Beer v. United States Brief for Appellees Johnny Jackson, Jr. et al.
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1974
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Beer v. United States Brief for Appellees Johnny Jackson, Jr. et al., 1974. 1e69798a-c69a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/df88b638-ca52-4f05-b298-0584f7261fe9/beer-v-united-states-brief-for-appellees-johnny-jackson-jr-et-al. Accessed December 07, 2025.
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I n t h e
&upr?m? (Emtrt nf tlj£ HuitPi* States
O ctober T e e m , 1974
No. 73-1869
P eter H . B e e r , et al.,
Appellants,
v.
U n it e d S tates op A m erica , et al.,
and
J o h n n y J a ck so n , J r., et al.,
Appellees.
ON APPEAL PROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
JOHNNY JACKSON, JR., ET AL.
J ack G reenberg
J am es M. N abrit , III
C h a rles E . W il l ia m s , III
E ric S c h n a p f e r
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
S ta n ley A. H a l p in , J r .
Suite 1212
344 Camp Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70103
C h a rles E . C otton
D avid D e n n is
301 Executive House
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
W il e y B ranton
666 Eleventh Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Counsel for Appellees Jackson, et al.
I N D E X
PAGE
Questions Presented .......... ........ -............................ -.... 1
Summary of Argument..... -............-.............................. 2
Argument ..................... 3
I. Plan II Would Have the Effect of Denying or
Abridging the Right to Vote on Account of Race
or Color ......................................................... 5
1. The Legal Standards......................................... 5
2. The Effect of Plan II ....... ...... . - ............... 14
II. Plaintiffs Failed to Prove That Plan II Did Not
Have the Purpose of Denying or Abridging the
Right to Vote on Account of Race........................ 22
C o n c lu sio n ............................ 27
T able of A u t h o r it ie s :
Cases:
Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1968) .......... 4
Anderson v. Martin, 375 IJ.S. 399 (1964) ................. 20
Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965) ........................- 7
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ..... 14
City of Petersburg v. United States, 410 U.S. 962
(1973) ........................................................................13,21
Connor v. Johnson, 11 Race Rel. Rep. 1859 (S.D. Miss.
1966) 8
11
PAGE
Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492 (S.D. Miss. 1967) 8
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 TT.S. 433 (1965) ............ 7
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) ...... 7
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) ............ 11
Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) ........ ................... 7
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) ________ 8, 9,10
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ......................... 19
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) ....4,11
Taylor v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974) ...... 12
United States v. Association of Citizens Councils of
Louisiana, 187 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. La. 1960) .......... 15
United States v. Georgia, 411 U.S. 526 (1973) ......... .10, 21
United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) .......... 15
United States v. McElveen, 177 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. La.
1960) ........................................................................ 15
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1974) .....................7, 22
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) ........ .......... . 11
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972) .......................................................... ............... 13
Wright v. Rockefeller, 375 U.S. 52 (1964) ................... 7,12
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions:
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment.... 11
United States Constitution, Fifteenth Amendment ..3,11, 21
Ill
PAGE
42 U.S.C. § 1973b (Section 4 of the Voting Eights Act) 3
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Section 5 of the Voting Eights
Act) .................................... ......... -.............. ......... passim
La. Eev. Stat., Art. 18, § 358 .......................................... 20
Legislative Materials:
115 Cong. Eec. (1969) ................................................- 7
116 Cong. Eec. (1970) ................. ........................-.....— 6,7
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Judi
ciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., (1975) ......... 11
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Eights of The Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
Bills to Amend the Voting Eights Act, 91st Cong.,
1st and 2d Sess., (1969-70) -................................ 7, 8, 9, 21
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary on H.E. 4249, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969) .................................. -........................ 6,8
Official Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the
State of Louisiana, 1898 ....................... .......... -......... 14
Other Authorities:
United States Commission on Civil Eights, The Voting
Eights Act: Ten Years After (1975) ............9,10,11,15
United States Commission on Civil Eights, Political
Participation (1968) ........................ .........-....5,6,7,8,15
PAGE
1961 United States Commission on Civil Rights Report:
Voting .................................. ............................... ......14,15
Hearings in Louisiana Before the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights .................................................... ........... 14
David H. Hunter, Federal Review of Voting Charges:
How to Use Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
(1974) 9
I n t h e
§>ttpmnp OInurt of tl|p ImtrS i ’tairn
O ctober T e r m , 1974
No. 73-1869
P eter H . B e e r , et al.,
Appellants,
v.
U n it e d S tates of A m erica , et al.,
and
J o h n n y J a ck so n , J r ., et al.,
Appellees.
o n a p p e a l f r o m t h e u n it e d s t a t e s d is t r ic t c o u r t
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
JOHNNY JACKSON, JR., ET AL.
Questions Presented
1. Did plaintiffs prove that Plan II will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color?
2. Did plaintiffs prove that Plan II did not have the
purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color?
2
Summary of Argument
1. 1. Section 5 of the Voting Eights Act was adopted to
prevent states and subdivisions with a history of dis
crimination in voting from devising new schemes to disen
franchise minority voters. Section 5 was applied to re
districting laws because ordinary constitutional challenges
had proved ineffective in preventing the dilution of black
voting strength. Congress was concerned in particular to
forbid through section 5 the implementation of districting
plans which divided concentrations of black voters among
several predominantly white districts. Such plans are
impermissible under section 5 regardless of whether they
have a “rational basis.”
2. Plan II is precisely the type of districting plan which
section 5 was intended to prevent. The District Court
correctly concluded that black voters in New Orleans were
concentrated in an east-west belt. Plan II systematically
divided that black concentration among five different city
council districts with substantial numbers of white voters.
The adverse effect of this division on black voters was
aggravated by the pattern of bloc voting along racial lines
in New Orleans.
II. Plaintiffs failed to establish that Plan II was a good
faith effort to correct the undisputed defects in Plan I.
Plan II was prepared before the Attorney G-eneral objected
to Plan I, and necessarily failed to take into account the
nature of those objections. Plan II was fashioned to solve
problems regarding the predominantly white Algiers
section, and its effect on the fragmentation of the black
community was both incidental and largely insignificant.
Since Plan II was enacted by city couneilmen with a vested
interest in diluting the voting strength of the black com-
3
munity, and since Plan II had precisely that effect, the
conclusion is inescapable that such dilution was the purpose
of Plan II.
Argument
In 1965, after extensive hearings and debate, and in the
face of evidence that less drastic measures had proved
ineffective, Congress adopted the Federal Voting Rights
Act. The Act implemented Congress’ firm intention to rid
the country of racial discrimination in voting, and provided
stringent new remedies against those practices which had
most frequently denied citizens the right to vote on the
basis of race. The Act suspended for five (now ten) years
the use of certain “tests and devices” which Congress
believed had been adopted or administered so as to dis
criminate on the basis of race. 42 IJ.S.O. §1937b. Although
none of these tests or devices were unconstitutional per se,
this Court upheld the suspension as within the power of
Congress under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966).
Congress was further concerned, however, that the mere
suspension of existing tests would not prove sufficient to
end the problems of discrimination that had existed for
decades in the covered states such as Louisiana. Some of
those states had in the past shown extraordinary ingenuity
in contriving new laws and procedures to perpetuate voting
discrimination, and Congress had reason to fear that those
states might resort to similar maneuvers in the future.
Under the compulsion of these unique circumstances, and
unable to foresee every discriminatory contrivance which
might in the future be concocted, Congress adopted section
5 of the Act. Section 5 requires that, prior to implementing
any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
4
standard, practice or prooednre with respect to voting
different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,”
the State or subdivision involved must obtain a declaratory
judgment in the United States District Court for the Dis
trict of Columbia that the new practice “does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”
42 U.S.C. §1973c. Section 5 also establishes an alternative
and more expeditious procedure for obtaining approval of
the new law; the new law may be enforced if it is sub
mitted to the Attorney General of the United States and,
within 60 days of the submission, the Attorney General
does not formally object to the' new statute or regulation.
See South Carolina v. Katsenhach, 383 U.S. 301, 335
(1966); Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548-49
(1968).
The subject of the instant action is Ordinance No. 5154
(hereinafter referred to as “Plan II”), which redistricts
the City Council of the City of New Orleans. Plaintiffs
submitted Plan II to the Attorney General in May, 1973;
on July 9, 1973, the Attorney General interposed an ob
jection to Plan II on the ground that plaintiffs had failed
to establish that the plan would not have the effect of dis
criminating on the basis of race.1 Thereafter plaintiffs
commenced this action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judg
ment that Plan II did not have the purpose and would
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color. On March 15, 1974, the
District Court concluded that Plan II would have such a
discriminatory effect, and denied the declaratory judg
ment.2 Having resolved the case on this basis, the Dis-
1 Appendix, pp. 33-35.
2 Jurisdictional Statement, pp. la-74a.
5
trict Court did not reach the question of whether Plan II
also had a discriminatory purpose.3
I.
Plan II Would Have the Effect of Denying or Abridg
ing the Right to Vote On Account o f Race or Color.
1. T he Legal S tandards
The legislative history of section 5, particularly in con
nection with the renewal of the Voting Rights Act in 1970,
makes clear the type of reapportionment with which Con
gress was concerned and which Congress adopted section 5
to stop—the division of a concentration of black voters
among several districts in which the black voters were
combined with a larger number of white voters. In 1968
the United States Civil Rights Commission reported to
Congress that district lines were being drawn in this way
in southern states to dilute the newly gained voting-
strength of Negroes.4 In Alabama state legislative dis-
stricts had been fashioned so that they “aggregated pre
dominantly Negro counties with predominantly white
counties,” thus “preventing election of Negroes to House
membership.” In Mississippi the congressional district
lines were drawn to divide the predominantly black Delta
region among three districts with white majorities.5 Senate
and House seats were also redrawn in Mississippi.
In several instances, the legislature combined counties
in which Negroes constituted a majority of the popula
tion and a majority of the registered voters in legis-
3 Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 40a-42a.
4 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Political Participa
tion, p. 177 (1968).
6 Id., p. 31.
6
lative districts with counties having white population
and voting majorities. For example, majority Negro
Claiborne County was joined in a senatorial district
with majority white Hinds County. Jefferson County,
with a 70 percent Negro population and a Negro voting
majority, was combined with Lincoln County, which
has a population 69 percent white. In both cases the
resulting district had a majority white population.6
The results of this 18 month Civil Rights Commission
study were among the factors that induced Congress in
1970 to extend the Voting Rights Act. See 116 Cong. Rec.
5521, 5526 (1970).
Concern with this problem was voiced throughout the
legislative process in 1970. At the House hearings Mr.
Glickstein of the Civil Rights Commission testified,
The history of white domination in the South has
been one of adaptiveness, and the passage of the
Voting Rights Act and the increased black registra
tion that followed has resulted in new methods to
maintain white control of the political process. . . .
For example, State legislatures [have redrawn] the
lines of districts to divide concentrations of Negro
voting strength.7
Congressman McCulloch expressed a similar concern with
the alteration of district lines.8 During the Senate hear
ings Mrs. Freeman testified for the Commission that legis
latures had done what they could to make black votes
“worth little” by drawing “lines of legislative districts
6 Id., p. 34-35.
7 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 4249, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 17 (1969).
*Id., p. 3.
7
to divide concentrations of Negro voting strength.” 9 Other
witnesses testified to the use of this device as well as
related practices such as use of multi-member districts.10
During the House and Senate debates repeated concern
was expressed that the value of minority votes would be
diluted by submerging them in districts with white major
ities.11
The need to apply section 5 to reapportionment cases was
particularly great because, as the Civil Eights Commission
pointed out, constitutional attacks on these efforts to dilute
black votes had been largely unsuccessful.12 Although this
Court held open the possibility that multimember districts
might not be invulnerable to judicial scrutiny, this Court
rejected all such challenges prior to 1973. See Whitcomb
v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1974); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S.
120 (1967); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). A
silmilar device, the annexation of white suburbs to a city
with a large minority population, was upheld in Burnette
v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965), affirming Mann v. Davis, 245
F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va. 1965). The possibility of a judicial
challenge to gerrymandering of district lines, first raised
in this Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),
was complicated if not dimmed by a later decision laying
great emphasis on proof of discriminatory motives. Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
9 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Eights of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend the
Voting Eights Act, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., p. 47 (1969-70).
10 Id., pp. 195-96, 469 (Efforts to frustrate the Act include
“redistricting to nullify local black majorities.”)
11115 Cong. Eec. 38486 (Eemarks of Eep. McCulloch) ; 116 Cong.
Eec. 5520-21 (Eemarks of Senator Scott), 5527 (Remarks of Sen
ator Scott), 6168 (Remarks of Senator Scott), 6358 (Eemarks of
Senator Bayh) (1970).
12 Political Participation, p. 35, n.63.
8
The Commission noted with particular concern the judi
cial treatment of constitutional challenges to certain Mis
sissippi redistricting which the Commission believed was
adopted for the express purpose of diluting black votes and
evading the Voting Rights Act. The challenge to the gerry
mandering of congressional lines was summarily rejected
on the ground that the black plaintiffs had to prove dis
criminatory purpose, and could not do so merely by offer
ing newspaper reports of statements made by the relevant
legislators. Connor v. Johnson, 11 Race Rel. Rep. 1859,
1863 (S.D. Miss. 1966). A challenge to the gerrymandered
legislative districts was summarily rejected when the dis
trict court refused to even consider the racial composition
of the new districts. Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492,
498-99 (S.D. Miss. 1967), aff’d 386 U.S. 483 (1967). Al
though all of these districting changes had survived con
stitutional challenges, none had ever been submitted for ap
proval under section 5. The Commission called on the
Attorney General to take steps, especially with regard
to Mississippi, to enforce section 5 as it applied, inter alia,
to changes in election districts.13 During the 1969-70 hear
ings on renewal of the Voting Rights Act, the Attorney Gen
eral repeatedly testified that a ban on any discriminatory
“purpose or effect” was broader than the unelaborated
constitutional prohibition.14 The Assistant Attorney Gen
eral in charge of the Civil Rights Division told the Senate
Committee, “[T]he real innovation about section 5 . . .
was that it contained language that changes with discrimi-
13 Political Participation, p. 184. The failure of the Attorney
General to take steps to enforce section 5 in similar circumstances
was discussed in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
14 Hearing's before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 4249, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 280 (1969) ;
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Voting
Rights Act, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pp. 189-190 (1969-70).
9
natory effect were in violation of the law. Most of us used
to assume, and the courts, I think, pretty well held, that if
you were to attack a State law as being in violation of the
15th Amendment, you would need to prove that there was
a discriminatory legislative purpose.” 15 Thus the Commis
sion concluded that the application of section 5 was neces
sary to stop redistricting practices which could not be
dealt with effectively through ordinary litigation.
In the years immediately preceding and following the
enactment of the Voting Eights Act, the principle tactics
used to prevent black participation in the political process
were direct obstacles to registration and voting. More
recently, however, the fashioning of district lines and multi
member districts to dilute the effectiveness of minority
votes have become the “prime weapons” of those seeking to
frustrate the purposes of the Act. Perkins v. Matthews,
400 U.S. 379 (1971). In January, 1975, the Civil Eights
Commission reported that
The most serious problem for minority voters now is
practices which dilute the minority vote. The greatest
use of section 5 has been in preventing such practices.16
Between 1971 and 1974 the Attorney General interposed
objections to 51 different redistricting plans in six states
involving congressional, legislative, county supervisors,
police jury, school board, parish council, and city council
districts.17 In objecting to these plans under Section 5 the
15 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend the
Voting Rights Act, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., p. 507 (1969-70).
18 The Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, p. 345.
17 Id., pp. 400-409; David H. Hunter, Federal Review of Voting
Charges: How to Use Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, pp. 90-97
(1974).
10
Attorney General used the same standard applied in the
instant case—that district lines must not he drawn in such
a way as to divide up a concentration of minority voters
and submerge the fragments of that concentration in dis
tricts with larger numbers of white voters.18
This construction of Section 5, fashioned by the Attorney
General in a series of cases to assure that districting plans
would not have a discriminatory effect, should be accorded
the deference due “to the interpretation given the statute
by the officers or agency charged with its administration.”
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 391 (1971). Such defer
ence is particularly appropriate in the instant case, since
Congress is at this very moment considering a ten year
extension of the Voting Eights Act so as to apply the estab-
18 United States Commission on Civil Rights, the Voting Rights
Act: Ten Years After, pp. 204-327 (1975).
In opposing the district lines which were the subject of United
States v. Georgia, 411 U.S. 526 (1973), the Attorney General noted
that eight Georgia counties “form a contiguous group—of 89,626
persons, of whom 57.2 percent are nonwhite—enough to form at
least three new majority-nonwhite single-member districts. Yet the
submitted plan has only one district in the area with a slight non
white population majority (50.56 percent)—new District 59. The
other new districts (60, 63, 64, 76 and 78) are ‘border districts’
partly inside and partly outside the majority-nonwhite area and
have significant, but minority, nonwhite population percentages.
These demographic facts . . . do not permit us to conclude, as we
must under the Voting Rights Act, that this plan does not have a
discriminatory racial effect on voting”. Appendix, No. 72-75, pp.
11-12.
In 1971 the Attorney General opposed the lines defining the
supervisors’ districts in Yazoo County, Mississippi because “the
district boundary lines within the City of Yazoo unnecessarily
divide the black residential areas into each of the five districts.”
Letter of David Norman to Griffin Norquist, July 19, 1971, annexed
to Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP in United States v .Georgia,
No. 72-75, p. A-3. See also Letter of David Norman to Jack P. F.
Gremillion, August 20, 1971, pp. A-5 to A-10; Letter of David
Norman to Thomas Watkins, July 14, 1971, pp. A-13 to A-15.
11
lished standards to the redistricting that will follow the
1980 census.19
Plaintiffs suggest that the District Court was obligated
to uphold Plan II unless it affirmatively concluded that that
plan violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. But
Section 5 neither requires nor entails such a constitutional
inquiry. In adopting Section 5 Congress chose to establish
what it believed to be a clear and effective test by which
new election laws would be measured, in order to insure
that the right to vote was not denied or abridged on account
of race. Whether that test is characterized as merely man
dating an inference of unconstitutional gerrymandering
from a plaintiff’s failure to prove the absence of dis
criminatory purpose and effect, or as establishing a new
substantive rule forbidding district plans otherwise per
missible under the Constitution, Congress’ power to enact
Section 5 is beyond dispute. South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966). Whatever may be the functional or substantive
relationship between the standards applied in section 5
case and in an ordinary challenge to the constitutionality of
a statute, it is the former which apply in the instant case.20
19 United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights
Act: Ten Years After, p. 345 (1975); Hearings on H.R. 939 Be
fore a Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., p . ----- (1975) (Remarks of Rep. Rodino).
20 The resolution of this case does not require a delineation of
the precise differences and similarities between these standards.
Were this a constitutional challenge to the creation of a multi
member district, judicial inquiry might be appropriate into such
diverse and troublesome questions as whether blacks had sufficiently
distinct interests as to make separate representation important,
whether white councilmen had in the past been indifferent to those
interests and whether blacks would be better off as a majority of
a few districts or a substantial minority of a larger number of
districts. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). As to minority
voters in the states and subdivisions covered by Section 5, Congress,
drawing on its unique expertise and experience, has resolved these
12
Appellants ask this Court to overturn the established
construction of Section 5, claiming that it requires “maxi
mization” of black voting strength21 and urging that the
District Court was obligated to approve any districting
plan with a “rational basis”.22 The District Court opinion,
like section 5, does not require the creation of the maximum
feasible number of majority black districts;23 they merely
forbid the systematic dismemberment of black concentra
tions. Doubtless adherence to this statutory standard will,
in the instant case, result in at least two districts with
substantial majorities of black voters,24 but such a conse
quence is neither undesirable nor unforseen. Insofar as re
districting is concerned, Congress enacted section 5, not to
improve the geometric aesthetics of districting maps, but
because Congress knew—as did the draftsmen of Plan II—
that the consolidation or division of a concentration of black
voters would directly effect whether blacks from a majority
of one or more districts and whether black candidates can
be elected.25
questions in favor of creating districts in which black majorities
can elect black candidates. Although circumstances will at times
require the courts to determine such difficult political and socio
logical questions, a congressional resolution is certainly to be wel
comed. Compare Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1964),
with Taylor v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974).
21 Brief for Appellants, p. 31.
22 Brief for Appellants, pp. 19-26.
23 Since blacks are now 38.2% of the voters in New Orleans, it
would probably be possible to draw district lines such that 3 out
of 5, or 4 out of 7, districts would have black majorities.
24 See Appendix, p. 626.
26 Consolidation will also affect the number of votes “diluted.”
Under Plan II, even treating District B as predominantly black,
there are 62,612 black voters in overwhelmingly white districts,
compared to only 18,694 white voters in a single marginal black
district. Appendix, p. 524. Under the Republican proposal there
would be 34,376 black voters in predominantly white districts and
28,384 white voters in predominantly black districts. Appendix,
p. 626.
13
Nothing in Section 5 or its legislative history would
require, or even permit, the Attorney General or a district
court to approve a voting change merely because it had
a “rational” or even “compelling” basis. The statute con
tains no express or tacit suggestion that the discriminatory
purpose or effect of a proposed change can be overcome
by a showing of some additional basis or effect of the
change, rational, compelling, or otherwise. Nor does the
statute distinguish between reapportionment and other
voting changes. Few* alterations in election laws and pro
cedure, particularly in the area of reapportionment,26 are
so bizarre that some rational basis for them cannot be
conjured up by a competent attorney; to require approval
of a discriminatory change because there was such a
rational basis would render section 5 a dead letter.27 See
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462,
467-68 (1972). Once it found that Plan II had the pro
scribed discriminatory effect, the District Court’s inquiry
properly came to an end.
In light of the purpose and legislative history of section
5, plaintiffs were required to establish either that there
was no concentration of black voters in New Orleans or
that any such concentration or concentrations had not been
divided among predominantly white districts.
26 The various considerations bearing on reapportionment are so
diverse, and often inconsistent, as to afford a “basis” for virtually
any plan: compactness, continuity, respecting natural and man
made banners (which usually run in all directions), creating hetero
geneous district to avoid legislators favoring special interests (or
creating homogenous districts to achieve the opposite effect), divid
ing up black communities so they can influence several legislators
(or consolidating those communities so they have more control
over a smaller number of officials), avoiding “inadequate”' repre
sentation for a particular group (the choice of group controlling
the districting pattern), etc.
27 This Court rejected a similar contention in City of Petersburg,
Virginia V. United States, 4l0 U.S. 562 (1973); Jurisdictional
Statement in No. 74-865, p. 12.
14
2. T he Effect of P lan II
The District Court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs
had failed to establish that Plan II would not dilute the
votes of black voters. The court found that black voters
were concentrated in a east-west belt running through New
Orleans, that that concentration was divided among five dif
ferent districts and combined with large numbers of white
voters, and that bloc voting by whites rendered unlikely
if not impossible the election of black candidates from at
least four of the districts. These findings of fact were sup
ported by the record, and plaintiffs do not challenge their
correctness on appeal.
Racial discrimination in voting was for years prior to
the Voting Rights Act a serious problem in Louisiana.28
When Reconstruction ended in Louisiana there were sub
stantially more blacks registered to vote than whites, but
by 1910 blacks accounted for less than the 1% of the state
registration.29 The principle device for limiting the fran
chise to whites was a literacy test adopted in 1898 for the
express purpose of discriminating against blacks.30 After
the Second World War black registration began to rise, a
pattern accelerated by this Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In the late 1950’s
a program of concerted activities was undertaken by the
Louisiana Legislature, the State Board of Registration, the
State Attorney General and the Association of Citizens
Councils of Louisiana to prevent further minority registra
tion and to remove blacks from the existing rolls.31 A series
28 See generally Hearings in Louisiana Before the U.S. Commis
sion on Civil Rights (48).
29 1961 United States Commission on Civil Rights Report: Vot
ing, pp. 40-41.
30 See Official Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the
State of Louisiana 1898, passim.
311961 United States Commission on Civil Rights Report: Vot
ing, 48-48.
15
of civil actions prosecuted by the United States failed to
bring an end to this active discrimination. See e.g. United
States v. McElveen, 177 F. Supp. 355, 180 F. Supp. 10, 11
(E.D. La. 1960), aff’d sub nom., United States v. Thomas,
362 U.S. 58 (1960); United States v. Association of Citizens
Councils of Louisiana, 187 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. La. 1960);
United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1965).
The passage of the Voting Eights Act brought a dramatic
change in black registration. In 1964 only 28.4% of eligible
blacks were registered in New Orleans, accounting for
barely 17% of the registered voters.82 During the following
three years over 24,000 blacks registered to vote, raising
black registration to 25.1% of the total.33 By May 1973
34.5% of the registered voters were black.34 In the year
between May 1972 and May 1973 minority registration rose
by 2,512, while white registration actually declined by
4,895.86 As of October, 1974, 38.2% of those voters were
black.36 New Orleans thus presents precisely the situation
in which Congress feared district lines would be drawn so
as to divide concentrations of black voters and thus dilute
the value of their vote.
The District Court correctly determined that the black
community wTas concentrated in the manner with which
Congress was concerned.
Although some black families are to be found in
most of the principal areas of New Orleans, there is no
32 1961 United States Commission on Civil Rights Report: Vot
ing, p. 267.
33 Political Participation, A Report of the United States Com
mission on Civil Rights (1968), p. 241.
34 Appendix, p. 623.
35 Compare id. 622 with id. 623.
36 United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights
Act: Ten Years After, p. 368.
16
general geographical blending of black and white resi
dences. The black population is heavily concentrated
in a series of neighborhoods extending eastwardly and
westwardly through the central part of the City; the
areas lying north and south of this belt, with minor
exceptions, are overwhelmingly white.87
Plaintiffs do not question the correctness of this finding,
which is fully supported by the record. The vast majority
of black voters live in a belt approximately a mile wide
running the length of the city from east to west; one can
traverse the city from St. Jefferson Parish eight miles to
St. Bernard Parish without crossing more than one or two
white precincts.38 This black concentration is separated
from the predominantly white parts of New Orleans by a
variety of man made barriers, including interstate high
ways,39 limited access highways,40 divided multi-lane main
37 Jurisdictional Statement, p. 4a.
38 See Appendix, p. 620. This map, based on 1971 figures sub
stantially understates the. size of the minority vote, Blacks consti
tuted approximately 31% of the registered voters in 1971, compared
to 38.2% of the voters in October, 1974.
39 Interstate 10 separates the black Desire section (Ward 9,
precincts 28, 28-A, 28-B, 28-C) from, the white neighborhood to
the north (Ward 9, precincts 29, 29-A, 30, 30-A, 31, 31-A), and
the black portions of the central city (Ward 2, precincts 6, 6-A, 7;
Ward 17, precincts 14 and 16) from the white neighborhood to the
north (Ward 3, precincts 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20) ; Interstate 610
separates the black community east of Dillard University (Ward
7, precincts 27, 27-A, 27-B) from the white neighborhood north of
the Fairgrounds Race Track (Ward 7, precincts 18 and 19).
40 The Pontchartrain Parkway, U.S. 9, separates the black central
city (Ward 2, precincts 1, 2, 3, 4) from the downtown business
area (Ward 3, precinct 1).
17
thoroughfares,41 cemeteries,42 the Inner Harbor Canal43 and
City Park.44 There are virtually no black voters in certain
white parts of the city, including the northern third of the
city45 and the neighborhoods surrounding Loyola and Tu-
lane Universities.46
The effect of Plan. II, as Plan I before it, was to system
atically dismember this concentration of black votes and to
place fragments in each of 5 separate districts with larger
41 St. Claude Avenue separates the black areas to the north
(Ward 9, precincts 2, 3, 3-A, 3-B, 4, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 8, 22, 23,
24, 25, 25-A, 26, 27) from the white river front (Ward 9, precincts
1, 1-A, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16); Florida Avenue separates those
same black areas from the white community north of the Avenue
and east of the Intercoastal Waterway (Ward 9, precinct 32),
and falls between the black southern portions of Wards 7 and 8
(Ward 7, precinct 8; 9, 9-A, 20, 20-A, 21; Ward 8, precincts 11
and 12) and the white portions of those wards to the north ; St.
Charles Avenue separates the black central city (Ward 1, precincts
5, 6, 7; Ward 10, precincts 10-H; Ward 11, precincts 10-19; Ward
12, precincts 11, 12, 13) from the white riverfront area to the
south (Ward 1, precincts 1-4; Ward 10, precincts 1-9; Ward 11,
precincts 1-9, Ward 12, precincts 1-8.)
42 The Metairie and Greenwood Cemeteries separate the black
neighborhood to the south (Ward 17, precincts 13, 13-A, 14, 15,
16) from the white neighborhoods to the north (Ward 17, pre
cincts 18-21).
43 The Canal separates the black Desire section (Ward 9, pre
cincts 28, 28-A, 28-B, 28-C) from the white area to the east (Ward
9, precinct 32) and separates the black development at Pontchar-
train Park (Ward 9, precincts 31-B, 31-C, 31-D and 31-E) from
the white area to the east (Ward 9, precincts 33, 42, 42.)
44 The Park separates the black community near Dillard Uni
versity (Ward 7, precincts 27-A, 27-B, 26-A, 27, 28, 28-A) from the
white portions of Ward 5 across the Park.
46 Excepting small black communities near Dillard University,
a predominantly black college, and near Pontchartrain Park, until
recent times the park used by blacks who were excluded because
of their race from City Park.
46 The Director of the City Council Staff which prepared Plan II
acknowledged the existence of these black and white concentrations.
Appendix, p. 238.
18
numbers of whites. The black neighborhood north west
of the French Quarter immediately adjoins even larger
black areas to the east and west; in District C, however,
that neighborhood is paired with the all-white neighbor
hoods of Lake Vista, 5 miles to the north across City Park,
and Aurora Gardens, 5 miles to the south across the Mis
sissippi River. The black voters in the southern portions
of wards 7 and 8 are combined, not with their black neigh
bors in Wards 6 and 9, but with the white residential area
on the shore of Lake Pontchartrain 3 miles to the north.
The black community concentrated between Florida and St.
Claude Avenues is divided betwen Districts D and E, each
of which has a larger number of white voters. The black
community along the Jefferson Parish line is separated
from the nearby central city neighborhoods, and combined
instead with white West End area miles to the north and
the Tulane area miles to the south.47 With one exception,
the districts are long and thin, crossing natural and man
made boundaries to pair fragments of black concentration
with larger but distant white areas; District C is a mile
wide and 12 miles long.
Had the district lines been drawn to reflect the natural
and man-made boundaries which separate the black con
centration from the rest of the city, or had the districts
merely been reasonably compact, two or more districts with
a substantial majority of black voters would have resulted.
The Republican plan, for example, resulted in two districts
with black majorities in excess of 60%.48 Instead, Plan II
carefully divided that black community among the five city
council districts, none receiving more than 21,000 or less
than 11,000 minority voters. Thus, the 83,588 black voters
concentrated in the center of New Orleans were divided so
47 See Appendix, p. 638.
48 Appendix, p. 626,
19
that—at the time Plan II was drawn up—every district
had a white majority. After the preparation of Plan II,
and before the decision below, a significant rise in black
registration raised the number of black voters in District
B to 52.6%.49 The next largest concentration of black voters
is in District E, which not coincidentally has the fastest
growing white population in the city.50 Given the obstacles
posed by the high concentration of black voters and the
geography of New Orleans, it would be difficult to design a
districting plan better suited to avoiding a substantial black
majority in any one district and thus preventing the election
of a black candidate.61
The District Court correctly concluded that the diluting
effect of Plan II was aggravated by a history of bloc voting
substantially along* racial lines.52 Three of the plaintiff
counoilmen conceded there was such bloc voting in New
Orleans,68 and two of defendants’ witnesses confirmed the
existence of this problem.64 Although a black candidate
49 Appendix, p. 624. Plan II was prepared in 1972 while Plan I
was still under consideration by the Attorney General. Id., pp.
350-51. Between May, 1972 and May, 1973, black registration rose
from 79,213 to 83,588, an increase of 5.5%. But for this increase
blacks would have constituted only 49.8% of District B.
60 Appendix, p. 187.
61 The effect of Plan I may have been slightly worse, but this
was accomplished by making 3 of the 5 districts non-eontinuous.
Appendix, p. 623.
Plaintiffs do not deny that it would he entirely feasible to fashion
a compact, districting plan that did not divide the black community
among white districts. Nor does such a claim appear to have
been raised in any of the other 50 cases in which the Attorney
General objected to a redistricting plan. The existence of a con
centration of black voters guarantees ipso facto that a non-dilutive
districting plan can be drawn which is compact, contiguous, and
consistent with Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
62 Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 18a-19a.
53 Appendix, pp. 260, 506-07, 545-46, 548.
64 Id., pp. 414, 547; see also Exhibits 29, 30, 33.
20
running against several whites in a primary might obtain
a plurality in a majority white district, state law requires
that the nominee obtain a majority and mandates a second
primary where necessary. La. Eev. Stat., Art. 18, § 358
(1966 Supp.). On several occasions blacks have won such
pluralities, only to lose the runoff election to a white
candidate due to white bloc voting.55 Although the Demo
cratic nomination is usually tantamount to election, on at
least one occasion a black Democratic candidate so nom
inated was defeated when white traditionally Democratic
wards voted in favor of a white Republican. Until
restrained from doing so by this Court, Louisiana in the
past encouraged such bloc voting by printing on the ballot
the race of each candidate. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S.
399 (1964).
Plaintiffs object that, in considering whether Plan II had
a discriminatory effect, the District Court was obligated
to ignore the fact that 2 of the 7 Council members were to
be chosen through an at-large election which, particularly
in view of the majority runoff and anti-single shot laws,
guaranteed the defeat of any black candidate.66 They also
suggest that, in assessing the impact of Plan II, the District
Court should have disregarded the “social, economic and
political context” in which it operated.57 The effect of a
proposed statute, however, cannot be assessed in the
abstract; it depends on the particular circumstances, legal
and otherwise, in which it is applied. The Assistant At
torney General advised Congress in 1970 that any judgment
on boundary changes would require demographic or other
55 Appendix, pp. 501, 564-6, 569; Jurisdictional Statement, pp.
19a, 64a; see also Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401 (1964).
56 Brief for Appellants, pp. 10-12.
57 Brief for Appellants, p. 16.
21
information.58 A similar argument was rejected by this
Court in City of Petersburg v. United States, 410 U.S. 962
(1973)69 and United States v. Georgia, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).60
The Attorney General’s regulations regarding Section 5
submissions have long required the submission of extensive
information on the background and impact of any submis
sion, especially when redistricting is involved. 28 C.F.R.
§ 51.10. The District Court, by detailing the legal and
factual context which led it to reject Plan II, provided
guidance to the City Council in fashioning a method of
electing the Council which would be consistent with sec
tion 5.61
The Fifteenth Amendment does not require that every
racial minority must in all cases be represented by a pro
portionate number of couneilmen or legislators. But
neither does the Constitution afford any protection to a
districting plan well calculated to prevent minority repre-
68 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Eights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend the
Voting Rights Act, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., p. 507 (1969-70).
59 The City, which wished to annex a predominantly white suburb,
unsuccessfully urged that the District Court which disapproved
that annexation under seetion 5 had erred when it took into con
sideration the fact that the Petersburg City Council was chosen
at large. Jurisdictional Statement, No. 74-865, pp. 13 et seq.
60 Georgia urged that the Attorney General had erred when, in
assessing the effect of its reapportionment plan, he considered the
impact of the state’s multimember district and majority runoff laws.
See Brief for Appellants, No. 72-75, pp. 25-30. This Court held
that the Attorney General’s inquiry was so limited, “Seetion 5 is
not concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures, but
rather with the realty of changed practices as thev affect Negro
voters.” 411 U.S. at 531.
61 In City of Petersburg, supra, the District Court advised the
plaintiffs that the annexation, though discriminatory under the
then existing circumstances, would pass muster under section 5 if
the at-large method of election were replaced by districts. 354
F.Supp. 1021, 1031 (D.D.C., 1972), a f d 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
22
sentation, or to insure no more than token representation
in a city where blacks are close to a majority of the popula
tion. In the instant case, although blacks constituted
45.0% of the population and 38.2% of the registered voters,
section 5 could not assure that ordinary “political defeat
at the polls” would not prevent the election of a substantial
number of blacks to the New Orleans City Council. Whit
comb v. Chavis, 403 IPS. 124, 153 (1971). Plan II, however,
as the District Court noted, did more than subject black
candidates to the everyday risks of the political process; it
harnessed the established pattern of white bloc voting to
create an insurmountable obstacle to the election of more
than a single black.
II.
Plaintiffs Failed to Prove That Plan II Did Not Have
the Purpose of Denying or Abridging the Right to
Vote on Account of Race.
Section 5 requires plaintiffs to establish not only that
Plan II would not have a discriminatory effect, but also
that it did not have a discriminatory purpose. In the in
stant case the District Court did not reach the latter issue,
since it ruled for defendants on the former.62 It is clear,
however, that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of
proof with regard to the purpose of Plan II. This failure
affords an alternative ground for affirming the decision of
the District Court.
Plan II was not the first districting proposal submitted
by the City Council. On March 2, 1972 the Council adopted
Ordinance 4796, (hereinafter referred to as “Plan I”),
providing for the redistricting of the New Orleans City
62 Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 40a-42a.
23
Council. On January 15, 1973, the Attorney General ob
jected to Plan I. In Ms letter of that date, the Assistant
Attorney General spelled out the basis for the objection
so as to make clear what steps were needed to fashion a
non-discriminatory plan:
Our analysis shows that the district boundary lines
in the submitted plan are drawn in a manner which ap
pears to dilute black voting strength by combining a
number of black voters with a larger number of white
voters in each of the five districts.68
Plaintiffs do not question the correctness of the Attorney
General’s decision regarding Plan I. Four months after
the rejection of Plan I the City Council, on May 13, 1973,
adopted Plan II. The controlling question is whether, as
plaintiffs claim, Plan II represented a good faith attempt
to remedy the defects in Plan I.
The most striking evidence in this regard is that Plan II
did not alter in any significant way the defects in Plan I,
The boundaries of Districts D and E were identical in
both plans.64 The total number of black voters in District B
rose from 20,012 to 20,976, an increase of 964, but much of
this change was attributable to the increase in minority
registration between 1972 and 1973.66 White registration
in District B fell, but this too was due in large measure to
a decline in white registration in City as a whole. The
only significant effect of Plan II, outside of the Algiers
area, was to move District B to the northeast, adding to it
several thousand black voters in Wards 2 and 3 and re
moving from it an almost equal number in Ward 13. This
63 Appendix, p. 29.
64 Compare Appendix, p. 27 with p. 31,
65 Appendix, pp. 623-624. The total number of registered blacks
in Districts A, B and C rose from 44,253 on May 4, 1972 to 45,546
on May 9,1973, an increase of 1,023.
24
worked a net transfer of approximately 1,000 black voters
from District C to District A, a change of no practical sig
nificance since both districts remained at least 75% white.
In Plan II blacks continued to be divided among the five
districts, and in virtually the same proportions as before.66
The dilution worked by Plan I was carried forward virtu
ally unchanged by Plan II.
The reason why Plan II failed to remedy the defects
noted by the Attorney General is also clear from the
record. The member of the Council staff who prepared
Plan II conceded that plan had been drawn up before
Plan I was rejected,67 and the Director of the Council
staff testified that in. preparing Plan II it was the staff’s
desire to leave “undisturbed the general racial composi
tion of the districts”.68 The bill containing Plan II recites
that it was introduced by one of the councilmen on De
cember 7, 1972, a month prior to the Attorney General’s
decision. Plan II was drawn up by the Council staff, not
as a result of the Attorney General’s decision, but because
of complaints from the residents of the predominantly
white Algiers section, who objected to being divided among
three different council districts and paired in part with
District A, whose residents had a conflicting attitude re
garding proposals for a neve bridge across the Missis-
66 The proportion of New Orleans’ black voters in each of the
districts under Plans I and II was as follows:
Plan I Plan II
District A 14.59% 15.50%
District B 25.26% 25.09%
District C 16.01% 13.88%
District D 21.24% 21.89%
District B 22.89% 23.71%
67 Appendix, pp. 3,50-51, 354.
68 Id., p. 213.
25
sippi.69 The changes worked by Plan II on the borders of
Districts A, B and C were “a result of” the decision to
consolidate the fragments of Algiers and place them in
District C,70 not of any desire to remedy the defects of
Plan I.
The reasons why the Council put forward Plan II, which
it must have known to be inadequate, rather than attempt
ing to draw up a new non-discriminatory plan, are not hard
to devine. The councilmen who voted for Plan II had more
than a casual interest in preventing the election of blacks,
for any such election would cost one of the incumbents his
seat. The potential for abuse inherent in this situation was
compounded by the fact that each councilman drew the lines
of his own district in consultation with the incumbent in
the neighboring district.71 Although at-large Council
man Moreau, the ostensible author of both plans, insisted
he took no interest in the racial composition of the dis
tricts,72 the councilmen wdiose districts were at stake asked
for and were given racial breakdowns on the various options
before the plans were finally drafted.73
Over and above the danger of defeat by a black candidate,
there was another reason why the Council was unwilling to
take the steps necessary to remedy the defects in Plan I.
With a single exception, all the members of the Council
lived in the white lake-front area in the north end of the
city.74 Any meaningful solution to the failings of Plan I
would have required the council districts to run from east
69 Id , pp. 112, 197.
70 Id., p. 223.
71 Id., p. 339.
72 Id., pp. 269-279.
73 Id , pp. 144-45, 208, 339.
74 Id , pp. 125, 232, 235.
26
to west rather than north to south, which would have placed
several incumbent councilmen in the same lake-front dis
trict. Despite some equivocation by plaintiffs’ witnesses, it
was clear that the Council had no intention of considering a
plan that placed incumbents in the same district, and that
th Council staff so understood.76
Nor is there any suggestion in the record that the Coun
cil or its staff did not understand that federal law forbade
fragmentation of the black community so as to dilute
minority voting strength. The record is replete with
evidence that they fully comprehended what was required
of them.76 The lame excuses offered for their failure to
do so are unpersuasive.77 The conclusion is inescapable
that the members of the City Council failed to remedy the
defects in Plan I, not through inadvertance, nor through
blind adherence to any lofty neutral principles, but be
cause they were unwilling to give up the practical political
benefits conferred on them by continued dilution of black
voting strength.
76 Id., pp. 120-21, 146, 148-50, 152, 192, 214, 229, 230, 232, 235,
297, 337, 344, 547, 571, 575, 580.
76 Id., pp. 176, 195, 206, 245, 263, 265, 333, 352, 541.
77 One witness said the north-south districts were fashioned to
conform to the natural boundaries of the city, but virtually all the
boundaries he listed served not as the boundaries of the districts
but as internal barriers. Id. p. 185-87. Several witnesses insisted
it would be impossible to draw east-west districts without dis
rupting existing precincts, id. pp. 187, 200, 326, 514, but in view
of the fact there were over 400 precincts it was conceded that the
only east-west plan proposed had not had this effect. Id. pp.
199, 575.
27
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons the judgment of the District
Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
J ack G reenberg
J am es M. N a brit , III
C h a rles E. W il l ia m s , III
E ric S c h n a p p e r
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
S ta n ley A. H a l p in , J r .
Suite 1212
344 Camp Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70103
C h a rles E. C otton
D avid D e n n is
301 Executive House
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
W il e y B ranton
666 Eleventh Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Counsel for Appellees Jackson, et al.
ME11EN PRESS IN C — N. Y. C. 219
IN THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 9 9 -2 3 8 9 , 9 9 -2 3 9 1 , 0 0 -1 0 9 8 and 0 0 -1 4 3 2
TERRY BELK, e t ah,
P lain tiffs-A p p ellan ts,
and
WILLIAM CAPACCHIONE, MICHAEL P. GRANT, e t ah,
P la in tiff-In terven ors-A p p ellees,
v.
THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, e t ah,
D efen d an ts-A p p ellan ts.
WILLIAM CAPACCHIONE, MICHAEL GRANT, e t ah,
P la in tiff-In terven ors-A p p ellees,
and
TERRY BELK, e t ah,
P la in tiffs-A ppellan ts,
v.
THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, e t ah,
D efen dants-A ppellants.
A ppeal From th e U n ited S ta te s D istr ic t Court
for th e W estern D istr ic t o f N orth C arolina
REPLY BRIEF IN FINAL FORM OF APPELLANTS
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
Allen R. Snyder
Maree Sneed
Jo h n W. Borkowski
HOGAN & HARTSON L.L.P.
555 T hirteenth Street, N.W.
W ashington, DC 20004
(202) 637-5741
Dated: May 19, 2000
Jam es G. Middlebrooks
Irving M. B renner
Amy Rickner Langdon
SMITH HELMS MULLISS
& MOORE, L.L.P.
201 N. Try on S treet
Charlotte, NC 28202
(704) 343-2051
Leslie W inner
G eneral Counsel
C harlotte-M ecklenburg
Board
of Education
Post Office Box 30035
C harlotte, NC 28230-0035
(704) 343-6275
C ounsel for A ppellants
C harlotte - M ecklenburg
Board of Education, et al.
MEILEN PRESS INC. —- N. Y. C. «̂ ggis*> 219