circumstances (some rather unusual) that distinguish it from 

this one, and that suggest considerations that may be relevant in 

deciding when it is necessary to stop an ongoing electoral process. 

First, in that case there was evidence that the fragmentaton of the 

Hispanic population found had occurred not just in the 1990s 

districting plan that was being challenged but also in 1980s and even 

1970s plans, and was intentional in its effects throughout this period. 

In North Carolina, the violation is by its nature only found in the 

1990s congressional plan. Second, in Garza, the court was able to 

confine its intervention in the ongoing electoral process to the single 

district where a Voting Rights claim had been made.® In North 

Carolina, any new plan would necessarily require stopping an 

ongoing electoral process in a large proportion of the state's 

congressional districts, perhaps in all of them. Third, in Garza, if a 

  

+1 might also note that. in Garza, the jurisdiction was given an opportunity to 

redraw the lines; however it offered a remedial plan that the court found 
unacceptable. That remedial plan violated standard districting criteria and 
community of interest and socio-economic commonalities in a fashion that 
tended to dilute minority voting strength, e.g., it created an elongated 
supposed "minority" district that put Watts and Beverly Hills together and 
contained an extremely narrow tendril dropping down over the Santa Monica 
mountains. 

3The appeal of the Section 2 aspect of this case appears at 918 F. 2d. 768 (9th Cir. 
1990). 

0The only new election ordered was in the district created to remedy the 
Voting Rights Act violation; elections in the other four supervisorial districts 
under the old lines were allowed to stand even though there were new district 
lines for the entire county. Because changes required to redraw the district 
found to be violative of the Voting Right Act were spread among several other 
districts, the changes needed in any single one of these districts were 
relatively minimal.  



  

® ® » w 15 

new electon in the district found unconstitutional had not been 

ordered for 1991, the next supervisorial election would not have 

taken place until after the 1990s redistricting, thus permitting the 

violation to remain in place for one full ten-year (census) election 

cycle. In contrast, in North Carolina, even if a new plan were not put 

into place until the 1998 elections, it would still be used for two 

elections, 1998 and 2000.7 

29. In sum, even if it were technically feasible that a new 

congressional plan could be drawn and implemented in North 

Carolina within the few months prior to November 5, 1996 , and the 

three-judge panel in Vera v, Bush, has already concluded that this 

would not be feasible in Texas, there are competing harms which 

need to be weighed: those arising in permitting ongoing November 

elections in a district whose lines have been found to be 

unconstitutional, on the one hand, versus those stemming from the 

likely injury to the democratic process caused by lowered voter 

turnout, lessened minority participation, voter confusion. and 

probable denial of a reasonable opportunity for the North Carolina 

legislature to play its proper role in the redistricting process, that 

  

71 might also note that the nature of the standard set forth in Shaw v. Reno 
gives rise to a constitutional violation different in character from the more 
common type of vote dilution claim (whether effects- based or purpose based) 
such as that dealt with in Garza. In North Carolina's congressional 

redistricting, there are no groups whose voting strength has been minimized 
or canceled out. Indeed, the Supreme Court found specifically to the contrary. 
In the Supreme Court's view, the nature of the harm under Shaw v. Reno is 

symbolic and stigmatic. Exactly how, if at all, this difference in type of 
constitutional violation affects the need for an immediate intervention into an 
ongoing state electoral process remains for this court to ascertain. 

 



  

would arise under a too hasty imposition of a remedial plan, on the 

other. 

30. Let me turn now to scheduling of elections under new lines at a 

date after November 5, 1996. As stated above, delay past November 

1996 would permit a remedy to be crafted by the State without 

unreasonable deadline pressure, and with the District Court able to 

act were the North Carolina legislature unable to do so in a timely 

fashion or were the State to propose a remedy that failed to correct 

the constitutional violaton. As for the specific timing of such post- 

November 1996 elections, the propositions about turnout given 

above suggest that the best calendar is one in which primaries and 

general elections occur at their normal time, i.e., May and November, 

and/or occur when there are other elections on the ballot. Thus, 

elections at their regularly scheduled time in 1998 would best 

maximize turnout. [ would also emphasize that the worst possible 

scenario would be one in which the general election takes places 

under circumstances (off regular electon cycle, at dates not generally 

recognized as election times, few or no other elections on the same 

ballot) likely to induce low turnout. If this were to be done there is 

grave risk that the unrepresentative electorate concomitant to a very 

low turnout election occurring under such circumstances could not 

only damage the legitimacy of election outcomes but introduce 

systematic racial and even partisan biases -- biases caused by 

disproportionately low turnout among African-American voters and 

among lower income and lower education voters who are more 

 



eo © eo © 17 

substantally Democratic in their partisan leanings than the rest of 

the electorate.8 

  

I declare under pain of perjury that the foregoing statements are 

true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 

Dated: July 24, 1996 

Bernard N. Grofman ol 

  

  

81 focus here on the general election simply because it is the decisive election 
and thus the one where an unrepresentative electorate is the most critical. 

 



   

  

29 
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL science dll) % serio GROFMAN 

UC-1rvine JUNE 1996 

VITA 

BERNARD NORMAN GROFMAN, Professor 

EDUCATION 

B.S. University of Chicago, Mathematics (1966) 
M.A. University of Chicago, Political Science (1968) 

Ph.D. University of Chicago, Political Science (1972) 

ACADEMIC POSITIONS HELD 

1980- Professor of Political Science and Social Psychology, 

University of California, Irvine. 

1970-71 Instructor, Political Science, SUNY at Stony Brook. 

1971-76 Assistant Professor, Political Science, SUNY at Stony Brook. 

1973 Visiting Lecturer (Gastdozent), Lehrstuhl fuer Politische 
Wissenschaft, University of Mannheim (Summer Semester). 

Adjunct Assistant Professor, Applied Mathematics, SUNY at 

Stony Brook (Spring Semester). 

1975-76 Visiting Assistant Professor, School of Social Sciences, 

University of California, Irvine (Winter and Spring 

Quarters). 

Associate Professor of Political Science and Social 

Psychology, University of California, Irvine. 
1984 Guest Scholar (Sabbatical), Governmental Studies Program, 

Brookings Institution (Winter Quarter). 

19715 

1976-80 

1985 College Visiting Professor, Department of Political 

Science, University of Washington, Seattle (Spring Quarter). 

1985-86 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral 

Sciences, Stanford. 
1989 Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, 

University of Michigan (Fall Semester). 

MAJOR RESEARCH GRANTS 

1976-77 Modeling Jury Decision Processes, National Science 
Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SOC 

75-14091, $68,200). 

1978-79 Electoral System: What Difference Does it Make? National 

Science Foundation, Political Science Program 

(NSF SOC 77-24474, $35,800, with Howard Scarrow). 

1978-79 Modeling Jury Decision Processes: The Multnomah Jury 
Archive, National Science Foundation, Law and Social 
Sciences Program (NSF SOC 77-24702, $73,800). 
Conference on Voter Turnout. National Science 
Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF SOC 78-19433, 

$14,400, with Richard Brody and Herbert Weisberg). 
Conference on Representation and Apportionment Issues in 

the 1980s. National Science Foundation, Political 
Science Program (NSF #SES 79-26813, $20,200, with Arend 

Lijphart, Robert McKay, and Howard Scarrow; additional 

$8,000 funding provided by the American Bar Association). 

Applications of Game Theory to the Study of Political 
Institutions. National Science Foundation, Political 

Science Program (NSF #SES 80-07915, $31,300 with Guillermo 

Owen) . 

1979 A 

1980 A 

1980-82 

 



  

¢ # 

MAJOR RESEARCH GRANTS - (Continued) 

1981-83 

1982 

1983-84 

1985-86 

1985-87 

1987-89 

1988 

1988-92 

1989-90 

1991-92 

1991-92 

1991-93 

1994-95 

1994-95 

Reapportionment and Representation. National Science 

Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 81-07554, 

$49,970 with Guillermo Owen). 

A Conference on Information Pooling. National Science 

Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 82-09109, 

$26,300, with Guillermo Owen and Scott Feld). 
Analysis of the Multnomah Jury Archive, National Science 

Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES 

#82-18588, $35,000). 
The Impact of Laws Relating to Elections and Representation, 

National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF 

SES #85-15468, $23,200). 
The Dynamics of Spatial Voting Games and Games on Graphs, 

National Science Foundation, Decision and Management 

Sciences Program (NSF SES #85-06376, $99,300, with 

Guillermo Owen). 
Ethnic Voting Patterns in Metropolitan Toronto (Social 

Sciences and Bumanities Research Council of Canada, 

$14,480, with Janet Landa and Michael Copeland). 
A Conference on "The Calculus of Consent”: A Twenty-five Year 

Perspective (Liberty Fund, with Donald Wittman). 

Collaborative Research on the Voting Rights Act: 
Implementation, Effects, and Implications for Law and 

Society. National Science Foundation Law and Social 

Sciences Program (NSF SES #88-09392, $231,000, with 

Chandler Davidson); Supplementary Grant for Collaborative 

Research on the Voting Rights Act: The Effects of Changing 
Electoral Systems on the Election of Women. National 

Science Foundation Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES 

#88-09392, $8,500, with Chandler Davidson and Susan Welch). 

A Conference on the Voting Rights Act: A Twenty-five Year 
Perspective (Rockefeller Foundation, $50,000, with Thomas 

Mann and Chandler Davidson, under the auspices of The 

Brookings Institution). 
Workshops on Politics and the Democratization Process, 

(National Science Foundation, Political Science Program 

SES# 91-13984 ($42,000, with Russell Dalton and Barry 

Eckstein). 

Planning grant on Japanese, Korean and U.S. Election 

Practices in Comparative Perspective (UC Pacific Rim 
Research Program, with Sung Chull Lee, Rein Taagepera and 

Brian Woodall, $14,700). 

The Impact of Redistricting on the Representation of 
Racial and Ethnic Minorities, The Ford Foundation 

(#446740-47007, $166,000). 
Electoral Laws, Electoral Lists and Campaigning in the First 

Non-Racial South African General Election, National Science 
Foundation, National Science Foundation (NSF# SBR-93- 

21864, with Arend Lijphart, $39,512). 
Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Thirty Year 

Perspective. Joyce Foundation (#446740-49317, $18,500 
with additional funding by the Federal Judicial Center). 

 



' GRANTS FOR INSTRUCTIONAL LBA COMPUTER LABS, AND UATE 

FELLOWSHIP SUPPORT   
  

1992-93 Grant from UCI Committee on Instructional Development 

to develop a new course: "Introduction to Computer Use 

in the Social Sciences" ($15,500) 

Small grant from the National Endowment for the 

Humanities to attend the NEH Summer Institute on 

"Athenian Democracy." ($3,250) 

Grant for graduate student support in Public Choice 

(Sarah Scaife Foundation, $50,000, with Amihai Glazer) 

Grant from the UC Center for German and European Studies, 

to develop a course on camparative political participation 

($10,000, with Pertti Pesonen). 

Grant from the National Science Foundation to develop a 

computer lab for the technology enhanced teaching of under- 

graduate statistics ($55,497, with Judith Treas). 

Grant from the UC President's Office to develop a long- 

distance learning course "The United States in Comparative 

Perspective.” ($13,200, with Arend Lijphart) 

SSION A ONS 

American Political Science Association 

Public Choice Society 
Law and Society Association 

American Institute of Parliamentarians 

ORI BOARDS 

1980-83 American Journal of Political Science 

1983-85 

1986-88 Society for Orwellian Studies 

1987-89 er. olitics Quarter 

1989-91 Political Analysis 

1991-93 Public Choice 
1996-98 Electoral Studies 

  

Law and Society Review 

 



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Books (published) 

Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi. Minority 

Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality. New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 1992. 
  

Edited Books (published) 

Grofman, Bernard N., Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow 
(Eds.), R sentation and Redistricting Issues. Lexington, MA: 

Lexington Books, 1982. 

Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Choosi a ctoral 

System. New York: Praeger, 1984. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Arend Lijphart (Eds.), Electoral Laws and 

Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), Information Pooling 

and Group Decision Making. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1986. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Donald Wittman (Eds.), The Federalist 

: Ww Rn ism. New York: Agathon Press, 1989. 

Grofman, Bernard N. (Ed.), ode Ge a a x Courts. 

New York: Agathon Press, 1990. 

Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson (Eds.), Controversies in 

Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective. Washington 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. 

Grofman, Bernard N. (Ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: An 

-Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993. 

Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in 
s mM 

= 0. 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 

Grofman, Bernard (Ed.) Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice 

Perspectives. Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1996. 

Edited Books (forthcoming) 

Grofman, Bernard, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall 

sede EdSgLA0NR A apen. Souss.and Talusi.URle: She Single Soe 

  

    

  

ACA CS Ne. 

Ann Arbor MI: University or Michigan Press, 1997 EorEhauRing. 

 



  

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Professional Articles (in print) 

Grofman, Bernard N., and Edward Muller. The strange case of relative 

gratification and potential for political violence: The V-curve. 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 67 (June 1973), 514-539. 

Grofman, Bernard N., and Gerald Hyman. Probability and logic in 

belief systems. Theory and Decision, Vol. 4 (1973), 179-195. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Helping behavior and group size, some 

exploratory stochastic models. Behavioral Science, Vol. 19 

(July 1974), 219-224. 

Grofman, Bernard N., and Gerald Hyman. The logical foundations of 
ideology. Behavioral Science, Vol. 19 (July 1974), 225-237. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The prisoner's dilemma game: Paradox 

reconsidered. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, 

Vol. 1.¢(1975), 101-119. 

Mackelprang, A. J., Bernard N. Grofman, and N. Keith Thomas. 

Electoral change and stability: Same new perspectives. American 

Politics Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1975), 315-339. 

Grofman, Bernard N. A review of macro-election systems. In Rudolph 

Wildenmann (Ed.), German Political Yearbook (Sozialwissenschaftliches 
Ja uc itik), Vol. 4, Munich Germany: Verlag, 1975, 303-352. 

Grofman, Bernard N., and Jonathan Pool. Bayesian models for iterated 
prisoner's dilemma games. General Systems, Vol. 20 (1975), 185-194. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Not necessarily twelve and not necessarily 

Johnson v. Louisiana. In Gordon Bermant, Charlan Nemeth and Neil 

Vidmar (Eds.), Psychology and the Law: Research Frontiers. 

Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1976, 149-168. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Jury decision-making models. In Stuart Nagel 

(Ed.), Model] t cri Justice System, Sage Criminal Justice 

Systems Annuals, Vol. 7. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications (1977), 

191-203. 

Grofman, Bernard N., and Jonathan Pool. How to make cooperation the 

optimizing strategy in a two-person game. Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology, Vol. 5, Ro. 2 (1977), 173-186. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Judgmental competence of individuals and groups 

in a dichotomous choice situation. Journal of Mathematical 

Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1978), 47-60. 

Grofman, Bernard N., and Howard Scarrow. Iannucci and its aftermath: 

The application of the Banzhaf Criterion to weighted voting in the 
State of New York. In Steven Brams, Andrew Schotter and Gerhard 

Schwodiauer (Eds.), Applied Game Theory. Vienna: Physica-Verlag, 

1979, 168-183. 
  

Grofman, Bernard N. A preliminary model of jury decision making. In 
Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, Vol. 3 (1980), 98-110. 

 



  

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Professional Articles (Continued) 

Grofman, Bernard N. Jury decision-making models and the Supreme 

Court: The jury cases from Williams v. F to Ballew Vv. Geo 

Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 8, No. 5 (1980), 749-772. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The slippery slope: Jury size and jury verdict 

requirements--legal and social science approaches. Law and Politics 

Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 1980), 285-304. 

Grofman, Bernard N., and Howard Scarrow. Mathematics, social science 

and the law. In Michael J. Saks and Charles H. Baron (Eds.), The 

Us u isuse of A ied Socia esea A 3.t Courts. 

Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, 1980, 117-127. 

  

Grofman, Bernard N. Mathematical models of juror and jury decision 
making: the state of the art. In Bruce D. Sales (Ed.), Perspectives 

w_and Ps o Volume II: The Trial Processes. NY: Plenum, 

1981, 305-351. 
  

  

Grofman, Bernard N. The theory of committees and elections: The 
legacy of Duncan Black. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Toward a Science of 

Politics: FEssays in Honor of Duncan Black. Blacksburg, VA: Public 

Choice Center, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 

1981, ll.57. 

Weisberg, Herbert and Bernard N. Grofman. Candidate evaluations and 

turnout. American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (April 1981), 
197-219. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. Weighted voting in New York. 

Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May 1981), 287-304. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Alternatives to single-member plurality 

districts: Legal and empirical issues. Policy Studies Jourpal, Vol. 

9, Special Issue 3 (May 1981), 875-898. Reprinted in Bernard 

Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow (Eds.), 

Representation and Redistricting Igsyes. Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1982, 107-128. 

Taagepera, Rein and Bernard N. Grofman. Effective size and number of 

components. Sociological Methods and Research, Vol. 10 (August 
1981), 63-81. 

Landa, Janet, and Bernard N. Grofman. Games of breach and the role 

of contract law in protecting the expectation interest. Research in 

Law and Economics Annual, Vol. 3 (1981), 67-90. 

Grofman, Bernard N. A dynamic model of protocoalition formation in 
ideological n-space. Behavioral Science, Vol. 27 (1982), 77-50. 

Grofman, Bernard N., Scott Feld, and Guillermo Owen. Evaluating the 

competence of experts, pooling individual judgements into a 

collective choice, and delegating decision responsibility to 
subgroups. In Felix Geyer and Bans van der Zouwen (Eds.), Dependence 

and Inequality. NY: Pergamon Press, 1982, 221-238. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Reformers, politicians and the courts: A 
preliminary look at U.S. redistricting in the 1980s. Political 

Geography Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1982), 303-316. 

 



  

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-Professi 09 » 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. 

reapportionment. w_and Poljc arterl 

1982), 435-474. 

Current issues in 

4, No. 4 (October 

  

    

Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen. A game theoretic approach to 

measuring degree of centrality in social networks. Social Networks, 

Vol. 4 (1982), 213-224. 

Grofman, Bernard N., Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld. 

theorems in search of the truth. 

(1983), 261-278. 

Thirteen 

Theory and Decision, Vol. 15 

Grofman, Bernard N. Measures of bias and proportionality in 

seats-votes relationships. Political Methodology, vol. 9:(1983), 

295-327. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Janet Landa. The development of trading 

networks among spatially separated traders as a process of 

proto-coalition formation: the Kula trade. So ial Networks, Vol. 5 

(1983), 347-365. 

Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. Coalitions and power in 

political situations. In Manfred Boller (Ed.), Coalitions and 

Collective . Wuerzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1984, 137-143. 

  

Grofman, Bernard N. The general irrelevance of the zero sum 

assumption in the legislative context. In Manfred Holler (Ed.), 

Coalitions and Collective Action. Wuerzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1984, 

100-112. 

Glazer, Amihai, Deborah Glazer, and Bernard N. Grofman. Cumulative 

voting in corporate elections: Introducing strategy into the 

equations. South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Winter 1984), 

295-309. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard N. Grofman. The accuracy of group 

majority decisions in groups with added members. Public Choice, Vol. 

42 (1984), 273-285. 

Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. To vote or not to vote: 

The paradox of nonvoting. Public Choice, Vol. 42 (1984), 311-325. 

Shapley, Lloyd S. and Bernard N. Grofman. Optimizing group 

judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies. Public 

Choice, Vol. 43, No. 3, (1984), 329-343. 

Grofman, Bernard N., Michael Migalski, and Nicholas Noviello. The 

“totality of circumstances' test in Section 2 of the 1982 extension 

of the Voting Rights Act: A social science perspective. Law and 

Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1985), 209-223. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Criteria for districting: A social science 

perspective. UCLA Law Review, vol. 33, No. 1 (October 1985), 77-184. 

Grofman, Bernard and Carole Uhlaner. Metapreferences and reasons for 

stability in social choice: Thoughts on broadening and clarifying the 

debate. Theory and Decision, Vol. 19 (1985), 31-50. 

 



  

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Professional Articles (Continued) 

Taagepera, Rein and Bernard Grofman. Rethinking Duverger's Law: 

Predicting the effective number of parties in plurality and PR 
systems--parties minus issues equals one. European Journal of 

Political Research, Vol. 13 (1985), 341-352. Reprinted in J. Paul 

Johnston and Barvey E. Pasis (Eds.). Representation and Electoral 

Systems: Canadian Perspectives. Englewood City, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 

1988. 

  

    

Niemi, Richard, Jeffrey Hill and Bernard Grofman. The impact of 

multimember districts on party representation in U.S. state 
legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1985), 

441-455. 

Uhlaner, Carole and Bernard Grofman. The race may be close but my 
horse is going to win: Wish fulfillment in the 1980 Presidential 
election. Political Behavior, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1986), 101-129. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 

representative committees. 

80, No. 3.(1986), 863-879, 

On the possibility of faithfully 

American Political Science Review, Vol. 

Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley. Does redistricting 

aimed to help blacks necessarily help Republicans? Journal of 

Politics, Vol. 49 (1987), 143-156. (Reprinted in Ann M. Bowman and 

R.C. Rearney, State and local Government. Boston, MA: Houghton 

Miflin, 1980.) 

Grofman, Bernard, Guillermo Owen, Nicholas Noviello and Amihai 

Glazer. Stability and centrality of legislative choice in the 
spatial context. American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 2 

(June 1987), 539-553. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Models of voting. In Samuel Long (Ed.), 
Micropolitics Annual, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1987, 31-61. 

Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman and Marc Robbins. Partisan and 

incumbency effects of 1970s congressional redistricting. American 

al o olit] Science, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1987), 680-701. 

(Reprinted in Susan A. McManus (Ed.), Reapportionment and 

Representation in Florida, Lake Geneva, Wisconsin: Paladin House, 

1991.) 

Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman, Richard Hartley, Mark O. Kilgour and 

Nicholas Miller. The uncovered set in spatial voting games. 

Theory and Decision, Vol. 23 (1987), 129-156. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a majority winner in n-dimensional spatial voting 

games: An intuitive geometric approach. American Journal of 

Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1987), 709-728. 

Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. Optimal partisan 
gerrymandering. Political Geography Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1988), 

5-22. 

Schofield, Norman, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. The core and 

the stability of group choice in spatial voting games. American 

Political Sci eview, Vol. 82, No. 1 (1988), 195-211. 

 



+ Professional Articles (continued) # 

Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. Rousseau's general will: A 

Condorcetian perspective. American Political Science Review, 

Vol. 82, No.2 (1988), 567-576. (Reprinted in J. Paul Johnston and 

Harvey Pasis (Eds.), Representation and Electoral Systems: Canadian 

Perspectives, NJ: Prentice Ball of Canada, 1990. Translated and 

reprinted in abridged form as La volonte generale de Rousseau: Une 

perspective Condorceene. In P. Crepel and C. Gilain (Eds.), des 

. Paris: Editions Minerve, 

  

  

1989.) 

Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard Niemi. 

Minority voting equality: The 65 percent rule in theory and 

practice. Law and Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1988), 43-62. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Ideological consistency as a 

collective phenomenon. Fo ; 
No. 3 (1988), 64-75. 

american Political Science Review, Vol. 82, 

Grofman, Bernard and Michael Migalski. Estimating the extent of 

racially polarized voting in multicandidate elections. Sociological 

Methods and Research, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1988), 427-454. 

Grofman, Bernard, Scott L. Feld and Guillermo Owen. Finagle's law 

and the Finagle point, a new solution concept for two-candidate 

competition in spatial voting games. American Journal of Political 

Science, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1989), 348-375. 
  

Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. Black representation: Making 

sense of electoral geography at different levels of government. 

islative Studies arterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1989), 265-279. 

Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman and Nicholas Miller. Limits on 

agenda control in spatial voting games. Mathematical and Computer 

Modelling, Vol. 12, No. 4/5 (1989) 405-416. (Reprinted in Paul E. 

Johnson (Ed.), Mathematical Modelling in Political Science. Oxford: 

Pergamon Press, 1989.) 
  

Erfle, Stephen, Benry McMillan and Bernard Grofman. Testing the 

requlatory threat hypothesis: Media coverage of the energy crisis 

and petroleum pricing in the late 1970s. american Politics 

Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1989), 132-152. 

Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 

majority rule. 

(1989), 379-406. 

The geometry of 

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, 

Grofman, Bernard and Barbara Norrander. Efficient use of reference 

group cues in a single dimension. Public Choice, Vol. 64 (1990), 

213-227.  



  

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. Professional Arti 9. » # 

Grofman, Bernard N. Toward a coherent theory of gerrymandering: 

Bandemer an A In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), Political 

Ger andering and the Courts. New York: Agathon Press, 1990, 29-63. 

    

Erfle, Stephen, Henry McMillan and Bernard Grofman. Regulation via 

threats: politics, media coverage and oil pricing decisions. Public 

Opinion Quarterly, (1990), 54(1): 48-63. 

Niemi, Richard G., Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci and Thomas 

Hofeller. Measuring compactness and the role of a competent standard 

in a test for partisan and racial gerrymandering. Journal of 

Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1990, 1155-1181. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Collectivities as actors, 

Rationality and Society, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 1990), 429-448. 

Hall, Richard L. and Bernard Grofman. The committee assignment 

process and the conditional nature of committee bias. American 

Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No 4 (December 1990), 1149-1166. 

Grofman, Bernard, and Lisa Handley. The impact of the Voting Rights 

Act on black representation in southern state legislatures. 

Legislative Studjes Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (February 1991), 

111-127. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Incumbency advantage, voter 

loyalty and the benefit of the doubt. Journal of Theoretical 

Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1991), 115-137. 

Grofman, Bernard. Statistics without substance: A critique of 

Freedman et al. and Clark and Morrison. Evaluation Review, Yol. 15, 

No. 6, (December 1991), 746-769. 

Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Bandley. Identifying and remedying racial 

gerrymandering. Journal of Law and Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, (Winter 

1992), 345-404. 

Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. Group decision making over 

multidimensional objects of choice, p1zati 

Performance, Vol. 52, 1992, 39-63. 

Grofman, Bernard. Expert witness testimony and the evolution of 

voting right case law. In Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson 

(Eds.), ing: vot] i t 

perspective. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992, 

197-229. 

Grofman, Bernard. An expert witness perspective on continuing and 

emerging voting rights controversies: From one person, one vote to 

political gerrymandering. Stetson University Law Review, 1392, 21 

(3): 783-818. (A revised and expanded version appears under the 

title "What happens after one person-one vote: Implications of the 

U.S. experience for Canada,” in John Courtney and David Smith (Eds.)., 

Drawing Boundaries, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Fifth House Publishers, 

1992, 156-178.) 

10 

 



  

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Professional J continued) » 

Grofman, Bernard. Would Vince Lombardi have been right if he had 

said, “When it comes to redistricting, race isn't everything, it's 

the only thing'? Cardozo Law Review, Volume 14, No. 5, (April 1993), 

1237-1276. 

Grofman, Bernard. Toward an institution rich theory of political 

competition, with a supply-side component. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), 

Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of 
Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 

Michigan Press, 1993, 179-193.. 

Grofman, Bernard. The use of ecological regression to estimate 

racial bloc voting. University of San Francisco Law Review, 

Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring 1993), 593-625. 

Grofman, Bernard. Public choice, civic republicanism, and American 

politics: Perspectives of a ‘reasonable choice' modeler. Texas Law 

Review, Vol 71, No. 7 (June 1993), 1541-1587. 

Brischetto, Robert, David R. Richards, Chandler Davidson, and Bernard 

Grofman. Texas. In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), 

let Revolut] in the South: The Impact of the Voti ] s 

1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 

Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson. The Effect of Municipal 

Election Structure on Black Representation in Eight Southern States. 

In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in 

the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 

Handley, Lisa and Bernard Grofman. Black Office holding in Southern 

State Legislatures and Congressional Delegations. In Davidson, 

Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Let volut] LN} 4 South: 

The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1994. 

Glazer, Amihai, Robert Griffin, Bernard Grofman and Martin 

Wattenberg. Strategic vote delay in the U.S. House of 

Representatives. Legislative Studies Ouarterly, 1995. 

Skaperdas, Stergios and Bernard Grofman. Modeling negative 

campaigning. American Political Science Review, 1995. 

Grofman, Bernard. New Methods of Valid Ecological Inference. 

In Munroe Eagles (Ed.), i 

Research. London: Taylor and Francis, 1995. 

Grofman, Bernard and Peter van Roozendaal. Toward a theoretical 

explanation of premature cabinet termination: With application to 

post-war cabinets in the Netherlands. Jou 

Research, 1995. 

al o olitical 

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4 » 2 
P ssiona s (forthcoming) » 

Grofman, Bernard. Extensions of a dynamic model of protocoalition 

formation. In Norman Schofield (Ed.), Theory of Social Choice and 

Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1996 forthcoming. 

  

Grofman, Bernard, Nicholas Noviello and Phillip Straffin. The 
sequential dynamics of cabinet formation, stochastic error, and a 

test of competing models. In Schofield, Norman (Ed.) Theory of Social 

Choice and Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1996 

forthcoming. 

Landa, Janet, Michael Copeland and Bernard Grofman. Ethnic voting 
patterns: a case study of metropolitan Toronto. Politi] Geograph 

1996 forthcoming. 

Anderson, Richard and Bernard Grofman. Elite Rhetorical Strategies 

in the Pre-Coup Soviet Union. Public Choice, 1996 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard. Downsian Political Economy. In Robert Goodin and 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Eds.) New Handbook of Political Science. New 

York and London: Oxford University Press, 1996 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. Voting rights in the 1990s: Cases 

and Controversies. University of Mississippi Law Review, 1996 

forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard. The Supreme Court, the Voting Rights Act, and 

minority representation. In Anthony Peacock (ed.) The Supreme Court 

and Minority Representation (title tentative). Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1996 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard and Peter van Roozendaal. Modelling cabinet 
durability/cabinet termination: A synthetic literature review and 
critique. Britij Journal © jtical Science, 1996 forthcoming. 

Merrill, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. Directional and proximity models 
of voter utility and choice: a new synthesis and an illustrative test 

of competing models. J ca olitics, 1997 

forthcoming. 

Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman, and Guillermo Owen. A neo-Downsian 

model of group-oriented voting. Public Choice, 1997 forthcoming. 

Merrill, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. Modeling large electorates with 

Pourier series: With applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and 

directional models of spatial competition. Social Choice and 

Welfare, 1997 forthcoming. 

Falmagne, Jean-Claude, Michel Regenwetter and Bernard Grofman. A 
stochastic model for the evolution of preferences. In A. J. Marley 

(Ed.) Choice, Decision and Measurement: Essays ip Honor of R. Duncan 

Luce. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard, Christian Collet and Robert Griffin. Analysing the 

turnout-competitiveness link with aggregate data. Public Choice, 

1997 forthcoming. 

 



  

» i 
£essjional Articles Bk, Jeinnlely » 

(100) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard Grofman. Estimating the likelihood of 

fallacious ecological inference: Linear ecological regression in the 
presence of context effects. Political Geography, 1997 forthcoming. 

   
(101) Grofman, Bernard. SNTV, STV,and Single Member District Systems: 

Theoretical Comparisons and Contrasts. In Bernard Grofman, Sung- 

Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections 

in Japan, Korea and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: 

i an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: 

  

jy Co 

University of Michigan Press, 1997 forthcoming. 

(102) Grofman, Bernard. SNTV: An inventory of theoretically derived 

propositions and a brief review of the evidence from Japan, Korea, 

Taiwan and Alabama. In Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin 
Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea and 

Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study 

of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 

Press, 1997 forthcoming. 

 



  

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Research Notes and Minor Articles (in print) 

  

Grofman, Bernard N. Some notes on voting schemes and the will of the 
majority. Public Choice, Vol. 7 (Winter 1969), 65-80. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The 1971 American Political Science Association 

election. PS (commissioned for Summer 1972), 278-289. 

Pool, Jonathan and Bernard N. Grofman. Computer programs as a means 
of efficiency and control in cross-cultural experimental games. 

rimental Study of Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (July 1975), 27-57. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Scott L. Feld. A note on clique avoidance 

in repeated jury selection from among a fixed pool of jurors: 
Comparisons of manpower savings in six- and twelve-member juries. 

Public Choice, Vol. 26 (Summer 1976), 145-150. 

Feld, Scott and Bernard N. Grofman. Variation in class size, the 

class size paradox, and some consequences for students. Research in 

Higher Education, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1977), 215-222. 

Grofman, Bernard N. A pilot study of individual behavior as mediated 

by the group context: three- and five-member mock juries. 

Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 7 (1979), 41-54. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate 

elections when voters use mixed strategies. Public Chojce, Vol. 34, 

No. 2 (1979), 189-200. 

Feld, Scott and Bernard N. Grofman. Conflict of interest between 
faculty, students and administrators: Consequences of the class size 
paradox. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, Vol. 3 

(1980), 111-116. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Fair apportionment and the Banzhaf index. 
American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 88. No. 1 (1981), 1-5. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. Introduction to Special 

Issue on Reapportionment.’ Policy Studies Journal, Special Issue No. 

3, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1980-81), 817-828. 

Grofman, Bernard N. Fair and equal representation. Ethics, Vol. 91 

(April 1981), 477-485. 

Grofman, Bernard N. For single-member districts, random 1s not 

equal. In Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard 

Scarrow (Eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues, Lexington 
Books, 1982, 55-58. 

Brody, Richard and Bernard N. Grofman. Stimulus differentiation vs. 
stimulus complexity as factors affecting turnout in two-candidate and 
multi-candidate races. Political Behavior, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1982), 

83-92. 
  

14 

 



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Research Notes and ® Articles (Continued) » 

Grofman, Bernard N., Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld. Average 

competence, variability in individual competence, and the accuracy of 
statistically pooled group decisions. Psychological Reports, Vol. 50 

(1982), 683-688. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Scott L. Feld. Group size and the 

performance of a composite group majority: Statistical truths and 
empirical results. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 

Vol. 33 (1984), 350-359. 

Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofman. Introduction. In Arend 

Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Choos] 5 tora 

NY: Praeger, 1984, 3-12. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The neglected role of the status quo in models 
of issue voting. Journal of Politics, Vol. 47 (1985), 231-237. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Nicholas Noviello. Jai-Alai outcomes as a 

function of player position and player skill level. Simulatjon and 

Games, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 1985), 211-223. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The accuracy of group majorities for disjunctive 

and conjunctive decision tasks. Organizational Behavior and Human 

Performance, 35 (1985), 119-123. 

Grofman, Bernard N. The effect of restricted and unrestricted 

verdict options on juror choice. Social Science Research, 14 (1985), 

195-204. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Arend Lijphart. Introduction. In Bernard 

Grofman and Arend Lijphart (Eds.), Electoral Laws and Thedr Political 
Consequences. NY: Agathon, 1986, 1-15. 

Grofman, Bernard, Michael Migalski and Nicholas Noviello. Effects of 
multimember districts on black representation in state legislatures. 
Review of Black Political Economy, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1986), 

65-78. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen. Condorcet models: Avenues 

for future research. In Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), 

Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, Greenwich, CT: JAI 

Press, 1986, 93-102. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Scott L. Feld. Determining optimal weights 

for expert judgment. In Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), 

Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press, 1986, 167-172. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Partial single-peakedness: an 
extension and clarification. Public Choice, Vol. 51 (1986), 71-80. 

Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. Two plus two plus two equals 
six: Term lengths of representatives and senators. Legislatjve 

Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1987), 555-563. 

Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. Limitations of the spatial 

model. Public Chojce, Vol. 58 (1988), 161-167.  



    

- Research Notes and Minor KJ (Continued) ® 
  

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Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman and Nicholas Miller. Centripetal 

forces in spatial voting: On the size of the yolk. Public Choice, 

Vol. 59 (1988), 37-50. 

Norrander, Barbara and Bernard Grofman. A rational choice model of 

citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral 

activities. Public Choice, Vol. 59 (1988), 187-192. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Majority rule outcomes and the 

structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision making. Public 

Choice, Vol. 59 (1988) 239-252, 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. The Borda count in n-dimensional 

issue space. Public Choice, Vol. 59 (1988) 167-176. 

Owen, Guillermo and Bernard Grofman. A theorem on the optimal 

allocation of effort. Revista Colombiana de Matematicas, Vol. 23 

(1987) 201-212. 

Grofman, Bernard. Richard Nixon as Pinocchio, Richard II, and Santa 

Claus. Jo al of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (February 1989), 165-173. 

Glazer, Amihal and Bernard Grofman. 

ideologists though voters are not. 

29-35. 

Why representatives are 
Public Chojce, Vol. 61 (1989), 

Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. Toward a sociometric theory of 

representation. In Manfred Kochen (Ed.), The Small World. Norwood, 

NJ: Ablex, 1988, 100-107. 

Owen, Guillermo, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. Proving a 

distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem. 

ematical Social Sciences, Vol. 17 (1989), 1-6. 

Grofman, Bernard. The comparative analysis of coalition formation 

and duration: Distinguishing between-country and within-country 

effects. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19 (1989), 

291-302. 

Grofman, Bernard. Introduction. 

Wittman (Eds.), The Fed 

NY: Agathon Press, 1989, 7-9. 

In Bernard Grofman and Donald 

ers' and the New Institutionalism. 

Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen. A model of 
candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences. 

Mathematical and Computer Modelling, Vol. 12, No. 4/5 (1989), 
437-450, reprinted in Paul E. Johnson (Ed.), Mathematical Modelling 

in Political Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989. 

Klingemann, Bans-Dieter, Bernard Grofman and Janet Campagna. The 

Political Science 400: Citations by Ph.D. Cohort and by Ph.D.- 

Granting Institution. PS (June 1989), 258-270. 

Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. Must liberals always vote for 

liberals, and need the more competent candidate always be 
preferred? British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19 (1989), 

154-159. 

16 

 



  

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% » i 
R arch Notes and ® Articles (Continued) » 

Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. Minority population proportion 

and Black and Hispanic congressional success in the 1970s and 1980s. 
American Politics arterly, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 1989), 436-445; 

reprinted in revised and updated form under the title "Preconditions 
for Black and Hispanic congressional success," in Wilma Rule and 

Joseph Zimmerman (Eds.) The Election of Women and Minorities. New 

York. Greenwood Press, 1992. 

    

Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. Democratic theory and the public 

interest: Condorcet and Rousseau revisited. American Political 

Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (December 1989), 1328-1340. 

Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Amihai Glazer. Identical 

geography, different party: A natural experiment on the magnitude of 

party differences in the U.S. Senate, 1960-84. In Johnston, R.J., 

F.M. Shelley and P.J. Taylor (Eds.), Developments in Electoral 

Geography. London: Routledge, 1990, 207-217. 

Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. Cycle avoiding 

trajectories, strategic agendas, and the duality of memory and 

foresight: An informal exposition. Public Choice, Vol. 64 (1990), 

265-277. 

  

Grofman, Bernard N. Introduction. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), 

eri a t 0 s. NY: Agathon Press, 1990, 

3-9. 

Grofman, Bernard. Investing in knowledge production: Should 

political scientists be paid to think? 

Politics, Vol. 2 No. 2 (1990), 231-236. 

Journal of Theoretical 

Campagna, Janet and Bernard Grofman. Party control and partisan bias 

in 1980s congressional redistricting. Journal of Politics, Vol. 52, 

No. 4 (November 1990) 1242-1257. 

Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. The Structure 

of the Banks Set. Public Choice, Vol. 66 (1990), 243-251. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. The half-win set and the 

geometry of spatial voting. Public Cheojce, Vol. 70, 1991, 245-250. 

Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Amihai Glazer. Is the Senate 

more liberal than the Bouse?: Another look. Legislative Studies 

Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1991), 281-295. 

Brady, David and Bernard Grofman. Sectional differences in partisan 

bias and electoral responsiveness in U.S. House elections, 1850-1980. 

British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, Part 2, (1991) 
247-256. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Voting in one's head as a source 

of nearly transitive preferences over multi-dimensional issues. 

Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 23 (1991), 257-263. 

Grofman, Bernard. Multivariate methods and the analysis of racially 

polarized voting: Pitfalls in the use of social science by the 

courts. Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 4 (December 1991), 

826-833. 

 



  

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hee] ® s 
Research Notes and [ Articles (continued) » 

Brady, David W. and Bernard Grofman. Modeling the determinants of 
swing ratio and bias in U.S. House elections, 1850-1980. 

arterly, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July 1991), 254-262. 

  

Political 

  

Glazer, Amihai and Bernard Grofman. A positive relationship between 
turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model. 

Quality and Quantity, 1992, 26, 85-93. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Who's afraid of the big bad 

cycle? Journal of Theoretical Politi s Vol. 4, No. 2. (1992) 

231-237. 

Thomas, Scott J. and Bernard Grofman. Determinants of legislative 

success in House committees, Public Choice, Vol. 74, 1992, 233-243. 

Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson. Postscript: What is the best 

route to a color-blind society? In Bernard Grofman and Chandler 
Davidson (Eds.), Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights 

Act in Perspective. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 

1992, 300-317. 

  

Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Amihai Glazer. The effects of 
black population on electing Democrats and liberals to The House of 

Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1992, 17 (3): 365- 

379. 

Thomas, Scott J. and Bernard Grofman. The effects of congressional 

rules about bill cosponsorship on duplicate bills: Changing 
incentives for credit claiming. Public Chojce, Vol. 75, 1992, 

93-98. 

Grofman, Bernard. Meeting Dynamics. In Gregory Phifer (Ed.) 
Readings ip Parliamentary Law. Pubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Bunt, 1992, 

53-58 (reprinted from Parliamentary Journal, Vol 18, October 1977). 

Grofman, Bernard. Editor‘s Introduction, Information, Participation 

and Choice: "An Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann 

Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993, 1-13. 
    

Grofman, Bernard and Julie Withers. Information pooling models of 

electoral competition. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), Information, 

Participation and Choice: "An Economic Theory of Democracy' in 

Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 

1993, 55-64. 

The President and 

In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), 

at] at a ce: ° Economic Theo of 

Democracy’ in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 

Michigan Press, 1993, 173-177. 

Vice-President as a package deal. 

Grofman, Bernard. Voting Rights in a Multi-Ethnic World. Chicano- 

Latino Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 15 (1993), 15-37. 

Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman. Editors’ Introduction. 

In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolutjon in 

the South: voti ; t 5— 0. Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 

 



  

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Research Notes and Minor ticles § (Continued) 

  

Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman. The Voting Rights Act and 

the Second Reconstruction. In Davidson, Chandler and Bernard GroIman 

  

  

  (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting 

i ghts Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1994. 

Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. Racial context, the 1968 Wallace 

vote, and Southern presidential dealignment: Evidence from North 

Carolina and elsewhere. In Munroe Eagles (Ed.), Spatial and 

Cc a oli sea . London: Taylor and Francis, 

1995. 

Grofman, Bernard, Robert Griffin and Gregory Berry. House members who 

become senators: Learning from a ‘natural experiment’ in 

representation. Legislative Studies Quarterly 1995. 

Grofman, Bernard and Neil Sutherland. The effect of term limits 

on legislative tenure when challenge is endogenized: A preliminary 

model. In B. Grofman (Ed.) Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. 

Boston: Kluwer, 1996. 
  

Grofman, Bernard and Neil Sutherland. Gubernatorial Term 

Limits and Term Lengths in Historical Perpsective, 1790-1990. 

In B. Grofman (Ed.) Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. 

Boston: Kluwer, 1996. 
  

Research Notes and Minor Articles (forthcoming) 

  

Grofman, Bernard and Andrew Reynolds. Modeling the dropoff 

between minority population share and the size of the minority 

electorate in situations of differential voter eligibility across 

groups. Electoral Studies, 1996 forthcoming. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Stability induced by no 

quibbling. Group Decision and Negotiation, 1996 forthcoming. 

Bandley, Lisa, Bernard Grofman, and Wayne Arden. Black population 

proportion and Black electoral success in the U.S. Bouse of 

Representatives and in state legislatures in the 1990s. National 

Political Science Review, 1996, forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard. The 1990s round of redistricting: A schematic 

outline of some key features. ona olitical Science Review, 1996 

forthcoming. 

Hanks, Christopher and Bernard Grofman. Turnout in gubernatorial 

and senatorial primary and general elections in the south, 1922-90: 

a rational choice model of the effects of short-run and long-run 

electoral competition on relative turnout. Public Choice, 1996 

forthcoming. 

Merrill, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. Conceptualizing voter choice 

for directional and discounting models of two-candidate spatial 

competition in terms of shadow candidates. Public Choice, 1997 

forthcoming. 

19 

 



  

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20 

Research Notes and Minor Articles (forthcoming) a oh 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Seven durable axes of cleavage in political 

science. In Kristen Monroe (Ed.). Contemporary Political Science 

(title tentative) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997 

forthcoming. 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Preface: Methodological Steps toward the 

Study of Embedded Institutions. In Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, 

Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea 

and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative 

Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor,MI: University of 

Michigan Press, 1997 forthcoming. 

  

Curricular Materials (in print) 

Grofman, Bernard N. Note: Mo Fiorina's advice to children and other 

subordinates. Mathematics Magazine, Vol. 52, No. S, (November 1979), 

292-297. 

  Grofman, Bernard N. Modelling jury verdicts. University Modules in 

Applied Mathematics (1982). 

Grofman, Bernard N. The pure theory of elevators. Mathematics 

Magazine, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January 1982), 30-37. 

Straffin, Philip and Bernard Grofman. Parliamentary coalitions: A 

tour of models. Mathematics Magazine, Vol. 57, No. 5 (November 

1984), 259-274. 

  Grofman, Bernard. Pig and proletariat: Animal Farm as Bistory, San 

Jose Studies 1990, 5-39. 

 



Prepared Testimony and Photo-Offset Conference Proceedings 

Mathematics and politics: Mathematical reasoning and optimal jury 

decision processes. Plus, Reply. In Max Black {(Ed.)}, Prob s of 

Choice and Decision: Proceedings of a Colloquium Held J spe 

Colorado, Ju -July 6, 1974. Cornell University Program on 

Science, Technology, and Society and Aspen Institute for Humanistic 

Studies: Photo-offset, 1975, 331-337; 544-547. 

A comment on Black's ‘rationality and cultural relativism.' In Max 

Black (Ed.), s of Choice and Decisij : Proceedings of a 

Colloquium Held in Aspen, Colorado, June 24-July 6, 1974. Cornell 

University Program on Science, Technology, and Society and Aspen 

Institute for Humanistic Studies: Photo-offset, 1975, 161-1390. 

  

Grofman, Bernard, Scott L. Feld and Guillermo Owen. Synopsis: A 

Bayesian approach to optimal decision making. In J. L. Elohim (Ed.), 

Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Systems and 

Cybernetics, Mexico City, Auqust 13-17, 1981, photo-offset, 1381. 

Comment on H.R. 2349, a bill on standards for congressional 

redistricting. Prepared for the staff of the Wednesday Study Group, 

U.S. House of Representatives, April 1981. 

Report on the constitutionality of Hawaii Reapportionment 

Commission's proposed state legislative redistricting. Prepared 

testimony in Travis v. King, U.S. District Court for the State of 

Bawaii, March 23-24, 1982, photo-offset. 

Report to the Special Master on methodology used to insure compliance 

with standards of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Flateau v. Anderson. 

U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, June 7, 1982, 

photo-offset. 

The disadvantageous effects of at-large elections on the success of 

minority candidates for the Charlotte and Raleigh City Councils. 

Prepared testimony in Gipgles v. Edmisten. U.S. District Court for 

the State of North Carolina, August 1983, photo-offset. 

Effects of multimember districts in state legislative elections in 

eight North Carolina counties, 1978-1982. Prepared testimony in 

Gingles v. Edmisten, U.S. District Court for the State of North 

Carolina, August 1983, photo-offset. (Also see R22.) 

Report on prima facie evidence of political gerrymandering in the 

1983 California Congressional redistricting plan, plus Rejoinder. 

Prepared testimony in Badham v. Eu, U.S. District Court for the State 

of California, December 1983, photo-offset. 

Report on the effects of the proposed redistricting plan for the 

South Carolina Senate. Prepared testimony in South Carolina v. U.S., 

U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, photo-offset, July 

1984. 

Affidavits in Haskins v. Wilson County, U.S. District Court for the 

State of North Carolina, photo-offset, 1985-86. 

Affidavit in Jackson v. Nash County, U.S. District Court for the 

State of North Carolina, April 1986. 
   



  

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Prepared Testimony and Conference Proceedings (continued) 
  

Affidavits in U.S. v. City Council of l.os Angeles, U.S. District 

Court for the State of California, July 1986. 

Declarations in Gomez v. City of Watsonville, U.S. District Court for 

the State of California, August and October 1986. 

    

  

Declarations in McGhee et al. v. Granville County of North Carolina, 

U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, 1987. 

Declarations in Badillo et al. v. City of Stockton, U.S. District 

Court for the State of California, December 1987 and February 1988. 

Affidavits in Republican Natjopal Committee of North Carolina v. 

James G. Martin, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, 

July, August 1988. 

Report in Chjisom v. Roemer, Civil Action No. 86-4075 in the Eastern 

District of Louisiana, October 1988, revised March 1989. 

Affidavits regarding minority representation in the 1988 Republican 

National Convention, August 5, 1988, and August 8, 1988. 

Report in Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. U.S. 

District Court for the State of California, April 1989; Declaration, 

October 26, 1989. 

Report for the Alaska Districting Commission on racially polarized 
voting in elections to the Alaska legislature, May 1991. 

Report in Republican State Party of Massachusetts v. Connolly, U.S. 

District Court for the State of Massachusetts, December 1991. 
  

Declaration in Pope et al. v. Blue et al., U.S. District Court, 

Western District, Charlotte, North Carolina Division, March 5, 1992. 
  

Declaration in Prosser v. State of Wisconsin Board of Elections, U.S. 

District Court for the State of Wisconsin, April 1992. 

Reports for State of Alaska on the 1992 legislative districts, 

November 1993, January 1994. 

Declaration in Republican Party of North Carolina v. James B. Hunt, 

Governor of North Carolina, April 1994. 

 



  

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* » 3 
Book Notes, na, 1 o » cations (in print) 
  

Book note: Robert's Rules of Order (New, Revised). American 

Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (December 1970), 1288-1290. 
  

  

A note on "A caveat to the 1970 APSA election.” PS (Summer 1972), 

230. 

A note on some generalizations of the paradox of cyclical majorities. 

Public Choice, Vol. 12 (Spring 1972), 113-114. 

Book note: John Sohnquist, Multivariate Mode] Building. American 

Political Science Review, Vol. 69 (December 1974), 1749. 

Rational choice models and self-fulfilling and self-defeating 

prophecies. In W. Leinfellner and E. Kohler (Eds.), Developments in 

the Methodology of Social Science, Boston: Reidel, 1974, 381-383. 

Book note: William BH. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, An Introduction 

to Positive Political Theory. Theory and Decision, (1976), 231-234. 

A comment on "Democratic theory: A preliminary mathematical model." 

Public Chojce, Vol. 21 (Spring 1975), 100-103. 

A comment on "Single-peakedness and Guttman scales: Concept and 

measurement.” Public Choice, Vol. 28 (Winter 1976), 107-111. 

Communication: Sloppy sampling - a comment on ~six-member Jyttes, in 

the Federal Courts. Social Action and the Law Newsletter, Vol. 

No. 2 (July 1977), 4-5. 

Communication: “Differential effects of jury size. . .' revisited. 

Social Action and the Law Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 2 (July 1977), 

7-11. 

Monopoly, the state of the art: A review of The Monopoly Book and 

1000 Ways to Win Monopoly Games. Simulation and Games, Vol 9 (1978), 

245-251. 

Monopoly is a capitalist plot. Simulation and Games, Vol. 9, No. 2 

(1978), 252-254. (Reprinted in Puzzles and Games, vol. 70 (1979). 

Book note: Keith M. Baker, From Natural Philoso +o 

Social Mathematics. EE use seize Vol. 72 

(March 1978), 212-213. 

Book note: Oliver Thomson, Mags Persuasion in History. Journal of 

Communication, (Autumn 1978), 204-205. 

A comment on Dye and McManus' use of discriminant function analysis. 

Political Methodology, Vol. 5 (1978), 241-248. 

Book note: Michael Saks, Jury Verdicts. Social Action and the Law 

Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February 1979), 9-11. 

Book note: Michael Tracey, The Production of Political Television. 

Journal of Communication, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1379), 211-212. 

A note on Abraham Lincoln in probabilityland. Theory and Decision, 

Vol. 11 (1979), 453-455. 

 



   ® eo © 24 
Book Notes, Reviews and Communications (in print) (continued) 

  

  

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(B32) 

(B33) 

(B34) 

(B33) 

(B36) 

The case for majority jury verdicts. Trial Magazine, Vol. 18, No. 12 
(December 1979), 23-25, 29, 47-48. 

Book review: Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation. Theory and 

Decision, vol. 12 (1980), 107-114. 

Book note: Susan Hensley, Body Politics: Powe Se and Nonv 

Communication. American Political Science Review, Vol. 72 (March 

1980), 122-123. 

Book note: Howard D. Hamilton, ctl on C3 EL. S55 

& 1 o erpative -Re ge 

Systems. American Political Science Review, Vol. 75 (1981), 771-772. 

Comment: Should representatives be 'typical' of their constituents? 

In B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, R. McKay, and B. Scarrow (Eds.), 
Representation and Redistricting Issues. Lexington, MA: Lexington 

Books, 1982, 97-99. 

Book note: Bruce J. West (Ed.), Mathematical Models as a Tool for 

the Social Sciences. Social Sciences Quarterly, Vol. 63 (September 

1982), 610-611. 
  

Book review: Political geography. American Political Science 

Review, Vol. 76, No. 4 (December 1982), 883-885. 

Abstract: Measuring the political consequences of electoral laws. 
Mathematjcal Socjal Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1983), 184-186. 

Comment: Models of voter turnout: A brief idiosyncratic review. 

Public Choice, Vol. 41 (1983), 55-61. 

Advice to the expert witness in court. PS (Winter 1984), 60-61. 

Should you brush your teeth on November 6, 19842? PS (Summer 1984), 

577-580. 

Introduction to minisymposium: Political gerrymandering: Badham v. 

Eu, Political science goes to court. PS (Summer 1985), 538-543. 

Grofman Declarations in Badham v. Eu (excerpts). PS (Summer 1985), 

544-549, 573-574. 

Expert vs. expert: Lessons from Badham v. Eu. PS (Summer 1985), 

576-581. 

Book review: Reasonable methods for aggregating preferences, a 
review of Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn, Approval Voting. 

Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. 29, (1985), 128-132. 

Reflections on academia. PS (Winter 1986), 57-61. 

Everything you always wanted to know about parliamentary procedure in 

an academic senate and were afraid to ask. PS (Summer 1986), 

661-668. 

Book note: Gunnar Boalt, The Political Process. Contemporary 
Sociology, Vol. 15, No. 3 (May 1986), 469. 

 



  

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A oO gs 
  

Book Notes, Reviews and Communications (in print) (continued) 

Book review: Michael Dummett, Voting Procedures. Contemporary 

Sgclology, Vol, 15, No. 4 (July 1986), 637-638. 

Biographical entry: Duncan Black. T New Pa ave: A Dictjonary of 

Economics (1987). New York: Stockton Press, 250-251. 

Biographical entry: Lewis Carroll. The New Pa ave: A Dictiona of 

Economics (1987). New York: Stockton Press, 371-372. 

Book review: Schmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush, Collective 

Decision-Making: An Economic Outlook. Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization (1987), 168-170. 

Grofman, Bernard and Michael Migalski. The return of the native: The 
supply elasticity of the American Indian population, 1950-1980. 

Public Choice (1988), 57: 85-88. 

The minimax blame rule for voter choice: Help for the undecided voter 
on November 8, 1988. PS (Summer 1988), 639-640. 

Book note: Manfred Holler (Ed.), The logic of multi-party systems. 

Political Geography Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July 1988), 300-301 

Book note: Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity. American 

Political Scjence Review (1989) Vol. 83, No. 2: 323-324. 

Pool, Jonathan and Bernard Grofman. Linguistic artificiality and 

cognitive competence. In Klaus Schubert (Ed.), Interlinquistics: 

Aspects of the Science of Planned Languages. Berlin: Mouton de 

Gruyter, 1989, 145-156. 
  

Uncle Wuffle's advice to the advanced graduate student. PS (December 

1989), 838-839. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. A theorem connecting 

Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two 

dimensions. Social Choice a We e, 1990, Vel. 7, 71-74. 

Bofeller, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. Comparing the compactness of 
California congressional districts under three different plans, 1980, 
1982 and 1984. In B. Crofman (Ed.), Political Gerrvymandering and the 

Courts. NY: Agathon Press, 1990, 281-288. 

Rernell, Samuel and Bernard Grofman. Determining the predictability 
of partisan voting patterns in California elections, 1978-1984. In 

B. Grofman (Ed.), eri a + +a. NY: 

Agathon Press, 1990, 289-295. 

Book review: Edward Carmines and James Stimson, Issue Evolution. 

International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 2, No. 2 
(1990), 185-190. 

Rejoinder: Straw men and stray bullets, a reply to Bullock. 

Scjence Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 4 (December 1991), 840-843. 

Social 

 



  

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     Book Notes lews and Communpjcations (in print) (continued) 

  

Grofman, Bernard. Questions of Electoral Fairness (translated into 

Japanese by Kyoji Wakata) in Nomp No. 2 (December 1991) Kansai 

University Institute of Legal Studies, Osaka, Japan, 19-24. 

Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson. Editors' Introduction: 

Issues and controversies in voting rights. In Bernard Grofman and 

Chandler Davidson (Eds.), Controversies i ijority vVoring: A 25 

a e ve on the Votj Lghts t of 1965. Washington, D.C. 

The Brookings Institution, 1992. 

    

Zimmerman, Joseph F. and Bernard Grofman, In Memoriam: Leon Weaver. 
PS, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1892), 97. 

Grofman, Bernard. A corollary to the third axiom of general 

semantics. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 

1992, 238-240. 

Grofman, Bernard. Book note: Laver and Schofield, Coalitions, 
Social Choice and Welfare, 1992, 265-266. 

Grofman, Bernard. Is turnout the paradox that ate rational choice 

theory? In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), atio Participatj and 

Choice: "An Economic Theory of Democracy’ in Perspective. Ann Arbor, 

Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993, 93-103. 

Grofman, Bernard. On the gentle art of rational choice bashing. In 
Bernard Grofman (Ed.) Information, Participation and Choice: “An 

Economic Theory of Democracy' in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993, 239-242. 

Grofman, Bernard. Uncle Wuffle's Advice to the Assistant Professor, 

PS, March 1993, 89-90. 

Grofman, Bernard. Editor's Introduction, a a icipatio 

a Choice: [e) of » : AS ectjive. 

Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993. 

Grofman, Bernard. The political economy of the automobile - 
4 approaches. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5 No 3, (July,1993): 

409-412. 

Grofman, Bernard. Throwing darts at double regression and missing 

the target. Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 3 (September) 
1993, 478-487. 

Grofman, Bernard. Lessons of Athenian democracy: Editor's 
Introduction, The 2500th Anniversary of Democracy. PS, September 
1993, 471-474. 

Grofman, Bernard. Book review. John Craven, S e: 
Rod 1] : lel Lividual gud : 

Ethics, Vol. 104, No. 2 (January 1994), 430-431. 

Grofman, Bernard. Book note: Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomansky, 
D Ll8ion: The Pure Theory of ectoral Preference. 

American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), 
439-440. 

 



Booknotes, Reviews and Communications (in print) (continued) 
  

Grofman, Bernard. Anthony Downs. In S.M. Lipset et al. 

(Eds.), Cc edia emocracy, 1995 

Grofman, Bernard. Districting. In S.M. Lipset et al. 

(Eds.), Encyclopedia of Democracy, 1995 
  

Booknotes, Reviews and Communications (forthcoming) 
  

Grofman, Bernard. Editor's Introduction: Minisymposium on 

Race and Redistricting. National Political Science Review, 1996, 

forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard and Christian Collet. Why Democrats shouldn't bother 
to vote (with acknowledgments to Robert Erikson). Jo (0) 

Theoretical Politics, 1997 forthcoming. 

Grofman, Bernard, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall, 

Introduction. In Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, 

Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea 

and Tajwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative 

Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor ,MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1997 forthcoming. 

Social Sciences Working Papers and Research Reports 
  

Note: Confessions of a mad modeler, Research Report R6, School of 

Social Sciences, University of California, June 1978. 

Note: The paradox of voting in a faculty appointment decision (with 
Steven Brown). Research Report R6, School of Social Sciences, 

University of California, Irvine, June 1978. 

Semiprofessj ublica (in print) 

Voting tactics: A neglected study, parts I, II. Parlij a 

Journal, vol. 12 (July 1971), 3-15; (October 1971), 19-26. 

Who knows the score on the board of supervisors? Opinion-Editorial 

Page, Newsday, March 6, 1977. (With Howard Scarrow.) 

My years as parliamentarian to the United States National Student 

Association. jamenta J VOL. 20 (1979), 18-2]. 

Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. The riddle of apportionment: 

Equality of what? National Civic Review, Vol. 70, No. 5 (May 1981), 

242-254. 

The Democratic party is alive and well. Society (July/August 1984), 

18-21. 

Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. Court should plunge deeper 

into gerrymandering thicket. Opinion-Editorial Page, [Los Angeles 

Times, July 15, 1986. 

Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. California's gerrymander and 

the U.S. Supreme Court. Opinion-Editorial Page, The Sacramento Dee, 

July 30, 1986.  



  

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semiorofessional urffyasi) (in print) (vensinsed) M4) » 

Should city councils be elected by district? PRO. Western Cities 

Magazine, March 1987, 4, 30-31. 

  

Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. What now for gerrymandering? 

Opinion-Editorial Page, The San Diego Union, November 18, 1988. 

Loewen, James W. and Bernard Grofman. Comment: Recent developments 

in methods used in voting rights litigation. Urban Lawyer Vol. 21, 

No. 3 (1989), 589-604. 

Grofman, Bernard. Voting Rights, Voting Wrongs: The Legacy of Baker 

v. Carr. A Report of the Twentieth Century Fund. New York: Priority 

Press (distributed through the Brookings Institution), 1991. 

Grofman, Bernard. Opinion-Editorial page: Voting rights may be an 

issue in Santa Ana. Los Angeles Times (Orange County Edition), 

August 5, 1991. 

Grofman, Bernard. Opinion-Editorial page: Race and Redistricting: 

No one is using the Voting Rights Act to “whiten” majority districts. 

Washington Post, October 21, 1991. 

Grofman, Bernard. Opinion-Editorial page: High court ruling won't 

doom racial gerrymandering. Chicago Tribune, July 9, 1993. 

Grofman, Bernard. Opinion-Editorial page: The Denny beating trial: 

justice in the balance. Chicago Tribune, November 3, 1993. 

Reynolds, Andrew S. and Bernard N. Grofman. Opinion-Editorial page: 

Everyone loses in South Africa boycott. Chicago Tribune, March 28, 

1994. 

Grofman, Bernard. An introduction to racial bloc voting analysis. 

With an annotated select bibliography on racial bloc voting and 

related topics. Atlanta, GA: Southern Regional Council. 

Other Publications 

  

Chicago. In David Glazier (Ed.), Student Travel in America. New 

York: Pyramid Publication, 1968. (Under pseudonym.) 

Chicago: Hyde Park and the University of Chicago, the Loop and 

Near-North. In Where the Fun Js: East of the Mississippi. NY: 

Simon and Schuster, 1969. (Under pseudonym.) 

 



  

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il o © 29 

‘Recent Conference Papers (unpublished) 

Avila, Joaquin and Bernard Grofman. The effects of the Voting Rights 

Act on Hispanic representation in California. Prepared for delivery 

at the NSF Conference on "The Voting Rights Act,” Rice University, 

Houston, Texas, May 11-12, 1990. 

Grofman, Bernard and Neil Sutherland. Terms limits of the third 

kind. Prepared for delivery at the Interdisciplinary Focused 

Research Program in Public Choice Conference on Term Limits, May 

1991. 

Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld, Social choice theory and the 

tyranny of the majority. Prepared for delivery at the American 

Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Panel on Social Choice 

and Democratic Stability, Washington, D.C., August 29-September 1, 

1991. 

Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. Distinguishing between 

ideological and judgmental bases of transitive majority choice. 

Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American 

Sociological Association, Chicago, August 1992; presented in revised 

form at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, 

California, March 24-26, 1995. 

Grofman, Bernard. Justice Department enforcement of the Voting 

Rights Act: Compromised campliance? Republican plot? or Great 

American success story? Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting 

of the American Political Science Association. Chicago, 

September 1992. 

Grofman, Bernard. What is a constitution? Presented at U.C. Irvine 

conference on "Constitutional Design," June 1993. 

Reynolds, Andrew S. and Bernard Grofman. Choosing an electoral 

system for the new South Africa: the main proposals. Presented at 

the Conference on Electoral Reform and Democratization, Columbia 

Institute for Western European Studies, Columbia University, April 

18-19, 1994. 

Grofman, Bernard. Should parties converge? Prepared for delivery at 

the World Congress of the International Sociological Association, 

Bielefeld, Germany, July 21-24, 1994. 

Brians, Craig and Bernard Grofman. Voter registration laws and 

turnout in the U.S. states: a longitudinal analysis. Prepared for 

the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 

New York, September 1994. 

Grofman, Bernard. Are voting rights special? Presented at the 

Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Perspective, Washington 

D.C. Federal Judicial Center, November 11-12, 1994. 

Grofman, Bernard, Christian Collet and Robert Griffin. Do Democrats 

do better in elections with higher turnout? Prepared for delivery at 

the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, 

California, March 24-26, 1995. 

 



  

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30 

Recent Conference s @..... (continued) @® 

Owen, Guillermo, and Bernard Grofman. Expressive voting and 

equilibrium in two-stage electoral competition involving both 

primaries and a general election. Prepared for delivery at the 

Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, California, 

March 24-26, 1995. (A revised version presented at the Conference on 

Strategy and Politics, Center for the Study of Collective Choice, 

University of Maryland, College Park, MD, april 12, 1996.) 

Regenwetter, Michel and Bernard Grofman. Choosing subsets: A size 

independent random utility model and the quest for a social welfare 

ordering. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Public 

Choice Society, Long Beach, Ccalifornia, March 24-26, 1995. 

Regenwetter, Michel and Bernard Grofman. Approval voting, Borda 

winners and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections.. 

Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice 

Society, Long Beach, Ccalifornia, March 24-26, 1985. 

Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Bandley and Robert Griffin. Homicide on the 

Hill: Is the voting rights act responsible for Republican control of 

the house in 1994? Presented at the Anual Meeting of the American 

Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 30-September 

3, 1995. 

Brunell, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. Explaining divided U.S. Senate 

delegations, 1788-1994. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting 

of the Public Choice Society, Houston, Texas, March 1996. 

Koetzle, William, Brunell, Thomas and Bernard Grofman. Determinants 

of congressional midterm elections. Prepared for delivery at the 

Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Houston, Texas, March, 

1996. 

Grofman, Bernard, Michael McDonald, William Koetzle, and Thomas 

Brunell. A new explanation for split ticket voting: The comparative 

midpoints model. Presented at the Conference on Strategy and 

Politics, Center for the Study of Collective Choice, University of 

Maryland, College Park, MD, April 12, 1996. 

 



   
Pi Sigma Alpha Award, Best Paper, 1979 Annual Meeting of the Midwest 

Political Science Association. 

Honors and Awards 
  

Co-Chair, 1982-85, Conference Group on Representation and Electoral 
Systems, American Political Science Association. 

1985 co-recipient (with Philip Straffin) of the Carl B. Allendoerfer Award, 

Mathematical Association of America, for exposition in mathematical 
writing for undergraduates. 

Chair, 1991-93, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American 
Political Science Association. 

1995 Co-recipient for (with Chandler Davidson) of the Richard Fenno Prize 

of the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science 
Association for the best book published in 1994 in the field of 

legislative studies (Quiet Revolution in the South). 

: : 

Chair, 1982-83, Lippincott Prize Committee for book-length work in 

political theory, American Political Science Association. 

Section Program Organizer, Panels on "Positive Theory," Annual Meeting of 

the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 

1984. 

Member, 1985-86, Working Group on Collective Choice Institutions, 
appointed by the Committee on Basic Research in the Behavioral and 
Social Sciences, National Research Council. 

Member, Executive Committee, 1986-89, Section on Representation and 

Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association. 

Chair, 1988-92, George Ballett Book Prize Award Committee, Section on 
Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science 
Association. 

Section Program Co-organizer, Panels on "Political Organizations," Annual 

Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1990. 

Member, 1990-91, Lasswell Prize Committee, International Society of 
Political Psychology. 

Member, 1995-96, Carey McWilliam Award for Journalists Committee, American 
Political Science Association. 

Chair, 1995-96, Richard Fenno Prize Committee, Legislative Studies Section, 
American Political Science Association. 

31 

 



    

eo © eo © 32 

1972-82 Manuscript Review Board: Behavioral Science. 

1975- Occasional referee: Ret] ournal of Political Science; 

Theory and Decision; Public Choice. 

1976~- Occasional referee: Political Methodolo 

Foundation, Political Science Program. 

1977- Occasional referee: American Political Science 

Association, Division of Educational Affairs; Jo of the 

American Statistical Association: Social Science Research; 

Research Award Program of the City University of New York 

(Political Science). 

Occasional referee: Psychological Review; National Science 

Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program; Journal of 

Personality and Social Psychology; European Journal of Social 
Psychology; Journal of Mathematical Sociology. 

1979- Occasional referee: Socjal Networks; National Science Foundation, 

Applied Mathematics Program. 
Occasional referee: Law and Policy Quarterly; National Institute of 

Mental Health; American Political Scjence Review, National Science 

Foundation, Sociology Program; National Science Foundation, 

Economics Program; Journal of Conflict Resolution; Legislative 
Studies arte 

1981- Occasional referee: erican Mat i Mont 

Decision Sciences, Economic InGuACY. 
1982- Occasional referee: Soc Science arte 3 

Sociological Methods and Research; Western Political 

Quarterly, Guggenheim Foundation; National Science 

Foundation, Developmental and Social Psychology Program; 

National Science Foundation, Decision, Risk and 
Management Science Program. 

Occasional referee: Journal of Poljtics, Political 

Geography Quarterly. 

1984- Occasional referee: National Science Foundation, 

Information Systems Program; National Science Foundation, 

Program in Social Measurement and Analysis. 

REFEREEING 

  

  

  

; National Science 

aculty 

1978- 

1980- 

1983- 

1986- Occasional referee: Review of Economic Studies. 

1987- Occasional referee: British Journal of Political Science, 

Journal of Political Economy, Comparative Political Studies. 
1988- Occasional referee: Social Choice and Welfare, Political 

Analysis, Polity. 
1989- Occasional referee: National Science Foundation, 

History and Philosophy of Science. 
1991- Occasional referee: Demography. 

1992- Occasional referee: European Journal of Political Research. 
1993- Occasional referee: Electoral Studies 

Program in 

 



rc: @os @ eo © 
Discussant, Panel on "Reapportionment in the 1990's: The Western States,” 

Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Newport Beach, 

March 1990. 

Co-organizer, NSF Conference on "The Voting Rights Act," Rice University, 

Houston, Texas, May 11-12, 1990. 

Organizer, Interdisciplinary Focused Research Program in Public Choice 

Conference on "Modelling Race and Electoral Politics," UCI, May 19, 1990. 

Invited Participant, NAACP-LDF Conference on "The Voting Rights Act," Panel 

on "Recent Developments in Section 2 Litigation," New Orleans, May 1990. 

Co-organizer, Rockefeller Foundation Conference on "The Voting Rights Act: 

Law and Society." The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., October 19, 
1990. 

Keynote speaker, National Conference of State Legislatures Reapportionment 

Task Force Redistricting Conference, Dallas, TX, February 25-27, 1991. 

Chair, Panel on "Empirical Issues in Representation" Annual Meeting of the 
Public Choice Society, New Orleans, March 15-18, 1991. 

Roundtable Participant, "James Coleman's Foundations of Social Theory" 

Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, March 15-18, 

19891. 

Discussant, Panel on "Conceptual Approaches to Public Choice" Annual 
Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, March 15-18, 1991. 

Co-Chair, Panel on "The Voting Rights Act,” Annual Meeting of the Western 

Political Science Association, Seattle, March 22, 1991. 

Invited Participant, NCGIA Conference on Geographic Information Systems in 

the Social Sciences, Santa Barbara, March 22-24, 1991. 

Discussant, panel on "Formal Modeling," Annual Meeting of the American 

Political Science Association, Wash. D.C., August 28-September 2, 1991. 

Invited spearker, Federal Judicial Center Conference for Federal Judges of 

the 6th and 8th Circuits, Orlando, Florida, January 13, 1992. 

Chair, panel on "Issues and Controversies in Legislative and Congressional 

Redistricting.” Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science 

Association, San Francisco, March 19-21, 1992. 

Participant, National Endowment for Bumanities Workshop on Athenian 

Democracy, UC Santa Cruz, June 21-July 30, 1992. 

Chair, "Roundtable on Ethnic and Linguistic Conflict and the Art of 
Constitutional Design.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 

Association, Chicago, September 3-6, 1992. 

Invited speaker, Southern Regional Council "Conference on Voting Rights." 

Atlanta, October 1-3, 1992. 

Invited panelist, "Roundtable on Uses of Operations Research in the Social 
Sciences.” Annual Meeting of ORSA-TIMS, San Francisco, November 2-4, 1992.  



   $ »® 2 
RECENT CONFERENCE PAR Ah (continued) 

Chair, panel on "Social Contract Theory," Conference on Democracy, 

Rationality and the Social Contract. Focused Research Project in Public 

Choice, University of California, Irvine, December 11-12, 1992. 

    

organizer, Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Perspective, 

Washington D.C. Federal Judicial Center, November 11-12, 1994. 

Invited participant, IGCC Conferences on "Ethnic Conflict," University of 

California, San Diego, May 11-12, 1994; Palm Springs, California, December 

12,1995. 

Invited panelist. National Conference of State Legislators Annual Meeting, 

Panel on "Redistricting Decisions of the Supreme Court.” St Louis, 

Missouri, Juley 29-31, 1996. 

Recent Invited Colloquia 

May 4, 1990 Program in Law and Economics, Columbia University Law 

School 

May 6, 1990 Program in Ethics and Public Policy, University of Chicago. 

June 13, 1990 Department of Political Science, Kwansei Gakuin University, 

Nishinomiya, Japan. 

June 16, 1990 Institute of Legal Studies, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan 

June 25, 1990 Department of Social Psychology, Tokyo University, Japan. 

Nov: 7.18381 Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, 

Canada 

Nov 13,1991 Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, 

Canada 

April 17, 1992 Department of Government, Barvard University 

Sept 12-17, Landsdowne Guest Speaker, Department of Political Science, 

1992 University of Victoria, Canada 

July 27, 1994 Department of Economics, Fern Universitet Hagen, Germany 

 



   
1977-79 

1877-79 

1983-84 

1987-89 

1988-89 

1988-91 

1991-92 

1994-56 

1994-95 

Service to t 

1978-79 

1979-85 

1980-81 

1981-82 

1982-83 

1983-84 

1986-87 

1988-89 

1988-89 

1988-89 

1988-91 

1991-92 

1991-93 

1992-96 

1992-96 

1996-97 

1996-97 

+ University Service, 

35 

Sd Nr 
  

Member, University Committee on Lectures 

Faculty Advisor, UCI Chapter, Student Model United Nations 

Member, University Library Committee 

Member, Privilege and Tenure Committee Hearing Panel 

Member, Tierney Chair Search Committee 

Member, University Committee on Rules and Jurisdictions 

Acting Chair, Focused Research Program in Public Choice 

Member, University Committee on Rules and Jurisdictions 

Member, Chancellor's Taskforce on Use of Educational Technology 

School of Social Sciences, UC 

Chair, Program in Politics and Society. 

Organizer, Program in Politics and Society 
Colloquium Series (Winter Quarters). 

Special Schoolwide Selection Committee: Distinguished Student 

Scholars Program. 

Chair, School of Social Sciences Faculty. 

Acting Co-Chair, Program in Politics and Society (Spring 

Quarter). 

Political Science Graduate Student Adviser. 

Organizer, Program in Politics and Society Colloquium Series 

(Spring Quarter). 

Organizer, Program in Politics and Society Colloquium Series 

(Fall and Winter Quarters). 

Political Science Graduate Student Adviser. 

Chair, Recruitment Committee in Mathematical Political Science. 

Member, Recruitment Committee in Public Law. 

Chair, Committee for the Interdisciplinary Concentration in Public 

Choice. 

Member, Joint Recruitment Committee in African-American Studies 

Member, Political Science Graduate Comittee 

Member, Committee for the Interdisciplinary Graduate Concentration 

in Public Choice 

Member, Executive Committee, UCI Center for the Study of Democracy 

Chair, Recruitment Committee for Pacific Rim FTE in Political Science 

 



   é a se 
current searc ® » 

My current research is on mathematical models of group and individual 

decision making with a focus on electoral behavior and voter choice, and 
issues connected with representation and redistricting. I also have strong 

side interests in individual and group information processing and decision 

heuristics; political propaganda, particularly political cartooning and 
satire; in law and social science, particularly in the domain of civil 

rights, and in using computers as a teaching aid. 

Courses Taught 

Computer-Based Research Methods in the Social Sciences 

Introduction to Public Choice 
The United States in Comparative Perspective 

Statistics for Citizenship 
Representation and Redistricting 
Elections and Voter Choice 

The Federalist Papers and the Art of Constitutional Design 

Law and Social Science 
Models of Collective Decision Making 

Introduction to Decision Analysis 
Game Theory Applications in the Social Sciences 
Small Group Behavior 
Introduction to Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences 

Coalition Theory 
Political Satire 

 



  

Major Redistricting Cases in Which Bernard Grofman Has 

Paracipated as an Expert Witness or Court-Appointed Consuitant 

Consultant to Case Name Type 
  

epublican Panty of Colorado 

pecial Master, U.S. Dismect Coun 
outhemn Dismect of New York 

.epublican Party of Hawa 

)emocratac Party of Rhode Island 
nd, subsequentiy, State of Rhode 
sland 
AACP Legal Defense Fund 

J.S. Deparunent of Jusace 

tate of Indiana 

_1ity of Boston 

lexican Amencan Legal Defense and 
=ducanon Fund 

J.S. Deparment of Jusace 

-.S. Department of Jusuce 

NAACP Legal Defense Fund 

Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 
(D. Colorado, 1982) 

Flateau v. Anderson, 537 F. Supp. 
257 (S.D. New York, 1982) 

, S52 F. Supp. 554; 
SS52F. fo 1200 (D. Hawaii, 
1982) 
Holmes v. Bums (Super. Ct., R.L 
1982) aff"d, No., 83-149 (R.I. S.Ct 
4/10/84) 
Qingles v. Edmisten, consol. with 
Pugh v. Brock, 590 F. Supp. 345 
(E.D. North Carolina, 1984) heard 
sub nom. Thomburg v, Gingles, 106 
S. Cr 2752, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) 
South Carolina v, US, (D.D.C,, 
1984) setued out of court by 
preclearance of a new plan for South 
Carolina Senate 

Bandemer v, Davis 603 F. Supp. 
1479 (1984). (S.D. Indiana, 1983), 
reversed sub nom Davis v. 
Bandemer. 106 S. Ct 2797, 

___(1986). iminally consol. 
with 

v 603 F. Supp. 1479 
(1984) (S.D. Indiana.1983) 

Y 

, 609 F. Supp. 739 
(D. Mass., 1985) 

v.Q4 Ww le (D. 
Calif., 1986), 863 F. 2nd 1407 (Sth 
cir. 1988) cert. denied. 109 Sct. 
1534 (1989) 

Ketchum v, Byme II (D. TOlinois 
1989), settled by consent decree 
US, v City of Los Angeles (D. 
Calif., 1986), settled out of court by 
adopuon of a new plan for LA. City 
Council with an additional majonty 
Hispanic seat 

McGhee v,. Granville County, No, 
87-29-CIV-95) (E.D. North Carolina, 
2/5/88); 860 F 2nd 110 (4th circuit 

1988) 

Congress: failure of the iegisiarure 10 

alt - 

Congress and both houses of siate 
legislature: failure of legisiarure to 
act; minority voung rights 
State legislature: equal populanon 

State house: minority vote dilution. 
compactness, communites of interes! 

Mulomember dismcts in the state 
legislature: Secnon 2 of the Voung 
Rights Act 

State Senate: Secaon 5 of the Voung 
Rights Act preclearance demal 

State legislature: parusan 
gerrymandenng, minonty vote 

dilution 

Boston City Council: munonty vote 
dilugon 

Watsonville City Council: Section 2 
of the Voang Rights Act 

Chicago City Council: munonty vote 

dilution 
Los Angeles City Council: Section 2 

of the Voung Rights Act 

Granville County Board of 
Supervisors: Secnon 2 of the Voung 
Rights Act 

 



  

Consultant to Case Name Type 
  

Republican National Comrmuttee Badham v. Eu, 721 F. 2d 1170 (D. Congress: partisan gerrymandenng 

Calif., 1983), dismissed for want of 
a federal claim, cert denied. | 

U.S. Department of Jusuce Garza v. Los Angeles County Board County Board: Secuon 2 of the 

cors (D. Calif., 1990),80 Voting Rights Act 
ACBO:5-8138-(0th cir. 1990) cert 

denied January 1990— ———- 

ne Pd 2 
Republican National Committee Pope et al. v. Blue et al. 14th Amendment 

Civ. No. 3:920V71-P, U.S. 
District Court, Western District 
Charlotte Division 

  

Republican Party of Wisconsin Prosser et al. v. Election Section 2 Voting Rights Act 

Board of State of Wisconsin 
  

  

No. 92-C-0078-C, U.S. District 
Court, Western District of 
Wisconsin 

 



APPENDIX E 

 



  

o © A ® ep 
USDC, WESTERN DISTRICT OF LA 
ROBERT H. SHEMWELL, RK 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT dl iv vii 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

  

  

SHREVEPORT DIVISION 

JOHNNY MAXWELL, 1 CIVIL ACTION NO: 98-1378 
BILLY JACK PRICE, H 

PLAINTIFFS, H 
H 

vs. H JUDGE DONALD E. WALTER 
H 

THE HONORABLE MURPHY J. } 
"MIKE" FOSTER, et al., H MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAYNE 

  

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
  

Before the Court is Defendants’, the Honorable Murphy J. Foster, and the Honorable W. 

Fox McKeithen, Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ 

Motion must be GRANTED. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
  

As a result of the 1990 census, the State of Louisiana began the process of redesigning 

the boundaries of state legislative electoral districts throughout the state. An extraordinary 

session of the Louisiana Legislature was convened in 1991 ("second session") for the purpose of 

aligning the Louisiana state legislative districts with new census data and long standing 

constitutional requirements. In the second session, the legislature adopted a revised district 

system that was eventually signed into law by then Governor Edwards and was submitted to the 

United States Department of Justice for preclearance. The Department of Justice denied 

preclearance. Spurred by this denial, another extraordinary session ("third session") of the 

Louisiana Legislature was convened and produced another redesigned legislative district plan. 

1 Maxwell - MS] - 98-1378 

 



  

The plan from the third session was signed into law and granted preclearance by the Department 

of Justice. Three districts created by this plan are the subject of this litigation. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The district court must "review the facts drawing all inferences 

most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 784 
  

F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its Motion, and identifying those parts of 

the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp., v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
  

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief based on the equitable doctrine 

of laches. The current system has been in place for almost a decade, and Plaintiffs did not file 

suit until July of 1998. This is compounded by the fact that new census information is due soon 

which will trigger the decennial legislative redistricting process.’ As such, Defendants contend 

the ripeness of this litigation has long since passed and that no relief should be afforded. 

  

! Article III, Section 6 of the Louisiana Constitution requires the legislature to reapportion 

the representation in each house of the Louisiana Legislature by the end of the year following the 

year in which the population of the state is reported to the President of the United States for the 

decennial federal census. 

2 Maxwell - MSJ - 98-1378 

 



  

The Doctrine of Laches and Equal Protection 

Plaintiffs contend that "The Time Within Which One Must Assert An Action Under The 

Equal Protection Clause Is Not Governed By The Clock." Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ 

  

Motion for Summary Judgment on Laches, at 3. While this statement may be true, it is not 

pertinent to the issue of laches and is not sufficient to spare this matter from its application. 

Plaintiffs attempt to equate laches with a traditional limitation or prescriptive period has no legal 

footing. Laches is an equitable doctrine, it "is not, like limitation, a mere matter of time; but 

principally a question of the equity or inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced." Barrios 
  

v. Faye, 597 F.2d 881, 884 (5" Cir. 1979). As for Plaintiffs’ contention that equitable 

considerations are not applicable to constitutional violations, the Supreme Court has squarely 

disagreed. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court touched on the consideration of 

equitable remedies in the context of voting rights cases: 

[Under certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and 
a State’s election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations might 
justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief in a 

legislative apportionment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme was 

found invalid. In awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and 
should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and 

complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable 

principles. With respect to the timing of relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to 

avoid a disruption of the election process which might result from requiring 

precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a state 
in adjusting to the requirements of the court’s decree 

Id. at 585. This passage makes it quite clear that equitable considerations can and do factor into 

equal protection challenges, in particular voting rights cases, even when the challenged plan is 

found unconstitutional. 

3 Maxwell - MSJ - 98-1378 

 



  

The Doctrine Of Laches Is Not Barred 

The doctrine of laches, which is similar to that of equitable estoppel, can be invoked 

when there is "[a] failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a 

proper time." See Lauderdale County Sch. Dist. v. Enterprise Consol. Sch. Dist., 24 F.3d 671, 

  

691 (5% Cir. 1994); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (6™ ed. 1990). Plaintiffs’ argument that 

laches should not apply collects the most relevant jurisprudence, but, ultimately, is not 

persuasive. The authorities cited are not dispositive of the proposal Plaintiffs advance that laches 

is inapplicable in the context of voting rights cases. Plaintiffs cite Dotson v. City of Indianola, 

514 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Miss. 1981) as the seminal case barring the doctrine of laches in Section 

5 cases. When taken in its entirety, Dotson provides no support for the prospect that laches is 
  

inapplicable to the instant matter. The Court in Dotson was confronted with a situation where 
  

the city had annexed property into its voting fold without obtaining preclearance from the 

Department of Justice. See id. at 399. This is a critical distinction. In Dotson, the Court would 

not apply laches because it was preventing the city from turning its long standing refusal to 

submit the plan to the Department of Justice into a defense. In other words, the Court would not 

"allow the burden of litigation delay to operate in favor of the perpetrators and against the 

victims of possibly racially discriminatory practices." 1d. at 401. As the plan in the instant 

matter was precleared, there is no similar evil to be combated and Dotson provides no support for 
  

Plaintiffs’ contention. 

Plaintiffs then turn to Henderson v. Graddick, 641 F. Supp. 1192 (M.D. Ala. 1986) as 

support for their premise that laches is inapplicable. However, the Henderson court merely cites 

to Dotson, without further discussion, in concluding that laches could not apply. See id. at 1200. 

  

4 Maxwell - MS] - 98-1378 

 



  

Given our determination that the rationale in Dotson is inapposite, Henderson is of no greater 
  

moment to Plaintiffs’ contention than Dotson. 

Plaintiffs then seek to distinguish Lopez v. Hale County, 797 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex. 
  

1993) wherein a three judge panel, according to Plaintiffs, "[did not apply laches] to the claims, 

but rather to a remedy phase of the section 5 action . . .". Plaintiffs’ Opposition, at 8. Plaintiffs 

are indeed correct that the Lopez court applied laches only to the remedy phase of a section 5 

analysis, but the remedy phase was the only matter before the court. Such a contention does 

precious little to prevent the consideration of laches in the instant matter. See Lopez, 797 F. 

Supp. at 549. Whether it is termed "applying laches to claims” or "applying laches to remedies," 

the result remains consistent. 

Finally, Plaintiffs cite a portion of Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 920 F. Supp. 

1233, 1240 n.14 (M.D. Ala. 1996) as support. Again, this case further undercuts the contention 

that laches is somehow inapplicable. In Shuford, the court was willing to accept the premise that 

laches could apply, although the Court decided it did not apply as essential elements of laches 

were not present. See id. at 1240. Aside from this contention, the portion cited by Plaintiffs 

refers to the elements of laches, not the proposition that the doctrine is inapplicable as a whole. 

This Court is unpersuaded that the equitable consideration of laches is somehow 

excluded. We turn now to determine the propriety of its use. 

All Elements of Laches Are Present 

A claim is barred by laches when (1) there was delay in asserting a right or a claim; (2) 

the delay was inexcusable; and (3) undue prejudice resulted from the delay. Armco Inc. v. 

Armco Burgular Alarm Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 1155, 1161 (5* Cir. 1982). There is no dispute that 

5 Maxwell - MSJ - 98-1378 

 



the plan was finalized in 1991 and the instant suit was not filed until July of 1998. As Plaintiff 

Billy Jack Price admits to having knowledge of the redistricting "[b]ack in the early 90's when 

following the [19]90 census we were reapportion [sic] [ was made aware of the changes that was 

in Lincoln Parish where portion of 11, 12, and 13 Districts all encompass part of Lincoln Parish. 

I was aware of that but I didn’t pay as much attention to it as I have in recent years . . .". 

Deposition of Billy Jack Price, at 6-7. In addition, Mr. Price admitted it was "[p]robably 

negligence on my part, but I didn’t realize that having one representative from Lincoln parish 

was as critical as it was or as it is," in response to why he did not pay attention to the effects of 

the redistricting. Id. at 8. Similarly, Plaintiff Johnny Maxwell admitted he was aware of the 

redistricting plan as early as 1991. See Deposition of Johnny Maxwell, at 7. In response the 
  

question of why he did not file suit at that time, Maxwell stated "I am not a political person. ..I 

kept thinking at some point that somebody would step up [to] protect the interest of Lincoln 

Parish." Id. Nowhere in either deposition or in any of Plaintiffs’ submissions to this Court is 

there a sufficiently compelling reason advanced, legal or equitable, as to why this suit was not 

filed earlier. As such, there clearly has been a delay and given the level of knowledge 

attributable to Plaintiffs, the delay cannot be anything but inexcusable. 

Given this litigation’s temporal proximity to the next installment of census data and 

associated redistricting, the amount of time that has elapsed since the cause of action arose, and 

the fact that statewide elections were recently held, less prejudice is required to show laches in 

such an instance than had the Plaintiffs expeditiously asserted their rights. See White v. Daniel, 

909 F.2d 99, 102 (4* Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs ask this Court to impose, after at least three elections 

Maxwell - MSJ - 98-1378  



        

have been held under the current plan, a judicially crafted reapportionment? on the cusp of a 

constitutionally required legislative reapportionment based on the 2000 census. The 

undesirability and prejudice involved in such an approach was well stated by the Fourth Circuit: 

We believe that two reapportionments within a short period of two years would 
greatly prejudice the County and its citizens by creating instability and dislocation 

in the electoral system and by imposing great financial and logistical burdens. Such 

a disruption is not justified when there will be no election prior to November 1991, 

at which time the court-ordered plan may no longer be appropriate because of new 

census information 

Id. at 104. The situation in White almost mirrors the instant case. This Court finds that rapid- 

fire reapportionment immediately prior to a scheduled census would constitute an undue 

  

2 This Court can only assume that Plaintiffs, should they prevail, would request that this 

Court impose a new legislative district plan on the state. In Plaintiffs’s complaint, they sought 

the following declaratory relief, in relevant part: 
(i) the enactment of [the current plan] is violative of the Constitution of the United 

States of America, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. §1981; 42 U.S.C. §1983; 42 

U.S.C. §1985 and 42 U.S.C. §1973; (ii) further elections of members of the 

Louisiana Legislative House of Representatives based upon the [current plan] is 

unconstitutional; (iii) the continued operation of the Louisiana Legislative House of 
Representatives is unconstitutional if the [current plan is] not repealed to eliminate 

the unconstitutional racial construction of its electoral districts; and (iv) the creation 

constitutional Louisiana Legislative House of Representatives’s electoral districts 

must be established and special elections immediately be held under the new districts 

by the end of 1998. 

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, at prayer for relief, §2 (no page number available). However, in 

Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 6, their position seems 
to soften a bit in an attempt to lessen the prejudice that would result from their requested relief. 

In that document, Plaintiffs suggest that there is no need for a newfangled, judicially drawn 

district. Instead, they recommend this Court issue a quick fix and impose the plan created by the 
second session which was denied preclearance by the Department of Justice. While this Court 
does understand the relevance of Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1491 

(1997) to such an idea, which is discussed infra, this Court would indeed be carrying a dim torch 

if we were to merely impose a decidedly questionable plan in place of another questionable plan. 

Thus, Plaintiffs contention is unacceptable. 

  

7 Maxwell - MSJ - 98-1378 

 



  

disruption of the election process, the stability and continuity of the legislative system and would 

be highly prejudicial, not only to the citizens of Louisiana, but to the state itself. 

Plaintiffs attempt to downplay the potential prejudice from the delay by claiming that the 

"population could be resorted within the three districts and no further because there is no need for 

new data for Plaintiffs to make their case." Plaintiffs’ Opposition, at 6. However, this 

contention does not assuage this Court’s concerns relating to electoral confusion. Plaintiffs have 

not asked this Court to declare only three districts in north-central Louisiana unconstitutional, but 

to declare the entire plan invalid. See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. This Court finds it 

difficult to accept the premise that a simple reshuffling of a population within three legislative 

districts would result in constitutional and electoral equilibrium without any further action on its 

part. If the plan is declared unconstitutional, a more likely scenario is that the legislature will be 

required to meet in extraordinary session, devise a constitutional plan, and submit it to the 

Department of Justice for preclearance. This scenario is likely because this Court would be quite 

reluctant to draw up a constitutional plan without first allowing the legislature a chance to do the 

same. This process, which will begin under a normal constitutional initiative in a matter of 

months, would take months, if not longer to sort out -- all based on decade old census data. The 

possibility, if not probability, of statewide electoral confusion at this late date given the impeding 

legislative redistricting, can easily be described as "undue prejudice.” 

Finally, Plaintiffs assert that there is "no need for new data" for them to make their case. 

Plaintiffs’ Opposition, at 6. If this Court were to declare the plan unconstitutional, any new plan 

devised by any branch of government, would be based on decade old census data. This Court 

finds it neither wise nor appropriate for any branch of government to reshuffle legislative 

8 Maxwell - MS] - 98-1378 

 



  

districts at this late date considering the outdated information that would necessarily be used 

when new and accurate information is forthcoming. 

Finding all elements of laches present and that its application is appropriate, this Court 

now turns its attention to Plaintiffs’ contention that the issuance of Reno v. Bossier Parish School 

Board, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1491 (1997) "was the precipitating force as to the filing of this 

action,” in July of 1998. Plaintiffs’ Opposition, at 15. This Court finds Bossier Parish 
  

irrelevant in terms of precipitating the instant action. The Supreme Court in Bossier Parish held 
  

that "[p]reclearance under §5 may not be denied solely on the basis that a covered jurisdiction’s 

new voting ‘standard, practice, or procedure’ violates §2. This Court has consistently understood 

§5 and §2 to combat different evils and, accordingly, to impose very different duties upon the 

States." Bossier Parish, 117 S.Ct. at 1494. As the plan in question received preclearance, the 

  

  

holding in Bossier Parish has no link, no matter how tenuous, to declaring the plan 

unconstitutional. 

In granting this Motion, this Court does not erect some form of permanent barrier 

between Plaintiffs and the remedy they seek; rather the concerns iterated herein are of greater 

substance and weigh in favor denying relief sought by Plaintiff at this time. If after the 2000 

census and subsequent redistricting Plaintiffs are not satisfied as to the new plan’s 

constitutionality, they may then reassert their claim in that context. The court in Dickinson v. 

Indiana State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497 (7* Cir. 1991) faced just such a situation. 

  

The district court also concluded that, on equitable grounds, the pending 1991 
redistricting (based on the 1990 census) makes the entry of relief inappropriate. The 

district court did not err in making this finding. The legislative reapportionment is 

imminent, and Districts 49 and 51 may well be reshuffled. The legislature should 

9 Maxwell - MSJ - 98-1378 

 



  

now complete its duty, after which the plaintiffs can reassess whether racial bias still 
exists and seek appropriate relief 

Id. at 502. It is quite possible that after new districts are drawn in the normal course after the 

2000 census that Plaintiffs would not even be in districts they would consider "racial 

gerrymanders." Given that the new decennial electoral cycle will commence within a few 

months, this Court finds that staying its hand in the instant matter and letting the Louisiana 

constitutional process unfold to be the proper approach. 

IV. CONCLUSION 
  

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment must be GRANTED. 

+h 
THUS DONE AND SIGNED this ZH day of November, 1999. 

JUDGMENT ENTERED NOV 24 1099 

  

  

  

  

BY a Ll 
COPY Pugh 

Meba/ug_ 

Bulle. 
  

10 

Quy [ Mi 
  

HENRY AJ POLITZ 
UNITED yo ET JUDGE 

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[A 
DONALD E. WALTER 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

    

   

  

  

JOUNM. SHAW 
{IZED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Maxwell - MSJ - 98-1378 

 



No. 

  

  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1999 

  

JAMES B. HUNT, JR. et al, 
Petitioners, 

and 

ALFRED SMALLWOOD, et al., 
Petitioner-Intervenors, 

V. 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, et al., 
Respondents. 

  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Todd A. Cox, a member of the Bar of this Court, hereby certify that on this 13th day of 

March, 2000, served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 

Application to Stay Decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North 

Carolina Pending Appeal and Appendices to Robinson O. Everett, Suite 300 First Union National 

Bank Building, Post Office Box 586, Durham, North Carolina 27702 and Edwin M. Speas, Jr, 

Chief Deputy Attorney General and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorney General, North 

Carolina Department of Justice, Post Office Box 629, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-0629, 

counsel for all of the appellants and appellees herein. I further certify that all parties required to 

be served have been served. Ne a 

Todd A. Cox 

NAACP Legal Defense 
& Educational Fund, Inc. 

1444 1 Street, N.-W., 10th Floor 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 682-1300 

  

  

Counsel for Petitioner-Intervenors