Senter v. General Motors Corp. Court Opinion

    John KKNIKK, I’hiiiiliff-ApiH'lianl, 
Cross-Appollcc,

(JKNKRAL MOTORS CORI’ORATION, 
Defcnclant-ApiH'lli'o, CrosK-Appollant.

Nos. 7r>-12(i1,

United States Ooiitt of Appeals,
Sixth I'ireuit.

Argued Oet. 1, l ‘.)7r).

Decided .March 1, 197G.

Black former eni|)h)yee hrought Title 
VII class action against motor vehicle man­
ufacturer, alleging, inter alia, di.scriminato- 
ry promotional proceduri's. The Uniteil 
States District Court for tlu’ Southern Dis­
trict of Ohio, Carl H. Rubin, .1,, 88.2 F.Su|)p. 
222, held that |)laintiff’s discharge from em- 
|)loyment was not in retaliation for filing 
charges with the Kipial Kinployment 0|)p(jr- 
tunity Commission, hut that defendant had 
discriminated against tTiinority employees 
by denying them eipial opportunity for pro­
motion, and cross ap|)eals were taken. The 
Court of Appeals, Celebrezz(p Circuit .Judge, 
held that plaintiff had standing to rai.se 
issues generally applicable to the class; 
that while the proper procc'dure would have 
been for plaintiff’s attorney to indicate in 
the complaint that the suit was brought as 
a class action umhu- role 28 and to identify 
the relevant subheading of the rule, an<l 
while the district court also should have 
ruled on the maintainability of the class 
action “as soon as [iraciicable” after com­
mencement of the action, no one was misled 
as to the class nature of the action, and it 
would be to ignore the substance of the; 
proceedings below in f.ivor- of an excessive­
ly form.’distic adherence to the federal rules 
to now stale that the suit was not a class 
action; that plaintiff satisfiisl the reipiire- 
monts of federal class action rule; and th.at 
given the gross disparity between the num­
ber of blacks and whiles in supiTvisory 
positions, and the eipially gross disparity 
l)etween the percentages of blacks em­
ployed at the hourly and supervisory levels.

v. (JKNKRAD MOTORS COlO’.
Cltpas 532 I 2il 51 I

the <listrict court was not guilty of clear 
(‘iror in concluding lh.it such disparities 
were the result of defemlant’s subjective 
selection (irocess.

Affirmeil.

1. Civil Rights «=>M(1)
In Title VII class action brought, 

against motor vehicle manufacturer by 
black former employee who alleged, inter 
alia, that the manufacturer denied minority 
employees eipjal promotional opportunities, 
the district court's finding tliat plaintiff’s 
suspension and di.scharge after June of 1971) 
were not in retaliation for his continued 
protests against discrimination Wius sup­
ported by substantial evidence. Civil 
Rights Act of 1901, § 70'1(al as amended 12 
II.S.C.A. § 2000e .8(a),

2. Federal Civil I’rocedure <S=>I08
Standing is a threshohl ipiestion in ev­

ery federal case, determining the |>ower of 
the court to entertain the suit. IJ.S.C.A 
Const, art. 8, 1 et seip

8. Fwleral Civil I’riicedure <s=»108
(lenerally, standing is not granted to 

vindicate the rights of third parties. U.S.C 
A.Const, art. ti, § 1 et seip

4. FtMleral Civil Frocedure '*=>108
In respect to standing, it is not suffi­

cient that a complaint assert a “generalized 
grievance.” U.S.C.A.thmsl art. 8, § 1 et 
.seip

.I. Federal Civil FriK-ediire g=>108
To have standing, plaintiff must allege 

such ii personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to warrant his invocation of 
the federal court’s Jurisdiction. II.S.C.A. 
Const, art. 8, 1 et .sei|

(i. I''eder;il Civil I’locediiic
Accepted test for standing is one of 

“injur}' in fact,” and a court’s jurisdiction 
may be invoked ordy where the complaint 
alleges th.al plaintiff him.s. lf has suffered 
some threatened or actual injury resulting 
from the putatively illegal action. IJ.S.ttA. 
Const, art. 8, § 1 et seip

* .J"!



532 KKDKRAh I{K1’()KTEH, 2d SER IES

7. Eedcral Civil I ’riK-i'diire c=>l(l3
Onro ;ui individual has allcjicd a dis­

tinct and |ial|)al)lc injury to himscdf. ho has 
standiiifi to challenge a practice even if the 
injury is of a sort shared hy a large class of 
[jossibk  ̂ litigants. II.S.C.A.Const, art. 3, § I 
et seep
8. Civil Rights 13.11

Standing for purposes of the Civil 
Rights Act of Ithil was intended hy Con­
gress as broadly as perniilteil by Article III 
of the Cotistitution. tlivil Rights Act of 
IDM, § 701 et se(|. as amended 42 I!.S.C.A. 
§ 2000e et se(p; I'.S.C.A.Const, art. 3, 1 et
se(p
9. Civil Rights c=>41

Taking a broad view of standing in 
Title VI1 litigation is consistent with the 
clear weight of authority in other jurisdic­
tions and is also in keeping with the uniipie 
enforcement structure of th(! 190-1 Civil 
Rights Act which relegates much of the; 
responsibility for vindicating the policies of 
the Act to private; litigants. Civil Rights 
Act of 19t>t, § 701 et seep as amended 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seep

10. Ecderal Civil Procedure
It is not sufficient that an aspiring 

class rejeresentative allege purely pe-rsonal 
injury ;it the hands of the elefendant; to 
have standing to sue on bedialf of the cla.ss, 
he must be a member of the class and 
suffer injury common to tlu’ class. Feel. 
Rules Civ.l’reee-. rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

11. EtMleral Civil PrcK-edure <5=184
Offer e)f promotieen te> empleeyee feelleew­

ing his complaint to the Eeiueil Empleeyment 
Oppeertunity Commissieen of eliscriminateery 
lereemotieenal preece'ehires eliel met eiffect the' 
e'mpleeyce;’s steineling tee raise e'hiss issue'. 
Civil Rights Ae't eef IttOl, § 701 e'l se'ep ;e.'; 
ame'iiele'el 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e e't Seep

12. Civil Rights ©^11
If an empleeyer e'eeulel neg.ite' :iii eunphey- 

ee>’s stemeling tee chalh'iige' elise'riminateery 
empleeyment prae'tie'es by the simple; expe;eli- 
ent eef eeffe'ring him unilatendly the' relief 
he seeks feer the' class, the iieelivielual-initiat- 
eel e'lifeerce'iieent slrue'ture eef Title; VII

weeidel be; se'rieeiisly thrcatene;el. Civil Rights 
Ae't of 1901, § 701 et si'e|. as aim;neleel 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2lMM)e et seep

13. Fwlcral Civil PreK'cdurc ©=103 
Staneling is eletermineel as eef the elate

suit is fih'el.

14. Civil Rights ©=41
Siiece' plaintiff w :is  a blae'k neensupe't vi- 

seery empleeyee een the elate Title VI1 suit 
was fileel charging em|eleeyi;r with eli;nying 
inineerity empUeyee;s eepial preemotieenal eep- 
peertunities, phiintiff hael staneling tee reiise 
the; issue' eef allegcel eliscrimimitieeii by the 
e'lnpleeyer in selecting supe'i'viseers. Civil 
Rights Ae t eef 1964, § 701 et .se;ep as ame'nel- 
e'el 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e el se:ep

15. EeKleral Civil PreM-e'dure <5=184
Neet every suit alleging emieheynu'iit 

eliscriminatieen is suitable for chuss action 
treatment; a plaintiff must sheew Ihiit the 
aclieen satisfies the re'e|uiremenls eef feeleral 
class iictieen rule. Civil Rights Act eef 1964, 
§ 701 et seep as amenele'el 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2000e; et seep; Feel.Reih's Civ.l’reee'. rule 23, 
28 U.,S.C.A.

16. Fenleral Civil Pren'celure <5=l(il 
I’reevisieen of feeleral cliiss actieen rule'

that “lajs seeon as practicable after the com­
mencement eef an actieen bieeughl as a cla.ss 
eu'lieen, the; court shall eletermine' by eerelcr 
whellu'r it is tee be so maintaineel” is manela- 
teery anel the' elislrid ceeurl has a eluty lee 
e'e'rtify the chess aclieen whe'ther reepiesleel 
lee elee so or met. Feel.Rules Civ.l’reec. rules 
23. 23(c)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.

17. Feeleral Civil Proe'celiire <5=161 
•Meinel.'ete' e e f  fe'ele'ral e'lass iictieen rule'

that “|a|s seieeii :is prae'l ie'eible' afle'f the' e'eem- 
mi'Mce'me'rel eef ate tie'tieeii breeught as a class 
actieeie, the' ceeurt sh.'ill elt'lcrmine' by eeriler 
whe'ther it is tee be; see maintaiiK'd’’ is eebvi- 
eeusly elire'cteel tee the elistrie't ceeurt, anel it 
eleees met impeese upeen a plaintiff the tuleli- 
tieenal burelen eef ensuriieg that the; elislrict 
eeeurt adhere's tee that elirective. Fe;el.Rules 
Civ.Freer, rule's 23, 23(c)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.



SKNTKK V. (iKNKRAI- MOTORS ('OKI'.
Cilea5 532 l . 2iir>ll ( I 97fi)

lights 
0(1 42

dale

ipervi- 
II suit 
onying 
lal op- 
() raise 
hy the 

Civil 
amend-

loy merit 
action 

that the 
federal 

of 1964, 
U.S.C.A. 
rule 23.

lion rule 
the com- 
us a class 
by order 

IS inanda- 
duty to 

reiiuested 
roc. rules

'il
liotl rule 

r the com­
as a class 
hy order 

I” is ohvi- 
irl, and il 

Uie addi- 
ho district 
Fed.Rules 

'.S.C.A.

18. Federal (dvil I’roccdiire c^lHl
Il is not essential that an action 

brought under Title VII of the ( ivil Rights 
Act of 1964 be labeled a class action since it 
is [lerforce a sort of class action for fellow 
einjiloyees similarly situ.atcd. t ivil Rights 
Act of 196'!, § 701 et seq. as amimded 42 
U.S.C.A. § 20l)0e et s('q.; Fed.Rules Civ. 
IVoc. rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

19. Federal Civil Procedure Ci^ltil
While the proper procedure, in 'I'itle 

VII suit charging discrimin.atory promotion­
al procedures, would have been for plain­
tiff’s attorney to indicate in the conqilaint 
that the suit was brought as a class action 
under rule 23 and to identify the relevant 
subheading of the rule, and while the dis­
trict court also should have ruled on the 
maintainability of the class action “as soon 
as practicable” after commencement of the 
action, no one was misleil as to the class 
nature of the action, and it would be to 
ignore the substance of the proceedings be­
low in favor of an excessively formalistic 
adherence to the federal rules to now state 
that the suit was not a class action. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, § 7111 el se<i. as amend­
ed 42 U.S.C.A. § 2l)l)0e et .seip; Fed.Ruh;s 
Civ.Proc. rule 23, 28 U.S.C./V.

20. Federal Civil Procedure c-=16l
Clear trend is to read the federal class 

action rule functionally rather than forrnal- 
istically in litigation brought under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1961. Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, ^ 7111 et se<|. as amend­
ed 42 U.S.C.A. § 2l)l)()e et seip; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc. rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.

21. Federal Civil Procedure <s=̂ 62.$
Pleading under the feder.d rules is de­

signed to give notice to the court and other 
parties of the naluie ol the action and the 
relief sought.

22. F(Hleral Civil PriM-ediire Ce.̂ 161
Party seeking to ulili'/.e the class action 

device has the burden of establishing his 
right to do so. Fe<l.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 2.!. 
28 U.S.C.A.

23. F'ederal Civil l*r<M‘cdure c=>184
Title VII suit charging discriminatory 

promotional procedures brought by black 
former enqiloyee against motor v'ehicle 
manufacturer was maintainable as a cla.ss 
action, since the numerosily recpiirement 
was satisfied by jiroof that, over the periixi 
in (piestion, blacks compri.sed approximately 
14% of the substantial work force, since 
there was a question common to the cla-ss of 
whether the manufacturer’s [irocedures for 
making promotions had resulted in discrimi­
nation against minority employees, since 
the typicality requirement was .satisfied by 
proof that plaintiff’s inl(’resls were coex­
tensive with thos(? of the class on all issues 
(•(dating to the class, sinc(! plaintiff demon­
strated that he would ade<p(ately represent 
the class interests, and since the manufac­
turer had acted or refused to act on 
grounds generally applicable to the class. 
Fell.Rules Civ Proc. rule 23(a), (bX2), 28 
U.S.tVA.

21. Federal Civil PriK-edure c=»161
In ruling on a class action, a judge may 

consider reasonable inferences drawn from 
facts before him at that stage of the pro­
ceedings, and an appellate court will gener­
ally defer to the district court’s determina­
tion that a cla.ss is sufficiently numerous to 
make joinder impracticable. Fed.Rules ( iv. 
Proc. rule 23(a)(1), 28 11.S.C.A.

2.5. Civil Rights <3=»4f»
While it is manifest that every decision 

to hire, fire or discharge an employiH' may 
involve individind considerations, yet when 
that decision is made as part of class wide 
discriminatory practices, courts bear a s|k;- 
cial responsibility lo vindicate tlie [silicii's 
of Title \ I1 of the Civil Rights Act of P.161, 
regardles.; of the |iositioii of the individual 
{ilaint.iif. ('.ivil Rights Act of 1964, § (01 et 
sei[. as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et .seq.

26. Federal Civil PriM-edure <^161
Factual identity between plaintiff’s 

(dainis and those of the cla.ss he seeks to 
represent is not. neci'ssary. 1'ed.Riih‘s ( iv'. 
Proc. rule 23, 28 US.('.A.

-1

V - ;

t, ?:



532 I i;i)KUAL UKI’ORI'KK, 2d SKIMKS

27. Civil Hislils
Rua; (liscriTiiiiialion is peculiarly cla.ss 

(liscriminalion.

28. Civil UiKhfs «==!). 10
The operative fact in an action under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of lOM is 
that an individual has heen discriminated 
against because he was a inemher of a class. 
Civil Rights Act of Ithrl, § 701 et se<|. as 
amended '12 U.S.C.A. § 2()0tk; et seip

29. Fcnleral Civil Rrocediire c^ ltil, 105 
There are two criteria for determining

whether the named i)laintiff's representa­
tion of the class will he ade(piate: the rep- 
n'.sentative must have common interests 
with unnamed meml)ers of the cla.ss, and it 
must appear that he will vigorously protect 
the interests of the cla.ss through (pialifieil 
counsel. Fed.Rules Civ.l’roc. rule 23(a)(4), 
28 U.S.C.A.

30. I’jHlcral Civil I’roceduro >3=105
As plaintiff was a member of the class 

at the time class suit was filed, to that 
extent his claims were typical; and class 
membership was also relevant to the (|ues- 
tion of common interests, although it was 
not dispositive. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 
23(a)(3, 4), 28 U.S.C.A.

,31. Ftnleral Civil Procedure <0=105
To be typical, a representative’s claim 

need not iilways involve the same facts or 
law, provided there is a common elemeid of 
fact or law. Fed.Rules Civ.l’roc. rule 
2tl(a)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

.32. Fwleral Civil Pna-ediire <o=l81
Since black former employee, who fileil 

'I'itle VII class action charging discriminato­
ry promotional procedures, primarily 
prayeil for inJuticLive relief, his addiliorud 
reipiesi for ba<-k pay diil not preclude cerli 
fication of the suit as a 2;i(b)(2) class aelii>n 
f'eil.Rules (uv.l’roc. rule 2tt(b)(2), 2S U S. 
C.A.

.3.3. Ferleral Civil I’roccdure <3=101
Lawsuits alleging class wide discrimi­

nation are particularly well suited for 
23(b)(2) class treatment since the common 
claim is susceptible to a single proof and

subject to a single injunctive remedy. Fed. 
Rules t'iv.l'ns'. rule 23(b)(2), ‘28 U.S.UA.

34. Coin Is <3=100.3(9)
On issues of fact and creilibility, the 

Court (d' Appeals is bound by the “clearly 
erroneous" principle, but it is not so bound 
where the contention is that tlu; district 
court api)lie<l erroneous legal iirincijiles. 
Fed.Rules Civ.l’roc. rule 52(a), 28 U.S.C.A.

35. Civil Riglits <s=‘).10
Facially noniliscriminalory employment 

practices may U‘ stria k down if they have 
the practical effect of continuing jiast injus- 
t ices.

30. Civil Rights <3=13
.Statistical evidence is an important tool 

for placing seemingly inoffensive employ­
ment [ir.-ictices in their proper pers|)ective 
in Title VII cases. Civil Rights Act of 19t’4, 
§ 701 et se(|. as amended 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2IIOOe et seq.

37. Clivil Rights <3=44(1)
An employee is at an inherent disad­

vantage in gathering hard evidence of em­
ployment discrimination, |)urticularly when 
the discrimination is plantwide in sc(.i>e, and 
it is for this rea.son that the courts general­
ly acknowledge the value of statistical evi­
dence in establishing a prima facie cu.se of 
<liscrimination under 3’itle VII. Civil 
Rights Act of 190'L § 701 et .seep !is amend­
ed 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et .seep

38. ( ivil Itights <3=<’43
In title VII chess actieen charging elis- 

crimiieateay preuneetiejmil proceelures 
breiught by black feermer empleiyee against 
moteir vehicle manufiie'turer, the elistrict 
e’eeurl preepeu ly e'eensiele're el the' st.'itislie'ul evi- 
ele'iie'e' ill re'ae'hing the' e'eme'lusion that the' 
mamd ae'l uri'C hael illscrmiinati'd against his 
minoiilv i iuployi'i's in thi' seli'ition eif su­
pervisors Civil Rights Ae't eif HHll, § 701 
e't, seep as anu'nile'el 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et 
si'ep

.39. Cieil Rights <3=9.10
It is not eni'Ugh that tlu'i'e are' seime 

e'lnpleiymi nt opportunities iivailable to mi- 
neirily eniployee's; Title' VII reipiires that



there he eijiial employment opportunities 
aviiilal)le. Civil Rif^hts Act of lOltl, § 701 et 
seep as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c et seep

40. Civil iti^hts toil.lO
Given the f̂ reess elispiirity he'twe'e n thee 

number of lelaeks :inel whites in supemviseery 
j)e)sitions, anel the eepeally pn-eess elisparity 
between the percentap;e.s eif bleieks em- 
|)loyeel at the heeurly anel seipeu-viseery levels, 
the elistrict ceeurt, in Title Vll edass ae'tiem 
cluirKing eliseriminateiry premieetiemeil preee'e- 
eiures, was neet guilty e>f clear e rieer in ce>n- 
clueling that such eiisparities we're thee result 
of elefenelant e'lnjeleiyer’s subje'e'tive' se'le'Ctieen 
process, (.'ivil Rights Ael e>f Itlttl,  ̂ 701 et 
seep as ameneieel 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e' et se'ep

41. Civil Rights c=>i;{.i:!(l)
After it prima feiciee eaese' eef disiTimina- 

tion against bhicks in preuneetiemal eippeertu- 
nities hiiei been establislu'el by phiintiff, it 
was not erreer for the ceeurt te> tlu'ii shift the 
burelen to the empleeyer tee e.xplain why see 
few blacks h:iel been preemote'el eluring the 
perieeel in e|uestie)n, peirticidarly in light eef 
the elr.amatic successes e>f ne'W preemeetiemid 
preeceelures eieleepteel sheirtly the re'afte'r.

42. Civil Rights c=>i;{.i;i(i)
Once a prima facie' case' eef e nipleiyment 

eliscriminatieen in respe'e't tee preimotieenal eip- 
portunities has beeen imieh', ;e streeng pre- 
sumptieen ari.ses that inelividiud me'inbers eef 
the class weeidel have receivi'd preuneitieens if 
the .system luiel been basi-el e ntii'e'ly een me'r- 
it.

4H. Fwleral Civil I ’reeccdiire' ■5;='7.''>,7
Stateite eef limiteilieens is an .aff irm ative  

eiefense anel must be expressly I’aise'el eer el.se 
it is waiveel. Feel.Reilees Civ.l’nee' rule' 8(c), 
28 U.S.C.A.

I're'i',IV I’faire'i', ('(eudeii,
'.e'e'ke'i', ,Ieese'|eh I’. Heicluinau, Day-

(diarle's 
Crew & I 
teen, Ohiee, Russe'll ,1. Theeiieiis, .)r. 
Moteers Ceerp., Detreeit, Mich., feer 
Moteers Ceerp.

' Mon. .lam es I la rve y . l ln ite d  S ta les .Ind ia ' tni- the 
Eastern U is lr ic l o l M ich ig an , S on the rn  D iv i 
sion, s it t in g  by  des ljm ation .

Ik'feere CF.UUHRKZZU eenel RUCK. Cire'eiit 
.luelges, anel IIARVUY, Uistrie't .leielgen*

CFUF.HRFZZK, Circuit .luelge.
This is an appeeil freem ;i chess action 

bi'eeught euieler Title Vll eef the' lOlVl Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e' e't seep (1970).' 
Appelhint .John Si'iiter ap|ee.ds freem the 
jueigment eef the District Ceeurt that his 
elischarge freem e'lnpheyment !il Ge'iieral Mo­
teers' Inlanel Divisieen was met in re'lidiatieen 
for filing charges with the Fejual Kmpleey- 
ment Oppeerliinity Ceemmissieen edleging elis- 
crimineitieen in Inlanel's preemeetieenal preece- 
eleircs. General Meeteers creess-ii|epeals from 
the Ceeurt’s fineling that tlmy hael eliscrimi- 
nateei :ig:dnst mineerity empleeyees by eieny- 
ing them e'epial eeppeertunity feer preemeetieen. 
Our juriseiictieen is baseel eepeen 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e .'■e(f)(3) (197t)).

Jeehn Senter is <i lehick nude whee w.is 
eunpleeycel at Genenil Meeteers Inhinel Divisieen 
in Dayteeti freem 1907 until his eii.scharge in 
1973. During his pe'i ieeel eef I'mpleeyment, he 
eiiel not at any time' eee'e-eepy a seipervi.seery 
peesitieen. While ;m e nipleeyee' ;it Inhmel he 
was a ltH'mlee:r eef Ueee'al 87 eef the Uniteel 
Rubber, Ceerk, Lineele'eim & I’hestie', Weerkers 
eef America. In 1909, he w:is eiccte'el as an 
Altermitive Ceefiimitte'eunan iiutheeri/.cel tee 
represent empleeye'cs ite grieveene'c pren'e- 
eiures whi'll the [•e'gularly e'le'e te'el Ceeinmit- 
tecnuin was neet pre'seuit in the plant. It 
wiis in this c;ip;ie'ity th;et his Ireeeibles with 
Inhenel begem. lb' appeire'iitly tesek his 
eluties epiite si'rieeusly einel be'ceeieee inveelveel 
in threee elise'iplineiry ine'iele'tets.

The eenly ine'iele iet whie-h heis any re'levem- 
cy tee this eeppe'eel (eccurre'el in .lune eef l!)7t). 
Die .luiU' 8, 197tl, ppi'lhilit eiiili eiviere d to 
pri'si'iit a '‘Group ( irii'veiiici'” on prii'veini'i' 
forms provieli'd by managi'iiiciit. The' 
grie'vaiU'C e'harge'il GciU'ral Moliers with elis- 
criminating ageunst its minority I'lnployees 
in nuiking preeinotioiis to siipi'iwisor. The'

1. i l i r  D is tr ic t C 'mnt o p in in ti is rc p o itc d  ;ii 3H.1
I' Supi) 222 (S .D .O h io  197 D

H

f ’.*1 

*
.? n i



5.(2 I KDKKAI, KKI'ORTIOR, 2<l SKRIICS

whose nieinhefs are iiu'a|)al)le of specific 
eniimeralioii." •’’*

In summary, Appellant has satisfie<l the 
re(piirement,s of Rule Zi and is entitled to 
proceed with the class action. Ŵe nov̂ ' turn 
to the issue of whether the case was cor­
rectly decided on the merits.

|.‘(4| Tile court helow found that Appel­
lant had shown hy a prepomlerance of the 
evidence that Appellee had discriminateil 
a>>;ainst its minority employees hy denvinjr 
them an eipial ()|)portunity to ipialify for 
promotions.^’ Apiiellee contends that the 
record cannot su|)|)ort this conclusion. Our 

| j  >1 standard of review in this ca.se is twofold.
On issues of fact and credibility we aiH' 
bound by the “clearly erroneous” principle 
of Rule .52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
I'rocedure. Sec Miller v. I ’nileil Stales, 
sui>r:i at 2. However, we are not .so bound 
where the contention is that the district 
court applieil erroneous lefral prineijiles. 
See Sims v. Sheet Meta! Workers hit. Ass’n 
hoeal ti,% F.2d 1022, 1020 (Oth (hr, HI72).

|.d5| In Griegs v. Duke I ’ower Co., 101 
U.S. 121, 120, <)1 S.C.t. 84!), 8.52, 28 L.Fd.2d 
158, 102 (1071), the Supreme t'.ourt stated 
that practices neutral on their
fiwe . , cannot be maintained if
they o|>erate to ‘freeze’ the status ipio of 
prior discriminatory employment luactices”  
This circuit hits followed Grifrf>s in striking; 
down facially nondiscriminatory I'lnploy- 
ment |)ractices which have the practical ef 
feet of continuin>r past injustices. See 
I'almer v. General Mills, Inc., 512 F.2d 1010, 
1012 (0th ( ir. 107,5); Afro American I ’atrol 
mens hea);iie v. Duck, 502 F.2d 2!)1, .'(01 
(01 h Cir. 1074); Sims v. Sheet Metal Work 
eis lot. .I.s'.s n. Local fi.'i, supra at 1020; 
lleail V. I iniken Holler Insirinp' Co., |80 
F.2d 870, 870 (Olh Cir. 1072).

.4(). .S'cc Notes ol the  A<lvisur\’ ( 'o m m i l le e  on the 
I9(i(> A m eiu l incn ts  to tlic Icdc i . i l  Kales ol Cl\il  
I’m ccO uic ,  r e p n a l c d  in Mo(jie ' 2:i.01|IO. 2|

.'{7. i Supp. Ill 22s.

3S. I d  at 227

The District Court found that Inland’s 
promotional procedures had the (iractical 
I'ffect of lockinK minority cin|)loyees in the 
hourly ranks.“  Apindlee contends that this 
conclusion is invalid becau.se the District 
Court improperly allocated the burden of 
proof when it considered statistical evidence 
as p;irt of Appellant’s prima facie iui.se of 
discrimination thus shiftin^r the burden of 
production to Appellee to justify iLs promo­
tional jirocedures. Ajijiellee submits that 
the Supreme Cajurt establLshed the proper 
order of proof in Title VI1 cases in McDon­
nell DoukIhs V. Green, 411 U.S. 7!)2, 802, 92 
S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 20 D.Fd.2d 608, 677 (1972). 
Appellee arffues that a district court should 
not consider statistical evidence until after 
a plaintiff luus established a prima facie 
case and the defendant has had an opportu­
nity for rebuttal. At that point, acairdinj; 
to Aiipellee, statistics could 1k' introduced 
by plaintiff to imlicate whether ilefendant’s 
e.\planat ions of his conduct ari' frenuine or 
pretextual.

We cannot accept so limiteil a role foi­
st atistical evidence in Title VII cases, nor 
do we believe that the Sujireme Court in­
tended to limit the u.se of statisticid evi- 
<lence by its decision in McDonnell Douf>las. 
'Phe i.ssui- in that case was the allocation 
and order of proof in a private non-class 
action challentrinf? employment discrimina­
tion solely atriunst the individual complain- 
ant.59 The Court .specifically disclaimed 
any intention of establishiiifr a rijrid order 
of proof in Title VII ca.ses. "̂ We rejected a 
similar arpniment in //ai;̂ <-e,sen v. Anaconda 
Co., 510 F.2d .’(07, 212 (6th Cir. 1975), where 
this C-ourt refu.sed to adopt a literal reading 
of McDonnell Doufrias in an afre di.scrimina- 
tion ca.se. The only relevance of the 
(kmri’s di.'.cussion of statistics in McDonnell 
Doiiplas to our inipiiry is that they reco ĵ- 
nized the benefit of slalisticid evidence in 
di nionstral iiiK a “(general iwilicy and prac-

.ti*. I l l  II .s , || HOO, <).! ,S I 1 at l«2H, .'{U l..(;d.2il 
at t)7(>.

10. /(/ at M, i:t. i .S.Ct. at 1S2-I. .iti I. (-(i 2<]
il «;77