Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University & Agricultural & Mechanical College v Ludley Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellants

    IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16,854

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY 
& AGRICULTURAL & MECHANICAL COLLEGE, ET AL.,

Appellants,
versus

ARNEASE LUDLEY,
Appellee.

No. 16,855

LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.,
Appellants,

versus
ALMA LARK, ET AL.

Appellees.

No. 16,856

LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,
Appellants,versus

JACK BAILEY, ET AL.,
_______ ______ __________ Appellees.

CONSOLIDATED

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS.

JACK P. F. GREMILLION, 
Attorney General,

State of Louisiana,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana;

GEORGE M. PONDER
First Assistant Attorney General;

WILLIAM P. SCHULER,
Assistant Attorney General ;

LAURANCE W. BROOKS, 
Louisiana National Bank Bldg., 

Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
WILLIAM C. BRADLEY,

Special Counsel for 
Attorney General.

W. SCOTT WILKINSON,
Post Office Box 1707,

Shreveport, Louisiana.
Attorneys for Appellants.



IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16,854

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY 
& AGRICULTURAL & MECHANICAL COLLEGE, ET AL.,

Appellants,
versus

ARNEASE LUDLEY,
.________________ _ Appellee.
No. 16,855

LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL-,
Appellants,

versus
ALMA LARK, ET AL„

No. 16,856

Appellees.

LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,
Appellants,

versus
JACK BAILEY, ET AL.,

Appellees.

CONSOLIDATED

MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

NOW comes JACK P. F. GREMILLION, Attorney Gen­
eral of the State of Louisiana, on behalf of the State of 
Louisiana, and with respect represents:

1.
That the decision of the Lower Court was erroneous in 

that the Court did not properly apply the Federal law, as 
well as the law of the State of Louisiana.



a
That the State of Louisiana asks leave of this Honorable 

Court to file a supplemental brief in support of its original 
brief, for the reason that the issues involved herein are of 
grave concern to the State; and that a copy of this brief 
has been transmitted to the Clerk of this Court for filing 
in the event this motion is allowed;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appearer prays 
that this Honorable Court grant petition leave to file a sup­
plemental brief in this proceeding and that an order be duly 
entered to this effect.

Further prays for all orders and decrees necessary and 
for full, general and equitable relief.

Respectfully submitted,
JACK P. F. GREMILLION 

Attorney General 
State of Louisiana

Baton Rouge, Louisiana
GEORGE M. PONDER 

First Assistant 
Attorney General

WILLIAM P. SCHULER 
Assistant Attorney General

LAURANCE W. BROOKS 
Louisiana National Bank 

Building
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

WILLIAM C. BRADLEY 
Special Counsel for 

Attorney General
W. SCOTT WILKINSON

Post Office Box 1707 
Shreveport, Louisiana

Attorneys for Appellants



Ill

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion has
been mailed all counsel of record in this case on this the-------
day of____________, 1957.

of Counsel



IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16,854

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY 
& AGRICULTURAL & MECHANICAL COLLEGE, ET AL„

Appellants,
versus

ARNEASE LUDLEY,
Appellee.

No. 16,855

LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.,
Appellants,

versus
ALMA LARK, ET AL.,

Appellees.

No. 16,856

LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,
Appellants,

versus
JACK BAILEY, ET AL.,

Appellees.

CONSOLIDATED

O R D E R

Considering the foregoing petition of Jack P. F. Gremil- 
lion, Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, for leave 
of Court to file a supplemental brief in this proceeding:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Jack P. F. Gremillion, 
Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, be and he is 
hereby granted leave of Court to file a supplemental brief 
in this proceeding.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED at New Orleans, Louisiana, 
on this the____ day of------------------ , 1957.

J U D G E
United States Court of Appeals 
Fifth Circuit



SUBJECT INDEX.

ARGUMENT:

That acts 15 and 249 of 1956 are constitutional both
on their face and in application................................ 1

That the Court attempted to use rules of statutory 
construction where said rules were not ap­
plicable ............................................................   11

CONCLUSION................. .........................................................  20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.................................................  22

AUTHORITIES CITED.

Aldredge v. Williams, 44 U. S. 9, 11 L. Ed. 469............. 14,16

Anniston Mgf Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337, 81 L. Ed. 1443. 18

Ark. Nat. Gas Co. v. Ark R.R. Comm., 261 U. S. 379,
67 L. Ed. 705 ...... ..................... ..................................18, 19

Bush v. New Orleans Parish School Board, 242 F. 2d 156.. 11

Campbell v. Aldridge, 79 Pac 2d 257, 159 Or. 208, appeal
dismissed 305 U. S. 559, 83 L. Ed. 352..........................  7

Carey v. S.D., 250 U. S. 118, 63 L. Ed. 886..........................  18

Chippwa Indians v. U. S., 301 U. S. 358, 81 L. Ed. 1156.. 18

Cumberland T & T Co. v. La. Pub. Service Comm., 260
U. S. 216, 67 L. Ed. 223,-...--...........-..................    20

District of Columbia v. Gladding, 263 Fed. 628..................  11

Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 474, 65 
L. Ed. 360........... ...........................................................13,15

Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 93 L. Ed. 1207............... ...... 14,

Fairport P & ER. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589, 78 L. Ed. 
1446 ............................................ .......................................  14,

Foley v. Benedict, 55 S.W. 2d 805, 86 ALR 477..................  7



AUTHORITIES CITIED— (Continued)

Hopkins Fed S & L Assn v. Cleary 296 U. S. 315, 80 L. Ed.
251 ................................................................................. ...... 18

In re Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 89 L. Ed. 921.............. ........... 14

Kuchner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 81 L. Ed. 340 . 14 

Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 90, 58 L. Ed. 519........   15
Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F 2d 661, 665 Cert Den. U. S.

562, 85 L. Ed. 1522........................................... ............... 19
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 601-2, 44 L. Ed. 605..... ............ 14
Mayo v. Lakeland Co., 309 U. S. 318-19, 84 L. Ed. 780.....  19
Mo. Pac. Ry Co. v. Boone, 276 U. S. 466, 70 L. Ed. 688..... 18
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed.

893 ____ ________ _____ ______ __________ _______ ______ 18
No. Pac. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 156 F. 2d, 346, affirmed 330

U. S. 248, 91 L. Ed. 876...... ...........................................  11
R.R. Comm. v. C B & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 589, 66 L. Ed.

383 _________________ __ ________ ____________ _______ 13

South Utah Mines v. Beaver County, 262 U. S. 331, 67 L. 
Ed. 1008............................ .................... .............................. 18

Texas v. E. Tex. R. Co., 258 U. S. 204, 66 L. Ed. 566..... 18
Trustees of the University of Mississippi v. Waugh, 105 

Miss. 623, 62 So. 827, ALR 1915D 588__________ __ _ 5
U. S. v. Colo, and N. W. Ry. Co. 157 Fed. 321, 330...........  11
U. S. v. Kung Chen Fur Corp., 188 F 2d 577...................... 14
U. S. v. Rice, 327 U. S. 753, 90 L. Ed. 989.............................  12
Walling v. McKay, 70 Fed. Sup. 160 affirmed 164 F. 2d

40 - ........... ................. .............................. ......................... i i

Waugh v. Mississippi University, 237 U. S. 589, 59 L. Ed.
1131.......................................................................................  5



LOUISIANA STATUTES:

Act 249 of 1956 (La. R.S. 17:443)... ......................................  3

Act 15 of 1956 (La. R.S. 17:2131-2135).............................. 2

Act 555 of 1954........ ....................................... ........................ . 11

MISCELLANEOUS:

American Jurisprudence, Vol. 55, p. 10............................... . 5

Corpus Juris Secundum;

Vol 14, p. 1359................................................................... 7

Vol 16, pp. 375-382..................    18

Vol. 16, pp. 383-4.    17

Vol 16, pp. 383-4.        17

Vol 16, pp. 387-8...........        18

Vol 78, pp. 624, 626, 630.................................................. 7, 8

Corpus Juris Secundum;

Vol 78, p. 631........... .................. ......................... ..............8, 9

Vol 82, p. 527..... ................... ............................. ............. . 12

Vol 82, pp. 544-5......... ........................................................ . 16

Vol 82, pp. 813-814............................................................  10

Vll



IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16,854

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY 
& AGRICULTURAL & MECHANICAL COLLEGE, ET AL.,

Appellants,
ARNEASE LUDLEY,

Appellee.

No. 16,853

LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL.,
Appellants,

versus
ALMA LARK, ET AL.,

Appellees.

No. 16,856

LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,
Appellants,

versus
JACK BAILEY, ET AL.,

Appellees.

CONSOLIDATED

May it please the Court:

That Acts 15 and 249 of 1956 are constitutional 
both on their face and in application.

In 1956 the Legislature of Louisiana enacted Act No. 
15 of 1956 (La. R.S. 17:2131 - 2135) and Act 249 of 1956 
(La. R.S. 17:443). These statutes are attacked by the plain­
tiffs and appellees as being in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution on the ground 
that they deny the plaintiffs and others similarly situated 
of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Consti­
tution and laws of the United States. Plaintiffs are negroes 
who have sought admission to the Louisiana State University, 
and to other institutions of higher learning maintained by



2

the State of Louisiana. They were refused admission because 
they failed to present the Certificate of Eligibility required 
by Act 15 of 1956 (R.S. 17:2131 - 2185).

Act 15 of 1956 hereafter referred to as Act 15, or as 
the Eligibility Statute, provides in Section 1:

“ § 2131. Certificate; requirement; contents

No person shall be registered at or admitted to any 
publicly financed institution of higher learning of this 
state unless he or she shall have first filed with said 
institution a certificate addressed to the particular in­
stitution sought to be entered attesting to his or her 
eligibility and good moral character. This certificate 
must be signed by the superintendent of education of 
the parish, county, or municipality wherein said appli­
cant graduated from high school, and by the principal 
of the high school from which he graduated. Act 1956, 
No. 15, § 1.”

The remaining sections of this statute merely provide 
for the form of the certificate, notice of the requirements 
of the law, penal provisions for its violation, and permits 
the State Board of Education and the Board of Supervisors 
of Louisiana State University to adopt other entrance re­
quirements including aptitude tests and medical examina­
tions. The Act makes no mention of race or color, and in 
its terms applies to all students who seek admission to all 
institutions of higher learning maintained by the State of 
Louisiana. There is nothing ambiguous about the statute, its 
meaning is quite clear, and there is nothing in the Act which 
would discriminate against any qualified students seeking 
admission to these institutions.



3

The other Act of the Legislature attacked by the plain­
tiffs in these consolidated cases, namely; Act 249 of 1956 
(La. R.S. 17:443) relates to the grounds on which a perma­
nent teacher in the public schools of the state may be re­
moved from office. This Act provides in part:

“ A permanent teacher shall not be removed from 
office except upon written and signed charges of wilful 
neglect of duty, or incompetency or dishonesty, or of 
being a member of or of contributing to any group, 
organization, movement or corporation that is by law or 
injunction prohibited from operating in the State of 
Louisiana, or of advocating or in any manner perform­
ing any act toward bringing about integration of the 
races within the public school system or any public in­
stitution of higher learning of the State of Louisiana, 
and then only if found guilty after a hearing by the 
school board of the parish or city, as the case may be, 
which hearing may be private or public, at the option 
of the teacher . . .”

The remaining provisions of this Act provide for the 
procedure to be taken including the service of written 
charges on the teacher in advance of the hearing and afford­
ing him the right to counsel. Provision is made for a right 
of appeal in the event of an adverse decision to a court of 
competent jurisdiction. The Act also provides that if the 
finding of the school board is reversed by the Court, the 
teacher shall be entitled to full pay for any loss of time or 
salary.

The plaintiffs in these cases do not allege that they are 
teachers or that the provisions of this Act have in any way 
been applied to them. The validity of the Act has been ques­
tioned on the tenuous ground that this Act would prevent 
plaintiffs from securing the Certificate of Eligibility pro­



4

vided for in Act 15. It may here be noted that Act 249 
applies to teachers in the public schools and has no applica­
tion whatever to school superintendents or school principals 
who are the officers designated in the Eligibility Statute as 
the persons who are to furnish such certificates. School 
superintendents and school principals are not forbidden to 
issue such certificates nor are they required to discriminate 
against any person on account of race in the issuance thereof. 
No penalty would be incurred by such officials if they were 
to issue to a negro a Certificate of Eligibility to attend any 
college of his choice in this State. The plaintiffs are there­
fore unaffected by any of the provisions contained in the 
teachers removal statute. The latter statute is utterly unre­
lated to the Eligibility Statute.

It may here be noted that Section 2 of Act 249 of 1956 
provides that in case any part of the Act shall be held to be 
unconstitutional, this shall not have the effect of invalidat­
ing any part of it that is constitutional. If therefore the 
Court should invalidate the clause in this Act which permits 
the school board to discharge a teacher who advocates inte­
gration of the races within the public school system, this 
would cut away the only connection that judicial imagina­
tion could supply between Act 15 and Act 249. Nevertheless, 
as pointed out hereinabove the teacher removal statute applies 
only to Superintendents and principals and has nothing to 
do with the present case.

In determining the rights of these plaintiffs to demand 
admission to any institution of higher learning in Louisiana 
they must be considered as ordinary citizens of this State 
who possess no greater right than other citizens by virtue 
of their color. No Court has yet decided that negroes have 
any greater rights to attend the public schools or the colleges 
and universities of the State than members of any other



5

race. Their rights are determined by the general principles 
of law and of right which apply to all who seek admission 
to these schools.

To begin with no one has a natural right to attend any 
educational institution maintained by the State, as stated in 
55 American Jurisprudence 10:

§ 14. State Universities.— The right to attend the 
educational institutions of a state is not a natural one, 
but is a benefaction of the law. One seeking to become 
a beneficiary of this gift must submit to such conditions 
as the law imposes as a condition precedent thereto. 
Hence, where a legislature, acting under a constitutional 
mandate, establishes a university, it may also legislate 
as to what persons are entitled to be admitted to its 
privileges and to instruction therein . . .”

The foregoing statement is taken almost verbatum from 
the text of the decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
in the case of Trustees of the University of Mississippi v. 
Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827, ALR 1915D 588 which 
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Waugh v. Mississippi University, 237 U. S. 589, 59 
L. Ed. 1131. The Supreme Court affirmed the following rul­
ing of the Supreme Court:

“  . . . The right to attend the educational institu­
tions of the state is not a natural right. It is a gift of 
civilization, a benefaction of the law. If a person seeks 
to become a beneficiary of this gift, he must submit to 
such conditions as the law imposes as a condition pre­
cedent to this right . . .

We can see nothing in the act which is violative 
of any section of the Constitution. Whether the act was



6

a wise one or an unwise one, was a question for the 
legislature to determine . .

The Legislature of Louisiana undoubtedly has the right 
to prescribe the conditions under which students may be 
admitted to the colleges and universities of the State. In 
affirming the decision of the State Court the Supreme Court 
of the United States said: (237 U. S. 595-6, 59 L. Ed. 1136-7)

“ The next contention of complainant has various 
elements. It assails the statute as an obstruction to his 
pursuit of happiness, a deprivation of his property and 
property rights, and of the privileges and immunities 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. 
Counsel have considered these elements separately and 
built upon them elaborate and somewhat fervid argu­
ments, but, after all, they depend upon one proposition; 
whether the right to attend the University of Missis- 
is an absolute or conditional right. It may be put more 
narrowly,— whether, under the Constitution and laws 
Mississippi, the public educational institutions of the 
state are so far under the control of the legislature that 
it may impose what the supreme court of the state calls 
‘disciplinary regulations.’

To this proposition we are confined, and we are not 
concerned in its consideration with what the laws of 
other states permit or prohibit. Its solution might be 
rested upon the decision of the supreme court of the 
state. That court said: ‘The legislature is in control of 
the colleges and universities of the state, and has a right 
to legislate for their welfare, and to enact measures for 
their discipline, and to impose the duty upon the trus­
tees of each of these institutions to see that the require­
ments of the legislature are enforced; and when the 
legislature has done this, it is not subject to any control



7

by the courts.’ (105 Miss. 635, L.R.A. 1915D, 588, 62 
So. 827.)

This being- the power of the legislature under the 
Constitution and laws of the state over its institutions 
maintained by public funds, what is urged against its 
exercise to which the Constitution of the United States 
gives its sanction and supports by its prohibition? . . .”

In the original brief herein filed authority is quoted to 
the effect that the Legislature may regulate the conditions 
on which students may be admitted to a University main­
tained by the State.

14 C.J.S. 1359
Foley v. Benedict, 55 S. W. 2d 805, 86 ALR 477 
Waugh v. Miss., supra

Furthermore, the State has the right to control and pre­
scribe the limits to which it will go in supplying education 
at public expense as stated in 78 C.J.S. 624:

“ The power to establish and maintain systems of 
common schools, to raise money for that purpose by 
taxation, and to govern, control, and regulate such schools 
when established is one of the powers not delegated to 
the United States by the federal Constitution, or pro­
hibited by it to the states, but is reserved to the states; 
respectively or to the people, and the people through the 
legislature and the constitution have the right to con­
trol and prescribe the limits to which they will go in 
supplying education at public expense . . .”

Public education and the control thereof are proper sub­
jects for the exercise of the State’s police power.

78 C.J.S. 626
Campbell v. Aldridge, 79 Pac. 2d 257, 159 Or. 208, 

appeal dismissed 305 U. S. 559, 83 L. Ed. 352.



8

The following statement in 78 C.J.S. 627 is supported by 
numerous citations of authority:

“ The state in legislating concerning education is 
exercising its broad sovereign power, and, subject, only 
to any requirements or restrictions prescribed by the 
constitution, the legislature has a large discretion as to 
the manner of accomplishing its purpose . .

In this connection, the following statement in 78 C.J.S. 
630 is pertinent:

“ Regulation of education and of the school system 
is a governmental function, and generally the police 
power extends to such regulation. The management and 
administration of the public schools and of the school 
system, like their establishment and maintenance, are 
primarily affairs of the state, and the legislature has 
full authority, subject to constitutional restrictions, to 
enact such laws as it may deem necessary and expedient 
for the proper administration and regulation of the pub­
lic schools and the promotion of their efficiency . . .”

In view of the above the Courts have uniformly held 
that the exercise of powers by the school authorities will 
be interfered with by the Courts only in the case of a clear 
abuse of authority and that the burden of showing such an 
abuse is a heavy one. The authorities on this subject are 
sumed up in 78 C.J.S. 631, as follows:

“ . . . While the courts have power in a proper pro­
ceeding to determine what the powers of school authori­
ties are, and whether or not the authorities have ex­
ceeded them, the exercise of discretion by school authori­
ties will be interfered with only when there is a clear 
abuse of discretion or a violation of law, and the burden



9

of showing such an abuse is a heavy one. In other words, 
the courts are not concerned with the wisdom of the 
policy of school authorities, and they are without power 
to interfere with the policies of such authorities as long 
as they act in good faith within their statutory powers.”

In their original brief the appellants point out that no­
where in the complaint does the plaintiff avow that the acts 
of the Legislature attacked in this case have been adminis­
tered unfairly or in a discriminatory manner. On the other 
hand, the affidavits of various college officials appearing on 
pages 32-38 of the transcript in this case show affirmatively 
that the Eligibility Certificate law has been uniformly applied 
to all applicants for admission to the colleges involved in 
this proceeding, and without regard to race or color.

All that the eligibility statute requires is a certificate 
that the applicant is qualified for admission to an institu­
tion of higher learning which he seeks to enter and that he 
is of good moral character. Surely the State cannot be ex­
pected to furnish higher education to unqualified students, 
and in the exercise of its police power it can certainly deny 
admission to applicants who are morally unfit to attend a 
college or university. Attendance as a student in our colleges 
and universities is a privilege given by the State which must 
be zealously guarded. The students in such institutions are 
intimately associated with one another in the classrooms, 
dormitories and in social contacts. To say that a State may 
not require of an applicant a certificate as to his moral 
character, regardless of his race, is to assert that in the 
realm of education the State has no authority to promote 
morality of its young people. This power of the State finds 
it most important exercise in all matters that relate to the 
morality and well-being of its youth. The Judgment of the 
District Court would deny the State of Louisiana this right 
solely on the supposition that the eligibility statute might



10

be used as a means of discrimination against negroes in this 
State.

The plaintiffs have contended and the lower Court has 
apparently ruled that although the Eligibility Statute is not 
of itself objectionable on its face it is nevertheless uncon­
stitutional because it is a part of a statutory system to 
discriminate against negroes. However, as pointed out in the 
original brief this Act is complete within itself and depends 
upon no implementation from any other acts of the Legis­
lature which were in effect at the time it was passed or 
which was passed at the same session of the Legislature. 
Since this is true, the Act must be considered alone and on 
its own merits. There is no ambiguity in its terms and there 
is nothing uncertain or obscure about its verbage. There is 
therefore no need for interpretation on the part of the Court. 
As pointed out on page 21 of appellant’s brief, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has in numerous decisions held 
that none of the rules of statutory construction may be 
used to ascertain the meaning or application of a statute 
where there is no ambiguity or doubt as to the meaning of 
the words employed by the Legislature. The Court therefore 
has no right to refer to other statutes in pari materia, or to 
import the provisions of such statutes into an act whose 
meaning is not doubtful. The general rule on the subject is 
thus stated in 82 C.J.S. 813-814:

“ • • • It must not be overlooked that the rule re­
quiring statutes in pari materia to be construed to­
gether is only a rule of construction to be applied as an 
aid in determining the meaning of a doubtful statute, 
and that it cannot be invoked where the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous. So, the rule of in pari 
materia does not permit the use of a previous statute to 
control by way of former policy the plain language of 
subsequent statutes, or to add a restriction thereto found



11

in the earlier statute and excluded from the later statute; 
nor has the rule any application in construing an act 
intended to be complete in itself. In other words, the rule 
of construction may not be applied to narrow the com­
pass of one statute by reference to another nonconflict­
ing and nonrepealing act, and restrictions placed on a 
power in one instance cannot be extended to another 
case for which they were not intended and for which 
another provision is made.”

The foregoing text is supported by numerous decisions 
of State and Federal Courts including No. Pac. Ry. Co. v. TJ. 
S., 156 F. 2d. 346, affirmed 330 U. S. 248, 91 L. Ed. 876, Wall­
ing v. McKay, 70 Fed. Sup. 160 affirmed 164 F. 2d 40, District 
of Columbia, v. Gladding, 263 Fed. 628, U.S. v. Colo, and 
NW Ry. Co., 157 Fed. 321, 330.

As a matter of fact there are no statutes in pari materia 
which in any way relate to the subject matter of the statutes 
in question. Certainly there are none on the subject of segre­
gation. The Federal Courts have written o ff all of Louisiana’s 
legislation pertaining to segregation in public schools and 
colleges. The provisions of the Constitution of Louisiana re­
quiring segregation have been held invalid by this Court 
and the Acts of the Legislature, particularly Act 555 of 1954, 
which require separate schools for the races have been nulli­
fied. (Bush v. New Orleans Parish School Board, 242 F. 2d 
156) If these acts are dead letter material they can hardly 
be revived as implements of interpretation for a statute such 
as the Eligibility Statute which nowhere refers to segregation 
or racial differences.

That the Court attempted to use rules of statutory 
construction where said rules were not applicable

Although the Eligibility Act clearly and distinctly evi­



12

dences a lawful purpose that lies within the police power of 
the State, and there is nothing arbitrary, unreasonable, or 
discriminatory either in its expressed object or in the means 
to be employed to achieve such object, the District Judge 
imported into the Act a legislative intent which he discovered 
in some press reports regarding the Act. These press reports 
reflected ideas gained by some newspaepr reporter who inter­
viewed the Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee 
which is not the committee that acted on the bill in the 
Legislature. From statements made by this individual mem­
ber of the Legislature the Court below found only a nefarious 
purpose in the Act and disregarded the moral aspects of the 
law. To say that the Legislature had no regard for the health 
and morals of its young people and that it acted only to 
discriminate against a minority race is to arbitrarily malign 
a coordinate branch of the government and to judicially usurp 
its legislative functions. The District Judge wrote into the 
Act a legislative intent that is nowhere expressed in the 
Act. He resorted to unreliable extraneous hearsay to create 
doubt and suspicion as to the constitutionality of the law and 
refused to attribute to the State of Louisiana any good pur­
pose that such a law can and will undoubtedly serve. If the 
Federal Courts intend to import doubt and to interpret with 
suspicion by Acts of the State Legislature regulating public 
schools, and if they propose to strike down all laws on the 
subject that carry any possibility of wrongful execution, the 
State will be deprived of sovereignty in a field where it, and 
method of interpreting a clear and unambiguous statute 
is contrary to every principle of Judicial power.

Rules of Construction are useful only in cases of doubt. 
They should never be used to create it, but only to remove it. 
(82 CJS 527 and cases cited)

In the case of U. S. v. Rice, 327 U. S. 753, 90 L. Ed. 989 
the Supreme Court said:



13

. . Statutory language and objective, thus ap­
pearing with resonable clarity, are not to be overcome 
by resort to a mechanical rule of construction, whose 
function is not to create doubts, but to resolve them 
when the real issue or statutory purpose is otherwise 
obscure. United States v. California, supra (297 U. S. 186, 
80 L. Ed. 573, 56 S. Ct. 421.)”

The rule just stated has been applied by the Supreme 
Court to prohibit the use of Committee Reports and explana­
tory statements made by members of Congress regarding the 
purpose of a law which is not therein expressed. So in R.R. 
Comm. v. C B & Q.R. Co., 257 U. S. 589, 66 L. Ed. 383 the 
court ruled:

“ . . . Committee reports and explanatory state­
ments of members in charge, made in presenting a bill 
for passage, have been held to be a legitimate aid to the 
interpretation of a statute where its language is doubtful 
or obscure. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 
U. S. 443, 475, 65 L. Ed. 354, 16 A. L. R. 196, 41 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 172. But when, taking the act as a whole the 
effect of the language used is clear to the court, ex­
traneous aid like this cannot control the interpretation, 
Pennsylvania R. C. v. International Coal Min. Co. 230 U. 
S. 184, 57 L. Ed. 1446, 1451, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 893, Ann. 
Cas 1915A, 315; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 
470, 490, 61 L. Ed. 442, 445, L.R.A. 1917B, 1168. Such 
aids are only admissible to solve doubt, and not to 
create it. . . .”

The District Judge under the pretense of conturing a 
clear and unambiguous Act of the Legislature resorted to 
extraneous hearsay statements to nullify a state law that



14

clearly evinces a lawful object. He committed a grievous error 
in so doing.

See also:

U. S. v. Rung Chen Fur Corp., 188 F 2d 577,
Aldredge v. Williams, 44 U. S. 9,11 L. Ed. 469
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 93 L. Ed. 1207
In re Walling 324 U. S. 244, 89 L. Ed. 921
Kuchner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 81 L. Ed. 1446
Fairport P. & ER. Co. v. Meredith, 292 US 589, 78 L. Ed.
1446

Even when it may be necessary to interpret a doubtful 
statute the courts attach little or no importance to the state­
ments of individual legislators as to the purpose of the law. 
We quote from Maxwell v. Dotu, 176 U. S. 601-2, 44 L. Ed. 605:

“Counsel for plaintiff in error has cited from the 
speech of one of the Senators of the United States, 
made in the Senate when the proposed Fourteenth 
Amendment was under consideration by that body, 
wherein he stated that among the privileges and im­
munities which the committee having the amendment in 
charge sought to protect against invasion or abridgment 
by the states were included those set forth in the first 
eight amendments to the Constitution; and counsel has 
argued that this court should therefore give that con­
struction to the amendment which was contended for by 
the Senator in his speech.

. . .  It is clear that what is said in Congress upon 
such an occasion may or may not express the views of 
the majority of those who favor the adoption of the 
measure which may be before that body, and the ques­
tion whether the proposed amendment itself expresses 
the meaning which those who spoke in its favor may



15

have assumed that it did, is one to be determined by the 
language actually therein used, and not by the speeches 
made regarding it.

What individual Senators or Representatives may 
have argued in debate, in regard to the meaning to be 
given to a proposed constitutional amendment, or bill, or 
resolution, does not furnish a firm ground for its proper 
construction, nor is it important, as explanatory of the 
grounds upon which the members voted in adopting it. 
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 
290, 318, 41 L. Ed. 1007, 1019, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Dun­
lap v. United States, 173 U, S. 65, 75, 43 L. Ed. 616, 19 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 319.”

Again in Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 90, 58 L. Ed. 519, 
the Court said:

“ Counsel for petitioner cites the debates in Congress 
as indicating that the act was not understood to refer 
to any others than immigrants. But the unreliability of 
such debates as a source from which to discover the 
meaning of the language employed in an act of Congress 
has been frequently pointed out ( United States v. Traris- 
Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 318, 41 L. Ed. 1007, 
1019, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540, and cases cited), and we are 
not disposed to go beyond the reports of the committees. 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 
457, 463, 36 L. Ed. 226, 229, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511; Binus 
v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 495, 48 L. Ed. 1087, 1090, 
24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816; Johnson v. Southern P. Co. 196 
U. S. 1, 19, 49 L. Ed. 363, 370, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158, 17 
Am. Neg. Rep. 412).”
We quote the following from Duplex Printing Press Co. 
v. Peering, 254 U. S. 474, 65 L. Ed. 360:

“By repeated decisions of this court it has come to



16

be well established that the debates in Congress expres­
sive of the views and motives of individual members are 
not a safe guide, and hence may not be resorted to, in 
ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking 
body. Aldredge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24, 11 L. Ed. 469, 
475; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U. S. 72, 79, 23 
L. Ed. 224, 228; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight 
Asso., 166 U. S. 290, 318, 41 L. Ed. 1007, 1019, 17 Sup Ct. 
Rep. 540. But reports of committees of House or Senate 
stand upon a more solid footing, and may be regarded as 
an exposition of the legislative intent in a case where 
otherwise the meaning of a statute is obscure. Binns v. 
United States, 194 U. S. 486, 495, 48 L. Ed. 1087, 1090, 24 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 816. . . .”  (Emphasis supplied)

It is not to be presumed that the Legislature intended to 
exceed its powers or that it sought to achieve an unlawful 
objective. To the contrary every presumption must be in­
dulged that it intended to enact a valid statute for a bene­
ficial purpose. The courts all agree with the following state­
ment made in 82 C.J.S. 544-5:

“ It is presumed that the legislature acted from hon­
orable motives, in accordance with reason and common 
sense, and with a full knowledge of the constitutional 
scope of its powers, and that it did not intend to ex­
ceed its powers, or to give its enactments an extra­
territorial operation. It is also presumed that it intended 
to enact a valid, effective, and permanent statute which 
would have a beneficial effect, favoring the public inter­
est, and which would achieve the purpose for which the 
statute was adopted; and there is a presumption against 
a construction which would render a statute ineffective 
or inefficient, or which would cause grave public injury 
or even inconvenience. . . .”

The words and phrases of the Eligibility Act manifest



17

clearly a lawful purpose. The statements imputed to one of 
the Legislators who passed the Act indicate a purpose which 
the District Judge concluded to be unlawful. Even if the Act in 
and of itself was susceptible to either interpretation the Lower 
Court should have adpoted the construction which would 
have upheld the validity of the law— as stated in 16 C.J.S.

“ If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one 
of which will render it constitutional and the other of 
which will render it unconstitutional in whole or in part, 
or raise grave and doubtful constitutional questions, the 
court will adopt that construction of the statute which, 
without doing violence to the fair meaning of language 
employed by the legislature therein, will render it valid, 
and give effect to all of its provisions, or which will free 
it from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the 
other construction is equally reasonable, or seems the 
more obvious, natural, and preferable, interpretation,

The above rule, followed in all jurisdictions, furthermore 
adds, quoting 16 C.J.S. 383-4:

“As a consequence of the rule of construction favor­
ing validity, the courts will not adopt a strained, doubtful, 
restricted, narrow, rigid, strict, or literal interpretation 
in order to condemn a statute or resolution as uncon­
stitutional, nor may they change or add to, the wording 
of the statute, or resort to implication, or innuendo, in 
order to destroy it. Also, the courts will not sustain an 
attack on a statute if it may be constitutionally upheld 
on any reasonable or sound theory, or any reasonable 
construction, or any reasonable or rational ground, or any 
reasonable, rational, or legal basis, or if any rational 
basis of fact can reasonably be conceived to sustain it . . . ”

These rules have been consistently followed by the



18

Supreme Court of the United States. See:

Note 6,16 C. J. S. 376 and cases cited 
Chip-pica Indians v. U. S., 301 U. S. 358, 81 L. Ed. 1156 
Anniston Mfg Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337, 81 L. Ed. 1443 
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893
Hopkins Fed S & L Assn v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315, 80 L.

Ed. 251
Mo. Pac. Ry Co. v. Boone, 276 U. S. 466, 70 L. Ed. 688 
South Utah Co. v. Beaver, 262 U. S. 325, 67 L. Ed. 1004 
Ark Nat. Gas Co. v. Ark R. R. Comm, 261 U. S. 379, 67 L.

Ed. 705
Texas v. E. Tex. R. Co., 258 U. S. 204, 66 L. Ed. 566 
Carey v. S. D., 250 U. S. 118, 63 L. Ed. 886

There is another rule of law that would preclude the 
federal courts from invalidating the Act of the Legislature 
of Louisiana. That is the rule that federal courts should not 
hold a State law unconstitutional unless such a conclusion 
is unavoidable. See 16 C. J. S. 387-8 and cases cited.

In South Utah Mines v. Beaver County, 262 U. S. 331, 
67 L, Ed. 1008 plaintiff argued that a State statute would 

produce an unjust and discriminatory result, and should 
therefore be held unconstitutional as a violation of the 14th 
Amendment. The Court rejected this argument, saying:

“ These statutory provisions, so far as we are in­
formed, have not received the consideration of the state 
courts, and we will not assume, in advance of such consid­
eration, that they will be so construed as to produce that 
result. See Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 
531, 58 L. Ed. 713, 720, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 359; Missouri 
K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 650, 58 L. Ed. 1135, 
1138, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678. Clearly, they are sus­
ceptible of a construction which will preclude their ap­



19

plication to the case now under consideration and as that 
construction will resolve all doubt in favor of their con­
stitutionality, it is our duty to adopt it. Plymouth Coal Co. 
v. Pennsylvania, Supra, p. 546; St. Louis Southwestern 
R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 369, 59 L. Ed. 265, 274, 
35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99; Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkan­
sas R. Commission, 261 U. S. 379, ante, 705, 43 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 387, decided March 19, 1923.”

In any event, the federal courts should not invalidate a 
state law on the suppostion that it will be given an uncon- 
al application by the state courts or by State officials charged 
with its enforcement, as stated in Manchester v. Leiby, 117 
F 2d 661, 665, Cert. Den. 313 U. S. 562, 85 L. Ed. 1522:

“ If, conceivably, the ordinance might be given an 
interpretation of broader sweep and more doubtful con­
stitutionality, the notable and altogether proper reluct­
ance of federal courts to issue injunctions against state 
and city officials, restraining their enforcement of crim­
inal laws and ordinances, would lead us to adopt the 
most innocent interpretation until the state courts have 
ruled otherwise, or at least until the local officials have 
proceeded to act on an interpretation which brings the 
law or ordinance in conflict with constitutional guaran­
tees. . . .”

In this class of cases where an injunction is sought 
challenging the constitutionality of state laws the Su­
preme Court has insisted that there be a clear and persuasive 
showing of unconstitutionality and of irreparable injury. So 
in Mayo v. Lakeland Co., 309 U. S. 318-9, 84 L. Ed. 780, 
the Court said:

“ The legislation requiring the convening of a court 
of three judges in cases such as this was intended to



20

insure that the enforcement of a challenged statute 
should not be suspended by injunction except upon a 
clear and persuasive showing of unconstitutionality and 
irreparable injury. Congress intended that, in this class 
of suits, prompt hearing and decision shall be afforded 
the parties so that the states shall be put to the least 
possible inconvenience in the administration of their 
laws. . .”

As Chief Justice Taft stated in Cumberland T & T Co. 
v. La. Pub. Service Comm. 260 U. S. 216, 67 L. Ed. 223, 
“ conflict between Federal and State authority (is) always 
to be deprecated.”

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion and the authorities cited, 
the following principles are established:

1. The two Acts of the Legislature challenged by Plain­
tiffs in this proceeding are in no way related to one another. 
In fact, Act 249 of 1956 relating to the removal of teachers 
has no application whatever to this case.

2. If the Court were to find that Act 249 of 1956 is 
unconstitutional in its clause relating to integration of the 
races in the public school system it would thereby remove 
any objection that might be made to Act 15 of 1956, the 
Eligibility Act, since this clause furnishes the only con­
nection that the District Judge found to exist between the 
two statutes.

3. Plaintiffs have no inherent right to attend any col­
lege or university maintained by the State, and must sub­



21

mit to such conditions as the Legislature may impose as a 
condition precedent to their admission to such an institution.

4. The power to establish and maintain colleges and uni­
versities is a broad sovereign power reserved by the states 
and constitutes and exercise of the police power of the state.

5. The courts have no right to resort to rules of construc­
tion in ascertaining the meaning or the application of a 
statute where there is no ambiguity or doubt as to the mean­
ing o f the words employed by the Legislature. The District 
Judge therefore erred in importing into the Eligibility Act 
the provisions of other State statutes on the subject of segre­
gation, and also erred in determining the purpose of the 
statute to be unlawful because of statements made by an 
individual of the Legislature as to its purpose.

6. Statements of individual members of the Legislature 
as to the meaning or purpose of a law are unreliable as a 
source from which to discover their true meaning or pur­
pose of such a law, and are entitled to consideration only 
where the language of a statute is doubtful or obscure.

7. If a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one 
of which will render it constitutional and the other of which 
will render it unconstitutional in whole or in part, the court 
will adopt that construction which will render it valid, and 
will uphold it only on reasonable or legal basis which might 
sustain it.

8. The Federal Courts should not hold a State law un­
constitutional unless such a conclusion is unavoidable. Since 
the Eligibility Act is clear and certain in its terms 
and has a lawful object the District Judge erred in nulli­



22

fying the statute on the basis of extraneous hearsay state­
ments regarding its purpose.

Respectfully submitted,

JACK P. F. GREMILLION,
Attorney General,

State of Louisiana,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana;

GEORGE M. PONDER
First Assistant Attorney General;

WILLIAM P. SCHULER,
Assistant Attorney General;

LAURANCE W. BROOKS,
Louisiana National Bank Bldg.;

Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
WILLIAM C, BRADLEY,

Special Counsel for 
Attorney General.

W. SCOTT WILKINSON,
Post Office Box 1707 

Shreveport, Louisiana
Attorneys for Appellants.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this day I have served copies 
of the forgoing supplemental brief on behalf of appellants on 
counsel to appellees by placing the same in the United States 
Mail with sufficient postage affixed thereto.

Dated this------ day of December, 1957.

GEORGE M. PONDER 
Attorney for Appellant