Brief of Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees

    IN THE 

UNITED STATES 

COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 75-1998 

WITT CAMPBELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 
Cross Appellant 

versus 

GADSDEN COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL., 
Egrc., 

Defendants-Appellants 
Cross Appellees 

Appeal from the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Florida 

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
CROSS APPELLEES 

LAW OFFICES OF 
BRIAN T. HAYES 
POST OFFICE BOX 1385 
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302 

Attorneys for Defendants- 
Appellants Cross Appellees 



IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE PIPFTH CIRCUIT 

NO. 75-1998 

WITT CAMPBELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 
Cross Appellant 

versus 

GADSDEN COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD, 

ET aL., ETC., 

Defendants-Appellants 
Cross Appellees 

CERTIFICATE REQUIRFD BY FIFTH CIRCUIT IOCAL 

RULE 13(a) 

The undersigned, counsel of record for Appellants 

certifies that the following listed parties have an interest 

in the outcome of this case. These representations are made 

in order that Judges of this Court may evaluate possible 

disqualification or refusal pursuant to Local Rule 13(a). 

Witt Campbell, for himself and others 
similarly situated 

‘Gadsden County Board of Education, 
M.D. Walker, as Superintendent of 

Schools of Gadsden County 
Edward Fletcher, 
Cecil Butler, 



C. Wi. Harbin, Jr., 
Will I Ramsey, Sr., 

Randolph Greene, as members of the 

Gadsden County Board of Education 

BRIAN T. HAYES 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 

ARGUMENT--POINT I 

ARGUMENT--POINT II 

ARGUMENT--POINT III 

CONCLUSION 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

PAGE 

16 

18 

19 



TABLE OF CITATIONS 

Page 

Adkins v. Duval County School Bd, et al 
{5th Cir., 1975) Case No. 74-1653 2, 16 

Bassett v. Atlanta Independent School District 
4835 P.28 1268 (5th Cir., 1973) 18 

Gay v. Wheeler, 363 PF, Supp. 764, 782 
{(S.D. Tex, 1973) 14, 15 

Horton v. Lawrnece County Bd. of Edu. 
320 F. Supp. 790, 797 (N.D. Al3,1970) 
Affirmed 449 P.24 792 (5th Cir. 1971) 12 

Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.24 84 (5th Cir. 1972) 17 

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Fduc, 453 F.24 1104 
{5th Cir., 1971) 9 

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ, 456 F,24 1371 
1373 (5th Cir., 1972) 9,12 

lee v., Macon County Bd. of Educ. 470 F.24 958, 959 
{5th Cir., 1972) 10 

Singleton v. Jackson, 419 P.1211 (5th Cir. 1970) 2r 5, 
: 9, 10 

11, 12, 
18 

Smith v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Pinellas 
County, 438 F.24 1209, 1210 (5th Cir., 1971) 14 

United States v. Gadsden County School District, 
TCA 1515 (R.D., Fla. 1970) 4, 5, 

14 

OTHER CITATIONS 

23 U.5.C. 1343 1, 2 
42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985 1, 2. 

7: 8. 
16 

ii 



U.S. Const. Thirteenth Amend. 

U.S. Const. Fourteenth Amend. 

Rule 23, Federal 

Florida Statutes 

Florida Statutes 

Florida Statutes 

Florida Statutes 

Rules of Civil Procedure 

231.351 

231.36 et seq. 

230.3347) 

231.57 (2) (c) 

iid 



POINTS ON APPEAL 

POINT 1 

DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION? 

POINT 1X 

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR 1IN 1TS APPLICATION OF 

THE SINGLETON v. JACKSON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE 

SCHODL, DISPRicT, 419 7.28 1211 (5th Cir., 1970) 

STANDARD? 

POINT 111 

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE 

PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES? 

1113 



IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

NO. 275-1998 

WITT CAMPBELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee : 
Cross Appellant, 

vs. : 

GADSDEN COUNTY DISTRICT 

SCHOOI, BOARD, et al., etc., 

Defendants-Appellants 
Cross Appellees. 

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
CROSS APPELLEES 



STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

The Complaint in this cause was filed on December 20, 

1973 in the District Court for the Northern District of 

Florida, Tallahassee Divison. See R-5. 

The proceedings were initiated by Witt Campbell, 

a black principal, acting for himself and others similarly 

situated against M. D. Walker, as Superintendent of Schools 

of Gadsden County, the Gadsden County District School Board, 

and five individuals, as members of the Gadsden County Board 

of Education. 

Plaintiff asserted a cause of action under 42 U.S.C., 

1981, 1983 and 1985, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend- 

ment to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction was 

based on 28 U.5.C. 1343. 

Relief sought was an injunction against the Defendants 

from maintaining a pattern and practice of racial discrimination 

in hiring, promotion, and in terms and conditions of employ- 

ment. Also requested were back pay and damages, class action 

relief pursuant to Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

and other equitable relief. 

Thereafter on February 14, 1974, the Plaintiff filed an 

Amended Complaint. See R-45. 



Upon Motion of the Defendant, the District Court on March 

19, 1974, dismissed the Complaint on the grounds that an action 

will not lie against a County School Board of Education under 

Title 42, U.S.C. 1981, 1983 or 1985 and that the Court lacked 

jurisdiction under the asserted 28 U.S.C. 1343. See R-51. 

On the 25th day of April, 1974, the District Court granted 

a Motion for Rehearing and entered its Order allowing the Plain- 

tiff to proceed for injunctive relief on the theory that an 

alleged violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights always gave 

Jurisdiction to a Federal Court. See R-58. 

An Answer was filed on May 10, 1974, denying the alle- 

gations of the Amended Compalint. See R-79. 

Various motions for Summary Judgment were filed which 

culminated in the Order of Partial Dismissal removing the class 

action issue from the Court and leaving for trial the question of 

Witt Campbell's claim of demotion under Singleton v. Jackson, 

419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir., 1970). See R-395. 

On this issue the cause was tried on January 22, 1975, 

before the Honorable Norman C. Roettger, Jr. sitting by special 

assignment from the Southern District of Florida. 

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court permanently 

enjoined the School Board, its individual members, and the 

Superintendent from failing to give a principalship to the 

Plaintiff and ordered the Plaintiff to be assigned to the position 

of an elementary school principal effective for the commence- 

ment of the 1975-76 school year term. See R-444, 

ey I 



Notice of Appeal was timely filed onthe 2nd day of April, 

1975. See R-451. Notice of Cross Appeal was filed by the 

Plaintiff on the 11th day of April, 1975. See R-453. Motion for 

Stay was filed on the 25th day of March, 1975 and denied by the 

Court on April 10, 1975. See R-445,454. 



STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 

The Plaintiff, Witt Campbell, is a black, tenured admin- 

istrator who has been employed by the Gadsden County Board of 

Public Instruction since 1934. He served as principal in a 

series of black elementary schools until the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee 

Division entered a final desegragation order in the case of U.S. 

Vv. Gadsden County School District, TCA-1616, mandating the School 

board of Gadsden County, Florida, to effectuate and put into 

operation a unitary and nondiscriminatory school system. 

Entered on August 7, 1970, this Order gave the School Board just 

sixteen days to transfer student assignments and reassign staff 

teachers, principals and other personnel within the school system, 

At the time, the Plaintiff was serving as principal of 

Stevens Elementary School. Pursuant to the directives of this 

Order, Stevens Elementary School was to be phased out, reducuing 

the number of principalships available in the desegregated school 

system and leaving the Plaintiff without a position as a 

principal. 

The Plaintiff was transferred to Assistant Principal and 

Desegregation Specialist at Chattahoochee Public Schools (a 

high school), Chattahoochee, Florida. In his new position, 

the Plaintiff received a Five hundred Dollar pay increase and 

remained a tenured administrator in the system. 



The Plaintiff testified that he objected to this transfer 

and demanded an elementary school principalship. However, testi- 

mony revealed that there were no openings or changes in ele- 

mentary school principalships between the time of the Plain- 

tiff's transfer and the time Plaintiff brought this action, 

except for one instance wherein the principal at St. Johns 

School was transferred to Havana Middle School and the principal 

at Havana Middle School went to St. Johns. 

Superintendent N. D. Walker testified that he considered 

the transfer of Witt Campbell a promotion with equal or greater 

prestige and more responsibilities. Yet, the District Court 

found to the contrary. 

The District Court concluded that the Plaintiff was demoted 

by his reassignment because he has less responsibility than he 

held previously as principal of Stevens Elementary School, 

and because his position as Assistant Principal and Desegre- 

gation Specialist of Chattahoochee Public Schools (a high 

school) is less prestigious than his former position. Further, 

the Court determined that the facts of this case were governed by 

Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 

F.2d 1211 (5th Cir., 1970), since the Plaintiff was demoted after 

a reduction in the number of principalships by Defendant pursu- 

ant to its inplementation of the Court's Desegregation Order 

TCA-1616. See R-441. 



Although the Court found that "the reassignment of 

Plaintiff was not a result of a pattern or practice of racial 

discrimination" (Findings of Fact No. 6, R-441, emphasis supplied), 

the Court concluded that the "Defendant had not developed objective 

and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards for selecting personnel 

to be dismissed or demoted" (Conclusions of Law No. 3, R-443), 

and ordered that the Plaintiff be assigned to the position of 

an elementary school principal effective for the commencement 

of the 1975-76 school term. (See R-444). 



POINT 1 

DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION? 

The Court lacked jurisdiction over the Defendant, the 

Gadsden County School Board, because it is not a proper party 

Defendant against whom injunctive relief may be granted under 

Section 1981, 1983 or 1985 of Title 42 U.S.C... The Gadsden 

County School Board is not a "person" within the meaning of the 

word in Section 1981, 1983, or 1935 of Title 42, U.S.C. for the 

purpose of establishing subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, 

it was clearly improper for the District Court to grant the 

Plaintiff, Witt Campbell, injunctive relief against the School 

Board under the above authority. See the decision of this 

Court in Adkins v. Duval County School Board, et al, (5th Cir., 

1975) Case no. 74-1653. 

The elected members of a Florida School Board, as 

individuals, have no authority to employ, dismiss or demote any 

school-employed person under existing Florida Law. Florida 

Statutes 231.351, and 231.36, et seg. Purther, the Defendant, 

M.D. Walker, as Superintendent, cannot employ or transfer any 

employee without the approval of the School Board, Florida 

Statutes 230.33(7). Therefore, injunctive relief is not a 

proper remedy as against any of these individuals. 

ol 



In sum, the Plaintiff did not establish subject 

matter jurisdiction of this cause in the Federal District Court 

under Title 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 or 1985 as against any of the 

named Defendants. 

Moreover, the Defendants submit that subject matter juris- 

diction of this cause was not established under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, since the Court below found no racial discrimination 

in the transfer of the Plaintiff herein from an elementary 

school principal to assistance principal of a county high school 

at no loss in pay, pension, rights or tenure. 

Plaintiff's proper forumwas in State Court or an Adminis- 

trative hearing pursuant to Plorida Statutes 231.57(2) (c). 



POINT 11 

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN ITS APPLICATION OF 
THE SINGLETON v. JACKSON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE 
SCHOO, DISTRICT, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Civ, 1970) 
STANDARD? 

"The essence of the Singleton approach as a 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of those displaced is this: if a school official, 
administrator, teacher, principal, or coach is - 
demoted or dismissed as result of a desegraga- 

tion order, and if his objective qualifications 1 
for his former position do not diminish in an 
absolute sense after the issuance of the order 
and his displacement, then he must be given the 
opportunity to assume any new position equal to 
the one he lost, prior to the offering of the 
position to any nev applicants. This is the 

per se preseumption of Singleton underlined in 
our recent decision in Lee v. Macon County Bd. 
of Educ., 453 7.24 1104 (5th Cir. 1971)... LL." 
Ice v. Macon County Bd. of BEduc., 456 F.24 
1371, 1373 (5th Cir., 1972). (Emphasis supplied) 
Hereafter referred to as Lee II 

Paraphrasing the language of the Singleton decision, 

supra at 1218, this Court stated further that Singleton: 

"granted a limited preferential right to pro- 

motion in the event of subsequent vacancies, to 

members of the pre-desegregation order school 

staff population who were dismissed, demoted 

or displaced in the wake of school desegregation." 

Lee 11, supra at 1373. (Emphasis supplied) 

A "demotion" was defined in Singleton, supra at 1218, 

to be as follows: 



"Demotion," as used in order requiring that a 
staff member to be dismissed or demoted in a 
school district be selected on basis of objective 
and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards, 
includes any reassignment (1) under which staff 
member receives less pay or has less responsi- 
bility than under assignment he held previously, 
(2) which requires a lesser degree of skill 
than did assignment he held previously, or 
(3) under which staff member is asked to teach 
a subject or grade other than one for which he 
is certified or for which he has had substantial 
experience within a reasonably current period." 

Defendants contend that Witt Campbell's appointment as 

Assistant Principal and Desegregation Specialist was not a 

demotion since he lost no salary or pension rights. Lee v. 

Macon County Board of Education, 470 F.24:958, 959 (5th Cir. 

1972). 

Even if this Court finds to the contrary, there has been 

no new openings of any elementary school principalships to which 

WITT CAMPBELL should have been assigned as dictated by 

Singleton, supra. The Court below specifically inquired as 

£o this fact at Tr 88, line 22, through Tr '89,:1line 9: 

"THE COURT 

"0 There have been no principalships open 
in the high schools since 1970, is that 
correct--no vacancies? 

"A "No, sir. 

"eo "Have there been any vacancies in the ele- 
mentary principalships other than this? 
I assume this is a swap at Gretna? 

"A Yes, sir, that was an exchange of two 
: principals, one from one school to another 

just a swap was what it amounted to." 

-]0~ 



Also, in its Findings of Fact announced from the Bench, 

the: District Court found at Tr 99, line 7 through line 18: 

"Now at that point, the relief to be 
ordered becomes somewhat difficult. There has 
not been an elementary school vacancy since 
1970, except for the strange swap of Mr. Harrell 
and Yr, Jones. There has been no vacancy in 
the high schools in Gadsden County since the 
desegregation order of 1970, but there have 
been three vacancies, other than swap arrange- 
ments, in the junior highs. Now, the Plaintiff 
is qualified for both elementary and secondary 
administration, but he has plainly indicated that 
he would like to be principal of an elementary 
school and has given his reasons and the Court 
finds that that is his primary purpose and the 
relief he wants." 

The Plaintiff herein has demanded a principalship at the 

elementary school level and has been granted such position 

by the District Court, even though there has been no violation 

by the Defendants as per Singleton in not granting the Plaintiff 

such elementary school principalship before this date. There 

simply has been no openings at the elementary school principal- 

ship level to which the Plaintiff should have been appointed 

by the Defendants since the 1970 school desegregation order. 

To order a pre-Desegregation Order, incumbant, elementary 

school principal out ‘of his job so that the Plaintiff may have 

it is unjustified, unlawful, and is not mandated by Singleton. 

By its Order, the District Court has unconstitutionally 

deprived a pre-Desegregation Order, incumbant, elementary 

school principal of his job. 

This is not a case in which the Plaintiff was denied an 

elementary school principalship; because that principalship 

-11- 



was given to an applicant from outside the school system as in 

Lee II, supra. The issues presented do not involve the constant 

rejection of the application of the Plaintiff herein and the 

employment of a new applicant to an elementary school principal-~- 

ship after the Plaintiff was demoted from his elementary school 

principalship. 

The elementary school principal who should be required 

to lose his job as a result of the 1970 Desegregation Order 

should have been determined by the standard set forth in 

Singleton. 

Singleton, supra at 1218, requires that: 

"If there is to be a reduction in the number of 
principals, teachers, teacher-aides, or other pro- 
fessional staff employed by the school district 
which will result in a dismissal or demotion of any 
such staff members, the staff member to be dis- 
missed or demoted must be selected on the basis of 
objective and reasonable non-discriminatory standards 
from among all the staff of the school district." 

* * * * * * * * * 

"Prior to such a reduction, the school board 
will develop or require the development of nonracial 
objective criteria to be used in selecting the staff 
member who is to be dismissed or demoted. These 
criteria shall be available for public inspection 
and shall be retained by the school district. The 
school district also shall record and preserve the 
evaluation of staff members under the criteria. 
Such evaluation shall be made available upon request 
to the dismissed or demoted employee." 

An example of the implementation of this procedure is 

set forth in Horton v. Lawrence County Bd, of Educ,, 320 F.Supp 

720, 797 (N.D, Ala., 1970) affirmed by this Court at 449 

F.2d 792 (5th Cir., 1971): 

-12- 



"Here is what should have been done, for 
example, respecting the principals; Under the 
June order the number of high schools in the 
system, and hence the number of high school prin- 
cipal jobs in the system, was reduced from nine 
to six. (Closing of Moulton High, and conver- 
sion to elementary status of Tennessee Valley 
and Courtland.) Of those who were principals 
at the close of the term, seven were interested 
in re-employment for the 1970-71 year. (The 
principal at Courtland and Hatton left the county 
system.) All seven should have been considered 
by the Board for the six high school principal- 
ships on the basis of "objective and reasonable 
nondiscriminatory standards." The criteria should 
have been available for public inspection, and 
the evaluation of the seven persons under the 
criteria should have been made available to the 
one "demoted," or not selected for retention as 
a high: school principal. Moreover, the one 
demoted (to an elementary school principalship) 
would have under the Singleton decree and the 
June order a "preferential right" to promotion-- 
namely, that (if he is white) the Board must 
offer him a position as high school principal 
before it can hire or promote a black person as 
high school principal; and vice versa. That is, 
the person "demoted" must be given a right of 
first refusal before a person of a different 
race can be hired at the level from which 
demoted." 

The standards used by the Defendants to determine which 

elementary school principal should lose his principalship in 1970 

were given by the Defendants in their Answers to Interrogatories 

answer number 3(p), R-82 stated: 

"3. {(b) Involuntary transfers prior to court ordered 
desegregation were recommended by the Superintendent 
based, generally, upon hardship, professional and 
interpersonal relationships with fellow teachers, 
personality conflicts, administrative necessities 
and other considerations which the Superintendent 
felt were in the best interest of the school 
system and the students on a case by case basis. 
There was no written policy for such involuntary 
transfers. 

-]3~ 



"Subsequent to court ordered desegregation, 

transfers were necessiated to effect the orderly 
reassignment of teachers, principals and staff 
to effect a unitary school system, which reassign- 
ments were further necessitated by the permanent 
closing of Stevens Elementary School. 

"No policies have been reduced to writing 
inasmuch as all involuntary transfers are handled 
in strict conformity with the orders as set forth 
in the case of United States v. Wakula County 
School District, et al, Case No. 1616-1971, U.S 
District. Court, Northern District of Plorida."* 

*This case has previously been referred to in this brief 

as United States v. Gadsden County School District. 

Should the Plaintiff complain that these standards 

were not within the requirement of Singleton, SUora, and that 

he was incorrectly chosen as the elementary school principal 

to be demoted as a result of the 1970 Desegregation Order, 

the Defendants would like to direct the Court to the language 

of the court in Gav v. Wheeler, 363 F. Supp. 764, 732 (s.D. 

Tex., 1973). 

"What constituted professional competence or 
incompetence has no easily ascertainable boundar- 
ies. What objective criteria are appropriate 
and necessary to judge professional competence 
or incompetence is likewise incapable of exact 
delineation. In most desegregation cases, courts 
have used the word "objective" to mean non-- 
arbitrary, non-capricious and racially non- 
discriminatory. The District's evaluative system 
viewed from this stance, was clearly objective 
in that it was developed and administered free 
of bad faith, improper motive or racial motivation. 
The Court concludes, therefore, that the method 
of evaluation and comparison used by the District 
was fairly conducted by qualified professionals 
acting in a professional manner, who were not 
motivated or influenced by impermissible racial 
considerations. Smith v. Board of Public 
Instruction of Pinellas County, 438 F.2d 1209, 

1210 (5th Cir., 1971). 

-1 fe 



In the present case, the District Court found that the 

transfer of the Plaintiff was not racially motivated in 

addition to its finding of no pattern or practice of racial 

discrimination by the Defendants. These findings read in 

light of the policy set forth in Gay v. Wheeler, supra, 

compel the conclusion that the School Board's decision 

to re-assign the Plaintiff from his elementary school 

principalship as a result of the 1970 school desegregation 

order should stand. 

1f “this is not ‘dohe Defendants suggest that the pre- 

cedent cstablished by this case will allow administrators 

or teachers, white or black, to come to Federal Court claim- 

ing jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, prove no 

racial discrimination and yet prevail if the Court is 

inclined to second guess or otherwise re-evaluate a transfer 

by a local school board of any given teacher or administrator. 

If it stands, the net effect of this decision is to allow 

Federal Courts to hear teacher employment suits whether 

racial discrimination is involved or not. 

-15~ 



POINT 111 

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE 

PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES? 

Defendants question under what authority the District 

Court has granted the Plaintiff an award of attorney's fees. 

Since the school board is not a proper party Defendant 

against whom an action may be brought under Section 1981, 

1983, or 1985 of Title 42 U.S.C.,, see Adking v. Duval County 

School Board, supra, and racial discrimination was not 

proved eliminating a Fourteenth Amendment cause of action, 

does the District Court's Order mean that attorney's fees 

will be assessed against the individual members of the 

School Board? 

Plaintiff's attorney has obtained injunctive relief 

for Witt Campbell allowing him elementary school principalship - 

which Defendants contend is an improper remedy not justified 

by the evidence. 

Plaintiff's attorney failed to obtain class action 

relief for the other Plaintiffs originally named in this suit. 

Plaintiff's attorney failed to prove a pattern or 

practice of racial discrimination, 

Plaintiff's attorney presented a multitude statistical 

evidence, much of it obtained from Defendants as a result of 

pre-trial discovery. A considerable amount of the evidence 

-16- 



collected by Plaintiff was of little weight in the prosecution 

of Plaintiff, Witt Campbell's case; but the presentation of 

such evidence required Defendants to answer it, and placed 

large burdens of time and expense on Defendants, which will 

have to be borne by the elected members of the Gadsden County 

School Board as individuals and the Superintendent M.D. Walker 

of Gadsden County School Board. 

The facts do not lend themselves to the finding of 

unreasonableness and obstinancy on the part of the Defendants 

that supports an award of attorney's fees, Johnson v. Combs, 

471 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1972), and therefore Defendants request 

this Court to reverse the award of attorney's fees. 



CONCLUSION 

Defendants contend that in the interest of fairness to 

all concerned, this case should be reconsidered at the trial 

level to determine the advisability of entering an order 

mandating the school board to offer Witt Campbell an elementary 

school principalship for the commencement of the 1975-1976 

school year under Singleton Standards. Bassett v. Atlanta 

Independent School District, 485 PF.24:1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 

1973). 

Respectfully submitted, 

BRIAN T. HAYES 4 
Post Office Box 1385 
‘Tallahassee, Florida 

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS- 

APPELLANTS CROSS APPELLEES. 

; =] 8m 



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was 

furnished by mail to Kent Spriggs, 324 West College 

Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida; Jack Greenberg, 10 Columbus 

Circle, New York, N.Y., and Richard Gardner, The Quincy 

State Bank Building, Quincy, Florida, this 2 aay of 

July, 1975. os | 

Attorney : / 

-19- 



ow 
4 

A. B. LETTER SERVICE, IRC, 

327 RUE CHARTRES 
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70130