Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant

    IN THE 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

¥OR "THE PIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 75-1998 

WITT CAMPBELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 
Cross Appellant 

versus 

 GADSDEN COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL., 

ETC., 

Defendants—-Appellants 
Cross Appellees 

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Northern District of Florida 

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
CROSS APPELLANT 

KENT SPRIGES 

324 W. College Avenue 
Tallahassee, Fla. 32301 

JACK GREENBERG 

JAMES C. GRAY, JR. 

10 Columbus Circle 

New York, New York 1001¢ 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Cross Appellant 



IN THE 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE -PIPTH CIRCUIT 

No. 75-1998 

WITT CAMPBELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 
- ] Cross Appellant 

versus 

GADSDEN COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL., 
BTC. 

Defendants—-Appellants 

Cross Appellees 

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Northern District of Florida 

CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY LOCAL RULE 13 (a) 

The undersigned, counsel of record for plaintiff- 

appellee, cross appellant certifies that the following listed 

parties have an interest in the outcome of this case. These 

representations are made in order BR of this Codrt: 

é may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal pursuant 

to Local Rule 13 (a): 

]. The original plaintiff who commenced this action in 

1973 was Witt Campbell. 



2. Plaintiff Campbell commenced this action as a class 

action pursuant to Rule 23 F.R.C.P. but the district court 

ruled that the action could not be maintained as a class 

action. 

4. The Aefendnnts are the Gadsden County Board of 

Education (Florida), M.D. Walker, Superintendent, and 

Edward Fletcher, Cecil Butler, C.W. Harbin, Jr., Will I. 

Ramsey, Sr., and Randolph Greene, members of the Gadsden 

County Board of Education. 

Loner Ley 1 
JAMES C. GRAY, JR. 

“Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Cross Appellant 



Issues Presented For Review 

INDEX 

bY rE he :CYOSS ADDER L vac dninamise nse o sess 

Procedural Statement of the Case ...... vs orhin wee . 

Plaintiff's Statement Of the Packs .cccecsesionso 

ARGUMENT 

2 The District Court Properly 
Exercised Its Jurisdiction 

Over he DelfenAants « cc cvenvsrseseees 

II. The District Court Properly 
Held That Plaintiff was Demoted 
and that His Demotion and Non- 
reappointment Were In Violation 

of the Singleton Reguirements ........ 

III. The District Court Properly 
Awarded Plaintiff a Reasonable 
Attorney's Fee .. ee © © © © 6 © © © © © © © © © 6 © 0 a 0 oo 

IV. The District Court Properly 
Ordered Plaintiff's Re- 
appointment to a Principalship ....... 

Cross Appe al 

Vv. The District Court Erred in 
Not Finding a Pattern and 
Practice of Racial Discrimination .... 

VI. The District Court BErred in 
Not Awarding Plaintiff Back 
Pay and Other Equitable 

Monetary Relief . 

CONCLUSION @ @ © ® ® © © © © °° ® ® © oo 

HE 

13 

17 

22 

23 

24 

26 

28 



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 
Page 

Aurora Education Ass'n East v. Board of | 
Education of Aurora Public School 
District No. 131 .0Ff Kane County,  I11., 
490 P28 431 ATE Cire TOT) ov nisinv emia vimive snicie vin ein 13 

Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 
VS. 5090 SL1OTL) igus sien wine vonswbi minions 8 womin inn ieinion. is mn ia wie wie 23. 

Brooks Nv. Beto, 366 F.28. 1 {5h Cir. 1966) «icovsninsve 25 

Campbell v. Masur, 486 F.2d :554 (5th Cir. 1973) ...... 1S 

Chambers v. Hendersonville City Board 
Of BEUC., 364 F.24 189 {Ath (ir. A185806) uve evvienese 25 

City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) ..... 13,14, 15 

District of Columbia v.: Carter, 402 U.8. 418 seevervses 15 

Haney v. County Board of Educ. of Sevier 
County, 429 ¥.24 364 (8th Cix. 1970) «css.» cece cennne 25 

Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School 
District, 427 7.28319: {5th"Cix. 1970), 

cert. “den. 400-18. 081 {1971) inv evnnsneasnetisinein 26 

Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973) ..... 14 

Hines v. D'Artois, 383 F.Supp. 184, 190 
(H.D, Tn. 1974) cuss anivivisisinainmismsinne snes seit oininwess 15 

Jackson v. Wheatley Sch. Dist. ‘No. 28, 
430 0.28 1359 (8th Cir. T0970) ui nnnmasnvssinvninissnsee 25 

Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 Denver, Colo., 
213 0.8: TOU H1973) cnn vmmuvissmmiv ess wisie.sio wn iaweeienie vie 25 

Lee v. Macon County Board of Blug.y 453 F. 2d. 

1304 {5th Cir. 1971) vs veinvirnes SARE 00 FA SSR RI 20 

Lee v. Macon County Board of Bue APlorence) — RE 15.74 

456 F.24 1371 (5th Cir. 1972), ceraeesreneas PEN LAER 20 

McCurdy v. School Board of Palm Beach’ 
County, Florida, 367 F.Supp. 747 
{S.D. Fla. 1973) 388 F.Supp. 599 
(1974), aff'd per curiam 509 F.2d 
540 (5th Cir. 1975): as ewvvssernn vets SR ER RN TA 23 

-dii- 



Maybank v. Ingraham, 378 F.Supp. 913 
0p ME BG LE RR CS ES EE Ea 

Monxoe VV. Pape, 305. eS. 167 (1961) Lu svvisnoonssses 

Moore v. Board of Educ. of Chidester Sch. 
Dist., 448 F.24 709 (8th Cir. 1971) icin ie iin eins 

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 
390 U.S. 42001988) ....viuiida wieiniv vinnie s siniein wind 

North Carolina Teachers Assh v. Ashboro 

City Board of Educ., 393 v.24 736 
BAL Cr. OEY i tiles se ad vie cE ib eee ei 

Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 

(1973) ciniann PLY LO SE SE a GR EE dR ee a aiets 

Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 
294 B..20 21) ASLEL Clr. O74) daininsvicinrersntinises 

Rolfe v. County Board of Educ. of Lincoln 

County, 391. 7.24 77 (6th Clr. 1968) ue eeceenn in 

Singleton v. Jackson Separate Mun. Sch. 
Dist. , 419 ¥.2d 1211 (5th Civ. 1969), 
cert. den, 386: 1.8, 1032 {1970) vu ciiviionnens 37,18, 16, 

Smith v. Board of Educ. of Morrilton Sch. 
Dist. No. 32, 365 F.24 770 

(SL Cir A000) ce wend vents a dias Ceielnie mie diene winte 

Sterzing v. Fort Bend Ind. School District, 
495. 7.24 82. A5th Clr, 1978) cessie ons SEVIER IEC EE 

United Farmworkers of Florida Housing 
Project Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 

Fla., 493. F.28 799 {5th Civ. 19874) see ciinveves on 

U.S. v. Jefferson County Board of Educ., | 
372 7.246 B36 A5th Clr, 19586) aise veinninsens “visin 

U.S. v. Wakulla County ape Lt ala 

Wall v. Stanly County Board of Educ:, ~ « «= = w= w= 
378 ¥.24 275 {4th Clr, X067Y ou iv sibits nid: 

Williams v. Albemarle County Bd. oF Educ., “1 
485 F.28 232 44th Clr. 1973) i. cit aeidndeateinsus 

-31ii~ 

Page 

20, 

16 

14 

25 

22 

25 

22 

26 

25 

23 

20 

14 

14 

25 

20 

26 

18 



Page 

Statutes: 

20 U8.CoS 6X7 iv vsmmsisienms TORI IRIE IE 22 

LLBEAN RIT A TEC TE Re SCAN IL ECR SO 1 SPI Bg 16° 

CL RE SAE IR 1 SHE wR A SI UA PER TR SE 13 

A IO CL 8 NOB ae awa tie vir ntin heats Sey 13, .15,:16 

A2 0.0.0, 8 HORS iv stannsvsnvn visi satis waives 13,14, 15,16 

A208. CST GOS ere sila ivan winnie iy is ale wiv wie 13, 16 

PB. AO. BBA) as iitiis mm aiave sonialeis a ninies viene mie 18, 25 

Constitutional Provisions: 

Thirteenth Amendment «ecco PRESS. eS A Pe ve ewe Eo 33, ‘16 

Fourteenth Amendment .ccececeeceeee fie ie. Le esiiolin io Js. 0 inne mere wie intel 13,16 

-iv- 



IN THE 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 75-1998" 

WITT CAMPBELL 

Plaintiff-Appellee 
Cross Appellant 

versus 

" GADSDEN COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD, ET AlL., 
ETC.. 

Defendants—-Appellants 
Cross Appellees 

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Northern District of Florida 

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
CROSS APPELLANT 

Issues Presented For Review 

By the Cross Appeal 

3. Did the District Court err in not making a finding 

that a pattern and practice of racial discrimination had been 

shown and in finding that plaintiff's demotion was not part 

of any pattern and practice? 

2 Did the District Court err in not awarding plaintiff 

back pay and other equitable monetary relief? 



Procedural Statement of the Case 

Appellee-Cross—-Appellant Campbell (hereinafter 

referred to as "plaintiff Campbell”) adopts the Statement 

of the Case set forth on pages 1 to 3 of the Brief of 

Defendants-Appellants Cross—-Appellees (hereinafter re- 

ferred to as "defendants"). 



PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 

a. Plaintiff's Demotion 

Plaintiff Campbell is a black administrator 

who has been employed by the Gadsden County Board of 

Public Instruction Sinng 1934. He has been certified 

as an elementary and secondary school principal since 

I952. [Finding of Pact {(F.F.) 1] In the 1569-70 

school year, plaintiff had thirty years of experience 

as an administrator in the Gadsden County school system 

and was the senior administrator in the system. [Plain- 

Liff's Behibit {P.X.) 5] 

The Gadsden County School District historically 

operated a dual school system with racially segregated 

faculties and student bodies up until the commencement 

of the 1970-71 school year. Pursuant to an order by 

the United States District Court for the Northern District 

of Florida in the case of United States v. Gadsden County 

School District, TCA-1616, enjoining further maintenance 

of the dual school system, the defendant district desegre- 

gated its system in August 19270. Under the dual system, 

the school district operated five white secondary schools 

(four with senior high school grades) but only two black 

secondary schools despite the fact that black students 

comprised more than 50% of he student body throughout 

the system. Of the schools - both secondary and elementary - 

none of the white schools had black principals or assistant 

3 



principals, but two of the black schools (Springfield 

and Stewart Street) had white principals. (P.X. 5) 

Prior to the desegregation of the Gadsden 

County system, plaintiff Campbell was the principal 

of Stevens Elementary School. As principal of Stevens, 

plaintiff had responsibility for selecting and hiring 

faculty, making teacher assignments, presiding over 

faculty meetings and ceremonial occasions and for the 

general operation of the school. (F.F. 9) 

As a result of the desegregation of the system, 

the Stevens Elementary School was phased out and the y 

number of principalships in the system reduced. (F.F. 57 

In August 1970, plaintiff was reassigned from 

his position as a principal to an assistant principal's 

position. Plaintiff objected to his reassignment. 

(F.F. 5) Plaintiff was assigned as assistant principal 

to Chattahoochee High School. As assistant principal 

of Chattahoochee High School, plaintiff had no responsi- 

bility for selecting and hiring faculty, making teacher 

assignments and presiding over faculty meetings and cere- 

monial occasions (F.F. 9) In September of 1973, there 

were fewer students enrolled at Chattahoochee High School 

than there had been at Stevens Elementary School when plain- 

tiff was principal. (F.F.:10) 

1l/ As part of its dismantling of the dual school system, 
the Gadsden County school board also changed the names of 

five formerly all black schools; no white schools were 
similarly changed. 

will 



The position of principal is generally more 

prestigions than the position of assistant principal 

regardless of whether the comparison is made on or between 

the elementary, junior high or high school levels. (F.F. 11) 

The salary range for principals is higher than the salary 

range for assistant principals. (F.F. 12) 

Although plaintiff did not suffer a loss in 

salary in the 1970-71 school year when his 1970-71 

assistant principal's salary is compared with his 1969-70 

principal's salary, a comparison of his subseguent salaries 

with Ghove of another principal with similar seniority 

shows that he did suffer a loss in income over the succeed- 

ing years. Principal William Grice who retained his ele- 

mentary school principalship and had in 1969-70 twenty-nine 

(29) years of seniority compared with plaintiff's thirty 

(30) years earned the following amounts more than plaintiff: 

in 1971-72 - $200, in 1972-73 -:$500, and in 1973-74 - £500. 

In 1970-71, however, plaintiff earned $300 more than Principal 

Grice. (PX.5) 

In August 1970, the Gadsden County school system 

had not developed non-racial objective criteria, to be used 

in selecting staff members for dismissal or demotion, and the 

system and defendants have never developed such criteria. 

The school system did not utilize objective and reasonable 

non-discriminatory standards to compare the members of the 

pre-desegregation order principal population in order to 

select from among ‘all the principals which ones were to be 

displaced in effecting the necessary reduction in the numbers 

of principals. (F.F. 7) 

a 



At the time that plaintiff was displaced from 

his principalship, he was the senior administrator in 

the system. Plaintiff has been assigned less respon- 

sibility as assistant principal of Chattahoochee High 

School than he had as principal of Stevens Elementary 

School. (F.F. 8) In the crucial year of integration 

when plaintiff os demoted, six new principals were 

brought into the system. 

In addition, in the 1970-71 school year, Charles 

Boyd assumed the Munroe Elementary principalship for the 

first time, and Corbin Scott assumed the Southside Ele- 

mentary principalship for the first time. Both new 

principals were white. (P.X. 5) 

In the fall of 1971 Leslie Jones, a white, 

assumed the principalship of Gretna Elementary School 

for the first time and his former position was assumed 

by the former Sinoinal of eretin. The combined seniority 

of these two principals was twelve (12) years compared 

to plaintiff's thirty-two (32) years. 

Since 1970, there have been at least three 

principal vacancies at the junior high school level for 

which plaintiff was qualified. a | 

Plaintiff has never been offered reassignment 

high -- since his EN ORI in August 1970. He remains 

duly certified to be a principal on either the. elementary 

or secondary level. 



Db. Statistical and Other Evidence of Racial 

Discrimination : 

Plaintiff introduced other evidence to show 

that his dismissal was part of a pattern and practice 

of racial discrimination. This evidence shows not only 

that other black administrators were demoted without 

objective criteria but also that whites have enjoyed 

prior to desegregation and also afterwards preferential 

employment treatment in the Gadsden County public school 

system. 

In the fall of 1970, defendants consolidated 

the black and white high schools in the Havana area, 

turning the previously black Northside High School 

building into a middle school. The former principal of 

Northside, John Williams, a black, was reassigned as 

principal of the middle school while a white was made 

principal of the High School. The white, Leslie Jones, 

had been prior to desegregation the assiwtant principal 

of an elementary school. No non-racial objective cri- 

teria were used in demoting an experienced black high 

school principal to a middle school position and promoting 

an elementary school assistant principal for the high 

school principalship. (P.X. 5) 

Mr. Freddie Andrews was moved from his elementary 

school principalship in 1969 to the assistant principalship 

of a senior high school. (P.X.4 and 5) In 1970 he was 

reassigned from his line administrative position to the 

county staff against his will. 

-7- 



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Two other black principals were assigned to 

‘assistant principalships in the wake of desegregation. 

In the fall of 1970, Verdell Hamilton was demoted from 

fe. high school principalship to a high school assistant- 

ship. In the fall of 1971, Pugh Young was demoted from 

an elementary school principalship to a junior high 

school assistantship. 



Despite the fact that the student body is and 

has been predominantly black (presently approximately 78% 

black), the school system has lowered black faculty employ- 

ment from 61% to 48% and maintained it at that level (ap- 

proximately 50%). (P.X's 8 and 13) 

From 1968 until the present, sixteen persons 

have been newly hired as principals or assistant principals 

in the system. Of these sixteen, fifteen were white. Of 

the fifteen whites, ten were brought in from outside of 

the system and were entirely new to Gadsden County. (P.X. 1) 

Nine of these fifteen white administrators were not rome 

certified in supervision and administration when they were 

selected and none of them had any previous experience in 

administration. (P.X's 2 and 3) During this period, there 

have been highly qualified blacks already ths system who 

had a number of years of experience within the system and 

proper certification. They however, were passed over. 

Among these black candidates were Robert Love, Robert Green, 

Harold Palmer, and Ms. Luree Houston. None was selected 

for a principalship or assistant Brinsioaletiv, Nessra 

Love, Green and Palmer all have long records of service 

with the defendant system and were at all voles tines 

properly certified in supervision and administration. Ms. 

Houston had like plaintiff Campbell served with distinction 

as an elementary principal in the Gadsden system prior to 

desegregation. She Was displaced to a non-principal position 

and has never been offered a principalship. She had twelve 

(12) years experience in administration in Gadsden County 

0a 



and one and a half years experience as a principal. 

{(P. X's 2 and 3) 

Since 1968, fourteen (14) assistant principal- 

ships have been filled. Of the fourteen persons filling 

these positions eleven (11) have been white and only 

three (3) black. All eleven whites were brought in from 

outside the system, while all three blacks were former 

principals who were demoted. (P.X. 2) 

Because there were more white secondary schools 

under the dual school system than black (five to two) 

Ser though blacks comprised more than half the student 

body, there were to begin with more white secondary school 

principals. By the 1974-75 school year, however, the 

number of secondary school principalships had increased 

from seven to nine but the number of black secondary 

principals remained frozen at two. (P.X. 5) 

The teacher employment statistics show that 

white teachers have also received better treatment in 

hiring and retention than blacks. In 1964-65, prior to 

the desegregation efforts, black teachers made up 61% 

of the teachers in the system. By 1970-71, the first 

year of integration, that percentage had dropped to 48% 

and has remained at approximately 49% since. (P.X. 8) 

A significant factor in this drop in percentage was the 

failure of the school district to rehire black teachers 

in 1969-70 and 1970-71. Teachers who are not recommended 

by their principals or who are not endorsed by the superin- 

-tendent if recommended by their principal are not entitled 

10 



+o be rehired. For 1969-70, thirty-six (36) teachers did 

not receive recommendation or endorsement. Of those 

thirty-six, twenty-nine (29) or 80% were black; seven (7) 

were white. The following year, sixteen (16) were not 

recommended for rehire or for continuing contract after 

the third year. Of these sixteen, thirteen (13) or 80% 

were black: three (3) were white. (P.X. 6) 

The hiring statistics show that the school 

system has maintained the faculty balance at Appveninately 

50% despite the high turnover in white on hore Enis 

hiring two to three times as many whites. Plaintiff's 

Exhibit 7 shows the following: 

New Teachers 
Year % Black 

White % Black 

1972«73 55 15 21.5 

1973-74 40 20 33.3 

1974- 57 16 21.9 

Finally, at the county staff level, whites have 

received better employment opportunities than blacks. Prior 

to desegregation in 1968-69, only two of the seventeen (17) 

county staff professionals were black, representing 11.8%. 

In 1970-71, the percentage had increased to 13.6% by adding 

one more black to the county staff. The number of whites 

2/ For instance, of those who entered the system in 1972, 
there were 55 white teachers and 15 black. At the end of the 
first year. 64% of the white teachers (20) remained in the 
system, compared to 80% (12) of the blacks. By the end of 
two years 44% of the whites (24) remained while 73% of the 
blacks (11) remained). 

=i 



had increased in the meantime by four. The one black 

added, Mr. Freddie Andrews, was like plaintiff a former 

principal who had been demoted to assistant principal 

before being placed on staff. (PX. .5:and 10) Of the 

fifteen (15) persons who have assumed county staff 

positions since 1970, only five (5) have been black. 

(Pix. 10) 

5 



ARGUMENT 

I 

The District Court Properly 
Exercised Its Jurisdiction 

Over The Defendants 

This action was brought against the Gadsden 

County District School Board, the Superintendent of 

Schools and the five individual Board members alleging 

a deprivation of rights secured by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 

1983 and 1985 and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend- 

ments. 

1983 Jurisdiction 

The United States Supreme Court's decision 

in Bruno v. City of Kenosha, 412 'U.8. 507 (1973) held 

that a municipality is not a "person" for the purposes 

of § 1983 jurisdiction. Admittedly, therefore, juris- 

diction does not exist as to the school board under 

§ 1983 to the extent that it is within the nature of 
23 / : 

a municipality. 

Jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does, 

however, clearly exist as to the defendant Superintendent 

and board members who are clearly "persons" within the 

meaning of the statute. Were they not "persons'" § 1983 

would be stripped of any effective eating inasmuch as 

it is directed to individuals acting "under color of law.” 

3/ See Campbell v. Masur, 486 F.2d 554 {5th Cir. 1973); 
but see Aurora Education Ass'n East v. Board of Education 

Of Aurora Public School District No. 131 of Kane County, Ill., 
400 F.28 431 (7th. Cx, 1974). 

-13- 



In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), 

decided the same term as Kenosha, the Supreme Court 

noted that "substantial federal causes of action” were 

stated against the individual county employees, despite 

the fact that the county itself was not amenable to suit 

under § ieBl. 

This Court has stated that while a city and 

other governmental agencies may not be proper parties 

under § 1983 "the individually named city council members 

and the other named individual defendants are clearly 

proper parties under . . $1983 , . .. United Farm- 

workers of Florida Housing Project, Inc, v, City of 

Delvay Beach, Pla... 493. 7.28 799 {5th Cir. 1974). See 

also, Sterzing v. Fort Bend Ind. School District, 495 
alten Shuned Amite Se 

.28'92 (5th Cir. 1974). ~The Pourth Clrcuit in Havrver 

v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (1973), reached a similar 

result. 

In Monroe v,. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the 

Supreme Court specifically held that city ctiiwidte are 

proper defendants under § 1983 even though the city 

itself was not a'person” for the purposes of a damage: 

action. 365 U.S. 192. The Kenosha decision, which 

clarified that the Monroe ruling extended to equitable 

actions as well as actions at law, did not however ex- 

pand the scope of exclusion from suit to city officials. 

-14- 



§ 1981 Jurisdiction Lies Against the Board 
and Individual Da2fendants : 

Unlike § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides 

Jurisatouion against the school board as a corporate 

entity in the nature of a municipality as well as 

against the school board members and the superintendent. 

~ § 1981 was was originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1866 in furtherance of the Thirteenth 

Amendment and was subsequently reenacted in light of 

the additional authorization of the Fourteenth Amend- 

ment. 

The Supreme Court, during the same LoL that 

it decided Kenosha, pointed out the distinction that 

Thos between an action brought pursuant to the 1866 

Civil Rights Act and one brought pursuant to § 1983. 

District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). 

The 1866 Act is focused on enabling non-white citizens 

to enjoy the same rights enjoyed by white citizens. 

Its provisions, now codified as §§ 1981 and 1982, are 

"not 'a mere prohibition of state laws establishing or 

upholding’ racial discrimination . . . but, rather, an 

‘absolute’ bar to all such discrimination, private as 

well as public, federal as well as state.” 409 U.S. 

422. 

Courts have recognized that employment dis- 

crimination actions under § 1981 may be successfully 

maintained against "municipal" defendants as well as 

‘individual official defendants. See Hines v. D'Artois, 

-15- 



383 F.Supp. 184,:190-(VW.D. La. 1974); Mavbank v. Ingraham, 

378. F.Supp. 913 AB. DD, Pa. 1974). 

8 1331 Jurisdiction 

Jurisdiction was also asserted against the 

school board under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 asserting that the 

nature of relief sought by plaintiff met the requisite 

jurisdictional eon. 

The instant matter raises questions arising 

under the Constitution and laws of the United States: 

the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. 

$8 1981, 1983 and 1935, 

ap 



II 

The District Court Properly 
Held That Plaintiff Was 
Demoted and That His Desmotion 
and Non—-reappointment Were 
In Violation Of The Singleton 
Reguirements 

- This Court announced the Singleton standards 

in December 1969. 419 F.24 1211 (5th Cir. 1970). Ac- 

cording to those standards, all future displacements 

of teachers and administrators were to be conducted 

in a manner designed to provide black educators with 

certain procedural protections from discriminatory 

treatment by school districts that had historically 

nalweeingd racially segregated school systems. Plain- 

tiff was displaced nine months later in a manner devoid 

of any of those procedural safeguards. 

Plaintiff Was "Dzmoted" 

In Singleton, this Court specifically defined 

what would constitute a "demotion" as follows: 

"Demotion” as used above includes any 
re—assignment (1) under which the staff 
member receives less pay or has less re- 

sponsibility than under the assignment he 
held previously, (2) which reguires a 
lesser degree of skill than did the assign- 
ment he held previously, or (3) under 
which the staff member is asked to teach 
a subject or grade other than one for 
which he is certified or for which he: has 
had substantial experience within a rea- 
sonably current period. 419 F. 2d 1218 (emphasis added) 

Plaintiff's assignment FAL Eafieinal 10 assistant 

principal - "desegregation specialist" was a demotion within 

-17~- 



the meaning of Singleton. The district court found as 

fact that plaintiff's new position involved lesser 

responsibility. (?. FP. 8) “The court found that the 

salaries of principals were generally higher than 

those of assistant principals. (F.F. 12) Although, 

as the court noted, plaintiff suffered no immediate 

loss of salary the first year, he did incur a loss 

in the succeeding year when compared to principal 

William Grice. 

The court's finding of fact that the new 

position entailed less responsibility is not "clearly 

erroneous" within the meaning of Rule 52(a) F.R.A.P. 

and defendants have not argued that the court's find- 

ing was wrong. 

The court's conclusion of law sit: pladne 

tiff's reassignment was therefore a demotion is clearly 

correct. See also Williams v. Albemarle County Bd. of 

BEduc., 485 F.24 232 {4th Cir. 1973). 

Defendants Failed To Comply 
With The Singleton Require- 
ments in Demoting Plaintiff 

Although subject to the provisions announced 
4 / : : iit 

in Singleton, defendants did not prepare objective 

Ld 3. If there is to be a reduction in the 
number of principals, teachers, teacher- 
aides, or other professional staff employ- 
ed by the school district which will result 
in a dismissal or demotion of any such 
staff members, the staff member to be 
dismissed or demoted must be selected on 
the basis of objective and reasonable 
non-discriminatory standards from among 
all the staff of the school district. 

LJ LJ ® 

le, 



criteria for determining which principals were to be 

demoted in order to achieve the necessary reduction 

in the number of principals in the system. The 

district court found that the school board had never 

developed written, objective, non-racial criteria to 

be used in connection with demotion and dismissal. 

(F.F. 7) There is no evidence in the record which 

indicated that plaintiff was compared with any other 

principal to determine who was to be demoted. 

The defendants' failure to undertake a com- 

parison of principals based on objective criteria is 

a per se violation of Singleton denying plaintiff the 

Dd 
procedural protections assured by that decision. The 

only apparent basis for demoting plaintiff appears to 

be the closing of his former chool. It was exactly 

such an approach which the Eighth Circuit deplored in 

4/ continued 

Prior to such a reduction, the school 
board will develop or require the develop- 
ment of nonracial objective criteria to 
be used in selecting the staff member who 
is to be dismissed or demoted. These 
criteria shall be available for public 
inspection and shall be retained by the 
school district. The school district 
also shall record and preserve the 
evaluation of staff members under the 
criteria. Such evaluation shall be -made 
available upon request to the dismissed 
or demoted employee. 419 F.2d 1218 (emphasis added) 

5 / Defendants cited the correct legal standard on pp. 12-13 
of their Brief but in doing so demonstrate beyond guestion 
that the District Court was right in finding an absence of 
written standards. In place of the uneguivocal command of 

this Court the School Board states that the transfers were 

-19- 



the seminal teacher rights case of Smith v. Bd. of Educ. 

of Morrilton School Digi, No. 32, 365 F.28 770 :{Bth Cir. 

1966). In that case, the defendants closed the Negro 

school and discharged all the black teachers on the 

theory that since their school was no longer operating 

they were out of jobs. The Eighth Circuit rejected this 

; approach noting the ineguitable burden placed on the 

black teachers in the absence of a comparison of qualifica- 

tions on an objective basis. 

Defendants Failed To Comply With 
Singleton When They Filled Sub- 
sequent Principalships Within 
The System With White Principals 

The law is now clear within this Circuit that, 

where a vacancy arises for which an educator displaced 

during desegregation is qualified, that educator is 

entitled to a preferential right of employment in the 

position over new gppiioants of the opposite race. 

Singleton, supra at 1218; IL,ee v. Macon County Board of 

Educ. (Muscle Shoals), 453 F.24 1104 (5th Cir. 1971); Le= 

5 / continued 

in "strict conformity with the orders as set forth in 
the case of United States v. Wakulla County . . .." 
No standards are cited from that case. There were none. 

Bf "In addition if thereis any such dismissal 
or demotion, no staff vacancy may be fill- 
ed through recruitment of a person of a 
race, color, or national origin different 
from that of the individual dismissed or 
demoted, until each displaced staff mem-— 
who is gualified has had an oppor- 
tunity to fill the vacancy and has failed 

to accept an offer to do so." 419 F.2d 1218 

- (emphasis added) 

-20- 



v. Macon County Bd. of Educ. (Florence), 456 F.2d 1371 

(3th Cir. 1972). 

Plaintiff's many years of experience as a principal 

demonstrate his qualifications as a principal. Not only 

is he the senior administrator in the system, but he is 

also certified for all levels -- elementary, junior high 

and high school principalships. Having been displaced 

from his principalship in 1970, he should have been con- 

sidered for and offered each available principalship in 

the system before any person from outside of the pre- 

desegregation principal population was offered it. The 

school district did not do so. 

"Instead, in 1970-71 the school district filled 

the Munroe and Southside Elementary schools with white 

principals who had not been principals prior to desegrega- 

tion. In the fall of 1971, the school district appointed 

Leslie Jones, a white to the principalship of Greta Ele- 

mentary school for the first time. This was another filling 

of a position for which plaintiff was qualified. The fact 

that Jones' former position was assumed by the former prin- 

cipal of Gretna does not diminish the fact that plaintiff 

could have equally filled the position. The two "swapped” 

principals' combined seniority was twelve (12) years as 

compared to plaintiff's thirty-two 32). oT 

Plaintiff should have been offered. the principal- 

ships of the three junior high schools whith fave been 

filled since the 1970 order. With his experience both as 

Wart 



as principal before desegregation and as an assistant 

principal at the high school level afterwards and 

with his secondary certification, plaintiff was 

clearly qualified to assume those positions. 

ITI 

The District Court Properly 
Awarded Plaintiff a Reasonable 
Attorney's Fee 

The 1972 Emergency School AidAct, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1617, provides that: 

Upon the entry of a final order by 
a court of the United States against a 
local educational agency, . +. . for dis- 
crimination on the basis of race, color, 
or national origin in violation of 
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, or the fourteenth amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States as they 
pertain to elementary and secondary educa- 
tion, the court, in its discretion, upon 
a finding that the proceedings were nec- 
essary to bring about compliance, may allow 
the prevailing party. other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part 
Of the costs, 

The Supreme Court in Northcross v. Board of Educa- 

tion, 412 U.S. 427 (1973), held that the prevailing plaintiff 

should be awarded such fees "unless special circumstances 

would render such an award unjust.” The Court stated that 

such plaintiffs were private attorneys general vindicating 

national policy. The Court noted the similarity of the 

statutory language to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 and cited its decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enter- 

prises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (19568). 

In Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.8. 696 



(1974), the Supreme Court held that the Emergency School 

Aid Act should be applied retroactively. While retro- 

active application is not an issue in this litigation, 

the decision manifests the Supreme Court's strong policy 

in favor of such awards. 

iv 

The District Court Properly 
Ordered Plaintiff's Re- 
appointment to a Principal- 
ship 

The instant matter is almost identical in facts, 

violations of law and the Constitution and relief ordered 

to those detailed in McCurdy v. School Board of Palm Beach 
*
 

County, Plorida. 367 P.Supp. 747 {S.D. Fla. 1973). The 

district court in granting plaintiff's preliminary injunc- 

tion ordered the removal of a white administrator who was 

appointed to a principalship which plaintiff was entitled 

to under the proper application of Singleton III supra. 

The preliminary injunction was made permanent in 1974. 

388 P.Supp. 599. This Court in March 1975 affirmed per 

curiam the rey courts decision and orders. 509 F.2d 

(5th cir. 1975). | 

siniiasly, the. chur should affirm the district 

court's grant of reappointment to the plaintiff in he 

instant matter. 

“D3 



Cross Appeal 

A" 

The District Court Erred 
In Not Finding A Pattern 
and Practice of Racial 
Discrimination 

In the defendants' Brief, they state that "the 

District Eh Si found that "the transfer of the plaintiff 

was not racially motivated.” (Brief of Defendants- 

Appellants Cross Appellees at p. 15). This is not 

accurate. The court found that plaintiff's reassignment 

was not the product of a pattern and practice of racial 

digcrimination. (F.F. 6) The court made no finding as 

to whether or not a pattern or practice of racial dis- 

crimination independent of plaintiff's situation existed. 

Plaintiff believes that the district court 

erred in not finding that a pattern and practice of racial 

discrimination had occurred and continues to occur and 

in not finding that plaintiff's reassignment was part of 

such pattern and practice. The matters cited in Part "b" 

of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts demonstrate such a 

pattern and practice. The demotion of other black principals, 

‘the preferential hiring of whites as. aguiniskratons, Lhe 

reduction through discharges and non-hiring of blacks in 

the teaching ranks and the non-appointment of blacks to 

the county staff creates a prima facie case which places 

the burden of proof on the Btn The dtatistionl 

and other data show hat desegregation has resulted in a 

disproportionate racial impact on black educators. Figures 

hr ¥, 



speak and when they do, Courts listen." Brooks v. Beto, 

366 1.24 1, 95th Cir. 1966), 

The Courts have made it quite clear in teacher 

retention cases arising out of desegregation of historical 

dual school systems that when a disproportionate racial 

impact is shown, the burden of proof shifts to the school 

authorities and they must explain their actions by "clear 

and convincing evidence." U.S. v. Jefferson County Board 

of Bduc., 372 7.24 836, 895 {5th Ciy. 19566). .. Accord, 

Chambers v. Hendersonville City Board of Educ., 364 F.2d 

189, 192 (4th Cir. 1966); North Carolina Teachers Assn, 

v. Ashboro City Board of Educ,, 393 ».28 736, 743 and 745 

{4th Cir. 1968); Rolfe v. County Board of Educ, of Lincoln 

County, 39) P.26 77, 80 (6th Cir. 1968); Moore v. Board of 

Educ. of Chidester School Dist,., No, 59, 448 7.28 709, 711 

(8th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Wheatley School Dist. No. 28, 

430 7.24 1359, 1363 {8th Cir. 1970}; Haney v. County Board 

of Educ, of Savier County, 429 v.24 364, 370-71 {8th Cir. 

1970. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No.l Penver Colorado, 

4138.8. 109 (1973). 

In the instant matter, defendants failed to ex- 

plain in any manner the disproportionate impact.’ Under 

these circumstances the district court's failure to enter 

a finding of a pattern and practice was wrong-and its 

finding that plaintiff's demotion was not part of said 

pattern and practice was "clearly erroneous" within the 

meaning of Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. 

-25-~- 



VI 

The District Court Erred 
.In Not Awarding Plaintiff 
Back Pay and Other Equitable 
Monetary Relief 

Plaintiff's earnings since desegregation were 

at a minimum $200 less than those of William Grice, a 

principal who retained his principalship and had comparable 

seniority. Plaintiff also incurred as a result of his 

demotion additional expense because he had to drive every 

day an extra forty-four (44) miles to Chattahoochee. His 

former position was in Quincy and subsequent principalship 

vacancies arose in Quincy. 

Back pay is an appropriate element of the equitable 

relief to be granted a wrongfully demoted educator. Harkless 

v. Sweeny Independent School District, et al.,; 427 7.248 319, 

324 {5th Civ. 1970): Hall ~v. Stanly County Bd. of Edur.,, 

378 ®.24 275, 276 (4th Cir. 1967). 

In Pettway wv. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 

.284 211 {5th Cir. 1974) *his Court stated: 

Under Title VII and section 1981 the injured 
workers must be restored to the economic po- 
sition in which they would have been but for 
the discrimination —-- their “rightful pl place 
Because of the compensatory nature of a back 
pay award and because of the "rightful place” 
theory, adopted by the courts, and of the 

. strong congressional policy, embodied in 
Title VII, for remedying employment dis- 
crimination, the. scope of a court's discre- 
tion to deny back Pav 1s BArYOW. vw ww se 
Once a court has determined that a plaintiff 
class has sustained economic loss from a dis- 
criminatory employment practice, back pay 
should normally be awarded unless special 
circumstances are present . . . (emphasis 

in the original and added : 

The district court should have in addition to 

-26- 



ordering plaintiff's reappointment to a principalship 

awarded him back pay for income lost and compensation 

for the additional expenses incurred as a result of 

Bis woonatul Qenstion. In not doing so, the court 

erred. 

rh 1 



CONCLUSION 

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, 

Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant respectfully 

prays that the Order of the district court be 

affirmed with modification granting back pay and 

other lost allowances to which he is entitled. 

. Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant 

further respectfully prays that this Court grant 

him reasonable attorneys' fees in connection with 

this appeal as well as his costs. 

Respectfully submitted, 

KEQT SPRIGGS Ll 
[/ 324 W. College Avenue 

Tallahassee. Fla. 32301 

JACK GREENBERG 

JAMES C. GRAY, JR. 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Cross Appellant 

2 8 



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of 

August, 1975, I served two copies of the foregoing 

Briel for plaintiff-Appellee Cros Appellant upon 

counsel for the Defendants—Appellants Cross Appellees 

by depositing same in the United States mail, first 

a class postage prepaid, addressed to - 

Brian T. Hayes 
Post Office Box 1385 

Tallahassee, Florida 32302