Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District Memorandum Brief

Public Court Documents
September 9, 1981

Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District Memorandum Brief preview

7 pages

Correspondence from Banks to Lee; Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District Memorandum Brief in Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

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  • Case Files, Henry v. Clarksdale Hardbacks. Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District Memorandum Brief, 1981. ae215961-8418-f111-8342-0022482cdbbc. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/d13941ba-e5dc-4f31-a14f-e985de84e6bd/singleton-v-jackson-municipal-separate-school-district-memorandum-brief. Accessed April 01, 2026.

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     [||e7535a76-ec19-4ab1-bba5-f1aa0100925a||] BaANks & NicHoLs 

318 EAST PEARL STREET 

JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205 

FRED L. BANKS, JR. 

JOHN A.NICHOLS September 17, 1981 
ISAAC K.BYRD, JR. POST OFFICE DRAWER 280 

C. C. ANDERSON, JR. AREA CODE 601 948-730I 

Bill Lann Lee, Esq. 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019 

Re: Singleton v. Jackson MSSD 

Dear Bill: 

Enclosed you will find a copy of defendants 
Memorandum Brief In Reply To Memorandum In Opposition 
To Motion To Dismiss. 

Sincerely, 

Fd LBA 
Fred IL. Banks, Ir. 

msc 
Enclosure 



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI 

JACKSON DIVISION 

DEREK JEROME SINGLETON, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS 

VS. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3379 

JACKSON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE 

SCHOOL DISTRICT : DEFENDANT 

MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN REPLY TO MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS 

8 £7 

Introduction 

Counsel for Plaintiff apparently does not contest the 

School District's contention that it has achieved unitary status 

in extracurricular activities, facilities, staff and transporta- 

tion. Therefore, this reply brief will be limited to the areas 

of composition of student body and faculty. 

11. 

Composition of Student Body 

The elementary student assignment plan for the elementary 

schools which was agreed to by the Plaintiffs, the Justice 

Department and a court appointed bi-racial committee was entered 

by this court on June 22, 1971. 1It is admitted by counsel 

opposite that said consent order provided for a racially neutral 

assignment plan. The School District operated under this court- 

approved student assignment plan for more than three years. The 

student body was effectively desegregated, and this court had 

fully performed its function of providing the appropriate remedy 

for the previous racially discriminatory zones. Pasadena City 

Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 

Having accomplished a unitary assignment plan, there was 

no constitutional requirement that the School District make year 

by year adjustments, but there was also no prohibition against 



making adjustments in student attendance zones unless these 

modifications were motivated by segregative actions on the part 

of the School District. Swann v. Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1 

(1971); Pasadena City Bd. of Education Vv. Spangler, supra. 

Certainly counsel opposite, an experienced civil rights 

attorney, was not motivated by an intent to segregate children of 

-the black race when he agreed to the modifications in the elemen- 

tary student assignment plan under the April 15, 1975 consent 

order. Neither does he charge the School District with such 

improper motivation. Therefore, the unitary nature of the School 

District's student assignment plan was obsattected. 

Counsel opposite contends that no student assignment 

plans with statistics similar to the School District's present 

statistics have ever been approved, with the exception of the 

City of Atlanta. Basically, counsel opposite is comparing apples 

and oranges. He is comparing the racial composition of the 

School District's student body now with the racial composition 

projected under court-approved desegregation plans. The School 

District is not submitting a desegregation plan to this court for 

approval. Its desegregation plan was approved long ago by this 

court. 1t is asking this court to dismiss this case because it 

is entitled to a dismissal under Swann and United States v. 

Texas, 509 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1971). As stated by the United 

States Supreme Court in Swann v. Bd. of Education: 

Neither school authorities nor district 
courts are constitutionally required to 
make year by year adjustments of the 
racial compositions of student bodies 
once the affirmative duty to desegregate 
has been accomplished....402 U.S. at 

31-32. 

Even if it were appropriate to compare the racial composi- 

tion of the School District's student body today with the racial 

composition of student assignment plans approved by the Fifth 

Circuit, it 1s clear that the School District's student assign- 

ment plan, as modified in 1975, would be approved by the Fifth 

Circuit. In Carr v,., Montgomery Bad. of Education, 377 F.Supp. 



3123: (M.D. Ala. 1874), aff'd 51) F.284°1374 (5th Cir. 1975), 

rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 511 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 

1975), the Fifth Circuit approved a student assignment plan which 

contemplated that 51% of all black elementary students would 

attend schools with student bodies 87% or more black. During the 

1975-76 school year, after implementation of the April 15, 1975 

court order, only 48% of the School District's black elementary 

students attended schools with student bodies of 87% or more 

black. These statistics are especially enlightening when con- 

sideration is given to the fact that during the 1975-76 school 

year, 73.5% of the School District's elementary students were 

black, whereas only 50% of the elementary students in the 

Montgomery, Alabama Schools were black when its desegregation 

plan was approved. Also, under the Fifth Circuit approved 

Montgomery, Alabama plan, 94.5% of all white elementary students 

attended elementary schools with 60% of more white student popu- 

lations. During the 1975-76 school year, only 14.4% of the 

School District's white elementary students attended elementary 

schools with 60% or more white enrollment. 

Even today, with a 71.9% black elementary enrollment, 

the School District. student attendance percentages compare | 

favorably with the desegregation plan approved by the Fifth 

Circuit in Carr v. Montgomery Bd. of Education, supra. In Carr 

v. Montgomery, with a 50% black elementary enrollment, 94.5% of 

all white students attended elementary schools with 60% or more 

white student enrollment. Today, only 37% of the School District's 

white elementary students attend elementary schools with 60% or 

more white enrollment. It is true that a substantial number of 

black students within the School District attend predominantly 

black schools. Presently, 71.9% of the School District's elemen- 

tary students are black. 72.1% of the entire student population 

is black. It is inevitable that there will be several schools 

with predominantly black student bodies. 



However, the School District has voluntarily taken steps 

to desegregate its student bodies £0 the fullest degree possible, 

taking into account the practicalities of the situation. For 

example, the School District's Biracial Task Force recommended 

modifications in student attendance zones which increased the 

black enrollment at Oak Forest Elementary School from 18.4% last 

year to 25.9% this year. Forest Hill High School, which had a 

black enrollment last year of 24%, has a black enrollment this 

| year of 31%. Timberlawn elementary, which had a 13.6% black 

enrollment last year, has an 18.2% black enrollment this year. 

Whitten Jr. High School, which had a black enrollment of 26% 

last year, has a black enrollment. of 33% this year. Conversely, 

Hardy Jr. High School, which had a white enrollment of 11.1% last 

year has a white enrollment of 18.7% this year. These modifica- 

tions in student attendance zones were the result of recommen- 

dations made by the Biracial Task Force in December, 1979. The 

Task Force will continue to monitor student attendance and make 

recommendations when necessary to insure a deseuresated student 

body to the fullest degree practicable. 

Counsel opposite contends that community acceptance of a 

unitary system, as measured by "white flight", should be coneidered 

by this court before declaring the School District unitary, 

citing United States v. Corinth Mun. Separate School District, 

414 F.Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1976). However, the Fifth Circuit 

has refused to recognize "white flight" as a deterrent to 

declaration of unitary status. In Calhoun v. Cook, supra, the 

court considered the unitary status of the Atlantic Public School 

Systems. In its consideration, the court stated: 

Since 1958 when this school desegregation 

suit was filed, the winds of legal effort 
have driven wave after wave of judicial 
rhetoric against the patrons of the 
Atlanta Public School System. Today, 
hindsight highlights the resulting errosion, 
revealing that every judicial design for 
achieving racial desegregation in the 
system has failed. A totally segregated 
system which contained 115,000 pupils 1n 
1958 has mutated to a substantially 
segregated system serving only 80,000 



students today. A system with a 70% white 
pupll majority when the litigation began 
has now become a district in which more 
than 85% of the students are black. 
Notwithstanding the lack of success in 
integrating these classrooms, our task 
1s to test whether the plan approved 
or district operation realistically 
promises effective protection now for 
the right of the pupils to a nondiscrimina- 
tory education. (Emphasis supplied) 

The Fifth Circuit concluded by holding that the Atlanta 

School System was unitary, notwithstanding its substantial decline 

in white enrollment following desegregation. 

111. 

Faculty 

Finally, counsel opposite contends that the School 

District is not unitary because of its discriminatory employment 

practices. Today, 55% of the School District's junior high 

teachers are black. 50% of the senior high teachers are black. 

54% of the School District's elementary teachers are black. In 

spite of these statistics, counsel opposite refuses to admit that 

the School District has a desegregated teaching staff. Perhaps 

counsel opposite's definition of a desegregated teaching staff is 

one that is 100% black. Counsel opposite contends that at least 

one lawsuit is pending in this court alleging unconstitutional 

employment practices, as if that were probative of some fact. He 

+ fails to point out, however, that no judgment has been entered 

against the School District for unconstitutional employment prac- 

tices for over a decade. It is ludicrous to contend that a 

majority black faculty is not desegregated. 

IV. 

Conclusion 

Counsel opposite, who has been a party to and in agreement 

with every court order entered since 1971, wants this court to 

retain jurisdiction over the School District because it allegedly 

has not yet achieved unitary status. If counsel opposite's 

watchful eye and "input from plaintiffs in every critical 



decision" for the last ten years has not resulted in a unitary 

school system, then counsel opposite and plaintiff have no one to 

blame but themselves. However, the School District has achieved 

unitary status. Contrary to counsel opposite's contention, the 

sky will not fall and the schools will not resegregate when this 

court dismisses this action. The biracial staff and school board 

.0f the School District have made a commitment to the continuation 

of a quality desegregated education for its students. It does 

not need the supervision of counsel opposite to fulfill that 

commitment. 

Respectfully submitted, 

JACKSON ynearal SEPARATE 

(he; A. Speyer 
Its Attorney 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Christopher A. Shapley, attorney for Defendant, do 

hereby certify that I have this day mailed by United States mail, 

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above and fore- 

going Memorandum Brief in Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to 

Motion to Dismiss to the Hon. Fred L. Banks, Jr., Banks & Nichols, 

'318 East Pearl Street, Jackson, Mississippi 39205. 

This the i day of September, 1981. 

CHRISTOPHER A. SHEAPLERY [||e7535a76-ec19-4ab1-bba5-f1aa0100925a||] 

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