Brumfield v. Dodd Memorandum in Support of Request for Attorney's Fee and Expenses

Public Court Documents
1975

Brumfield v. Dodd Memorandum in Support of Request for Attorney's Fee and Expenses preview

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  • Case Files, Norwood v. Harrison - Hardbacks. Brumfield v. Dodd Memorandum in Support of Request for Attorney's Fee and Expenses, 1975. b68c09f5-722e-f111-88b4-000d3a199651. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/ea91dcf4-5046-4a96-8a31-0521016fa4e2/brumfield-v-dodd-memorandum-in-support-of-request-for-attorneys-fee-and-expenses. Accessed July 18, 2026.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

NEW ORLEANS DIVISION 

OLESS BRUMFIELD, ET AL., : 

Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION 

NO. 71-1316 
(THREE-JUDGE COURT) 

V. 

WILLIAM J. DODD, ET AL., 

Defendants. SECTION: B 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEE AND EXPENSES 
  

Section 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 

U.S.C.§1617, provides that: 

Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the 
United States against a local educational agency, 

a state (or-any agency thereof), or the United 
States (or any agency thereof), for failure to 
comply with any provision of this chapter or for 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin in violation of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment to the Constitution of the United States as 
they pertain to elementary and secondary educa- 
tion, the court, in its discretion, upon a finding 
that the proceedings were necessary to bring about 
compliance, may allow the prevailing party, other 
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's 
fee as part of the costs, 

This suit was filed to vindicate the Fourteenth Amendment 

rights of black children attending public schools throughout the 

state of Louisiana by requiring the elimination of public aid to 

private, racially segregated schools. The defendants are the 

State Department of Education, the State Superintendent of Educa- 

tion, the State Board of Secondary and Elementary Education, its 

members, and various local school boards. Defendants’ memorandum 

filed recently in this case, attacks some aspects of the relief 

requested by plaintiffs and the United States, but virtually con- 

cedas that plaintiffs will be ''the prevailing party" within the 

meaning of Section 718. The history of this litigation plainly 

demonstrates that it "was necessary to bring about compliance". 

Indeed, the public aid to segregationist schools which plaintiffs 

  

    

 



  

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complain of is being distributed undiminished in the current school 

year. Accordingly, this is an appropriate case for an award of 

attorney's fees. 

In Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis City 

Schools, 412 U.8.427, 428 (1973), the Supreme Court held that under 

  

Section 718, "[t]he successful plaintiff should ordinarily recover 

an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such 

an award unjust", thus adopting the standard for attorney's fee 

awards established for the civil rights acts of 1964 in Newman v.   

Pigogie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S.400 (1968). Plaintiffs suggest 
  

that no special circumstances exist in this case which would make 

such an award unfair, 

Though §718 became effective after this case was filed, an 

award of fees under the act is appropriate for time spent prior to 

the effective date of the Act. In Bradley v. School Board of Rich- 

mond, 416 U.S.696 (1974), the Court held that Section 718 1s appli- 

  

cable to litigation pre~dating, but pending, on the effective date 

of the statute, See also, Thompson v. Madison County Board of 

Education, 496 P.2d 682, 690 (5th Cir.1974). 

  

  

Though the Court need not go beyond Section 718 to award 

attorney's fees, plaintiffs feel that an alternate ground for the 

award is the obdurate behavior of defendants in not terminating 

aid to private segregated schools after the decision of the Supreme 

Court in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.455 (1973), thus requiring 
  

the continuation of this litigation. See, Lee v. Southern lome- 

Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir.1970), McLaurin v. Columbia 

  

    

Municipal Separate School District, 478 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 
  

1973); Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 480 

F.2d 583, 3585 (5th Cir.1973). 

  

Respectfully submitted, 

  

George IM. Strickler Jr. 
344 Camp Street, Suite 1212 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 
Telephone: 581-2688 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 

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