Draft Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum in Support of Standing and Class Action

    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al..

Defendants,
NO. 35257

and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

Intervening Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF STANDING AND CLASS ACTION

Plaintiffs' standing as individuals with personal 
constitutional rights to raise the issues set forth in the 
Complaint is not a question for determination under Rule 23, 
F.R.C.P.* The Fourteenth Amendment and Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) set forth in full the standing of 
black children and their parents to attack segregation in the 
public schools. An individual parent or child has this 
standing not just for the grade, or school, which he attends, 
but for all schools in the system. He has standing as an 
individual to challenge racial allocation of faculty even if 
he was not in the school or grade desegregated.

In Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 15 L.ed.2d 265, 267 
(1965), the Supreme Court discussed the Court of Appeals' 
"holding that only students presently in desegregated grades 
would have standing to make that /faculty/ challenge. 345



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al.,

Defendants,
NO. 35257

and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

Intervening Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF STANDING AND CLASS ACTION

Plaintiffs' standing as individuals with personal 
constitutional rights to raise the issues set forth in the 
Complaint is not a question for determination under Rule 23, 
F.R.C.P.. The Fourteenth Amendment and Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) set forth in full the standing of 
black children and their parents to attack segregation in the 
public schools. An individual parent or child has this 
standing not just for the grade, or school, which he attends, 
but for all schools in the system. He has standing as an 
individual to challenge racial allocation of faculty even if 
he was not in the school or grade desegregated.

In Rogers v. Paul. 382 U.S. 198, 15 L.ed.2d 265, 267 
(1965), the Supreme Court discussed the Court of Appeals' 
"holding that only students presently in desegregated grades 
would have standing to make that /faculty^ challenge. 345



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al.,

Defendants.
NO. 35257

and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS. AFL-CIO,

Intervening Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MEMORANDUM
m  a rneom . or

Plaintiffs' standing as individuals with personal 
constitutional rights to raise the issues set forth in the 
Complaint is not a question for determination under Rule 23, 
F.R.C.P.. The Fourteenth Amendment and Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation . 347 U.S. 483 (1954) set forth in full the standing of 
black children and their parents to attack segregation in the 
public schools. An individual parent or child has this 
standing not just for the grade, or school, which he attends, 
but for all schools in the system. He has standing as an 
individual to challenge racial allocation of faculty even if 
he was not in the school or grade desegregated.

In Rogers v. Paul. 382 U.S. 198, 15 L.ed.2d 265, 267 
(1965), the Supreme Court discussed the Court of Appeals' 
"holding that only students presently in desegregated grades 
would have standing to make that /faculty? challenge. 345



IK THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
WILLIAM G. MILLXKEH, St al.,

Defendants,
NO. 35257

and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

PLAINTIFFS* SECOND MEMORANDUMIB M SBSBSL SSL SUM J^SOm

Plaintiffs' standing as individuals with personal 
constitutional rights to raise the issues set forth in the 
Ccnaplaint is not a question for determination under Rule 23, 
F.R.C.P.. The Fourteenth Amendment and Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) set forth in full the standing of 
black children and their parents to attack, segregation in the 
public schools. An Individual parent or child has this 
standing not just for the grade, or school, which he attends, 
but for all schools in the system. He has standing as an 
individual to challenge racial allocation of faculty even if 
he was not in the school or grade desegregated.

In Rogers v. Paul. 382 U.S. 198, 15 L.ed.2d 265, 267 
(1965), the Supreme Couurt discussed the Court of Appeals' 
"holding that only students presently in desegregated grades 
would have standing to make that /faculty7 challenge. 345



II? THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, ®t al.,

VB.
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, at al.,

Defendants,
NO, 35257

and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MEMORANDUM
SLwatssaL of miwswjmsMM-tsaam
Plaintiff®' standing as individuals with personal 

constitutional rights to raise the Issues set forth in the 
Complaint is not a question for determination under Rule 23, 
F.R.C.P.. The Fourteenth Amendment and SXSm v. aftsyfl ftf.JS&fr:. 
cation. 347 U.S. 463 (1954) set forth in full the standing of 
black children and their parents to attack segregation in the 
public schools. An individual parent or child has this 
standing not just for the grade, or school, which he attends, 
but for all schools in the system. He has standing as an 
individual to challenge racial allocation of faculty even if 
he was not in the school or grade desegregated.

In Rogers v, Paul. 362 U.S. 196, 15 L.ed,2d 265, 267 
(1965), the Supreme Court discussed the Court of Appeals' 
"holding that only students presently in desegregated grades 
would have standing to make that /faculty7 challenge. 345



not agree and remand for a prompt evidentiary hearing on this
issue." It elaborated as follows:

Two theories would give students not 
yet in desegregated grades sufficient 
interest to challenge racial allocation 
of faculty: (1) that racial allocation
of faculty denies them equality of 
educational opportunity without regard 
to segregation of pupils: and (2) that 
it renders inadequate am otherwise 
constitutional pupil desegregation plan 
soon to be applied to their grades.

See also, Bradley v. School Bd, of City of Richmond. 382 U.S.
103 (1965).

F.2d 117, 125." The Supreme Court rejected this view. "We do

The Fourth Circuit in a recent en banc decision, 
Whitley v. Wilson City Bd. of Educ., 427 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.
1970) said:

We hold that although the plaintiffs 
are assigned to an integrated school, 
they nevertheless have standing to 
attack the defects in the board's .. , 
overall assignment policies. —'

What is involved is the personal constitutional right 
of each plaintiff "to attend schools which, near or far, are 
free of govemmentally imposed racial distinctions. /Not just7 
the peculiar rights of specific individuals /are7 in controversy. 
/The controversy is7 directed at the system-wide policy of 
racial segregation." Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288-89 (5th 
Cir. 1963).

In Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Court made clear 
that the remedy extends beyond the assignment of any particular 
individual. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,

1/ In Whitley, white parents and minor children assigned to
formerly black schools sought the right to assert their posi­

tion that while their schools were integrated, they were being 
singled out while other schools in the system remained segregated. 
See also. Caldwell v. Craighead. 432 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1970) 
(dictum noting that sixjle black student and parent had standing tc 
attack racial discrimination in public education throughout state).

-2-



not agree and remand for a prompt evidentiary hearing on this
issue." It elaborated as follows:

Two theories would give students not 
yet in desegregated grades sufficient 
interest to challenge racial allocation 
of faculty: (1) that racial allocation
of faculty denies them equality of 
educational opportunity without regard 
to segregation of pupils; and (2) that 
it renders inadequate an otherwise 
constitutional pupil desegregation plan 
soon to be applied to their grades.

See also, Bradley v. School Bd. of cltv of Richmond. 382 U.S.
103 (1965).

F.2d 117, 125." The Supreme Court rejected this view. "We do

The Fourth Circuit in a recent en banc decision, 
whitlev v. Wilson City Bd. of Educ.. 427 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.
1970) said:

We hold that although the plaintiffs 
are assigned to an integrated school, 
they nevertheless have standing to 
attack the defects in the board's . , 
overall assignment policies. **

What is involved is the personal constitutional right 
of each plaintiff "to attend schools which, near or far, are 
free of govemmentally imposed racial distinctions. /Not jus^7 
the peculiar rights of specific individuals /ar§7 in controversy. 
/The controversy i§7 directed at the system-wide policy of 
racial segregation." Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288-89 (5th 
Cir. 1963).

In Brown II. 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Court made clear 
that the remedy extends beyond the assignment of any particular 
individual. See United States v. Jefferson Countv Bd. of Educ..

1/ In Whitlev. white parents and minor children assigned to
formerly black schools sought the ric^it to assert their posi­

tion that while their schools were integrated, they were being 
singled out while other schools in the system remained segregated, 
See also. Caldwell v. Craighead. 432 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1970i 
(dictum noting that sigle black student and parent had standing t > 
attack racial discrimination in public education throughout state).

-2-



not agree and remand for a prompt evidentiary hearing on this
issue." It elaborated as follows:

Two theories would give students not 
yet in desegregated grades sufficient 
interest to challenge racial allocation 
of faculty: (1) that racial allocation
of faculty denies them equality of 
educational opportunity without regard 
to segregation of pupilst and (2) that 
it renders inadequate an otherwise 
constitutional pupil desegregation plan 
soon to be applied to their grades.

£££ also. Bya<&,gy v. £ghool ,_3d* of city of Richmond, 382 U.S.
103 (1965).

F.2d 117, 125." The Supreme Court rejected this view. "We do

The Fourth Circuit in a recent banc decision, 
V-klUSY v. w U a o n  Mt. MaSt.. 427 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.
1970) said:

We hold that although the plaintiffs 
are assigned to an integrated school, 
they nevertheless have standing to 
attack the defects in the board's . , 
overall assignment policies. ■*'

What is involved is the personal constitutional right 
of each plaintiff "to attend schools which, near or far, are 
free of govemmentally imposed racial distinctions. /Not jusjfc7 
the peculiar rights of specific individuals /ar§7 in controversy. 
/The controversy ig7 directed at the system-wide policy of 
racial segregation." Potts v. Flax. 313 F.2d 284, 288-89 (5th 
Cir. 1963).

In Brown II. 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Court made clear 
that the remedy extends beyond the assignment of any particular 
individual. s*g l&ifefid v. Jefferson County Bd. of Sduc..

1/ In Whitley, white parents and minor children assigned to
formerly black schools sought the right to assert their posi­

tion that while their schools were integrated, they were being 
singled out while other schools in the system remained segregated. 
Sjge alaa. caldwgjj. V. Crai^iegd. 432 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1970) 
(dictum noting that algle black student and parent had standing to 
attack racial discrimination in public education throughout state!)

2-



not agree and remand for a prompt evidentiary hearing on this
issue." It elaborated as follows:

Two theories would give students not 
yet in desegregated grades sufficient 
interest to challenge racial allocation 
of faculty: (1) that racial allocation
of faculty denies theta equality of 
educational opportunity without regard 
to segregation of pupils? and (2) that 
it renders inadequate an otherwise 
constitutional pupil desegregation plan 
soon to be applied to their grades.

£ss g.sas&ay v. atiteaUtik. fittaLflt lU&aaRa* 382 u.s.
103 (1965).

F.2d 117, 125." The Supreme Court rejected this view. "We do

The Fourth Circuit in a recent jgi banc decision, 
i^.Ugy V. W U P Q R  C t o  M m. Mttgjt. 427 F«* 2<* X70 (4th Cir.
1970) said:

we hold that although the plaintiffs 
are assigned to an integrated school, 
they nevertheless have standing to 
attack the defects in the board's . , 
overall assignment policies. ■*'

that is involved is the personal constitutional right 
of each plaintiff "to attend schools which, near or far, are 
free of yovernmentally imposed racial distinctions, /jtiot jus$7 
the peculiar rights of specific individuals /arjj7 in controversy.

ocntsovwr^ u ff <U«c«»d at th. ayatao-wld. policy of 
racial segregation." Potts v. Flax. 313 F.2d 284, 288-89 (5th 
Cir. 1963).

In Brown II. 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Court made clear 
that the remedy extends beyond the assignment of any particular 
individual. S*s v. jU U aaU S*SatBiaL M*. ffiC. JBtiBBa»

1 / In hitiev. white parents and minor children assigned to
formerly black schools sought the ric^ht to assert their posi­

tion that while their schools were integrated, they were being
singled the system remained segregated 

432 F.2d 213, 217 (6th
to

.r. 1970)
student and parent had standing 

discrimination in public education throughout state)

2



not agree and remand for a prompt evidentiary hearing cm this
issue." It elaborated as follows:

Two theories would give students not 
yet in desegregated grades sufficient 
interest to challenge racial allocation 
of faculty: (1) that racial allocation
of faculty denies them actuality of 
educational opportunity without regard 
to segregation of pupils: and (2) that 
it renders inadequate an otherwise 
constitutional pupil desegregation plan 
soon to he applied to their grades.

See also. Bradley v. 9 t  Slty 9l iUd&FWnfl# 3®2 u.s.
103 (1965).

F.2d 117, 125." The Supreme Court rejected this view, "we do

The Fourth circuit in a recant banc decision, 
i.&iUra V. 'j .iXpqn, .qJLfcY. ,3dt, <3& ffi,t» *27 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.
1970) said:

we hold that although the plaintiffs 
are assigned to an integrated school, 
they nevertheless have standing to 
attack the defects in the board's . , 
overall assignment policies. **

what is involved is the personal constitutional right 
of each plaintiff "to attend schools which, near or far, are 
free of govermoentally imposed racial distinctions. jusjfe7
the peculiar rights of specific individuals in controversy.
/The controversy t j j  directed at the system-wide policy of 
racial segregation." Potts v. Flax. 313 F.2d 284, 286-89 (5th 
Cir. 1963).

In Brown II. 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Court made clear 
that the remedy extends beyond the assignment of any particular 
individual. v. £9Maty M i

-2



372 F.2d 836 (1966), aff1d on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967): . . states
/hav§7 the duty of fumighing an integrated school system, that 
is the duty of 'effectuating a transition to a racially non­
discriminatory school system.' " 372 F.2d at 867 (quoting
.from Brown II at 301? emphasis added by Wisdom, J.).

Thus for all practical purposes the relief in a 
school segregation case extends to the entire school system.
Potts v. Flax, supra; Moore's Federal Practice 3B, App., 5.23.10-1 
at 2768 (1969).

Plaintiffs' standing as individuals to obtain this 
relief is without reference to Rule 23, F.R.C.P. sufficient to 
cover all aspects of the public schools in the city of Detroit.

In other cases discussing class actions the courts 
have held that racial segregation is by definition class discrim­
ination. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1966); Oatis v. Crown-Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 
(5th Cir. 1968); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th
Cir. 1968); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.. ___ F.2d ___
(8th Cir. 1970); see Moore's Federal Practice 3B, App. 23.10-1 
at 2761-62.

Thus, for all practical purposes it makes no difference 
whether the Court views this action technically as a class action! 
the inquiry into the factual and legal issues and any ultimate 
relief granted will be the same whether this action is prosecuted 
by the named plaintiffs on their own behalf or on behalf of some 
larger group. Potts v. Flax, supra; Moore's Federal aactice 3B, 
App., 23.10-1 at 2768. As no individual has a constitutional
right to a public school system not operated in conformity with
the Constitution, class action questions are academic.

-3-



372 F.2d 836 (1966), aff'd on rehearing en banc. 380 F.2d 385
(5th Cir.), cert, denied. 389 U.S. 840 (1967): ”. . .  states
/hav§7 the duty of fumighing an integrated school system, that 
is the duty of 'effectuating a transition to a racially non­
disc rimina to ry school system.* H 372 F.2d at 867 (quoting 
Xrom Brown II at 301? emphasis added by Wisdom, J.).

Thus for all practical purposes the relief in a 
school segregation case extends to the entire school system.
Potts v. Flax, supra: Moore's Federal Practice 3B, App., 5.23.10-:. 
at 2768 (1969).

Plaintiffs' standing as individuals to obtain this 
relief is without reference to Rule 23, F.R.C.P. sufficient to 
cover all aspects of the public schools in the city of Detroit.

In other cases discussing class actions the courts 
have held that racial segregation is by definition class discrim­
ination. Hall v. werthan Baa Corp.. 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1966): Qatis v. Crown-Zellerbach Corp.. 398 F.2d 496, 499 
(5th Cir. 1968)t Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.. 400 F.2d 28 (5th
Cir. 1968): Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.. ___ F . 2 d___
(8th Cir. 1970): see Moore's Federal Practice 3B, App. 23.10-1 
at 2761-62.

Thus, for all practical purposes it makes no difference 
whether the Court views this action technically as a class action: 
the inquiry into the factual and legal issues and any ultimate 
relief granted will be the same whether this action is prosecuted 
by the named plaintiffs on their own behalf or on behalf of some 
larger group. Potts v. Flax, supra: Moore's Federal aactice 3B, 
App., 23.10-1 at 2768. As no individual has a constitutional 
right to a public school system not operated in conformity with 
the Constitution, class action questions are academic.

-3-



372 F. 2d 836 (1966), aff'_d on rehearing £n bapc, 380 F.2d 385 
(5th Cir.), cert, denied. 389 U.S. 840 (1967)* ". . . states
/havg7 the duty of furnishing an integrated school system, that 
is the duty of ’effectuating a transition to a racially non­
discriminatory school system.* " 372 F.2d at 867 (quoting
j£rom Brown II at 301? emphasis added hy Wisdom, J.).

ihus for all practical purposes the relief in a 
school segregation case extends to the entire school system.
Potts v. Flax, supra? Moore’s Federal Practice 3B, App., 5.23.10-, 
at 2768 (1969).

Plaintiffs' standing as individuals to obtain this 
relief is without reference to Rule 23, F.R.C.P. sufficient to 
cover all aspects of the public schools in the city of Detroit.

In other cases discussing class actions the courts 
have held that racial segregation is by definition class discrim­
ination. Hall v. Verthan Baa Corp.. 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1966)? Qatig v. Crowrv-Sgllerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 
(5th Cir. 1968)? V. y&Ja« LSafl.SPSHx • 400 p *2d 28 <5th
Cir. 1968)? v. Soiathtfgjj&gm I t U J E iLi.SSU • ___ p -2 d ___
(8th Cir. 1970)? see Moore's Federal Practice 3B, App. 23.10-1 
at 2761-62.

Thus, for all practical purposes it makes no difference 
whether the Court views this action technically as a class action: 
the inquiry into the factual and legal issues and any ultimate 
relief granted will be the same whether this action is prosecuted 
by the named plaintiffs on their own behalf or on behalf of some 
larger group. Potts v. Flax, supra; Moore's Federal aactice 3B, 
App., 23.10-1 at 2768. As no individual has a constitutional 
right to a public school system not operated in conformity with 
the Constitution, class action questions are academic.

-3-



372 F.2d 836 (1966), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385 
(5th Cir.), cert, denied. 389 U.S. 840 (1967)* -. . . states
2*havs7 the duty of fumighing an integrated school system, that 
is the duty of 'effectuating a transition to a racially non­
discriminatory school system. * " 372 F.2d at 867 (quoting
JLrota Brovin II at 3017 ecphasis added by wisdom, J.).

Thus for all practical purposes the relief in a 
school segregation case extends to the entire school system.
Potts v. Flax, supra* Moore's Federal Practice 3B, App., 5.23.10-;i
at 2768 (1969).

Plaintiffs' standing as individuals to obtain this 
relief is without reference to Rule 23, F.R.C.P. sufficient to 
cover all aspects of the public schools in the city of Detroit

In other cases discussing class actions the courts 
have held that racial segregation is by definition class discrim­
ination. Hall v. Verthan Baa Coro.. 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1966)7 Qatls v. Crown-:: oiler bach Corn.. 398 F.2d 496, 499 
(5th Cir. 1968)7 Jenkins v. United Gas Coro.. 400 P.2d 28 (5th
Cir. 1968)7 v. fiflllflMMfem EftH U L l fltta» ___  ***2d ___
(8th Cir. 1970)7 see Moore's Federal Practice 3B, App. 23.10-1 
at 2761-62.

Thus, for all practical purposes it makes no difference 
whether the Court views this action technically as a class action t 

the inquiry into the factual and legal issues and any ultimate 
relief granted will be the same whether this action is prosecuted 
by the named plaintiffs on their own behalf or on behalf of some 
larger group. Potts v. Flax, supra? Moore's Federal Beetles 3B, 
App., 23.10-1 at 2768. As no Individual has a constitutional
right to a public school system not operated in conformity with
the Constitution, class action questions are academic.

-3-



372 F,2d 836 (1966), aff'd rehearing jgj banc, 380 F.2d 385 
(5th Cir.) * cart, denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) s *. . . states 
j^&ys7 the duty of fumi#iing an integrated school system, that 
is the duty of 'effectuating a transition to a racially non­
discriminatory school system. * ** 372 F.2d at 867 (quoting
Iron Broun II at 301 r ecfhasis added by wisdom, J«)»

Thus for all practical purposes the relief in a 
school segregation case extends to the entire school system.
Potts v. Flax, suora? Moore's Federal Practice 3B, App., 5.23,10-1 
at 2768 (1969).

Plaintiffs* standing as individuals to obtain this 
relief is without reference to Rule 23, F.R.C.P. sufficient to 
cover all aspects of the public schools in the city of Detroit.

in other cases discussing class actions the courts 
have held that racial segregation is by definition class 
ination. Hall v. v.erthan Baa Coro., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1966)? oatls v. Crown-Zellerbach Corn.. 398 F.2d 496 , 499 
(3th Cir. 1968)? Jenkins v. United Gas Coro.. 400 F.2d 28 (5th
Cir. 1968)? , £ M t e  v. > ___  F . 2 d___
(8th Cir. 1970)? see Moore's Federal Practice 38, App. 23.10-1 
at 2761-62.

Thus, for all practical purposes it 
whether the Court views this action technically as 
the inquiry into the factual and legal issues and any ultimate 
relief granted will be the easts whether this action is prosecuted 
by the named plaintiffs cm their own behalf or cm behalf of some 
larger group. Potts v. Flax, supra? Moore's Federal a&ctice 38, 
App., 23.10-1 at 2768. As no individual has a constitutional
right to a public school system not operated in conformity with
the Constitution, class action questions are academic.

3-