Jackson v. Marvell School District No. 22 Motion for Permission to Appeal Upon the Original Papers, to Consolidate Appeals, and for Summary Reversal

    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS 

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

NOS. 19,746 and 19,797

CEINERS JACKSON, et al..
Appellants,

v.

MARVELL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22, et al.
Appellees.

EARLIS JACKSON, et al.
Appellants,

v.

MARVELL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22, et al.
Appellees.

Appeals From The United States District Court For 
The Eastern District of Arkansas, Eastern Division

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL UPON 
THE ORIGINAL PAPERS, TO CONSOLIDATE 
APPEALS, AND FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL

JACK GREENBERG 
MICHAEL MELTSNER 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019 

JOHN W. WALKER 
BURL C. ROTENBERRY

1820 West 13th Street 
Little Rock, Arkansas 72202 

GEORGE HOWARD, JR.
329| Main Street
Pine Bluff, Arkansas 71601

Attorneys for Appellants



IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

NOS. 19,746 and 19,797

CEINERS JACKSON, et al.,
Appellants,

v.

MARVELL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22, at al.
Appellees.

EARLIS JACKSON, et al.
Appellants,

v.

MARVELL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22, et al.
Appellees.

Appeals From The United States District Court For 
The Eastern District of Arkansas, Eastern Division

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL UPON 
THE ORIGINAL PAPERS, TO CONSOLIDATE 
APPEALS, AND FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL

Appellants, by their undersigned counsel, respectfully pray pur­

suant to Rule 30(f) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that 

they be permitted to prosecute these appeals upon the original papers 

filed in this cause in lieu of a printed appendix? that these separ­

ate appeals from orders of the district court entered April 15, 1969 

and June 13, 1969, respectively, be consolidated and considered to­

gether? and further, that after consideration of the matters presente 

herein and the original papers, this Court summarily reverse the



judgments below and remand with instructions. In support of their 

motions, appellants respectfully show this Court:

History of Case

1. The orders appealed from were entered following this Court's 

remand in 1968. Jackson v. Marvell School District No. 22, 389 F.2d 

740 (8th Cir. 1968).
2. Prior to September 1, 1965, appellees operated a dual schoo 

system with separate school facilities and faculties for white and 

Negro pupils (Id,, at 742).

3. During the 1965-66, 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69 school 

years, appellees operated the Marvell public schools pursuant to 

freedom-of-choice plans (Ibid.; Report of appellee school district 

in No. H-66-C-35, dated June 13, 1968).

4. During the four years when appellee school-district operated 

freedom-of-choice plans, no white student ever exercised a choice

to attend any all-Negro school; the following table shows the results 

of the choice periods in each of the four years:
No. of % >o£ White 

No. of % of Negro white Students
Total Negro Negro Students Students Students In All- 
Students In In "white" In "white" In All- Negro

Year District Schools_____  Schools Negro Schs. Schools
1965-66 1,700 17 1.056 0 0%

1966-67 1,700 116 6.8% 0 0%

1967-68 1,566 207 13.2% 0 0%

1968-69 1,616 205 12.7% 0 0%

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(Jackson v . Marvell School District No. 22. supra at 742;

Answers to Interrogatories in No. H-67-C-20, No. 25; Report of ap- 

ellee school district in No. H-66-C-35, dated June 13, 1968).

5. During the school year 1965-66, appellees operated on one 

site the predominantly white Marvell High School and Marvell Elemen­

tary School; on another site, the all-Negro Tate High School and Tate 

Elementary School; and three other small, all-Negro elementary school" 

(Jackson v. Marvell School District No. 22, supra at 742-43). One 

small all-Negro elementary school was closed prior to the 1966-67 

school year (Answers to Interrogatories in No. H-67-C-20, No. 1); 

another such school was closed prior to the 1967-68 school year (Id.. 

No. 3). Appellees opened a new, predominantly white high school 

facility in 1967-68, which is called the Marvell High School (Id..

No. 4) and which is located two blocks from the former Marvell High-
1/Marvell Elementary complex (Tr. Ill 40). The predominantly white 

high school grades were transferred from the old site to the new 

building commencing with the 1967-68 school year.

1/ Appellants have previously furnished the Court, at the time
of filing their earlier Motion for Summary Reversal in No. 19,746 
certified copies of the transcripts of the hearings below. The 
transcript of the August 6, 1968 hearing is in two volumes and 
will be referred to herein as Tr. I and II respectively; the 
one-volume transcript of the March 31, 1969 hearing will be 
referred to herein as Tr. III.

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Proceedings Below

6. These appeals are taken from judgments issued in two cases 

consolidated at the time of trial:
A. Ceiners Jackson v. Marvell School District No. 22, No.

. ; H-66rO-35, was originally commenced on August 17, 1966, and

was the subject of the prior appeal herein, 8th Cir. No. 18,762, 

opinion reported at 389 F.2d 740.

B. Earlis Jackson v. Marvell School District No. 22, No. 

H-67-C-20, was commenced in July, 1967, seeking to enjoin ad­

ditional construction by the school district on the site of 

the (all-Negro) Tate High School on the grounds that such con­

struction would perpetuate the dual school system operated by 

appellees (Complaint in No. H-67-C-20, 2SI II/ XI). The Com­

plaint also soiig.it relief consistent with this Court's ruling 

in Kelley v. A l ^ -lmer. Arkansas School District No. 22, 378

F .2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967).
C. Plaintiffs in the second case subsequently withdrew 

their request for an injunction against construction, which 

had been completed, and stated that they would rely upon the 

prayer for alternative relief consistent with Kelly (Letter 

from undersigned counsel for appellants to Hon. Oren Harris,

U.S. District Judge, dated September 14, 1967, in No. H-67-C-20).

D. Subsequent to the May 27, 1968 decisions of the United

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States Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board of New

Kent County, Virginia, 391 U.S. 430; Monroe v. Board of Com­

missioners of Jackson, Tennessee, 391 U.S. 450; and Raney v.

Board of Education of the Gould, Arkansas School District, 391 

U.S. 443, plaintiffs in the original action filed a Motion for 

Further Relief seeking to require appellee school district to 

adopt and implement a plan of desegregation other than a 

freedom-of-choice plan (Motion for Further Relief, No. H-66-C-35)

E. Because the issue in both cases was thus very similar, 

they were consolidated at the August 6, 1968 hearing (Tr. I 4; 

Order entered August 29, 1968, p. 2).

7. At the Augu-t 6, 1968 hearing, appellee Charles Cowsert, 

Superintendent of the appellee school district (Tr. I 6-107; Tr. II 

3-24) and Dr. Myron Lieberman, an expert witness called by appellants 

(Tr. II 24-99), testified.

8. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court ruled 

from the bench (Tr. II 105-19) that appellees could not constitu­

tionally continue to operate the Marvell, Arkansas public schools 

pursuant to a freedom-of-choice plan:

Here we have an important school program 
in a transitional state at a time when 
our circuit has suggested this Court 
recognize that there should be some time 
and opportunity in this transitional 
period for the development of a consti­
tutional desegregation program. The

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thing that bothers me is just what the 
court itself recognized, that there are 
school boards and districts which simply 
do not come to the reality of developing 
the kind of a program that would be ac­
cepted and approved and would provide the 
objective which the Court said fourteen 
years ago that we must come to ultimately 
to do justice to all of those who are en­
titled to an equal opportunity for public 
education. So consequently the Circuit 
Court of Appeals and this Court has given 
an opportunity to this school district 
for compliance, and I for one was hopeful 
that the proposed plan for freedom-of- 
choice would prove to be effective. . . .

. . .  If you've got something that doesn't 
work then we better look for something 
else, and that is precisely what this Court 
is going to do.
It is quite obvious to me that the freedom- 
of-choice system is not working for this 
district. It is clear from the testimony 
and the record presented here that it will 
not work, that you are not going to resolve 
this problem with this kind of program. . .

. . .  I am therefore going to cancel and 
disapprove your proposed desegregation 
plan of freedom-of-choice. . . .

. . . This is the 6th of August. To leave 
the school district in that kind of a sus­
pended situation at this time would, in my 
judgment, be cruel and certainly unjustified.
So the Court is going to permit the school 
district to proceed with the school program 
under the present arrangement beginning with 
the school system.
Then I am going to ask that by February the 
1st that you submit another type of plan be­
cause I. am saying that for this school district

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under the circumstances freedom-of-choice 
is out the window. There is no need to 
pursue a_ course that has already run out 
and is no good.

(Tr. II 110-11, 113, 114, 116 [emphasis supplied]).

9. The district court thereafter entered a written order 

August 29, 1968, which provided, inter alia:

2. The Plan of Desegregation of Marvell 
School District No. 22 proposed on Nov­
ember 25, 1966, and amended April 9, 1968, 
is hereby disapproved as an unacceptable 
method for the operation of this school 
on a constitutional basis as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court in Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County (No. 695 
decided May 27, 1968).
3. The defendants are hereby ordered to 
propose an alternate plan for the conver­
sion of the school system to a unitary sy­
stem in accordance with the decisions of 
the Supreme Court made May 27, 1968, for 
all students in attendance, and such plan 
shall be presented to the Court on or be­
fore February 1, 1969. Upon the filing 
of said plan with the Court and after due 
notice, a hearing will be held at a day 
certain to be determined by the Court.

TOrder entered August 29, 1968, p. 2)
10. On February 1, 1969, appellees filed a "Report" purportedly 

in compliance with the district court's August 29th order. However, 

rather than proposing an alternative plan to convert the Marvell 

School District to a unitary school system, the Report stated that 

"freedom of choice is the only feasible procedure in the assignment

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of students in this system; there is no feasible alternative" (Re­

port of Defendants dated January 31, 1969, p. 1).

11. February 21, 1969, plaintiffs filed a Motion requesting 

that continuation of freedom of choice not be permitted, that the 

district be given five days in which to submit a plan in compliance 

with the court's August 29, 1968, order, and that if the district 

thereupon failed to present an acceptable plan, a receiver be ap­

pointed by the court to operate the schools in conformity to the 
2/

law.

12. The district court set March 31, 1969 for a hearing on 

the matter. At that hearing appellees presented testimony by the 

Superintendent (Tr. Ill 6-48), the Mayor of Marvell (Tr. Ill 48-66), 

and two Negro school teachers employed by the district (Tr. Ill 66- 

87). Appellants presented no evidence.

13. At the conclusion of the March 31, 1969 the district court

reversed its August 29th ruling:

There were many of us in the Congress 
at the time [May 17, 1954] who felt 
that the [Supreme] court arbitrarily 
went way out in left field to change 
the basic law which the Supreme Court 
had ennunciated in 1896. . . .

. . .  I have made it very clear that 
as long as those who have the respon­
sibility will undertake to bring about 
compliance, it may be the impact is

2/ Cf. Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724 (S. D. Ga. 1965).
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greater on some than on others, but as 
long as there can be shown an effort 
towards bringing about compliance with 
the basic constitutional requirements.
I have great compassion and sympathy 
and I am going to do what I can as the 
court to assist the leadership and en­
couragement towards a constitutionally 
operated system. . . when it is apparent 
that there is no real effort being made 
to bring about better methods and means 
of compliance, this court is directed to 
act with this kind of situation. . . .

. . .  I want to compliment those who 
have the responsibility in this diffi­
cult problem. I can see a decidedly 
changed attitude of the people through­
out the school district who have children 
and interested in their education . . . .  
of course, the best solution, if it could 
be done, would be to have an all high 
school where everyone would be assigned 
and an all elementary school. . .

. . . However, the school district is 
still operating at this time a state- 
imposed dual school system. No progress 
has been noted iii the disestablishing 
of the Negro School as such. . . .

From the testimony, it is apparent that 
through efforts of the mayor, members of 
the city council and other leaders in 
the school district, the novel approach 
proposed might provide a solution of this ' 
most sensitive problem.

So since there appears to be a good-faith 
effort in the proposal and the court being 
persuaded that with the proper guidance 
and leadership and understanding, patience 
and tolerance, real progress can be realized, 
I am going to give the district an opportun­
ity . . .

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I am going to modify my previous ruling 
in which I disapproved the continuation 
of freedom of choice in the operation of 
the schools of this district, at least 
for the time being, in an effort to see 
just how the proposal of the district will 
now work. . . .

If, from the reports, no progress is indi­
cated and there is no prospects of achieving 
a constitutionally operated school system, 
the court will have to take notice and act 
accordingly. After the results are reported 
about May 15 and should it become necessary 
for the court to consider this problem in 
a different light, the parties will be given 
another opportunity to be heard. . .

Now the court is going to approve this pro­
cedure at the risk of being reversed by the 
Circuit Court of Appeals. . . .

(Tr. Ill 99-101; 105-109) [emphasis supplied].

14. On April 15, 1969, the district court entered the order 

which is the subject of the appeal in No. 19,746. That order pro­

vided that the district should hold a special choice period between 

April 15 and May 15, 1969 and report the results thereof to the dis­

trict court on or before May 22, 1969, after which time the district 

court would pass upon continued use of freedom-of-choice for the 

1969-70 school year. On April 24, 1969, appellants filed a Notice 

of Appeal.

15. On May 17, 1969, appellants filed a Motion for Permission 

to Appeal Upon the Original Papers and for Summary Reversal in No. 

19,746. June 6, 1969, this Court entered an order denying appellants'

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motion "without prejudice to renew after the filing of any additional 

order as contemplated in the District Court's order of April 15, 1969.‘

16. On May 22, 1969, appellees filed a Report with the district

court which indicated the following results of the special choice

period:
Number white Number Negro Number Faculty memb:

students students of minority race
School choosinq choosinq assiqned

Marvell Elementary 251 117 0

Marvell High 261 98 1

Tate Elementary 36 660 4-2/3

Tate High 0 628 2t?2/3
3/Turner Elementary^ 0 45 0

Total Number of Negro students choosing . . . 1548 
Total Number of white students choosing . . . 548
No. of Negro students choosing

"white" schools ..........................  215
No. of white students choosing

"Negro" schools ..........................  36
%  of Negro students in "white" schools. . . .  13.9 %
% of white students in "Negro" schools. . . .  6.6 %
% of Negro students in all-Negro schools. . . 43.5 %

17. June 13, 1969, the district court entered an order approving

the use of a freedom-of-choice plan of desegregation for the 1969-70

school year because it would "produce the maximum degree of desegre­

gation possible at this time when compared with the reasonably pre-

3/ The school district proposed to close Turner and offer its 
Negro students a second choice between Tate Elementary and 
Marvell Elementary Schools.

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dictable results of other alternatives." On June 17, 1969, appellant 

filed a Notice of Appeal from the June 13, 1969 order, which appeal 

has been docketed as No. 19,797

Reasons Why Summary Reversal Is Required

18. The appellees produced no evidence at the March 31, 1969 

hearing which suggested that freedom of choice is any more likely 

to disestablish the dual school system than it had been on August 29, 

1968. In fact, the Superintendent's testimony on March 31 establishe 

the contrary conclusion:

Q. How many can you say will attend the Tate 
school pursuant to your solicitation for 
the next school year?

A. How many can I guarantee?

Q . Yes.

A. I could not guarantee.

Q. How many can you reasonably estimate will 
attend the Tate school?

A. Of course, the letter has not been circu­
lated long enough for the people to discuss 
it and to really make a decision. You real­
ize this is a complete new situation, some­
thing that has never happened in this community.

Q. Is it fair to say that if you have not been 
able to get white pupils to transfer to the 
black schools under the freedom of choice, 
that you are not likely to get white pupils, 
in any numbers anyway, to transfer to the 
black schools this next year?

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A. That is something that I would be quessing 
at.

Q. I understand that.

A. In any great numbers?

Q . Yes.

A. I do not believe that the first shot of 
integrating a school is going to be made 
with any great degree of enthusiasm.

Q. So if any white students accepted your
offer or invitation it would be token more 
or less, would it not, a few white pupils?

A. I think the first step, yes, sir, would be 
to get a few.

Q. How long do you propose, in case the court 
grants your request, to operate under the 
freedom-of-choice procedure, or the solic­
itation procedure?

A. Well, of course, we feel like if the be­
ginning is made that that foundation could 
be built on.

(Tr. Ill 17-18). The results of the special April 15 - May 15 choice 

period confirm these expectations. Forty-three per cent of the Negro 

pupils in the Marvell school system will continue to attend a segre­

gated, all-Negro school. The Marvell schools remain identifiably 

white by both student enrollment and faculty assignments; the Tate 

schools are demonstrably Negro schools when judged by the same indiej 

Appellees by no conceivable test have met the "heavy burden upon the 

board to explain its preference for an apparently less effective

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method," Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, Virginia,

391 U.S. 430, 439 (1963).
19. The district court itself recognized (Tr. Ill 105-06) that

the most efficacious plan to eradicate the dual school system, which 

the court itself found still in existence after four years of, freedom 

of-choice (Tr. Ill 106), was the plan recommended by appellants' ex­

pert at the August, 1968 hearing: reorganization of the school sy­

stem to provide for one district-wide high school and one district- 

wide elementary school. Yet the court below did not require the 

appellees to adopt this plan; instead, free choice was continued.

20. Appellees' sole justification for failing to adopt the 

reorganization approach suggested by appellants' expert, Dr. Lieber- 

man, was community resistance and the possibility of what has come

to be known as "white flight":
Q. But really, I just want to captalize [sic] 

this, you are making your request for ad­
ditional time, and your request for per­
mission to continue with freedom of choice 
primarily because of the disproportions of 
blacks to whites in the school district,is 
that correct. That is to say that you have 
too many Negroes in the school system and 
too few whites to make integration attrac­
tive to white parents and their children.

A. In one immediate shot?

Q . Yes.
A. Yes. The school is based on acceptance of 

the people in that communxty. If you are

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going to destroy or chase people out and cause 
them to abandoix their school, then the responsi­
bility of the local people is to keep their schools 
for the studexits.

(Tr. Ill 22-23. See also Tr. Ill 19-20, 26-27, 30-31; cf. Tr. Ill 

39). It should be clear by now that this is no justification for 

further delaying the achievement of a unitary school system. E , 

Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of City of Jackson. Tennessee, 391 U.S. 

450, 459 (1968); Anthony v. Marshall County Bd. of Educ., No. 26432 

(5th Cir., April 15, 1969), p. 5? Kelley v. Altheimer, Arkansas

School District No. 22. Civ. No. PB-66-C-10 (E.D.' Ark,, March 24, 

1969), pp. 8-9.

21. There is no evidence in the record from which the district 

court could have concluded that the request to continue free choice 

was a "good-faith effort" (Tr. Ill 105) to bring about a unitary 

school system which reflected "a decidedly changed attitude" (Tr.

Ill 107) on the part of the school district. The district waited 

until nine days before the hearing —  well after it proposed on 

February 1 to continue free choice —  to send out the letter to 

white parents (Tr. Ill 9). Even then, as noted, the response was 

uninspiring. Furthermore, the district very clearly has acted in 

bad faith with regard to faculty desegregation. Despite this Court's 

instruction on February 9, 1968 that "the Board should be required 

to take affirmative action to (1) encourage voluntary transfers . . .

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(2) assign members of the faculty and staff from one school to an­

other, • Jackson v. Marvell School District No. 22, supra at 745, no 

such teacher assignments have ever been made "against their wishes" 

(Tr. Ill 13). The totally inadequate performance of the district 

to date results in the continued racial identifiability of its school 

At any rate, the time for mere "good faith" has passed.

At this very, very late date in the 
glacial movement toward school racial 
integration, it should no longer be 
an issue of good faith.

United States v. Board of Educ. of Bessemer, 396 F.2d 44, 49 (5th 

Cir. 1968); accord, Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., ...

F.2d___ No. 26450 (5th Cir., May 28, 1969) (slip opinion at p. 16).

22. Finally, the remarks of the district court reflect applic­

ation of an improper legal standard:

. . .  I have made it very clear 
that as long as those who have the 
responsibility will undertake to 
bring about compliance, it may be 
the impact is greater on some than 
others, but as long as there can be 
shown an effort towards bringing 
about compliance with the basic con­
stitutional requirements I have 
great compassion and sympathy and 
I am going to do what I can as the 
court to assist the leadership and 
encouragement towards a constitu­
tionally operated system.

(Tr. Ill 100-01). What is required at this late date is far more 

than an undertaking or an effort towards compliance with the Con-

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stitution. Compliance in deed as well as in speech must be achieved 

now. This Court has recently reiterated that "the time for transi­

tion has now passed and that these problems should have been worked 

out long ago." Haney v. County Bd. of Educ. of Sevier County, Ark­

ansas, No. 19,404 (8th Cir., May 9, 1969), p. 11. Cf. Kemp, v. Beasley 

389 F.2d 178, 185 n.10 (8th Cir. 1968) and accompanying text. "We 

are firm that a point has been reached in the process of school de­

segregation 'where it is not the spirit but the bodies which count.1 

Montgomery County Board of Education, et al., on petitions for re­

hearing en banc, 5 Cir. 1968, ___F.2d ___ [No. 25865, November 1, 1968]

(dissenting opinion p. 6)." United States v. Indanola Municipal 

Separate School District, No. 25655 (5th Cir., April 11, 1969), p. 12

23. Summary reversal, while an extraordinary procedure, has 

been found to be particularly suitable and necessary in school de­

segregation cases "because of the importance in school administration 

for having an immediate end to any doubt with respect to procedures 

to be followed for the next school year," Gaines v . Daugherty County 

Bd. of Educ., 392 F.2d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 1968). This is particu­

larly true where, as here, the normal appellate process would delay 

consideration of an appeal beyond the start of the following school 

term. Summary reversal has been found to be proper in numerous such 

cases. See generally, Acree v. County Bd. of Educ. of Richmond 

County, No. 25136 (5th Cir., August 31, 1967); Banks, v. St. James.

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Parish School Bd., No. 25375 (5th Cir., Nov. 20, 1967); Bivans v . 

Board of Educ. and Public Orphanage for Bibb County, No. 25743 (5th 

Cir., May 24, 1967); Thomie v. Houston County Bd. of Educ._, No. 24754 

(5th Cir., May 24, 1967); George v. Davis, and Carter v. West Felic­

iana Parish School Bd.. No. 24860 and 24861 (5th Cir., July 24, 1967) 

and Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., No. 25092 (5th Cir., August 

4, 1967).
24. Unless this Court summarily reverses the orders below, an­

other school year will go by before a unitary school system is im­

plemented in this district. A year has already been lost because 

the district court determined in August, 1968 that it was "too late" 

to implement any plan other than freedom of choice. Despite the 

clear import of the Green, Monroe and Raney decisions for this dis­

trict, no hearing was held between the date of those decisions,

May 27, 1968, and August 6, 1968. Consequently, even though the cour 

below determined upon such hearing that freedora-of-choice was an un­

constitutional plan of operating the Marvell public schools, it 

ordered continuation of free choice during the 1968-69 school year 

because of the district's claimed inability to implement a different 

kind of plan between August 6 and the opening of school. But see,, 

e ,cf., Tr. II 44-46. The district court has now approved continued 

use of freedom of choice despite the court's own recognition that 

reorganization of the school system would immediately end the dual

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school system, despite the continued clear racial identifiability 

of the Tate and Marvell schools as Negro and white schools, re­

spectively and despite the continuation of Tate High School as 

an all-Negro school. The only argument with which the Board has 

attempted to justify its preference for a less effective method 

of desegregation than grade reorganization is the specter of 

"white flight." Reliance on such arguments is constitutionally 

forbidden, as this Court itself has had occasion to point out. 

Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1958). We respectfully 

urge this Court to act in order to prevent the irretrievable loss 

of Negro students' constitutional rights for yet another year.

WHEREFORE, for all the reasons set forth above, appellants ■ 

respectfully pray that they be permitted to prosecute these ap­

peals upon the original papers in lieu of a printed appendix; 

that their Motion for Summary Reversal in No. 19,746 be renewed; 

that these appeals be consolidated and determined together; and 

that this Court summarily reverse the orders entered below, and 

remand this cause with instructions to the district court to 

order the implementation of a school reorganization plan or any 

other equally effective plan which desestablishes the dual school 

system and substitutes therefor a unitary nonracial school system

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in the Marvell School District No. 22 effective with the 1969-70 

school year.

Respectfully submitted.

JACK GREENBERG 
MICHAEL MELTSNER 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

JOHN W. WALKER 
BURL C. ROTENBERRY

1820 West 13th Street 
Little Rock, Arkansas 72202

GEORGE HOWARD, JR.
329| Main Street
Pine Bluff, Arkansas 71601

Attorneys for Appellants

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the day of June, 1969 I served

a copy of the foregoing Motion for Permission to Appeal Upon the 

Original Papers, To Consolidate Appeals, and for Summary Reversal 

upon Robert V. Light, Esq., 1100 Boyle Building, Little Rock, 

Arkansas 72201 and Charles B. Roscopf, Esq. 417 Rightor Street, 

Helena, Arkansas 72342, attorneys for appellees, by United States 

air mail, postage prepaid.

Attorney for Appellants