Order Denying Application for Stay
Public Court Documents
August 17, 1970
5 pages
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Case Files, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hardbacks. Order Denying Application for Stay, 1970. 6b16ef2e-2e34-f111-88b4-0022482cdbbc. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/a1c86e60-2945-45d7-b175-4a9a2512243d/order-denying-application-for-stay. Accessed June 02, 2026.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOURTH CIRCUIT
SAMUEL W. PHILLIPS TELEPHONE 643-5592
CLERK Augus t 18 ’ 1970 AREA CODE 703
TENTH AND MAIN STREETS
RICHMOND. VIRGINIA 23219
J. LeVonne Chambers, Esq.
216 West Tenth Street
Charlotte, North Carolina
Jack Greenberg, Esq.
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York
Conrad 0, Pearson, Esq.
203-1/2 East Chapel Hill Street
Durham, North Carolina
William J. Waggoner, Esq.
1100 Barringer Office Tower
Charlotte, North Carolina
Benjamin S. Horack, Esq.
806 East Trade Street
Charlotte, North Carolina
Erwin N. Griswold, Esq.
Solicitor General
Jerris Leonard, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
Misc. No. 681, James E. Swann, et al., v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, et al.
Gentlemen:
Enclosed is certified copy of the order of this
Court filed August 17, 1970, denying the application for
a stay of the District Court's order directing desegregation.
Sincerely yours,
SAMUEL W. PHILLIPS, CLERK
g8/ Carol R. Lemon
By
Carol R. Lemon,
Chief Deputy Clerk.
CRL/mpj
Enclosure:
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS E I [ = D
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT EE
AUG 1 | 14/0) JW
MISC. No. 681.
SAMUEL W. PHILLIPS
CLERK
JAMES E. SWANN, et al.,
Appellees,
versus
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD
OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Appellants.
ORDER
Counsel for the School Board have submitted to me
an application for a stay of the August 3, 1970 order of the
United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina. I decline the application, because I find myself
without power to consider its merits.
On May 26, 1970, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit vacated a previous order of the District Court and
remanded the case to that Court for further proceedings. On
June 29, 1970, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
to the Court of Appeals, expressing approval of the judgment of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it remanded the case for further
See ott ues in the District Court, and specifically authorized
the forener proceedings in the District Court. The Court of
Appeals' vacation of the District Court's order, however, was,
itself, vacated by the Supreme Court, and the District Court's
order reinstated, to remain in effect pending the authorized
proceedings in the District Court.
It is thus apparent that the case is now pending in
the Supreme Court of the United States and that further
proceedings in the lower courts are appropriate only to the
extent that they have been authorized by the Supreme Court.
Cf. Hermann v. Brownell, 9 Cir., 274 F.2d 842. The Supreme
Court has authorized such proceedings in the District Court,
but not in the Court of Appeals.
I requested the lawyers for the parties to submit
to me memoranda expressing their views on my authority to act.
Those memoranda were received by me this morning, and have been
considered. They express differing views of my authority.
The lawyers for the School Board find in the Supreme
Court's authorization of further proceedings in the District
Court an implicit authorization of further proceedings in the
Court of Appeals. This they attempt to support by reference
to the suggestion of the United States in a brief filed with
the Supreme Court as Amicus Curiae in response to the plaintiffs’
petition for a writ of certiorari. Earlier in that brief the
United States had expressed the view that the case was not
ripe for full review in the Supreme Court, and that, while
expressing general agreement with the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, it was thought that general review in the Supreme
Cotirt should await the contemplated filing of additional plans
and further proceedings in the District Court and, possibly,
in the Court of Appeals. Its ultimate suggestion was that
the Supreme Court grant the writ of certiorari, that the Court
of Appeals' authorization of further proceedings in the
District Court be lef: undisturbed, but that the District
Court's prior judgment be left in effect pending further
proceedings in the District Court. That ultimate suggestion
was substantially what the Supreme Court did, but I cannot
read the Government's suggestion as impliedly contemplating
further proceedings in the Court of Appeals any more than I
can find such authorization implicit in the Supreme Court's
order. The earlier reference in the Government's brief to the
possibility of further proceedings in the Court of Appeals
simply was not carried forward in the Government's final
suggestion or in the Supreme Court's order.
It would be most unbecoming for the Court of Appeals
to undertake a review of the District Court's order of
August 3, 1970 under the standards enunciated in the opinion
of the Court of Appeals of May 26, 1970, when the Supreme Court
clearly has vacated that judgment to the extent that it enunciates
such standards and directed the reinstatement of the District
Court's earlier order, subject to such modifications as might
be made by the District Court after further hearings. If the
Supreme Court had intended subsequent orders of the District
Court to be generally reviewable in the Court of Appeals, it
seems to me that such proceedings would have been expressly
Shbrized by the Supreme Court just as it expressly authorized
fopiher proceedings in the District Court.
When the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari,
it foreclosed all further proceedings in the lower courts,
except to the extent the Supreme Court has authorized such
proceedings. Such authorization usually is explicit; it ought
not be lightly inferred.
For such reasons, I conclude that I have no authority
to entertain the application for a stay, and I think it would
serve no useful purpose, as an alternative, to attempt to
convene the Court of Appeals for an expedited review of the
District Court's order of August 3, 1970.
In the interest of time I am acting upon the applica-
tion alone without a formal submission of the application to
a panel of the Court of Appeals. Informally, however, I have
consulted with my brothers Winter and Butzner, who, without
having had an opportunity to see the papers, on the basis of
my statement to them of the problem, have authorized me to say
that they are in agreement with my view.
IT IS NOW, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the application
for a stay of the order of the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina of August 3, 1970
be, and it hereby is, denied.
A Vi Ye: ui / 2 AALS ud
Chief Judge, Font] Circuit
August 17, 1970
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