Memorandum from Williams to Greenberg and Others; Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoenae or in the Alternative for a Protective Order; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoenae or in the Alternative for a Protective Order; Order
Correspondence
December 14, 1981 - January 18, 1982

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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Working Files - Williams. Memorandum from Williams to Greenberg and Others; Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoenae or in the Alternative for a Protective Order; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoenae or in the Alternative for a Protective Order; Order, 1981. 8026ee81-d992-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/e3a98614-d5c8-4dea-8217-c3ced4f25dca/memorandum-from-williams-to-greenberg-and-others-brief-in-support-of-defendants-motion-to-quash-subpoenae-or-in-the-alternative-for-a-protective-order-plaintiffs-response-to-defendants-motion-to-quash-subpoenae-or-in-the-alternative-for-a-p. Accessed May 01, 2025.
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Memorand-um re January 18, 1982 From: : Jack Greenberg, Jim Nabrit,' Steve Ralston, LowellJohnston, Peter Sherwood, Bill Lann Lee, iatrickPatterson, Ga11 Wrlght, Beth Llef, Steve Wlnterand Jlm Llebman Napoleon B. w1ll1ams, t". k0 lt Dlscovery of Leglslators r Motlves rn the North carollna reapportionment case, Glngles y: PST1.r=t"1,, we issued subpoenas to varioui mffir-s-,of the North carolina state Leglslature. The scopeof_ dlscovery encompassed virtuilly alr lnformationreratlng to the enactment of the state,s reapportlon-ment scheme, lncrudlng knowledge of the reasons forenactment of the relevant statutes. Defendants f1Ied for a protective order, clalmingprivllege. V{e objected.. The district court aecided1n our favor. Attached. are the supporting memoranda.r am not convinced that they provlde the complete answer to this issue of using leglslators to discoverthe motlves or lntent of the legislatlon. If you have any ldeas on how thls problem should be ai-proached and resolved, r welcome your communlcltionof them. Thank you. Re NBW,/T Attach FIL F,n< ,1._y' rN TIIE UNITED S?ATES DISTRICT COUR! flcn FoR THE EAsTERN DrsrRrcr oF NoRTH cARoLrI'IA -'u ! 4lg1,t RALETGH o'u"'ol;;r,. No. r -*#^biffi:rer" RALPH GINGLES, et. al., Plaintiffs, tr BRIEF IN SLPPO]?T OF DEPENDANTS I II1OTION TO OUASH SUBPOENAE OR IN THE AITEPNASIVE FOR A PROTECTTVE ORDER v. RUFUS EDMISTEN, etc., Et A1., Defendants. INTP.ODUCTION Plaintiffs have subpoenaed Nortir Carolina Senators Helen Marvln and Varshall Pauch for the Purpose of taking their depositions on December 17, 198I. The prospective deponentg, nembers of the }lorth Carolina General Assembly, are not parties to thls actj.on. Defendants contend that the matters about which tttarvin and Rauch woul.d be asked to give testimony are privileged, hence non-discoverable under Ped. R. Civ. Pro. 25(b)(1), and that such matters are irrelevant to the actlon, hence also non-di-scoverable under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26 (b) (1.) . I. TNE DOCTRINE OF LEGISLATIVE PRIVTLEGE PREVENTS INOI]IRY INTO t-dcrs RuLe 25 (b) (1) specifically excludes from the scope of otherwise discoverable material matters which are privlleged. The corunon-law doctrine, variously referred to as legislative privilege or legisla- tive immunity, affords legislators a privilege to refuse to answer any questions concerning legislative acts in any proceeding outside of the legislature. See United States v. I{andel, 415 P.Supp. 1025 (D. Md. 1976). This concept is codified in N.c. Gen. stat. s120-9, which guarantees freedom of speech and debate in the legislature and in the legislativ. pto"u"".1 lTh€ sectlon reads as follovrst "The members shall have freedom of speech and debate in the General Assemb1y, and shall not be 1lab1e to inpeachment or question, in any court or place out of the General Assembiy, for vrords therein spoken; and shall be protected except ln cases of crirne, frorn all arrest and imprisonment, or altachment of proPerty, during the tirne of their going to, coming from, or attending the General Assembly. " -2- North carolina,s statutory provision Slarallels the speech or Debate Clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. I, 56), as well as the statutory and constitutional enaetments of most other states. In interpreting the federaL constitutional version of this doctline the United State6 SuPreme Court has written: The reason for the privilege is clear' It r'ras well summarized by Janes wilson an influential member of the Corunittee of Detail which rras responsible for the provision in the Federal Conltitution. nln order to enable and encouraqe a rePresentative of the publlc to discharge . his public trust rrith firmness and success, it is inilispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and th'at he should be Protected from the resentment of every one, however porverful, to rrhom the exercise of that liberty may olcasion offence." TenneY v' Bfc.radl?ve' 341 u.s. 367 (I951) at 372-73 (citatrons omitted). Legislative privilege has a substantive as well as evidentiary aspect, and both are founded in the rationale of legislative integrity and independence, enunciated by the Framers and propounded two centuries Later by the suprerire court. The substantive asPect of the doctrine affords LegisJ.ators immunity from civil an<i criminal liability arising from legislative proceedings. The evi.dentiary aspect affords legislators a privilege to refuse to testify about Iegislative acts in proceedings outside the legislative ha1Is. Unlted State v. ltandel , suP::a at 1027. At issue here is the evidentiary facet of the privilege and, specifically, whether such a state-afforde<i evidentiary privilege should have efficacy in the federal courts. It is clear that the S;:eech or Debate clause of the fe<leral constitution would preclude the depositi.on of a member of congress in an analogous situation. In @, 408 U.S. 508 (1975), the Court stated, .It ls beyond doubt that the Speech or Debate clause Protects again8t inqulry lnto acts that occur in the regular courae of the leglalatlve proceas and lnto the motlvatlon lor those acts.r 408 U.S. at 525. L -3- Defendants acknowledge that even the privllege granted federal legislators is bounded by countervailing considerations, particularly the need for every manis evidence in federal criniinal prosecution. As Brewster further states, 'the privileee is hroad enough to insuret' the historic independence of the Legislative Branch . . . but narrov, enough to guard against the excesses of those wlro woul<l corrupt the process by.corrupting its memhers.n 408 u.s. at 525. Defendants motion attelpts, however, to conceal no ncorruption"' with the boundaries of the federal legislatlve privileqe in mind, we turn to the question of the scope of paral1eI state prlvileges' whatever their extent and range of applicability in state court, the united states suprene court has ruled that state privileges v'ill, at times,yeildtooverridingfederalinterestsinfederalcourts' unj.ted states v. Glllock, I0o s.ct. 1185 (1980). The Court has recognized only one federal interest of irnportance sufficient to merit dispensing with this state-granted privilege: the prosecutlon of federal crimes. The supreme court has never sgrarely addressed the issue Presented here: whether a state legislatorrs evidentiary privilege remains intact in federal civil proceedings. In Tenney v. Broadhove, 9.g!E,, the court ruled that a legislator's substantive irununity from suit withstood the enactment of 42 U.S.C. 51983, and thus state legislators were not susceptible to suit for r.rords and acts wlthin the purvievr of the legislative process. Although it deals with the substanti.ve aspect of the privilege, Tenney is instructive, i'nsofar as the court there gave great deference to the state'g own doctrine. Recently, in united states v. Gillockr suPrar a crlurinal case involving the evidentiary f,acet of legislatlve lnununlty, the Colrrt clted Tennev for the propositlon that all federal courts nuEt €ndeavor to apply atate legislatlve prlvllege. In @, howevor, thc court rulcd -4- that the Tennessee Speech or Debate Claug-g would not exclude inquiry into the legislative acts of the defendant-legislator prosecuted for a federal criminal offense Throughout the Suprene Court,s activity in thi.s field no r. distinction has been drawa betvreen substantive and evidentiary applications of the privirege for the purpose of determining the efficacy of legislative privilege in federal court. Thus, the Court's conclusions in Gillgck and T93EI must be read together, and their comhined effect dictates that the evidentiary privilege granted a legislator by his state rernains inviolabre except where it must yield to the enforcernent of federal criminal statutes. See Gillocl: at 1193. Unless federal criminal prosecution demands othe:r..rise, "the role of the state legislature is entitled to as much judicial respect as that of Congress . . . lhe need for a Consress vrhich may act free of interference by the courts is nei.ther more nor ress than the need for an unimpaired state J.egi.slature." star Distributors, Ltd. v. Marino, 613 P.2d 4 (1980) at 9. On this fundamental point the Supreme Court has recently said, "To create a system in which the Bill of Rights rnonitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutionar design on its head.n Butz v. Economou,428 tr.S.47B (1929) at 504. In the present civil action, brought by prlvate citizens of liorth Carolina, Leqislators t{arvin and Rauch are privileged to refuse to testify concernins their regislative acts. principles of comity and the decided law strongry suggest that federal courts honor.this evidentiary privilege in all civil actions. rI. THE I,TATERTAL SOUgHI TO BE DISCOVERXp rS TRRELEVAIIT. The North Carollna Houao, Scnato, and Congreaalonal reapportlonnan! plana challenged ln thla lltlgatlon apeak f,or thcngelves. rncolar as -5- the intent of the legislature is in quegtion, the legislative history, i.e., the contemporaneous record of dehate anC. enactment, reveals the Iegislative intent. The remarks of any single legislator, even the sponsor of the bi1l, are not controlling in analyzing legi.slatlve t! history. Chrysler Corporation v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). That such remarks have any relevance at all precludes that they were made contemporaneously and constitute part of the record. See qniteg State v. Gila River Pima-llaricopa Indian Conununity, 586 F.2d 209 (Ct. Cl. 1978). This proposition ls adhered to even more strongly by the appellate courts of North Carolina. The North Carolina Supleme Court, for example, stated the following in D & I.!, Inc. v. Charlotte, 268 N.C. 577, 581, 151 S.E.2d 24L, 244 (1965): ". . . llore than a hundred years ago this Court held that 'no evidence as to the moti.ves of the Legislature can be heard to give operation to, or to take it from. their acts. . t Drake v. Drake, 15 N.C. 110, 117. The meaning of a sFffiFaid-EhE' intention of the legislature which passed it cannot be shown by the testimony of a memher of the legisla- ture; it rmust be drawn from the construction of the Act itself.' Goins v. fndian Training School, 169 N.C. 736, 739, The testj-mony of Marvin and Rauch is not relevant tn the intent of the General Assembly and can have no other discernahle relevance. Thus, their depositions are outside the scope of pcrmissible discovery. III. PRESERVATION OF LEGISLATIVE INDEPENDENCE REQUIRTS THAT, SHOULD If the court orders the depositions to proceed, lt Is imperatlve that tho transcripts he sealed and opened only upon Court Order. The purpose of legislative privilege is to "avoid intrusion by the Executive or the Judiciary into the affairs of " "o-"qual hranch, and . . . to protect leglslative independence.' Gillock at I19I. L -6- Legislators must feel free to discussland ponder the plethora of economic, social, and polltical considerati.ons which enter into legisrative decision-rnaking. Eear of subsequent discrosure of an individuar legislator's intent or rati.onale rvould ch1I1 debate and t' destroy independence of thought and vote. In this case, sensitive political consideratj.ons rnight be recklessry exposed by the plaintlffre proposed dj.scovery. To maintain free expressi.on of ideas vrithin the General Assemblyr as well as to protect those ideas already freely expressed therein, a protective order nust issue, lf the subpoenae are not quashed, as they should be. Respectfully submitted, this ,n" ( day of December, 1981. P.UFUS L. EDI'ISTEN ATTORNEY GT,I.IERAL Agt6rnev ceneralrs Office [. C. oepartment of Justice Post Office Box 629 Raleigh, llorth Carolina 27602 Telephone: (919) 733-3377 Norma Harrell Tiare Smiley Assistant Lttorneys General John Lassiter Aesociate Attorney ceneral Attorneys for Defendants Of Counsel: Jerris Leonard & Associates, P.C. 9oo 17th street, N.r{. Suite I020 }lashington, D. C. 20006 (2021 872-L095 , rIf. Attorney Legal Affairs CERTIFTCATE OF Sr:RECE I hereby certify that I have this dav served the foregoino Motion to Quash subpoenae or i.n the Alternative for a Protective Order and foregoing Brief in suPport thereof upqn Plaintiffsr attorneys by placing a copy of same in the United States Post office, postage prepaid, addressed to: - J. Levonne Chanbers Leslie l{inner Chamhers, Ferguson, ?latt, I{a11as, Adkins & Fu11er, P.A. 951 South IndePendence Boulevard Charlotte, llorth Carolla 28202 Jack Greenberg James l:. llabrit, III Napeoloen B. wil1iams, Jr. I0 Columbus Circle Nev, York, New York 10019 This the / y' uu, of December, 1981. RALPH GINGLES, v. RUFUS EDMISIEN, IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE i, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA RALEIGH DIVISION NO.81-803-CrV-5 eE al., Plainciffs, et a1. , De fendant s . PIAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MoTIoN r0 QUASH SUBPOENAE OR IN THE ALTERIIA. TIVE FOR A PROTECTI\E ORDER I. Introduccion Plainclffs, black citizens of Norch Carolina, bring this acElon Eo enforce Chelr righc Eo vole and Eo have equal repre- senEaElon. They asserE claius under the fourteent,h and Flfceenth Amendments to che United States ConsEicucion and under gg2 and 5 of che Voting Righcs Act of 1965, as aoended, 42 U.S.C. S$1973 and 1973c ("The Voting Rights AcE"), challenging che apporEionroenc of che NorEh Carolina General Assembly and the United SEaEes Congressional distrlcEs in North Carolina. Ptainciffs allege thac the apporrionmencs were adopEed with che purpose and effecr of denying black clEizens the rlght to use chelr voces effectively and Ehac Ehe General Asserobly apportionmenEs vtolaEe the i'one person-one voEe" provlslons of rhe equal procecclon clausc. Discovery h35 qemgnqsd. 0n Deceober 3, I981, plaintiffs noEiced the deposicions of and subpoenaed Senalor Marshall Rauch, the Chairoan of che Norch Carollna SenaEe's CouricEee on Legls- lacive Redlscrlcting and SenaEor Helen Marvln, che Chairoan of che Norch CaroIlna Senace's CourlcEee on Congresslonal RedlstrlcClng. The subpoenae request chac Ehe senaEors bring Eo che deposiElons: DocuoenEs of any kind which you have in your possession which relaEe Eo che adopclon of SB 313 t87l durlng che 1981 Session of che Norch Carolina General Assenbly. This : requesE includes buE is noE litriEed Eo correspondence, menoranda or oEher writings proposingfor objecting Eo any plan for apportionmen! of North Carolina's Senace ICongressional] discrlcts or any criEeria cherefore. Defendants ruove Eo quash the subpoenae on the grounds EhaE neiEher senacor can give any relevanc EesEiEony and that arl tesEi- nony of both senarors is prlvileged. plainriffs oppose this notion. Defendants' moEion Eo quash is an objeccion Eo Ehe entire depost- llons- Prainciffs have noE asked partlcurar questions. rf plain- Eiffs had Eaken the deposiEions, the inquiry would have incruded the fo llowing 1. The naEure of the Senator's role as Chairman of a Redlstrict ing Conrnit,tee ; 2. The sequence of evenEs whtch lead to the enacEmenc of che redistricting legislatlon; 3. Normal procedures for enacting Ehis type of legi.slatlon; 4. fhe criEeria adopced by the redistrictlng coumiEtees i 5. Fact,ors normally considered inporEant in redisEriccing; 6, The existence of any subscantive or procedural departures from nornalt 7, The extscence of documenEs, official records, or unoffi- cial records which conE.ain che substance of commiEcee, subcomictee or whole SenaEe debate i 8. Their knowledge of che conEemporary sEacemenEs by mem- bers of the legislature of che reasons for adopcing or rejeccing proposed apportiontrenE plans ; 9. The exiscence of wlEnesses co sEaterDenEs as described ln paragraph 8 above; and I0. The exiscence of oEher wlcnesses who observed or were invorved in che process uhac red Eo che enacEuen! of che chalrenged aPPorc lonulenE s . Because che SenaEors were che Chalroen of che redlscricCing comniEcees which $rere responsible for reporclng co che full Senace a recorElended apporrionoenE for enaccmenE, plainciffs believe each has knowledge relevanE Eo chese inquiries. One of plainciffs' allegacions is Ehac chese apporcionmenEs discriminace againsc them on the basis oftr."" in violation of the equal proEeccion clause of the Fourteench Amendment. In order t.o prevail on this claim, plaintiffs ousE shor., EhaE Ehe plans were conceived or nainEained with a purpose to discrininaEe. cicv of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 tJ.s. 55 (19g0); village of Arlingron HeiehEs v. Merropol@, qzg u.s. z5z (L977); l.IashinRcon v."Davis , 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In addtEion, it ls arguable that plainciffs utrst show purpose to diluce brack voce in order to prevail in Eheir claims under s2 of che Voting RighEs AcE. See Mobile v. Bolden, g.gpIi, l^Iashinscon v. Finley, _ f .2d _, (4Eh Cir ., ,80-L27 7, Novernber 17, 19g1). The Supreme Courc in Arlington Heighrs, g.lry, noEed EhaE,, "DeEermining whecher tnvidious discriminatory purpose uas a ruocl- vaEing factor demands a senslt,lve iirquiry inEo such circuoscancial anddirecc evldence of incenc as Day be available." 429 V.S. at 256. Anong che subjeccs of proper inquiry for provlng incenc lisced by che Suprene CourE are: l. The specific sequence of evenEs leading up Eo the chal- lenged decision; 2. Deparcures from normal procedural sequencet 3. Subscancive departures from factors usually considered inporcanE; and 4. ConEemporary sEaEemenCs by members of the declsionmaktng body, minutes of iEs ureeEings, or reporcs. Arlington Heighrs v. ttetro Housing Corp., 429 V,S. ac 257-268. See also McMillan v. Escamlia_gg_=_, 638 F. Zd LZ3g (5ch Cir. I98I) ; U.S. v. City of Parma, 494 E.Supp. 1049, 1054 (N.D. Oh. l98O). Senacors Rauch and Marvin would be expecced co glve Eestinony rclevanc co each of chese inqulries. rn addlclon, Ehe supreoe courc recognized, "In some excraordinary lnscances Ehe oembers oighc be called Eo Ehe scand ac crial Eo EesEify concerning Ehe purpose of of f icial acEion, . .. . " Arlington HeighEs, .guora.. -3- rn additi.on, defendanEs have raised as Ehe Fourth Defense in their Answer EhaE, "The deviaEions in in" ,rr, Apporcionnent of the Generar Assenbry were unavoidabre and are jusrified by raEional srate policies." This defense relaEes ro plaintiffs, "one person-one voEe" crairn. rf alrowed Eo Eake the deposirion of senaEor Rauch, chairnan of the SenaEe comnittee on Legisra- tive Redistricting, plainciffs would inquire about the raEional scace policies chac caused the populacion derriations in the senaEe plan and wourd inquire about che exiscence of ocher prans thac met chese poricies bur had rower populacion deviacions. These depositions and these lines of inquiry are peroiEced under Rules 26 and 33 of che Federar Rules of civil procedure and under the Federal Rules of Evidence. II. THE TESTIMONY OF SENATORS RAUCH AND MARVIN IS NOT PRIVILEGED. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provldes, in per- EinenE parE: Excepc as oEherwise required by che Conscitucion of che Uniced SE.aEes or provided by Acr of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Courc pursuanE Eo scaEuEory aurhoricy, che privilege of a rritnessr p€ESoo, governnen!, Scace, or policlcal subdivision Ehereof shall be governed by che principles of che coymon law as chey rnay be inEer- preted by che courEs of che United SEaEes in che light of reason and experience. This rule applies Eo discovery as weII as to t,rial. F.R.Ev., Rule 1101(c). Thus, in ordcr Eo deEeroine if Ehe resciuony of senaEors Rauch and Marvin is privileged wirhin Ehe meaning of Rule 26(b) of che Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ehe CourE EusE deceroine if lt, ls covered by Rule 501 of che Rules of Evtdence. See !l=f-J.;Q!!!g!, 445 U.S. 350, 366 (1980). Defendancs asserc a legislacive privilege parallel co uhe Speech and Debace Clause of Arcicle I, $6 of che Uniced Scares Consclruclon. However, che Speech and Debace C1ause applies only co meubers of che uniced sE.aEes congress, noE Eo stace legislators. Nor does the sEate sraruEe esrablishing the privilege i.il stat.e courEs esEabrish che privilege under Ehe Federal Rures. u.s. v. Gillock, 44g u.s. at 358' 374. Defendant.s do noc eite any provision of the uniEed Scaces Consticution, Act of Congress, or Supreme Courc rule which establishes a privilege which exe'pts stace legislalors froo ces- tifying' rhus Ehe courE musE deEermine if Ehe EesEimony is pri- vireged "by Ehe principres of cormon raw as chey may be inEerpreted by che courts of che unired scates tn light of reason and experlence.,, F.R.Ev., Rule 501. Defendancs ciEe no case in.which legislacive privirege is excended Eo che cest,imony of sEate legisracors, and plainciffs know of none. U.S. v. ltandel, 4I5 F.Supp. lO25 (D.Md. Lg76), which defendanrs cice in support of che evidentary privilege, is a case tn which a st,ate governor asserted irmunit,y froo criminal prosecu- cior; and Ehe courc held chac Ehere was no imunity for governors doing legislative acEs. The language quoEed by defendancs ls onry dicta, Iargely irrelevanE Eo che issue before EhaE Courr. rn order Eo deEermine wheEher a privilege paralrer to the speech and Debate crause should be creaEed for state legislators, iE is helpful Eo analyze Ehe purposes of the speech and DebaEe clause. Ics history is seE ouE in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 16g, 2O L.Ed. 377 (I881). The clause rras paEEerned afrer an English parlia_ menEary provision which was designed co stop Ehe crown from inprlsoning llembers of ParlianenE for sedicious ribel. 26 L.Ed ac 390-391. As cranslaced inco che American republican form of governmenE,, Ehe clause has Ewo purposes: l. To procecc Ehe meobers of the co-equal legislacive branch of the federal governmenE from prosecucion by a possibly hosrtle execuElve before a posslbly hosctle Judiciary, Kilbourn v. Thonpson, supra; and 2. To preserve che independence of che leglslacure by frcelng rhe members froo rhe burden of defendlng Ehemselves in courE and of ulcimace liabilicy. Dombrowski v. Easrland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). -5- Neicher of chese reason is appli.cable to the moEion before the CourE. ' Since a scate legislaEure is noE one of Ehe Ehree co-equal branches of che federal governrnenE, che firsc reason does noc apply. The Supreme CourE reached this conclusion in llr[!!!!gk,' supra, in holding EhaE a scace legislacor is noc isgrune from federal prosecution for crimes cormicEed in his legislacive capaciEy and t.hat he had no privilege againsc che admission into evidence of his legislacive accs. Both would have been precluded if a privilege similar in scope Eo the Speech and Debace Clause applied. In reaching the conclusion che CourE said: The firsr racionale, resllng solely on Ehe sePararion-of- powers docErine, gives no supporE Eo Ehe granE of a privi- lege Eo state legislaEors in federal crioinal prosecuEions. IE requires no ciEation of auchoriEies for che proposiEion that. che Federal Government. has limiced powers wit,h respect Eo Ehe sEaEes, unlike the unfercered aughority which English monarchs exercised over Ehe Parliamenc. By che same Eoken, however, in chose areas where Ehe Consritution granEs Ehe Federal GovernmenE che power Eo acE,, Ehe Supremacy Clause diccaces chat federal enacEmencs will prevai.l over cooPeEing sEaEe exercises of power. Thus, under our federal sEruccure, we do noE have the scruggles for power beElreen rhe federal and sEace sysEems such as inspired Ehe need for che Speech or Debace Clause as a resErainc on the Federal ExecuEive co proEec! federal legislacors. 445 U.S. at 370. Since a scare legislaEure is nog a co-equal branch wich che federal legislacure which passed che Vocing Rights AcE or wich the Federal Courcs, rhe flrsE reason for che Speech and Debace Clause has no relaclon co Ehis acElon. The second purpose for che Speech and Debace Clause ls Eo assure chaE che legislacors can be free co sPeek ouE wi.EhouE. fear of liabi- 1icy.Forrh!sproposiciondefendanEsciEc@'34l -6- U.S. 367 (f951) and SEar Discributors Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1980). However, in boch of chose acEions Ehe staEe legislacor was che defendanc. The cases discussed not an evidentiary privilege but. raEher a coumon law iurmunicy from liabilicy. The purpose of pro- Eeccing legislacive independence is fully protecced if legislators are relieved of Ehe burden of defending Ehemselves. Powell v. Mclqorlnack, 395 U.S. 486, 501-505 (1969). Plainciffs do noc seek Eo hold eicher SenaEor Rauch or SenaEor Marvin liable. Neither is a defendanc. Neicher !s puc in a posi- tion of having she burden of defending Ehe acEion.. A11 plainciffs seek is Eo discover whac evidence each has thar eic,her supporcs che claims or defenses. In addition, in @, -ggp53, che legislator was sued for money d:mages. Ic is reasonable chat possible financial liabilicy might inhibic a legislacor from act,ing his conscience. Ir is noc reasonable thar merely having Eo disclose Ehe process or sub- sEance of legislati.ve actions will prevent a legislacor from acclng in the interesEs of che people. Plaintlffs herein do noE seek money damages from anyone, much less Senacor Rauch or SenaEor i,tarvin. FurEfrermore, in SEar DisEributors, .ggg., an ac!ion Eo cnjoin a legislacive investigaEion, Ehe Courc sras careful t,o Point ouc EhaE che plaintiff had anoEher remedy available; co refuse Eo courply wiEh che legislacive subpoena and asserE Ehe claim as a defense in conEempt proceedlngs. In rhis case, plainciffs EusE asserc their claim in a judicial proceeding or noc ac a1l. They have no oE,her renedy. FinalIy, Ehe nccion of independence of scace legislacures is anElEheclcal co che purpose of rhe FourceenE,h AoencroenE and of che VoEtng Rlg,hcs Acc, boEh of which have che purPose of ltolclng Eh. acEtons which scaEes may rake. See, e.8., @ v. Kaczenbach, 383 U.S.30l (1956). Afcer rejeccing boch che seParaEion of of legislacive privilege. rhe Supreme CourE che doctrine of comiEy. The CourE scaEed: powers and independence in Gillock also considered -7- We conclude, Eherefore, chat alchough principles of cooiEy command careful consideration,|our cases dis- close chac where lmportant federal interests are ac scake, as in Ehe enforcemenE of federal crininal staEuEes, comity yields. Here we believe t,haE recogniEion of an evidenciary privilege for sEaEe legislacors for their legislacive accs would impair che legitimaEe i.nEerest of the Federal Governmenc ln enforcing its crininal staEuEes with only speculaEive benefit to the state legislacive process. 445 U.S. aE 373. In Gillock the imporcanE federal interest was enforcemenc of a crininal sEaEuEe. However, enforcement of the Uni.ced SEates Conscitucion and of the VoElng Rights Act is of equal imporEance. This r.ras recognized by the Court of Appeals for rhe FourEh CircuiE in Jordan v. Hurchinson, 323 E.2d 597, 600-601 (4Eh Cir. I973), in holding EhaE plaintiffs, black lawyers, could maincain an acEion againsc che members of an invesEigatory couuriEtee of the Virginia legislacure seeking co enjoin the legislaEors from engaging in racially morivaced harassmenE of plaintiffs and Eheir cliencs. Thc Court scac.ed, "The concepE of federalism, i.e. federal respecE for scace inscicucions, will noE be pernicted to.shield an inva- sion of citizen's consc.itutional righcs." Id at 501. Thus plain- tiffs were allo*ed to maincain an acEion with legislacors as defen- danrs. The incrusion here is, of course, utrch more minor. In addicion, Congress has provided chac a prevailing plainciff in an accion under che Vocing Righcs Acc or under 42 U.S.C. 51983 is co be awarded his accorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. S$I973Uc) and 1988. The reason for che fee award provtslon lg chac Congress rccognlzcd chc lmporcanco of ancouraglng prlvacc clctzeno, scctng as privaEe arEorncys generaL, co cnforce Ehe Vocing Righcs Acc and che Conscicucion. R!ddelI v. Nacional DemocraElc ParEf:, 624 F.Zd -8- 539, 543 (5Eh Cir. 1980); 5 U.S. Code Congressional and Adminis- crative News 5908, 5910 (1976). The righs Eo vote and Eo be fairly represenEed are central Eo our democratic governmenE. DefendanEs' quoE.e from Bucz v. Economou, 428 lJ.S. 478, 504 (f978), Eo che effecr EhaE Ehe iuununity of a federal defendanr should noc be greaEer Ehan the irurunity of a scate defendanE, is inapposice. In Bucz the quescion was whecher federal adminisEra- Eors should have greaEer innunity fron liabilicy for invading an individual's consEituEional rights Ehan do sfuoilar state adnini- sEraEors. The question involved cooparing Ehe proEeccion of 42 U.S.C. S1983 and the Fourteenth AmendmenE Eo Ehe proEection of the Fourch and Fifch AmendmenEs co the Uniced Staces Conscicucion. the Court held chac Ehe tlro could noE be rationally distinguished. Ihac is a tar cry from Ehe situacion here in which Ehe U.S. Congressional irnunrnity, creaEed by an unanbiguous consciEuEional provision, is compared co Ehe stace legislaEor's privilege, a creaEure of either sEace sEatuEe or unprecedented federal conmon law. Even if Ehere is an evidenEiary privilege for sEat.e legisla- tors, in Ehis case iE musE give way in the inEerest of cruth and juscice. The courEs have recognized chac privileges of governuenE officials are in derogation of che Eruch and musE exEend only to Ehe exEenE necessary co proEecE the independence of che branch in question. See, e.g., U.S. v. Nixon, 4I8 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ; U.S. v. Itandel,415 F.Supp. ac 1030. However, in rhis case privilege would be more Ehan in dero- gacion of che cruEhi ic would prevenE plainciffs froo being able Eo prove an essenEial elemenc of Cheir clains. As discussed in Parc I, above, discrininacory Iegislaclve PurPose is a necessary elemcnc of ac lcasc one and posslbly cwo of plalnctffs'clalns. To hold onc che one hand chac evldencc of leglslaclve purpose ls necessary and on che oEher chac ic is privileged and inadroissible is co make a mockery of boch che ConsciEuEion and che Vocing Rlghcs Acc. -9- This reasoning was recognized by the Supreme Courc in Herbert v. Lando, 44f U.S. 153 (L979). In'HerberE Ehe Courr held that a television news edlEor could noc claim his First Agrenduenc privilege noc co disclose his sources, Eocivations, and chought processes in a libel suic broughc by a public figure. The CourE recognized it would be grossly unfair co require che plainciff to prove acrual malice or reckless disregard for che cruuh and pre- clude him fron inquiring Eo the defendancs' knowledge and moEiva- Eion. Id. ac 170. The Courc noEed, in addition, E,hac, iE. was particularly unfair ro allow defendancs co tesEify to good faich and preclude plainciff froro inquiring lnco direcc evidence of known or reckless fal sehood. Thus the Court concluded EhaE an evidenEiary privilege, even one rooEed in the Conscitutioh, musE yield, in proper circuu- sEances,-to a demonstraEed specific need for evidence. In Ehis case, as in Herbert v. Lando, plaintiffs have demon- srraEed a specific need for Ehe evidence which Senators Rauch and Marvin have which may escablish'discriminarory purpose. This case is, however, even scronger Ehan Herberc v. Lando because, in Herbcrt, defendanrs asserEed a ConsclEuclonal privilege. In chls case Ehe privilege, if one exisEs, cotres only from common law or scace sEar,uE.e. The Supreme CourE. in ArlingEon Heighcs v. Metropoliran Housing Aurhority, supra, recognized chat in some circumsEances a oember's cescimony abouE moEivaEion could be privileged and ciced Cicizens to Procect OverEon Park v. Volpe, 40I U.S. 402 (1971). 429 U.S. ac 268, n. 18. In Overcon Park che Supreure Courc considered whether the SecreEary of TransporEaEion could be examined as co his reasons for choosing Eo puE a highway chrough a park. The Courc held chac under che circunscances in chac case he could be examined. The Courc reasoned chac alchough ic uras SeneraIly co be avoided, when Ehere was no formal record decailing che reasons for che decision, ic is permissible co examine che menEaI process of decisionmakers. Id. ac 420. -10- In chis case, as in Overton park, supra, lhere is no formal record adequaEe to deEermine Ehe purpose, or even che process, of Ehe legislaEors. A direct exami.narion is, cherefore, peruissi.ble. III. THE TESTII'IONY OF SENATORS RAUCH AND MARVIN IS RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. RuIe 25(b) provides in perEinent part, "parEies nay obcain discovery regarding any maErer, noE privleged, which is relevanc Eo the subject EaEt,er in the pending action, ... IE is noE ground for objection Ehat Ehe informarion sought wilr be i.nadroissible at the Erial if the infornarion soughE appears reasonably calcuraced co lead Eo the discovery of admissible evidence.,' Thus, in order co be enEitled Eo prevenE the entire deposit,ion, defendancs must show thac the "informaEion soughE was whol1y irrelevant and could have no possible bearing on t,he issue, but in view of Ehe broad Eest of relevancy. aE Ehe discovery sEage such a moEion will ordinarlly be denied. " WrlghE and Miller, 8 Federal Praccice and Procedure 52037 The EesEiDony of Ehe Ewo senators is relevanE Eo Ehe subjecC maEEer. Each senator was Chairnan of a Redistricting ComiEtee. As discussed in Part I above, Ehese senaEors are believed co have knowledge of the procedures used for developing Ehe apporcionoenEs, Ehe criceria used by the cormiE.Eees, other plans which were consi- dered but rejecEed, and che docr:slenEs and sEaEements which indicace Ehe reasons EhaE che General Assembly adopced che proposals which plaintiffs challenge. Under che Supreue CourE decisions in Cicy of Mob.ile v. Bolden, supra, and Village of ArLingcon Heighcs v. Metropolican Housing 9orporaciog, .W,, chis informaEion is noE sinply relevanc, iE is cricical co plainciffs' abiliEy co prove Eheir claims. Defendancs asserE Ehac Ehe legislacive hiscory and official records speak for chemselves and rhat che indlvidual senaEors' Eescimony is, therefore, irrelevanE. Plainciffs know of no official records which concain any comiEcee proceedings, Ehe concencs of any floor debaEe, Ehe criEeria used by rhe comictees, a lisc of pro- posed apporEionmencs available co buc rejected by Ehe conrmicEees, -lr- or the contemporaneous sEJEemenE.s of Ehe members, If, however, these records exisE, perhaps SenaEors Rauch'and Marvin can describe E,hem so thac plaintiffs may discover rhem. Finally, defendanc,s asserc EhaE Ehe Eestimony of legislators is noE relevanE when analyzing legislacion. Plaintiffs do not seek Eo use Ehe cesEimony Eo inEerprec any aurbiguicy in che legislaEion, as Ln D & W, Inc. v. Charlqtle, 268 N.C. 577 (1966), ciEed by defendancs. Racher, plainciffs seek t.he tesctmony Eo establish purpose. See Arlington Heighis, .ggpE. To this end, Ehe tesEimony is relevanE. IV. CONCLUSION "Exceptions Eo che demand for every rnanrs evidence are noc lightly created nor expansively conscrued, for they are in dero- gacionofchesearchforEruEh.''@,441U.S.ac170. "These rules shall be consErued Eo secure fairness in adninls- Eration, .,. Eo che end t,hat the truch may be ascert.ained or pro- ceedings justly deEermined." RuIe 102, F.R.Ev. The search for EruEh requires chac defendanEs noE be allowed Eo ascerE a privilege which wilk deprive plainciffs of the proof of one of the necessary elemenEs of their claios. To require plainciffs Eo prove purpose and Eo refuse to allow Ehem co lnquire abour ic is neirher fair nor jusc. PLaintiffs, Eherefore, request, thac che subpoenae of SenaE.ors Rauch and Marvin noE be quashed. This 30 day of December, 198 1. t1u,a" / U",**, J . Le VONNE ,'CHAIIBERS LESLIE J. WINNER Chambers, Ferguson, WaEE, Wallas, Adkins & Fuller, P.A. Suice 730 Easc Indepence Plaza 951 Souch Independence Boulevard Charlocre, NorEh Carollna 28202 704/ 37 5-846L AEcorneys for Plainciffs -L2- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE r certify EhaE r have served che foregoing plaintiffs' Response. To Defendant.s' Motion To Quash subpoenae or rn The Alternacive For A ProcecEive order on all oEher parEies by placing a copy thereof enclosed in a postage prepaid properly addressed wrapper in a posc office or official depository under Ehe exclusive care and custody of che Unlced SEaEes Poscal Servtce, addressed Eo: Mr. James Wallace, Jr. Mr. Jerris Leonard NC Actorney General's Office 900 lTEh SE. NW Posc Office Box 629 Suire 1020 Raleigh, NC 27502 Washingron, DC 20006 This ?O day of December, 1981. -13- I f'-^ a_ {ffirrvEg:I i i- J :FTIJED I I 'ftrlraac ^-** rtf, r, r lrq4l.Ss:,.1t*;Jiltrh" uNrrED srArES DrsrRrcr couRr\ u'*r ' rtbn'rtne EASTERN DrsrRrcr oF NoRrH cARoLTNA UAll 5 1982 RALETGH DrvrsroN :r.RlcH TJoNARD, v-tRh I'. S. DISTRICT COURT E DIST. NO. CAR. RALPH GINGLES, 6t al., Plaintiffs NO.8r-803-CrV-5 vs. RUFUS EDllISfEll , et aI. r De fendants ER Ihis action brought by black citizens of North carolina chal- Ienging the apportionment of the North Carolina General Assembly and the Unitedl States Congressional districts in North Carolina is before the court for a ruling on defendants I motion to quash sgbpoenae or in the alternative for a Protective order. on Decerober 3, 1981, Plaln- tiffs noticed the depositions of and subpoenaed Senator Marshall Rauch, the Chairman of the Nortlr Carolina Senatets Committee on Legislative Redistricting, and senator Helen Marvin, the chairman of the North Carolina Senaters Comnittee on Congressional Redistricting' Defendants have moved to quash the subpoenae on the grounds that the testimony sought is lrrelevant and privileged. In lieu of an order guashing ttre subpoenae, defendants seek a pr'otective order.directing' that the transcripts be sealed andt opened only upon court order. Plaintiffs oPPose the motion to quash but have not resPonded specifi- cally to the motiotl for a protective order' The testimony sought is plainly material to questions presented inthis1itigation.InordertoPrevai1onat1eastoneof, claims, plaintiffs must shor,, that the reapportionment plans were qonceived or uraintained with a PurPose to discrininatc. citv of Mobile L @, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The matters concerninE which testimony ls eought, lncludtng the sequenqe ol eventa leadlng uP te the adoption of the aPPortionment plans, departures from the nornal procedural sequence, the crlteria congldered inportant in tlre aPPor- tionment decision, and contemporaly scatements by members of the legislature,areallrelevanctothedeterninationofwhetherarr invidiousdiscriminatoryPurposeUasaEotivatingfactorinttre ORD \ >.4 decision. Village of Arlington Hei'ghts v' MetroPolitan Housing Developmen! corporation ' 42g l)'S' 232' 261-268' (19?7)' In general' without addressing any particular guestion which toight be asked during the depositions' the matters sought are material and relevant' the .legisLative privilege" asserted on the senators' behalf does ! not prohibit their depositi'ons here' fhey are not Parties to ttris Iitigation and are in no way being made personally to answer for ttreir statements during legislative debate' Compare' e'g" Dombrowski v' Eastland, 387 U's' 82 (1967)' Because federal lav' EupPlies the rule of decision in this case' the guestion of the Privilege of a witness is ngoverned by the principles of the conunon larv as they rnay be inter- preteal by the courts of the United states in the fiTfrt of reason and experience." F'R'Evid' 50I' No federal statute or constitutional provision estabtishes such a privilege for state legislaLors ' nor does the federal common law' See United States v' Gillock' 445 U'S' 360 (f980). It is clear that principles of federalism and comity also do not Prevent the testimony sought here' See United States v' Gillock' Ilerbert v. I4l19' 44I U'S' I53 (1979)' for these reasons ' the motion to quash must be denied' In an effort ,to insure regisrative independence,' unitecl slates v' Girlock' Sra, 445 u's' at 371' and to minirnize any possible chilling effect on legislative debate' the court will grant defendants' uotion for a protectiveorderanddirectthatthetranscriPtsofthedePositionsbe sealed uPon filing with the court' SO ORDERED 4- emJ ;;iffii iiimrct rUDGE JanuarY 5, 1982' :*H,,#l#'.fii.HfT,l #E::riDffi I I I Page 2 6rty q"tt'