Outline Preparing for Argument

    I* Introduction (LRL). Outline of who will handle what part of 
argument.

II* Fname the case by outlining the theories of the case, careful 
proceedings below, exact status of the case on appeal. (LRL)

HI* Pnool of Violation by state and Detroit and state defendants with 
respect to Detroit. (LRL)

IV. Proof of Violation by state and state and Detroit defendants 
•̂long Detroit school district lines and effecting racial 
composition and identity of schools throughout the metropolitan 
area; and status of school districts and state defendants under 
Michigan lav/. (LRL)

V. Outline of Remedial Proceedings with particular reference to
District Court’s interest in allowing all interested parties to 
be heard at an appropriate time, the magnitude of the task, 
and the need for prompt remedy; primary burden of state defendants 
with respect to metro. (JHF)

VI. Outline of Remedial Theories Requiring Metro; none involve
gerrymander of school district boundaries nor dejure acts of 
segregation by suburban school districts within their respective 
districts. (JHF)

VII. Detroit-only Plans - non-plans of Detroit Board, legal and 
factual inadequacy (J.H.F.)

VIII. Legal and factual support for Metro; state defendants default 
in submitting a plan; limitation of metro hearing to shaping 
sharply and quickly the development of a plan for hearing and 
implementation; area is "conservative" and subject to change 
in facS of actual plan; order and opinion give guidance to 
planning, required by exigencies of the circumstances. (But 
this Court need not express its view on area or details of opinion, 
ala Kalamazoo.)

IX. Rule 19 issue; as no plan has been before the Court and no
plan ordered, suburbs who are not parties have not been denied 
opportunity to be heard prior to implementation; opportunity to 
be heard relates only to relief (and all but 18 have had that 
opportunity as fully as any of the parties). Therefore, no error



committed m  District Court and Metro rulings should not be 
vacated. Moreover, it is plaintiffs’ position that suburban 
districts are not necessary parties yfor relief reasonably 
can be accomplished among the parties already present_>ala T.E.A. 
Only if suburban districts, like any other entity, obstruct 
implementation of plan should they be joined as parties pur­
suant to Rules 21 and 19, like City Council in Nashville or 
authorization to join tax collector. In any event, this Court 
should give guidance to the District Court on when suburbs must 
be joined, which ones, and of what the opportunity to be heard 
consists. (J.H.F.)
Conclusion (Nate)
A. Not a racial balance, white majority case. Rather eliminate

containment of 175,000 blacks in hundreds of schools
u*, vtv-K- - y . x *  * v' .designated for blacks/, t*? Only effective remedy is maximum

actual desegregation (not dispersal of blacks because two-way)
and substitution of schools without any racial identity
within the relevant area of feasible desegregation for
pattern of black schools and white schools. In context
of Detroit case, that means most schools may be majority
white; in context of southern black belt, that means
pattern of schools predominantly black; in South Dakota,
pattern of schools virtually all white.

B. Timing. Delay is no longer tolerable, two full school years 
after finding of violation. District Court, even under 
most inflexible reading of Rule 19, has comitted no error; 
therefore, District Court's rulings should be affirmed,
but, at a minimum, no basis for vacating/any but the

T' :-i /; ‘a<u
transportation order. -Xl^sSue/opinion modified so as

, ’ ii '
4  .n r  t  k . ' O  r r A  -  o ,  ■t . . anot to vacate Metro Prop, and Rulings,/issue mandate 

immediately with reissuance of modified opinion^ Any dissent 
can be noted and filed later. That will allow both prompt 
Supreme Court review of the critical legal issue and the
immediate development of a plan of desegregation for prompt



hearing by all parties^either interested who apply or who 
are deemed necessary by this or the District Court. This 
case concerns the denial of rights to plaintiff children; 
the right to a remedy has V'ested long ago, but the procedural 
mechanics of relief and state defendants* default have 
too long delayed relief.

3