Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Occidental Life Insurance Co. of California Brief for the Appellee

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No. 75-1705 
IN THE

U n i t e d  S t a t e s  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l ;

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

E qual Employment  O pportunity commission ,
n ppciU-.m, 

vs.

O ccidental Li f e  Insurance Company of cal 
fornia,

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BRIEF FOR T! APPEL

I.
CGUNTERSTATEMENT CF THE ISSUES v' .ESLHTrX.

1. Whether Section 706(f)(1) of Title Vil of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended effective March 
24, 1 >72, authorizes the Equal Employment Cppnrtu- 
nity Commission to file suit on a charge of employment 
discrimination more than 180 days after that cnarge 
was filed with the Commission or, in the case of a 
charse filed with the Commission pnci to trie amend­
ments, more than 180 days alter the cfdeuuUu -‘■•R 
of such amendments?

2. Whether the California statute of hrmt 
this action which was filed more than t .me 
the occurrence of the act which gave rise to 
lying charge?

aliens bars 
years after 
the under-

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3. Whether the Equal Employment G y p .  .unity 
Commission is barred trorn proceeding with respect to 
certain paragraphs of its complaint because live allega­
tions set forth therein are outside the scape or the 
underlying charge?

II.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS.

Or: December 27. '270. Tamar Edels <•» tsied^ a 
charge against Occidental Lite Insurance Company of, ,. . . r .-v*
California (hereinafter “Occidental” ) vtn: Cm equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ' hereinafter 
the ‘'EEOC") alleging that she had beer. c;bcriminated 
against because of her sex | R. 103, lus icOi. Her 
charge specified that "the most recent d: _e cut which,, 
this discrimination took place” was ‘•October i 
the Hate of her discharge ov Occidental [R. it

Although the EEOC acknowledged reccip. of this 
charge on December 30, 1970 | R. 103 j. the tn O C  
did not formally file her charge until MarC; 2. 1971 
[R . 223], This was the only charge which Ms Elelscn 
filed against Occidental, and the EEOC amt now leches 
that this is rite charge upon which its entire CcmotatirJ 
herein is based fR. 2, 140|.

The EEOC undertook an investigation of me charge, 
and on February 25. 1972, the District Director or the 
EEOC in San Francisco issued Findings of hoc: that 
Occidental had discriminated against Ms. File Ison and 
also had discriminated against marry other employees 
through various practices and policies which could not 
have discriminated against Ms. Eadson | R. i 40-145;. 
On March 23. 1972. Occidental Hied me,-shoos both 
to the -findings themselves and to tries excessive 
breadth [R. 146]. However, the EEOC din not issue

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its ‘‘Reasonable Cause” Determination until tAbru

dental [R. 147 j.
The present action was not filed in the Fe 

Diet Court until February 22, 1974 |R. 1. 
this point almost three and a half years after Ac si.

charge, or where, as here, the charge v/ns filed 
prior to the 1972 amendments to Title Y 'r ■ ; 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, more thru 
days after the effective date of such anion - 
meats;

2. Alternatively, the EEOC was barred from filing 
this suit by the California statute of lire nations;

3. Alternatively, the EEOC was barred from pro­
ceeding on paragraphs 8(b) and 9(c) of its 
Complaint because the allegations contained 
therein were outside the scope of the nnderiyAg 
charge; and

4. In any event, the EEOC was barred from sec-k­
ina backpay for any alleged violations occurring 
more than two years prior to the filing; of tne 
underlying charge.

By its appeal herein, the EEOC challenges only the 
first three findings by the Court.

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ith Occi- ; A-. : . A . • .. . < ' •■ ;"v. ■ ••AVva
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act of discrimination which Ms. Edelson had com­ A •' \ y *. ' ‘A * w
plained cf. ' V'* A

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On December 9, 1974, the District Court granted f . «,A' • .

Occidental's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judg­ • A - v.'5- A ; ■ 7 «

ment. finding that • • "■ ‘ -1 r .- A
• - r ' .  -«• >, . 3 • : ...

1. The EEOC has no authority to file suit more ' : ; a"a ;';
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than ISO days after the filing of the umieriyh.g
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1972 Amendments, Trior.: Thau -

Unde r r:fitie ' ' j I of the CiEvil Rights . ,w of ; f r.s
original j v enact*ou, there w; no prc'd. ' t gi\i i me
L'.FOC .: i e until.rri ty to file r; suit in me . !■. *ul l. f 1: let
Court, :me! thus the EEOC !■sad no such at iiuvicy >iO\V-
ever, ir:i i 972, Congress scf / i }- "X • « • \ f'- '» uhUUl C v/ - v . v. nous
provide ns of tl-\ J existing /\ci, includi p m er crcj-
ment prov:isit ns. 7 i'iC clcDciic soon feeu <e ■" ; tve. .me
ent mo::hocis of Cn force ment: the sup oi h oad
p p o r Cl u tbority sots_.nt to give■ tilt; r. .... ,,.. -i.; auu
desist ; ;crs s im ila r to t! i e i n a11 f): > . L a b o r Re : alien s

B o a rd ; ot hers prcfei•red to h rnit i !•..% U * • t j : •*
authori .7 to file  suit in the Federal j ; . a.. In
the enci •. i L . ie propone:'! is c S : read EEr\*~* . , , - .-s • ’ • K.J _ clll'wî v .i.V C\..
in  thei; c.fort to obtttin ce: .e ai.td d csf i  author:; O f- J
C o n g rr ■SS ::'Ctiled on v. hut was ge ■ ■ .eralb  agreed !;.j tlie

m ore ’ ? ! 1ted m ethod of enforce men a :. n h c  it; ‘ the

EEOC to file  an action in Fede ral !hiM .ret Cc....■ • - - -  ̂7
on a specific underI yina char;tc r:nd after sat i v ! \ • CT. • * • O
certain ccmentions. 1972 0.3. C'ode Cong, and .- ‘ !1
News, PP. 2143-2147, 2.167-21 ’i 0.

Th is; new authority1 to file suit Wi.);; set forth in .....c;h.-n
706 ff;i (1 ) of the A.at-_ J. 7 T I O f*' t 2C00eof:'‘ i V__

whic’n provides the fo1 lowing mu '{**?•' r;j-3C-.h\ ' .
1j 1 i “If within thi:•ty days, • r ■, m 1 f: Iced
\\rith the Como•fission . . ijhe Cor/urms.-. has
fc.: c n. unable to secure fro;W t ' :c ro.i.ncnder.*. a con-



__r __ t -yCc• . : .■»/•-*> •

ciliation agreement acceptable to me Coiamission,
the Commission rnay bring a civil actio:r against . .•< ,r
[ the i respondent. hundred
and eighty days fram the filing o: such cl•oroe
the Commission has not filed a civil action under
this section . . . the Commission . . . shall so
notify the person aggrieved and ; ? ; vr;th•in ninety ■
days after the giving of such: notice a cfvis action 1 '.yi vVv
may be brought :'gainst the rc.-mondeni named in • ■
the charge . . . by any person . . . agarieved by the ' 1
alleged unlawful employment practice , • • i * j
Upon timely application, the Court may. in its dis- .V. 1; . • ■ '•
cretion, permit the Commission . . .  to irrtervene in
such civil action upon certification that the case
is of general public importance.”1 u-'.'CC

.is, the first question posed by this appeal is whether
the foregoing section 
more than 180 days

authorizes tin-. '££CC 
after the filing of the

to tne suit 
underlying

charge or, where the charge was nor to the
1972 amendments, more than ISO days alter the 
fee live date of such amendments, where the EEOC 
mittedly had no authority to file suit av . 0 prior to
such amendments.

The EEOC in its Opening Brief, p.Q Or -• • S, correctly 1

notes that four Courts of .appeal hare COIf1 l W l- .C'.l ti llj
issue, and each has concluded—aithctvC.'i .not without ■
dissent—that the foregoing section doer, not r . or-:.-t ' >
EEOC to filing suit within 180 days. 1’’bus, Occidental
acknowledges that the present weight of .a nhority is

V. • ' •
[irifegr

against its position, as it was when th:e Dicm lev Court ■FiC;;
sustained Occidental’s position in the cour: 1•eh.vvv. How-
ever, as Judge Moore of the Second Giro. ;it wrote in If -  .
EEOC v. L & .V Railroad Co., 505 F. 2 ! 61C, 61S i : vVJ' C. •

’Numbers in brackets are inserted to assist aP.:\n'sis; they do S
not appear in the statute itself.



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mi ontv ■ holding(C.A. 5, 1974), dissenting from th 
of no ISO-day limitation:

“in terms of sheer numbers, the weight of judicial 
authority holds that section 706 Cr) (1) sets no 
time limitation on the right of the Commission to 
sue. Fortunately, however, it is the pemuam -ness 
of judicial reasoning and not the Tree of numbers 
which is of prime importance in oar .v-v.Ci...

With this sentiment in mind, it is respectfully .vaomicted 
that there are several compelling arguments .vhich 
appear not to have been considered by die Courts of 
Appeal which have sustained the reU-OC s position. 
Thus, Occidental urges this Court to consider me fol­
lowing arguments carefully bet ore it deemes r m-dier to 
follow or part company with the present v.mgr.: oi au­
thority.

1. The Legislative HisUvy.

history expressly giving the EEOC ti

broi
to sue interrninably. Furl hermore, it a :ppar<
the deb cite between IliU proponents a f EEC
and desist authority and the pi i penen t ; -• rOl V.Oart

enforcement that in the final bill which was passed, the 
EEOC proponents got less, not more, man the; ashed 
for. 1972 U.S. Code Administrative and Legislative 
News, pp. 2143-2147. 2167-2176. Lous, I nc
right to sue interminably was never even: asked for by 
the EEOC proponents and where the O DC proponents 
got less than they asked for, the conclusion .s inescap­
able that the EEOC right to sue was never .vended by 
Con mess to be interminable.

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ring ir. the legislative ; "wV ■ -o ■/.
the auinoru ' to file
filing of die under- 

hat no proponent cf 
asked for an EEOC

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That conclusion is reinforced by the siaie.nencs cv 
two of the leading senators in this c rente. Senator 
Dominick, one of the leading proponenti.-. of the court 
enforcement proposal which eventually prevailed. Stated 
during the debate on February 7, 1972:

“The Amendment contains several .cosmetic differ­
ences from the original Amendment as t...T as 
one substantial change which reduces the time 
period within which the Comm fusion raav tilt a 
civii action against the respondent moat 170 lays 
to 150 days from the time the Commission first 
issues its informal charge.” (Emphasis i deled)

lid  Cong. Rec. 1307 (February 7, 1972). aaverai 
days later, Senator davits, speaking for a nrocosm va.ioh 
involved a comparable time sequence, sta md:

“Let us understand that we are dealing .Cm a 
period of approximately 150 days, that tlm: is the 
allowable time for the Commission to move into 
a given situation. The first 30 days repress ms an 
effort to conciliate, making a totai c: six months.”

118 Cong. Rec. 1800 (February 15, 1972). Signifi­
cantly, no one took issue with either Senator’s encdura­
tion of these time limitations which were w ...nundlv 
adopted by Congress in Section 706(f) ( : ) .

In its Opening Brief, however, the EEOC contends 
that there are three specific instances cf legislative his­
tory which support its claim to an interminable rinht 
to sue. On page 17 of its Brief, the EEOC cites two 
short statements by the same two Senators which nopear 
contrary to the above-quoted remarks. Kowc.er, both 
of the EEOC’s quotes are drawn from state-menu: made 
on January 25, 1972, two weeks before the quotes set



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on the EEOC's right to sue.

quotes were drawn focused solely cm wh. 
706(f)(1) should read that the EEC ' 
or "shall” file suit where concilia: Em 
plished during the first 30 days after me 
underlying charge. Bolls Senators ague, 
from ‘‘shall” to “may” in order to mala 
EEOC was not obligated to file st.it o; 
Tatis, it is clear from the context in vd 
quoted by the EECC arose that the Sen 
concerned about not imposing a stri-f. r 
front end of when the EECC hut! tc file s

the concern that
“. . . [I j f we change the word ‘shall 
we net have to have some cut-off t 
the Commission is concerned, with 
exercise of that discretion in bri 
action. . . .”

-As Senator Dominick stated

which is simply designed to try to 
delivery business, ‘a burr under the c h i '  >. .he parties. But 
I do not see why we should require the:!’. 1 h.n 30 days to 
bring suit. They might be able to ;teeef.:;.iEb. voluntary com­
pliance within 40 days or it might ttike 31 .. tvs, but under 
the language of this amendment v.urat ha pa •••>. they do no; 
tile suit within 30 da vs? then what do \ ;

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may” die suit '7 . ■ :
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filing of the v -7
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ter Dominick t&V*' '^vEyy
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d.c 30-day delay
they say in the V:.

1 i 8 Cong. 1067 (January 23, 1972).

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was required with respect to the ESCC’s Earn rc fi'e 
su.t, but ne was troubled by shortening die i'.-lC-j 
limitation on when the EEOC’s right stepped an 
aggrieved party’s right started:

"We can shorten the 180-day priv. p- 
stno.ten as far as I ant concerned, fcm i . • ••• 
snoald keep in mind that this is : 
w'hich has been appointed for the purpose e. t.- ■me 
to soive any employment discrimination that there 
may be and, consequently, [ do not think we 
snetdd assume they will net take nation where 
t.iOie is a clear case. Problems will arise . ■ 
there are gray areas, or where they are no 
w .iCt.ici ti.ey have substantial evidence 
a case. Under those circumstances, it wo am
to me that we should give them me.re i.rne...........
want io say 90 days from the filing of such charge, 
or on the expiration of any period, instead of ISO 
or 120, that is all right with me. If the Senator 
would do that, then we are changing the timmable 
which the Committee has already worked out in 
the process of trying to determine what should be 
done within enforcement procedures.”

US Cong. Rec. 1069.

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:pport 
seem 

we

Thus, it apparent from this section of : 
on January 2o that Senator davits clear!', 
need for a cut-off time on the EEOC’s 
sue (which he confirmed by his later 
about “the allowable time for the Commissio.: 
into a given situation” ) and that Senator Do, . men 
equated the 180-day “private filing restriction” with the 
cut off time limitation about which Senator Javr: v,->s 
inquiring (which was also confirmed by Senator Comi- 
nicx’s subsequent statement concerning “the time cried

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saw the
right to 

state u.ent 
move

within which the Commission may file a civil act].ton.

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Thus, both Senators were agreed as to tr.e need for i. f;\ '

ana existence Oi cl: cut-off time for the EE DC - right to
sue ano were uebating on Januar;/ 25 only whether
the statute sihould read that the ■Ei nmissio “may”
sue or “shall” sue alter 30 days. Indeed, the •very fact
that they we:•e t!(-bating that distil:icfion dein '■"is. rates

U ' ; • . . -

that they ex]aectc■d the EEOC m i,T '* ,* ' ■. dy on 4- ' •
charges.

cp.icondly, tlie HEOC see las solace in vine w.w::on of
r . •

die tegislative Ilia tory whicn refers 10 :allow i.y * / . *

“The person aggrieved to elec:- iC‘ pursiu. his or r  * '•
tier own reme,'-!y under this title in the cow us where hr/>V
mere is ageney inaction, daliiarice or dimussai of .. . . .

phasis in
charge, or unsatisfactory 

Brief).r; TT o  r>
i—<_/ w

EEOC Brief, P- 16. r  rcm that siteCe“ -serfence the
;5 j EEOC W OUld fincl a 0 0 03 ro .S' CiC:er •• •na:ion to

afford the ind i v idua! ‘’an elec tion of re.nedic ’ which
election , says the EEQ ?1, is only 1tl e .. i 4 ‘ ’ ai if thepvtqc can still sue after 180 days. YOt Ihat ;n:e:Treta-

t j tiop. of these few WOl-c!s is r'eluted by t 0 notation
> itself, \vhich refens to aif owing the pe. £0:1 a c 2 1‘;e red “to
j i

elec: to pursue his or 1:ter own remedy . . . iere there

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rerore, 
ass a o'1

is . . . dismissal of the charge.” Obviously, the 
tr.e “election” being given the individual in ihi-; p 
is the right to sue or not to sue on his own bemdf. not 
to elect between suing himself or bavin a th.- '-'EL' .-1 -
on his behalf.

Finally, at page 14 of its Brief, the EEOC ref 
a letter from the Attorney General unri.ie that to 
enforcement provisions be made applicable m 
charges which mav have been nendirm io - 
two years, which proposal was eventually agreed

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ConSreiX v .  •
HEOC’s J:ihocstn£ flic icn 1
of fh ‘ ^ to Sl!c does t,a^ '!nyi[:,t;
Qt the new prom i Ilot Prevert Ci) -
Obviously ■! ' L l̂lI0S to f/-,e J u‘e -Ppl/C'f’ic 

UUii3 die 180-duv r ■ Pondin'* Ck J  "
°  * »  would aot W . ,ln“ t»lioji ou the n p ; *
nu!n-  until the firsr  . ° ,un on charge

tioi^  fo .sue, /<, M Ca,y tnat the E £ o c  : ^  'Vt!i'e
of the I97> . Marcjj 24, / 97o C *‘:-d au_
i n - c W c  uI:lcnanjents. Comer ^  CI‘fe«ivu dre» L04(gcs, as with , W5iCc;uemjv JO-. , .
J* s the /'-.I; 19n ,Ilh subsequent h-T  d'-nd-
tc file Sa;, 'O wh/eh to Cvr, ’ ,h“ --ECO_ “* ‘'ACICISC itsThirc .■ 1--- - ’-'flOnwhus. 'it-, ? .,J‘w iceisEttix/i r •

oence of •, u  ‘‘isto.-v nrn,.; .
uiscictior, to sue at , < ^ l  ‘Ui0a to cut 0w 4, ^  iv-
lnat E £0C S da-« a«d Ubsolutd : C ® » »

sue is ;ntennina^  no ewoou.-e
T r

Section 706 o H v  . “ utof-v
P:irty shun ,\ ,u 1 iy Cnvi'sions r 
fliinS the E E o r  ’ ' to n;e his C'nr» ■ ‘̂ e v e d
which thj-o ru . “ ‘ S j days t0 7 ’ d,‘ "̂ which
aetrrievew”"  /  £ £ ° C  «si *i/e i:s - t ic n  ..*rv
thT  ° <* h/s i-;ght tn ‘i“‘1 50 notify ..... — r 

^oSncvcd nmm . *■ Sue’ after Vvh?-» ’ " i'e-‘‘G-’i 
it is ach-^, • ^ n /las 90 d'Mv ; c/- -o t;.:icrw0„
o^rieved par^  that **h  of th e se 'd e l-  b";°- 
thereafter, e . ^  t  " Stn«  C ita tion  the
^ •A . 9, 1975) T S V‘ °a*s ^ tion

:  ,aa° n oa it can s° f  C° ;dra*  <l.ar a = 7  , ; E t  
Mowever 9,1̂ ,- J

the E ^ c r  ’ ^tl0n 706(f)(1)  n
^  7 , inay t'W enc- i, j ^ pijcitly 
: ; ter J8° days oaiv h / l  ind^ d u u r ^ : '. 'F *  tf2a:
1,p0" W ificnu -o /., ' ‘-/f CO;' r'c  oiscretio., t E  

~~ET- 10 case nf al*«4,1 " - • ■’ Oi rtflu,

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specific esc
options not here , j  >v1 w |  c  V ■ n ;



ir.1 t>.;: .' nee.” : :urth;-r;no the Nint : O be
clear a.at the EfctOC s ro.ht to intervene nav '■: Bruited 
to the issues raised by tlie charcin: arty's nv:alnt
v./a n  iioomisxen v. .Wrox Carp., 407 F.2B iO, ; C A 
9, ! 974;.

. the EEOC is red need to the * / ‘ t • ' ; • . a.-sert-
ight to sue •ri.enii inaiiiy while \  “-..V ,lv con-
hat its rathe to hit.. rvene after .• A' :S Trie i. i y
to cares of "erne: al public i.'.;■ a d to
•e.ised bv -ate cha:firing part;-. 1i ■ .: -■ i-l*‘AMiXI.CtL U tlie EEOC to Iii-VC i::C iight •(' *Uw 0. its own,. f»..« .ai ier > C* pi- O iDays, there certainly V. Ot! i i r. !" w‘ - no

necessi:ty to ipemio ' f e EECC's right u :. ’ t j i \ and
even rit ore obvious!) r1 r\ ro •' r-« to re:-, *. c. i .*■ w . )
intervetie as, <Cr. -J ■ V I ; • ': it did. Ti■* ; '• ..'I'' : •. « _
tion is + 1 t the EEOC has no right u - ALAJ U.l \$ own

tnat me cEOC failed to compiy wit!, 
directive in Section 7 0 6 (f)( i) that it 
Cj.wiLi.ie 1̂v.ii_y Cl nis ot iter richt to m:

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tr.e

after 1 •e i1C C ill! Toe is filed JR 1041. Bv B . r o • ci
statut Ci•y direct ive, the E*--- V—* V- has 1‘ ; ‘*C 1 • 1 ’ 1
statutor■y ;ichenue and attervipted to on
to sue, Vor had t * 10 r-.uLoUu-y nc.nice been '-cut u,u 1
charg in3 1party filed suit. die ±z£CC would have be
limitcfCi tc) the restricted rig!!n to i’■ tervo: . 0  Discass
abov; - 4.Ule; woui ei not have i ,O i 1 li Dio to pursue maf:.
boyor•; , ? ,rL i:e ind : \ 1 Cl Liai's c!tar * rT' y DS, •. ..i.-J h.'

•ThiC i5E4DCs inclmiltcd fiiiiu: 0 l<J S end :!I is no .i lie no >!i:c !-) rl:e r 11 i illj i4 iOC . .. au-:!'..'Brie! ;UlLa sending sue!; notice lb !.lii that i

■ ■ "

hoc CO A . , • • •nd may participate in. . r i . b . ̂ ei ;e-
ter 0 "1 1 / . J •' . 1 mtervenor under the thru . 'J vl eirenm- ;
anees where in -ervoruion is peniiitte'el r.: . , 7 tw.Utid.
Fur: hermore. one shocking fact in the a.. . l i.r is

' yr:*;



circumvention of the statutory limitations on the 
EEOCs right to intervene simply confirms the necessity 
of terminating tile EEOC’s right to s..o on its arm' after 
J80 days, for without such limitation the EEOC can 
and obviously will make a nullity of its limits., riant to 
intervene.

finally, the Act’s provisions setting forth tit.; duties 
of the Federal District Court support the conclusion 
that a time limitation on nECC court action rta. have 
been intended by Congress in the 1972 amendments. 
Section 706(f) provides that once the EEOC lies suit. 

“(4) It shall be the duty cf the Chief Judge of the 
District . . . immediately to designate-a ware in 
such district to hear and determine the case. . .

and further,
‘’(5) It shall be the duty of the Judge designated 
pursuant to this subsection to assign the case for 
hearing at the earliest practicable dace and to 
cause the case to be in every way expedited."

In other words, the Federal District Courts are to move 
mountains' in order to have the case heard as emir as 
possible.

Given that uiimistakaolc command, which obvtouslv 
imposes a considerable burden on the Federal District 
Courts, how can it be seriously argued that the EEOC 
nevertheless has the right to take as long as it v- ants to 
bring a matter to court? The statutory command of
immediate federal court action is made a mockers if__
as the EEOC insists—it has the right to wait rbroe and 
a. haif yea is or live scars or even longer oaf ore Elina

requires the EEOC to do. In other words, the £E<£C*s own 
practice rejects the interpretation of the Act which the EEOC 
would have this Court accept.



y
 v

.

suit. If Congress really intended to permit ...e EEOC 
to wait that long, would Congress ht ve expected the 
Federal District Courts to move so quienly?

In short, it is simply inconceivable tli ;t Congress 
expected such prompt action both by b.c merging 
parly and by the Federal District Court, and y : none 
by the EEOC. It' the 180-day provision does not cut 
off the EEC'C’s right to sue, then the EHGC Is the only 
party in the entire process which has no time limitation 
at all.

3. The Backlog of Charges in 1972.
Perhaps the one argument found me-., per.-., .-Ice by 

the Courts of Appeal which have endorsee, the EEOC’s 
position is that Congress knew in 1972 enarges 
before the EEOC commonly took one to two years 
to process and thus Congress could not possibly have 
intended to require the EEOC to file suit within six 
months. However, that conclusion does not foibvr for 
two reasons.

r First, it assumes that Congress intended to u.wc such 
delays become an integral part of the statutory scheme 
rather than to have such delays eliminated, in other 
words, the EEOC's argument is that Congress was 
aware of the horrendous delays and set up an enforce­
ment procedure which deliberately incorpur... ed those 
delays into the statutory scheme by givim ; EEOC 

| forever to sue. However, the legislative history is far 
j more susceptible to the conclusion that Co.; nans was 
I appalled by these delays and was determined t > ciimi- 
'* nate them. Thus, definite time limitations were Paced



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— 15—

both cn charging parties and on the 
Courts, and the 180-day provision v 
guarantee that the EEOC would peri'onn it.- 
bilities expeditiously just as charging par;
Federal District Courts were required to do.

Judge Moore made precisely this pom. • 
in EEOC v. L & N Railroad Co., 505 F.2d

“There is no doubt that Congress was we!, aw... 
of both the average time necessary to process com­
plaints and of the backlog winch was •ro'jimo.nung 
the Commission at the time of the 1972 Amend­
ments. But to conclude that Congress cook: mere- 
fore not have intended to impose a t.me arm* on 
th.e Commission seems to me erroneous. A Stronger 
inference is that Congress intended to expedite the 
administrative process and to eliminate tne intermi­
nable delays which had previously bee.: the rule. 
The entire thrust of Section 706(f)(1) is toward 
increased ctlicicnc^.

In this regard, it is important to remember that this 
statute was designed to deal not simply with me sm-a-

i Secondly, several parts c 
; onstrate a specific Congressional detenmnaucu to mam 
j rather than to incorporate past EEOC practices and to 
\ require prompt EEOC, handling of charges, mu c\- 
j ample, there is no question that piioi to -9;_

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amendments, the EEOC’s “reasonable reuse determi­
nation had frequently taken several >cm> iron; Ine time 
the charge was first filed. Nevertheless cony. ess specifi­
cally provided in Section 706(b) or the Act.

“The Commission shall make its ucicrtrr.narion cc
asonabie cause as promptly as possible and, so

,ir as ictieabic. not later nys irom
the filina of tire c! rEmphasis aaded).

Of course, this Congressional commanu was completely
at odds with the EEOC's exist ini» cr̂ .wiic Yet CJon-

n;;Act eaoi - V.
r ’0egress’ intention

e e:xi sting EEOC p.

arcss, rather than incorporating the existing practice 
into tire new statute, expressly commanded :;:e r-huC 
to abandon that past practice and niiac ns uelerndna-

pre- 
i to

•alter rather than to incorporate existing EEOC prac­
tice.’'

Having thus ordered a cietermmaiion of reasonable 
cause within 120 days, it is inconceivi ; t.iat ^.ongress 
would have intended to permit the EhC u u '-axe two 
or three years or whatever to conciliate t.te nia-.tcr. Fee 
120-day provision is made a virtual nUnity u-t-.e-.s the 
EEOC is required to act on its determination within a 
reasonable time thereafter, i.e., w-.tn.ii tnc ue.'-t oO 
days—for a total of ISO days.

That conclusion is confirmed b\ the provision in 
Section 706(f) (1), which states in relevant part:

“Upon request, the court may. in its discretion, 
stay further proceedings for not more than sixty

-• Phis section also shows that Congress a w  w - aord the 
EEOC a flexible deadline when sum deericu •' propriatc. 
Si' rificantly, no such equivocation exists mr. terainr re IcO-aay 
limitation.

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— 17—

days pending . . . further efforts ci the emission 
to obtain voluntary compliance.” ■ Emphasis 
added).

That provision establishes two points. First me pro­
vision proves a Congressional awareness that court 
actions might have to be filed by the EEOC vicr to 
the completion of its conciliation efforts m orcer to 
comply with the 180-day limitation, and ilws affords 
the EEOC an additional 60 days if necessary after suit 
is filed. Second, Congress obviously v ,s con unccd that 
60 days was more than an adequate time for reasonable 
conciliation efforts, for the courts veers a . . o r . for­
bidden to delay court action for more a...a 60 cays of 
conciliation. If Congress would not ailov, the m art more 
than 60 days for conciliation efforts, won: ir mere to 
make one think that Congress intended to allow the 
EEOC several years?

Furthermore, it is highly significant that combining 
these two Congressional determinations— ! 20 days for 
the reasonable cause determination. CO fays for con­
ciliation—yields the 180-day period here in question. 
This clearly demonstrates Congress' determination that 
the EEOC complete its two steps by the 1 SCt!. day and 
at that point either exercise its discretion to sue or 
relinquish that right to the charging p.w.y. Of course, 
if the EEOC has not yet completed is  conciliation 
efforts by the 180th day. Congress ,. so-. fa;d an addi­
tional 60 days after suit is filed to com.pkua that process.

Another statutory provision dcmon.-.mai.ag Congress’ 
intention to alter rather than to incorp vs,.- h_• isting 
patterns of delay is Section 706> f ) 1: i. which requires 
the Federal District Court to “cause me ease to be in 
every way expedited.” Of course, as previously noted,

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this is a leaitim:Ue impesh ion on i Q f ■
re sc urces if ihc 1 i 1 id '.Cl 1 J b roughl t0
with in the EEOC s ISO-day time pci•!, . >
pari yds 90-day dii'.e period. Yet if
mitt)ed to take tin eC anc a ».■an years
virtutally forever. as die EE OC argi ’• s. w —
on ;h.e court's tk“ O > ' 1 - rurces 1:0 C v <:
justiltied. It is sin:p;y inconceivable t>.as
have expected :!he courts CJ i* C. 1 SO !
CO,!:'oleiely altering rather than inco:
exist:;ng ease handding procedures— •...liiJ.r
in tenueci iliac die r;,_QC would’ h
past practice of lao;vena<;us vrelays hi
to COurt within 1 8 0 days.

.e and 
tmptly 
urging 

p cr- 
c—or 
addon 
' un­
to uld

iheir
also

ii itg

altar

In short , we havC ct11 k. Iw.L/ora te siat:LltOry p "fed are
which conipletciy a: tercel cxisi ::i a j - i ii c .. v- as and ■ r. posed
subsetinti al bit i*de:’ :S and stract tune I; rvy j,s oon tiie
courts; and on «> ryrr 2*ieved par'ties. The 1SSn j 1\i' i" *v. > tw .J i
sente.: ! is v,diet her Cong re.-.c nIso impoxi 0 L. 1 ....ien.s and
till!a iiiiiitations on the id— s~\ ̂ as well. \ .\ Pt •natatory
er.rorcomen t sc: ,eniC which v_:v. <Id ids on :. 1 • - parties
for si:iccess . it is 11. coned vab that c:6 ) - two parties
are rsquired t0 T-'*F recced C ' vpC-:hitioe •>;y, par ticuiariy
where the ii.htenninable del by a \ i oa r :> effcc-
lively nuiiit ies any e.xpeditiOils acilion by i n c ori . e r  two.
Either the IcECC iS 1the on!y party■ in thes f- i 6 • - V.‘h - vhich
lias no obi:gatic• n to act i:t ari c  .•tpcditkvas i y  <: :r. cr. or
the 120-ciay■, 60-day, and 180-ciay-- pro\ ision.. . 1 i w..a  what
they sc' v .

• i . tcjza*3m*r**& i.;*4f$ v- - ■ > <c** AW *•#•?•**** **UiUJWi' ** lH»ilHW ‘MffMWmiWlilj ~JIW||



Fu.Ilierance of Stetutorv hiup 
The EEOC insists, however, that its having a.i inter­

minable right to sue is more consistent v:.h . /\ci s 
remedial purposes than its having an cb.-guti ut o an 
within 180 days. Yet just the opposite is true. -Yith a 
! 80-cay time limitation, the EEOC would be torced 
to act promptly on behalf of uggne\eu name . Pro­
cedures would be streamlined, investigation and con­
ciliation efforts expedited, and marginal chums . e.r.ed 
out. Truly aggrieved parties would be guaranteed court 
action on their behalf within six montns; .or me cay 
they filed their charges, and thus would oe c u r  .waged 
to press their claims. Surely that is precise;; . ha; Con- 
cress intended, for it fulfills the aggrieved par.vs in­
terest in prompt relief, respondents’ interest m a prompt 
hear in a and the Federal District Court-. ;r. ..rest m 
avoiding stale claims.

However, with no such time limitation, are d eC e  
has no incentive to expedite its handling of charges. 
The EEOC can—and obviously does—take ns ior.g as 
it wants to, doing a great disservice not orb. to ag­
grieved parties but to respondents as v/eh. :.e tr.e 
EEOC obviously has an administrative desire for an 
interminable period in which to file suit. v.hat purpose 
of Title VI1 is served by permitting— indeed, cn.cc .wag- 
inc—wen delay? Far from increasing corny nance .vita 
the Act, such delays simply lessen the likelihood that 
aggrieved persons will turn to the EEOC for re. ef.

Indeed, this is precisely the point mad- ey „ udge
Moore in his dissent in EEOC v. L & A’ RcAiroal Co.,
505 F.2d at 619:

“It is well known that an imminent. dead line md
in particular the penoancv of a ...• : ..U. i a p t  lO



— 2 0

make even the mem hard-line bargainers soften 
their position. Thus a 12C-dav lh:;h on the Com­
mission's right to sue seems like;;, to m. m y.e set­
tlements.”

Moreover, Cong;es.% by impu.-dng m. m a..-. h a tin- 
lions on all other parties to the pm . ... . cL-niv. -.greed 
with Judge Moore that it is. the i: a mediae; . court
action rather than the remoteness of court action which 
induces compliance with the Act.

The EEOC expresses concern, howe\er, the? recalci­
trant employers may drag out the in mTy.sTw and 
conciliation in hopes of running out or ' .he • .'■•"‘-day 
period. Appellant’s Brief, page 20. Yet Congress ex­
pressly' provided for such contingency in. d melon 706 
(f)(1) ,  for, as Judge Moore pointed on. C E:IOC v. 
L <x N Railroad Co., 505 F.3d at 619:

“And merely because the IhOlh day com;.; and a 
suit is filed does not mean that talks ... mrmi- 
nate. Nothing prohibits the settlement of a 
pending lawsuit, and in fact section CO; ( mi l )  
explicate refers to the possibility of senCntc u by 
giving the District Court discrcti n to stay proceed­
ings for 60 days while the Com.Cn.Co:) met;.: fur­
ther efforts to achieve voluntary compliance.”

Moreover, as previously noted, it is the immi:mr. filing 
of the lawsuit rather than the inienr.imthle A. ferrui of 
the '.a-.vsuit which is likely to hrhm ..to remhohraat 
employer into conciliation and complim; m.

It thus seems clear that an EEOC ' m: sue im­
mediately is far more conducn/c m m; noiim.ne man 
an EEOC right to sue interminably, b . .■ t if d o hi HOC 
is unable to act on all of its charge . ■ J. . I "o days.



- 21 -

thc person aggrieved still has the right to a. for >3 
clays thereafter, and the Act makes provide.! da: e •-•art
appointive. ■p_t of ;an attorney 1:or the aggrieved -

an award of re a s o i a: b 1 e a 11 o r n e y s' fees if he or d:c pre-
v m i b ■ S 'c v-.don 7 06(t ) (1) and (tO- And ere,. - * l ilo
grieved p:r rty fai Is a) ava il himself of these rig.its c. osing.
his three-:i no.uh right to sue perioci and a lea
natory pi•act •CCS thus go> ui;i reinedtied in that - .■ • • • ••-.s _
ing. no g:■eat harm has becn done. r\b UlC w'i.■'.‘.yj :
Supreme O - . U(art recently stared in Johnson v.
U.S.L.W. 4623, 4627 n. 13 (May 19. 1975), i i  o
civil righ is .actio;n under 42 U.3.C. Section i '.'o i Cv/ 0-5
barred by a one-year state statute of kmuniav;-;, 

“We note expressly how little is at stake
We are not really concerned with in.2 L-read op

\J tion whether those respondents can OC compel1 ,k, - jS;
| to conform their practices to the nauonaliy w.
a si f,> L a cUd policy of equal employment oppvertunicy. 1 L ! gv. O'1 V  • .

the respondents, or any of them, proher■ !•’ v ty liC- V.
1
• turn!'!y engaged in such conduct, the rj neeesse • y ■’ Th':';
i will be claimants who are in a position now ei.her
i1 to flie a charge under Title VII or sue ander!

Section 1981. The question in this CLiSc IS C- ** j f ■ ■ t ; . •
Jj
1 whetiter this particular petitioner itas waicea so •V V-’■
a lone: that he has forfeited his right to assert his £-C'C- • t ..
1
lj tion 1981 claim in federal court.” »•* • •., • w •'.
i In sunarnary, the remedial purposes oil ti .e Act . :m

v
: obvious!}/ be far better served by prom■ rg aCtiO. i on
< many ch:urges rather than by dilatory action c.i iX 1 : P'd. ..
i charges. ’The statutory enforcement scheme arid the le'1 i S” 1■ J' : vh.p
i• ■ i iative his;tor, are both replete with evicieiace: that Lo n-

•> arCSS WCIs convinced of that fact anti wrote it into L!Cj
■ 1972 amendments to Section 706.

■ \ v g. •. ;



— 22—

- ' ------ in  .a aia utie o
Instant Action.

Assuming ar^iu’iuio that this C’cuit o.y; 
l!;j nhOC.s action is not barred by d._- ’ 
tion contained in Title VIJ, then the 
ier.st insofar as it seeks backpay, dearly is 
the California statute o,: limitations.

I. Stab.- Saitatcs of Limitation Apr.iy v. 
Bac’o-av.

Lv.CC v. Ciijjm hr her!, el ! i-.2ci 456 « 
’97a).  in that case, as in the case at bar. an u 
fiieu a cltarge ol discrimination, upon \'h:ch tr 
eventually filed a complaint seeking , i ) bar: 
the charging party and ail other employees 
legedij had been discriminated against, a d (2 
live relief against future violations. The Fifth 
held mat that part or the suit which :
backpay involved the vindication of prim : - • ■ 
was thus gov err.ed by the state s t a * - . i
on the other hand, that part of the . j i t  wh U 
injunctive relief invoi, the vindicatic n ■ j ut 
so tln.t the state statute of limitations did no: 
that petion of t 'c  suit. 51 1 F.2u at 459.

M,

s imiia rly, iri Ur.■iicd S' cites v. Gear:
2d :306 (C.A, 5. i 973) . the Court
Geo rjia statute of lirnita tions applicai
men L’s ciaim !'.rr hiackpay but not an pi
for injunctive iolio f. staling at 925:

"YV!;ere the >'! o ini' v. a is suin ;

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belonging to it. state statutes of limitations ae  not 
applicable. [Citing cases.J However, this mi.:hole f?>

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__23__

is not apropos to the present backpay claims. in­
sofar as the pattern or practice si:.-. c< . ;:6 .. .
proper legal conduit for die reecwrv ,j.w  
individual citizens rather than the u wsurv. . i , a 
private and not a public action. ] Cid.ig •.v |  
there personal claims are entitled to ;y> .-dor 
states because they are here allowed to re as emed 

die Attorney General's suit as wet! t. .. pri­
vate class action."

io the same ctlect are EEOC v. Eagle . .
367 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. fewa, 1973), and EEOC r. 
ChrislUhiberg Garment Co.. 376 F.Supo. 1067. f071- 
1073 ( -A-.D. Va. 1974), which apply state sta.ntes of 
limitation to EEOC claims for backpay.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has very recr.it 
phed a state statute of limitations to an inch.Cam's 
suit for backpay under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. the 
other major civil rights legislation, statinu:

‘’Since there is no specifically stated rr ;se
relevant federal statute of limitation.-., few a cause 
of action under Section 1981, the controlling pe­
riod would ordinarily be the most appropriate one 
provided by state law. [Citing cases.]
. . . In borrowing a state period or Location tor 
application to a federal cause of acw.m. r. L era! 
court is relying on the state's wisdom in. set tine a 
limit, and exceptions thereto, on or. mm
of a closely analogous claim.
There is nothing anomalous or no ..., -now T.is.
State law has been followed in a v..____ w-
that raised questions concerning the overtones r.r.a 
details Oi application oi the state liman,vm ee- 
nod to the federal cause of action. .' 6 . casts.;

■ •
.



. - ■ ■ ■ » '. v ;

■<o ' is the re tU.j :l.i no need Nr ') 'V
;’tghts actic,;i *:Uit \VO’ild jusliiy - r-iw'CK.i
in applying sta Le law

John*.on v. RE.- !, 43 U.S1 I . .- . S . ci L -] i■ ~ ■■ -
Griff i;7 v. Pac.fi,;■ Maril ini Associaik
( C.A. 9, !973).

T •. ■ 1.1..;s, all of ti j L t’ore no ;g cases h;ji v ; i out
for recovery of backnay i"Nrough. 1 un.c ■ • ’.
rights SIciwt.tC C. i* i c* r by thc EEOC or J v, , 1.
himsei f is subjee t to ‘die n10i>:t a.uilogou.-; SI. ;ic

•lirnita ■ons. Non-j o t’ the ; visions ci;. C Ci lr,-
in its brief top. O').■24) !:10Id to the’< .Ci
suer, r•use inveh Cki a suit brought b; ■ >  ̂ (';,
either for injunc tive relief or to reco\ c r .'t 10 Vi
public treasury inot for priv'ate ir.uivk;uaj v Qi.j. .j :
the Si:;.dn Circuit’s recent dleicisior. in f.•jr,-)C V.
Clark, 511 F.2d 13:C (C v. 6, 1975 > in v'oi
solely for injunct IVO relief (\ 5 1 i F.2d 1353
recove.ry of hoc!-;pay.. and t!iiis simple Poor
tinctio: set forth in GriifiH Wheel anJ ti t C (.
cited abovc. i he cot:;rt in rrHOC v. D; , ( ’■Bro.pr C» ; »- 405 (E. D. Term. }973), foa . Cl the
ute in; :ppli cable beea use r!i ease
govern meat seeks; to CflJOiiTpi notices . 3o
at 409 . Finally, the third case which. ike EE
as support for its position is the E>rift'.:? ire
decisio discussed ; bove, vhich expsV>v V
same cdistinction set forth in Griff In
Supp. ;at 323-82-1 (' ‘claim lor bticej", • i \/ [\ rc*
by the state statute” )

Thus>, the Grij (in When cystine* ion bef v.’-ce
claim:- for back. :;:xy while : irmittins cOh • - i c
tive re’lief is well1 establisl1CI 'in j ; vi j c i  11 ci 1 L . 11 i? c! i

• ■! CIVii

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Brief, o 9s\ -p.
Wheel— as }} “O - The Fifth w c .

/ v / ( / . ' lllc cOf/rf
( •$‘c I/'On ! y ()r/.v , C0Ui ^  in P.

'•inequivocuPv u »> . * ^W’W/anhero r:„
barrel ff '  i'"*c ‘nat the clai-^c ~^  it t ie inocf- „ , ^so.nis iQr ---
liad ri!„ p ,.r Ma'°Sous s ta ie ......■** T Or m/C o  , ■“ ^‘-‘■UtUo
ti3e EEOC's d 'javr f .t0 hoJd otherwisee - U v i « V h  r n

O i ;*
OC's d->jaVc * • 1JOia oihe...

for hac’-mt /  * t0 g;v-c iifc fQ .
cou!,I have a ^ ^ y° nd thc ^ e ' h a

 ̂ 'iiu;
the

* 6 . 

i \  r * ~ n■' - v i ci
iCl Vj Cl! i

Shite StV’,1.
. _ .  '  <" - s  * • .

-*iOC Suits fo, / ........  -‘■iothti
*J-I«utedly Grijfin lV ’,„ , 

volv.no F F o r  c and tne r * .
or sanitation >n red a°ovc hold tW
iJ*J‘■•active re/ief p ou, P1 } to a suii by r
the benefit of the S i n r ^ ’ C0.ne of ^ese .. 
ooc.’sion in . p Cj-ie Court's th;VoV-

z?< ^
./•uviously noted the r  irLCl'-y Ci'J this •>,,«

“Peculiar i t l S * " 1. " 116*
CUid Justify special ■ CJvil nuhts

4a U .s t  \v 1 “ rejactance in ar.r K,; ' " 'n
E ^ C r  /- at 4626-46?7 /  ^ " h a s t a t e ]
. '-Sains no greater . /n other v,c -i~
.‘n o -  f , s  /• n o h t  c ’ w  7 .

° ° enforce a civil ri w f  J piy because ;./c noted tlmi 1 nc;ns statute c s

Ihe

f — -ion °"S Feri° d- h i S
necessarily wiil be , ^ ^ n e d ie d  t
novv vPaer to fiJe a ch"lmdnts vvho are i ,  .
under Section 198L U s T s  I T  ^  Vfi

at n. 15,

.In:

-OlSlont 
;h- Pat;

T? <"• ̂

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ocrr .i a!tier anThus, there is simply no reason to 
individual or the EEOC to proceed o. 
five-year-old claim. If the unlawful : 
corrected, the Act’s purposes ha'e 
If an unlawful practice continues, tin: 
ceed on a timely rather than a st 
greater likelihood of vindicating the peUic irt.rest.

Furthermore, while the EECC 1 
sions holding that the right of th 
for injunctive relief is unaffected by 
limitation, no: one of those decisions in 
mental agency such as the EECC v.t 
sue is dependent safety cel the ex-Vo 
underlying charge. In ether wore'.-., tin 
authority to file suit under Section 706 tmless it has a 
valid underlying charge. Thus, since me EEOC can 
only sue on a valid underlying charge, it necessarily 
follows that the EEOC’s right to rue >h u!J expire

: wear is now a 
ractite has been 

bum fulfilled. 
EEC E can pro- 
chare e. with far

r.

u.-.s a:tec Several QeC'i- 
:ed mates to sue 
state statutes of 
voOn d a govern- 
uae .. •... "i'.y to 
ear E yard 
:• EECC has r.o

3. The Under!} ing Cause A Acuta use or. October 
1, 197t).

Having thus established that state lutes a: limita­
tion apply to EEOC actions at least h : a ..r as back­
pay claims are concerned, two issues r a n ( 1 ) when

*!ln this respect, it is critical to recognise 
filed not only by the aggrieved party but x  
behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieve.:, 
the Commission." Section 7oe( i). 
has a stale claim it would like to pursue 
members can file a new charge and begin .

: eh .r.vs may be 
..a. :v on “on 

hi member of 
• dr EF.OC now 
the 1.1: EC’s own 
creor;e.r.ent ma-

,v

— _

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, . . ^ 7 r r r . r r r . . f n . ^ W V T . , - f , „ , r .  r .

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• . when the underlying charge does. Sine. : shorn below ! • ■ . '

y; t ■ • ,
the underlying charge in this case pi; in 
the California statute of limitations, it

ly is barred by 
-ssarilv fol-

■, ;w.'
•' . E'Vy.EE ■;VET
'f ■ ■

l / ' v i S ;
lows that the EECCs right to sue the. 
equally barred.

reor. should be

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H ' !did the cause of action arise in this case, a 
which statutory limitation period is applicable.

The first issue presents no problem in this case, for 
the underlying charge expressly states that - - no. t 
recent date on which this discrimination toon pa.ee 
was “October I, 1970’ [11. 1051. That cf comae ..as 
the date the charging party was uncharged tor reasons 
she considered discriminatory j R. 140-14 i j . 1 hat case 
was thus the day her cause of action arose. As stated 
in Johnson v. REA,  43 U.S.L.W. at 4620,

“The cause of action asserted by petitioner ac-
Cl•tied, if at: all, not 1a ter li!- m n 1 i ir 1»cv* I 4 Ut a: 20. i 96?. the
d;me of his discharge.’

Accon :: Griffin v. Pacific Marii ime Assc'.•/ 7 ’ t fy * ; 4 j ]< ^ .

2d 11 i o a 1 0 9, 1973) , cert . denied, 414 CJ.S. 859
(1974 ) (cause of action based on layoff accrued on
date of layoff) ; Collins v. Utliter! Ah > >v V ?(U

...., K3 FEP 728 (C.A. 9, 1975) (c ease cf action
arose on date of involu:nary resign at.on: subsequent
noneir.ploy merit and refusal to reinstate cm no. consti-
true continuing violation). Thcse decidens simply apply
the genera! ruie set forth 1;y the r i 1 111 ; .fcait in Georgia
Power and Griffin Wheel t i i a t

•‘For purposes of the statute of limitations, a cause 
of action accrues whenever an individual is di­
rectly and adversely affected by the c.scrimmalory 
practices of the defendant.’

474 F.2d at 924; 51 1 F.2d at 4592

chincry anew, with far greater chanee for 
relative freshness of the available evidence 
if any there be.

rGrijjin Wheel expressly held dial the ... 
not arise on the day the charge ;s filed. 511 r..

;.,s .. vet; tne 
a.,-coivipiiar.ee

- . e t i o n U (' c* s



!I

S'

• i

j

j

Since tire chrirgl n parly v7 as , ; * . \ . . ,yi October
i, 1970 for rer.sons :me con ICiC*'0 J dii.CI*:'.'. • t 'ey. that
IS the date she \vas "direct:y a: e\ . f; cted”
by the alleged discriininatory' pr:aedee an:: 2. us mat is
tiic date her ca use o! acti:at <. e. ■ ■. e ii. - aId s  com-
pi:lint h.erein wa k i filed. It.d we Vwi. '...'.Hit .“ejduary 22.
1 Ql y74, almost tin•Cj aitd a half j ... . *. . ..., i S l . •. L’ . J i . 1 » V- 1 .

Ecth of :• Audogow. ■Call, y.... iduiils-
tion Bar rr;113 Action. -

The District Cou rt found fU L litit tit e most :. m.uogoas
^  , V- .ilifornia statute of limit:nic.’.s was . r. e or: e-year
pcitied set forth in Callfornia Code of id : . race dure
Section 340(3) 1or actions i:tvolvir.
catrsed by the v;/ rrj n i T!V il i{Q\ _ ; . ,1 Oi i :.;G- !:c/ . • •” fR-
0 0 ■5-226j. Certs V !j that is a.n api deseript: T , - ■% 4-Of W tiul
tne: charging party claimed cCCU:. : C C: wO . 1 ‘J 1". 1..ore over,
the California St:;j-' ■ e oiu i has in. iw'G i(.I -1 a j -»  ̂-1 Z'*OH-vJ
(3 ) “embraces ini rin«cements of persona; GS GO-
pc:led to property ri 7 A/ /Dr aArp. v.
Davies, 66 Cal. 2 cl 4.75. 437 (! ; : SCl . Vc/.y v.
Frc’S )lO  CoiiVilWi:;\ ’ospital. 3 3 < '■ i An.* Ai - • * • • v r a • ~v" ’32, 705
(1974) ("Section 340(3) embraces not only bodily
injuries but all inf rimremenis of P- or,a i . ‘ n.us as op-
PG3(rd to property rig!hits”). oGt.i.iariy. •he Federal Dis-
t I'lC i. Court in EEGC v. Chr,ini cm!>e.y C. u mcnJ - o., 376
F.Sijpp. 1067 (W.D. V Q ■ 97- 1 tit at m e most
ana.logons state limita.tion period! f o; i.jlie iliC C ’s suit
undor Title VII was Virgin: a’s tv. c-year P.ni.atlt.ns peri-
cd governing “every act s' i for . 7 v * j so:; :.l i.tjurv.” A c -
cove!: Almond v. Kem , 459 F.2d 2 0 0  <v. ■ ■■ • 4. i 972)
(same statute applicable to S— v. . 3 d. ..r cis-
crimination). Thus, all of these de..vs Ion;-: ,V!!y support 
the lower court’s finding that Section 3 - applies
to and thus bars this action.



■29-
■ ■) ■■ i■i] : °t,ler federalde„j .

uPPt!Cabh c- i;r s-°n-s Sli<n,,r  .
in °rUia st*»tc  is7h e ;, *at the

o  ) ^  - ll:fornia Code of r  thrcc-year 0 -,v ,
* '  c^nccrnins  ”:1,  r ° fC,Vl i  Procedu ^  0c Set
aUUe> other than *> *<L i0J1 u-P°iJ a iiabi?; x ''''CtJ'V: 33S 

*as aiready h(J  J, pCni%  or forf ■ * **;> Cr£a- d  by 7 '-ua t/i-ir '-’‘future, t -.;. J
' Cu®  1983 — then, 11 act'0.l ’••cur;

OV

“The c *W»t
is b-v,-/: n,a courts hov ,

- -u upon a b'ahiii* “ C Jcpi that 
"canine of £ 5 * ‘y Crca^  by stati,

r " n o t « *  C t  3 3 ," > . *uL action ic nnf , 1 stature. O r
^ “ ttltc* if , . *“ca Upon •:■ V. “ ■' ■■■• .*̂*1, 2“ ? or * **-vtj2ir£x/ ■%>,
OO.’i/U’on ?., • * lL ‘S One W'h'nUn wvv in the ^  ‘‘ WouldCases! absence - c*’ I • " ^4. St';*4-*. / v r>

Of course, ti,e c _

for a'T* CA!St at COn3̂ o n T n 'inVGiVCS a ^abi:ftv .„v  ,
3 0 ) i ; : r - ^  ^ e e o c  vvoi!id * *  :
Sn, , "au'se the EECtn’ UC So ar?ues t .-•• • - l t solely on T;(!e v t L ° C s  cause of ?•

"" 0,1 “  based

- tne

bon 
• bin

summary, there k that tbr. ^ ^  a suhet-a „• ,
ae-j'ear oeriod m " Ua ^ody o*

v  • • caused bv oC S°vernin,> a„f- ;  “^ u o - v
piies as held byVh T ° ngfui a«  " " ' f° r “aiurv
decisions that th ° /ovver court, anJ 1 ano
Period o0v.,r . ° aPPhcable Sfatm ■c°vernina flrf- .. ^atutc IS o,, .
s‘ature.” u/i.-, “-t^ns “lmn„ „ <h

“ c^vernmer arf- .. Jl£̂ ute iS f?,,
statute.” u/i u ‘cfions ‘upon a . . t;-'- 1
Court C ° cciciental , k a ^abii/ty c;

vvas correrr • Subm/ts tb-tC • 
Purposes of th-> T  aPPp'inu cec,. a\ wlsPu"poses of the T !  ‘‘PPCiny S c c n T  
w,iidi of dicsc asc al ,lar this C W  W1 ',4af

,W0 »  “‘be , n o s r  I I ^  -o:
atogcuc” c.

Li'icr 2p-
Tne of

re,1-'rear
a ted b}
a-> :.s;riot
n
uecir/e

,:;/v

r',Tvr'»----

•<;•.'••';;p^ \  ■■'.'si? ■■;■•• : up . :

•>-v̂  r .4. -■{««.< At.*’., ̂

‘>5-



• •' "' • <? V '  • ' ■ 

• ' .

—30—

ute, for both statutes bar this action v.hicn •.■ as filed 
almost three and a half years alter me cause aedc.i 
arose on October i, 1970.

s e v e r a l  o ec

clc;

this, ti . 1 T • ' /Ll ’L v-1C' this
cost an;dogO t i s ' si::.‘.ate is the
! in Cal.no;w.T Cede of Civil
■ hich govei . i s ‘"an a; . i o n tor
roviueu for ’> V •: us_the
uh the Cl.:l:fo r.rua coarts ana
teeming Calii'o:•nia Cusec make
:ase at 1bar has bee a provided
340(3) or unf!er ice hen 338
3 does not a . . . . . . . . nd the
is barr'cd citii cr by •the one-

-year statm:e for suo’ actions

(1). Thus, Section 3 
EEOC’s cause of'actio 
year statute or the mree-year sunun 
in California.

C. Paragraphs 8(b) and 9(c) Arc Ousslde Cm dcopt 
oi the Underlying Charge and Are Thus carrea

The charge upon which the EEOC's compkmrt acre 
in is based was filed by a married female employee. A:

result, the complaint asserts
fr"

various :.lh ons or 
other 

though
discrimination against the charging parly uiv 
married female employees, which edegutio 
not specifically raised in the underlying charge, coula 
have been raised by the charging party and are rea­
sonably within .no scope of her change. r\v,cCidmgl>, 
Occidental does not contest that enlargement on the 
specific allegations in her charge, e.g., 'Bine Bed Soots 
v. EEOC. 413 r .2d 355 (C.A. 6, 1959).

However, paragraph 8(b) of the EEOC s complaint 
alleges discrimination against umncreE ■: m . U.e em­
ployees, and paragraph 9(c) alleges urwr.mmanon 
asainst nunc employees concerning c-.-c.:.

Id
ft*? " .y ■■ ' v

: ’ " U d

benefits.

»• •• ‘ .?';• b.. •.
fh'c:.
} ■ -

f k
I '..'Cm"
5■ '
r --y :

s i p■pa P.-.-o'I
rfdf.'h...

...

. hb; .
’ v.,'o:h :h. ■... ;-V .

o ■



j
'4

Obviously neither of those allegations could have been 
raisco by die charging party in this case, who as a mar- 
lied female employee could not personally have been 
prejudiced or directly affected by alleged discrimina- 
uon against unmarried females or again, t maic . -

American Rockwell Carp., 432 F.2d 569.. 57.1 _(C.A. 9, 
1973) and cases cited therein. Furthermore, in Van 
Iloonussen v. Xerox, 497 F.2d 180 (C.A. 9 , 1 9 7 4 ) 
this Court held that the EEOC could be limited :c the 
issues raised in the private party’s complaint.

In Ouhichon, a black employee whose EECC charac 
raised allegations of racial discrimination sought to ex­
pand his complaint to include subsequent acts of 
racial discrimination against himself. Tnh. Court sini- 
Pty held that the subsequent acts of alleged racial dis­
crimination against that individual were “like or reason­
ably related to” the initial act of racial discrimination 
against that individual. The expansion perm it re 
thus simply to other allegations which the d. 
party personally could have raised.

However, the EEOC would have this .curt

*" **- 1 * 1
ly have raised. Such an expansion would Iw com

f : % 0
. -t, ';" ■ m -a. .

■ v '

'ri;;

i ees.
The issue, therefore, is whether the 2. TOC cn;i pro-

■■■"•■iV’fV-

coed on these allegations where the ch a rein a ■; am
if

3 ly did not and couid not have raised them.
We submit that the answer is no. This Court ii uis rc-

I'fr < 1*
■V" vyTmOv"'. /-f’- *'.•»;

ji
iterated the universally stated rule that a  Tit! 
complaint may only encompass allegations of O

e VII
> r ;
Civ ■
>/ 1 CwF~ a,-;,;,.;14 nation which are “like or reasonably related rcT the

■ •- ■■ ..i-*.;.-: ... . , . s. , .
\'r • ■'* allegations in the underlying charge. 0  nine, ton 1 ;7t'jrrh
'.a v • . •; »• . ;._ : . y •• V '
w.<
, /- a m .
gif " "  .; .t c . - .  , •
ir'w-y : 
l ' / T  
.

F .Im m y ,"  

.•
Im■■'‘Vlr-'X.1

was T T F p I
■ging X • iTC'-r 

Tom; .Ovui;.'1
xmd , ••. -■ 0i-?v-
'a..sc o'- on • On..>...
nai­
ra rv ■■

;i: ,  l .. ..

•w •- y v
OF ■ 'm mM X e

v ■_ c iy -  Tv" T . -, J \
' -v ■■■■■•.■ 4 - T ’- m m  '• • 

v
: F-p r .

. .



1 tc tlv.; orcvailing weight of authority, v inch .-vr-iu.-. thac
.■ i . .  ■ l'; the 

a sort. 
: 270 

on by

the complaint cannc.t assert discfiinineu.un 
charging party has no standing perse.!.’.'..y
EECC v. Hears! Corn., .... F.Supp........ 8 i'Ee
(W.D. Wash. 1974) (ciiarge of s.x dcrmiu.L 
male employee could net he expancec: •.nclu..e -.lega­
tions of sex discrimination against icni.cr e:. .u.- eas), 
EECC v. General Electric Co.. 376 F.Supp. 757 Y.D. 
Va. 1974) (charge of discrimination by mule lployee 
could not be expanded to include ailegadoiic of sex 
discrimination against female- e m p lo y e e s E HOC v. 
Western Electric Co., 382 F.Supp. 787 (Ej. >."■}
(charge of discrimination by miFc-emm.-yco ...

. •> *T • «,: v > h- )
• i-( r» J*

oc cooanocv to inciude tiiicgatioi .■.illation

’"Swvera1 courts have gone even ft:niter, ilniita g the lain
to t!;C piirticuiar kind of discriiViinat ion ail reci in
even where ihc charcing party conk:1 have personal' - ’.. .:VJ tllC
otheir kind of discrimination. L..;;., EEOC "• Hick . y-.'. '.end'
Co., 372 F.Supp- 1117 (E D. Nio. 1973) (cha.ye c . dis-
criminaticjn e: 'aid not be expanded to include r-1 . . kA sex
disc:'in', in;.ition); HBOC v. Copeuui it Carp........  E.S r.y....... , 8
FEP S65 (S.D. 0 hio 1974) (same) ; EEOC v. AVi, ; ' / . . Times
Broculcas,!ini’, 364 F.Supp. 651 (W.D. Term. 1973 ; (e e .rye of
sex discri mi nation could no: be expaneled uteu: I'eee dis-
crierinativMl).

t .#

o( . S u feint: 1 -S. 1 V- cmployce: / -.s the Coen tated in f,..
EEC v. C ate rat Electr ic Co 376 F.euup. at 76 i:

-•yfive di sen mi.talion uncov•ered must r . i. a si have
h:id the paten rial of prej udicing the me.y:lr.g par-
ty in order to be theI SUOject of a inter mlit a rc'.v- j - ’ -

A - yd' •'
ing cut of ti:,e char•gc.” | Emphasis in c inal | . 1 i

We submi t thiat this is the better upphem.b i c: the
genera i “like or x Casonablv rei;ated r.;'e tor ay:~- ■;
sons.. First, penvtil t iing the com t:iluirit to raise any t ilega- \-c ci J r " 1
tier. which the" ch•J: r oi:i or party pert: tnuhv ..Id have
raise;s gi ves subtic:ent : :ead'th lo  the c >7n nr while f ^ : r  >

.. '7 :

: .'-a)

i
S'
’■ -■.?' - y *•



— 33—

still providing ar. easily workable limitation. (or 'c will 
be a simple matter’ In virtually all cases c de,ermine 
whether the charging "party could have peworwUy 
been prejudiced by the alleged discriminatory practice. 
Extended litigation on this point will hus re' 1-t.ijed. 
On the other hand, the “anything which grows out of 
the investigation’' rale suggested by b .• EEOC is so 
open-ended and ambiguous as to assure .tnetce. ;sary 
litigation on this point. The mere workable '.nr.card 
will thus assure a more expeditious resolution e. cases 
and eliminate unnecessary litigation.

Secondly, there is good reason to confine the com­
plaint to matters which could have been raised personal­
ly by the charging party, for otherwise the warn r 
lief may operate against the charging party. Tor . . 
ample';’ iFa Tiiale 'employee's charge may be e:. .aimed 
to include discrimination against female employ res. the 
relief eventually afforded the female employe;:' may 
very well be at the expense of the male employee who 
filed the charge. Similarly, a black male employee v. no 
files a charge may find that the EEC C spore's -.wo 
years investigating sex discrimination against ' l b ;  fe­
male employees rather than focusing its anemic a and 
resources on his claim. This point has particular appli­
cation to the case at bar, where EEOC action . a the 
underlying charge might have been forthcoming sooner 
but for the EEOC’s determination to expand its in­
vestigation and its complaint.

Finally, the fact is that Congress expressly provided 
thc’EEOC and private individuals with a means of as­
serting discrimination beyond that which x ersonaily af­
fects them. Section 706(b) permits EEOC ie a n x r  to 
file charges on their own. and permits persons tile



I

charges on behalf of other persons. ..... very e. . • , *. - N

of these provisions suggests a Congre '.m :r. .era to
keep ate complaint within the confine of >.r.e c Large
except where the Section 7 0 3(b) pro' ras are J.
They further suggest that a wide-ranging : iwsai.. . s. o tii cl
not be imposed on a charging parrs to aid .. a. seek
to assert claims or. behalf of other aim-, •- V.. 1 ■ -• - C' e J
parties but only on behalf of itimse.i. I; d e _. TOC is
permitted to file a complaint on ar.ytl ;rv  if fir: s dor-
ing investigation, these statutory pros' 
dered virtually meaningless.

is ions a au-

Accordingly, the better rule is the eue set ■ a:, in
the above-cited cases, that the emm . cornel. can
only raise those matters which “had .ne pete.r.tial of
prejudicing the charging party” and thas whicha could
have been raised by the charging p a r '; .. The oruy case
cited by the £EOC which clearly pcr.v.ias exp:.■ non of
a charcc to include an allegation wa.es: coinJ 
personally affected the charging pari.'

nave 
n v.

870 (D. Colo.*1973). a charge os nndona! 
raised by a female employee was enlarged 
of both, national origin and s. 
which, could hm e been raises 
Alls true Insitranci; Co. v. Le.C 
involved solely tire Question o 
vestigation, not an EEOC complaint.

an a .:.nauo:r 
ations

scriinina'b n —aslair., ’;..a. of
the char ra 1; v.

1 FEP fie a (S.O . f. 1972)
bread, h or the ELk j v_ o in-

f § .

(' il.C

f : •■ A
;:Vv

;a a.

American Tobacco Co., .... F.iupp. - O TT)...., o - ..*• T O/  .io m-
(D.C. Va. i 974)— is, we submit, ir.eeerrecth ectdecl A- ' ■
and should be rejected for tire reasons • o f  for Li: L. C0 VC. k ' ,' '

9No.vc of the other cases cited by the EhO-7 car. permit
a complaint to include allegations which -.e clv.v. .ay party
could not personally have raised. For earn: 11- • ..-A' V. h*' ;
General Fireproofing Co., .... r.2d ...... 3 Fh? 80*7 .'-.A. 4,
1971), a race discrimination charge by a ti.fick Vv.v. ./T was
expanded to permit allegations of barn mure :tad sc:: :i a- \ .
tion, noth of which the charging party . :<\m m : !>.: r:;vj
raised. Similarly, .n Lav.no v. llatr.ruj / ’\:C" • ,l’ i ■

m .

r s

m-v



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4

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IV
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iA.J

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i

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. .. ■

■ ■ :  • ■;■■■. ■ V* > . / .

, v ' e - ‘ ‘. ' r .

. , . ' U
"We ■■ I

— 35—

IV.
CONCLUSION.

For tnc foregoing reasons, it is respect fulsub:  .-'.tod 
:har the decision of the District Court should be sus­
tained in ail respects.

Dated: June 30, 1975.
Respectfully submitted,

Paul, Hastings, Janofsky 1 vW lxer, 
D ennis H. Vaughn,
Howard C. Hay,
Patricia D iaz D ennis,

Attorneys for Appellee.

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