Administrative Interventions Upon Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination by James J. Fyfe

    ADMINISTRATIVE INTERVENTIONS UPON 
POLICE SHOOTING DISCRETION:
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION

James J. FyfeNew York City Police Academy
235 East 20 Street
New York, New York IOOO3

Accepted for publication by the Journal of Criminal 
Justice. Pre-publication citation or reproduction is 
not authorized.



Abstract

In August, 1972, the New York City Police Department 
promulgated administrative shooting guidelines and shooting inci­
dent review procedures far more restrictive than formerly operative

istatutory "defense of life" aind "fleeing felon" justifications for 
police shooting. Using a data base which includes all reported 
New York City police firearms discharges and serious assaults on 
police between 1971 and 1975r this paper examines the effects of 
those changes on shooting frequencies, patterns and consequences.

The research finds that great decreases in "fleeing 
felon" shootings, "warning shots" and shooting opponent injuries 
and deaths are associated with these changes. In addition, de­
creases in line of duty officer deaths and serious injuries suggest 
that such organizational attention to police-citizen violence 
impacts favorably upon these phenomena as well. The paper then 
discusses implications of these findings.



Perhaps the major anachronism of the American system 
of justice is the discretionary latitude it allows many of its 
police officers in the use of their firearms as a means of 
"deadly force". While the system— and the society argue and 
agonize over the "death penalty issue", police shootings gener­
ally draw little attention. It is likely, in fact, that the 1977 
execution of Gary Gilmore generated more publicity and debate 
than did the more than 25OO police shooting deaths which occurred 
during the ten year period between that event and the last previous 
court ordered exercise of "deadly force" (Milton, et al., 1977«33).

It is true that police deadly force differs dramatically 
from court death sentences. Police often use their firearms as 
the "last resort" against real and imminent peril; they often 
have no choice but to shoot. Judges who elect to impose the 
death penalty, in contrast, usually select it from among a range 
of alternatives after lengthy deliberation in the safety of their 
chambers. Despite these differences, it is ironic that the system 
has devised rigid devices to control and review court death sen­
tences, but has generally maintained a "hands off" policy where 
police decisions to shoot are concerned. Indeed, the system 
zealously controls the courx's power to take lives upon evidence 
of "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt", but frequently allows its 
police a blank check in deciding whether to not to shoot at those 
they have "probable cause" to arrest.



Police '~̂hootinrr̂ ;̂; lGr:a.l Controls and Heviev/ Frocedure;

More specifically, while Milton, et al., (1977: 
detect both a "recent eagerness of the judiciary to impose re­
straints upon police conduct" and an increase in the number of 
civil actions alleging excessive police force, police shooting 
discretion in many jurisdictions is limited only by the broad 
common law "fleeing felon" and "defense of life" rules (National 
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 
1973s18). In addition, police shooting is often subjected to 
review procedures of questionable effectiveness (Harding and 
Fahey, 1973).

The "fleeing felon" rule is very briefly, but accurately, 
described by Wilson as police "authority to use deadly force to 
prevent escape from any felony charge" (1972). Milton, et al., 
(1977:39) note that this principle was defensible when "virtually 
all felonies were punishable by death", but question its v/isdom 
in an era in which the death penalty is all but extinct.

An only slightly lengthier definition of the "defense of
life*" rule is offered by Rhine (1978:53^):

(The police officer's) general right to use deadly 
force for defense of self and others against threats 
of death and serious bodily action. In addition, lav/ 
enforcement authorities never have a duty to retreat 
before using deadly force, and may always use this 
for defense of others solely upon reasonable belief 
that they are being threatened v/ith death or serious 
bodily harm.



The most striking features of these guidelines are 
brevity and breadth. Further, while' many states have supple­
mented them by legislating more narrow and cleaxly delineated 
statutory limits on police shooting discretion, the record 
suggests that police officers are rarely penalized for violating 
them.^ The adjudication of violations of either codified common 
law principles or more restrictive legislative guidelines requires
that they be subjected to the criminal process. Here,' one finds

2that, even among those cases which do come before the courts,
often the only civilian eye witness to a police.shooting is its
subject— if he survives. The only version of a police shooting
which comes to court attention, therefore, is likely to be that
of the police involved. Further, even where alternative versions
are offered, the prosecutor involved must decide to take action
before a case reaches trial. Several reasons have been proposed
to explain the reluctance of district attorneys to do so. Rhine
(1968:856) suggests that it is very difficult to prove criminal
intent in police killings. Harding and Fahey (1973«298, 299) point
out that elected prosecutors may find that both constituent concern 

«
with "law and order" and the need to maintain a cooperative re­
lationship with police mitigate against such prosecutions.

Police Shootinrs; Administrative Controls and Review Procedures

The broad nature of legal restrictions on police shooting 
discretion and the difficulties of enforcing them have led many to



argue that police agencies should formulate narrower administrative 
guidelines and internal procedures for review of shootings 
(President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice, 1967:189, 190; American Bar Association, 1973«125-131)• 
Milton, et al., (1977:^5-57) report a "clear trend" toward the 
adoption of such policies. They note also, however, that where 
administrative standards are operative, they vary widely and are

I.

frequently self-contradictory or (perhaps intentionally) vague.
As a result, "their impact on the conduct of police officers is 
questionable". Further, the adoption of administrative guidelines 
and review procedures is often resisted by police who perceive 
such rules as arbitrary restrictions on their ability to defend 
themselves (Berkley, 1969: McKiernan, 1973). This argument is 
based on the premise that such regulations would promote police 
reluctance to shoot when necessary for self-defense out of fear 
that their split-second, life or death decisions will be subject 
to leisurely "second-guessing" (Rubinstein, 1973*333)•

• ■ New York City: A Test Case
One agency which has adopted clearly delineated admin­

istrative shooting guidelines and review procedures is the New 
York City Police Department. In August, 1972, that department 
promulgated "Temporary Operating Procedure 237" (T.O.P. 237), a 
directive which narrowed officer shooting discretion considerably 
more than do New York's statutory provisions. In addition, T.O.P.
237 established a high level "Firearms Discharge Review Board" (FDRB)



to investigate and adjudicate all officer firearms discharges.
T.O.P. 237 refined New York's Penal Law restrictions 

on police shooting (which are based upon the American Law 
Institute's 1962 Model Penal Code and which permit officer use 
of deadly force to "defend life" or to arrest for several specified 
"violent felonies") by providing that:

a - In all cases, only the minimum amount of
force will be used which is consistent with 
the accomplishment of a mission. Every other 
reasonable means will be utilized for arresting, 
preventing or terminating a felony or for the 
defense of oneself or another before a police 
officer resorts to the use of his firearm,

b - A firearm shall not be discharged under circum­
stances where lives of innocent persons may be 
endangered,

c - The firing of a warning shot is prohibited.
d - The discharging of a firearm to summon assistance 

is prohibited, except where the police officer's 
safety is endangered.

e - Discharging a firearm at or from a moving vehicle 
. . is prohibited unless the occupants of the other 

vehicle are using deadly physical force against 
the officer or another, by means other than the 
vehicle. (NYPD, 1972:1)
Except for some minor changes in 1973 (NYPD, 1973:2), 

these provisions have been operative since 1972, So too, has the 
FDRB, which is chaired by the Chief of Operations (the department's



highest ranking officer), and which also includes as members tv.’o 
Deputy Police Commissioners and the supervisor of the Police 
Academy's Firearms Unit. FDRB is empowered to conduct hearings 
at which it may question civilian witnesses, the officer involved, 
his commander or any other officers. Its findings are submitted 
in the form of recommendations to the commander of the officer 
involved. These, a review of case dispositions reveals, fall 
into one or more of the following•categories:

1 - the discharge was in accordance with law and
department policy

2 - the discharge was justifiable, but the officer
should be given additional training in the use 
of firearms or in the lav/ and department policy

3 - the shooting v/as justifiable under law, but
violated department policy and warrants 
department disciplinary action

4 - the shooting was in apparent violation of law
and should be referred to the appropriate 
prosecutor, if criminal charges had not already 
been filed

5 - the officer involved should be transferred (or
offered the opportunity to transfer) to a less 
sensitive assignment

6 - the officer involved should be the subject of 3psychological testing or alcoholism counselling-^
T.O.P. 237 became the core of this study, which attempts 

to examine the impact of that directive on the frequency, nature 
and consequences of police shooting in New York City,



Data Sources ....

The primary data for this study consist of ^904 "Firearms 
Discharge/Assault Reports”, or all those filed by officers who had 
reported discharging their firearms (n=3827) and/or being the sub­
jects of "serious assaults" (assaults with deadly weapons and/or which 
resulted in officer death or serious injury) between January 1, 1971 
and December 31, 1975. These TDAR" reports, supplemented by various 
personnel records, were converted to computer mode and analyzed using 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (Nie, et al., 1975)*

V/e would have preferred to have included in this data 
set reports on shootings and assaults on officers which occurred 
during the two or three years immediately prior to 1971. While 
this endeavor might have strengthened our analysis by providing a 
clearer description of shooting frequencies and patterns before 
the promulgation of T.O.P. 237, we were precluded from undertaking 
it by the unsystematic and incomplete shooting and assault data 
available for prior years. Of necessity, therefore, we contented 
ourselves with the inclusion of data on shootings and assaults on 
officers reported during the nineteen months preceding T.O.P, 237.

A potential weakness of this data base (or of amy other 
which consists of incident reports) involves the degree to which 
events have not been reported or have been inaccurately reported. 
Because officers who fired justifiably would not be disciplined 
for shooting but would be charged for failing to report, we con­
cluded that missing data would most often include shooting of



10

questionable justifiability. Even in vi.qlative cases, however, 
officers would be unlikely to omit reports of shootings in which 
they had (or thought they might have) hit someone or something.
They would also be unlikely to omit reports of shootings perceived 
as likely to be brought to official attention by third parties, 
including their colleagues. Because of New York City's population 
density and because its police rarely work alone, it is unlikely 
that more than a very few police could fail to file incident re­
ports in confidence that their shootings would not otherwise come 
to light. V<e concluded that the problem of missing data was of 
minimal import.

The problem of inaccurate reports was viewed as more 
substantive. Following T.O.P. 237's ban on warning shots, for 
example, we had found a great and unexpected increase in reported 
accidental "shots in the air" fired by police who "tripped on 
curbs" while pursuing fleeing suspects (Fyfe, 1978j316-328).
FDRB generally recommends disciplinary action against officers 
who fire warning shots, but usually refers accidental shooters to 
non-fJunitive "tactical retraining" classes. It is probable, there­
fore, that this specific pattern change reflects altered reporting 
behavior rather than changes in actual field behavior. To minimize 
the effects of this and any other distortions, we attempted to limit 
our analyses to variables reasonably immune to reporting bisis.^

Analysis
Shootings and Intra-Communitv Violence

In related research (Fyfe, 1978132-106), we had found



11

strong correlations among the geographic distributions of shooting 
incidents, arrests for felonies against the person and reported 
murders and non-negligent manslaughters (Pearson's r = +.62 and 
+.78, respectively). Therefore, we commenced the present investi­
gation by examining the relationships among these variables over 
the five years studied. If we found that these associations also 
existed over time, it would be reasonable to conclude that changes 
in shooting frequencies were at least in part attributable to these 
nonorganizational variables.’

Table 1, which contrasts annual shooting incidents (which
may include one or more officer shooters who fired at the same time
and place) with reported criminal homicides and arrests for felonies
against the person, presents strong evidence to the contrary. After
peaking in 1972, homicides remain fairly constant over the period
studied (the relatively large 1973-197^ decrease is only,a 7.5 per
cent decline), while arrests register a regular annual increase and
firearms discharge incidents decline annually after a large increase
between 1971 and 1972. More specifically, columns four and five
reveal considerable variation in annual ratios of homicides/shootings
and arrests/shootings before and after the promulgation of T.O.P. 237,
In 1971, there were 2.33 reported criminal homicides for every police
shooting in Nev/ York City; this ratio declines slightly (to 2.11)
in 1972, then increases considerably over 1973 and 197^ to a high
of 3.67 in 1975. Perhaps most significant for the purposes of
police administrators, the table indicates that the annual ratio
of arrests/shootings has been nearly doubled over the five years
studied (from ^7.62 in 1971 to 86.88 in 1975)*

>
(Insert Table 1)



12

TABLE 1 .

REPORTED MEW YORK CITY MURDERS AMD MOri-NEGLIGENT 
MANSLAUGHTERS, ARRESTS FOR FELONIES AGAINST 
THE PERSON, AND POLICE FIREARI'.S DISCHARGE 

INCIDENTS BY YEAR, 1971-1975

Year Reported
Homicides^

Felony 
Arrests^-* ̂

Police
Firearms
Discharge
Incidents

Ratio
Homicides/
Shootings

Ratio
Arrests/

Shootings
1971 I 8 . 2f:

(1^66)
17.1“̂(30002) 2 1 . 5%(630) 2.33 47.62

1972 2 1 . 0%
(1691)

18.9%(33070) 27.5f-(803) 2,11 41.18

1973 20.9(̂I68O)
2 0 . 1 %

(35163)
19.6f

(574) 2.93 61.26

197^ 19.3%
(155 )̂

21.7f̂ 
(37971)

1 6 . 1 %
(471) 3.30 80.62

1975 20.5%
(1645)

22.2% 
(38922) 1 5 . 3%(448) 3.67 86.88

Totals 100.0^̂  ̂
(8036)

100. Of, 
(175128)

100. Of,
(2926) 2.75 59.85

^Calculated from; New York City Police Department (December, 
1971-1975). Monthly arrest report.

“includes murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, 
robbery, felonious assault.

^Subcell percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.



13

T.O.P. 237
The decline in reported shooting incidents in the face 

of a continuing increase in arrests since 1972 suggests the 
intervention of another variable. A logical first subject of 
investigation in looking for such an event is T.O.P. 237, which 
became effective in late 1972, after which the relationship seems 
to have changed. Our examination of the association of T.O.P. 237 
with decreased shooting frequencies commenced by dividing the 
five years under study into two month periods and displaying the 
number of reported officer shooters and shooting incidents for 
each, as per figure 1. The two month observation periods were 
chosen to refine the trend as far as possible without losing 
information! they reduce the total of observations from sixty 
to thirty and allow for the data to be cut September 1, close 
in time to T.O.P. 237 (August 18, 1972) and its slightly altered 
successor, I.O. 118 (August 27* 1973)*

(Insert Figure 1)

The chart, and the overall r's of -.62 and -k64 for 
officer shooters and shooting incidents, indicate that both 
phenomena have fluctuated somewhat, but have been declining 
steadily since the period during which T.O.P. 237 became 
effective "officer shooters" show a peak of 210 during May and 
June, 1972, decline to 175 during July and August, 1972 and never 
again reach either level. Similarly, "shooting incidents" peak 
at 1^9 during the May-June, 1972 period, decline to l4l during 
July-August, 1972 and remain below those levels for the duration



FIGURE 1
NEW YORK CITY POLICE FIREARIS DISCHARGES 

JANUARY 1, 1971-DECEMBER 31, 1975 
IN TWO MONTH PERIODS‘

250
T n ~ ? T7 I . C .  115

200

overall
Officer I/7I-8/31/72 
Shooters 9/72-12/75
Incidents overall

1/71-8/31/72
9/72-12/75

150

100

50..

1972 1973 197^
n = number of bi-monthly periods.

1975

reported officer 
hooter

reported shooting 
incidents

r r2 n^
- .6 2 .38 30-f .88 .77 10
- .7 0 .^9 20
-.6/» .^1 T•t.9̂ .88 1
- .6 6 20

■t



FIGURE 1
NEW YORK CITY POLICE FIREARf.S DISCHARGES 

JANUARY 1, 1971-DECEMBER 31, 1975 
IN TWO MONTH PERIODS'

n

250

200

150

100

T.C.F. 237

overall = -.62 .38 30
Officer 1/71-8/31/72 = .88 .77 10
Shooters 9/72-12/75 = - .7 0 .^9 20
Incidents overall = - , 6k .^1 nn

1/71-8/31/72 = +.9^ .83
9/72-12/75 = - .6 6

1971 1972 1973 1974

= number of bi-monthly periods.

1975

reported officer 
shooter
reported shooting 
incidents



15

of the period studied.
One cannot argue, of course, “that incident declines are 

entirely attributable to T.O.P. 23?. Indeed, the "shooter" and 
"incident" r^ values of .38 and ,4l serve notice that less than 
half these'variations are explained by the passage of time. Many 
other variables over which the department has little or no control 
(e.g., economic and social conditions, the numbers of officers 
available for street duty) are certain to have impacted upon these 
frequencies. On the other hand, splitting the chart at September 1, 
1972 produces Pearson's r values of-f.88 (officer shooters) and+.9^ 
(shooting incidents) for the earlier period and respective r's of 
- ,7 0 and - .6 6 for the latter. It is evident, therefore, that 
T.O.P. 237 was accompanied by rather dramatic changes in the fre­
quencies with which New York City police officers reported dis­
charging their firearms.

1.0. 118
The second department firearms policy statement was

1.0. 118, which was issued on August 27, 1973- The major purposes 
of this directive were to clarify T.O.P. 237’s ambiguities and
to establish decentralized "area level" review boards,^ but the 
document appears at the beginning of a six month decline in shoot­
ing incident frequencies and an eight month decline in officer 
shooter frequencies. Some percentage of these decreases may be 
attributable to a "cold weather" slump. But the declines continued 
in the absence of other possible explanations (e.g., the department 
was, at that time, adding to its ranks; reported homicides and 
arrests for violent crime did not show similar declines, etc.).



16

and are at least as severe and as long as those which followed 
the issuance of T.O.P. 237.

Because so few observations are included in this second 
period, it was decided not to attempt to test their possible 
significance statistically. It would be interesting, hov/ever, to 
continue following the frequencies of shooting incidents and re­
ported shooters consequent to other clarifications, procedural 
alterations and minor discretionary changes. If further declines 
occ\irred, one might postulate that substantial influence is exerted 
upon shooting frequencies by continuing emphasis on limits to in­
dividual officer discretion and/or the institution of decentralized 
reporting and review procedures.
Weekly Weans

The two month periods studied thus far are, of course, 
rather inexact and may be criticized if used as a basis for com­
parison because they include varying numbers of days. July/August 
periods, for example, encompass sixty-two days, while January/ 
February includes only fifty-nine (in all years except 1972, which
was a leap year). In addition, bimonthly figures do not allow the «
data to be split precisely at the effective date of T.O.P. 237 
(August 18, 1972).

To provide more comparable figures, the five years under 
study were therefore split at midnight, August 18, 1972 and means 
of reported officer reason for shooting were computed weekly for 
each period (period 1 weeks = 85.1; period 2 = 175*7)• The results



A (

are presented in table 2. Its column totals reveal that a weekly 
mean of 18.^ officers reported discharging their firearms prior 
to T.O.P. 237 and that this figure dropped to 12.9 officers after 
the directive became effective (this represents a decrease of 
29.9 per cent). Further, the table shows important changes in 
the reasons given by officers in reported discharging of firearms 
(p = .OOlj V = .28). Indeed, while the weekly mean reported 
"defense of life" shootings have decreased (from 11.9 to 9.0), 
the pre-T.O.P. 237 percentage for these shootings (65.8 per cent) 
has increased since the order (to 70.6 per cent). Concomitantly, 
both the weekly mean and percentage of "prevent/terminate crime" 
shootings (usually "fleeing felon" situations) have decreased 
substantially (from 3.9 and 21 .̂  per cent to .6 and h . 6 per cent 
respectively). Conversely, table 2 demonstrates that both the 
weekly means and percentage of suicide attempts have remained 
relatively constant. As one would expect, T.O.P. 237 has little 
effect in deterring suicides.

(Insert Table 2)
Warning Shots

I

While table 2 demonstrates reduced shooting frequencies 
and varying reported reasons for shooting, it leaves unanswered 
many questions about other consequences of T.O.P. 237* Its fre­
quencies, for example, are confounded because they include warning 
shots, which were not treated separately but were coded on the 
basis of the officer shooter's reported intent. If, for example, 
a police officer fired a shot into the air in an attempt to stop



TABLE 2

MEW YORK CITY POLICE OFFICER SHOOTER 
REPORTED REASON FOR SHOOTING,

PRE AND POST T.O.P. 237, 
INCLUDING WEEFJLY r.iEANS

18

Pre Weekly 
T.O.P. 237 Mean

Post Weekly
T.O.P. 237 I‘=ean

Weekly 
Totals Mean

Defense
of

Life
6 5 . 8%
(1016)

7 0 , 6fo _ _ 
(1582) 6 7 , 9% 10.0

(2598)

Prevent/
Terminate

Crime
21.^%  ̂Q
(330)

4.67,  ̂
(103)

11.3/'’ 1 n (433) 1-7

Destroy
Animal

0(68)
1 1 .^% . - 
(255)

8.^/ . P(323)

Suicide
Attempt

0.7<> , 
(11) (18)

0.8f7 •
(29)

Accidental 3.6?5 ,
(56)

9 • 0v« . p (201) (257)

Other
i

(63)
3.77 b
(83)

3.87.  ̂(146)

Totals UO .Sfo 1 Q h(1562)
■ 59.2/.
(2265) ^

100.0;;̂  .
(1827)b

chi-squa.rc = 31S.S2 
P = .001
V = .28

^ubcell percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.
^All column totals include 18 pre-T.O.P. 237 and 23 post- 

T.O.P. 237 cases in v/hich reason for shooting was not rcoorted,



a fleeing 'burglary suspect, his shooting would be classified as 
"prevent/terminate crime" and would be included in table 2. What 
table 2 does not provide, therefore, is a measure of T.O.F. 237's 
effect in reducing shots fired ^  fleeing burglars or other 
opponents.. Instead, it indicates that prior to T.O.P. 237, 3.9  

officers per week reported discharging their firearms to prevent 
or terminate crimes, regardless of whether or not they fired at. 
or over the heads of, suspects, and that this mean has subsequently 
declined to .6. Since, in addition to mandating the use of "every 
other reasonable means,.,for arresting, preventing or terminating 
a felony...before a police officer resorts to the use of a fire­
arm", T.O.P. 237 flatly prohibits warning shots, one might expect 
that much of the decrease discussed above is attributable to 
smaller warning shot frequencies rather than to reduced numbers 
of shootings at human targets.

To control for this possibility and to better measure 
relative frequencies of officers who shot at targets (except, 
obviously, accidental shooters), table 3» which excludes all 
officers who reported, firing only warning shots, was calculated. 
This* table presents some important differences from the data in 
table 2. Its total (3^13 shooters) indicates that ^14 of the 
shooters reported in the previous table had fired only warning 
shots. Further, most of the reported warning shots (304 of the 
4l4) took place during the period preceding T.O.P. 237. Conse­
quently, the weekly mean number of officers who reported firing 
"in defense of life" during the early period has declined to 10.6  

ard the weekly mean "prevent/terminate crime" shooters is almost



20

halved from 3.9 to 2.0). While this table's exclusion of "warning 
shots" still leaves significant pre/pos-t T.O.P. 237 differences 
in the mean weekly frequencies of reported reasons for shootings, 
the differences shrink considerablyj indeed, the relative per­
centage of reported "defense of life" shootings decreases.^ In 
terms of weekly shots fired at people, however, this table also 
demonstrates significant decreases following T.O.P. 237*

(Insert Table 3)

T.O.P. 237 and Firearms Discharge/Assault Generated Injury
In measuring the impact of T.O.P. 237 on officer injury, 

we chose to include in our analysis only injuries and deaths sus­
tained in the "line of duty". In this manner, we eliminated from 
consideration injuries upon which one might reasonably expect 
that T.O.P. 237 would have no impact (e.g., officer suicides, 
injuries accidentally suffered while handling or cleaning weapons, 
etc.). This does not, however, limit the analysis to injuries 
sustained by on-duty officers. Off-duty officers hurt while 
"taking police action" (e.g., while attempting arrests, stopping _
and questioning suspicious persons, etc.) are defined by the «
department to have been injured in the line of duty. Thus, for 
example, an off duty officer who is shot while attempting to 
apprehend the perpetrators of a robbery he witnesses is deemed 
to have been injured only because of his status and his actions 
as a police officer. He has sustained his injury because he rose 
to "duty's call". If, conversely, whether he is off or on duty, 
he is injured in circumstances which do not involve the performance 
of his police function or which involve negligence on his own part.



NEW YORK CI'T’Y POLICE OFFICER SHOOTER REPORTED REASON’ FOR 
SHOOTING, EXCLUDING OFFICERS WHO REPORTED FIRING 

ONLY WARNING SHOTS, FRE AND POST T.O.P. 237 
INCLUDING WEEKLY NEAN

TABLE 3

Pre Weekly 
T.O.P. 237 Wean

Post Weekly 
T.O.P. 237 I'iean

Weekly 
Totals Mean

Defense
of

Life
72,7/5  ̂Q g (902)

70.7/5 O 
(1536)

71 • 5?5 Q Q (2438)

Prevent/
Terminate
Crime

13.9/» 2 0 (172)
*̂370 r
(93)

7*8̂ 5
(265)

Destroy
Animal 5*5/5 g  (68)

11.7/̂  . u 
(254)

9 • 4/5 . 2 
(322)

Suicide
Attempt

0.9% . 
(11) (18)

0.8^ . 
(29)

Accidental ^ i  
(56) (201)

7.5/ 1 0 
(257)

Other 2.5^ h 
(31)

3*3?5 21 
(71)

3.0/ 2: 
(102)

•Totals 3o. 3?5 . ̂   ̂
(12i;0)

63•'?% -ip "a
(2173)

100.0/  ̂~ .a 
(3413)

chi-square = 102.62
p = .001 
V = .17

^otal v/Gckly mean includes J6 cases in which reason for 
shooting not reported.



his injury is defined as "non-line of duty". As a case in point, 
an officer stabbed in a street robbery"by individuals who do not 
know that he is a police officer is regarded as having been in­
jured as would any citizen in similar circumstances. His injury, 
therefore, is classified as non-line of duty. Similarly, an on- 
duty officer who injured himself by, for example, the accidental 
discharge of a carelessly handled weapon while he is not engaged 
in a specific police action, is also recorded as having suffered 
a "non-line of duty" injviry.

Table 4, which presents comparative frequencies of 
FDAR generated officer line of duty injury and death before and 
after T.0,P, 237, demonstrates that the injury vs. death per­
centages remained fairly constant across the two periods. Once 
again, however, one finds that weekly means for "injured" and 
"killed" officers vary considerably. Before T.O.P. 237, 4,4 
officers a week suffered nonfatal FDAR generated line of duty in­
juries; after T.O.P. 237i the figure declines to 2.5, Similarly, 
the frequency with which officers are killed in the line of duty
drops from ,2 (one every five weeks) to .1 (one every ten weeks).«

(Insert Table 4)

Table 5» which presents frequencies of known shooting 
incident opponent degree of injury for the pre and post T.O.P. 237 
periods, shows reductions in these frequencies as well. Again, 
one finds that the relative chances of opponent injury have remained 
fairly constant across the five years studied. Of opponents whose

11



TABLE h

REPORTED LI^’E OF DUTY INJURIES SUSTAINED BY NE'// YORK CITY 
POLICE OFFICERS IN FIREAPJ.S DISCHARGE/aSSAULT INCIDENTS, 

PRE- AND POST T.C.P. 237, INCLUDING V.'EEiaY MEAN3-

2 3

Officer Pre- Weekly Post \<cekly Weekly
Injury T.O.P. 237 Mean T.O.F. 237 Me an Totals Mean

Injured 95-9% L h 96.97 2.5 96.47 1(376)  ̂9 ^ (^38) (814) 3*1

Killed 4.1fb .2 3.17 3«6%
(16) (14) • 1 (30) • X

Totals 46.47, h A 53.67 2.6 100.07 T 0(392) H , 0 (452) (844) 3.2

chi-square = ,14 
P = .70 
Q = -.14

• Excludes incidents not involving confrontations with 
human opponents (e.g., destroying injured animal).



degree of injury was known to the police, approximately seventy
per cent suffered no injury, slightly more than twenty per cent 
were wounded and just over nine per cent were killed, during both 
periods.

(Insert Table 5)
But in examining the weekly meajis, we again find con­

siderable reductions in all our categories following T.O.P. 237. 
Most specifically, table 5 shows us that New York City police 
wounded a weekly average of 3.9 opponents and that they killed 
1.6 prior to T.O.P. 237; during the period between that inter­
vention and December 31, 1975• these means fell to 2.3 and 1.0, 
respectively.

V/hile both tables 4 and 5 present rather striking 
differences between the pre and post T.O.P. 237 periods, several 
considerations prevent our concluding that these differences are 
entirely attributable to that directive and they limit the degree 
to which equivalent reductions might be predicted for other 
agencies. Simply stated, the reduced frequencies that are pre­
sented in both tables are based upon two observations made over

I

a five year period, during which other variables might have been 
expected to influence police and citizen injuries. Those other 
variables (e.g., injuries resulting from the unprovoked police 
assasination attempts by the radical "Black Liberation Army" which 
were most frequent during the pre-T.O.P. 237 period; police 
personnel deployment, etc.), however, are beyond the scope of the 
present inquiry."^ We elected, therefore, to more clearly identify

I



lâ OV/N INJURIES SUSTAINED BY OPPONT-NTS IN NEW YORK CITY 
POLICE SHOOTING INCIDENTS, FRE-.AND POST T.O.P. 237

INCLUDING WEEKLY T.EAN

. TABLE 5

Opponent
Injury

Fre- Weekly 
T.O.P. 237 Kean

Post Weekly 
T.O.P. 237 Mean

Weekly 
Totals Mean

None 69 . 0^  ̂ p  0  

(1043) ^
7 0 . 9<  ■  g  2

U'<35) •
7 0 . 1 %  Q .  

(2478)

Injured 21 . 8^ 0  g(329)
2 0 .  ^  

(405)
20 . 8/u 0  p

C73'*)

Killed 9 .2^ 1 6  
(139)

9 . 1/̂  I  Q(184) 9.1?̂  1 2(323)

Totals

«

42.7/̂  17 8
(I51I) ^

5 7 . 3 %  11 ^ (2024)
100. Of. c

(3535)

chi-square = .03 
p = .99
V = .01



"th© effect of T.O.P. 237 ori police and ciiiizen injury by in­
creasing the number of observations in“our examination of those
phenomena during the five years studied.

Figure 2 contrasts the bi-monthly frequency of civilian 
FDAR generated deaths and injuries (classified as one entity on 
the premise that degree of injury is subject to chance variations) 
with the frequency with which officers were shot or stabbed in the 
line of duty (including only what are generally the most serious 
injuries). This figure demonstrates a general decrease in both 
these phenomena between 1971 1975* addition, the figure
reveals that the relationship between citizen injuries and officer 
shot/stabbed frequencies is subject to considerable variation.
In some periods, citizen injuries far outweigh officer shot/ 
stabbed frequencies, while in others, the gap is closed con­
siderably t during May and June, 1973* officer injuries even 
exceeded citizen injuries. Again, except for these periods, and 
despite the gross incident and injury reductions cited earlier, 
the relative risk of FDAR generated officer or citizen injury
or death looks relatively stable.«

(Insert Figure 2)

Conclusions
Our examination has demonstrated that a considerable 

reduction in the frequency of police shooting accompanied New 
York City's direct intervention upon the firearms discretion of 
its police officers. Further, our data indicate that this 
reduction was greatest among the most controversial shooting



NEV; YORK CITY POLICE OPPONENT INJURIES AND DEATHS AND 
POLICE OFFICERS SHOT OR STABBED IN THE LirrE OF DUTY, 

JANUARY 1, 1971-DECEMBER 31, 1975,IN TWO MONTH PERIODSa

FIGURE 2

75



incidents: shootings to prevent or terminate crimes, which
frequently involve police shots at "fleeing felons". To the 
extent that this New York experience may he generalized to 
other agencies, therefore. Bp. obvious consequence of the imple- 
mentation of clear shooting guidelines and their stringent 
enforcement is a reduction of injuries and deaths sustained hy 
suspects who would face far less severe penalties even if con­
victed after trial.

Of equal significance to the police administrator is 
the fact that these shooting decreases were not accompanied by 
increased officer injury or death. Conversely, since both these 
phenomena appear to be associated with the frequency of shooting 
incidents and related citizen injury, both declined pursuant to 
T.O.P. 237.

In the most simple terms, therefore, the New York City 
experience indicates that considerable reductions in police 
shooting and both officer and citizen injury and death are 
associated with the establishment of clearly delineated guidelines 
and procedures for the review of officer shooting discretion.



Note

This paper is a revision of a paper presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, 
Atlanta, Georgia, November, 1977.

"'m  ■ > P  X  J PL  M. \



30

Footnotes

^Kobler (1975tl6^) reports that only three of the 1500 
police shooters he studied were criminally punished for their 
actions.

^It is probable that officers who do violate statutory pro­
visions (e.g., by shooting at fleeing misdemeanants, etc.) but 
who both miss and fail to apprehend their targets do not often 
come to court attention,

^Firearms Discharge Review Board cases disposed of with 
recommendations including more than one of these categories most 
typically involve shootings deemed to have violated depantmental 
guidelines and to have indicated that transfers from sensitive 
(and often desirable) assignments are appropriate. Narcotics 
officers and other plainclothes personnel who shoot in violation 
of departmental policy, for example, are often recommended for 
transfers to administrative assignments or to patrol duty in 
outlying areas where the chances of encountering circumstances 
provocative of weapons use are slight. In such cases, we considered 
the Board's recommendation for disciplinary action to be its major 
and most severe finding, and coded dispositions under that single 
heading. Similarly, because we regarded "criminal charges" to 
be the major and most severe finding in all cases in which they 
resulted, we included such cases in that single category, although 
they also invariably involved some departmental disciplinary action. 
Cases involving criminal charges are held in abeyance by FDRB



31

pending court dispositiom officers‘convicted of criminal use 
of firearms are then summarily dismissed from the department;- all 
officers acquitted of such criminal charges during the period we 
studied were subsequently subjected to departmental trials for 
their actions.

By the time data collection for this report ceased 
(August, 1976), the Firearms Discharge Review Board had adjudicated 
2155 shootings. Their major recommendations in these cases were 
as follows:

Withing Law and Department Guidelines 70.8f« (1525)
Retraining in Law and/or Tactics 1 8 , 3f, (395)
Disciplinary Action 7,7% (167)
Criminal Charges 1 , 2% (26)
Transfer 0 , 6% (13)
Psychological/Alcoholic Counselling l .J% (29)

Total 1 0 0 , 0% (2155)

^This attempt was not always successful. In the absence of 
information to the contrary (e.g., FDRB or judicial findings), we 
accepted "officer reported reason for shooting" at face value. 
This exception, however, affects only our examination of changes 
in the nature of shootings. It has little or no significance as 
far as total shooting frequencies are concerned.

■̂ I.O. 118's only new discretionary parameter was the state­
ment that "(t)he discharge of a firearm at dogs or other animals 
should be an action employed ONLY when no other means to bring 
the animal under control exists".



32

A good part of this percentage decrease, however, is due 
to the great increase in frequency of reported "destroy animal" 
shootings. Had these remained constant at their pre-T.O.P. 237 
level (.8 per week), the post-T.O.F. 237 "defense of life shots 
at people" percentage would have been 7^*6 per cent.

*̂ We conducted detailed examinations of the effects of 
several other variables upon shooting frequency, type and conse­
quences in Fyfe, 1978,, and found that they did not significantly 
alter the findings reported in the present study.



33

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f vfc r 34

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