Derrick Bell Dept. of Health Education and Welfare (Folder)
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Division of Legal Information and Community Service, Correspondence. Derrick Bell Dept. of Health Education and Welfare (Folder), dbebb854-709b-ef11-8a69-6045bddc2d97. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/e0fb4128-954c-4d24-a7c9-b52f80de3026/derrick-bell-dept-of-health-education-and-welfare-folder. Accessed July 18, 2026.
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HEW
Derrick Bell
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Derrick A. Bell, Jr.
Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Civil Rights
Department of Health, Education and V/elfare
330 Independence Avenue, S.V̂ .
Washington, D.C.
Dear Derrick;
I have not answered your letter of November 25 because
I am punishing you for violating your President’s
orders re economy! As a taxpayer, I protest the use
of two pages of grade B stationery for a letter which
includes such unnecessarily long and stupid paragraphs.
Also, I regret the waste of the time of your fine
secretary who probably had to spend most of that day
taking aspirin when she should have been in a post-
Thanksgiving state of euphoria.
Your brilliant conceptualization of a Title VI Alert
Group is most timely and exciting.
It won’t work.
Sincerely,
Jean Fairfax
JF;df
D E P A R TM E N T O F H EA LTH . E D U C A TIO N . AND W ELFA RE
W A S H IN G T O N . D .C . 20201
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY November 25, 1966
Miss Jean Fairfax
NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.
Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Dear Jean;
Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum summarizing my idea as to how
outside groups who are concerned about Title VI can more effectively
assist in its implementation. I would doubt seriously whether the
government would be willing to take on this coordination role and
indeed the potential of the plan would be weakened if it did so.
This plan is based on my theory that government takes the most
action in those areas where the demand for action is greatest.
In the Title VI area there are competing demands from those who
want more action to enforce Title VI and those who want less.
During the last six to eight months, HEW has been taking action
in the face of far greater demand for less action than there is
for more action. This, from a political standpoint, is an un
natural situation and probably cannot last for very long.
One would think that the necessity of substantial improvement in
the area to protect the long-range Interest of the society to say
nothing of its ideals would be sufficient basis for continued
action despite any amount of pressures for less action. Unfor
tunately, experience indicates that things don't work this way
and regardless of the worth of a particular cause, very little
gets done unless there is strong and continuing pressure on
government to get it done.
While I am certain that Title VI would not survive a national
referendum, there are many more people and groups who wish it
to be effectively implemented than are able to effectively make
their views known to both Congress and HEW. The Title VI Alert
Group is one means by which those who care can make their
desires known.
I look forward to hearing your views on this.
Sincerely,
Derrick A. Bell, Jr.
Deputy Special Assistant to the
Secretary for Civil Rights
Enclosure
« - ' ‘ '' I '■yy:i,..:J''I ■ ^ - ? . ; W v ' - ■ ' - . ■■
D errick
November 21, 1966
T i t le VI A lert Group
I have no objections to the d ra ft rcaponoe to the l e t t e r from the ^
Aaooclatlon of U nlvcrnity Women (AAW) as attached, biit
of support contained in th e ir l e t t e r and conaidcrina it
out rceont d lscu M lon . con c.m ln g the need
the same kind* of preeeute on Congress »* tn te r a s t L u ld beOther side by our enemies, it aeoma th at th is group s In te re s t could oe
u til iz e d in a more e f fe c t iv e fash ion ,
I ece the need fo r o rg an lta tio n s suih os tho MUW end the members of the
Leadership Conference on C iv il R ights u n itin g in ^ n t might be *
' T U l f ^ A lert croup. Host of these groups have lo c a l u n its and p o te n tia l
for r c a c h ln r a great percentage of the l ib e r a l people in th is country.
Fm examnle th ere are almost 2 .000 NAACP branches; the Legal Defense
Fund m Sk to in s con tact with some 200-300 cooperating l a s e r s , law school
p ro fe ^ o ? s ! educators, e t c . ; the Urban League branches throughout
the co u n try th ere are the lo c a l o f f ic e r s of A. P h ilip ^ndolph s union
a L the l ^ a l m in istry of churches e f f i l ln t e d with the N ational Council
of Cburchefi.
These groups could serve as a ready and in te re s te d ^ t l e t l " f ° ^ « l o n
on T i t l e V I. Tho new gu id elin es might be sent to them, together with a
, sumnary of inform ation on school '’“• '^ ''^Sstim i progress l a s W “ ^^ ̂
the prospects fo r th is y ear, n - ^ khen com-
X r n » ‘’: r r i : L ? : e r t h : \ S ' : a l “s t T l Z l the com pl«ia.d-of
f a c i l i t y i s located could be contact p o in ts fo r our In v cstlg a to r.s . .0
io c n i g L i p . c o f i r s c r v e as in i t ia t o r s o f le t to r s to C o n g resses a ^
could L s o make known through le t t o r s . c o n fe « n c M .
T i t le VI compllanco to lo c a l school boards, h o sp ita l o f f i c i a l s , nows
p ^ e r s ^ e tc ^ c e r ta in other valuable uses fo r th e e , group, could be
found.
T we should In v etJtlca tc cardfnlly the p o s s ib il i ty of organizing
S.X it
of th is kind of organization..
I an ready to d iscuss th is m atter w ith you a t g rea ter length a t your
coTtvcnience.
Unto ^cfjool of llarbarb ?Hniber£fitp
Cambribse, iHlasfs;. 02138
April 10, 1972
Miss Jean Fairfax
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc.
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York
Dear Jean:
It was certainly good to spend some time with you last
weekend at the Washington Conference on Black Education.
There were some exciting sessions as well as enlightening
ones, and I came away from the event with both new information
and insights that I wishihad more fully incorporated in my
paper.
I appreciated your comments on my paper, but did not
appreciate learning at this late date that you consider my
Wisconsin article a "sloppy effort". I don’t mind the
criticism (although I do want you to re-read the article
and provide more detail as to your criticism), but I was
deeply disturbed that you should hold this view over so long
a time without conveying it to me. As I told you in Washing
ton, and as you will find when you compare the two papers,
it is impossible to think the Washington paper is "brilliant",
and conclude the Wisconsin paper is "sloppy". I fear that
your initial conclusion about the Wisconsin piece stems more
from your then total commitment to integration (and perhaps
some subtle brainwashing by the Greenberg contingent at the
Fund) than by whatever shortcomings the article contains.
But whether you agree with me or not, this is a dis
cussion that true friends should have had two years ago,
I am, as you said in Washington, almost dangerously naive
about a lot of things, I certainly hope the basis on which
our friendship is founded is not included in your statement.
Doug Cassel has made some progress on his research, and
talked with Professor Bittker of Yale who had just completed
a book on black reparations. It will not be published before
the end of the year, but he is sending us a copy of his trans
script. So, please spur your fact-finders to new efforts.
Miss Jean Fairfax
Page Two
April 10, 1972
Finally, thanks for the offer of your Philadelphia
apartment to use while I finish my book this Fall. I
haven't yet decided what to do, but received a very fine
offer from the Minnesota Law School which I may not be
able to afford to turn down.
Sincerely,
BOOK REVIEW
Horowitz and Karst: Law, Lawyers and
Social Change: Cases and Materials
on the Abolition of Slavery, Racial
Segregation and Inequality of
Educational Opportunity
Derrick A. Bell, Jr.
R ep rin ted fro m
UCLA LAW REV IEW
VO L. 18, NO. 3, F E B R U A R Y 1971
© The Regents of the U niversity of California, 1971
BOOK REVIEWS
L aw , L aw yers and S ocial Ch a n g e : Cases and M aterials on t h e Abolition
OF S lavery, R acial Segregation and I nequality of E ducational
Oppo rtu n ity . By Harold W. Horowitz and Kenneth L. Karst. In
dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969. Pp. xxiii, 531. $11.50.
Tw o professors a t the U C L A Law School, long associated
with writings offering support and innovative suggestions for those
utilizing the law to correct racial injustices,^ have combined their
considerable talents in an impressive and pioneering work which
presents the m aterial of a legal process course in a new and exciting
form at and, in addition, provides badly needed aid to those seeking
teaching m aterials for courses on race and the law. While unlikely
to fill totally the needs of law teachers in either area. Law , Law yers
and Social C hange serves as a valuable pedagogical stepping stone
in legal education. Some law schools have neglected the recognized
need for an introductory offering on the Am erican legal process.
M ost have failed even to recognize their obligation to offer a course
on the law’s role in perpetuating the nation’s oldest and most serious
social problem. The Horowitz and K arst book provides a means of
correcting these shortcomings, and enables the teaching of both
subjects in a manner likely to reap valuable benefits to students and
teachers alike.
Courses intended to give an overview of the legal process are
not new, but all too frequently, well-intentioned efforts to teach
fledgling law students the workings of courts, legislatures, and
adm inistrative bodies, engender more confusion than clarity . The
selection of appropriate m aterials is difficult, for to avoid an overlap
with cases the students encounter in their basic first year courses,
the m aterials selected m ay contain concepts too complex for in
experienced law students to understand readily.
M oreover, if, as often happens, the course is presented via the
1 S ee, e.g ., Horowitz, Unseparate but U nequal— T h e E m erg in g F o u rteen th
A m endm ent Issue in Public School E ducation , 13 U.C.L.A. L. R ev. 1147 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ;
Horowitz, F o u rteen th A m endm ent Aspects of Racial Discrimiruition in “Private*’
H ousing, 52 Calif. L . Rev. 1 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; Horowitz, T h e M isleading Search fo r “State
A ction” U nder the F o u rteen th A m en d m en t, 30 S. Ca l . L . Rev. 208 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ; Horowitz
& Neitring, E qu a l Protection Aspects o f Inequalities in Public E ducation and Public
Assistance Program s fro m Place to Place W ithin a State, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 787
( 1 9 6 8 ) ; Karst, Invidious D iscrim im tio n : Ju stice Douglas and the R etu rn o f the
“N atural-Law -D ue-P rocess Fo rm u la ,” 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 716 (1 9 6 9 ) ; Karst, L e g
islative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Su p . C t . Rev. 7 5 ; Karst & Horowitz,
R eitm an v . M u lk e y : A Telophase o f Substantive E qu al Protection, 1967 Sup. C t . R ev.
3 9 ; Karst & Van Alstyne, State A ction, 14 Stan. L. R ev. 3 (1 9 6 1 ).
616
BOOK R EV IEW S 617
classical socratic method, the explanation of the legal process will
likely be weighted too heavily on objective, logical analysis. Too
little consideration, in the form of economic, social and political
ramifications of the litigation, m ay be given to the possibility that the
decision sought to be harmonized with existing law through logic
and traditional legal standards was actually the result of the law
m aker’s non-rational politics, prejudices, and carefully calculated
(albeit concealed) conclusion that his action would benefit that
aspect of society with which he most closely identifies. The result is
a course that m ay be intellectually stimulating and academ ically
satisf5dng but totally removed from the reality of the legal process.
Professors H orowitz and K arst have bridged both the case
selection and reality gaps that plague first year legal process courses.
M aterials dealing with race, a subject of great intrinsic interest to
contem porary students, are utilized as the vehicle for analyzing how
the various units in the legal system contribute to the law’s func
tioning. Carefully selected writings and copious notes are organized
to assist students to identify not only the competing social interests
that underlie most decisions, but also the considerations of societal
self-interest that frequently influence the result.
F o r example, insight into the “a rt” of statutory interpretation
is gained by reading Ja ckson v. Bulloch.^ In that case, the Connecti
cut Supreme C ourt concludes, after more than a little effort, that a
statute barring the importation of slaves (clearly enacted less to
-further abolition than protect the jobs of white workers)® also
prevented an out-of-state slave owner from regaining his escaped
slave whom he had brought into the state for a tem porary, albeit
substantial, stay. A t another point, the limitations, both legal and
practical, on the President’s executive powers are clearly revealed in
a well-chosen selection of m aterials on the Em ancipation Proclam a
tion of 1863.^ A fter D red Scott v. Sandford,^ the editors need add
only a few words to explain® why courts generally refuse to give
advisory opinions or otherwise perform their function unless there is
a real dispute to be resolved. Judicial review of legislative “purpose,”
“m otive” and “intent” are appropriately discussed'^ following a
lengthy opinion striking down tuition grants,® a seemingly legitimate
2 12 Conn. 39 (1 8 3 7 ) , reprinted in H. Horowitz & K. Karst, Law, Lawyers
AND Social Change 59 (1 9 6 9 ) [hereinafter d ted to page num ber o n ly ].
3 P . 65.
4 Pp. 103-09.
» 60 U .S. (19 H ow .) 393 (1 8 5 7 ), reprinted p. 84.
« P . 99.
7 P. 287.
8 Poindexter v . Louisiana F in an d al Assistance Com m ’n, 275 F . Supp. 833 (E .D .
L a . 1 9 6 7 ), a ffd p er curiam , 389 U .S . 571 (1 9 6 8 ) , reprinted p. 274.
618 UCLA LAW R EV IEW [Vol. 18:616
method of financing public education but here invalidated as simply
another scheme to circum vent school desegregation.
T o cite but one other example, the oft-discussed appropriate
ness of the Supreme C ourt’s citation of sociological data in B row n
V . B oard of Education,^ to show the harm ful effects of racial segre
gation, is examined^® in the light of the contrary conclusions reached
by courts in earlier racial cases without benefit of any evidence.
W hat these courts did, the editors observe, was typical of w hat
most appellate courts have done: “ [th ey] simply decided the issues
of legislative fact on the basis of the Ju stices’ own education, experi
ence and insight.” ^̂
Law , Law yers and Social C hange covers four m ajor areas: the
abolition of slavery, public school segregation, desegregation under
B row n, and de facto school segregation. In each of these areas, the
editors’ notes point out, frequently through questions, the m ajor
issues. The questioning process, although a t some points clearly
overdone, does insure that class discussions will be lively, and that
students will a t least be alerted to the m ajor problems, a consider
able accom plishment for a first-year legal process course.
Law teachers will reach varying decisions on the degree to
which Law , Law yers and Social C hange succeeds as a medium for
explaining the legal process.^^ B u t whatever its acceptance as a
® 347 U .S. 483 (1 9 5 4 ), reprinted p. 186.
10 P . 195.
11 P p . 122, 143-44. See Gong L um v. Rice, 275 U .S. 78 (1 9 2 7 ), reprinted p. 1 5 6 ;
Plessy V. Ferguson, 163 U .S . 537 (1 8 9 6 ), reprinted p. 1 3 0 ; R oberts v. City of Boston,
59 M ass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1 8 5 0 ) , reprinted p. 114. In Plessy, the C ourt citing R oberts
rejected the contention th at enforced segregation brands the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. Social prejudices cannot be overcom e by legislation, the C ourt
added, concluding: “If one race be inferior to the other sociaJly, the Constitution of
the U nited States cannot p ut them upon the same plane.” 163 U .S . a t 552.
12 Undoubtedly, m any legal process teachers will conclude th at w hatever its
intrinsic interest, a full semester of cases dealing with racial discrimination is simply
too m uch. They m ay fear th a t focusing the course exclusively on one area of the
law will result in the loss of issues and problems th at do n ot occur in th at area.
M oreover, it is possible th at the legal system functions m ore objectively in fram e
w orks other than the highly em otional atmosphere th at frequently permeates the
proceedings when the issue involves race. B u t there are advantages to teaching legal
process using one subject m atter. W ithout the necessity of jum ping from one subject
to another, students need n ot continuingly shift m ental gears but can become oriented
to the area and develop a “ feel” for the intangibles th at comes with fam iliarity.
Proponents of either view can find support for their position in presently avail
able legal process books. E .g ., C . Auerbach, L. Garrison, W. Hurst & S. Mermin ,
T he Legal Process (1 9 6 1 ) (legal materials focusing upon industrial accid en ts); P .
M ishkin & C. M orris, On Law in Courts (1 9 6 5 ) (m aterials used from a num ber of
legal a reas). The latter process is the m ost frequently used. S ee R . Covington, E .
Stason, J . Wade, E . Cheatham & T . Smedley, L egal M ethods (1 9 6 9 ). I t is also
followed in the highly regarded, albeit still unpublished, H . H a rt & A. Sacks, The
1971] BOOK R EVIEW S 619
teaching tool for perspective courses, the book does partially fill the
need for a text usable by the growing number of law schools where
decisions have been made to find room in the curriculum for a course
on racial problems.^^
W hen, after ten years as a practicing civil rights lawyer, I
accepted a law school’s invitation to teach a course on the subject,
I discovered that, despite the increasing legal and political impor
tance of civil rights litigation during the 1 9 5 0 ’s and 1960 ’s, there
were simply no published law school texts devoted to racial cases.
There are, of course, sections on civil rights in constitutional law
casebooks, but none of these provide the coverage of cases and
m aterials needed for the in-depth study of the subject that is pos
sible during a full sem ester course.^^ There is the classic work on
civil rights and civil liberties by Professors Em erson, H aber and
Dorsen,^® the second volume of which is devoted to racial cases.
While a valuable research tool and civil rights law yer’s deskbook,
there are simply too many citations, m any of them buried in lengthy
notes, and too little explanation of their significance to enable its
effective use as a teaching aid.
Fortunately, I obtained a copy of Law , Law yers and Social
C hange (then still in mimeographed form ) from Professors H oro
witz and K arst. The m aterials provided an ideal framework for
reviewing the role that law and lawyers played in abolishing slavery
both in England and America.^® The m aterials on slavery and the
W^^-Brown litigation to desegregate public schools occupy just under
200 of the book’s 531 pages. T hey contain cases, few of which are
Legal P rocess: Basic Problem s in the M aking and Application of L aw (T en t. ed.
1 9 5 8 ).
13 A recent study indicates th at a num ber of law schoob are instituting courses
in race relations law. The curriculum changes, in some p art due to the presence of
growing numbers of m inority group students, were basically attributed to “ the desire
of the faculty and the general student population for ‘relevancy’ to m odern social
problems.” Association of American Law Schools, 1970 Annual Meeting P ro
ceedings, pt. 1, § I I , a t IS (1 9 7 0 ) (T h e L aw Schoob and the M inority Group L aw
S tu d en ts).
14 Editors of some constitutional law casebooks have publbhed separately those
sections of their books dealing with civil rights and civil liberties. S ee G. Gunther &
N . D owling, Individual R ights in Constitutional Law ( 1 9 7 0 ) ; W . L ockhart,
Y . ELamisar & J . Choper, Constitutional R ights and L iberties (3d ed. 1 9 7 0 ).
B u t, of course, less than a third of those volumes b devoted to racial cases.
13 T . E merson, D. Haber & N . D orsen, P olitical and Civil R ights in the
United States (3d ed., student ed. 1 9 6 7 ).
18 The need for a teaching text on racial cases b n ot limited to law schoob.
L aw , Law yers and Social C hange b in use in several undergraduate courses devoted
to racial problems. In hb review of the book, one law professor reported he used
the book in a special pre-legal course for m inority group students, and found it
“highly instructive.” Seeligson, Book Review, 47 J . Urban L a w 242 n .l (1 9 6 9 ).
620 UCLA LAW R EV IEW [Vol. 18:616
available in other law school texts, that are invaluable to a full
appreciation of the law’s effect on race relations in this country.^^
Law texts, particularly those dealing with subjects of con
tem porary social concern and activity , are foreordained to early
obsolescence by the steady stream of new developments. Because
events in the school desegregation area have moved rapidly since
the book went to press in 1969,^® Law , Law yers and Social C hange
is not immune to this problem. Although the editors warn that their
work is intended to examine institutions, not present doctrine,^®
those using the book as a substantive text for a course on racial
problems can expect some difficulties with out-of-date m aterial.
The more recent developments in the school field (as well as
appropriate cases concerning other areas of racial discrimination)
can be reproduced and distributed to students as a supplement to
the text. B u t the appropriate objective in a course on race in Am er
ican law is less the exposure of students to every new development
in the field than it is the provision of a foundation of understanding
about how the law functions when relatively powerless minorities
seek to use legal standards established by the m ajority to change
m ajority policies and practices which clearly violate those standards.
Students must learn to comprehend the significance for blacks of
17 Cases involving slaves have n ot frequently found their w ay into law school
te x ts ; those th at have are intended to m ake a point in property or agency th at
reminds one all too painfully of how effectively the A m erican legal system encom
passed slavery. S ee, e.g., W . Seavey, H. Reuschlein & L . Hall, Cases on Agency
AND Partnership 103-04 (1 9 6 2 ) , which includes Chastain v . Bow m an, 1 Hill 270
(S .C . 1 8 3 3 ), where the cou rt finds th at a slave can be an agent for his m aster,
statin g: “ There is no condition, how ever degraded, which deprives one of his right
to a ct as a private ag en t; the m aster is liable even for the a ct of his dog done in
pursuance of his com m and.”
IS In Southern school litigation, the book’s materials stop short of the Supreme
C ourt’s final rejection of the “ all deliberate speed” concept in Alexander v . Holmes
C ounty, 396 U .S . 19 (1 9 6 9 ) , and, of course, do not cover cases (although the issues
are raised) interpreting B ro w n to require Southern school systems to eliminate all
racially identifiable m inority schools even if this necessitates large-scale bussing of
pupils. Such bussing is n ot imposed on N orthern districts where serious racial im
balance in the schools is attributed to segregated housing patterns. Argum ent on
these questions was heard this term by the Supreme C ourt in a num ber of cases. See
39 U .S .L .W . 3157-61 (U .S . O ct. 20 , 1 9 7 0 ). W h atever the C ou rt’s decision, it is likely
th a t litigation on these issues will continue.
B u t new issues have arisen in the school field n ot covered in the book. The
black com m unity’s growing disenchantm ent with the slow pace of school integration,
has manifested itself in litigation objecting to elimination of racial imbalance by the
bussing of black but not white children. See N orw alk C O R E v . N orw alk Bd. of E d u c.,
423 F .2d 121 (2d C ir. 1 9 7 0 ). Blacks have m ade efforts to reject integration where
implem entation of th at policy conflicts with com m unity control projects. S ee Oliver
V. D onovan, 293 F . Supp. 958 (E J 5 JN .Y . 1 9 6 8 ) ; Brief fo r C O R E as Amicus Curiae,
Swann v . Cbarlotte-M eddenburg Bd. of E d u c., — U .S. — (A pr. 20 , 1 970).
1» P. 1.
1971] BOOK R EV IEW S 621
legal developments dealing with race, as opposed to the often very
different significance of these developments for whites. M any of the
statutes and decisions included in Law , Law yers and Social C hange
are adm irably suited to aid in the attainm ent of this understanding.
F o r example, the slavery m aterials are built around a group
of cases, each of which presents the question whether a slave is
freed when taken by his m aster into a jurisdiction where slavery is
forbidden or been abolished.^® While consciously (and conscien
tiously) dealing with the issue of human freedom, the opinions
quite candidly weigh the moral benefits of emancipation against the
difficulties, including economic loss, fear of racial strife and social
turmoil, which granting freedom for blacks might create for whites.
B u t the calculated evaluation of these factors, which appear so
calloused to contem porary readers, are quite analogous to the con
siderations that led the Supreme Court to delay implementation of
its order to end the maintenance of segregated schools despite its
finding that segregation violated the constitutional rights of blacks
and generated feelings of inferiority as to their community status
that m ay “affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone.”^̂
These “conflict of slavery” cases were the predecessors of the
famous but generally neglected Supreme Court decision in the
D red Scott case. E xcerpts from Chief Justice T an ey ’s m ajority and
Justice C urtis’ dissenting opinions are included by the editors,^^ both
of whom express their regret a t having completed law school with
out having read the case they deem “one of the most im portant
judicial decisions an Am erican court ever m ade.” ®̂
A few writers have criticized the failure of constitutional law
texts to include the D re d Scott case.^^ T he omission, except for a
20 Som erset v . S tew art, 98 E ng. Rep. 499 , 1 Lofft 1 (1 7 7 2 ) , reprinted p. 11
(L o rd M ansfield’s fam ous decision that in the absence of a statu te, a slave owner
could not recover an escaped slave brought voluntarily into E n g la n d ); The Slave
G race, 166 E n g . Rep. 179 (1 8 2 7 ) , reprinted p. 25 (holding th at Som erset did not
provide a basis for freeing a slave who while brought into England from Antigua
by her m aster then returned home with her mistress before claiming her freed o m );
Com m onwealth v . Aves, 35 M ass. (18 P ick .) 193 (1 8 3 6 ) , reprinted p. 44 (Chief
Ju stice Shaw ruling th at because slavery was invalid in M assachusetts, an out-of-state
slave owner could n ot recover a slave brought voluntarily into the state under U .S.
Const, art. IV , § 2 (th e “ fugitive slave” provision), which was interpreted as apply
ing only to slaves who escaped and fled into the s t a te ) ; Jackson v . Bulloch, 12 Conn.
39 (1 8 3 7 ), reprinted p. 59 (a result similar to th at in A ves, based upon a state statute
prohibiting the im portation of slaves into the s ta te ) .
21 347 U .S. a t 494.
22 Pp. 84-98.
28 P . 2.
24 Kinoy, T h e Constitutional R ight o f N egro F reed o m , 21 R utgers L . R ev. 387,
391 (1967).
622 UCLA LAW R E V IE W [Vol. 18:616
short excerpt or brief mention in a footnote, is justified apparently
by the fact that the adoption of the fourteenth amendment is thought
to have overturned Chief Justice T an ey ’s m ajority decision, i.e.,
that blacks, whether slave or free, were citizens neither of the United
States nor the states of their residence.
In strictly legal term s, the fourteenth amendment did overturn
D re d Scott. B u t as far as black people are concerned, this amend
ment, exacted alm ost by duress from a nation which by 1868 was
w eary of sectional division and whose people had never been
enthusiastic about accepting blacks as co-equals, has proven an
only partially effective shield against the forces that hailed the
D re d Scott decision. Indeed, even from a legal standpoint, the
promise of citizenship to blacks was seriously eroded by the series
of Supreme C ourt decisions which transform ed constitutional pro
visions intended to protect the personal rights of the newly freed
slaves into instruments that served to insulate effectively private
industry from government control. Although Law , Law yers and
Social C hange includes several of these cases as well as com m entary
on the political and social clim ate of the period. Professors Horowitz
and K arst surprisingly subscribe to the view that D re d Scott was
overruled by the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.^® Despite
their statem ent of its im portance, they cite com m ents, including one
by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes that D re d Scott was one of
the C ourt’s “self-inflicted wounds,” ®̂ which contribute to the posi
tion, understandable for whites but egregious to blacks, that the
case was a m istake when decided, and now is only a historical
curiosity.^^
B u t both history and current events support the w riter in
whose view Chief Justice T an ey ’s most famous opinion “had, and
continues to have, the most extraordinary im pact upon American
history and Am erican law.’’ ®̂ Taney worked from an all too accu
rate foundation of historical fact when he observed in hi<; famous
dicta (regretably omitted from the portions of the opinion included
25 Pp. 84, 102.
26 99
27 In another instance of unthinking conform ity to the traditional American
historical perspective, the editors, in referring to the protections granted slave owners
in the original U .S. Constitution, art. I , § 2 (slaves to count as three-fifths of a
p erson ), a rt. I , § 9 (im portation of slaves n ot to be prohibited before 1 8 0 8 ), art.
IV , § 2 (au th ority for federal fugitive slave la w s), rep ort th a t the three provisions
represented a compromise provision, for the new hlation, on the Question of the
validity of slavery.” P . 43 . I t m ay have been comprom ise for whites, but for blacks,
it was capitulation on a m oral issue from which the country has never recovered.
See L yn d , Slavery and the F o u n d in g F a thers, in Black H istory 117 (M D rim m er
ed. 1 9 6 8 ).
28 K inoy, supra note 24 , a t 391.
1971] BOOK R EV IEW S 623
by Horowitz and K a rs t) that blacks, regarded from the beginning
as inferior beings unfit to associate in social or political relations
with the white race, “had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect.” ®̂ And despite the Civil W ar and the fourteenth amend
ment, events long after his opinion was supposedly “overturned”
continued to add credence to T an ey’s position. The Supreme Court,
with the country’s acquiescence, renewed rather than repudiated
T an ey ’s view that N egro inferiority justified their maintenance in
a subordinate role in every phase of Am erican life.
Horowitz and K arst convey some sense of what occurred. T hey
note the Supreme C ourt’s insensitivity if not hypocrisy in G um m ing
V . R ichm ond County B oard of Education?^ Finding no constitu
tional bar in a Georgia school system ’s refusal to close a white
high school until facilities were provided for black high school
students, the Court emphasized that the suspension of the N egro
high school was “ tem porary.”®̂ Horowitz and K arst ask whether
there is any difference between a perm anent and tem porary closing
to students whose high school careers normally would last only a
few years.®^ T hey also question the logic in the C ourt’s willingness
to decide post-Civil W ar school segregation questions as though the
validity of the practice was well settled.®^ T hey note the C ourt’s
reliance on precedent decided long before the enactm ent of the
fourteenth amendment, and its simplistic application of Plessy v.
F ergu so n , i n v o l v i n g segregated railroad cars, to the infinitely more
28 60 U .S. (1 9 H ow .) a t 407. The legality of slavery m ade the tru th of T an ey’s
statem ent self-evident in the South, but there was overwhelming evidence to support
its accuracy in the N orth as well. H orow itz and K arst refer to the severe legal dis
abilities imposed on blacks by N orthern states with an aU too brief quote from one
of several excellent w orks of the period. P . 112, quoting L. L itwack, North of Slav
ery : T he Negro in the F ree States 1790-1860 (Phoenix ed. 1 9 6 5 ). See also E .
B erwanger, T he F rontier Against Slavery (1 9 6 7 ) ; L. Ratner, P owder Keg:
Northern Opposition to the Antislavery M ovement 1831-1840 (1 9 6 8 ).
As one fam ous, foreign observer, De Tocqueville, w ro te : “ R ace prejudice seems
stronger in those states th at have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists,
and nowhere is it m ore intolerant than in those states where slavery was never
know n.” A. De T ocqueville, Democracy in America 343 (A nchor Books ed. 1 9 6 9 ).
While the N orthern states voluntarily abolished slavery, the authorities d ted
above m ake clear th at reasons of economics and racism and n ot m orality were the
m ajor m otivating factors. The statutes themselves d ted as the basis for abolition the
concern for “public safety and w elfare” and noted th at slavery was “injurious to the
poor and inconvenient.” See Jackson v . Bulloch, 12 Conn. 39 (1 8 3 7 ), reprinted p. 65.
Again, De Tocqueville summed up the situation in a sentence: “ In the United States
people abolish slavery for the sake not of the Negroes but of the white m en.” D e
T ocqueville, supra, a t 344.
30 175 U .S. 528 (1 8 9 9 ) , reprinted p. 151.
31 Id . a t 545.
32 Pp. 153, 224.
33 P. 160.
34 163 U .S. 537 (1 8 9 6 ) , reprinted p. 130.
624 UCLA LAW R EV IEW [Vol. 18:616
difficult issue of segregated schools. Thus did the Supreme Court,
as one w riter suggests, return the solution to racial problems to
local communities, “subject to the limitation that chattel slavery
should not be reestablished.”®® And it was through this process that
the society created “ a discipline which would be as effective as
slavery in maintaining N egro subordination to the white race.”®®
The significance of underestimating the perniciousness and
resilience of the D re d Scott philosophy would be less if as Judge
W isdom wrote a few years ago, '̂■Brown erased D red Scottr^"^ And
yet the decade and more of T^osi-Brown litigation, the highlights of
which are set forth in Chapter Three of Law , Law yers and Social
C hange, clearly reflect the continuing vitality of the beliefs, if not
the words, of Chief Justice Taney. V irtually all of the Supreme
Court Y»osi-Brown school decisions have supported the basic prin
ciple of equal educational opportunity. Y e t, the C ourt’s efforts to
implement this principle were hampered greatly by the self-imposed
“all deliberate speed” standard for compliance, a standard quickly
construed to mean that desegregation of blacks was to proceed a t
the convenience of whites. The quite predictable resistance to
school desegregation by some whites, supported by the apathy of
most of the rest, hardly required this judicial encouragement.®®
The combined weight of this opposition served to limit m ean
ingful desegregation in schools and other public facilities until en
actm ent of the Civil Rights A ct of 1964.®® T he A ct was a result of
the pressures exerted by civil rights’ activists across the land who
literally, through their direct protests against racial segregation,
forced the nation to give a t least minimal substance to the m andate
of B row n and to abandon a t least in p art its ideological commitment
to D red Scott.
P . 128, quoting R . Gabriel, T he Course of American Democratic T hought
13S-36 (1 9 4 0 ).
se Id .
United States v . Jefferson County Bd . of E d u c., 372 F .2d 836, 873 (Sth Cir.
1 9 6 6 ), reprinted p. 353.
88 As the book makes clear, the policy of recognizing racial injustices and then
delaying implem entation of the rem edy was n ot invented by the B row n C ourt. P .
223. The A ct which abolished slavery in the British colonies (3 & 4 W ill. 4 , c. 73)
took effect in 1834 but provided th at slaves would become “ apprentice labourers”
to their form er masters until 1840. P . 38.
Several N orthern states abolished slavery through laws similar to a “Pennsylvania
statu te. A ct of M arch 1, 1780, c. 146, [w hich] provided th at no person b om in the
state after the date of enactm ent should be deemed a slave” . P . 41 . Slaves’ children
were considered indentured servants of the m aster of their parents until age tw en ty-
eight. P p . 4 1 -42 . S ee Springer, T h e U nconquerable Prejudice o f Caste— CivU R ights
in E arly Pennsylvania, S D uquesne L . R ev. 31 (1 9 6 7 ) .
42 U .S .C . § 2000 a-h (1 9 6 4 ) .
1971] BOOK R EV IEW S 625
I t is significant, however, that the weakening of the D re d Scott
philosophy required direct action and economic pressures, with the
role of the lawyer being necessarily supportive. T o the extent that
Law , Law yers and Social C hange does not expressly make this
clear, Horowitz and K arst endanger the achievem ent of their addi
tional purposes— “demonstrating to the law student some of the
ways in which the legal system can be made an instrum ent for effect
ing changes in society.” ®̂ Of course, lawyers and litigation played
an im portant role in the success of the sit-ins, freedom rides and
other direct action protests, extending in the process constitutional
protections in the free speech area. And, similarly, Granville Sharp,
Jam es Stephens, Charles Sumner, and R obert M orris, whose impor
tance is reviewed by Horowitz and Karst,^^ helped secure the aboli
tion of slavery in England and Am erica. B u t lawyers alone have not
been able to bring about the essential changes in economic interests
and social outlook.
While one would have preferred that the editors make this
point more directly, the reader m ay reach the conclusion that the
law, and the lawyers who serve it, can a t best exert limited leverage
in bringing about social change designed to remedy large scale racial
injustices. The conclusion m ay be inferred not only from the
historical m aterials in Chapters One and Two but also from the
plethora of current school issues in Chapter Four. The validity of
de facto school segregation, under Brow n or perhaps T itle V I of
the 1964 Civil Rights A ct, and the relevance of com pensatory educa
tion to the B row n m andate, pose the old problem of how to get the
white m ajority to allow blacks that “equal educational opportunity”
without which the Supreme Court concluded it to be “doubtful that
any child m ay reasonably be expected to succeed in life.”^̂
The m aterials in the book concerning the efforts of black
people to utilize the legal process to obtain quality education for
their children provide a valid and valuable means of conveying an
understanding of the legal process to law students. B y raising the
basic legal process points in the context of almost two hundred
years of litigation and legislation focused on race, the reader can
see for himself how predictably these cases and laws balance the
interests of the white m ajority against the entitlement of blacks to
even the most basic rights. W hatever the meaning of precedent,
the standards for statutory interpretation, the limits on the E xecu
tive’s power, and the presence or absence of appropriate restraints
40 p . 1.
41 Pp. 7-10, 40, 114.
42 347 U .S. a t 493 , reprinted p . 190.
626 UCLA LAW R EV IEW [Vol. 18:616
on the administrative agency, the particular racial issue is most
likely to be decided in a form favorable to the black peUtioner
when his interests can be harmonized with economic, political and
social interests of the white majority.^®
A final caveat may be in order for those utilizing Law, Lawyers
and Social Change in a race and the law course. The editors insis
tent introduction of questions and comments to raise legal process
points can prove disquieting when one is concerned primarily with
the racial issues. It is, for example, unnerving to read an opinion
like Dred Scott, which had the most devastating effect on the future
of blacks, and then in the notes following the decision to read the
editors’ discussion of collusive suits.'‘ ̂ One quickly adjusts to the
process, however, and it soon appears that both the racial and legal
process points are made clearer by being considered together.
The experience is somewhat reminiscent of James Baldwins
brilliant essay on racial problems in America, Letter from a Region
in My Mind, initially published in a magazine with a national
reputation for sophistication and chic.̂ ® In the article, as Baldwin
utilized his unique prose gifts to castigate white society for its lack of
conscience and morality manifested by the nation’s racist Practices,
the reader became aware of the seeming incongruity of Baldwins
words flanked by page after page of glossy advertisements of
jewelry, automobiles, furs, perfumes, all the materidistic status
svmbols for which Baldwin was claiming the country had bartered
its soul But after a time, it seemed natural and appropriate that,
acting as a modern-day Jeremiah, Baldwin’s voice should be heard
amidst the idols he deplores.
It is not at all clear from the contents of Law, Lawyers and
Social Change, that Horowitz and Karst seek to become the Jere
miahs of the legal system, but intended or not, their utilizaUon o
racial problems in a legal process text serves, perhaps rnore effec
tively than any other area of the law, to inform the student as to the
American legal system’s potential for fairness, objectivity and justice.
On the record in racial matters, the evidence prior to Brown was,
to put it kindly, not good. And as to the Brown decision and what
has followed it, perhaps James Baldwin is as instructive as the legal
commentators. In the same essay referred to above, he wrote:
Most of the Negroes I know do not believe that this immense conces-
43 See Bell, School Litigation Strategies fo r the 197 O's’. N ew Phases in the C on
tinuing Quest fo r Quality Schools, 1970 W is. L . R e v . 2S7. ^
« Ne w ’ Y orker, Nov. 17, 1962, at 59, repH nted a s j . f f ***
C ro ss : L etter fro m a R egion in M y M in d in T he F ire Next T im e 29 (1963).
1971] BOOK R EV IEW S 627
sion would ever have been made if it had not been for the competition
of the Cold War, and the fact that Africa was clearly liberating her
self and therefore had, for political reasons, to be wooed by the de
scendants of her former masters. Had it been a matter of love or
justice, the 1954 decision would surely have occurred sooner; were
it not for the realities of power in this difficult era, it might very well
not have occurred yet.*®
Little more can be said in favor or a law school text devoted to race
and the legal process than to note that its materials permit the
reader to reach conclusions about both that accord with the views
of perhaps the most prophetic commentator on racial problems of
our time.
Derrick A. Bell , jR.f
*« J . Baldwin, D ow n at the C ro ss : L etter fro m a R egion in M y M in d in The
F ire Next T im e 101 (1 9 6 3 ).
t A .B ., Duquesne U niversity, 1 9 5 2 ; L L .B ., University of Pittsburgh, 1957. L ectu rer
on L aw , H arv ard L aw S chool; M em ber, California, D istrict of Colum bia, New Y o rk ,
and Pennsylvania Bars.
DEPARTM EN T O F H EALTH . ED UCATION. AND W ELFA R E
W A S H IN G T O N . D .C , 20201
September 1, 1966
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Miss Jean Fairfax
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.
Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Dear Jean:
I thought you would be interested in receiving the enclosed copy of
a page from the Congressional Record on which is set forth the amend
ment that would completely emasculate Title VI if it were enacted into
law. The amendment failed in the House by only nine votes.
Set forth below is the so-called "Callaway Amendment" introduced by
Representative Howard H. Callaway of Georgia which was passed by the
House. It provides that:
"Sec. 606. Nothing in this title shall be
construed to authorize action by any department
or agency to require the assignment of students
to public schools in order to overcome racial
imbalance."
My views on this amendment are contained in a memorandum, a copy of
which is also enclosed. I think it is very important that civil
rights groups be aware of the danger to Title VI encompassed in
this amendment and take appropriate action to see that it is not
passed by the Senate.
With the Senate debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1966 scheduled to
begin next week, I think it also very important that civil rights
groups provide friendly Senators with information about the diffi
culties of Southern school desegregation with which they can
counteract the wild charges being flung by Congressmen representing
the South. I am certain that Task Force personnel have provided
you with detailed complaints concerning the difficulties their
contacts have encountered in trying to attend desegregated schools.
Such illustrations would be very helpful when debate on amendments
to Title VI begins in the Senate.
I shall expect to receive from you the reports suggested above,
Sincerely,
DERRTCK A. 'BELL, JR.
Deputy Special Assistant to the
Secretary for Civil Rights
Enclosures
GRESS
In a t e
iu g u st 1
lie Pacifi
JapancM
fairs, to c
cm of ad'
13510, tc
iity and
I Area i:
j and N<
if to the
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ction nc
11s, to au
he Delm
:c Buildit
I Commt
ng for tl
; Raybur
inittcc N
the statu ̂
;nts of th
luilding.
Hi.R. 166
vearing,
related hi
great scj
)nal
Itle 44, Un
itanccs wt
d by mal
the Supcrl
ally Issuct
Df Congrci
in Individ'
erlal fron:
I
I i
I i i 'i
/ir.NDMF.NT O FFER ED B Y M R . W H IT E N E B ]
Mr. WHITENER. Mr, Chairman, I:
offer an amendment. |
The Clerk read as follows: \
A m e n d m e n t offered by Mr. W h i t e n f r̂ : On
page 80. between lines 6 and 7, Insert the Xol j
S ™ r v i oI the c lv n R ights Act'
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) Is amended
by a d d in r a t the end thereof the following
(a) Nothing contained m th is
title shall be construed to
term ination of. or th e refusal to grant or
continue, any Federal
any cause other th an a violation
Sion of the Constitution, or an affirmative
provision of a sta tu te of the United S te te^
w hich has been established by substantial
No rule, regulation, or order which
may result In the term ination of. or the fa ll-
' ure^to grant or continue, any Federal ^ s te t-
ance s S l l be placed In effect i m l ^ It hae
been adopted after s e S
compliance with the requlremente of ^
tlons 4-10. inclusive, of the Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
-fcl A determ ination under th is title to
the effect th at discrim ination on the ground
of race, color, or national origin exlste. hM
existed, or In the futu re ’J.*?.
adm inistration of any program or ^ t lv l t y
shall require a showing by substantial evl
dence th a t In the adm inistration or o^ ratlon
thereof, conditions or requirem ents are
have been, or m ay be Imposed w ith
tlve in ten t to exclude, or w ith the n ecew an
effect of excluding. Individuals from partlch
patlon in the benefits of such program «
activ ity solely upon th e ground of race, color
or national origin. .,4.,.,
“ ‘ (d) Nothing contained In th is title shal.
be construed to authorize any Federal d^
partm ent, agency, or officer to Issue any nU
regulation, or order for the purpose or wltt
controlling or regulating the adm in
istration or operation of any school, hosplta
or other Institution for any purpose othe.
th an to provide equal opportunity for accea
thereto by Individuals w ithout regard w
race color, or national origin; or
" '(2 ) depriving any class of Individuals o
th e privilege of determ ining voluntarll;
w hether or not to avail them selves of
benefit provided by any program or actlv ltj
or of th e facilities of any school, hospital, o
other Institution.’ ”
Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman. 1
parliamentary Inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlemai
will state his parliamentary Inquiry.
Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman. I
It not customary for an amendment 0
this length to be submitted to the m
̂ noiity table so that we may know wn ̂
is being discussed?
. /C ,
Hr. TIicoucra .iC/j, i.966
Aasiiitsxxt Gcr.C'rrJ. CounccI, Dî rlî ion of Lo;̂ I'ji3£ion
jDcrrlck A* Beil, Jr., Actin;rr Spoo.is.1
to th e Scarete r y for C i^ '-il Sights
H,R. 14765 (Civil rjLghts Act of i ’566)—ĵIc-ugo ?Ioor /aieiicreiiC to 'fltic Vi of fclio Civil Rii:;I;£a Act of I>-64 rc ilccicl Irhalcncc.
ihis Ir in rcspCTiSG to yevr subject t̂cnarcr.du.'ri of AcTUot 25, I96G,
raquc5tir.3 our vievs on the position the Depertnent chanid tohe vith
regard to tlia Cnllcvny anxenfnerst tl'vci; enprctcly include Title
VI a restriction cu ar^y DeptrtnerAul action to overcome rccinl iô bninnee.
It is the opinlca of this office th.iL tbs Heprirnnerci: should tnhe every
rensonabic ctep to •prevciit this o:!7,CT4Aneni: iron chtnircir!̂ Scncto nnprovei.
The provisioa deco cot have any cerinite rceninj end cs c result ic being
ccruitrued by Northern Cengress-ru-in to pruvveet ccticn to correct recinl
Ijcen lcncc ro cu ltin g from cln In c tc .».ituution5i end i s being construcil by
Congi'cccetcn to Keen; thet 'iiinv cc.:i 2“:ot require: (on the -gf-ldcLlnc'S
do) tlitt adoption by fcr-ucrly scyregeted school systcris of nLan;> tb.et %-ilI insure the cliniiraticn of the ccai school eystan.
thC: Tirnvn cesaIherc can be no doubt at this date that U:o icen-dete o.
roy-uirss tlie elluiaetion of the dual schoel syst-en. The Court
held that only in this uay could Hegre chllJron be ŷrnrentced their
right to ea ĉ ûai cducatiooai epportunitpu oGutbern schccl aystco.s
vhich iinvn opted to nact the mndctc by freĉ ten cf choice picne
have, through such selccticn, pieced nuch of"the hardon for dcscgrcga-
tioa cf their schools cn ITegro pupils and their p̂ irents.. In cone cases,
pnrticclnrly vhere the nurrJber of IJcp.rees i:i the systen is snrdll, a free
cnoice plnu Day effect the discstabUsln.cnt of cbe duel ccLosi cyst era.
la aosu CSGC3, heu'-r'/er, a freedom cf choice plan* unless it Is ;uiie to
vork by huV.’ prodding, v ili result Ir. only a tchen number cf begroeo
attending vhitc schools v/hilc Lhe e\:ei school system rernins intact,
Tlius, if tha restriction on racial iube.lnr,ce is ii:tererctcd to apply
to cystons forr?iiriy segrogntci by lev. Title VI v ill be affectively
ennsculnted vita regard to cbtslning csnpii:iacc isitli tbs Brem cesa,
'G’-i the findiiigs in tl\^ recent Oifice of Education report ^ Z v u :i l ity
CL suacationai Cppcrtunity,*' it appears that the miî'»têaIice: cf ccgrcgatcd
schGoia ia i-'02:them de facto situatiens deprives Heyro cbildrea of nu
equal oducaticnal epportuuity in a way not substantiaily different ttum
0 - j A c t cr'ilf
tliat ituCfcrci by t'hca ia iiouthcra 8cIicolrj. V':>crc echcol cystcuia full
to take a;iproprlate etcps to cIi>:;l.n:c’;:-3 jjucU cr^-c-aZicn.^ xc i5‘ 'jr4-:5.r;;en
able to ccnclwde sruch oysten̂ a c:re dl::c'>ir,lnati:o tko l-k-.-.ro
ckxidrea and arc tî yoably at iiot ir. to-:yliancc vdth Title VX.
Eflorta to rcculrc cliainntiovi of £:ec:L di-vcrJU-incticn vc'cld icot be an
effort to cbi:eln ’'corrccticu c-f faclnl irahalcncô ' but bo cn cf~
fort to insure that each calldrcn irccclve tb.elr rir,kL' to ar;
equal ocacational or/portundt-v̂ . The cdoptlca end ir.yltr,c-iLctic:; of
cv:ch ii policy ere vital to an «ffcati70 Torthom cchcol proy,r<i’̂2 by
this Departmeut- Adoption of the Callnv;oy ceendatat v:,li not
specificaiiy prevent use of croh a policy (apnin, tha cin voiud. be
to C'iir4l‘c,'ite dlocriiilriaticn and any corrccuion of racial i'̂ tcXvincc
vouid be ncrely a coaccrritant ef the oliiinatiori end not the rca-aai
for xt) but it ĉ alcl thcroû ĥ iy conrase the Icsua cad mho the policy irore difficult to carry out,
Siuller o:*.iovce:3crit prebleas ?vill ariao in hospital cad other compliance
prcj?raa;a if the racial inbeleace aaeud:;;c-at i.:i <:dc;ptcd» Ary effort to
deCeruuLno the nunher cf heyrans utiny e facility end eu indicntica fren
uu that such ntmheru scan unnatirriil̂ iy ii'acil In viev of the ziueber cf
Kogroeo in the community vill bo rcsictci on iho baois that ‘re ere *‘etCs>uptin̂ to cvû rcorc reclil
For iill above rcaocc.a and vunreral '̂izrc I ehell not set forth
here* It is vicei that this Ptyarvacat take all rocsenable atcya to
prevent the e?::actmnnt of the Caliar:;’ into iau* I think
e ncetinp; to discuDO thin L:ntCcr a.-i::nld lo scbcdulci at the carlleot pooalbic tire.
cc; H. 2;aier::r. ::. Yeunaan
Mr. b. Sec'icy
Mr. F. ?. Libesi
Chron
CR File
DilBoll :d j f ; 8 -3 0 -6o o
__1