Miller v. Johnson Motion to Affirm
Public Court Documents
December 23, 1994
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Miller v. Johnson Motion to Affirm, 1994. bbb211ac-bd9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/a844663c-88fa-4ee7-b23d-3b9d4f268fe3/miller-v-johnson-motion-to-affirm. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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Nos. 94-631,94-797,94-029
In T he
Ihqiremr (Emtrt rtf tfy? HUnxtrb States
October T erm , 1994
Zell M iller , in his official capacity
as Governor, State of Georgia, et al.,
Appellants,versus
D avida J ohnson, et a l ,
and Appellees,
United States of A merica and
L ucious Abrams, Jr ., et al,
A ppellant-Intervenors.
On Appeal from a Three Judge Panel
of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
MOTION TO AFFIRM
A. Lee Parks
Counsel of Record
Larry H. Chesin
Kirwan, Goger, Chesin
& Parks, P.C.
75 Fourteenth Street
2600 The Grand
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
(404) 873-8000
Attorneys for
Movants-Appellees
W i l s o n E p e s P r i n t i n g C o . , In c . - 7 8 9 -0 0 9 6 - W a s h i n g t o n , D , C . 2 0 0 0 1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether the District Court’s finding of a racial
gerrymander is reviewed under the clearly erro
neous standard?
II. Whether the decision below presents any substan
tive departure from the holding of Shaw v. Reno
which defined the constitutional limits the Four
teenth Amendment places on race based reappor
tionment legislation?
III. Whether Georgia’s admission that racial gerry
mandering occurred as a direct consequence of the
Justice Department’s demand Georgia maximize
black voting strength without due regard for tradi
tional districting principles mandates summary
affirmance of the decision below?
IV. Whether the absence of any legal obligation under
the Voting Rights Act to maximize black voting
strength in derogation of Georgia’s traditional dis
tricting principles pretermits any contention that a
compelling interest was furthered by this race based
district?
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................... v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................... 2
ARGUMENT................... .................................................. 6
I. THE DISTRICT COURT’S CONCLUSION
THAT RACIAL GERRYMANDERING RE
SULTED IN A BIZARRELY CONFIGURED
DISTRICT IS REVIEWED UNDER THE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS STANDARD........ 6
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHAW v. RENO,
THAT GEORGIA’S LEGISLATION CREAT
ING THE ELEVENTH CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICT VIOLATED THE PLAINTIFFS’
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION.................. 8
III. GEORGIA’S UNPRECEDENTED AND EX
TREME DEPARTURE FROM ITS TRADI
TIONAL DISTRICTING PRINCIPLES FOR
PURELY RACIAL REASONS IS SUBJECT
TO STRICT SCRUTINY..................................... 18
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT CAN NOT CONSTITUTE A COMPEL
LING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN
THIS CASE SINCE THE STATE AFFIRMA
TIVELY DISAVOWED THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT AS ITS RATIONALE FOR THE REDIS
TRICTING LEGISLATION.................. ............ 15
A. A Congressional District Which Is Bizarrely
Configured And Is Overly Safe From The
Vantage Point Of Assuring The Election Of
A Black Representative, Is Not Narrowly
Tailored To Further A Compelling Govern
mental Interest ................................................ 16
(iii)
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
V. GEORGIA DOES NOT HAVE A COMPEL
LING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF
MINORITIES........................ 18
VI. THE ABRAMS INTERVENORS SHOULD
NOT BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE
IN ANY PLENARY REVIEW OF THIS
CASE................................................................... 21
CONCLUSION........................................ 24
APPENDIX
Population Density Map ....................... .................. App. 1
Race Map of Chatham County................................... App. 2
Race Map of Effingham County ....... .......... ....... . App. 3
Race Map of Richmond County .............. ......... ........ . App. 4
Race Map of DeKalb County............................. ........ App. 5
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S.
564, 105 S. Ct, 1504, 84 L.Ed. 518 (1985)).......... 7
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 109 S. Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989)----- 19
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 100
S. Ct. 1548, 64 L.Ed.2d (1980) ........................... 6
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 80 S. Ct. 669
(1960) ....................... ............................................- 8
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994) ....17,18, 23
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750
(1978)_____ _____ ___ - ........................- ............ 19
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362
(1964) ......................... - .............................- ......... 2
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S. Ct. 3272,
73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982) .... ................................... 6
Shaw v. Hunt, 1994 WL 457269 (E.D.N.C. Au
gust 1, 1994, as amended August 22, 1994 ......... 14
Shaw v. Reno,----- - U.S. —-— 113 S. Ct. 2816, 125
L.Ed.2d 511 (1993).................... passim
Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 478 U.S. 30, 92
L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) ................................ 6,15,20
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 68 S. Ct. 524, 92 L.Ed.2d 746 (1948).. 7
White v. Regester, 412 U.S., 755, 93 S. Ct. 2332,
37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973)........................................... 6
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 603
(1964)............................................. -............. -......... 18
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129
(1969) .... 7
CONSTITUTIONS
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1....... ....................—-....... passim
STATUTES
Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2 and 5 ............... ......... passim
RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 2 (a )....
Supr. Court Rule 18.6
2
1
In The
i ’uprTmF (tart 0! ttjr Imtrb
October T erm , 1994
Nos. 94-631, 94-797, 94-929
Zell M iller , in his official capacity
as Governor, State of Georgia, et ah,
Appellants,versus
Davida J ohnson, et ah,
and Appellees,
U nited States of A merica and
L ucious A brams, Jr ., et al.,
A ppellant-Intervenors.
On Appeal from a Three Judge Panel
of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
MOTION TO AFFIRM
Pursuant to Rule 18.6, Appellees move this Court to
affirm the Order and judgment of the three judge panel
in this matter. Affirmance is appropriate in light of the
State’s own candid acknowledgement that it was forced
to enact a black vote maximization plan, concocted by
the American Civil Liberties Union and imposed on
Georgia by the Department of Justice which employed
racial gerrymandering as its modus operandi.
The issues upon which this case turns are fact intensive.
The District Court correctly concluded that the Eleventh
2
District’s shape was highly irregular—bizarre in the par
lance of these cases—due to racial gerrymandering. The
facts on which this pivotal finding is based are ex
haustively cataloged in the majority opinion. Given the
deference due those findings by this Court, affirmance
is warranted without further argument under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
With the completion of the 1990 census, states were
obligated to reapportion their Congressional districts to
bring them into conformity with the one man-one vote
ruling of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 555 (1964). Prior
to the 1990 census, Georgia had ten (10) districts. Its
increased population entitled it to one additional seat.
(J.S. App. 5)
Since the 1980 census, there had been a quantum
leap in the technology of computer software available to
assist states in the reapportionment process. Racial data
for each census block (100 or less people) became the
building blocks employed to fashion districts with a racial
rather than geographical focus. (J.S. App. 12, n.6)
This case is ultimately between the State of Georgia
and the plaintiff citizens and voters of Georgia who ob
jected to the State’s decision to racially gerrymander the
boundaries of the Eleventh District. And the State does
not dispute any of the salient facts presented by Plain
tiffs which the District Court found to be true in connec
tion with the enactment of the reapportionment plan.
Miller, et al. Jurisdictional Statement [hereinafter Miller
J.S.] at p. 2. Those facts include the following:
(1) The District Court found Georgia was forced to
engage in racial gerrymandering by the Department of
Justice [hereinafter referred to as the DOJ] to maximize
the Black population in the Eleventh District. Georgia is
3
a state still under the jurisdiction of the DOJ for purposes
of reapportionment. The race based legislation the State
adopted was the DOJ’s quid pro quo for preclearance
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act [hereinafter,
the VRA]. (J.S. App. 26-27) It resulted in a district
that was unprecedented in Georgia’s history in terms of
its shape. The plan surgically segregated every major
population center south of Atlanta in order to maximize
the inclusion of Blacks and exclusion of whites within the
two new majority minority districts the DOJ required
the State create.
(2) “The amount of evidence of the General Assem
bly’s intent to racially gerrymander the Eleventh District
is overwhelming and practically stipulated to by the par
ties involved.” (J.S. App. 42-43). In its jurisdictional
statement, the State embraces the District Court’s de
scription of the process by which the Eleventh District was
created as “a search for [minority voting] maximization
by the crudest means, the pursuit of ‘maximization of the
black vote, whatever the cost’, and the like.” (Miller J.S.,
p. 3 quoting from the Opinion at App. 27, 11-12, n.4 28).
(3) During the 1990 reapportionment process, the
DOJ, in concert with the ACLU, pursued a policy of
minority vote maximization throughout the South. (J.S.
App. 11). Majority minority districts called “Max-Black”
plans were created by the ACLU, ostensibly for their
clients, then state legislators Cynthia McKinney and San
ford Bishop. Both were subsequently elected to Con
gress to represent the very Max-Black districts they
worked with the ACLU and DOJ to create. (J.S. App.
13 n.7).
(4) There was no evidence of any intent to discrimi
nate against minorities uncovered at any time during the
reapportionment process. (J.S. App. 13). Regardless of
that fact, the DOJ adopted the ACLU’s Max-Black ra
cial population quotas as the benchmarks for the three
majority minority districts the DOJ required Georgia to
4
create. Those percentages could not be attained without
resort to gerrymandering. As stated by the District Court:
“. . . [T]he slow convergence of size and shape between
the Max-Black plan and the plan the DOJ finally
precleared, bespeak a direct link between the Max-
Black plan formulated by the ACLU and the pre
clearance requirements imposed by the DOJ.” (J.S.
App. 26).
(5) The DOJ summarily rejected the first two plans
passed by Georgia’s legislature. (J.S. App. 13). In the
second rejection letter, the DOJ “suggested” the shape
the Eleventh District needed to take to meet the 65%
black population quota the ACLU had convinced the
DOJ was “possible” for the Eleventh even without the
Black population in Macon which was needed for the
other new Black Max district the DOJ wanted to create.
The only way to do that, according to the ACLU,
was for the Eleventh, anchored in Atlanta, to find a way
to get to Savannah. (J.S. App. 15-20) Georgia’s Attorney
General complained, to no avail, that the proposed con
figuration of the Eleventh District being advocated by
the DOJ/ACLU as violative “. . . of all reasonable stand
ards of compactness and contiguity.” (J.S. App. 19)
The DOJ was unmoved. Traditional districting principles
were then subordinated on a wholesale basis to further
the black maximization policies of the DOJ/ACLU by
drawing boundaries that specifically included Blacks and
excluded whites. Ms. Wilde, the ACLU attorney and
acknowledged architect of the gerrymandered District in
issue, was not apologetic: “That is how you draw a
majority black district.” (J.S. App. 20).
(6) The State, acting through its Director of the State
Reapportionment office, drew the Eleventh “as close as
she could to copying the Max-Black percentages. She was
prevented from exact duplication by the need to construct
eight other districts . . . .” (J.S. App. 22).1
1 The DOJ/ACLU team did not even bother with requiring the
Max-Black plan to be presented as a state-wide plan. The ACLU
5
(7) The twin forces that led to the racial gerrymander
in issue were the ACLU’s advocacy of a black vote maxi
mization policy and the DOJ’s misguided reading of the
VRA as obligating states to maximize black voting
strength wherever possible without regard to the resulting
aberrations in the shape and size of the district and the
fact states were forced to segregate voters on the basis
of their race. This de facto delegation of authority by
the DOJ to the ACLU was found by the District Court
to be an “embarassment.” (J.S.App. 26-27).
The dissenting judge adopted a “shape over substance”
approach to Shaw. In so doing, the dissent would turn
a deaf ear and blind eye to the machinations of the
ACLU and the DOJ’s abuse of its authority under the
VRA. The dissent believed the existence of a racial
gerrymander turned on the subjective opinion of the fact
finder as to the geometric shape of the District, independ
ent of where the people are concentrated and whether they
were intentionally racially segregated by this district’s
boundaries. With all due respect, the courts cannot hope
to offer the kind of continuity we expect of our juris
prudence if the standard is, essentially, a visceral one that
will vary from judge to judge and be materially impacted
by subjective perceptions that, in the end, are highly
personal spatial observations unrelated to any objective
standard.
just drew the Max-Black districts, and left the State to work out
the rest as best it could.
6
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT’S CONCLUSION THAT
RACIAL GERRYMANDERING RESULTED IN A
BIZARRELY CONFIGURED DISTRICT IS RE
VIEWED UNDER THE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
STANDARD
This Court has made clear that findings of fact are
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. This is a
strict and longstanding rule. It has been expanded to
include ultimate findings in Voting Rights Act cases. See
Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 478 U.S. 30, 92
L.Ed.2d 25 (1986).
The standard is especially applicable in these types of
cases because of the importance of local factors and
geography in assessing whether a gerrymander has in
fected a districting plan. By analogy, this Court has
repeatedly held that the ultimate question of vote dilu
tion under the VRA is a finding subject to review under
the clearly erroneous standard:
“. . . [Ojur several precedents . . . have treated the
ultimate finding of vote dilution as a question of
fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Rule
52(a).” See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at
622-627; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 183, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1564 . . . (1980);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S., at 765, 770, 93 S.Ct.
at 2339, 2341.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S.Ct.
at 2780.
This same reasoning must apply to the presence of a
racial gerrymander because the rationale for the deference
—the importance of local factors—is equally applicable
in both types of cases. As the Court stated in White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. at 769-770, 93 S. Ct. at 2341:
“[W]e are not inclined to overturn these findings,
representing as they do a blend of history and an
intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of
the . . . district in the light of past and present
reality, political and otherwise.”
7
The Gingles court concluded:
“Thus, the application of the clearly erroneous stand
ard to ultimate findings of vote dilution preserves
the benefit of the trial court’s particular familiarity
with the indigenous political reality without endan
gering the rule of law.”
106 S. Ct. at 2752.
A case of minority vote maximization via racial gerry
mandering should be decided under the same standard as
a vote dilution case. District courts possess the critical
knowledge and experience of the local jurisdiction in
issue to make the critical factual determinations on which
these cases must turn.
A finding is only clearly erroneous when “although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City
of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct.
1504, 1511 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), (quoting United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
68 S. Ct. 524, 92 L.Ed.2d 746 (1948). Furthermore,
the Court has emphasized that “ ‘[i]n applying the clearly
erroneous standard to the findings of a district court
sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly
have in mind that their function is not to decide factual
issues de novo.’ ” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
N.C., 470 U.S. 573, 105 S. Ct. 1511 (1985), (quoting
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazedtine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 123, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969)).
The District Court brought its considerable local knowl
edge to bear in this case; that is readily evidenced by its
exhaustive opinion. That knowledge is an indispensable
ingredient to any sound judgment as to whether this dis
trict so materially departed from Georgia’s traditional and
historical districting principles for racial reasons that it
must stand the test of strict scrutiny.
8
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SHAW v. RENO, THAT
GEORGIA’S LEGISLATION CREATING THE ELEV
ENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT VIOLATED
THE PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTEC
TION
Perhaps it is the simplicity of Shaw’s teaching that
creates the problem for Appellants. The District Court’s
summary of Shaw leaves little to quarrel about as to the
standard by which racially gerrymandered districts are to
be judged:
“Shaw holds that if a plaintiff shows that racial con
cerns were the overriding consideration for drafting
a redistricting plan, leading to the creation of dra
matically irregular district boundaries, that plan is
unconstitutional, unless it survives constitutional
strict scrutiny.” See Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2826-27.
Contrary to Appellants’ view, Shaw makes clear that
a “highly irregular” boundary line is not the only evidence
that would be probative of the existence of a racial
gerrymander:
“The difficulty of proof, of course, does not mean
that a racial gerrymander, once established should
receive less scrutiny under the Equal Protection
clause than other state legislation classifying citizens
by race. Moreover, it seems clear . . . that proof
sometimes will not be difficult at all. In some excep
tional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly
irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to ‘seg-
regatfe] . . . voters’ on the basis of race, [cit.]
Gomillion [v. Light foot], 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct.
127 . . . so, too, would be a case in which a state
concentrated a dispersed minority population in a
single district by disregarding traditional districting
principles such as compactness, contiguity and re
spect for political subdivisions.” (Emphasis added).
113 S.Ct. at 2826.
9
No one can dispute the fact that the above-emphasized
portion from Shaw fits the Eleventh District like a glove.
While Georgia has persistently contended the gerryman
der that formed the framework for this district was fash
ioned by the ACLU and forced upon it by the DOJ, those
facts hardly absolve the State from ultimate responsibility.
Appellees agree that the Eleventh District does not
represent a voluntary act of the Georgia legislature. The
District Court made voluminous findings in that regard.
No party disputes those facts. Appellees acknowledge the
State argued mightily against legislatively animating the
gerrymandered version of the “Max-Black” plan that is
now the Eleventh District, because of its blatant violation
of Georgia’s traditional districting principles. (J.S. App.
19). The Georgia Attorney General made this written
statement to the DOJ before finally acquiescing to their
demands:
“. . . [T]he extension of the 2nd District into Bibb
County and the corresponding extension of the 11th
District into Chatham County (Savannah), with
all the necessary attendant changes, violate all reason
able standards of compactness and contiguity.” J.S.
App. 19, emphasis added).2
Given that statement, it is not surprising the State’s
proof as to its adherence to traditional districitng prin
ciples was virtually nonexistent. It would be an under
statement to say that the State’s expert witness on com
pactness, Lisa Handley, was not well received by the
Court. In large measure, this was due to the fact the
only way the State could generate any argument at all on
compactness was to invent a compactness test just for
this district.3 The District Court was not fooled:
2 It is difficult to understand how the Attorney General could now
argue to this Court that the district is compact.
s The District Court found that the “. . . test, formulated . . .
specifically for this litigation, constituted the State’s only notable
submission on the subject of compactness.” (J.S. App. 78)
10
“[T]he . . . test is especially useless in analyzing the
Eleventh District while the vast—and sparsely popu
lated—core of the Eleventh accounts for the district’s
favorable score on Dr. Handley’s test, the narrow—
and densely populated—appendages escape notice.
In fact, this test is an excellent means of highlighting
the egregiously manipulated portions of any voting
districts. . . . (J.S.App. 79, emphasis added).
On the issue of compactness, the District Court found:
“[T]he . . . Eleventh District, from a population
based perspective . . ., is not compact for purposes
of Section 2 of the VRA. The population of the
Eleventh are centered around four discrete widely
spread urban centers that have absolutely nothing
to do with each other, and stretch the district hun
dreds of miles across rural counties and narrow
swamp corridors . . . . These communities are so
far apart that the DOJ’s insistence . . . they are “com
pact” renders the term meaningless. The hooks,
tails and protrusions of those counties reveal the
true “shape” of the district. . . .” (J.S. App. 78-79)4 5
Neither the State nor the Intervenors offered any other
witnesses on the question of the district’s shape. At trial,
Plaintiffs offered the population density map attached as
Appendix 1 to underscore the truth about this district. It
is nothing more than four distant population centers,
gerrymandered to make them majority black, stuck to
gether by over 6000 square miles of farmland. Maps
reevaling the gerrymander of DeKalb, Chatham, Rich
mond and Effingham counties are also included in the
Appendix so the Court can get a feel for just how cleanly
a computer can separate the races. (App. 2-5)®
4 The District Court also found there was considerable potential
for voter confusion due to the fact the “. . . erratic lines and split
counties and precincts do not afford voters ready indications of
the district in which they reside.” (J.S. App. 80, fn. 43)
5 These are known as race maps, the most common tool used by
the DOJ/ACLU to fashion the Eleventh. The orange represents an
11
The State freely admitted race drove the district’s crea
tion and that the ACLU’s Max-Black plan was the DOJ’s
litmus test for the district’s racial population percentages.
Given those admissions, the district had no hope of sur
viving strict scrutiny. So, the State opted for an “all or
nothing” defense by arguing first, that the admitted racial
gerrymandering was accomplished without having to draw
boundaries that were as bizarre as what was done in other
Southern states. Second, the State contended the district
was not bizarre because its boundaries track bits and
pieces of state, county, city, precinct and highway lines.
These arguments, if accepted, would allow wholesale
racial gerrymandering to escape constitutional review.
The District Court made short work of these arguments.
It recognized that the way racial gerrymandering is ac
complished at the Congressional level is to contort distant
densely populated urban areas into super majority black
population centers and then connect them. The urban
cities/counties divided for racial purposes must, by defini
tion, be located on the peripheries of the gerrymandered
district. (J.S. App. 22) This is the only way to segregate
a political subdivision’s population racially. Thus, myriad
chards of the circumferences of these divided cities and
counties always become conterminous with district bound
aries. This is the very evidence from which gerrymander
ing is proven.
The State, however, tried to turn this geographical
truism to their advantage. In its view, bits and pieces of
divided city, county lines that blend with the districts
boundaries because of the gerrymandering taking place
could be considered evidence of regularity. Incredibly, the
tables the State hinges its case on are intended to quantify
just such a contention. (Tables 1-2, Miller, J.S., p. 7-8).
Absurd results would follow if the consequences of
racial gerrymandering were accepted as indicia of regu
area that is over 50% Black; yellow is over 60% Black, and blue
is 35-49% Black. Grey is less than 35% Black. See Plaintiff’s trial
exhibits 11; 18-20.
12
larity. Just two examples should suffice. The State con
tends adherence here and there to State boundaries is evi
dence of a district’s regularity regardless of the location
of the population centers. A review of the unconstitu
tional Fourth District in Louisiana points out the fallacy
of such a contention. Almost half its boundary is cotermi
nous with the State’s northern boundary. See Miller’s
J.S., App. 109. The district itself, however, hangs from
that border like long icicles off a roof, fingers that grope
for and grab pockets of Blacks, but thin out and elongate
to skirt contiguous population centers that are predomi
nantly white. The State would argue that the Court should
not even inquire as to the reasons for the formation of the
“icicles”, given the regularity of the roof line.
For a second example, consider the thin land bridge
that runs through Effingham and Chatham County to
reach the black neighborhoods of Savannah. (App. 3-4)
Its purpose was to get Black people in Savannah into the
Eleventh while maintaining technical contiguity with the
rest of the district. This land bridge has, as its eastern
border, the state line of Georgia and its coast. It has such
a boundary, not because of any desire to follow a state
line, but to avoid the predominantly white population in
Effingham County by running the district to Savannah
partially through a swamp. (J.S. App. 42-43) Should
this racial motive be immune from strict scrutiny merely
because a state line that runs through a swamp came into
play? 8 If ever an argument could be said to put form
over substance, the Appellants have done it.
The District Court correctly refused to ignore the
reason for the unprecedented division of cities and coun- 6
6 Likewise, pieces of the boundaries of DeKalb, Richmond,
Chatham, Wilkes and Baldwin counties that matched the ultimate
boundaries of the Eleventh are touted by the State as proof of the
district’s regularity while, in the same sentence, it freely admits
these counties were torn apart solely to further the segregationist
motives of the district architects.
13
ties required to create the DOJ mandated majority minor
ity districts.7 The majority firmly grasped the fact that the
mechanistic interpretation of Shaw urged by the State
would create a gaping loophole in the fabric of our Con
stitution through which all fashions of admitted racial
gerrymanders would escape strict scrutiny. It did not per
mit this attempted end run around the Equal Protection
Clause.
III. GEORGIA’S UNPRECEDENTED AND EXTREME
DEPARTURE FROM ITS TRADITIONAL DIS
TRICTING PRINCIPLES FOR PURELY RACIAL
REASONS IS SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY
There is nothing new about this Court’s view that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of legisla
tion that incorporates racial classifications. The State’s
“shape only” argument is borne of the fact it cannot allow
an analysis under the strict scrutiny test due to its ac
knowledgement that the District is based on a “black max”
plan—the converse of the “narrow tailoring” required for
the use of racial classifications in legislation. The District
Court made short work of the State’s contention that
shape, and shape alone, must be the evidence from which
a finding of gerrymandering is based:
“Defendants argued . . . that evidence of the legis
lature’s intent to gerrymander must be inferred from
the shape of the . . . District itself, and not from
direct testimony of those involved in the process.
This view finds little support in Shaw v. Reno. The
purpose of scrutinizing a district’s shape is to glean
the intent of the legislature by working backwards.
If the district appears uninfluenced by accepted dis
tricting principles . . . it must have been influenced
7 The District Court also rejected the State’s contention that ad
herence in some spots (the gerrymandered areas) to precinct lines
was evidence of regularity. The State’s own Director of Reappor
tionment Services testified that the use of such lines as racially
motivated. (J.S. App. 46)
14
by unaccepted ones. The Supreme Court explicitly
approved this inferential approach because legisla
tive intent is notoriously difficult—if not logically
impossible—to ascertain . . . . What the Supreme
Court did not do in imbue geography with constitu
tional significance; the requirement for a successful
Equal Protection claim is still intent, however
proved. Foreclosing production of direct evidence
of intent until Plaintiffs convince the Court that a
district looks so weird that race must have dominated
its creation is not what Shaw intended. [Defendants’]
approach would make district shape a (previously
unheard of) threshold to constitutional claims.”
(J.S. App. 42, emphasis added).
In taking up the State’s banner, the dissent has chosen
a path no subsequent court could hope to follow. There
can be no universal standard by which shape, and shape
alone, can govern the ability of citizens to seek relief from
the disenfranchising and discriminatory effects of a racial
gerrymander. Each case is unique to the locale where it
arose. No one would ever suggest for a minute that Black
voters would be so limited that motive and intent could
be ignored in determining whether a gerrymander existed.
That is racism in its purest form and has no place in the
equal protection jurisprudence of this Court.
Of all the three judge courts that have dealt with issue
of racial gerrymandering and construed the standards es
tablished in Shaw v. Reno for constitutional review of an
alleged gerrymander, no court has agreed with the State’s
position. Even in Shaw v. Hunt, where the District Court
rejected the Plaintiffs’ claims in a 2-1 decision, the major
ity refused to adopt such an extremely narrow view of
Shaw. Once that contention is rejected, the State has no
further defenses to offer.
Lest we lose right of it in the smoke and fire of the
racial politics that drove the creation of this district, it is
important to remember that the primary purposes of re
apportionment is to equalize the voting districts’ popula
15
tion so to comply with the constitutional mandate of one
man-one vote. Each state has its own districting tradi
tions, its own history of reapportionment. When those dis
tricting traditions are ignored, when districts are drawn
that twist and turn due solely to the need to meet racial
percentages, the district must stand the test of scrutiny.
That is the only way to insure white voters are not either
being discriminated against, or, if they are, to insure the
State is furthering a compelling state interest in a manner
narrowly tailored to further that interest.
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
CAN NOT CONSTITUTE A COMPELLING GOV
ERNMENTAL INTEREST IN THIS CASE SINCE
THE STATE AFFIRMATIVELY DISAVOWED THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AS ITS RATIONALE FOR
THE REDISTRICTING LEGISLATION
Unlike the other Southern states defending DOJ man
dated gerrymanders, Georgia did not (because it could
not) argue compliance with the Voting Rights Act as a
compelling state interest to justify this district. It was
wise not to. No court would ever hold the failure to
combine the distant urban centers, skeletonized of their
white citizenry by the computer driven gerrymandering
techniques of the ACLU, would violate Section 2 of the
VRA. The DOJ could never have met the test for vote
dilution laid down by this Court in Gingles, supra. The
District Court so found. (J.S. App. 78-80)
It is not surprising then that the DOJ urged this Court
to great plenary review in the Louisiana case8 and hold
the case at bar. In its jurisdictional statement, the DOJ
carefully skirted the huge problem created by Georgia’s
recognition that compliance with the Voting Rights Act
cannot serve as a compelling state interest to justify the
race based districting that took form as the Eleventh Dis
8 United States v. Hayes, Docket No. 94-558.
16
trict. Note the language the DOJ chose to describe the
dilemma:
“The first question in both [Hayes and this case]
would be whether the State’s asserted interests in
drawing an additional majority minority district
were sufficiently compelling . . . . In both cases,
the primary interests that could be asserted were
the need to comply with Section 2 and . . . Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act . . . (p. 16, emphasis
added).
The key words are “could be asserted.” In this case, it
was not so asserted.
Georgia has gone to great lengths to disavow any cor
relation between the State’s acquiescence on the preclear
ance demands of the DOJ and any perception on the part
of Georgia that the failure to draw such a gerrymandered
district would violate either Section 2 or 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. Georgia had this to say about its preclear
ance experience and what the DOJ believed the Act
required of a state:
“. . . [I]n [the DOJ’s] view . . . anything can be
done in the name of minority voting opportuni
ties. . . . [I]n the interveners’ view . . . ‘race
trumps all else’.” (Miller, J.S., p. 15).
A. A Congressional District Which Is Bizarrely Con
figured And Is Overly Safe From The Vantage
Point Of Assuring The Election Of A Black Repre
sentative, Is Not Narrowly Tailored To Further A
Compelling Governmental Interest
Georgia affirmatively opposed the DOJ’s contention
that the district’s gerrymandered boundaries were com
pelled by the VRA to remedy racially polarized voting.
And Georgia also demonstrated, via expert testimony, that
even assuming a compelling state interest existed in the
VRA, the district was far from being narrowly tailored.
Georgia stood firmly with the plaintiffs on that issue at
17
trial and the District Court agreed. (J.S. App. at pp. 86-
87.)9 Based on testimony offered by the State’s expert
witness, the Court found that Black candidates would
have “. . . an equal chance of being elected in a district
containing 45-50% black registered voters.” (J.S. App.
p. 88) The Eleventh District is overly safe with 57%
Black registered voters which gives the Black candidate
a 73% probability of winning. Obviously, an assessment
using the district’s Black voting age population (61% ),
the standard used by this Court in Johnson v. DeGrandy,
114 S. Ct. 2752 (1994), “. . . would yield an even
higher probability.” J.S. App. 88).
The District Court therefore had little problem finding
that, even assuming the YRA provided a compelling state
interest to engage in remedial districting, the district was
not narrowly tailored. Georgia thus found itself vindi
cated on the one hand, but devoid of any constitutional
basis upon which to justify the race based districting that
resulted from Georgia’s acquiescence to the DOJ/ACLU
ultimatum to “maximize” Black voting strength, regard
less of the bizarre shape of the resulting district, or be
denied clearance under the VRA.
The consequences of the DOJ’s Section 5 review of
the Georgia Congressional plan, if left to stand, would
have cataclysmic effects on the democratic form of gov
ernment we are guaranteed by our Constitution. In the
Eleventh District, regional representation has been sup
planted by racial representation. To tinker with such
a fundamental aspect of our democracy would be un
thinkable but for the fact its proponents advance their
claim under the banner of “equal opportunity”. The road
to a color blind society is surely not followed by method- 9
9 The District Court correctly observed that . . the State . . .
retained Dr. Katz for the unusual purpose of undermining the
testimony of both Intervenor United States’ expert . . . and
Plaintiffs’ expei't. He was largely successful.” (J.S. App. 86)
18
ical segregation of the races into separate voting districts.
The Constitution must remain unsullied in its pristine
guarantee of equal protection if we are not to regress
into a country of racial and ethnic enclaves. This Court
has made this point time and time again. See e.g., Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 53-58, 84 S. Ct. 603 (1964).
The District Court correctly implemented that message
in this case. (J.S. App. 32, n.17)
V. GEORGIA CANNOT HAVE A COMPELLING GOV
ERNMENTAL INTEREST IN PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES
This case was foreshadowed in Justice Kennedy’s con
curring opinion last term in Johnson v. DcGrandy, 114
S. Ct. 2647, 2666 (1994).
“Operating under the constraints of a statutory re
gime in which proportionality has some relevance,
States might consider it lawful and proper to act with
the explicit goal of creating a proportional number of
majority-minority districts in an effort to avoid Sec
tion 2 litigation. . . . The Department of Justice
might require (in effect) the same as a condition
to granting preclearance under Section 5 of the
Act. . . . Those governmental actions, in my view,
tend to entrench the very practices and stereotypes
the Equal Protection Clause its set against, [cit.]
As a general matter, the sorting of persons with
any interest to divide by reason of race presents
the most serious constitutional questions.” Opinion
at pp. 20-22.
Justice Kennedy’s fears became reality in Georgia.
After the DeGrandy decision was handed down, the
State announced that its alleged interest in “proportion
ality” would, standing alone, satisfy the troublesome need
for a compelling state interest. (J.S. App. 51) This novel
contention, borne of a most tortured reading of the
Court’s DeGrandy opinion, was juxtaposed against the
19
explicit disavowel in the VRA of any requirement of pro
portional representation and summarily dismissed by the
District Court. (J.S. App. 53-54)
The State argues that the end (rough proportional
ity) somehow justifies the means (segregation via gerry
mander). The District Court characterized the State’s
argument as tautological, holding proportionality standing
alone, can never be a compelling state interest. (J.S. App.
53) To require proportionality is to sanction racial quotas.
The constitution forbids it, and the Voting Rights Act
specifically disavows it. To accept the State’s claim that
proportionality, in these circumstances, does not function
as a racial quota, would require this Court to ignore the
overwhelming and largely undisputed evidence to the con
trary detailed in the District Court’s opinion regarding
the origins of the Georgia plan. To evaluate proportional
ity to such a level would require reversal of a long line
of precedent that prohibits employment of racial quotas
by governments, from admissions policies for professional
schools, to public sector affirmative action plans and the
awarding of public contracts. See e.g., City of Richmond
v. /. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706, 102
L. Ed. 2d 854 (1989) (plurality opinion); Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct.
2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978).
The evidence was overwhelming on the issue. The
Eleventh District’s boundaries were drawn specifically to
maximize the number of minority controlled districts and
to meet “Black-Max” racial population quotas. Not even
Appellants contend that the district’s bizarre shape was
an incidental and natural development during reappor
tionment. The number of majority minority districts in
the plan suddenly became proportionate to the percentage
of black people living in the State only because the DOJ
decreed it be so over the State’s strident objection. The
State’s eleventh hour attempt to reply on proportionality
20
is an attempted revision borne out of advocacy rather than
history.
If there were sufficiently large, concentrated and com
pact minority populations capable of supporting the cre
ation of three minority controlled districts, Section 2 of
the VRA would have provided the mandate for their
creation. See Gingles, supra. That was not the case
here, the District Court finding “. . . the district does not
satisfy the Gingles preconditions . . .”. J.S. App. 88)
Were it otherwise, there would be no need for any dis
cussion of proportionality in the context of what com
pelling state interest could justify the race based district
ing under challenge. The State correctly conceded it did
not possess the kinds of contiguous and concentrated
minority populations sufficient to justify, or even mandate,
the creation of three minority districts under the Gingles
standard. With this concession, the VRA falls away as
substantiation for the blatant dominance of race as the
creative force behind the Eleventh District.
The State acknowledged there is no legal obligation or
authority under the VRA to excise the black people out
of DeKalb County and link them by various land bridges
to distant black populations excised out of coastal Savan
nah. In fact, the State stipulated Savannah would not
have been included in the District but for the need to
increase the Black population of the District. (J.S. App.
48-49)10 The ideal of proportionality can never justify
a State’s creation of voting districts based on race with
quota like black population percentages imposed by the
DOJ/ACLU. This Court must leave this social debate
without arming proponents of proportionality with con
10 Incredibly, the line drawing in Chatham County (Savannah)
excised a 80,000 plus population for inclusion in the Eleventh that
was 84% Black from a general population that was 62% white.
See Race Map of Chatham County at App. 2.
stitutional authority to gerrymander. Given the standard
of review applicable to this case, this Court must accept
the District Court’s findings on this issue and affirm the
decision below.
VI. THE ABRAMS INTERVENORS SHOULD NOT BE
PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY PLENARY
REVIEW OF THIS CASE
From the onset, this litigation has been slowed and
unduly complicated by the presence of the Intervenors.11
That sentiment is borne out by a review of the ACLU’s
jurisdictional statement. Their contentions at trial and
on appeal are wholly duplicative of the DOJs position.
The ACLU intervenors present no credible arguments or
contentions not adequately advanced either by Georgia
or the Justice Department.12 Should this Court not sum
marily affirm the judgment below, they are not a neces
sary party to any plenary review of this case. For this
reason, the six (6) issues they urge the Court to consider
are dealt with summarily below:
1. Plaintiffs lack of standing: The three judge Court
characterized the lack of standing argument as frivolous.
(Order of June 14, 1994). Shaw specifically states that
nothing in the law precludes “white voters (or voters of
any race) from bringing a . . . claim that a reappor
tionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate
voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient jus
tification.” 113 S. Ct. at 2824, 2830. No Court has
11 During the trial of this case, the Court expressed constant
displeasure over the role Intervenors sought to play in the presenta
tion of the evidence. The Court’s frustration reached the point
where Judge Edenfield observed that, in retrospect, granting the
Intervenors party status was a mistake.
1:2 All DOJ/ACLU evidence at trial was presented jointly. The
ACLU offered no independent expert testimony.
22
since questioned Shaw’s holding that voters having stand
ing to challenge racially gerrymandered districts. The
argument is not worthy of further discussion; perhaps
that is why the ACLU Interveners only offered two sen
tences on the subject.
2. The District is not bizarre: The Court below found
the district’s boundaries to be bizarre as that term is de
fined in Shaw. The standard of review of such fact finding
makes it unworthy of plenary review. The ACLU inter-
venors offered no independent evidence as to the appear
ance of the district. Instead, they focused their presenta
tion on the proposition, which no court has accepted to
date, that being Black, in and of itself, creates a racial
community of interest that transcends geography and le
gitimizes majority minority districts, no matter how
bizarre their shape. Again, the argument is not a serious
one given the Court’s holding in Shaw.
3. Racial Community of Interest As Compelling State
Interest: As noted above, the question is not substantial.
The racial community of interest argument advanced by
these intervenors would effectively overrule Shaw. The
consolidation of Black voters into their own districts so
to maximize their voting strength, regardless of the geo
graphic aberrations required to bring together a “racial”
community of interest, is the political apartheid Shaw
speaks so eloquently against. In the search for an in
tegrated color blind society, the ACLU intervenors advo
cate resurrection of racial enclaves that, at least politi
cally,, will resegregate society. That is precisely what
Shaw was intended to prevent.
4-5. Voting Rights as a Compelling State Interest:
Throughout the case, the State has refused to raise the
VRA as a compelling state interest to justify the bizarre
geography of the Eleventh District. The State put on
expert testimony, accepted by the Court, rebutting In
tervenors’ joint efforts to paint Georgia as suffering from
rampant racially polarized voting that mandated con
23
struction of a remedial district. Intervenors’ frustration
with the State’s rejection of this defense has found a voice
in their decision to vicariously advance compliance with
the VRA as the State’s motive for the district’s con
figuration. The missing link in the logic is, of course,
the State’s refusal to participate in the plan and the incur
able antagonism between the maximization goals that the
district was based on and the narrow tailoring required
under strict scrutiny. The Intervenors are left with the
State’s post hoc rationalization, borne of its misreading
of the DeGrandy decision, that proportionality was its
“true motive”. However, this is not simply a compelling
state interest sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. With that recognition, the
equal protection analysis is at an end.
6. Narrow Tailoring: The issue is mooted from the
State’s vantage point due: (1) to the absence of a com
pelling state interest; and (2) the expert testimony it
offered to rebut the Intervenors’ claim that the 65%
Black population was needed to give minority candidates
an equal opportunity. Intervenors are hard pressed to
contend with any credibility that a plan known as the
“Black Max” is “narrowly tailored”. The District Court
meticulously traced the interrelationship between the ad
vocacy of the ACLU, the positions taken by the DOJ
during the preclearance process of the fact the ACLU’s
Black-Max plan became the blueprint for what is, for
now, the Eleventh District. Maximization is the antithesis
of narrow tailoring. The ACLU is “hoisted on its own
pitard” with respect to this aspect of the strict scrutiny
test.
24
CONCLUSION
This case presents a scenario that is an anathema to a
constitutional democracy. The will of the people, as ex
pressed by their elected representatives, was subverted in
ruthless fashion. And this subversion was accomplished
by no less a force than the United States Department of
Justice, whose conduct the District Court characterized
as nothing less than an “embarrassment.” (J.S. App. 27)
Democracy is a system of government that depends on
an intricate scheme of checks and balances for its viability.
The genius of our democracy is that there is a check to
correct every wrong—even when it is visited upon the
people by the federal agency charged with enforcement of
our constitution and laws. The trial court performed that
function thoroughly and courageously.
This Court has repeatedly acknowledged the extreme
deference due local tribunals in matters of this nature. It
should not stray from that precedent, particularly where
it is not presented with a single issue of first impression
by this case due, in large measure, to the State’s admis
sions and its refusal to rely upon the Voting Rights Act
as justification for the gerrymander. Instead, Georgia has
offered the weak pop fly of proportionality as its reason
for deployment of a racial gerrymander. That is not an
argument worthy of serious consideration.
Racial gerrymanders that torture our most fundamental
right—to vote in elections free of governmental interven
tion on the side of any candidate or any class of candi
dates—are generally not welcome in a democracy. Given
the well supported and largely stipulated findings upon
which the District Court decision is based, coupled with
the deference they are due, summary affirmance is war
ranted.
25
Respectfully submitted,
A. Lee Parks
Counsel of Record
Larry H. Chesin
Kirwan, Goger, Chesin
& Parks, P.C.
75 Fourteenth Street
2600 The Grand
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
(404) 873-8000
Attorneys for
December, 1994 Movants-Appellees
Persons per Acre by Census Block Group
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