Brumfield v. Dodd Memorandum in Support of Request for Attorney's Fee and Expenses
Public Court Documents
1975
2 pages
Cite this item
-
Case Files, Norwood v. Harrison - Hardbacks. Brumfield v. Dodd Memorandum in Support of Request for Attorney's Fee and Expenses, 1975. b68c09f5-722e-f111-88b4-000d3a199651. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/ea91dcf4-5046-4a96-8a31-0521016fa4e2/brumfield-v-dodd-memorandum-in-support-of-request-for-attorneys-fee-and-expenses. Accessed July 18, 2026.
Copied!
[||32cc6948-0e4d-4937-9b41-d43c6afcbb4e||] " oe 400
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
NEW ORLEANS DIVISION
OLESS BRUMFIELD, ET AL., :
Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION
NO. 71-1316
(THREE-JUDGE COURT)
V.
WILLIAM J. DODD, ET AL.,
Defendants. SECTION: B
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEE AND EXPENSES
Section 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20
U.S.C.§1617, provides that:
Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the
United States against a local educational agency,
a state (or-any agency thereof), or the United
States (or any agency thereof), for failure to
comply with any provision of this chapter or for
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in violation of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States as
they pertain to elementary and secondary educa-
tion, the court, in its discretion, upon a finding
that the proceedings were necessary to bring about
compliance, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs,
This suit was filed to vindicate the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of black children attending public schools throughout the
state of Louisiana by requiring the elimination of public aid to
private, racially segregated schools. The defendants are the
State Department of Education, the State Superintendent of Educa-
tion, the State Board of Secondary and Elementary Education, its
members, and various local school boards. Defendants’ memorandum
filed recently in this case, attacks some aspects of the relief
requested by plaintiffs and the United States, but virtually con-
cedas that plaintiffs will be ''the prevailing party" within the
meaning of Section 718. The history of this litigation plainly
demonstrates that it "was necessary to bring about compliance".
Indeed, the public aid to segregationist schools which plaintiffs
* oo ‘oe
complain of is being distributed undiminished in the current school
year. Accordingly, this is an appropriate case for an award of
attorney's fees.
In Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis City
Schools, 412 U.8.427, 428 (1973), the Supreme Court held that under
Section 718, "[t]he successful plaintiff should ordinarily recover
an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such
an award unjust", thus adopting the standard for attorney's fee
awards established for the civil rights acts of 1964 in Newman v.
Pigogie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S.400 (1968). Plaintiffs suggest
that no special circumstances exist in this case which would make
such an award unfair,
Though §718 became effective after this case was filed, an
award of fees under the act is appropriate for time spent prior to
the effective date of the Act. In Bradley v. School Board of Rich-
mond, 416 U.S.696 (1974), the Court held that Section 718 1s appli-
cable to litigation pre~dating, but pending, on the effective date
of the statute, See also, Thompson v. Madison County Board of
Education, 496 P.2d 682, 690 (5th Cir.1974).
Though the Court need not go beyond Section 718 to award
attorney's fees, plaintiffs feel that an alternate ground for the
award is the obdurate behavior of defendants in not terminating
aid to private segregated schools after the decision of the Supreme
Court in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.455 (1973), thus requiring
the continuation of this litigation. See, Lee v. Southern lome-
Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir.1970), McLaurin v. Columbia
Municipal Separate School District, 478 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir.
1973); Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 480
F.2d 583, 3585 (5th Cir.1973).
Respectfully submitted,
George IM. Strickler Jr.
344 Camp Street, Suite 1212
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Telephone: 581-2688
Attorney for Plaintiffs
“du [||32cc6948-0e4d-4937-9b41-d43c6afcbb4e||]