Lancaster v. Hammond Opinion

    C ircuit C ourt N o. 2 of Baltimore C ity

No. 30021-A  Docket 58A— 184, (1949)

Filed August 15, 1949

H . C A R R IN G T O N  L A N C A S T E R , E T  A L ., 

vs.

H A L L  H A M M O N D , A T T O R N E Y  G E N E R A L  

O F  M A R Y L A N D , E T  A L .

Subversive Activities Act of 1949— Constitutionality—  

Emergency Act— Constitutionality

Opinion by Sherbow, J.

Price 10 Cents



Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City
No. 30021-A Docket 58A—184, (1949)

Filed August 15, 1949.

H. CARRINGTON LANCASTER, ET AL„
VS.

HALL HAMMOND, ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF MARYLAND, ET AL.

I. Duke Avnet, Mitchell A. Dubow, Linwood G. Roger, Donald, G. Mur­
ray, Robert P. McG-uinn, and Bernard Rosen for the complainants.

Hall Hammond, Attorney-General; J. Edgar Harvey, Deputy Attorney- 
General ; Thomas N. Biddison, City Solicitor of Baltimore; Leroy W. 
Preston and Hugo A. Ricduti, Assistant City Solicitors, for the defen­
dants. __________________

A m ici Curiae
Harold Buchman for National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards.
Benjamin L. Wolfson and Kenneth R. Hammer, for American Legion, 

Department of Maryland.
Dallas F. Nicholas and David Rein, for National Lawyers Guild.
David Scribner for United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of 

America.
Subversive Activities Act Of 1919—Constitutionality—Emergency Act—Consti­

tutionality.
SHERBOW, J —
The complainants assert that the 

“ Subversives Act of 1949,” also known 
as the “Ober Bill,” Chapter 86 of the 
Acts of the General Assembly of 1949, 
is unconstitutional and void. They also 
seek to have Chapter 310 of the Acts 
of 1949, declaring the “ Subversives Act 
of 1949” an emergency measure, like­
wise declared unconstitutional and 
void.

Parties; History Of The Statutes.
The complainants are four professors 

of Johns Hopkins University, a pro­
fessor of Morgan State College, a doc­
tor of medicine specializing in psychia­
try, a professor of George Washington 
University, a salesman, a general med­
ical doctor, and a sculptor.

Other interested parties received per­
mission from the Court to file briefs 
as amici curiae. The Attorney-Gen­
eral of Maryland and the City Solicitor 
of Baltimore have filed demurrers, 
asserting both acts are valid and con­
stitutional.

As a great number of contentions 
have been made, they will be treated 
separately under appropriate headings.

By Chapter 721 of the Acts of 1947 
a constitutional amendment was pro­
posed, and this was approved by the 
voters in November, 1948. It is now 
Section 11 of Article 15 of the Con­
stitution, and is as follows:

“Sec. 11. No person who is a mem­
ber of an organization that advocates 
the overthrow of the Government of 
the United States or of the State of 
Maryland through force or violence 
shall be eligible to hold any office, 
be it elective or appointive, or any 
other position of profit or trust in 
the Government of or in the admin­
istration of the business of this 
State or of any county, municipality 
or other political subdivision of this 
State.”
At the Special Session of the Gen­

eral Assembly of 1948, a Resolution 
was passed by the Senate (Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2) creating a 
Committee on Subversive Activities. 
The Committee was directed to make 
a study of the laws of this country 
and formulate and prepare a legisla­
tive program to protect the democratic 
principles and ideas of this State from



those seeking to destroy our freedom 
and institutions, and to expose and 
expurgate subversive and other illegal 
activities.

On June 26, 1948, at the annual meet­
ing of the Maryland State Bar Asso­
ciation, Mr. Frank B. Ober delivered 
an address on the subject “ Sedition 
versus the Constitution.”  (53 Md. Bar 
Assn. Transactions, 255.) In the Aug­
ust 1948 issue of the American Bar 
Association Journal, Mr. Ober also 
wrote and published an article entitled 
“ Communism versus the Constitution: 
The Power to Protect our Free Institu­
tions.”

Pursuant to the Senate Joint Reso­
lution, the Governor appointed a Com­
mittee of eleven citizens, called the 
“Commission on Subversive Activities,” 
with Mr. Ober as Chairman. The re­
port of the Commission was submitted 
to the Governor on December 30, 1948, 
with an attached draft of a proposed 
bill to be entitled “Sedition and Sub­
versive Activities.”

The bill was passed, with few amend­
ments, on March 31, 1949, to become 
effective in the usual manner on June 
1, 1949, and became Chapter 86 of the 
Acts of 1949. Almost immediately 
thereafter it became publicly known 
that a group of citizens proposed to 
secure sufficient signatures to a peti­
tion for a referendum on this bill in 
accordance with the provisions of 
Article 16 of the Constitution of Mary­
land. If the requisite number of sig­
natures was obtained the Act would 
not go into effect on June 1, 1949, and 
could not become effective unless ap­
proved by the voters at the General 
Election to be held in November, 1950.

On April 1, 1949, Senate Bill No. 
528 was introduced to make the earlier 
bill an emergency measure, effective at 
once. The rules of the Senate were 
suspended, the bill placed on second 
reading and ordered printed for third 
reading. It was passed by the Gen­
eral Assembly, and on April 22, 1949, 
was signed by the Governor and became 
Chapter 310 of the Acts of 1949. The 
original bill will be generally referred 
to in this opinion as the “ Subversive 
Activities Act of 1949” or the “Ober 
Bill,”  and the second statute will be 
referred to as the “Emergency Act.”

The Subversive Activities Act con­
tains a number of recitals referring 
to the world communist movement, its 
objectives and methods, and to other 
subversive groups with similar objec­

tives, and recites that “the communist 
movement plainly presents a clear and 
present danger to the United States 
Government and to the State of Mary­
land.”

Section 1 defines subversive organ­
izations, foreign subversive organiza­
tions, subversive persons, and others. 
It makes a felony certain acts under 
the subsection entitled “ Sedition.” 
After June 1, 1949, any person who 
becomes or who after September 1, 
1949, remains a member of a subver­
sive organization or a foreign subver­
sive organization and is convicted by 
a court of competent jurisdiction may 
be imprisoned up to five years and 
fined not more than $5,000 or both in 
the discretion of the Court. Those 
convicted under the Act are barred 
from holding any office or employment 
of the State of Maryland or any poli­
tical subdivision, or standing for elec­
tion for any public office, or voting in 
any general election. The statute pro­
vides that such organizations may be 
declared subversive by a finding of a 
court of competent jurisdiction, the 
charter shall be forfeited and all funds 
and records and property shall be 
seized by the State of Maryland. The 
Attorney-General is authorized and 
directed to appoint an additional 
Assistant to perform the duties of Spe­
cial Assistant Attorney-General in 
charge of Subversive Activities.

Judges of the Criminal Courts of the 
State are directed under certain con­
ditions to instruct grand juries to in­
quire into violations of this law.

Then follows a group of sections 
under the sub-title “Loyalty.” Every 
employing group of the State of Mary­
land and its political subdivisions is 
required to ascertain that all such em­
ployees, including teachers, are not 
subversive persons, “and that there 
are no reasonable grounds to believe 
such persons are subversive persons. 
In the event such reasonable grounds 
exist, he or she as the case may be 
shall not be appointed or employed.” 
Laborers are excluded. All those em­
ployed by the State of Maryland or 
its political subdivisions from the first 
of June, 1949, shall make a written’ 
statement, subject to the penalties of 
perjury, that he or she is not a sub­
versive person as defined by this law. 
Reasonable grounds shall be cause for 
discharge subject to the right to a 
hearing under the provisions of the 
Act, with the right of appeal to the

2



courts, and a jury trial, if elected, with 
a further appeal to the Court of Ap­
peals of Maryland.

Section 15 provides that no person 
shall become a candidate for election 
for any public office in this state un­
less he files with his certificate of 
nomination an affidavit that he is not 
a subversive person. The certificate 
shall not be received for filing by any 
election officials, nor placed upon the 
ballot or voting machine, if the affi­
davit has not been made.

No appropriation of funds of any 
character shall be made by the State 
to any private institution of learning 
until there is filed with the Governor, 
the President of the Senate, and the 
Speaker of the House of Delegates, on 
behalf of the institution, a written 
report setting forth procedures it has 
adopted to determine whether it has 
reasonable grounds to believe that any 
subversive persons are in its employ 
and the steps taken to terminate em­
ployment of such persons. All written 
applications for employment shall be 
under the penalties of perjury.

The Emergency Act
The complainants maintain that the 

Emergency Act is invalid and there­
fore the Ober Bill is not now in effect 
as the requisite number of signatures 
have been filed with the Secretary of 
State for a referendum.

Article 16 of the Maryland Constitu­
tion provides for a referendum by the 
people, to reject or approve at the polls 
any act or part of any act of the 
General Assembly. It is not applicable 
to appropriations for maintaining the 
State Government, and applies to cer­
tain portions only of appropriations 
for public institutions.

All laws generally tak'e effect on the 
first day of June directly succeeding 
the date of passage. I f a petition for 
a referendum is filed by ten thousand 
qualified voters, not more than half 
of whom are from Baltimore City, the 
law does not take effect until thirty 
days after its approval by a majority 
of the voters at the next state-wide 
election.

Section 2 of Article 16 of the Con­
stitution provides that “no law enacted 
by the General Assembly shall take 
effect until the first day of June next 
after the session at which it may be 
passed, unless it contains a Section 
declaring such law an emergency law 
and necessary for the immediate pres­

ervation of the public health or safety, 
and passed upon a yea and nay vote 
supported by three-fifths of all mem­
bers elected to each of the two Houses 
of the General Assembly. * * *” An 
emergency lam remains in force not­
withstanding a referendum petition, 
but can be repealed by referendum of 
the voters in which case the repeal 
takes effect thirty days after rejection 
by a majority of the voters at the 
election. An emergency act shall not 
create or abolish any office, or change 
the salary, term or duty of any officer.

The Subversive Activities Act of 1949 
was approved by the Governor on 
March 31, 1949, and became Chapter 
86 of the Acts of 1949. Section 3 states 
“ that this Act shall take effect June 
1, 1949.”

The Emergency Act which became 
Chapter 310 of the Acts of 1949 was 
approved April 22, 1949, to take imme­
diate effect. It did not re-enact the 
entire Ober Law. The entire Emer­
gency Act is as follows:

“Chapter 310 
(Senate Bill 528)

“AN ACT to repeal and re-enact, 
with amendments, Section 3 of Chap­
ter 86 of the Acts of 1949, said Act 
adding Article 85A to the Annotated 
Code of Maryland, title “ Sedition and 
Subversive Activities,” providing 
that said Chapter 86 be declared an 
emergency measure.

“ Section 1. Be it enacted by the 
General Assembly of Maryland, That 
Section 3 of Chapter 86 of the Acts 
of 1949, said Act adding Article 85A 
to the Annotated Code of Maryland, 
title ‘Sedition and Subversive Activi­
ties,’ be and it is hereby repealed and 
re-enacted, with amendments, to read 
as follows:

“3. This Act is hereby declared to 
be an emergency measure and neces­
sary for the immediate preservation 
of the public health and safety, and 
having been passed by a yea and 
nay vote, supported by three-fifths 
of all the members elected to each 
of the two Houses of the General 
Assembly of Maryland, the same 
shall take effect from the date of its 
Ijassage.

“Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, 
That this Act is hereby declared to 
be an emergency measure and neces­
sary for the immediate preservation 
of the public health and safety, and 
having been passed by a yea and nay

3



vote, supported by three-fifths of all 
of the members elected to each of 
the two Houses of the General As­
sembly of Maryland, the same shall 
take effect from the date date of its 
passage.” Approved April 22, 1949.

The procedure followed by the Gen­
eral Assembly to declare the Ober Act 
an emergency law was novel. The 
usual method is to literally follow the 
language of the Constitution as was 
done in Chapter 85 of the Acts of 1949, 
“ Sabotage Prevention.” Every emer­
gency act which the Court has exam­
ined (and counsel have not found any 
others) contains within itself a provi­
sion declaring the act an emergency 
measure and necessary for the imme­
diate preservation of the public health 
and safety, and passed by the requi­
site three-fifths of the elected members 
of the General Assembly.

In this instance the Legislature 
sought to make a whole Act an emerg­
ency law, by amending only the sec­
tion of the Act setting the date it 
becomes effective. The amending sta­
tute, Chapter 310, concerns itself only 
with Section 3 of Chapter 86.

Section 3 of the original Ober law, 
as amended by the Emergency Act, 
undertakes to operate retroactively 
upon the whole of Chapter 86 and to 
declare the entire Ober Act an 
emergency measure, and to have been 
passed as an emergency measure. Ac­
tually the Ober Act was not passed 
as an emergency law originally. It 
was not repealed and re-enacted as 
an emergency act. The explicit provi­
sions of the Constitution spell out in 
unmistakable words that such an act 
becomes effective on June 1st “unless 
it contains a Section declaring such 
law an emergency law. * * *” “It” 
refers clearly and only to the law 
sought to be made an emergency act.

Manifestly, Chapter 86, the Ober 
Act, does not contain any such section. 
So far as the Ober Act itself shows, 
it may not have been deemed necessary 
for the immediate preservation of the 
public health or safety, and it may 
not have been passed by the requisite 
three-fifths of all the elected members. 
A recital in a later Act that the orig­
inal Act had been passed by a three- 
fifths vote, is, by no means, conclusive 
of that fact; nor does a later determi­
nation by the legislature that it was 
emergency legislation answer the clear 
requirement of the Constitution that

no act shall become an emergency act 
unless it contain a section so providing.

The 'Emergency Act becomes effective 
on April 22, 1949. It contains a provi­
sion that the Ober Act becomes effec­
tive on the date it (the Ober Act) was 
approved, namely, March 31, 1949. 
Putting it another way, we have here 
one law passed as an emergency law 
effective on one date making another 
law, not passed as an emergency act, 
effective retroactively to an earlier 
date.

Counsel for the complainants con­
tend this action was taken to delib­
erately thwart the will of the people 
to prevent a referendum on the Sub­
versives Act of 1949. Whatever may 
be the reasons, the Court cannot con­
sider them. The Court of Appeals has 
already spoken flatly on this subject.

In Culp vs. Chestertown, 154 Md. 
623, the Court said:

“We deem it advisable, however, to 
say in answer to that argument that,
* * * if the legislation does come 
within the provisions of Art. 16 of 
the Constitution, in that event the 
question of whether or not an 
emergency in fact exists is a ques­
tion for the Legislature, and its de­
termination is final and not subject 
to review by the courts.”
In Norris vs. Baltimore, 172 Md. at 

p. 686, the Court of Appeals again said 
that “the Legislature alone has the 
power to determine whether such an 
emergency as is contemplated by that 
section of the Constitution exists, and 
its determination of that question is 
not judicially reviewable.”
• The Court of Appeals has, however, 

held invalid an ordinance of the Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore author­
izing a debt as an emergency measure. 
Baltimore vs. Hofrichter, 178 Md. 91; 
see also Geisendaffer vs. Baltimore, 
176 Md. 150.

Complainants contend that the 
emergency statute is an ex post facto 
law and prohibited by Article 1, Sec­
tion 10, of the U. S. Constitution and 
Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Bights. An ex post facto law is one 
making punishable as a crime what 
was not criminal when done. Hoch- 
heimer, Criminal Law, fid Ed. p. 102. 
Mr. Justice Chase in Calder vs. Bull, 
3 Dallas, 386, 1 L. Ed. 648, defined ex 
post facto laws, among others, as 
“every law that makes an action done 
before the passing of the law, and

4



winch was innocent when done, crim­
inal ; and punishes such action.”

In this case if we are to follow the 
plain meaning of the statutes then 
the emergency law creates a crime on 
April 22, 1949, and makes it retro­
active to March 31, 1949. In Mary­
land a statute is not given retroactive 
effect unless no other meaning can 
be attached or the legislative intent 
is clear. (Kelch vs. Keehn, 183 Md. 
140; Commission vs. Power Co., 182 
Md. 111.)

However, in the second opinion in 
Robey vs. Broersma, 181 Md. 325, the
Court of Appeals held that a law
made effective by its terms on May 1st, 
but not signed by the Governor until 
May 26th, was effective from the latter 
date. It might therefore be argued 
that while the emergency act purports 
to act retroactively, actually it does 
not, because both laws are effective 
from the date the emergency act was 
signed, and no earlier. Such a con­
struction would be opposed to the plain 
language of the statutes. It is clear 
the Legislature meant (and it said) 
the Ober Act was to be effective from 
the date it was passed.

Anyone violating this law between 
March 31st and April 22nd was guilty 
of a crime, carrying heavy and severe 
penalties, although such a person could 
not know until April 22nd that his 
earlier act was in fact a violation of 
the law.

The general presumptions of validity 
of a statute are narrowed in their 
scope when we deal with laws limiting- 
rights protected by the Constitution. 
Statutes dealing with civil rights and 
personal liberty are not those referred 
to in the dissent of Mr. Justice Car- 
dozo in U. S. vs. Constantine, 296 U. S. 
287, 299, where he said: “There is 
another wise and ancient doctrine that 
a court will not adjudge the invalidity 
of a statute except for manifest neces­
sity. Every reasonable dou-bt must have 
been explored and extinguished before 
moving to that grave conclusion.”

Rather, they come within the deci­
sion of Schneider vs. State, 308 U. S. 
147, following the now famous foot­
note of Chief Justice Stone in U. S. 
vs. Carolena Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 152, where he said: “there may 
be narrower scope for the operation of 
the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face 
to be within a specific prohibition of 
the Constitution, such as those of the

first ten amendments, which are 
deemed equally specific when held to 
be embraced within the Fourteenth 
* * See also Duine vs. U. S., 138 
F. 2d, 137.

The complainants also maintain that 
the Ober Act as amended by the 
Emergency Act creates a. new office 
and changes the duties of an officer, 
which cannot be done by emergency 
legislation.

The Subversives Act of 1949 author­
izes the Attorney-General to appoint a 
Special Assistant Attorney-General in 
charge of subversive activities. While 
he is under the general supervision of 
the Attorney-General, his own special 
duties and responsibilities are set out 
in detail. He is in charge of subversive 
activities, and it is his responsibility, 
under the supervision of the Attorney- 
General, to work with the State’s At­
torneys in this State, submit informa­
tion to grand juries, collect evidence 
and information, call upon the Super­
intendent of State Police, the Police 
Commissioner of Baltimore City, and 
other police authorities. They in turn 
are directed to furnish such informa­
tion and assistance as he may request. 
The Special Assistant may testify be­
fore any grand jury, and he is required 
to keep complete information of all 
records and matters handled by him. 
Such records as may reflect on the 
loyalty of any resident may not be 
made public except with the permission 
of the Attorney-General. Every em­
ploying authority who discharges any­
one pursuant to the provisions of this 
article shall promptly report to the 
Special Assistant Attorney-General the 
fact of, and the circumstances sur­
rounding, the discharge.

In Maryland there is a wide dis­
tinction between “office” occupied by 
a “public officer” and a “position” oc­
cupied by an employee. In Buchholtz 
vs. Hill, 178 Md. 280, the Court said: 

“The most important characteris­
tic of a public office, as distinguished 
from any other employment, is the 
fact that the incumbent is entrusted 
with a part of the sovereign power 
to exercise some of the functions of 
government for the benefit of the 
people. But the necessity of taking 
an oath of office is also a very im­
portant test in determining whether 
a certain position is a public office.”

See also Worcester County vs. Golds- 
borough, 90 Md. 103, and State Tax 
Commission vs. Harrington, 126 Md.

5



157. In this latter case the Court of 
Appeals held that the General Counsel 
to the State Tax Commission was a 
mere employee and not a public officer. 
His salary and tenure of employment 
were not fixed by law, no oath was 
required, no official bond was given, 
no commission was issued, and the in­
cumbent did not exercise any sovereign 
power. Article 32A, Section 4 of the 
Code provides that the Assistants to 
the Attorney-General continue in their 
employment “during the pleasure of 
the Attorney-General.” In Norris vs. 
Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, an emergency 
law was involved providing for the 
use of voting machines and setting up 
a special board to carry out the act. 
The law was upheld as an emergency 
law.

The Court holds that the Special 
Assistant Attorney-General is not an 
officer holding an office in contraven­
tion of the Constitution preventing the 
creation o f an office by an emergency 
act, nor does the change in the duties 
of the Attorney-General violate the 
same section of the constitution. That 
it will change and alter the work of 
the office of Attorney-General is appar­
ent. This is inherent in the kind of 
activity the Special Assistant will en­
gage in. The Ober Commission was 
careful to point out that he should not 
become a Gestapo agent, and therefore 
placed him under the supervision of 
the Attorney-General. They were fear­
ful, and rightly so, of what could come 
out of the creation of such an office, 
with power placed in the hands of an 
incompetent, narrow, biased official for­
getful of the grand traditions of Mary­
land.

Conclusions; Emergency Act.
The Court finds that the Emergency 

Act, Chapter 310 of the Acts of 1949, 
is unconstitutional and invalid, be­
cause, it is an ex post facto law and 
does not comply with the special pro­
visions of the Constitution of Mary­
land relating to emergency statutes.

Oaths By Candidates For Office
Section 15 of the Subversive Activi­

ties Act provides that no person shall 
be a candidate for public office in this 
State unless he files an affidavit he 
is not a subversive person within the 
meaning of this law. The Supervisors 
of Elections and the Secretary of State 
shall not enter the name on the ballot 
or voting machine if the affidavit has 
not been filed.

The complainants contend this re­
quirement is in violation of Article 
37 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights; “ * * * nor shall the Legisla­
ture prescribe any other oath of office 
than the oath prescribed by this Con­
stitution.” The oath required is set 
out in Section 6 of Article 1 of the 
Constitution. It is simple; the affiant 
swears to support the Constitution of 
the United States, be faithful and bear 
true allegiance to the State of Mary­
land, support the Constitution and 
laws thereof, and execute faithfully, 
without partiality or prejudice, the 
office which he assumes.

The defendants say the Ober Act 
does not prescribe any additional oath 
of office ; it merely requires a candidate 
for office to take a special oath.

The history of these sections of the 
Declaration of Rights and of the Con­
stitution are interesting and will be 
found in “Perlman’s Debates of the 
Maryland Constitutional Convention of 
1867” and Chief Judge McSherry’s 
opinion in Davidson vs. Brice, 91 Md. 
6S1.

Beginning with the Declaration of 
Rights of the Constitution of 1776, on 
through the Constitutions of 1851 and 
1864, the Legislature was empowered 
to prescribe the oaths of office to be 
taken by different officers of govern­
ment. Prom 1864 to 1867 the citizens 
of this State knew what it meant to 
live under a Constitution they did not 
approve; one that had gone into effect 
by a scant majority of 375 votes, after 
“counting” the ballots of soldiers out 
In the field. Confederate sympathizers 
could not hold office unless restored to 
full rights of citizenship by special act 
of the General Assembly passed by a 
two-thirds vote. ( See Art. 1, Secs. 4, 7, 
and 8 of the Constitution of 1864, set 
out in full in Perlman’s Debates, etc., 
supra.)

The Constitutional Convention of 
1867 swept aside these repressive re­
strictions, and introduced a positive 
prohibition against any additional 
oath. This action was deliberate. As 
Chief Judge Me Sherry said: “Thus the 
old provision which gave to the Legis­
lature the power to exact official oaths 
not prescribed by the organic law was 
not only deleted, but a new clause 
was put in which denied to the Legis­
lature the authority it formerly pos­
sessed in this particular. Article 37 
of the Declaration of Rights is not 
confined to offices created by the Con­

6



stitution” and “it is wholly immaterial 
whether the office he of constitutional 
creation or of statutory origin.”

In this case the Court of Appeals 
had squarely before it the question 
as to whether or not the Legislature 
has the authority to prescribe as a 
qualification for the office of County 
Treasurer any other oath than the one 
which Section 6, Article 1, o f the Con­
stitution imposes. That Section of the 
Constitution was held to be a manda­
tory provision. The Court said: “Not 
content with prescribing the precise 
oath to be taken, the Declaration of 
Bights, in Article 37, prohibits any 
other oath from being exacted, for it 
declares: * * nor shall the Legisla­
ture prescribe any oath of office than 
the oath prescribed by this Constitu­
tion.’ ”

The Subversive Activities Act of 
1949 seeks to do by indirection that 
which cannot be done directly. It is 
obvious that of all the candidates who 
file for office, one will be successful. 
The law forbids an additional oath 
of the elected official. To allow the 
oath of all the candidates, knowing 
one will be the successfully elected offi­
cial, is to nullify the restriction of 
Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights. 
This is in the face of the plain and 
positive inhibition of the law. It 
means we no longer look to the sub­
stance but adopt the form which de­
stroys the substance.

This section of the Ober Act is there­
fore invalid.

Constitutionality Of Ober Act.
The question of the validity of the 

Subversives Activities Act of 1949 turns 
principally on whether it violates the 
first, fifth and fourteenth amendments 
to the Constitution of the United 
States, the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights, and our State Constitution.

The complainants say the law is an 
unlawful Bill of Attainder, finding 
guilt by legislative fiat; that it violates 
the freedoms of speech, of the press, 
and lawful assembly, creates guilt by 
association, and Is obnoxious to our 
■whole system of democratic govern­
ment. They argue that this act changes 
the basic philosophy of our government 
from one where the sovereign powrer 
lies in a free people, to one where it 
would be vested in the governing au­
thorities by the device of empowering 
them to forcibly control the ideas, ex­
pressions and independent political 
activities of the people of Maryland.

It is not for the Court to pass on 
the wisdom of this or any other legis­
lation, nor substitute its judgment or 
views for that of the law-making body. 
Certain legal principles have been set 
down by the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland; this 
Court is bound by those principles as 
applied to this statute.

Various anti-sedition laws have been 
passed from time to time. In this 
country they began with two laws in 
1798. The first, the Alien Act, gave 
the President power for two years to 
expel any alien whom he might deem 
“dangerous to the peace and safety of 
the United States.” The second, the 
Sedition Act, placed heavy penalties 
on every person trying to stir up “sedi­
tion” or who wrote or published any­
thing “false, scandalous or malicious” 
against the President, or other officers 
of government. The American people 
reacted violently against these attacks 
on their liberty, and the laws were 
never renewed.

Reconstruction days after the Civil 
War saw the passage of many laws 
depriving citizens of civil rights, and 
in Maryland the people hastened to 
nullify the Constitution of 1864 by the 
Constitution of 1867, now in effect. In 
other states laws which constituted 
unlawful Bills of Attainder were struck 
down by the Supreme Court.

It is usually after wars that such 
legislation is passed, engendered by 
flames of passion and strong feeling. 
In 1918, Congress amended the Es­
pionage Act (40 Stat. 553, 1918) by 
adding a paragraph by which many 
types of utterances could be inter­
preted as disloyal. Then followed the 
raids by Attorney-General Mitchell. 
Palmer and arrests of thousands of 
persons, with the subsequent failure 
of the prosecutions. (See Chafee, Free 
Speech in The United States.)

In 1920 the New York Assembly 
suspended without hearing and pend­
ing trial five members of the Socialist 
Party, alleging this organization was 
disloyal. This was followed by the 
Lusk Committee of the New York Leg­
islature which held many hearings on 
the subject of sedition. New York in 
1921 enacted the Lusk Anti-Sedition 
Bills, establishing standards of loyalty 
for teachers and providing for loyalty 
tests.

This high intensity of feeling after 
the First World War was then fol­
lowed by a period of calm, dispassion­

7



ate review, then the repeal by Congress 
of the amendment it had adopted in 
1918, and next in New York by the 
repeal of the Lusk Anti-Sedition Sta­
tutes. In signing these repealers Gov­
ernor Alfred E. Smith said:

“They are repugnant to the funda­
mentals of American democracy. 
Under the laws repealed, teachers, in 
order to exercise their honorable call­
ing, were in effect compelled to hold 
opinions as to governmental matters 
deemed by a State officer consistent 
with loyalty. * * * Freedom of opin­
ion and freedom of speech were by 
these laws unduly shackled. * * * 
In signing these bills, I firmly be­
lieve that I am vindicating the prin­
ciple that, within the limits of the 
penal law, every citizen may speak 
and teach what he believes.’’
In denouncing the expulsion action 

of the New York Assembly, Charles 
Evans Hughes, later Chief Justice of 
the United States, said: “ it is of the 
essence of the institutions of liberty 
that it be recognized that guilt is 
personal and cannot be attributed to 
the holding of opinion or to mere in­
tent in the absence of overt actions. 
* * *”  (5 N. Y. Legis. Doc. No. 30.)

Today we face serious problems to 
a degree undreamed of and unknown 
before. The situation in Europe and 
Asia has brought us face to face with 
the realization that the world may be 
plunged again into war, of a character 
that might destroy civilization as we 
know it. Techniques of sedition are 
different; unfortunately they have been 
successful in too many places for us 
to remain complacent. It is clear this 
country has powerful enemies outside 
its borders. To what extent are they 
within our country? How shall they 
be ferretted out? What powers have 
our legislative bodies to pass laws 
aimed at those who threaten us from 
within ?

Many penal statutes are now on the 
law books dealing with such activities, 
as for example, acting as agent of a 
foreign government without notifica­
tion to the Secretary of State, 18 U. 
S. C., section 951; possession of prop­
erty in aid of foreign government for 
use in violating any penal statute or 
treaty rights of the U. S., 18 U. S. C., 
section 957; espionage activities, 18 
U. S. 0., sections 793-797; inciting or 
aiding rebellion or insurrection, 18 U. 
S. C., section 2383; seditious conspir­

acy, 18 U. S. C., section 2384; advocat­
ing overthrow of the government by 
force, 18 U. S. C., section 2385; treason, 
18 U. S. 0., section 2381; misprision 
of treason, 18 U. S. C., section 2382; 
undermining loyalty, discipline or 
morale of armed forces, 18 U. S. C., 
section 2387; sabotage, 18 U. S. C., 
section 2156; importing literature ad­
vocating treason, insurrection or forci­
ble resistance to any federal law, 18 
U. S. 0., section 552; injuring federal 
property or communications, 18 U. S. 
0., section 1361. Organizations en­
gaged in civilian military activity, sub­
ject to foreign control, affiliated with 
a foreign government, or seeking to 
overthrow the Government by force, 
are subject to registration requirements 
under the Voorhis Act, 18 U. S. C., 
2386. And we have the general law of 
conspiracy, a, powerful weapon in the 
hands of a skilful prosecutor.

With this brief historical discussion, 
and some knowledge of present laws, 
we now consider the constitutionality 
of the Subversive Activities Act of 
1949.

Laws abridging freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, are 
forbidden by the first amendment and 
to the States by the fourteenth amend­
ment. Such laws can be constitution­
ally justified only if the utterance, pub­
lication or assembly sought to be sup­
pressed threatens “clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent.” This statement by 
Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck vs. U. 
S., 249 U. S. 47, 52, has been repeated 
in a series of cases in the Supreme 
Court and in Maryland in the recent 
case of WFBR. et al. vs. Maryland, 
T h e  D a ily  R ecoed, June 27, 1949. In 
that case, Judge Henderson, speaking 
for the Court of Appeals, said :

“It is now perfectly clear that 
whatever the law of the state, em­
bodied in its constitution, statutes 
or judicial decisions, the provisions 
of the Federal Constitution are su­
preme. Bridges vs. California, 314 
U. S. 252. It is also clear that the 
guarantees contained in the first 
amendment, safeguarding free speech 
and a free press, are implicit in the 
concept of due process contained in 
and made applicable to the States 
in the fourteenth amendment.”
The Supreme Court has made it clear 

that laws may punish acts and conduct
8



which clearly, seriously and imminent­
ly threaten substantive evils. They 
may not intrude into the realm of 
ideas, religious and political beliefs 
and opinions. Clear and present danger 
refers to proximity and degree. The 
law deals with overt acts, not thoughts. 
It: may punish for acting, but not for 
thinking.

In the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes 
in Abrams vs. U. S., 250 U. S. 616, 
630-631 (1919), he said:

“* * * we should be eternally vigi­
lant against attempts to check the 
expression of opinions that we loathe 
and believe to be frought with death, 
unless they so imminently threaten 
immediate interference with the law­
ful and pressing purposes of the law 
that an immediate check is required 
to save the country. * * * Only the 
emergency that makes it immediately 
dangerous to leave the correction of 
evil counsels to time warrants mak­
ing any exception to the sweeping 
command ‘Congress shall make no 
law abridging the freedom of 
speech.’ ”
This is now the law as stated by 

the Supreme Court in Schneiderman 
vs. U. S., 320 U. S. 118, 138; “ * * * if 
there is any principle of the Consti­
tution that more imperatively calls for 
attachment than any other it is the 
principle of free thought—not free 
thought for those who agree with us 
but freedom for the thought that we 
hate.” In this case the Court rejected"; 
the Government’s contention that a 
naturalized citizen who advocated the 
principles of the Communist Party was / 
not entitled to retain citizenship.

In Bridges vs. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 
165, Mr. Justice Murphy said;

“Proof that the Communist Party 
advocates the theoretical or ultimate - 
overthrow of the Government by 
force was demonstrated by resort 
to some rather ancient party docu­
ments, certain other general Com­
munist literature and oral corrobo­
rating testimony of Government wit­
nesses. Not the slightest evidence 
was introduced to show that either 
Bridges or the Communist Party 
seriously and imminently threatens 
to uproot the Government by force 
or violence.”

Chief Justice Hughes held that the 
display of a red flag as a symbol of 
opposition by peaceful and legal means

to organized government was protected 
by the free speech guaranties of the 
Constitution. (Stromberg vs. Califor­
nia, 283 U. S. 359.) The Supreme Court 
has upheld the right of persons to as­
semble at a public meeting under the 
auspices of the Communist Party. (He 
Jonge vs. Oregon, 299 TJ. S. 353.) In 
Harndon vs. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, a 
statute restricting (as construed) the 
right to a Communist to solicit mem­
bership in the Communist Party was 
held invalid. In Thornhill vs. Ala­
bama, 310 U. S. 97, the Court said: 
“The existence of such a statute, which 
readily lends itself to harsh and dis­
criminatory enforcement by local prose­
cuting officials, against particular 
groups deemed to merit their dis­
pleasure, results in a continuous and 
pervasive restraint on all freedom of 
discussion that might reasonably be 
regarded as within its purview.” 

Recently, in Terminiello vs. Chicago, 
337 U. S. 1, 4, Mr. Justice Douglas 
said:

“ » * * right to speak freely 
and to promote diversity of ideas 
and programs is therefore one of the 
chief distinctions that sets us apart; 
from totalitarian regimes. Accord­
ingly a function of free speech under 
our system of government is to in­
vite dispute. It may indeed best: 
serve its high purpose when it in­
duces a condition of unrest, creates ; 
dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to 
anger. Speech is often provocative; 
and challenging. It may strike at - 
prejudices and preconceptions and 
have profound unsettling effects as it 
presses for acceptance of an idea. : 
* * * There is no room under our Con­
stitution for a more restrictive view. 5 
Por the alternative would lead to 
standardization of ideas either by 
legislatures, courts, or dominant poli­
tical or community groups.”
The Ober Act is a penal statute car­

rying severe and drastic penalties. 
Statutes creating crimes are invalid 
if they define the crime in vague and 
ambiguous terms. If a law is indefinite 
and uncertain it fails to meet the con­
stitutional requirement of due process 
as in Winters vs. New York, 333 D. S. 
507, 515, where the Court said: “The 
standards of certainty in statutes pun­
ishing for offenses is higher than in 
those depending primarily upon civil 
sanction for enforcement. The crime 
must be defined with appropriate defi­

9



niteness * * * there must be ascertain­
able standards of guilt. Men of com­
mon intelligence cannot be required to 
guess at the meaning of the enactment. 
The vagueness may be from uncertain­
ty in regard to persons within the scope 
of the act, * * * or in regard to the 
applicable tests to ascertain guilt.” 
And at page 518 the Court said: 
“ * * * Tjie present case as to a vague 
statute abridging free speech involves 
the circulation of only vulgar maga­
zines. The next may call for decision 
as to free expression of political views 
in the light of a statute intended to 
punish subversive activities.”

The Ober Act makes it a felony by 
the use of general language for any 
person knowingly and wilfully to act, 
advocate or teach “by any means’’ the 
commission of any act as to constitute 
a clear and present danger to the 
security of the United States, Mary­
land, or any political subdivision, or 
participate in the management or con­
tribute to support of any subversive 
organization. This would Include any 
attempt to bring about such a result 
by speech, pamphlet, publication, radio 
discussion, or participating in a meet­
ing designed to bring about changes in 
our government.

Crimes must be definitely defined. 
What is meant by “alteration” of the 
constitutional form of the Government 
of the United States? There are some 
who believe in the Socialist form of 
government and advocate that this 
country adopt the system of govern­
ment in force in England today. To 
them revolution means the consumma­
tion of the change; it does not include 
force or violence. This may seem far­
fetched, but the test of the constitu­
tionality of a statute ordinarily is 
not what has happened, but what may 
happen under it. (Raney vs. Montgom­
ery County, 170 Md. 196.)

This statute makes it a felony to 
remain a member of a subversive or­
ganization after September 1, 1949, 
knowing the organization to be sub­
versive. Does “knowing” mean actual 
knowledge, or constructive knowledge? 
Does it mean having the information 
in one’s possession to lead a reasonable 
person to believe the organization is 
subversive? May reasonable persons 
differ on the meaning or interpretation 
of such information?

If a member honestly believes he 
belongs to an organization that is not 
subversive, he may find himself facing

severe, even harsh penalties, if that 
organization has been found to be sub­
versive under Section 5 of the Act by 
a court of competent jurisdiction. It 
is then too late to withdraw from mem­
bership.

Some labor organizations have been 
characterized as subversive. A worker 
may believe his union is in the con­
trol of officers who would direct its 
activities into seditious channels. If 
that union has a closed-shop agreement 
with management he cannot withdraw 
from the organization without losing 
his job. If he remains in the union, he 
is guilty of a felony, not because of 
any act of commission on his part, but 
because of his association with others. 
Valuable property rights within the or­
ganization may be lost; the alternative 
is no job, or conviction of a serious 
crime, all without his day in court, and 
without due process.

An organization, legal when founded, 
may become subversive within the 
meaning of this law, as a result of 
acts by a small group of officers in 
control for a short time, and in spite 
of the violent opposition of the general 
membership.

If it be a political party that is de­
clared subversive, what tests shall be 
applied to determine whether one is 
a “member” of the party? How does 
one determine who is a member of the 
Democratic or Republican party? Po­
litical parties do not take applications 
for membership; individuals do not 
swear their adherence to the party’s 
platform. Suppose such an organiza­
tion does have characteristics of mem­
bership which require a card or other 
symbol of membership and immediately 
upon passage of this bill abolishes such 
indicia of membership, how then would 
one determine what constitutes mem­
bership?

In the case of Bridges vs. Wixom, 
326 U. S. 135, 143, supra, the Supreme 
Court distinguished between “member­
ship” and “affiliation.” Does member­
ship mean making speeches on behalf 
of candidates of a party? attendance 
at meetings? If this act means the 
Communist Party, the Supreme Court 
has said that such participation in the 
affairs of the Communist Party does 
not necessarily indicate adherence to 
any purpose to overthrow the Govern­
ment of the United States hy force and 
violence or subserviance to the policies 
of a foreign government—Schneider- 
man vs. U. S., 320 U. S. 118, supra.



There the Court said, at p. 136: “Un­
der our traditions beliefs are personal 
and not a matter of mere association, 
and men in adhering to a political 
party or other organization notoriously 
do not subscribe unqualifiedly to all 
of its platforms or asserted principles.”

In the loyalty section of the statute 
no subversive person is eligible to hold 
any kind of office or position in the 
State Government or any political sub­
division. All employers must establish 
rules and regulations and procedures 
to ascertain if any person, including 
teachers, is a subversive person “and 
that there are no reasonable grounds 
to believe such persons are subversive 
persons. In the event such reasonable 
grounds exist, he or she, as the case 
may be, shall not be appointed or em­
ployed.”

What kind of standard is set up by 
“ reasonable grounds?” What may seem 
reasonable to one may seem extremely 
arbitrary and unreasonable to another. 
Here the employer need not have evi­
dence that the prospective employee is 
subversive. All he needs is reasonable 
grounds. No man may be convicted of 
a crime in Maryland except upon evi­
dence; the court and jury must be con­
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt, 
based upon the evidence. In civil cases 
it is the preponderance of the evidence. 
Under this statute one may be deprived 
of an opportunity to work for the state, 
county or city upon no evidence at all, 
but merely upon “reasonable grounds.”

In the Schneiderman case, supra, the 
Supreme Court held that cancellation 
of the naturalization of a member of 
the Communist Party was illegal be­
cause the law required “clear, un­
equivocal and convincing evidence.” 
The Court said, p. 153: “We are not 
concerned with the question -whether 
a reasonable man might so conclude, 
nor with the narrow issue whether 
administrative findings to that effect 
are so lacking in evidentiary support 
as to amount to a denial of due pro­
cess.”

Every person who is employed by 
the State of Maryland is required to 
sign a written notice, subject to the 
penalties of perjury, that he is not a 
subversive person or a member of any 
subversive organization. All who re­
fuse to execute such a statement shall 
immediately be discharged, even 
though the refusal is based on con­
scientious scruples against taking such 
an oath.

“Reasonable grounds on all the evi­
dence to believe that any person is a 
subversive person” is cause for dis­
charge. While the loss of a position 
is purely civil, the discharge must be 
reported to the Special Assistant At­
torney-General in charge of subversive 
activities. So one may lose his job 
after many years of honorable service 
in the State’s employ, if he is a mem­
ber of an organization that started out 
innocently enough, but found its aims 
prostituted by its officers. The fact 
that he attended no meetings, showed 
no interest in its affairs, perhaps did 
not even pay dues, may not save him 
from the loss of his job if he was 
carried on the roster of membership. 
Such a fact may be “reasonable grounds 
on all the evidence.”

The definition of foreign subversive 
organizations brings in another vague 
term. It “means any organization 
directed, dominated or controlled 
directly or indirectly by a foreign gov­
ernment * * *” What does “indirectly” 
mean ? To ask the question is to answer 
it. This is so vague and indefinite as 
not to meet the requirements of a 
penal statute. Does “indirect” mean 
that the organization is a foreign sub­
versive organization when it changes 
with the party line as given out at 
Moscow? or if it opposes the Atlantic 
Pact? or the Marshall Plan? or the 
foreign policy of this country? or has 
connections with, or is affiliated with, 
international labor organizations whose 
policies may be “indirectly” controlled 
from England or Canada? What be­
comes of the status of a dissenting 
member? a minority of members? or 
even a majority who differ with the 
officers?

It may well be that what this statute 
seeks to accomplish is difficult under 
our law. In Musser vs. Utah, 333 U. S. 
95, 97, the Supreme Court said: “This 
led to the inquiry as to whether the 
statute attempts to cover so much that 
it effectively covers nothing. Statutes 
defining crimes may fail of their pur­
pose if they do not provide some 
reasonable standards of guilt. * * * 
Legislation may run afoul of the Due 
Process Clause because it fails to give 
adequate guidance to those who would 
be law-abiding, to advise defendants 
of the nature of the offense with which 
they are charged, or to guide courts 
in trying those who are accused.”

Every public school teacher must 
take a loyalty oath. State aided insti­

l l



tutions of learning must purge their 
institutions of subversive persons 
within the meaning of the Act. To de­
termine if such statutes are clear and 
precise in their terms or vague and 
indefinite, one need only turn to the 
debates now being waged in academic 
circles on this very issue.

There are some who, although im­
placable foes of Communism, feel that 
so long as membership in the Com­
munist Party is legal, that faculty 
members should not be deprived of 
their positions. Others hold that mem­
bership in the Communist Party is in­
compatible with academic competence 
and integrity. There are some who 
even believe professors should be dis­
ciplined if they lend their presence 
and give encouragement to extra-cur­
ricular activities regarded as com­
munistic in leaning, if not in fact.

The Ober Act refers to the “World 
Communist Movement” and inferential- 
ly to the Communist Party. It is 
charged by the complainants in this 
case that the act means members of 
the Communist Party as well as lib­
erals, labor organizations, political 
parties other than the Democratic and 
Republican Parties; any and all who 
differ from the generally accepted be­
liefs of those who happen to be in the 
majority at the moment. They charge 
that this is a Bill of Attainder and 
unconstitutional.

In Anderson vs. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 
604, the Court of Appeals defined Bills 
of Attainder. It said:

“Bills of attainder, which include 
bills of pains and penalties, are pro­
hibited as well by the Constitution 
of Maryland, (Art. 18, Declaration 
of Rights,) as by the Constitution of 
the United States. They are special 
Acts of the Legislature, inflicting 
capital or other punishments upon 
persons supposed to be guilty of an 
offense, without any conviction in 
the ordinary course of judicial pro­
ceedings. In such cases, the Legisla­
ture assumes judicial magistracy, 
pronouncing upon the guilt of the 
party without any of the common 
forms and guards of trial, and satis­
fying itself with proofs, when within 
its reach, whether conformable to the 
rules of evidence or not.”
In U. S. vs. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 

the Supreme Court, after reviewing its 
prior decisions on Bills of Attainder, 
said, at p. 315 :

“ * * * They stand for the proposi­
tion that legislative acts, no matter 
what their form, that apply either 
to named individuals or to easily as­
certainable members of a group in 
such a way as to inflict punishment 
on them without a judicial trial are 
bills of attainder prohibited by the 
Constitution.”
In that case certain government em­

ployees were charged by a Congres­
sional Committee with subversive be­
liefs and subversive associations. A 
rider was attached to the Appropria­
tions Bill depriving them of further 
pay. The Court said, p. 316:

“ * * * The fact that the punish­
ment is inflicted through the instru­
mentality of an Act specifically cut­
ting off the pay of certain named in­
dividuals found guilty of disloyalty, 
makes it no less galling or effective 
than if it had been done by an Act 
which designated the conduct as 
criminal. No one would think that 
Congress could have passed a valid 
law, stating that after investigation 
it had found Lovett, Dodd, and Wat­
son ‘guilty’ of the crime of engaging 
in ‘subversive activities’, defined that 
term for the first time, and sentenced 
them to perpetual exclusion from any 
government employment. Section 
304, while it does not use that lan­
guage, accomplishes that result. The 
effect was to inflict punishment with­
out the safeguards of a judicial trial 
and ‘determined by no previous law 
or fixed rule’. The Constitution de­
clares that that cannot be done either 
by a State or by the United States.”
The Supreme Court cited Cummings 

vs. Missouri, 4 Wall (U. S.) 217, where 
a Catholic priest was convicted for 
teaching and preaching without taking 
the oath of loyalty as provided by the 
Missouri (Reconstruction) Constitu­
tion. The conviction was set aside, the 
constitutional provision struck down 
as an unlawful Bill of Attainder. The 
Court said that case has never been 
overruled—it is still the law.

Conclusion.
The Subversive Activities Act of 

1949 for the reasons stated is uncon­
stitutional and invalid. It violates 
the basic freedoms guaranteed by the 
first and fourteenth amendments, and 
due process under the fifth amendment. 
It violates the Maryland Constitution 
and Declaration of Rights, is an un­
lawful Bill of Attainder, and is too

12



general for a penal statute. As stated 
by Mr. Justice Jackson in West Vir­
ginia Board vs. Barnette, 319 U. S. 
624, 642: “If there is any fixed star 
in our constitutional constellation, it 
is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”

The demurrers will be overruled.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 2 
OF BALTIMORE CITY

No. 30056-A Docket 58A, 224 (1949)

PHILIP FRANKFELD AND GEORGE 
A. MEYERS, 

vs.
HALL HAMMOND, ATTORNEY- 

GENERAL, ET AL.

Maurice Braverman for complain­
ants.

Hall Hammond, Attorney-General; 
J. Edgar Harvey, Deputy Attorney- 
General; Thomas N. Biddison, City 
Solicitor of Baltimore; Leroy W. Pres- 
ton and Hugo A. Riccuiti, Assistant 
City Solicitors, for the defendants.

Philip Frankfeld, Chairman of the 
Communist Party of Maryland, and 
George A. Meyers, labor secretary of 
the Communist Party, filed this Bill of 
Complaint following in the main the 
allegations in the case of Lancaster, 
et al., just decided. In addition, they 
filed as an exhibit a copy of the Con­
stitution of the Communist Party of 
the United States, and set out the 
various aims of this organization.

For the reasons given in the Lan­
caster case, the demurrers will be 
overruled.

(Reprinted from T h e  D a ily  R ecord, August 16, 191/9)

13