Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoenae; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoenae
Public Court Documents
December 14, 1981

Cite this item
-
Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Working Files - Williams. Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoenae; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoenae, 1981. 7bc1e27b-d992-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/b43be161-637d-4233-8c16-5f061e57abdb/brief-in-support-of-defendants-motion-to-quash-subpoenae-plaintiffs-response-to-defendants-motion-to-quash-subpoenae. Accessed May 21, 2025.
Copied!
i' I D I \l IN TIIE UNITED STAT}1S DISTRICT COU]17 THE DASTERN DISTRICT OF NORT}I CAROLII'IA IT-TT ED oEc I 4 BBt No . s r- Qg 36?:fg.F,,??l 1,$;a;usri,.*Yatax+i#{.,2,g FOR RALEIGH DIVISION RALPH GINGLES, Qt. aI., Plainti ffs, v. RUFUS EDMISTEN, etc. , et af. , CI\ITL t'., BRIEF' IN SUPPOP.T OF DEFENDANTS I I{OTION TO QUASH SUBPOFNAE OR IN THE ALTEPNATIVE FOR A PROTECTIYE ORDEF Defendants. INTP.ODUCTION plaintiffs have subpoenaed Nortir Carolina Senators Uelen Marvin l'i' and Marshall pauch for the purpose of taking their depositions on December ;-7, 1981. The prospective deponents, members of- the llorth ' Carolina General Assembly, are not parties to thls action. Defendants contend that the matters about which l4arvin and Rauch rvould be Ssked to give testimony are privileged, hence non-discoverable under Fed. R. Civ. pro. 26 (b) (1) , and that such matters are irrelevant to the action, hence also non-cliscoverable under Fed. F.. civ. Pro. 26 (b) (1). I. TIIE DoC,i.IlINE OF LtrGISLATIVE PRIVTLEGE PREVENTS IIIQI]]RY INTO r,-E-cTsr,rrrrvn neT5-on r-ua-llorffETroN r'6n trosE Acrs . RuIe 26(b) (1) specifically excludes from the scope of otherlise, discoverable material matters which are privileged. The common-law doctrine, variously referred to as legislative privilege or legisla- tive immunity, affords legislators a privilege to refuse to answer any questions concerning legislative acts in anv proceeding outside of the legislature. q"i , 415 F.Supp. L025 (o. Md. 1976). This concept is codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. 5120-9, whicl'r guarantees frecdom of speech and debate in the legislature and in the legislative p.o".=".1 ,.7 lrhe Section reads as follovrs: ,'The members shall havb ^freedom of speech and debate in the General Assembly, and shall not he liabIe to impeachment or guestion, in lny court or place out of the General Assembiy, for vrords therein spoken; and shall be protected except in cases of crime, from all arrest and imprisonment, or attachment of property, during the time of their going to, coming from, or attending the General Assembly. " 'L -2.- North Carolina's statutory provision pararllels the Speech or Debate Clause of the Federal Constitution (art. I, 56), as well. as the statutory and constitutional enactments of most other states. In interpreting the federal constj-tutional version of,,, this doctrine the United Statesupreme Court has written: ,.-i ;" r ,; ...fr4. {t:' .C..' ';: l:{.. '','l't' '. rtL' :1. The reason for the privilege is clear. It r.ras weIl summarized by James Wilson an influential member of the Committee of Detail which rras responsible for the provision in the Pederal Constitution. "In order to enable and encourage a rcpresentative of the public to discharge his public trust r'rith firmness and success, it i.s indispcnsably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and tt'.at he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however porverful, to r'rhom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence." Tenney v. P,roadhove, 341 u.s. 367 (1951) at 372-73 (cltTEions omTffi).- Legisl-ativo privilege has a substantj.ve as weLl as evidentj..ry , , aspect, and both are founded in the ratj-onaIe of legislative integrity and independence, enunciated by the Framers and propounded two centuries later by the SupreriTe Court. The substantive aspec,t ,1.. of the doctrine affords legislators immunity from civil anrl criminal liability arising from legislative proceedinqs. The evidentiary aspect. affords legisLators a privilege to refuse to test,ify about legislative acts in proceedings outside the legislativo halls. United State v. llandel, guprg at 1027. At issue here is the evidentiary facet of the privileqe and, specificalIy, rvhether such a state-afforderl evidentiary privilege should have efficacy in the federal courts. It is clear t,hat the S,:reech or Debate Clause of the f ederal constj-tution vrould preclud.e ., the deposition of a member of Congress in an analogous situatj-on. In Brewster v. United Stat-=s, 408 U.S. 508 (1975), the Court stated, "ft is beyond doubt that the Speech or Debate clause protects against the legislative .a U.S. at 525. . I , -( . rr1..';..I !#'L .'J l; :el !lJ t' l.' inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course ,r, .1 process and into the motivation for those acts.', of 408 ,..t .'l .' *'-1. f .,,lir-'"c N -3- , - / rl,'; 'l':,{.u.'. .,rn].l!., , , ,..|.,' 1.:fi. ,,i' ', 'In. .'. 'L.. Defendants acknowledge that even the privilege granted federal legislators is hounded by countervailinq consideratj-ons, particularJy. 'ix .. the need for every man's evidence in federal criminal prosecutionlf:;!:;'l' As Brewster further states, "the privilege is hroad enough ao irr".,r.::r., .'::. the historic independence of the Legislativc Branch . but narrow,-i. " t.enough to guard against the excesses of those who would corrupt the:.;; process by corrupting its memhers. " 408 U.S. at 525. Defendant,s i.. -, ,1, 'i- motion attempts, however, to conceal no "corruption,'. :' ... 'i .. i'. "I{ith the boundaries of the ferleral legislative privilege in .,,1.i1, mindr w€ turn to the question of the scope of paralle1 state privileges ,'t''whatever their extent and range of applicabllity in state courtr the,,' United States Suprerne Court has ruled that state privileges v,ill r dt , times, yeild to overriding federal interests in federal courts. United States v. Gill_ocl:, IOO S.Ct. 1Ig5 (1980) . The Court has recognized only one federal interest of importance sufficient t,o ': , merit dispensing with this state-granted privilege: , the prosecution of f ederal cri-mes. The Supreme Court has never scluarety addressed the issue presented here: .whether a state legislator's evidentiary privilege remains intact in federar civir proceedj-ngs. rn @, =,rpr",i, the Court ruled that a legislatorrs aybs.lang-ve. immunity from suit,'?:. withstood ah: enactment of 42 U.S.C. 51983, ancl thus state legislators were not susceptible to suit for rrords and acts vrithin the purvievl of the legislative process. Although it deals r+ith the substantive ' . aspect of the privilege, Tenney is instructive, insofar as t,he Court there gave great dcference to the statets own doctrine. Recently, i" llitea stat"s v. (;i}o.E, supra, a criminal case invoLving the ,:evidentiary facet of legislative immunity, the Corrrt cited Tenney forthepropositignthqta11federaIcourtsmustendeavortoaPp1y state legislative privilege. In GiIIock, however, the Court ruled ,'^ - {ri , I \ that the Tennessee Speech or Debate C1ause would not exclude inquiry into the legislatj-ve acts of the aefJndant-legislator prosecuted for a federal criminal offense. Throughout tl'rc Supreme Court's activity in this field no Congress j-onaI for themselves ,, . ,' ].:: .,:1.( - 4--r," +:,' ' :i dr.''1"'J t .:i, '' A. 1.,., ' rrt{:. .il'*-" ,i>''. li r reanportionmen {. . Insofar ,as distinction has been drawn betvreen substantive and evidentiary .. ,i''l" applications of the privilege for the purpose of determining the ,,:: l. .lt _.efficacy of legislative privileqe in federal court. Thus, the i .. \. Court's conclusions in gillgck and Tgnsy must be read togetherr'','l' ,; and tl:eir comhined ef fect dictates that the evidentiary prj.vilege i': 1,. , granted a legislator by his state remains inviolahle except where:,1.:,.,, ,,V,F:i it must yield to the enforcement of federal criminal statutes. ,dre es es'-- ' , ll J' Sce Gillocl: at 1193 ':'t''.'. Un1ess federal criminal prosecution demands othen'rise, "the role of the state legislature is entitled to as much judicial respect as that of Congress . The need for a Congress rahich may ' (- act free of interference by the courts is neithe:: more nor less than the need for an unimpaired state legislature. " Star Distributors, Ltd v. Mari-no, 613 F.2d 4 (1980) at 9. On this fundamental point the Supreme Court has recently said, "To create a system in wlrich the a Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the consti-t,ut,ional design on its head." P"!Z_y:_ gcgqomou, 428 tl.S. 478 (1978) at 504. fn the .present civil action, brought by private citizens of Ilorth CaroIina, Leqislators l{arvin and Rauch are privileged to refuse to testify concernins their legislative acts. Principles of comity. and the decided law strongly suggest that federal courts honor this evidentiary privilege in aIl civil actions II. TI.IE I.IATER]AL SOUGIIT TO BE DISCOVERED IS IRRELEVA}IT. The North Cago1iXa House, Senate, and plans challenged in this litigation speak , r\* ,.. ,'.r,i ' ' .t,., trr.) ,.r,;i,.:,i-r ' lr. ' .''.lt ..i , . '.- -!q;*!rre* the intent of the legisl-ature is in question, the legislative history, i'e., the conteml>oraneous record of dehate .ie. enactment, tulr"a1"t tna "'' '' i. .Iegislative intent. The remarks of any single legislator, even thei,i, ''..., i.i {.i.if,r,sponsor of the bi11, are not controlling in analyzing Iegislative,,,", history. Chrysler Corpo{ation rz. Brown , 441 U.S. 2g1 (tgl9) . ft.til such remarks have any relevance at all precludes that they were made "{: i,,/ l contemporaneously and constitute part of the record. See United l'',,", .;ti$; State v. Gila River pima-ltaricopa_Indian Community, 5gO F.2d 2Og 1.' (ct' cl' 1978). This proposition is adherecl to even more strongly;.' by the appellate courts of North carolina. The North Carolina Supq,emg ' ' '.:.'Court, for example, stated the following in D & w,-.rnc. v. Charlotterlt: 268 N.C. 577 , 581, 151 S.E.2d 24L, 244 (1966) : ". I.,lore than a hundred years ago tl-ris Courtherd that 'no evidence as to the motives of theLegislature can be heard to give operation to t otto take it from, their acts. . Dral<e v. Drake,15 N.c. 110, rr7. The meaning of a sEEEuEe--anilEhe'intention of the legislature which pas.serl it cannotbe shorvn by the testimony of a memher of the legisla_ture, it 'must be drarvn from the construction oi theAct itself .' Goi_ns v. fndian Training School , l-69N.C. 736, 739, B6 s.E.--07g, 0grl '! .: , r'.\ The testimony of Marvj-n and Rauch is of the peneral Assembly and can have no Thus, their depositions are outside the discovery. II] not relevant to the intent,, other discernable relevance. scope of permissible PRESERVATTON OF LEGISLATIVE INDEPENDENCE REQUIRES T}IAT, .SHOI.ILDtTiE pEp osr 1rI6NS-pRoCEED Lr- If the court orders the deposi-tions to procee<l, it is imperative that the transcripts he sealed and opened only upon Court Order. The purpose of legislative privirege is to ,'avoid intrusion by the Executive or the Judiciary into the affaj-rs of a co-equal hranch, and - to protect legislative inrlependence." Gillock at II91. a t .,| It { t - 6-. Legislators must f ee1 f ree to discuss anQ,. ponder the pletfrora,',;ilj'. of economic, social, and political considerations which enter into'Liit, oi}itlY,, legislative decision-making. Pear of subsequent disclosure of arl"lfj'.",' individual legislator's intent or rationale tvouLd chil1 <lebate "rrq;'::.;' destroy independence of thought ancl vote. In this case, sensitivq ;t political considerations might be recklessly exposed by the Plaintiff.'t proposed discovery. To maintain free expression of j.deas vrithin qh"l',,iil: General Assembly, as well as to protect those ideas already freelyiilT 1:. l.: cxpressed therein, a protective order must issue, if the suhrpoenaqjjfi, are not quashed, as theY should be. P.UFUS L. EDI,{ISTEN ATTORNEY GNI'IERAL Jam- Attorney Gene LegaI Affairs rney Generalrs Office . C. Department of Justice Post Office Box 629 P.a1eigh, I.lorth Carolina 27602 Telephone: (919) 733-3377 Norma Harrell Tiare Smiley Assistant A.ttorneYs General John Lassiter Associate AttorneY General Attorneys for Defendants Of Counsel: Jerris Leonard & Associates, P.C 900 17th Street, N.I{. Suite 1020 Washington, D. C. 20006 Q02) 87 2- 109 s 'i)/ :t" 'i,,'t' .,' 'i !:'..,i ,. tl'_'t:,) i, l;:. tr. ,;' \\^ \ I !,, not quashed, as they should be. ,t'X,tffi*-.. Respectfully su):mitted, this L,," /( day of December, 1981. :ffij: