Findings and Recommendations

    ART 
a TRS iy UNITED STATESY. DISTRFET COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF RN 

TOILE 

N 3 
Lev 

HEY a 
op LORET LL § 

BARBARA MAJORS, ET AL Ee) CIVIL ACTION 

VERSUS 
NUMBER: 82-1192 

DAVID C. TREEN, ET AL 
SECTION: C(5) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 
  

This litigation arose as a class action suit instituted by five (5) 

black plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all of those similarly 

situated. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief restraining use 

of the realignment of the State's congressional districts brought about as a 

result of Act 20 of the 1981 first extraordinary session of the Louisiana 

legislature. The basis of plaintiffs' claim for relief was that Act 20 was 

designed and had the effect of cancelling, minimizing or diluting minority 

voting strength by dispersing a black population majority in Orleans Parish 

into two (2) congressional districts. 

On October 18, 1983, judgment was entered by a three (3) judge panel 

composed of United States Circuit Judge Henry Politz and United States 

District Judges Fred J. Cassibry and Robert F. Collins. The court found in 

plaintiffs' favor that Act 20 impermissibly resulted in dilution of minority 

voting strength. Act 20 was declared illegal and unenforceable and the 

defendants were enjoined from taking any action to enforce its provision. 

The court further determined that the Louisiana legislature was to be 

given reasonable opportunity to confect a new plan for the election of members 

to the United States House of Representatives. On February 6, 1984, a hearing 

was conducted to determine if an appropriate remedy had been arrived at by 

  

rng Farry ii JUL 1986 

———  



all the parties. By that time, a proposed remedy had been agreed upon and the 

court ordered that this remedy be presented to the Attorney General of the 

United States for approval. 

At that February 6, 1984 court hearing, it was determined that the three 

(3) judge panel would not be needed for the determination of the attorney fee 

issue. Counsel were ordered to attempt to resolve this matter amicably and to 

submit an affidavit as to time and expenses as a starting point. The parties, 

ultimately being unable to reach a figure that both sides could agree upon as 

attorneys' fees for the handling of this matter, caused plaintiffs' motion for 

an award of attorneys' fees and expenses to be referred to the Magistrate for 

hearing along with Findings and Recommendations. 

The record reflects that six (6) attorneys, only five (5) of whom are 

listed as counsel of record, have submitted affidavits totaling almost 

twenty-six hundred (2600) hours plus expenses incurred in the handling of 

litigation which commenced on March 26, 1982 and culminated on April 5, 1984 

when defendants voluntarily dismissed their motion to appeal to the United 

States Supreme Court. By February 6, 1984, in compliance with the order of 

the three (3) judge panel, the defendants submitted to the court the proposed 

remedy in the above captioned matter, namely Act 2 of the second extraordinary 

session of the 1983 Louisiana legislature. From that point forward, the only 

litigation which has occurred in the above captioned matter pertains to the 

issue of attorneys' fees. For the approximate twenty-six hundred (2600) hours 

of legal work which counsel has invested in this litigation, they seek 

approximately Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand ($750,000.00) Dollars in legal 

fees. This figure is in stark contrast to a sum of approximately Eighty 

Thousand and no/100 ($80,000.00) Dollars which was paid to counsel for the  



PAGE 3 

defendants, Martin L.C. Feldman, in both fees and cost reimbursement. (See 

plaintiff's Exh. 29 and 30). 

The court rejects the fee claim by the plaintiffs’ attorneys as 

excessive. Such an award would be inequitable and burdensome to the tax 

payers of the State of Louisiana as well as an unwarranted windfall to counsel 

for the plaintiffs herein. Bolden v. City of Mobile, United States District 
  

Court, Southern District of Alabama, Civil Action No. 75-297-P. 

Congress has provided that attorneys' fees and costs will be awarded to 

prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases unless special circumstances would 

render an award unjust. 42 U.S.C. §1973(1)(e), 1988. In determining what 

constitutes the reasonableness of fees and expenses, the court must apply the 

factors articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th 
  

Cir. 1974). Johnson applies what is known as the lodestar method and then 

adjusts this figure upward or downward on the basis of ten (10) other factors 

enunciated therein. The lodestar figure is obtained by détermining the number 

of hours reasonably spent on the case by plaintiffs’ attorneys and a 

reasonable hourly rate for those services. These two (2) factors are then 

multiplied to arrive at the lodestar amount. This approach has consistently 

been approved by the Fifth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court as 

well. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 
  

(1983); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575 {5th Cir. 
  

1980). 

To begin the Johnson analysis, it will therefore be necessary to first 

articulate the fees and expenses sought by counsel for plaintiffs herein. The 

court will differentiate the fees and expenses sought in connection with the 

handling of the principal litigation as opposed to those sought in connection  



PAGE 4 

with the handling of this motion for attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs' claim 

for attorneys' fees are as follows: 

FEES AND EXPENSES RE PRINCIPAL LITIGATION 
  

ATTORNEY TOTAL HOURS HOURLY RATE TOTAL FEE TOTAL EXPENSES 
  

Stanley A. 

Halpin 573+25 $160.00 $91,720.00 $1,863.61 

GC. Lani 

Guinier 691.10 $160.00 $110,576.00 $15,187.52 1 

3,220.00 

R. James 

Kellogg $135.00 $ 68,877.00 -0- 

Steven 

Scheckman $125.00 $ 26,837.50 $32,240.46 

William P. 

Quigley $125.00 $ 60,428.75 -0 - 

Armand 

Derfner . $175.00 $ 4,900.00 

    

Total 

Lodestar 2502.48 $363,339.25 

1. Ms. Guinier seeks $3,220.00 for time spent by Ms. Janice McCaughan, a law 
student, on various tasks performed under her direction. This sum representes 
80.5 hours work at $40.00 per hour. 

The plaintiffs also request a multiplier of two (2) which would give a total 

attorneys' fee award on the principal litigation of Seven Hundred Thirty-Eight 

Thousand Sixty-Two and 50/100 ($738,062.50) Dollars. 

In connection with plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees in connection 

with this motion to establish the amount of fees due and owing, the following 

constitutes the amount sought by counsel herein:  



FEES AND EXPENSES RE DETERMINATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
  

ATTORNEY TOTAL HOURS HOURLY RATE TOTAL FEE TOTAL EXPENSES 
  

Stanley A. 

Halpin “73 $160. $11,800.00 437.40 

C. Lani 

Guinier : $160. $ 9,600.00 $1,815. 

R. James 

Kellogg : $135. $ 6,243. 

Steven 

Scheckman . $125. $4,325. 

William P. 
Quigley : $125. $ 4,956. 

Armand 

Der fner . $175. $ 4,532. 

Larry 

Mene fee : $120. $32,004. $16,187. 

  

    

Total . $63,461. $18,670. 

Again, the plaintiffs' request a multiplier of two (2) which would give a 

total attorney fee award in connection with the motion to assess fees of One 

Hundred Twenty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Three ($126,923.00) Dollars. 

Counsel for plaintiffs therefore seek a total figure of Eight Hundred 

Sixty-Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eight-Five and 50/100 ($864,985.50) Dollars 

in fees alone for their complete handling of this litigation, almost ten (10) 

times the amount paid by the defendant to Judge Feldman in connection with his 

work and the work of his law firm. 

A. The Johnson factors considered individually - calculation of the fee.  



PAGE 6 

1. The time and labor required. As shown in the above charts, the 
  

plaintiffs' request compensation for two thousand five hundred two and 48/100 

(2,502.48) hours of attorneys' time in connection with the principal 

litigation. This time is documented by affidavits supplied by counsel, their 

depositions and testimony before the court. By comparison, the defendants’ 

attorneys expended a total of 864.75 hours on the case. 

While the defendant does not contest the accuracy of counsel's affidavit 

as to the number of hours expended, defendant does contest the necessity for 

the investment of so much time. More specificially, defendant argues 

duplication of effort amongst counsel, both pre-trial and during the trial, 

performance of non-legal work by an attorney when same could have been 

performed by clerical staff or paralegals, the disproportionality of time 

spent in preparation for court as compared with time spent in trial, the 

excessive nature of conference and telephone calls, the inclusion of working 

time with travel time and the inclusion in billable hours of non-working 

travel time. Additionally, the State objects to being charged for counsel's 

time which was devoted to the administrative proceeding under Section 5 of the 

Voting Rights Act which formed no part of this litigation, which according to 

the State's calculations, amounts to two hundred seven and 40/100 (207.40) 

hours of attorneys' time. 

Plaintiffs’ attorneys testified by affidavit and direct testimony at the 

hearing that in their professional opinion this time was both reasonable and 

necessary for the proper representation of their client's interest in this 

litigation. As a general rule, the statement of counsel as to his independent 

professional judgment on how to best represent his client carries great weight 

with the court. Nevertheless, the court must independently scrutinize the  



PAGE 7 

hours and examine the objections of the defendant in order to objectively 

arrive at a fee which is fair, just and equitable not only to counsel for 

plaintiff but to the citizens of the State of Louisiana who ultimately bear 

the burden of paying for the mistake of the legislature. 

The court finds that not all of the time claimed by the plaintiffs’ 

counsel is properly compensable. More specificially, the court finds that the 

time billed by Armand Derfner was not necessary to plaintiffs' prevailing in 

this litigation and should be disregarded in its entirety. Mr. Derfner, 

although certainly a noted expert in the field of civil rights and civil 

rights litigation, was not even counsel of record in these proceedings. When 

one is not enrolled as counsel in the litigation for which attorneys' fees are 

sought, the court must look with some disbelief as to the necessity of the 

services rendered. Mr. Derfner was contacted by Ms. Guinier to either consult 

with her or perform certain limited duties in connection with this 

litigation. There has not been proof satisfactory to this court that Mr. 

Derfner's efforts were necessary in plaintiffs' prevailing herein. 

With regard to the time claimed by the other attorneys, the court simply 

is of the opinion that the same result would have been reached had fewer hours 

been spent. As was stated in Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, 
  

"The district court also should exclude from 
this initial fee caluclation hours that were 
not 'reasonably expended.' Cases may be 
overstaffed, and the skill and experience 

of lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the 
prevailing party should make a good faith 
effort to exclude from a fee request hours 

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private 
practice ethically is obligated to exclude 
such hours from his fee submission. 'In 

the private sector, "billing judgment" is 
an important component in fee setting. It 
is no less important here. Hours that are 
not properly billed to one's client also 
are not properly billed to one's adversary 

pursuant to statutory authority.'" 

  

  

   



Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 
at 1939-40 (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis 

added.) 

  

The court is therefore of the opinion that an across the board reduction 

is appropriate because Two Thousand Five Hundred Two and 48/100 $2,502.48) 

hours need not have been spent on preparing and conducting this litigation. A 

review of the entire record indicates to the court that a fifty (50) per cent 

across the board reduction is in order because the number of hours requested 

by counsel for plaintiffs is manifestly excessive. Copper Liquor, Inc., 
  

supra; Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 713 F.2d 
  

1384 (8th Cir. 1983); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. 
  

granted, 444 U.S. 824, 100 S.Ct. 44,62 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979) affirmed; Maher v. 

Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). Defendants have in 

their brief focused on certain particular items which are argued to be 

excludable. The court sees no value in discussing individual items since an 

across the board reduction is being utilized herein. The court simply feels 

50% of the time expended could have accomplished the same result. 

The appropriateness of an across the board reduction is likewise 

supported when one considers the hours billed by counsel for defendant, Martin 

L.C. Feldman. Eight Hundred Sixty-four and 75/100 (864.75) hours were billed 

by Judge Feldman and his associates. The court is not suggesting that the 

time spent by counsel for the defendant is a controlling factor in terms of 

limiting the number of hours for which plaintiff's counsel may seek 

reimbursement. But it is to be weighed and considered and is a comparator in 

determining what work was necessary as well as indicating where work was 

performed in an expeditious fashion. Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School 
   



PAGE 9 

District, 608 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1979). It appears from the record that five 

(5) lawyers were active in the trial of this matter on behalf of the 

plaintiffs. For the most part, Judge Feldman and one associate handled this 

matter on the part of the defendants. The fact that plaintiffs' counsel 

should have chosen to work with five (5) team members is within their 

discretion but the citizens of the State of Louisiana should not have to bear 

the financial burden of that decision. 

The aforementioned across the board reduction shall be made after a 

deduction of all hours billed by attorneys in connection with the 

administrative proceeding under §5 of the Voting Rights Act. On June 18, 

1982, William Bradford Reynolds, the head of the civil rights section of the 

Department of Justice, informed the State of Louisiana that he would not 

object to the Louisiana Congressional Redistricting Plan. Prior to that 

decision, and between the months of December, 1981 and June, 1982, two hundred 

seven and 40/100 (207.40) hours were expended by counsel in their attempts to 

have the Justice Department withhold preclearance of Act 20. Their actions 

were unsuccessful in this regard. 

This pre-clearance, while essential to the placing into effect of the 

redistricting legislation, is an administrative procedure separate and 

independent from this litigation process for declaratory judgment and 

injunctive relief. Regardless of whether the plan was precleared by the 

Attorney General, the plan remained vulnerable to attack on the part of 

plaintiffs. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 97 S.Ct. 2411 53 L.Ed.2d 506 
  

(1977). 

42 U.S.C. §1973(1)(e) provides that attorneys' fees are to be awarded to 

a prevailing party in any action or proceeding to enforce the voting  



PAGE 10 

guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. This court is of the 

opinion that the statute is not referring to administrative proceedings under 

§5 of the Act where, as here, the parties were unsuccessful. Rather it refers 

to successful litigation only under §2 of the Voting Rights Act. 

Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755 (2nd Cir. 1984); Posada v. Lamb County 
  

  

Tex, 716 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1983). However, even if attormeys' fees for acts 

in the administrative preclearance procedures were appropriate, and this was 

not so held in Posada, supra, the parties seeking the fees would have to be a 

prevailing party. The plaintiffs did not prevail before the Attorney General 

in the preclearance proceeding. Neither can the court say that the tasks 

performed in connection with these administrative proceedings under §5 were 

crucial or at all helpful in the ultimate litigation under §2. Therefore, 

these hours will be disallowed in their entirety. 

The court thus finds that the plaintiffs should receive attorneys' fees 

for a total of 1,235.30 hours divided as follows: 

PRINCIPAL LITIGATION 
  

ATTORNEY 

Stanley A. Halpin 
C. Lani Guinier 

R. James Kellogg 

Steven Scheckman 

William P. Quigley 
Armand Derfner 

2. Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions. This litigation did not 
  

present unduly novel or difficult issues. It is not a case such as Bolden v. 

City of Mobile, supra, which traveled on more than one occasion to the United 
  

States Supreme Court. This case was tried once at the district level and did 

not proceed past that point.  



PAGE 11 

At the time that this suit was instituted, the burden of proof in 

litigation such as this was established in the case of City of Mobile v. 
  

Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980). Within a matter of 

months thereafter, Congress amended §2 of the Voting Rights Act in order to 

legislatively over rule the Bolden case. In so doing, the burden of proof 

established in White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 3332 37 L.Ed.2d 314 
  

(1974) and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) were 
  

reinstated. The standard in White and Zimmer is substantially lower insofar 

as burden of proof is concerned than it was in Bolden,supra. Bolden required 

that the plaintiff show intent on the part of the legislature to discriminate; 

whereas, White and Zimmer merely required that a result of discrimination be 

established regardless of what the intent of the legislature was in enacting 

the questionable statute. 

As noted in the brief furnished by the State, Stan Halpin, one of the 

attorneys seeking fees herein, was lead counsel in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra, 
  

and, as such, must be considered intimately familiar with the burden of proof 

necessary on plaintiffs' part, having met that burden in prior litigation. 

Although this is not to indicate that any voting rights litigation is simple, 

what it does indicate is that there is no reason to enhance or multiply the 

award given to counsel herein because of the difficulty or novelty of the 

issues involved in this piece of litigation. 

3. The Requisite Legal Skill. This court certainly recognizes that 
  

there is a heavy burden on counsel for plaintiff in voting rights litigation 

because counsel represents an entire class of citizens on an issue fundamental 

to the democratic process. Certainly, there is no basis upon which to  



PAGE 12 

criticize any of these attorneys in this litigation for the quality or 

standard of the work which they put forward. Neither is there any reason to 

reward them with a multiplier because there was nothing extraordinarily taxing 

in the amount of skill which they need put forth to properly represent their 

clients. 

As has been noted above, the issues herein were not unduly novel nor 

extraordinarily difficult. All of these attorneys had prior experience in 

voting rights cases from which they could easily draw to assist them with this 

litigation. This factor, therefore, does not support an enhancement of 

plaintiffs' attorneys' fees herein. 

4. Preclusion of Other Employment. As was succinctly stated by the 
  

district court in the fee hearing opinion in Bolden, ''when an attorney decides 

to handle a case, he necessarily precludes some other employment because of 

time constraints. This preclusion is reflected in any fee". In the instant 

case, however, the court is of the opinion that counsel suffered no relevant 

preclusions because this is the type of litigation that these attorneys relish 

handling. All of them hold themselves out to be experts in the field of civil 

rights and civil rights litigation. No one forced these lawyers to turn their 

time and attention to Major v. Treen. They wholeheartedly chose to devote 
  

their time and attention to this project. 

Mr. Halpin and Ms. Guinier were, during the time of the principal 

litigation, employees of organizations dedicated to the preservation of civil 

rights and civil liberties. As such, preclusion does not apply to them. 

Loewen v. TurnipSeed, 505 F.Supp. 512 (N.D. Ms 1980). It is not even 
  

suggested that the organization with which each is associated was precluded 

from other employment as a result of this case.  



PAGE 13 

In addition, shortly before the institution of this litigation, Messrs. 

Quigley and Scheckman had only recently entered the private practice of law as 

partners. The court has heard of no significant work open to these attorneys 

during the same time period that Major v. Treen was litigated from which they 
  

were precluded as a result of their efforts herein. Neither can the court 

pinpoint, as far as Mr. Kellogg is concerned, any specific or large client or 

fees which he has lost as a result of his activities in this litigation. 

Again, this factor does not support the granting of a multiplier to 

counsel. 

5. The Customary Fee. In the affidavits annexed to plaintiffs' motion 
  

for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses, each attorney states his 

background and gives a brief resume of the work he has performed to date. 

R. James Kellogg graduated from the Columbia University School of Law in 

May, 1976. Since graduation, Mr. Kellogg has been, as he states, 

"overwhelmingly devoted to civil rights and civil liberties issues" in his 

practice of law. He has been a staff attorney for the American Civil 

Liberties Union and the Louisiana Center for the Public Interests. He has 

served as a consultant to the New Orleans Legal Assistance Corporation, 

Northwest Louisiana Legal Services, North Louisiana Legal Services, Acadiana 

Legal Services, Southeast Louisiana Legal Services and New Mexico Legal 

Services. In addition, he has been affiliated as counsel in various civil 

rights and civil liberties litigation with the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense Fund, 

the American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana, the National Prison Project,  



PAGE 14 

the Mental Health Law Project, the National Senior Citizens Law Center and 

many other such interested groups. 

Mr. Kellogg advises that ninety (90%) percent of his litigation 

experience has been in the federal court system on civil rights and civil 

liberties issues and that at the time he litigated Major v. Treen he had been 
  

involved in approximately ten (10) voting rights cases. Mr. Kellogg seeks an 

hourly rate of One Hundred Thirty-Five ($135.00) Dollars per hour in 

connection with the work he performed herein. Mr. Kellogg has stated that his 

responsibilities in Major v. Treen were the day-to-day operation of the case, 
  

handling of the motion practice aspect of this case, and acting as supervisor 

of trial preparation and overall coordinator of the efforts of counsel. 

It is obvious that all of Mr. Kellogg's activities, although necessary 

to achieve an orderly result, were not legal work. Under the circumstances, 

the court is of the opinion that an hourly rate of Ninety ($90.00) Dollars per 

hour would adequately compensate Mr. Kellogg for the work performed. Mr. 

Kellogg functioned in the capacity of an associate counsel as opposed to lead 

counsel herein. The above rate is commensurate to what local firms would bill 

for an associate's time. 

Steven Scheckman graduated from Tulane University School of Law in 1978. 

Thereafter, he has engaged overwhelmingly in civil rights and civil liberties 

issues. Mr. Scheckman states that he was a staff attorney for the New Orleans 

Legal Assistance Corporation from 1978 through 1981 at which time he entered 

private practice of law as a partner in the firm of Quigley and Scheckman. 

Mr. Scheckman was likewise a member of the Board of Directors of the American 

Civil Liberties Union on whose behalf he has litigated. 

Mr. Scheckman advises that he has been either lead or co-counsel in 

litigation involving the institutionalized in local and state juvenile 

facilities and adult penal institutions. Mr. Scheckman advises that his  



PAGE 15 

special emphasis in civil rights and civil rights litigation surrounds the 

rights of juveniles and juvenile law, the mentally handicapped and prisoners. 

In this litigation, Mr. Scheckman states that it was his role to 

establish the legislative history applicable herein, to analyze and review all 

documents received in discovery and to determine how they might be used at 

trial. Additionally, he interviewed various expert witnesses. The court is 

of the opinion that a fee of Eighty ($80.00) Dollars per hour would adequately 

compensate Mr. Scheckman for the work performed. 

Mr. William P. Quigley graduated in 1977 from the Loyola Law School. He 

has served as the general counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union in 

Louisiana and, in addition, has been counsel to various other public interest 

and civil rights groups, including the Louisiana Chapter of the Southern 

Christian Leadership Conference, the Louisiana Coalition on Jails and Prisons, 

the New Orleans Public Housing Tenants, Inc. He has been co-counsel with the 

N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense Fund and with the National Housing Law Project on 

federal litigation. 

At present, Mr. Quigley ie associated with Mr. Scheckman in the private 

practice of law. In connection with this litigation, Mr. Quigley was involved 

with the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act and with the §5 

submission to the Justice Department. Mr. Quigley advised in connection with 

other matters which he handles that he attempts to obtain an hourly fee rate 

of between Seventy-Five ($75.00) and One Hundred Twenty-Five ($125.00) Dollars 

per hour. The court is of the opinion that a fee of Eighty ($80.00) Dollars 

per hour would adequately compensate Mr. Quigley for the work performed.  



PAGE 16 

C. Lani Guinier is presently employed as assistant counsel for the 

N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, a non-profit corporation 

originally founded in 1940 to furnish legal assistance in cases involving 

claims of racial discrimination and deprivation of constitutional rights. 

Ms. Guinier graduated from Yale Law School in 1974 and since that time has 

specialized in civil rights and constitutional litigation. She has served as 

special assistant to the head of the Civil Rights Division in the United 

States Justice Department where she helped reorganize the voting rights §5 

unit. Ms. Guinier states that since April, 1981, she has worked primarily on 

voting rights cases as a staff attorney at the Legal Defense Fund. 

Insofar as her activities in connection with this matter, Ms. Guinier 

testified that she was responsible for drafting all pleadings, amending the 

original complaint filed herein, drafting all pre-trial findings and 

conclusions of law, drafting the pre-trial memorandum along with Mr. Stan 

Halpin, drafting the post trial findings and conclusions of law, summarizing 

all testimony that came out of the trial accurately and succinctly, and 

formulating the strategy to overcome the advantage to the defendant as a 

result of preclearance of the Act by the Justice Department. Along with Stan 

Halpin, Ms. Guinier worked with the experts to obtain testimony responsive to 

the new standard under §2. Additionally, she cross-examined Governor Treen 

and, in general, worked to establish the lack of fairness of the Act sought to 

be overturned. Ms. Guinier seeks an hourly rate of One Hundred Sixty 

($160.00) Dollars per hour for the work which she has performed in connection 

with this matter. 

There is no doubt that Ms. Guinier is a very well-trained, highly 

qualified professional in the area of civil rights. However, the court is of 

the opinion that an hourly rate of One Hundred Thirty-Five ($135.00) Dollars  



PAGE 17 

per hour will adequately compensate Ms. Guinier for the work performed in 

this matter. 

Stanley A. Halpin, Jr. graduated from Tulane Law School in 1965. Prior 

to that time, he had received a PhD in political science from George 

Washington University having written his doctoral dissertation on the Voting 

Rights Act of 1965. Shortly after his graduation from law school, Mr. Halpin 

began litigating voting and redistricting cases in Louisiana and since that 

time has litigated over fifty (50) state, county and local redistricting 

matters. Mr. Halpin has stated that he was either lead counsel, or, in most 

cases, sole counsel during those efforts. 

From 1971 through 1974, Mr. Halpin litigated as lead counsel the matter 

of Taylor v. McKeithen, 333 F.Supp. 452 (E. D. La 1971); aff. 457 F.2d 796 
  

(5th Cir. 1971); remanded, 407 U.S. 191,92 S.Ct. 1980, 32'L.Ed.2d 648 (1972); 

499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974). From 1974 through 1976, Mr. Halpin served as 

lead counsel on behalf of black intervenors in the matter of Beer v. United 
  

States, 374 F.Supp. 357 (E.D. La 1974), 425 U.S. 130, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 

L.Ed.2d 629 (1976). In addition, Mr. Halpin was intimately involved in the 

matter of Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) wherein the so 
  

called Zimmer factors important in redistricting litigation were established. 

There is no doubt in this court's mind that the expertise of Mr. Halpin 

alone working with one or two co-counsel would have been sufficient to 

litigate this entire matter. It is obvious that Mr. Halpin had his hands on 

every aspect of this case commencing with his examination of census data and 

statistical evidence for purposes of analyzing the act for potential 

discrimination, and continuing with meeting with experts, gathering data and 

facts, discussing and confecting stategy, updating research on the Zimmer  



PAGE 18 

factors, researching black participation in the political process and 

analyzing the effects of past discrimination and representation on the present 

political spectrum as well as refining the tasks of the various experts. It 

is obvious that Mr. Halpin not only brought his talents as an attorney to this 

litigation but also his considered talents as a political scientist. Whereas 

it appears that Ms. Guinier did much of the reduction of ideas to paper, it 

does appear that Mr. Halpin formulated the structure and the direction that 

this litigation was to take. 

As with Ms. Guinier, much of Mr. Halpin's work preparatory to trial was 

non-legal in effort. An hourly rate of One Hundred Thirty-Five ($135.00) 

Dollars per hour will be adequate compensation for the expertise which he 

brought to this matter. 

The court is of the opinion that the above hourly rates are in line with 

the customary fees paid in this area for comparable legal work. 

6. Fixed or Contingent Fee. The plaintiffs' attorneys handled this 
  

matter on a contingency fee basis. That is to say that counsel received no 

monies from their clients during this litigation to compensate them for the 

services rendered. Had they not prevailed, they would have been unable to 

have collected any fee as a result of their efforts. As was stated in Jones 

v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981): 

"Lawyers who are to be compensated only in the event 
of victory expect and are entitled to be paid more 
when successful than those who are assured of compen- 

sation regardless of the result. This is neither 
less nor more appropriate in civil rights litigation 
than in personal injury cases. The standard of 
compensation must enable counsel to accept apparently 

just causes without awaiting sure winners." At p. 1382  



PAGE 19 

Therefore, one of the most important factors to be considered is what 

precisely was the risk of plaintiffs’ failure in thie particular litigation. 

Once the standard of proof was changed to eliminate the aspect of intent 

which had been enunciated in the Bolden case, the risk of loss on the part of 

plaintiff was greatly diminished. This legislative overruling of Bolden by 

Congress occurred early on in this litigation and from that point forward the 

plaintiffs had a large degree of control over their risk of loss in terms of 

how well and articulately they could present the facts of the matter to the 

court. 

In this instance also, the plaintiffs mitigated their risks of a large 

amount of productive time by one attorney being invested in this litigation by 

working in a team fashion. This was not a question of one lead attorney and 

one or two associates investing all of their time in one file. Part of the 

reason that more than one attorney, in this case five (5) lawyers being 

actively involved, was to spread the risk. In granting attorneys' fees to all 

of the individuals actively involved in this litigation as this court is 

doing, there is no reason to add a multiplier to further compensate these 

lawyers when none of the individuals involved spread themselves precariously 

thin in order to conduct this battle. 

7. Time Limitations Imposed by the Client of the Circumstances of the 
  

Litigation. The record reflects that this litigation proceeded along a 

reasonable time table and the court sees no undue constraints imposed upon 

counsel either by the client or the circumstances of the litigation in 

bringing this matter to trial. Therefore, no fee enhancement is warranted  



PAGE 20 

based on this factor. 

8. The Amount Involved and the Results Obtained. The relief requested 
  

in this litigation was that Act 20 of the 1981 legislature be declared 

unconstitutional and that the State be enjoined from attempting to place it 

into effect. The purpose for which this relief was sought was to have a 

fairly proportioned congressional district for the State of Louisiana which 

would not dilude or minimize the vote of the black citizens located in that 

district. Plaintiffs indeed achieved a One Hundred (100%) percent victory in 

that respect. The state was forced to reconsider and pass additional 

legislation demarcating the various congressional districts in the Orleans, 

Jefferson and St. Bernard Parish area. The results obtained by the plaintiffs 

were important and significant and support a substantial fee for the results 

obtained. 

9. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of the Attorneys. The 
  

plaintiffs’ attorneys have an excellent reputation and considerable experience 

in the area of civil rights litigation. The background of each of these 

practitioners has been listed with greater specificity in an earlier portion 

of this opinion. All of the attorneys appearing before the court displayed 

excellent skill and competence and deserve to be justly compensated for the 

turning of these talents to a matter of extreme public importance. 

However, the court does not feel that a multiplier should be added to the 

fee of every practitioner of good reputation who addresses himself to a 

worthwhile public cause. The court is of the opinion that while these 

attorneys engaged in this litigation they suffered no setback to their 

practices, no loss in standing in the community nor have they experienced any 

other negative reaction to their representation which might need to be  



PAGE 21 

compensated for by multiplying the fee which they receive. The court sees no 

reason to set a fee on any basis other than hours spent and reasonable 

compensation therefor. 

10. Undesirability of the Case. There has been testimony to the fact 
  

that civil rights type litigation is undesirable to private attorneys. There 

is much to be said in support of this proposition. However, for these 

particular lawyers, who have built their reputations and practice on civil 

rights litigation, who hold themselves out as specialists in this area, this 

type of case is not only not undesirable but most advantageous. 

Mr. Halpin and Ms. Guinier at time of trial were both associated with 

organizations entirely devoted to advancement of civil rights. Messers. 

Kellogg, Quigley and Scheckman, although private practitioners in other areas, 

take pride in the civil rights work which they have done. However, this court 

finds it difficult when one actively and freely chooses the area of law which 

one wants to practice to say that, because one has chosen a field unattractive 

to another individual, one should be rewarded beyond the time one expends at a 

reasonable hourly rate. Furthermore, with regard to this litigation and given 

the circumstances peculiar to New Orleans, that being that the majority of its 

citizens are black, it would appear that these attorneys acted on behalf of 

the majority rather than on behalf of the minority interests in becoming 

involved with this litigation. The court cannot, therefore, say that, having 

represented the interests of the majority of the citizens of the area, these 

lawyers will suffer economic loss by their inability to attract clients with 

other types of litigation from the community as a whole. Again, this factor 

warrants no enhancement of the fee requested by counsel.  



PAGE 22 

11. The Length of the Relationship with the Client. Plaintiffs' 
  

attorneys had no prior relationship with the client. Neither are these 

clients likely to generate any additional fee paying work; therefore, an 

amount greater than the fee which one might charge to a regular overhead 

paying client would be in order in connection with this factor. 

12. Awards in Similar Cases. The court has reviewed the appropriate 
  

jurisprudence with regard to fee awards in voting rights litigation. The 

following constitutes a synopsis of cases informative on this issue: 

Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983), also known as White 
  

v. Regester, supra, involved legislative redistricting in the State of Texas. 

This litigation spanned over a decade and included two trials, nine reported 

opinions and two trips to the United States Supreme Court. It was extremely 

complex in nature involving eight urban legislative districts wherein there 

were multi-members. A total lodestar of fifty-three hundred (5300) hours was 

awarded to counsel in the fee hearing for a total fee before the multiplier of 

Four Hundred Forty-Four Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen and 50/100 ($444,516.50) 

Dollars. A multipler of two was added to this fee and a grand total of Nine 

Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighteen ($940,818.00) Dollars in fees 

and expenses was awarded to counsel. Although a multipler was awarded herein, 

the court specificially stated that a contingency multiplier should not be 

awarded in all cases. The court went on to state that when the lode star is 

based on present hourly rates rather than on rates applicable when the 

services were rendered, any resulting disadvantage to counsel because of delay 

is largely eliminated.  



PAGE 23 

Connor v. Winter, 519 F.Supp. 1337 (S.D. Ms 1981) involved fifteen years 
  

of effort to reapportion the Mississippi legislature. It included problems 

associated with multi-member districts and the necessity of fragmenting 

traditional political boundaries in order to achieve population equality. 

There was a state wide impact to this litigation which resulted in a complete 

reorganization of Mississippi's system of legislative elections. 

In Connor v. Winter, a lode star of one thousand two hundred sixty-nine 
  

and 2/5 hours was allowed and a total fee and expense award of Seventy-Seven 

Thousand Six Hundred Eighteen and 75/100 ($77, 618.75) Dollars granted to 

counsel. No multiplier was allowed in this instance. 

Farnham v. Barnes, 571 F.Supp. 45 (D RI 1983) involved state wide 
  

redistricting in the state of Rhode Island. The matter involved thirty-six 

legislative districts which litigation generated three published opinions. A 

lodestar of one thousand fifty-seven (1,057) hours was granted to counsel at 

One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars per hour. Thereafter, a multiplier of ten (10%) 

per cent was added to grant counsel a total fee of One Hundred Sixteen 

Thousand Two Hundred Seventy and no/100 ($116,270.00) Dollars. In that 

litigation, the court specifically voiced the opinion that a multipler should 

be appled with care because of the incongruity inherent in a multiplier, that 

is, although the public interest has been vindicated by counsel, the 

multiplier nevertheless makes the public pay for that vindication. 

Rybicke v. State Board of Elections, 584 F.Supp. 849 (D.C. Ill 1984) 
  

involved the 1981 legislative redistricting plan to the Illinois State 

Assembly. In that matter, there were three (3) groups of plaintiffs, and 

three (3) reported opinions affecting one hundred seventy-seven (177) 

legislative seats.  



PAGE 24 

In Rybicke one, the evidentiary hearing went on for nine days, with 

twenty-five witnesses and two hundred exhibits. That matter involved the 

alleged discrimination against suburban voters by disproportionately 

concentrating power in Chicago and in addition it involved a second issue of 

alleged dilution of black voting strength, i.e., the Bolden issue. All three 

plaintiffs had separate and distinct interests, each group having their own 

counsel. Fees were awarded by the court to two of the three groups and no 

multipler was allowed. A lode star of Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Seven 

Hundred Ninety-Five and 25/100 ($255,795.25) Dollars in fees, together with a 

cost reimbursement of Seventy-One Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Eight and 

10/100 ($71,378.10) Dollars was awarded by the court. 

Mader v. Crowl, 506 F.Supp. 484 (M.D. Tn 1981) involved the 
  

reapportionment plan for the Tennessee State Senatorial Districts. Four 

hundred twenty-two and 2/10 (422.2) hours at Seventy-Five and no/100 ($75.00) 

Dollars were awarded to counsel without a multiplier. 

In Re Illinois Congressional District Reapportionment, 704 F.2d 380 (7th 
  

Cir. 1983). In this matter, a total of nine hundred fifteen (915) hours at 

rates varying from Fifty-Five to One Hundred Sixty-Five ($55.00 to $165.00) 

Dollars per hour were allowed by the court. A total fee of One Hundred 

Twenty-Eight Thousand Two Hundred Fifteen and no/100 ($128,215.00) Dollars was 

awarded counsel as the lode star amount. A bonus of twenty (20%) percent was 

added to this figure with the court specifically noting that a large 

multiplier should not lightly be granted.  



PAGE 25 

Brooks v. Allain, F.Supp. No. GC 82-80 & 81-WK-0 (N.D. Ms 
  

1985) involved the fee award for the Mississippi Congressional Redistricting 

case. This case reapportioned three of Mississippi's congressional districts 

after two three day trials and two appeals to the Supreme Court. In Brooks, 

plaintiff was awarded a lode star of One Hundred Ten Thousand Two Hundred 

Thirty-Seven and 50/100 ($110,237.50) Dollars for one thousand two hundred 

sixty-two and 3/5 (1,262.35) hours. A fifty (50%) per cent multiplier was 

allowed on a portion of the hours requested by one attorney and a total 

compensation of One Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Five and no/100 

($140,805.00) Dollars was allowed. 

Burton v. Hobbie, CA 81-617-N (M.D. Al 1983) involved the state wide 
  

legislative reapportionment of a hundred forty (140) seats in the Alabama 

legislature. Seven (7) of the districts involved had problems regarding 

proper representation of blacks. A lodestar of approximately one thousand 

seven hundred (1,700) hours was allowed to counsel for a total award of One 

Hundred Fifty-One Thousand Five Hundred Seventy-Five and no/100 ($151, 575.00) 

Dollars. No multipler was granted. 

Bolden v. City of Mobile, CA 75-279-P (S.D. Al 1983) was a landmark case 
  

in the voting rights area. It is the decision rendered herein which prompted 

Congress to amend section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to legislatively overrule 

the jurisprudence established after two (2) trials, several instances of 

appeallate review and eight (8) years of litigation. A total of four thousand 

eight hundred twenty-five and 7/10 (4,825.7) hours and a lode star of Four 

Hundred Forty-Four Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Three and no/100 ($444,843.00) 

Dollars was allowed to counsel. A multiplier of two was granted in this case.  



PAGE 26 

Having reviewed comprehensively the above jurisprudence, the court is of 

the opinion that two thousand five hundred two and 48/100 (2,502.48) hours 

originally requested by counsel in connection with this principle litigation 

is excessive and that total hours of one thousand two hundred thirty-five and 

30/100 (1,235.30) hours, which the court is allowing herein, is well supported 

by the teachings in the aforementioned litigations. The court further notes 

with regard to plaintiffs' request for a multiplier in regard to the 

attorneys' fees that multipliers are granted only under unusual 

circumstances. The standard for granting a multiplier is succinctly stated in 

Blum v. Stenson, U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984) wherein the court 
  

noted as follows: 

"Neither complexity nor novelty of the issues, therefore, 
is an appropriate factor in determining whether to 
increase the basic fee award...The quality of representa- 
tion may justify an upward adjustment only in the rare 
case where the fee applicant offers specific evidence to 
show [1] that the quality of service rendered was superior 

to that one reasonably should expect in light of the 
hourly rates charged and [2] that the success was exceptional 

...Because acknowlegment of the 'results obtained' generally 
will be subsumed within other factors used to calculate a 

reasonable fee, it normally should not provide an independent 

basis for increasing the fee award...Nor do we believe that the 
number of persons benefitted is a consideration of significance 
in calculating fees under §1988." 

Blum, supra, U.S. at = ,7104 8.Ct..1349,.n. 16. 

This court refuses to grant a multiplier as requested by counsel for 

plaintiffs. 

B. Expenses requested by counsel in connection with principle 

litigation. 

Steven Scheckman requests reinbursement for expenses totaling Thirty-Two 

Thousand Two Hundred Forty and 42/100 ($32,240.42) Dollars. Of this amount, 

the following amounts were not initially disputed by the State and had been 

stipulated as reasonable:  



Expert and Professional Assistance 

Richard Engstrom 

74.25 hrs at $100.00/hr 

Joseph Logsdon 

32.00 hours at $100/hr 

Raphael Cassimere, Jr. 

34.00 hrs at $100/hr 

Shirley Laska 
13.0 hrs at $25/hr = $325.00 
Expenses - $56.49 

Mapmakers and Supplies 

Photographer 

Depositions 

Treen 356.40 

Hainkel 99.90 
Henderson 161.90 

Selle 276.14 

Logsdon 70.00 

Cassimere, Chehardy 143.90 
Lewis, Engstrom 128.30 
Morial 446.40 

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

E. 

F. 

G. 

H. 

Express Mail 400.00 
  

TOTAL EXPENSES $20,339.43 

However, in light of the recent holding of the Fifth Circuit in IWA v. 

Champion International Corp., slip opinion 83-4616, filed June 2, 1986 the 
  

State now contests all of those items listed as expert witness fees above. In 

that opinion, the appellate court ordered district courts "to apply the rule 

announced today to all pending cases'". Accordingly, as to expert witnesses 

Engstrom, Logsdon, Cassimere and Laska, all expert fee charges over and above 

the normal court attendance fee of Thirty and no/100 ($30.00) Dollars per diem 

shall be disallowed. Since the work billed on behalf of these experts does 

not establish that a court appearance or deposition was involved, no amount 

will be awarded on these claims.  



PAGE 28 

As the State does not contest the reasonability of any other above listed 

amounts, there is no necessity to discuss these items further other than to 

order that they be paid. 

The following fees submitted by Mr. Scheckman are additionally being 

contested by the State: 
ITEM AMOUNT 
  

Witness Fees for Depositions of M. Landrieu, 

E. Bruno, L. Watermeier, $30.00 each incurred 

12/18/82 

Payment to Metropolitan Agency for serving 

deposition subpoenas and providing mileage 

incurred 12/13/82 256. 

Depositions of M. Landrieu, E. Bruno, and L. 

Watermeier incurred 12/23/82 475.00 

Kinko's copying for exhibits incurred 2/28/83 555.03 

Fees for expert Gordon Henderson 9,325.00 

Travel 1,200.00 

TOTAL EXPENSES $11,901.03 
  

The first four above expenses are objected to by the State on the same 

grounds, that being, failure to comply with this court's discovery order prior 

to the date established by the court. On March 26, 1985, this Magistrate 

entered an order directed to plaintiff mandating that the defendant be 

furnished with any documentation supporting expenses other than expert witness 

fees claimed in this matter. This documentation was to be furnished to the 

defendant on or before April 2, 1985. That order specifically stated that 

failure to make such document production by April 2, 1985 would preclude 

introduction of the documentation supporting those expenses at the time of 

trial.  



PAGE 29 

Plaintiff did not make document production until April 11, 1985 and 

therefore is in violation of this court's order. Accordingly, all of the 

first four immediately hereinabove listed expenses are DENIED. 

With regard to the fee of Gordon Henderson, the State did not initially 

contest the hourly rate of that expert but did contest that he needed to 

devote the amount of time which he has billed to the case. In light of IWA, 

supra, the State now contests that the entire amount is payable as being 

excessive of that allowed by statute. Again, the Thirty and no/100 ($30.00) 

Dollar per diem alone will be allowed on this expert's bill if it were for a 

court appearance of deposition. Since this was not specified, no amount will 

be allowed here. 

Lastly, defendants except to the full Twelve Hundred ($1,200.00) Dollar 

travel expense claimed by Mr. Scheckman on the grounds that the expense is 

unidentified in terms of time the expense was incurred as well as the reason 

therefore. More succinctly stated, the State does not believe that Mr. 

Scheckman has met his burden of proof in connecting this expense as a 

reasonable and necessary expense connected with this litigation. The court 

concurs with the State in this respect. The court does not consider that this 

expense has been verified as relating to matters concerned with this 

litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra; Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors 
  

  

Co., supra. 

Accordingly, of the sums requested by Mr. Scheckman, the total of Five 

Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Two and 94/100 ($5,932.94) Dollars will be 

allowed as reimbursable expenses. 

The following constitutes the itemized expenses of Stanley A. Halpin in 

connection with the principle litigation:  



DATE ITEM AMOUNT 

2/28/83 Trial and Travel Expenses 

thru 3/13/83 Parking, gas, ground transportation $349. 

Credit card food expenses 134. 

Rental car 200. 

Gas 52. 

Airfare 190. 

1/18/83 Deposition Travel Expenses 

thru 1/24/83 Food, parking, misc. 
Rental car 

Airfare 

Credit card food 

Gas 

12/17/82 Travel to New Orleans for case prepara- 

thru 12/19/82 tion 
Food, parking 116.70 

Gas 23.94 

Airfare 210.00 

Long Distance Telephone Calls N/C 
TOTAL $T, 862.61 

The major problem with all of these expenses appears to be largely the 

failure on the part of Mr. Halpin to produce a receipt or other documentation 

that the expense was incurred. For example, regarding parking, gas and ground 

transportation expenses incurred by Mr. Halpin from 2/28/83 thru 3/13/83 in 

the amount of Three Hundred Forty-Nine and 50/100 ($349.50) Dollars, only Four 

and 45/100 ($4.50) Dollars has been documented by way of a receipt. For the 

same time period with regard to the Fifty-Two and 45/100 ($52.45) Dollars in 

gas reimbursement sought by Mr. Halpin, only receipts for Fifteen ($15.00) 

Dollars in gas have been produced. 

Regarding deposition travel expenses incurred from 1/18 through 1/24/83, 

again receipts present a problem on Mr. Halpin's food, parking and 

miscellaneous expense requests of One Hundred Forty-One and 95/100 ($141.95) 

Dollars. In that instance, receipts have been produced for only Ninety-Nine 

and 50/100 ($99.50) Dollars of the requested amount. For the time period,  



PAGE 31 

December 17, 18 and 19, 1982, receipts have not been forthcoming to support 

One Hundred Twelve and 70/100 ($112.70) Dollars of the requested One Hundred 

Sixteen and 70/100 ($116.70) Dollars in food and parking sought by Mr. Halpin 

nor have receipts been forthcoming to support Ten and 94/100 ($10.94) Dollars 

of the requested Twenty-Three and 94/100 ($23.94) Dollars in gas reimbursement 

sought by Mr. Halpin. 

The court is of the opinion that defendants' position of calling for 

strict proof of expense money incurred is well founded. As receipts are not 

available to support and corroborate the incurring of the aforementioned 

expense, the amount sought will be reduced to those sums for which a receipt 

has been provided. 

With regard to Mr. Halpin's request for reimbursement for food expenses 

incurred from February 28, 1983 through March 13, 1983 in the amount of One 

Hundred Thirty-Four and 62/100 ($134.62) Dollars the reasonableness of the 

cost is disputed by the State. Of that amount, Thirty-Seven and 45/100 

($37.45) Dollars is attributable to a meal at Chez Helene restaurant and the 

remainder to one meal at Brennan's. The bill at Chez Helene indicates three 

people were present, i.e., Mr. Halpin, Ms. Guinier and Mr. Scheckman. The 

bill at Brennan's is silent as to who was present. Of the amount requested, 

the total sum of Thirty Seven and 45/200 ($37.45) Dollars will be allowed on 

the Chez Helene bill. The bill is not exorbitant and there is no basis to 

determine how much is attributable to each person. On the Brennan bill, 

Thirty and no/100 ($30.00) Dollars will be allowed as sufficient for a 

reasonable meal. All other amounts are disallowed. 

The State does not object to the reasonableness of the Two Hundred 

($200.00) Dollars sought by Mr. Halpin for rental car expense nor the One 

Hundred Ninety ($190.00) Dollar airfare reimbursement likewise requested.  



PAGE 32 

With regard to the deposition travel expenses incurred January 18 through 

24, 1983, the State does not object to the reasonableness of the Two Hundred 

Fifteen ($215.00) Dollars airfare reimbursement sought by Mr. Halpin. 

However, Ninety and 33/100 ($90.33) Dollars of the One Hundred Thirty-Five and 

49/100 ($135.49) Dollars sought for rental car reimbursement is objected to on 

the basis that Mr. Halpin was not needed except for January 2lst and 22nd in 

connection with these depositions. The court will not second guess the wisdom 

of counsel with regard to remaining for the extra four days in question herein 

and the full amount of the rental car reimbursement sought by Mr. Halpin will 

be granted to him. 

Of the Seventy and 24/100 ($70.24) Dollars credit card food reimbursement 

expense for this same time period, i.e., January 18-24, 1983, the State 

objects to Twenty-One and 08/100 ($21.08) Dollars of same on the grounds that 

this amount is attributable to a meal eaten by Mr. Kellogg for which Mr. 

Halpin paid and now seeks reimbursement. Since Mr. Kellogg, being a native of 

New Orleans, would not have been entitled to a per diem, the State seeks 

disallowance of a prorated amount of the total bill which it allots to Mr. 

Kellogg's food consumption. Since there is no basis upon which to assume that 

Mr. Kellogg consumed a full meal as opposed to a Seventy-Five ($.75) Cent 

glass of ice tea and since this bill is not exorbitant, the court orders 

reimbursement of the full amount to Mr. Halpin. 

Of the Twenty-Three and 72/100 ($23.72) Dollar gas reimbursement sought 

by Mr. Halpin, the State objects to Fifteen and 79/100 ($15.79) Dollars on the 

grounds that Mr. Halpin was not needed in New Orleans except for two of the 

six days in question. Again, the court will not second guess the wisdom  



PAGE 33 

of counsel on what amounts to a non-consequential expense. Mr. Halpin will be 

reimbursed for the full amount sought on this item. 

With regard to Mr. Halpin's expenses for December 17, 18 and 19, 1982, 

the Four ($4.00) Dollars for which receipts have been furnished the State as 

to food and parking will be allowed. Despite the fact that the State urges 

that Mr. Halpin was not needed in New Orleans at this time, the court will not 

second guess counsel on such a non-consequential amount. The same rationale 

holds for the gas reimbursement sought by counsel. Thirteen ($13.00) Dollars 

in receipts have been furnished to the State and this amount will be allowed 

to Mr. Halpin. Accordingly, the following amounts will be awarded to Mr. 

Halpin in conection with the expenses which he has sought. 

DATE ITEM AMOUNT 

2/28/83 thru Trial and Travel Expenses 
3/13/83 Parking, gas, ground transportation $. 4, 

Credit card food expenses 67. 

Rental car 200. 

Gas 15. 

Airfare 190. 

1/18/83 thru Deposition Travel Expenses 
1/24/83 Food, parking, misc. 99. 

Rental car 

Airfare 

Credit card food 

Gas 

12/17/82 thru Travel to New Orleans for Case 

12/19/82 Preparation 
Food, parking 

Gas 

Airfare 

Long Distance Telephone Calls 
  

TOTAL $1,037.85  



PAGE 34 

C. Lani Guinier requests reimbursement for expenses totaling Eighteen 

Thousand Four Hundred Seven and 52/100 ($18,407.52) Dollars in connection with 

the principle litigation. Of this amount, the following items were not 

initially disputed by the State and had been stipulated as reasonable. 

DATE AMOUNT ITEM 

1/10/83 $32.00 Motion and Brief to 
Kellogg by Federal 

Express 

1/12/83 . Supplementary affidavit 

to James Kellogg, Esq., 

by Federal Express 

3/11/83 . Trial material to Lani 

Guinier by UPS 

6/9/83 5 Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law, 

Purolator, to James R. 

Kellogg, Esq. 

3/11/32 : Compensation to G. 
Henderson for analysis 

of data 

7/14/83 . Court cost 

3/28/83 . Shirley Laska, expert 

witness fee 

Gordon Henderson, 

expenses only for 

deposition 

4/8/83 1,126. J.H. Echezabal, 
trial transcript 

5/26/83 658.63 Trial transcript 
  

TOTAL $ 7,532.42 

In light of IWA, supra, the State now contests and seeks disallowance of 

those amounts attributable to experts Henderson and Laska over and above the 

amount allowed by statute. 28 U.S.C. §1821. The clear dictate of IWA, supra, 

supports defendants' position.  



PAGE 35 

As the State does not contest the reasonability of the other above listed 

amounts, there is no necessity to discuss these items further other than to 

order that they be paid. 

The following fees submitted by Miss Guinier are being contested by the 

State: 

ITEM 

Conference with co-counsel and plaintiffs in 
New Orleans (LG) in December, 1981 

Travel to D.C. to review Justice Dept. files (LG) 

in June, 1982 

Travel to D.C. to review DOJ files (LG) in December, 

1982 

Hearing on Pre-trial Motions, Depositions, Trial prep. 

(LG) in January, 1983 

Trial prep. and Trial (LG) in March, 1983 

Post-trial brief, Review exhibits, confer with co- 

counsel New Orleans (LG) in May, 1983 

Local taxis (LG) in June, 1983 

Hearing, New Orleans (LG) in June, 1983 

Hearing, New Orleans (NBW) in June, 1983 

Local taxis (LG) in July, 1984 

Photo copying at .l15 cents per page from January, 1983 

through January, 1984 

Postage paid on opposition to intervention forwarded 

to William Quigley on December 12, 1983 

Long distance telephone calls from November 12, 1982 

through June 5, 1984  



PAGE 36 

ITEM AMOUNT 

Legal printing paid for July 14, 1983 53.50 

Service of subpoenas by Associated Investigators 

paid for February 16, 1983 86.65 

Expenses of expert Gordon Henderson in connection 

with his deposition paid for March 28, 1983 1,654.90 

Expenses of expert Gordon Henderson in connection 

with trial paid on May 31,1983 1,002.19 

Services of Janice McCaughan from May 14, 1983 through 

May 29, 1983 - 80.5 hours time at $40.00 per hour 3,220.00 
  

TOTAL $6,017.24 

With regard to the first of the hereinabove contested expenses, that 

being the Six Hundred Twenty-Six ($626.00) Dollar item incurred in December, 

1981, the court disallows One Hundred Eleven and 71/100 ($111.71) Dollars for 

lack of a receipt to document this expense. Receipts have been presented in 

the amount of Four Hundred Fifty ($450.00) Dollars for air fare and Sixty-Four 

and 29/100 ($64.29) Dollars in connection with hotel expenditures, both of 

which the court finds to be reasonable. Accordingly, an amount of Five 

Hundred Fourteen and 29/100 ($514.29) Dollars will be allowed reimbursable to 

Miss Guinier on behalf of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense Fund. The State has 

argued that these total expenses should be disallowed on the grounds that  



PAGE 37 

Miss Guinier had no need to meet with plaintiffs or with co-counsel herein. 

The fact is, however, that Miss Guinier was present at the meeting and was a 

very moving force in connection with this litigation. The court has handled 

the question of duplication of time and hours spent at an earlier stage of 

this opinion. Certainly plaintiffs might have carried forward with this 

litigation in a different fashion but that was not done and this expense was 

incurred in bringing this matter to fruition. Accordingly, the State's 

argument will be disregarded and the aforementioned sum awarded. 

The Ninety-Two and 25/100 ($92.25) Dollar expense in connection with 

travel to Washington, D.C. to review Justice Department files in June of 1982 

will be disallowed in its entirety. There have been no receipts submitted by 

Miss Guinier to establish amounts incurred in connection with this trip. Only 

a legal defense fund expense report filled out by Miss Guinier and submitted 

to her employer has been entered into evidence. There are no receipts to back 

up the expenses listed on the form. Moreover, these sums were incurred in 

connection with Miss Guinier's meeting with the Department of Justice 

regarding the Louisiana Congressional Submission under Section 5. The court 

has disallowed all legal time to attorneys in connection with the Section 5 

proceedings. All expenses will be disallowed also. 

As to the December, 1982 travel, food and lodging expenses regarding Miss 

Guinier's trip to Washington, D.C. to review Department of Justice files, this 

entire sum is disallowed. No receipts have been produced to support the 

payment of any sums. The same result will be reached as to the travel, food 

and lodging expenses claimed by Miss Guinier in the amount of Seven Hundred 

Three and 95/100 ($703.95) Dollars in January, 1983. Again, no receipts  



PAGE 38 

were produced to substantiate these sums requested. 

Of the One Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-Six and 67/100 ($1,896.67) 

Dollars requested for food, transportation and lodging in connection with the 

trial in March, 1983, Eight Hundred Sixty ($860.00) Dollars of this amount 

will be allowed as receipts have been presented to document this sum. 

The State has argued that this amount should be further reduced because Miss 

Guinier was not needed for more than six (6) days in New Orleans in connection 

with the trial, since the time expended by her was duplicitive of that spent 

by other counsel. The court rejects this argument insofar as legitimate 

expenses incurred at a time when she was in New Orleans and working on this 

litigation are concerned. The duplicative nature of the hours of counsel 

herein have been handled at an earlier point in this opinion by way of an 

across—the-boards reduction of compensable time. 

The Five Hundred Eight and 05/100 ($508.05) Dollars expenditure for food, 

travel and lodging to New Orleans in May of 1983 requested by Miss Guinier 

will be denied in its entirety. This travel was in connection with confecting 

the post-trial brief, reviewing exhibits and conferring with co-counsel as to 

other post-trial pleadings. Included in this amount is One Hundred 

Twenty-Three and 51/100 ($123.51) Dollars in hotel bills paid to the Radisson 

Plaza Hotel in Raleigh, North Carolina. The court can discern no conexity 

between Miss Guinier's stay in Raleigh, North Carolina and this litigation. 

This amount will be denied in its entirety. 

Three Hundred Eighty-One ($381.00) Dollars of the aforementioned amount 

represents air fare from New York City to Raleigh Durham on May 3, 1983 and 

from Raleigh Durham to New Orleans via Atlanta on May 5, 1983. It likewise 

includes air fare from New Orleans back to New York on May 8, 1983. Assuming 

in Miss Guinier's favor that this trip was, in fact, a necessity in connection  



PAGE 39 

with this litigation, obviously the whole amount of Three Hundred Eighty-Eight 

and no/100 ($388.00) Dollars was not attributable to Major v. Treen. It is 
  

obvious that the stop made by Miss Guinier in Raleigh Durham was in connection 

with another litigation which she was handling, namely, Gingles v. Edmisten, 
  

totally unrelated to the present matter before the court. Miss Guinier has 

made no attempt to suggest or prove to the court the cost of round trip air 

flight from Raleigh Durham to New Orleans and back to Raleigh Durham which 

would be the cost of air fare reasonably attributed to Major v. Treen. Since 
  

it is Miss Guinier's burden to establish the amount for which she should be 

reimbursed, this claim may not be adjudicated until Ms. Guinier provides the 

court with creditable proof as to the amount which should be allocated to that 

portion of her air travel from Raleigh Durham to New Orleans and back to 

Raleigh Durham. Ms. Guinier will be allowed to so supplement the record. 

The request for reimbursement in connection with fees paid to local taxis 

in June of 1983 shall be disallowed in its entirety for the failure to present 

receipts to document these expenses. 

The Four Hundred Seventy-Eight and 59/100 ($478.59) Dollars request for 

food, travel and lodging expenses incurred in June of 1983 in connection with 

the hearing in New Orleans shall be allowed in its entirety. The State has 

argued that someone other than Miss Guinier could have argued this motion. 

The court will not substitute its judgment for the strategic judgment of 

counsel viewed with hindsight. The full amount of this claim will be allowed. 

The claim for Five Hundred Thirty-Five and 75/100 ($535.75) Dollars for 

food, travel and lodging on behalf of Napoleon B. Williams incurred in June  



PAGE 40 

1983 will be disallowed in its entirety. Mr. Williams was not counsel of 

record; he was not actively involved in this litigation nor was he necessary 

to a proper representation of plaintiff's claims. This amount shall be 

disallowed. 

As with other claims where there has been a lack of receipt furnished to 

the State to substantiate the amount expended, the claim for reimbursement for 

local taxi fares in July, 1984 will be disallowed. 

Miss Guinier requests reimbursement on behalf of the legal defense fund 

for photo copying in the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Nine and 

07/100 ($1,289.07) Dollars. Thirty-Five and 55/100 ($35.55) Dollars of that 

amount will be disallowed for lack of a receipt to substantiate the expense. 

In addition, the State argues that a further Three Hundred Thirty-Two and 

10/100 ($332.10) should be disallowed as representing excessive or unnecessary 

photo copying. The court will allow Miss Guinier to be reimbursed on behalf 

of the legal defense fund in the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred 

Fifty-Three and 52/100 ($1,253.52) Dollars. The number of photo copies made 

herein should not necessarily be limited to the number needed for service on 

counsel. According to Miss Guinier's affidavit, it was necessary that this 

photo copying be done and therefore the legal defense fund will be reimbursed 

in this amount. 

Insofar as the postage necessary to mail the opposition to the 

intervention to Mr. Willim Quigley in the amount of Thirty-Four ($34.00) 

Dollars is concerned, this amount will be disallowed. There have been no 

receipts to substantiate this amount provided to the State to verify the 

expense. As there are no receipts to substantiate the full One Hundred  



PAGE 41 

Sixty-Six and 78/100 ($166.78) Dollars on the long distance reimbursement 

sought on behalf of the legal defense fund, the full amount of this requested 

reimbursement will not be granted. Ninety-Three and 70/100 ($93.70) Dollars 

will be granted as having been verified expenditures. The entire amount 

requested for legal printing which was paid on July 14, 1983 in the amount of 

Fifty-Three and 50/100 ($53.50) Dollars will likewise be denied for failure to 

produce a receipt to substantiate the sum sought. 

Eighty-Six and 65/100 ($86.65) Dollars reimbursement is requested in 

connection with the payment of Associated Investigators for service of 

subpoenas. The State objects to this expense on the grounds that there is no 

record or itemized receipt of who was served, for what purpose the service was 

needed or when the service was accomplished. The court notes that at the time 

a requisition was requested from the legal defense fund by Miss Guinier the 

charge was categorized as one for special research rather than for service of 

subpoenas. Since the court is unsure as to who was to be served, when the 

service was to be accomplished and for what purposes service was sought, 

thereby making it impossible to determine whether this amount was a necessary 

expense, this amount will be disallowed in its entirety. 

Reimbursement in the amount of One Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Four and 

90/100 ($1,654.90) Dollars is sought in connection with the expenses of Gordon 

Henderson, expert witness, on March 28, 1983 in connection with his 

deposition. Six Hundred Seventy-One and 92/100 ($671.92) Dollars of this 

amount will be discarded as no receipts were produced to substantiate the sums 

claimed. Of the amounts for which receipts were produced, Six and no/100 

($6.00) Dollars in ground transportation has been stipulated as reasonable by 

the State. Five Hundred Twenty-Four and no/100 ($524.00) Dollars in air fare  



is requested. However, the record reflects that this sum was expended by Mr. 

Henderson for purposes of traveling from New Orleans to Cincinnati to Dayton, 

Ohio by first class instead of by coach. The court is of the opinion that 

there should be some reimbursement for the amount of this air fare, but on the 

basis of a coach ticket as opposed to a first class ticket. Therefore, Miss 

Guinier, on behalf of the legal defense fund, will have the option of 

presenting to the court some type of proof by way of affidavit from Delta Air 

Lines, Inc. as to the cost of a coach ticket from New Orleans to Cincinnati to 

Dayton, Ohio during the relevant time period. The full amount of Mr. 

Henderson's bill at the Royal Orleans will be allowed which is Four Hundred 

Nineteen and 23/100 ($419.23) Dollars as well as the restaurant bill at Gins 

Mee Hong Restaurant for Thirty-Eight and 75/100 (338.75) Dollars. The court 

is exercising its discretion to allow reimbursement for the expenses of out of 

town witnesses. Dasher v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N,.Y,, 78 F.R.D. 142 (8.D. 
  

Ga 1978). 

Expenses in the amount of One Thousand Two and 19/100 ($1,002.19) Dollars 

paid to G. Gordon Henderson in conection with his trial appearance before this 

court is sought. Said reimbursement, occurring on May 31, 1983, is denied in 

its entirety. No receipts have been produced to substantiate the amount 

requested. 

Lastly, reimbursement is sought for the services of Janice McCoughan, a 

law student working at the behest of Ms. Guinier on certain aspects of this 

litigation. After review of this time sheet, the court does not feel this 

work was necessary to plaintiff's prevailing herein. Liberal amounts of time 

have been allowed counsel of record in this litigation to properly represent 

their respective clients. This item will be disallowed. 

Of the contested amounts therefore, the following constitutes the 

expenses allowed to Ms. Guinier on behalf of the Legal Defense Fund:  



PAGE 43 

ITEM REQUESTED BY LDF FOR TRAVEL, FOOD AND LODGING 
  

Conference with counsel and plaintiffs in New Orleans 

December, 1981 

Travel to Washington June, 1982 to review Justice 

Department files 

Travel to Washington, D.C. December, 1982 to review 

Justice Department files 

Hearing on pre-trial motions, depositions and trial 

preparation January, 1983 

Trial preparation and trial March, 1983 

Post-trial brief, review of exhibits, confer with co- 

atcounsel in New Orleans May, 1983 

Local taxis June, 1983 

Hearing New Orleans, June, 1983 

Hearing New Orleans (Napoleon B. Williams), June, 1983 

Local taxis: July, 1984 

Photo copying 

Postage in connection with transporting opposition 

to intervention to William Quigley 

Long distance telephone calls 

Legal printing 

Associated Investigators for service of subpoena 

February, 1983 

Gordon Henderson expenses for deposition, March 1983 

plus an undetermined amount for airfare 

Expenses — E. Gordon Henderson in connection with trial 

May 31, 1983 plus an undetermined amount for airfare 

Services of Janice McCaughan from May 14, 1983 through 

May 29, 1982 
TOTAL 

ALLOWED   

=0 

860.00 

Undetermined 

present 

- 0 - 

  

$3,664.08  



PAGE 44 

The court will now turn attention to the request of plaintiffs' counsel 

for attorneys' fees for litigating the above captioned motion to assess fees. 

Again, as to each attorney, the Johnson factors will be considered 

individually. 

1. The Time and Labor Required. 
  

Miss Guinier seeks Sixty (60) hours time at One Hundred Sixty and 

no/100 ($160.00) Dollars per hour for a total fee of Nine Thousand Six Hundred 

and no/100 ($9,600.00) Dollars. With regard to the itemized statement of 

attorney time designated in Appendix A on plaintiffs' exhibit 8 for the 

time period July 27, 1984 through October 24, 1985, the court disallows all 

telephone conversations with Mr. Quigley and Mr. Kellogg re attorneys' fees. 

Mr. Quigley and Mr. Kellogg did not represent Miss Guinier in the attorney fee 

hearing and such discussions between co-plaintiffs are not productive to 

moving this matter forward expeditiously. Three and 9/100 (3.9) hours 

will therefore be disallowed from this billing and 6/10 (.6) hours allowed 

which represent a telephone call with Larry Menefee, counsel for Miss Guinier, 

in connection with this matter on October 24, 1984. On Miss Guinier's 

statement of attorney time from November 18, 1984 through March 29, 1985, 

the court makes the following allowances: 

SERVICES RENDERED HOURS ALLOWED 
  

  

Conservation with Larry Menefee 11:30 to 12:05 re 
on to produce on 11/19/84 

Preparation for deposition on attorneys' fee motion 
7:30 to 9:30 p.m.:on 11/20/84 

Review time slips, etc. for deposition 11/21/84 
All other time billed on 11/21/84 is disallowed. 

Telephone conversation with Larry Menefee 11:35 
to 12 noon - discussion re deposition on 11/26/84 
All other itemsizations on this date are disallowed.  



PAGE 45 

SERVICES RENDERED HOURS ALLOWED 
  

  

Entries for 11/27/84 of .4 hours. All of these entries are 

disregarded 

Travel to Washington, D.C. to deposition and preparation 

on plane on 11/28/84 

Met with Larry Menefee for forty-five minute deposition by 

Kendall Wick 1-1/2 hours on 11/29/84 

Reviewed and corrected deposition 12/11/84 

Meeting with Quigley and Kellogg 12/13/84 
Disallowed in its entirety 

Conversation re attorneys' fees with Armand Derfner 

12/19/84. Disallowed in its entirely 

Thirty minutes reviewing Larry's draft motion setting 

case for Judge 1/23/85. Disallowed entirely 

Conversation with Larry and Richard Lawson re attorneys’ 

fees 1/30/85. 

Conversation with Larry Menefee re defendant's motion to 

produce. Reviewed Larry's letter 3/15/85 

Production of documents for defendants pursuant to court 

order 3/18/85 

Preparation of response to defense motion for production 

of documents 3/22/85 

Preparation of response to defense motion to produce 

documents on 3/25/85 

Conversation with Menefee re production of documents in 

response to defense motion on attorneys' fees 3/25/85 

Preparation of response to defendants' request for documents 

per court order 3/26/85 

Conversation with Larry Menefee re preparation of response 

to defendants' request for production 3/27/85 

Conference with Bill Quigley and Steve Scheckman re 

preparation of response to defendants' request to produce 

on 3/28/85. Disallowed entirely. 

Conversation with Stan Halpin re deposition of Martin Feldman 

3/24/85. Disallowed entirely.  



PAGE 46 

SERVICES RENDERED 
  

Attended deposition of Gervis Leonard from 9:15 to 

11:45, travel from Gervis Leonard's office to legal 

defense fund office and discussed strategy re 

department of justice deposition from 11:45 to 1:00 p.m. 
on 4/24/85. Disallowed entirely. 

Conversation with Larry Menefee re hearing on 4/29/85 

Conversation with Stan Halpin re Martin Feldman de- 

position. Disallowed entirely. 

Preparation of supplemental affidavit and exhibits 
work on 5/1/85 

Review of Gervis' closing statement 5/1/85 

Preparation of supplemental affidavit and preparation 
for hearing on 5/2/85 

Conference with co-counsel and expert re hearing before 

Magistrate and travel and reviewing defense objections 

and exhibits on 5/5/85 

Hearing before Magistrate and various conferences with 

counsel on 5/6/85 

Court appearance 5/7/85 

  

49.3 

William Quigley requests compensation for Thirty-Nine and 65/100 (39.65) 

hours in connection with his activity in connection with assessment of 

attorneys' fees. By way of supplemental affidavit, Mr. Quigley has specified 

the activity, the date and the time for which he seeks reimbursement. The 

following constitutes the activities for which the court grants Mr. Quigley 

compensation:  



PAGE 47 

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY ALLOWED 
  

  

Preparation of attorney's fees affidavit from 
records 2/9/84 

Deposition preparation, deposition and meeting with 

Menefee, re: discovery 1/7/85 

Letter to court and letter to Menefee, re: change of 

address 1/15/85 

Received and review Louisiana interrogatories and letter 

from counsel 3/17/85 

Pretrial conference and meeting with counsel regarding trial 

preparation 3/30/85 2. 

Preparation of expert affidavits and letters to experts, 

preparation of supplemental expense, research affidavits 

4/5/85 

Received and review Louisiana objections to hours 

Telephone conference with Larry Menefee, re: testimony 

5/3/85 

Meeting with all counsel, re: trial preparation 5/5/85 

Trial and trial preparation re: exhibit maps, documen- 

tation for hours 5/6/85 

Trial 5/7/85 

Preparation of affidavit to State 5/10/85 

Preparation of affidavit for State 5/28/85 
TOTAL 

In all other respects, the activities for which Mr. Quigley seeks 

reimbursement are DENIED. 

 



PAGE 48 

Steven Scheckman seeks reimbursement for an added 34.6 hours in 

connection with the fee petition. The following constitutes the items for 

which the court allows reimbursement to Mr. Scheckman: 

WORKED PERFORMED HOURS ALLOWED 

Preparation of affidavit and time sheet from records 

1/19/85 2.0 

  

  

Deposition at Attorney General's Office 1/7/85 2.0 

Analysis for Attorney Menefee of number of depositions 

with numbers of attorneys for each party and number of 

exhibits, including subparts and letter re same to 

Menefee 2/13/85 

Preliminary review and analysis of State's objections to 
our attorney's fee request 4/9/85 

Attorneys fees trial and preparation for trial 5/6/85 

Attorneys Fees trial (I did not attend the entire day) 

5/7/85 

Preparation of supplemental affidavit and time sheet 5/11/85 

Preparation of testimony by review of State's objection to 

my fee request, detail analysis of State's exhibits A-K and 
outline of other testimonial topics of importance 5/11/85 

Attorney Fee trial 5/14/85 

Preparation of affidaavit re: State's objections to my fee 

request 6/2/85 
TOTAL 

In all other respects, Mr. Scheckman's requests for compensation in connection 

with the fee hearing is DENIED. 

R. James Kellogg 46.2 hours in compensable time in connection with the 

attorney fee litigation. The following constitutes the items which will be 

allowed to Mr. Kellogg:  



PAGE 49 

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY HOURS ALLOWED 
  

  

PCT Patricia Bower re: attorney's fees 3/19/84 +25 

Meet with Ms. Bowers 4/2/84 +50 

Phone calls with Bowers and Guinier 4/9/84 .50 

Phone call with Menefee, Lani, Bill and Steve 6/15/84 .50 

Phone call to Menefee 9/6/84 .25 

Phone call from nenefee 11/20/84 +30 

Deposition 1/7/85 .00 

Response to request for production of documents 

pursuant to court order 3/10/85 

Ibid 3/12/85 

Letter to Menefee re: request for production 3/13/85 

Review Louisiana interrogatories and letter from counsel 

3/17/85 

Phone call from Menefee 3/29/85 

Preparation for testimony; meet with Larry, Frank, Stan, 

etc. 5/4/85 

Review depostion, and prepare testimony; attorneys fees 

hearing 5/5/85 

Fees hearing 5/6/85 

Fees hearing 5/14/85 

Preparation of affidavit of objections 5/22/85 

Preparation of supplemental fees application 6/6/85 
TOTAL 

In all other respects the services for which Mr. Kellogg seeks 

reimbursement will be disallowed. 

Armand Derfner requests a total of 25.9 hours compensable time in 

connection with the attorney fee hearing. Since Mr. Derfner's claim has been  



PAGE 50 

disallowed on the main litigation, his time in connection with the fee hearing 

will likewise be disallowed in its entirety. 

In connection with the motion for attorney's fees, Stanley Halpin has 

requested compensation for seventy-three and 75/100 hours (73.75) hours. Of 

that requested amount, the following time will be granted to Mr. Halpin as 

compensable: ITEM HOURS ALLOWED 
  

Response to defendant's discovery regarding fees, 

document production, interrogatories. 11/19/84 

Response to defendant's discovery, documents to be 

provided. 11/24/84 

Preparation for Feldman deposition, review of materials 

produced by discovery from Feldman's firm. 4/20/85 

Preparation for Feldman deposition. 4/24/85 

Preparation for testimony, review of defendant's 

objections to specific time items (1.5); prepare with 
Menefee, review materials (2.0) in preparation for 
hearing. 5/5/85 

Hearing before Magistrate regarding fees; testimony of 
Strickler, Leonard, Etc. (5.5); Halpin testimony (3.0). 

5/7/85 

Dictation of supplemental affidavit in response to 
defendant's objections H, 1, J, RK. 5/18/85 

Dictation of supplemental affidavit in response to 
defendant's objection L (expenses) and remainder of 
affidavit. 6/1/85 

Confer with L. Menefee (2.25); deposition of S. Halpin 
re fees (3.0). 11/27/84. All other items billed for that 

date are DENIED. 

Preparation for Feldman deposition, reading and analysis 

of Leonard's deposition (2.5); deposition of Judge 
Feldman (2.0). 5/1/85. All other items billed for that 

date are DENIED. 

Hearing before Magistrate regarding fees (6.0). 5/6/85 
All other items billed for that date are DENIED. 

Preparation for hearing and hearing (4.0). 5/14/85 
All other items billed for that date are DENIED. 

TOTAL  



PAGE 51 

All other items requested by Mr. Halpin will be DENIED. 

Larry Menefee, counsel representing the aforementioned attorneys in this 

motion to assess fees, requests compensation for a total of two hundred 

sixty-six and 7/100 (266.7) hours in connection with the fee litigation. The 

State has acknowledged that it has no objection to the number of hours billed 

by Mr. Menefee for his legal work other than those hours incurred for travel. 

The court concurs with the defendant in this regard. There has been no 

showing of necessity to hire out of town counsel to handle the attorney fee 

matter. Competent counsel were present in New Orleans who could have been 

employed or alternatively Messers. Kellogg, Quigley or Scheckmann could have 

handled this aspect of the case. Accordingly, thirty (30) hours will be 

disallowed from the two hundred sixty-six and 7/100 (266.7) hours requested by 

Mr. Menefee, this being the number of hours billed by Mr. Menefee which were 

incurred for travel time. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760 (7th 
  

Cie. 1982), 

The reason that the court has disallowed all other items requested by 

counsel other than the above are several fold. First, counsel on the main 

demand exercised their discretion and hired Mr. Menefee, a stranger to the 

principle litigation, to represent them in the fee hearing. At the point that 

original counsel became clients of Mr. Menefee, there is no need that they 

charge, and that the State pay for, time spent in discussing strategy with 

co-counsel, reviewing depositions, sitting in on depositions and looking over 

Mr. Menefee's shoulder in their representation. They cannot assume the role 

of counsel and client at the same time. As counsel for a prevailing party,  



PAGE 52 

the original five (5) attorneys are entitled to reasonable compensation when 

they litigate their own claims for entitlement to Section 1988 fees. Johnson 

v. University College of the University of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 
  

1205 (11th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1979). 
  

It is not appropriate in every case for an attorney to hire counsel to 

prosecute his Section 1988 fee application and indeed cases where this is done 

are the exception and not the rule. Jonas v. Stacks, 758 F.2d 567 {11th Cir. 
  

1985). Since fees are being allowed to Mr. Menefee under a set of 

circumstances wherein it is marginal whether or not plaintiffs needed to hire 

him to pursue this attorney fee question, the court is most cognizant that 

there be no duplication of effort on the part of counsel and Mr. Menefee for 

which compensation is being allowed to both. Instead the court is making 

every effort to grant compensation for time expended by all counsel which 

constituted a bare bone necessity in carrying through with the litigation of 

this motion. 

There is also authority for the fact that Mr. Menefee is improperly 

before this court seeking a fee as he was not counsel of record in the initial 

litigation. Jonas v. Stacks, supra. However, since counsel who benefited 
  

from Mr. Menefee's representation could supplement their fee application to 

include his fee as a cost and/or expense, the court will address the issue as 

though Mr. Menefee were properly before the court in order to completely 

dispose of plaintiff's Section 1988 claim. 

The court thus finds that fee counsel and Mr. Menefee should receive 

attorneys' fees for a total of 436.05 hours divided as follows:  



PAGE 53 
ATTORNEY HOURS ALLOWED 

Stanley Halpin 43.25 
  

Lani Guinier 49. 

James Kellogg 38. 

Steven Scheckman 29. 

William Quigley 

Armand Derfner 

Larry T. Menefee 

Novelty and Difficulty of the Question 
  

The matter of calculating fees herein did not present a novel or 

difficult question. It was basically the collection of bookkeeping 

information in order to ascertain number of hours, hourly rate and customary 

fee. 

The Requisite Legal Skill 
  

These attorneys involved in this litigation were not operating in the 

field of their expertise in litigating this attorneys' fee motion. This 

proceeding required tedious gathering of information and supplementing the 

information with receipts to back up expenses. The matter required far more 

bookkeeping and accounting skills than it did legal skills. 

Preclusion of Other Employment 
  

Fee counsel suffered very small preclusion of other employment because 

they employed Mr. Menefee to represent them in this litigation. Preclusion of 

employment, as far as Mr. Menefee is concerned, is of no consequence. Mr. 

Menefee will be paid an hourly rate for his efforts in this matter. 

The Customary Fee 
  

Fee counsel have requested compensation at the same rate for which they 

sought compensation on the main demand. It is, however, unwarranted to grant 

counsel his or her best hourly rate attainable in their field of expertise 

when they are not functioning in an area where their expertise is needed.  



PAGE 54 

Flowers v. Wiley, 675 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1982). The court is of the opinion 
  

that an hourly rate of Eighty and no/100 ($80.00) Dollars per hour for 

original counsel is sufficient on the fee application. As to Mr. Menefee, an 

hourly rate of One Hundred and no/100 ($100.00) Dollars per hour is 

appropriate to reflect his added responsibility in coordinating this effort. 

Fixed or Contingent Fee 
  

Counsel handled this matter on a contingency fee basis. That is to say, 

no monies were received during this litigation to compensate Mr. Menefee or 

fee counsel for services rendered. However, there was very little risk of 

failure on the part of plaintiffs in this particular piece of litigation. 

Time Limitations Imposed by the Client or the Circumstances of the Litigation 
  

Again, this litigation proceeded along a reasonable time table. The 

court preceives no undue constraints upon counsel in meeting this court's 

deadlines. 

The Amount Involved and the Result Obtained 
  

Plaintiffs sought in excess of Eight Hundred Thousand and no/100 

($800,000.00) Dollars in connection with this fee application. The result 

obtained is to get approximately twenty-five (25%) percent of that which was 

requested. 

The Experience, Reputation and Ability of the Attorneys 
  

This has been commented upon under the same category in connection with 

the main demand. As far as Mr. Menefee's work is concerned, he also has an 

excellent reputation and has conducted himself with extreme professionalism 

throughout this entire matter. 

Undesirability of the Case 
  

The court sees nothing undesirable on the part of counsel in pursuing 

fees earned in connection with their efforts on the main demand.  



PAGE 55 

The Length of the Relationship with the Client 
  

The court cannot comment on the length of the relationship nor whether 

these attorneys will again employ Mr. Menefee to assist them in obtaining 

collection of their fees. 

Awards in Similar Cases 
  

The court is of the opinion that an hourly rate of Eighty and no/100 

($80.00) Dollars per hour is in line with the awards in other litigations. 

Flowers v. Wiley, supra. Bolden v. City of Mobile, supra. The court declines 
  

  

to grant a multiplier in connection with the attorney fee litigation, seeing 

no reason to augment a fair hourly rate. 

In connection with the motion for attorneys' fees Stanley Halpin has 

requested Four Hundred Thirty-Seven and 40/100 ($437.40) Dollars in expense 

reimbursement. Of the amounts requested, the following will be granted by the 

court: 

ITEM AMOUNT ALLOWED 
  

Mileage, round trip, Lafayette to New Orleans, 

miles at 21¢ per mile. 11/27/84 $57. 

Mileage, round trip, Lafayette to New Orleans, 

miles at 21¢ per mile. 5/1/85 

Lunch, Crepe Nanou. 5/1/85 

Mileage, round trip, Lafayette to New Orleans, 

miles at 21¢ per mile. 5/6/85 

Dinner, Tortia Flats. 5/6/85 

Hotel charge, Hotel Richelieu. 5/5 & 6/85 

Mileage, round trip, Lafayette to New Orleans, 

miles at 21¢ per mile. 5/14/85 

Dinner at Eddie's. 5/14/85 
   



PAGE 56 

The court awards these amounts based on the court's agreement that the 

mileage charged is a standard amount acceptable to most businesses. The other 

amounts are allowed based on the fact that Mr. Halpin has presented receipts 

to substantitate these payments. Of the other items requested, there have 

been no receipts presented to the court and therefore these amounts will be 

disallowed. 

Larry Menefee claimed Sixteen Thousand One Hundred Eighty-Seven and 

84/100 ($16,187.84) Dollars in expenses in connection with the attorney fee 

hearing. The State objects only to Mr. Menefee's expenses in four (4) areas. 

First, travel expenses related to his travel to New Orleans are questioned. 

These expenses will be disallowed in their entirety. There has been no 

showing to this court that competent counsel was not available in New Orleans 

for purposes of representing fee counsel. Mr. Menefee's travel expenses to 

and from the city therefore were unnecessary and shall not be charged to the 

State. The court has examined Mr. Menefee's affidavit as to expenses and 

finds that the sum of Nine Hundred Thirty-Eight and 62/100 ($938.62) Dollars 

relates to his travel expenses to and from the metropolitan area. 

The State objects to reimbursing Mr. Menefee for postage expended 

asserting that postage is a matter of overhead which should be included in the 

hourly rate. The court rejects the State's argument in this regard and will 

allow Mr. Menefee compensation for the full amount of his postage expenses. 

Thirdly, the State excepts to reimbursement for meals claimed by Mr. 

Menefee at Cafe Sbisa in the amount of Sixty-Two and 55/100 ($62.55) Dollars; 

Archna Indian Restaurant in the amount of Sixty-Four and 38/100 ($64.38) 

Dollars and Restaurant Jonathan for One Hundred Sixty and no/100 ($160.00) 

Dollars. Obviously, more than one person enjoyed a meal based on  



PAGE 57 

these prices. There has been no showing or discussion as to who the other 

parties to these meals might have been and the court declines to infer that it 

was Mr. Halpin or Ms. Guinier. The court will allow Twenty-One and no/100 

($21.00) Dollars on the Cafe Sbisa bill; Twenty-Three and no/100 ($23.00) 

Dollars on the Archna Indian Restaurant bill and Forty and no/100 ($40.00) 

Dollars on the bill at Restaurant Jonathan. 

Lastly, the State objects to a bill for Four Hundred Eighty-One and 

25/100 ($481.25) Dollars for photo copying requested by Mr. Menefee on the 

basis that there is no reference as to what was copied or for what purpose, 

thereby making an evaluation of the reasonableness of the expense impossible. 

The court concurs with the State in this regard. 

In light of the recent Fifth Circuit ruling in IWA, supra, the sum of 

Nine Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-One and 32/100 ($9,251.32) Dollars claimed by 

Mr. Menefee is further disallowed by the court. This sum represents an amount 

expended on experts which is not now compensable since not specifically 

provided for by statute. Accordingly, the sum of Five Thousand Three Hundred 

Thirteen and 72/100 ($5,313.72) will be awarded to Mr. Menefee in connection 

with his expenses in the handling of the attorneys' fee litigation. 

Lani Guinier seeks One Thousand Eight Hundred Fifteen and 80/100 

($1,815.80) Dollars in expenses incurred by the Legal Defense Fund in 

connection with the fee hearing. These expenses are itemized in Appendix B, 

C, D and E of Miss Guinier's affidavit entered into evidence as plaintiffs’ 

exhibit 8. With regard to the expenses claimed on Appendix B, the court 

allows all amounts requested for photo copying excepting the Fifty-Four and 

30/100 ($54.30) Dollars for photo copying on March 25, 1985. Miss Guinier has 

not presented contemporaneous records to support this expense. Rather the  



PAGE 58 

records which she has produced indicate photo copying in the amount of Seven 

and 10/100 ($7.10) Dollars and this figure will be allowed for a total of One 

Hundred fifteen and 85/100 ($115.85) Dollars in photo copying expenses. 

Furthermore, the full amount of Fourteen Dollars and no/100 ($14.00) in 

postage expenses will be allowed but all telephone calls amounting to Three 

Hundred Ninety-Five and 20/100 ($395.20) Dollars will be disallowed as there 

are no records from the telephone company to establish the amount billed to 

the Legal Defense Fund. The only records presented to the court are records 

indicating the date and time and number of minutes of these various telephone 

calls but there are no documents indicating the actual dollar amount paid by 

the Legal Defense Fund in connection therewith. Of the amount sought for 

postage and photocopying, a total of One Hundred Twenty-Nine and 85/100 

($129.85) Dollars will be allowed. 

Miss Guinier requests One Thousand Fifty-Two and 45/100 ($1,052.45) 

Dollars in reimbursement for travel, food and lodging in connection with the 

attorney fee motion. The court will allow Ten and 50/100 ($10.50) Dollars in 

transportation; Three Hundred Twenty-Four and 40/100 ($324.40) Dollars in 

hotel bills and Forty-Five and no/100 ($45.00) Dollars in air fare. It is 

unclear from the records presented by Miss Guinier as to the cost of her air 

transportation on May 5, 1985 from New York to New Orleans and the cost of her 

return flight. It is also unclear from the documents presented whether she 

flew coach class or first class on this occasion. The court feels a 

reimbursement for coach class fare is in order and will allow Miss Guinier to 

present, by way of letter to the court, information as to whether she flew 

coach class or first class and the amount expended therefore. All other 

requested amounts will be DENIED as unsupported by receipts.  



PAGE 59 

In Appendix D, Miss Guinier presents claims for special research, service 

of subpoenas and legal printing and mailing. The five and 85/100 ($5.85) 

Dollars service of subpoena expense will be allowed. The Forty-Seven and 

25/100 ($47.25) Dollars expense to Susie Wong for special research is 

disallowed. The nature of the research is not specified and if it pertains to 

the attorney fee motion Miss Guinier had counsel in the form of Mr. Menefee, 

who could have performed any such special research required. The Seventy-Two 

and 75/100 ($72.75) Dollars expense for copying and mailing information from 

Gingles v. Edmisten is disallowed. The nature of the material is not 
  

specified nor is the necessity. 

The Sixty-Five and 75/100 ($65.75) Dollars requested reimbursement 

outlined on Appendix E is DENIED in its entirety as being unrelated to the 

attorney fee motion, having been incurred at a point of time when the main 

litigation was still ongoing. 

In conclusion, the court feels constrained to comment upon the 

allegations made by plaintiff relative to the alleged failure of the defendant 

to settle this matter because ''the case was a political issue between the 

current and former State Administrations". The court notes that a settlement 

conference was conducted subsequent to the trial of this matter in 1985. 

Subsequent to that settlement conference, which occurred in late May, the 

State made a valid, significant and good-faith settlement offer to the 

plaintiffs. The amount of that settlement offer did not substantially vary 

from the amount awarded to counsel herein. This court does not consider that 

the State's choice to litigate is in bad faith when the amount of money sought 

by counsel herein was excessive and unrealistic.  



PAGE 60 
RECOMMENDATION 
  

It is recommended that the following amounts be awarded to counsel for 

fees and expenses in connection with the main demand: 

ATTORNEY FEE AWARD COST REIMBURSEMENT 
  

Stanley Halpin $38,526.30 $1,037.85 

GC. Lani Guinier 46,291.50 5,001.83 

E. James Kellogg 22,950.00 = - 

Steven Scheckmann 16,520.00 5,932.94 

William Quigley $11,681.60 =0 = 

Armand Derfner -) - -0 - 

$135,969.40 812,572.62 
  

  

It is further recommended that the following amounts be awarded to 

counsel for fees and expenses in connection with the motion to assess 

attorney's fees: 

  

ATTORNEY FEE AWARD COST REIMBURSEMENT 

Stanley Halpin $3,460.00 $391.85 

C. Lani Guinier 3,944.00 515.60 

R. James Kellogg 3,100.00 0 

Steven Scheckmann 2,328.00 0 

William Quigley 3,116.00 0 

Armand Der fner = Ouse 0 

Larry T. Menefee 23,670.00 55,313.72 

TOTAL $39,618.00 $6,221.17 
  

  

It is further recommended that to the extent this opinion provides 

counsel with the option of supplementing the record with information regarding 

airfare, counsel be allowed thirty (30) days within which to supply said 

documentation.  



PAGE 61 

It is further recommended that legal interest commence to run from the 

date of judgment until paid. 

New Orleans, Louisiana, this /0R day of Susy 
  

  

UNIZTED STATES MAGISTRAT 

FAILURE TO FILE Wihuitine OBoEC 02008 

THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATI 
CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WITHIN TEN DAYS 
FROM THE DATE OF ITS SERVICE SHALL BAR 
ANY AGGRIEVED PARTY FROM ATTACKING THE 
FACTUAL FINDINGS ON APPEAL. NETTLES V. 
WAINWRIGHT, 677 F.2d 404 (5th CIR. 1982).