Letter to Ms. McGuan from Reynolds re Additional Information concerning H.B. No. 2, Chap. 1
Public Court Documents
June 21, 1984

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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Memorandum from Williams to Chambers, 1982. 2ab736d9-d792-ee11-be37-6045bddb811f. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/1daca25c-113c-45d1-adda-0c0ea4752024/memorandum-from-williams-to-chambers. Accessed May 22, 2025.
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MEMORANDUM February 2, L982 To : Julius Levonne Chambers From : Napoleon B. Wi11iams, Jr. Re : Gingles v. Edmisten (f.O. N.C.) North Carolina Reapportionment I The Nature of the Claims for Relief Our overall goals in the North Carolina reapportion- ment lawsuit are twofold: (1) to maximize the number of districts in which minority voters in North Carolina can elect candidates of their choice to the General Assembly and to the House of Representatives; and (2) to insurer ES near as possible, that the Staters districting plans are in compliance with the constitutional mandate of one person, one vote. Our complaint in Gingles v. Ed.misten reflects the twin goals. One claim for relief in the complaint is based upon dilution of minority voting strength and the other claim for relief is based upon the constitutional standard of one person, one vote. There are two components to the claim based upon vote dilution with respect to districting for the General Assembly. One part arises from the adoption and application in 1967 of amendments to the Constitution of North Carolina which prohibit the division of county lines in drawing up electoral districts for the two houses of the General Assembly. The second component results from gerrymander- ing in 1981 and L982 in the placement of district lines. The vote dilution claims are based upon both the equal protection cl-ause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The former requires proof that the discrimination is purposeful and caused by giovernmental officials. Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, all new changes in voting laws, practices, and rules must be approved by the Attorney General of the United States or by the United States District Court in the District of Columbia. The changes can be d.isallowed if their purpose or effect is discriminatory. By contrast, government officials of the State are assumed to have intentionally violated the 14th Amendmentrs equal protection claim of one person, one vote if the arithmetical total of the percentage deviations of any two districts in the State from the median exceeds 16.58. If, however, the total never exceeds this amount but is greater than 9.92, then an intentional violation of the one person, one vote standard will not be presumed. Rather, it must be established. 2- It can be established only by showing that smaller deviations could have been achieved which did not sacrifiee the compelling and legitimate governmental interests which the State was trying to achieve when it adopted the district- ing plan with higher deviations. When this occurs, this State is put into the position of having to justify the large deviations. Where the combined percentage deviations for any two districts does not exceed 9.9t, it wiII, in most cases, not be necessary for the State to justify the deviation from population equality. II The Re1ief Required and Requested Assuming that our claims are good and that they can be established, then we move to the next stage of our lawsuit, namelym the question of relief or remedy. Here, the basic problem is that the relief which we are entitled to receive as a matter of law if our claims are proved, is not necessarily the same as the relief which we desire. The relief we desire for the General Assembly is the creation of single member dis- tricts, appropriately drawn as to maximize the potential for electing the largest, number of minority members. In practical terms, this means that we want single member districting and 3- we want the districting plan to contain the largest number possible of districts in which either the majority of the registered voters or the majority of the population is com- posed of minority citizens. This is our first prJ-ority. A second priority, if the first is not achieved, is to harre the maximum number of districts, however constructed, in which minorities can be constructed. There is no law which gives us a right to have any of the two priorities realized, that is, we will not be entitled automatically, even if we prove all of our claims, to have a districting scheme maximizing the number of minorities who can get elected to the General Assembly. What our claims entitle us to get unconditionally is (1) a reapportion which satisfies the one person, one vote standard, and (2) a dis- tricting scheme whose purpose or effect is not to minimize or cancel out minority voting strength. There are four possible ways in which this lawsuit might result in the creation of single member district for the General Assembly. First, the State l,egislature might volun- tarily create them for one or both houses. Second, the Justice Department might continue to invalidate proposed apportionment schemes until single member districts are finally proposed and adopted. Third, single member districts may prove to be the only districting scheme which will have the requisite variances. Fourth, the district court might impose single member districts. The second and t.hird are possibilities which 4- are either remote or non-existent. The first possibility is not one whose likelihood I can determine. Our hopes for single member districts are based on the fourth possibility. Here, however, we have obstacles arising out of well established legal principles promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States. First, the Court has instructed district courts, following invalidation of a reapportionment plan (irrespective of whether the claim is based on the one person, one vote standard or on the dilution of minority voting strength), to give the affected Legislature the first opportunities to come up with a remedial respportion- ment plan. Second, the Supreme Court has held that district courts are to give deference to any choice by the Legislature of multimember district p1ans. See, for example, Wise v. Lipscomb,437 U.S. 535 (1978). It is only when the Legislature defaults and is not able, during the remedy stage, to come up with a districting plan that works, i.e., which satisfies the applicable federal legal standards, that the district court should step in and devise its own remedy. In trying to determj-ne whether the Legislature is likely to to able to develop a satisfactory plan, the federal district court can take into account, I assume, the previous failures by the Legislature to devise an acceptable plan. Once, however, it is clear that the Legislature cannot district court be relied upon to draw up a valid plan and that the federal / 5- must intervene, then the district court, according to existing Supreme Court 1aw, must ordinarily impose only a single member district pIan. This analysis reveals, dt least in part, the extent to which this lawsuit relies upon a belief that the State Legislature willr ds a practical matter, continue to be unable to draft a satisfactory reapportionment p1an. If the district court is forced to draw up a plan, then, I believer w€ will have won. SomethJ-ng less than tot.al victory can be achieved if each successive plan developed by the Legislature is progressively more favorable for the ability of minorities to get elected to the General Assembly. This Rdy, j-n fact, be the pattern which the Legislature is now pursuing. In addition to the concerns articulated above, there are other important j-ssues which are surfacing in the lawsuit. One is the manner in which we prove our claims. This concerns the methods which we use to prove intentional racial discrim- ination and violation of the one person, one vot,e standard as weII as the means employed to get evidence of this nature. Evidence of discrimination must be obtained both for the Fourth Congressional District and for the reapportionment of the General Assembly. Another matter which must be determined is the significance of the Justice Department's invalidation of the L967 consti- tutiqlalamendments. More precisely, we must ascertain how 6- it will be possible, with respect to each apportionment scheme, to establish that the apportionment plan was not constructed to conform with the requirements of the L967 amendments. This issue will become extremely important when- ever it is necessary to show that the reason why a particular district is a multimember district is because of the necessity for complying with the disallowed L967 amendments (this is another manner in which single member districts might be created). A third issue of concern is our ability to identify each district which we believe can be made into a minority district and each district which we can show, by credible evidence, to be entitledr ds a matter of 1aw, to be made into a minority district, I will present this and other issues j-nvolved in the analysis at another tj-me. III Prognosis Our chances of winnj-ng on the one person, one vote issue are good. Whether they are good enough to get us ultimately to single member districts is a different question altogether. Our cnances on the vote dilution issue are, until we have examined the evidence more thoroughly, up for grabs. Even if we are not able to wein the vote dilution issue directly, we might still be able to prevail as a result of whatever advantages might flow from a victory on the one person, one 7- vote issue without stint or limit. I will prove later a more detailed, thoughtful, comprehensive, and practical analysis of all of the issues raised in Gingles. 8-