Lytle v. Household Manufacturing Inc. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1988
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Lytle v. Household Manufacturing Inc. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 1988. 156a112f-bc9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/ee9161b3-dd53-45e6-84e8-a3133217f62d/lytle-v-household-manufacturing-inc-petition-for-writ-of-certiorari. Accessed May 14, 2025.
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No. 88- -WA
I n th e
§>npnmz (tart of % Itutrib £>tatra
October Term, 1988
J ohn S. L ytle,
Petitioner,
v.
H ousehold Manufacturing Inc.,
d /b /a Schwitzer T urbochargers,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Julius L eV onne Chambers
Charles Stephen R alston
R onald L. E llis
Judith R eed*
E ric Schnapper
NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street
16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
P enda D. Hair
1275 K Street, N.W.
Suite 301
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-1300
Attorneys for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED
Did th e Fourth C i r c u i t c o r r e c t l y
h o ld th a t d i s t r i c t c o u r t v i o l a t i o n s o f
th e Seventh Amendment are u n rev iew ab le by
th e a p p e l la t e c o u r ts i f th e t r i a l ju d g e ,
a f t e r v i o l a t i n g th e Amendment by r e fu s in g
t o em panel a j u r y , com pounds t h a t
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f r a c t i o n by d e c id in g
h im s e lf th e v e ry fa c t u a l is s u e which
shou ld have been p resen ted t o and d e c id e d
by a ju r y ?
i
PARTIES
A l l p a r t i e s in t h i s m atter are s e t
f o r t h in th e c a p t io n .
ii
Q uestion P resen ted ........................ i
P a r t ie s ............. i i
Table o f Contents .......................... i i i
T able o f A u t h o r i t ie s ................... v
C i t a t io n s To O pinions Below . . 2
J u r i s d i c t i o n ...................................... 2
S ta tu te s , C o n s t i t u t io n a l Pro
v i s i o n and Rules
I n v o lv e d ...................................... 3
Statement o f th e Case ................. 5
Reasons f o r Granting The
W rit ............................................. 11
I . The H olding o f th e Fourth
C i r c u i t Has Been
E x p ress ly R e je c te d By
Four Other C i r c u i t s , And
I s I n c o n s is t e n t With the
P r a c t i c e s o f Nine Other
C i r c u i t s ......................... 11
I I . The D e c is io n Below
C o n f l i c t s With E ight
D e c is io n s o f t h i s C o u r t . . 30
I I I . The D e c is io n Below Poses
S er iou s Problems f o r
E f f i c i e n t J u d ic ia l
A d m in is tr a t io n ........................ 37
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
iii
Page
IV. The D e c is io n Below
Should Be Summarily
R ev ersed ...................................... 4 3
C on c lu s ion .......................................... 53
Appendix
O pinion o f th e Court o f the
A pp ea ls , O ctober 20,
1987 ....................................... la
Order Denying Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc,
A p r i l 27, 1988 ..................... 22a
D i s t r i c t Court D e c is io n from
th e Bench, T r i a l Tran
s c r i p t o f February 26,
1986............................................... 25a
Judgment, February 27, 1986 . . 32a
Order o f D ism issa l,
February 27, 1986................. 34a
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Amoco O il Co. v . Torcomian,
722 F.2d 1099 (3d C ir . 1 9 8 3 ) . . 29
B a y l is v . T r a v e le r s '
Insuran ce C o ., 113 U.S. 316
(1 8 8 5 ) .............................................. 32
Beacon T h eatres , In c . v .
W estover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959) 1 4 ,2 1 ,2 2 ,3 2 -3 5
Bibbs v . Jim Lynch C a d i l la c ,
I n c . , 653 F .2d 316
(8th C ir . 1981) 29
Bouchet v . N ation a l Urban
League, 730 F .2d 799
(D.C. C ir . 1984) 27 ,28
Cohen v . B e n e f i c i a l I n d u s t r ia l
Loan C o rp ., 337 U.S. 541
(1 9 4 9 ) ............................................ 39
C u rt is v . L oeth er , 415 U.S. 189
(1 9 7 4 ) ....................................... 32
Dairy Queen, In c . v . Wood,
369 U.S. 469 ( 1 9 6 2 ) . . .............. 1 4 ,3 4 -3 5 ,4 8
EEOC v . Corry Jamestown C orp .,
719 F.2d 1219 (3d C ir . 1983). 26 ,29
H all v . Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644
(11th C ir . 1 9 8 7 ) ................ 29
v
Cases: Page
H ildebrand v . Bd. o f T ru stees
o f M ichigan S ta te U n iv . ,
607 F.2d 705 (6th C ir . 1 9 7 9 ) . . 29
Hodges v . E aston, 106 U.S. 408
(1882) ................................................. 32
Hussein v . Oshkosh Motor
Truck C o ., 816 F .2d 348
(7 th C ir . 1 9 8 7 ) ........................9 ,1 5 ,2 1 -2 3 ,2 5
Johnson v . M is s i s s ip p i ,
100 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1 9 8 8 ) ........................ 17
Johnson v . Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . . 7
K e l l e r v . P r in ce G e o rg e 's
County, 827 F .2d 952
(4 th C ir . 1 9 8 7 ) .......................... .. . 40
Lewis v . Thigpen, 767 F .2d 252
(5th C ir . 1 9 8 5 ) ......................................... 29
Marshak v . T o n e t i , 813 F .2d 13
(1 s t C ir . 1 9 8 7 ) ......................................... 29
M atter o f M e r r i l l ,
594 F .2d 1064 (5th C ir .
1 9 7 9 ) ................................................................ 29
Meeker O i l v . Ambassador O il
C o r p . , 375 U.S. 160
(1 9 6 3 ) .......................................... 1 3 ,1 4 ,3 2 -3 5 ,4 1
Morgantown v . Royal Insurance
C o . , 337 U.S. 264 (1 9 4 9 ) .......... 4 0 ,4 1 ,4 7
Palmer v . U nited S ta te s ,
652 F .2d 893 (9th C ir . 19 81 ) . 29
vi
C ases : Pace
Parklane H osiery v . Shore,
439 U.S. 322 (1 9 7 9 ) ..................... Passim
P a tterson v . McLean C re d it
Union, No. 8 7 -1 0 7 .......................... 44
P e rn e l l v . S o u th a l l R e a lty ,
416 U.S. 263 (1 9 7 4 ) .............. .. 32
R ichardson G reen sh ie ld s
S e c u r i t i e s , I n c . v . Lau,
825 F .2d 647 (2d C ir . 1 9 8 7 ) . . 28
R i t t e r v . Mount S a in t M ary's
C o l le g e , 814 F .2d 986
(4th C ir . 1 9 8 7 ) .............................. Passim
Roebuck v . D rexel U n iv e r s ity ,
(3rd C ir . No. 87-1301)
(J u ly 26, 1 9 8 8 ) .............................. 2 3 -26 ,43
Runyon v . McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1 9 7 6 ) ................................................... 7 ,44
Schoenthal v . I r v in g Trust C o .,
287 U.S. 92 (1 9 3 2 ) ........................ 32
S ib le y v . F ulton DeKalb
C o l l e c t i o n S e r v ic e , 677
F.2d 830 (11th C ir . 1 9 8 2 ) . . . . 29
T u ll v . U nited S ta te s ,
95 L .E d.2d 365 (1 9 8 7 ) ......... 9 ,3 0-3 2 ,5 0 -5 1
United S ta te s v . One 1976
Mercedes Benz, 618 F .2d 453
(7th C ir . 1 9 8 0 ) .......................... 49
U nited S ta te s v . S ta te o f
New M exico , 642 F .2d 397
(10th C ir . 1 9 8 1 ) ............................ 29
V olk V. C o le r , 845 F .2d 1422
(7 th C ir . 1 9 8 8 ) ............................. 2 1 ,2 3 ,2 5 ,4 3
Wade v . Orange County
S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e , 844 F.2d
951 (2d C ir . 1 9 8 8 ) ........................ 28 ,43
W ebster v . R eid , 52 U.S. 437
(1 8 5 0 ) .................................................... 32
Western E le c . Co. v . M ilgro
E le c t r o n i c C o r p . , 573 F.2d
255 (5th C ir . 1 9 7 8 ) ..................... 39
Other A u t h o r i t i e s :
Seventh Amendment,
U nited S ta te s C o n s t i t u t i o n . . . Passim
28 U .S .C . § 1254 ( 1 ) .......................... 3
42 U .S .C . § 1981................................. 3
T i t l e V II , 1964 C i v i l R igh ts
A c t ........................................................... Passim
Rule 38, F edera l Rules o f
C i v i l P ro ce d u re ............................... 4
Rule 39, F ederal Rules o f
C i v i l P roced u re ............................... 5
Cases: Page
viii
Page
R.Revesz and P. Karlan,
"N onm ajority Rules and the
Supreme C o u r t ," 136
U .P a .L .R ev . 1067 (1 9 8 8 ) ............ 44
I X
No. 88-
IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
JOHN S. LYTLE,
P e t i t i o n e r ,
v .
HOUSEHOLD MANUFACTURING INC. ,
d /b /a SCHWITZER TURBOCHARGERS,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
The p e t i t i o n e r , John S. L y t le ,
r e s p e c t f u l l y p r a y s t h a t a w r i t o f
c e r t i o r a r i is s u e t o rev iew the judgment
and o p in io n o f the United S ta te s Court o f
2
Appeals f o r th e Fourth C i r c u i t en tered in
t h i s p ro ce e d in g on O ctober 20, 1987.
CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW
The o p in io n o f th e c o u r t o f ap pea ls
i s u n pu b lish ed , and i s s e t ou t in th e
Appendix t o t h i s p e t i t i o n a t pages l a -
213. The o rd e r o f th e c o u r t o f a p p ea ls
denying re h e a r in g , which i s n ot r e p o r te d ,
i s s e t o u t a t pp. 22a-24a o f th e
Appendix. The d i s t r i c t ju d g e 's bench
o p in io n , which i s u n rep orted , i s s e t out
in th e Appendix, a t pp. 25a-31a . The
o rd e r o f th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d ism is s in g
th e ca se i s s e t out in th e Appendix a t
pp. 34a-35a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment o f the c o u r t o f ap pea ls
a f f i r m in g th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d is m is s a l
o f th e ca se was en tered on O ctob er 20,
1987. (App. l a . ) A t im e ly p e t i t i o n f o r
re h e a r in g was den ied on A p r i l 27, 1988.
3
On J u ly 19, 1988, C h ie f J u s t i c e Rehnquist
en tered an o rd e r ex ten d in g th e tim e f o r
f i l i n g a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i
t o and in c lu d in g August 25, 1988. The
j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h i s Court i s invoked
under 28 U .S .C . § 1 2 5 4 (1 ) .
STATUTES. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND RULES INVOLVED
S e c t io n 1981 o f 42 U .S .C . p r o v id e s :
A l l p erson s w ith in th e j u r i s d i c t i o n
o f th e u n ite d S ta te s s h a l l have the
same r i g h t in e v e r y S ta te and
T e r r i t o r y t o make and e n f o r c e
c o n t r a c t s , t o sue, be p a r t i e s , g iv e
e v id e n c e , and t o th e f u l l and equal
b e n e f i t o f a l l laws and p ro ce e d in g s
f o r th e s e c u r i t y o f person s and
p ro p e r ty as i s en joy ed by w hite
c i t i z e n s , and s h a l l be s u b je c t t o
l i k e punishment, p a in s , p e n a l t i e s ,
t a x e s , l i c e n s e s , and e x a c t io n s o f
every k in d , and t o no o th e r .
S e c t io n 703 (a) o f T i t l e VII o f the 1964
C i v i l R igh ts A ct , 42 U .S .C . § 2000e-
( 2 ) ( a ) , p r o v id e s in p e r t in e n t p a r t :
I t s h a l l b e an u n l a w f u l
employment p r a c t i c e f o r an em ployer-
(1) t o f a i l o r r e fu s e t o h i r e
o r t o d is ch a rg e any in d iv id u a l , o r
4
o th e rw ise t o d is c r im in a te a g a in s t
any in d iv id u a l w ith r e s p e c t t o h is
com pensation , term s, c o n d i t i o n s , o r
p r i v i l e g e s o f employment becau se o f
su ch i n d i v i d u a l ' s r a c e , c o l o r ,
r e l i g i o n , s e x , o r n a t i o n a l
o r i g i n . . . .
The Seventh Amendment t o th e U nited
S ta te s C o n s t i t u t io n p r o v id e s :
In s u i t s a t common law, where the
v a lu e in c o n t r o v e r s y s h a l l exceed
twenty d o l l a r s , th e r i g h t o f t r i a l
by ju r y s h a l l be p re se rv e d and no
f a c t t r i e d b y j u r y s h a l l be
o th erw ise re-exam ined in any Court
o f th e U nited S ta te s , than a c c o rd in g
t o th e r u le s o f the common law.
Rule 38 o f th e F edera l R ules o f C i v i l
P rocedu re p r o v id e s in p e r t in e n t p a r t :
(a) R igh t P re s e r v e d . The
r i g h t o f t r i a l by ju r y as d e c la re d
by th e Seventh Amendment t o the
C o n s t i t u t i o n o r as g iv en by a
s t a t u t e o f th e U nited S ta te s s h a l l
b e p r e s e r v e d t o t h e p a r t i e s
i n v i o l a t e .
(b) Demand. Any p a rty may
demand a t r i a l by ju r y o f any is s u e
t r i a b l e o f r ig h t by a ju r y by
s e rv in g upon th e o th e r p a r t i e s a
demand t h e r e f o r in w r i t in g a t any
tim e a f t e r th e commencement o f the
a c t io n and not l a t e r than 10 days
a f t e r th e s e r v i c e o f th e l a s t
p le a d in g d i r e c t e d t o such is s u e .
5
Such demand may be in d orsed upon a
p le a d in g o f th e p a r ty .
Rule 39 o f th e F edera l Rules o f C i v i l
Procedure p r o v id e s in p e r t in e n t p a r t :
(a) By J u ry . When t r i a l by
ju r y has been demanded as p ro v id e d
in Rule 38, th e a c t i o n s h a l l be
d e s ig n a te d upon th e d o ck e t as a ju r y
a c t i o n . The t r i a l o f a l l i s s u e s so
demanded s h a l l be by ju r y , u n le ss
(1) th e p a r t i e s o r t h e i r a t to rn e y s
o f r e c o r d , by w r it te n s t i p u l a t i o n
f i l e d w ith the c o u r t o r by an o r a l
s t i p u l a t i o n made in open c o u r t and
en tered in the r e c o r d , con sen t t o
t r i a l by th e c o u r t s i t t i n g w ith ou t a
ju r y o r (2) the c o u r t upon m otion or
o f i t s own i n i t i a t i v e f in d s th a t a
r ig h t o f t r i a l by ju r y o f some or
a l l o f th ose is s u e s does n ot e x i s t
under th e C o n s t i tu t io n o r s ta tu te s
o f th e United S ta te s .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n in
D e c e m b e r , 1984 , a l l e g i n g t h a t th e
respondent em ployer had engaged in r a c i a l
d is c r im in a t io n in v i o l a t i o n o f T i t l e VII
o f the 1964 C i v i l R igh ts Act and o f 42
U .S .C . § 1981 . P e t i t i o n e r c la im ed
s p e c i f i c a l l y th a t respondent had f i r e d
6
him b e c a u s e o f h i s r a c e , and th a t
resp on d en t su b seq u en tly had r e t a l i a t e d
a g a in s t him becau se he had f i l e d a charge
o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w i t h t h e EEOC.
P e t i t i o n e r req u ested a ju r y t r i a l on h is
s e c t i o n 1981 c la im s .
P e t i t i o n e r 's d is c r im in a t io n c la im s
r a is e d s e v e r a l s t r a ig h t fo r w a r d fa c t u a l
i s s u e s . P e t i t i o n e r was d ism issed in
August o f 1983 a f t e r he had m issed two
days o f work due t o i l l n e s s . P e t i t i o n e r
a s s e r te d th a t he had n o t i f i e d respondent
in advance th a t he would be a b sen t , and
th a t company o f f i c i a l s had agreed t o h is
ta k in g th e days o f f . Company o f f i c i a l s
i n s i s t e d th a t th e absence was in f a c t
unexcused. There was a l s o c o n f l i c t i n g
e v id e n ce reg a rd in g how respondent t r e a te d
w h ite w orkers who had problem s w ith
absen tee ism .
7
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i s m i s s e d
p l a i n t i f f ' s c la im s under s e c t i o n 1981,
h o ld in g —- d e s p i t e Runyon v . McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976) and Johnson v . Railway
Express A gency . 421 U.S. 454 (1 9 7 5 )—
th a t T i t l e V II o r d i n a r i l y p r o v id e s the
e x c l u s i v e r e m e d y f o r e m p lo y m e n t
d i s c r im in a t io n . (App. 2 6 a ) . Having thus
removed p e t i t i o n e r ' s l e g a l c la im s , the
d i s t r i c t ju d ge condu cted a bench t r i a l on
the e q u it a b le T i t l e VII c la im s . At the
c l o s e o f th e p l a i n t i f f ' s ca s e , the
d i s t r i c t j u d g e d i s m i s s e d t h e
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y d i s c h a r g e c l a i m s ;
f o l l o w in g th e c l o s e o f a l l th e e v id e n ce ,
th e ju d ge ru led from the bench in fa v o r
o f respondent on the r e t a l i a t i o n c la im .
(A p p . 2 6 a - 3 1 a ) . The t r i a l ju d g e
s u b s e q u e n t ly e n te r e d a judgment f o r
defendant on a l l i s s u e s . (App. 3 2 a -3 5 a ) .
8
P e t i t i o n e r appealed t o th e Fourth
C i r c u i t , a rgu in g , in t e r a l i a , th a t he had
been d en ied h is r ig h t t o a ju r y t r i a l in
v i o l a t i o n o f th e Seventh Amendment. A
m a jo r i t y o f th e Fourth C i r c u i t panel
a ck n o w le d g e d t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l o f
p e t i t i o n e r ' s § 1981 c la im , and thus the
d e n ia l o f a ju r y t r i a l , was "a p p a re n t ly
e r r o n e o u s ." (App. 7a n , 2 ) . The panel
c o n c l u d e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h a t
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r wa s " n o t
c o n t r o l l i n g , " becau se an a p p e l la t e c o u r t
was p ow er less t o c o r r e c t any such Seventh
Amendment v i o l a t i o n . The panel i n s i s t e d
th a t th e d i s t r i c t ju d g e 's d e c i s i o n on the
m e r its o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s a l l e g a t i o n s , even
though is su e d in c o n tra v e n t io n o f the
Seventh Amendment, c o u ld be r e l i e d on t o
c o l l a t e r a l l y e s to p th e p e t i t i o n e r from
l i t i g a t i n g the c la im s in v o lv e d b e fo r e a
ju r y . (App. 8a-9a) . F ind ing th a t the
9
ju d g e 's r e s o l u t i o n o f th e fa c t u a l is s u e s
was "n o t c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s ," th e m a jo r i ty
a f f ir m e d . (App. l O a - l l a ) . 1
Ju dge W id en er , in a d i s s e n t in g
o p in io n , noted th a t th e m a j o r i t y 's v iew
o f c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l was in c o n s is t e n t
w ith a s e v e n th c i r c u i t d e c i s i o n on
" e x a c t l y t h i s i s s u e " in Hussein v .
Oshkosh Motor Truck Co. , 816 F .2d 348
(7th C ir . 1987) (App. 1 9 a ), and th a t i t
was "n o t c o n s i s t e n t w ith " the r e ce n t
d e c i s i o n o f t h i s Court in T u ll v . United
S t a t e s . 95 L .Ed,2d 365 (1 9 8 7 ). (App. 19a
1 The d i s t r i c t judge found th a t
p e t i t i o n e r had f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h a
prima f a c i e ca se w ith regard t o h is
d is m is s a l c la im . (App. 2 6 a -2 9 a ) . The
c o u r t o f appea ls reasoned th a t whether or
n ot p e t i t i o n e r had made out a prima f a c i e
ca se turned on a number o f d isp u ted
s u b s id ia r y f a c t s ; the a p p e l la t e c o u r t
found th a t the t r i a l ju d g e 's r e s o lu t io n
o f th o se s u b s id ia r y is s u e s , and thus h is
c o n c lu s io n rega rd in g the s u f f i c i e n c y o f
th e e v id e n ce t o e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e
ca s e , were not c l e a r l y erron eou s . (App.
1 0 a -1 2 a ) .
10
n . 4 ) . Judge Widener c r i t i c i z e d th e
m a j o r i t y 's r e l i a n c e on th e e a r l i e r Fourth
C i r c u i t d e c i s i o n in R i t t e r v . Mount S a in t
M ary 's C o l l e g e . 814 F .2d 986 (4 th C ir .
1 9 8 7 ) , i n s i s t i n g th a t th e c ir cu m sta n ces
and th u s t h e i s s u e in R i t t e r were
" s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t " than in th e
in s ta n t c a s e . (App. 1 8 a ) . Judge Widener
con c lu d ed th a t i f th e a p p e l la t e c o u r ts
were p ow er less t o c o r r e c t th e erron eou s
d e n ia l o f a ju r y t r i a l m erely becau se th e
j u d g e i n v o l v e d h a d i s s u e d a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y t a in te d d e c i s i o n o f h i s
own on th e m e r i t s , " th e Seventh Amendment
means l e s s today than i t d id y e s t e r d a y . "
(App. 1 9 a ) . A t im e ly p e t i t i o n f o r
re h e a r in g and su g g e s t io n f o r re h e a r in g en
banc were d e n ie d ; Judges Widener, R u s s e l l
and Murnaghan v o te d t o rehear th e ca se en
banc. (App. 2 2 a -2 4 a ) .
11
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I . the holding of the fourth c ir c u it has
BEEN EXPRESSLY REJECTED BY FOUR OTHER
CIRCUITS, AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH
THE PRACTICES OF NINE OTHER CIRCUITS
As Judge Widener ob served in h i s
d i s s e n t in g o p in io n be low , (App. 1 9 a ) , t h i s
ca se p r e s e n ts a c l e a r c o n f l i c t among the
c i r c u i t s r e g a r d i n g a p r o b l e m o f
c o n s id e r a b le im portance — whether Seventh
Am endm ent v i o l a t i o n s a r e r e n d e r e d
u n r e v ie w a b le i f th e t r i a l judge who
im properly den ied a ju r y t r i a l compounds
t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r by d e c id in g
h im s e lf th e v ery is s u e th a t shou ld have
been d e c id e d by a ju r y . The Fourth
C ir c u i t has now tw ic e h e ld th a t such
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s can n e i th e r be
rev iew ed nor c o r r e c te d on ap p ea l. These
d e c i s io n s o f th e Fourth C i r c u i t are f l a t l y
in c o n s is t e n t w ith the p r a c t i c e in nine
o th e r c i r c u i t s , and the rea son in g o f the
12
d e c i s i o n below has been e x p r e s s ly r e j e c t e d
by r e c e n t d e c i s i o n s in th e Second, T h ird ,
Seventh and D i s t r i c t o f Columbia C i r c u i t s .
These i n t e r - c i r c u i t c o n f l i c t s a r i s e
ou t o f a d is p u te r e g a rd in g th e meaning o f
t h i s C o u r t 's d e c i s i o n in Parklane H os ie ry
v . S h o r e . 439 U.S. 332 ( 1979) . In
Parklane H os iery c e r t a i n f a c t u a l i s s u e s ,
r e g a r d i n g w h ich t h e p e t i t i o n e r would
o th e r w is e have been e n t i t l e d t o a ju r y
t r i a l , had e a r l i e r been d e c id e d a d v e r s e ly
t o p e t i t i o n e r by a t r i a l ju d ge in an oth er
a c t i o n . T h is Court h e ld th a t c o l l a t e r a l
e s t o p p e l , based on a p r i o r d e c i s i o n in a
n o n - ju r y t r i a l , c o u ld be used t o p r e c lu d e
l i t i g a t i o n o f th o s e same is s u e s b e f o r e a
ju r y . 439 U.S. a t 33 3 -3 7 . F oo tn o te 24 o f
th e m a jo r i t y o p in io n e x p r e s s ly n oted th a t
t h e l a c k o f a ju r y in th e e a r l i e r
p r o c e e d in g , an e q u i t a b le in ju n c t i v e a c t i o n
brou gh t by th e SEC, was e n t i r e l y p ro p e r .
13
439 U.S. a t 337 n. 2 4 . 2 But th e m ajority-
o p i n i o n was s i l e n t r e g a rd in g whether
c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l m ig h t a l s o be
a v a i la b le where th e e a r l i e r d e n ia l o f a
ju r y t r i a l was e r ro n e o u s , and as t o
w h e th e r c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l might be
invoked in o rd e r t o p rev en t c o r r e c t i o n o f
th a t v e r y e r r o r . In a d i s s e n t in g o p in io n
i n P a r k l a n e H o s i e r y , C h i e f J u s t i c e
R ehnquist warned th a t th e m a jo r i ty o p in io n
m ight be in t e r p r e t e d as c a l l i n g in t o
q u e s t io n th e lo n g sta n d in g r u le th a t an
i n t e r v e n i n g n o n - ju r y d e c i s i o n on the
m e r its o f a ca se d id n ot p r e c lu d e an
a p p e l la t e c o u r t from r e v e r s in g th e e a r l i e r
im proper d e n ia l o f a ju r y t r i a l . 439 U.S.
a t 351 n. 1 9 .3
2 See a l s o 439 U.S. a t 351 n. 18
(R eh nqu ist, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) .
3 " Meeker O il v . Ambassador O il
Coro. . 375 U.S. 160 (1963) (p er cu r ia m ),
i s a ca se where th e d o c t r in e o f c o l l a t e r a l
e s t o p p e l y i e l d e d t o th e r i g h t t o a ju r y
14
The Fourth C i r c u i t ' s e x p a n s iv e v iew
o f Parklane H os ie ry began l a s t y ea r in
R i t t e r v . Mount S a in t M ary 's C o l l e g e . 814
F .2d 986 (4 th C ir . 1987) , c e r t , d en ied ____
U.S. ___ ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 4 In R i t t e r , th e Fourth
t r i a l . In M eeker, p l a i n t i f f s a s s e r te d
b o th e q u i t a b le and l e g a l c la im s , which
p r e s e n te d common i s s u e s , and demanded a
ju r y t r i a l . The t r i a l c o u r t t r i e d th e
e q u i t a b le c la im f i r s t , and d e c id e d th a t
c la im , and th e common i s s u e s , a d v e r s e ly t o
p l a i n t i f f s . As a r e s u l t , i t h e ld th a t
p l a i n t i f f s w e r e p r e c l u d e d f r o m
r e l i t i g a t i n g th o s e same is s u e s b e f o r e a
ju r y on t h e i r l e g a l c l a i m . . . . P l a i n t i f f s
a p p ea led , a l l e g i n g a d e n ia l o f t h e i r r i g h t
t o a ju r y t r i a l . . . . T h is Court r e v e rs e d
. . . on th e b a s is o f Beacon T h eatres In c ,
v , W e sto v e r . 359 U.S. 500 (1959) and Dairy
Queen, I n c , v . Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) ,
even though, u n l ik e th o s e c a s e s , the
e q u i t a b le a c t i o n in Meeker had a lre a d y
b e e n t r i e d and t h e common i s s u e s
determ ined by th e c o u r t . Thus, even
th o u g h t h e p l a i n t i f f s in Meeker had
r e c e iv e d a " f u l l and f a i r " o p p o r tu n ity t o
t r y t h e common is s u e s in th e p r i o r
e q u i t a b le a c t i o n , th ey n o n e th e le s s were
g iv e n th e o p p o r tu n ity t o r e t r y th o s e
is s u e s b e f o r e a ju r y . T o d a y 's d e c i s i o n i s
t o t a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w ith Meeker and the
Court f a i l s t o e x p la in t h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . "
4 In op p os in g rev iew by t h i s Court
in R i t t e r , th e resp on d en t emphasized th a t
t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s r e s o l u t i o n o f the
15
e q u i t a b le T i t l e V II c la im in th a t ca se had
been upheld in an e a r l i e r a p p e a l , and was
thus n ot in d is p u te when i t was r e l i e d on
t o c o l l a t e r a l l y e s to p th e p l a i n t i f f from
r e c e i v i n g a ju r y t r i a l . The resp on d en t in
R i t t e r conceded th a t th e a p p l i c a t i o n o f
c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l in th e c ir cu m sta n ce s
p re se n te d by th e in s ta n t ca se would be
b o th i n c o r r e c t and i n c o n s i s t e n t w ith th e
Seventh C i r c u i t d e c i s i o n in Hussein v .
Oshkosh Motor Truck C o , . 816 F. 2d 348 (7th
C ir . 1987) :
" I n R i t t e r . p e t i t i o n e r had
numerous o p p o r t u n i t ie s t o a v o id the
a p p l i c a t i o n o f c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l ,
b u t a v a i l e d h e r s e l f o f n o n e . . . .
During her f i r s t appeal she had the
o p p o r tu n ity t o seek p re v e n t io n o f the
a p p l i c a t i o n o f c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l by
r e q u e s t in g r e v e r s a l o f th e T i t l e VII
judgment based on th e arguments she
makes h ere .
" In Hussein . . . [ u j n l i k e R i t t e r
. . . [ t ] h e S e v e n t h C i r c u i t was
r e q u e s t e d t o i n v o k e c o l l a t e r a l
e s to p p e l in H u ss e in 's f i r s t and o n ly
a p p ea l . I f i t d id s o , Hussein would
have been d e p r iv e d o f any o p p o r tu n ity
t o d e v e lo p h is l e g a l c la im s and
p re s e n t them t o a j u r y . . . .
" . . . R i t t e r and Hussein d i f f e r
becau se th e r e was an e a r l i e r v a l i d
and rev iew ed judgment in R i t t e r , but
n o t in H u sse in . The Fourth C i r c u i t
rev iew ed and a f f ir m e d th e T i t l e VII
judgment in th e f i r s t a p p ea l , and was
16
C i r c u i t acknowledged th a t th e t r i a l ju d g e ,
in p a s s in g on th e d is p u te d f a c t s r a th e r
th a n r e f e r r i n g them t o a ju r y , had
v i o l a t e d t h e S e v e n th Amendment, but
i n s i s t e d th a t i t was p e r m it te d , in deed
r e q u ir e d , t o g iv e c o n c lu s iv e w e ig h t t o
t h a t v e r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y t a i n t e d
d e c i s i o n . "The f a c t th a t th e ju d g e in
t h i s ca s e was in e r r o r in d is m is s in g th e
l e g a l c la im s . . . i s i r r e l e v a n t . " 814 F. 2d
n o t asked t o v a ca te th a t judgment
u n t i l th e secon d a p p e a l . . . . H ussein ,
on t h e o t h e r h an d , p r e s e n te d a
s i t u a t i o n where th e r e was no e a r l i e r
v a l i d ju d g m e n t . The T i t l e VII
judgment th e r e was on rev iew f o r th e
f i r s t tim e so th e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t was
n o t asked t o v a c a te i t s e a r l i e r
judgm ent. The Seventh C i r c u i t used
th e la c k o f an e a r l i e r v a l i d judgment
i n i t s a t t e m p t t o d i s t i n g u i s h
P a rk la n e . . . . That d i s t i n c t i o n i s
absen t in th e in s ta n t c a s e . "
R e sp o n d e n t 's B r ie f in O p p o s it io n , No. 87 -
309, pp. 6 -7 .
17
a t 9 9 1 .5 Even though th e bench t r i a l th a t
had o c c u r r e d in R i t t e r v i o l a t e d the
c o n s t i t u t i o n , th e fo u r th c i r c u i t i n s i s t e d ,
"One t r i a l o f common f a c t s i s en ou gh ."
I d . A p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o th e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r i a l guaranteed by th e
Seventh Amendment, i t rea son ed , had t o
g iv e way under Parklane H os ie ry t o " th e
i n t e r e s t s o f th e j u d i c i a l system in a
s p e e d y and e c o n o m ic a l r e s o l u t i o n o f
l i t i g a t i o n . " Id . The f a c t th a t a
p l a i n t i f f would l o s e h i s o r her r i g h t t o a
ju r y t r i a l becau se o f th e e r r o r o f th e
t r i a l ju d ge was, in th e words o f th e
c i r c u i t c o u r t , o n ly "a p p a re n t ly u n f a i r . "
814 F .2d a t 991.
The panel d e c i s i o n in th e in s ta n t
T h i s Court su b seq u en tly h e ld
th a t s t a t e c o u r ts cannot r e l y on such
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y in f ir m p r i o r d e c i s i o n s .
Johnson v . M i s s i s s i p p i . 100 L .E d.2d 575
(1988) .
18
ca s e expands R i t t e r 6 and Parklane H os iery
t o th e p o in t where th ey v i r t u a l l y p r e c lu d e
e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e Seventh Amendment
f o l l o w i n g an u n c o n s t i t u t io n a l n o n - ju r y
v e r d i c t . F i r s t , th e d e c i s i o n below
ex ten d s R i t t e r t o a c a s e in which th e
v a l i d i t y o f th e n o n - ju r y v e r d i c t on th e
e q u i t a b le i s s u e s was i t s e l f c h a l le n g e d on
d i r e c t a p p e a l ; as Judge Widener n oted in
h i s d i s s e n t , th e p l a i n t i f f in R i t t e r was
n o t c h a l l e n g i n g th a t p o r t i o n o f th e
d i s t r i c t ju d g e 's a c t i o n in th a t c a s e .
(P e t . App. 1 7 a ) . Second, th e p an el in th e
i n s t a n t c a s e h o l d s t h a t , s i n c e th e
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s are p o w e r le ss t o c o r r e c t
6 Judge Widener ob serv ed in h i s
d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n b e l o w t h a t t h e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f R i t t e r w e r e
d i s t in g u i s h a b le from th o s e o f th e in s ta n t
c a s e , s i n c e a t th e t im e when t h e
c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l i s s u e a r o s e th e
p l a i n t i f f in R i t t e r was no l o n g e r
c h a l le n g in g th e t r i a l j u d g e 's r e j e c t i o n o f
h er e q u i t a b le T i t l e V II c la im s . (App.
1 7 a -1 8 a ) .
19
a Seventh Amendment v i o l a t i o n , a c i r c u i t
c o u r t s im ply has no reason t o d e c id e
whether th e a c t i o n o f th e t r i a l ju d ge
d e n i e d o n e o f t h e p a r t i e s i t s
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o t r i a l by ju r y .
This c o u r t h e ld in R i t t e r . . .
th a t th e f in d in g s o f th e t r i a l
c o u r t made in a T i t l e V II a c t i o n
a r e e n t i t l e d t o c o l l a t e r a l
e s t o p p e l e f f e c t , thus p re v e n t in g
r e l i t i g a t i o n o f t h o s e f a c t s
b e f o r e a ju r y under a " l e g a l "
th e o r y a r i s i n g ou t o f th e same
f a c t s . We found th a t c o l l a t e r a l
e s t o p p e l would o b ta in even where
th e t r i a l c o u r t had e r r o n e o u s ly
d ism isse d th e p l a i n t i f f ' s l e g a l
c la im s . As th e Supreme Court
determ ined in Parklane H os ie ry
. . . , th e j u d i c i a l i n t e r e s t in
e c o n o m y o f r e s o u r c e s i s
s u f f i c i e n t t o o v e r r i d e t h e
l i t i g a n t ' s i n t e r e s t i n
r e l i t i g a t i n g h i s c a s e , even
where th e consequence o f the
f a i l u r e t o perm it r e l i t i g a t i o n
i s t o deny th e p l a i n t i f f h i s
r i g h t t o a ju r y t r i a l . Whether
th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t has committed
e r r o r i n s t r i k i n g t h e
a p p e l l a n t 's [ l e g a l ] c la im s . . .
i s n o t c o n t r o l l i n g .
(App. 8 a - 9 a ) . I t i s perhaps c o i n c i d e n t a l ,
but n o n e th e le s s d i s t u r b in g , th a t th e s e two
20
landmark Fourth C i r c u i t d e c i s i o n s , h o ld in g
th a t th e u n c o n s t i t u t io n a l d e n ia l o f a ju r y
t r i a l can n ot be c o r r e c t e d on a p p e a l , both
come in c a s e s in which th e u n d e r ly in g
l e g a l c la im in v o lv e d i n t e n t i o n a l in v id io u s
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , i n w h i c h t h e
u n c o n s t i t u t io n a l bench t r i a l r e s u l t e d in a
judgment f o r th e d e fen d a n t , and in w hich ,
a t l e a s t in th e in s ta n t c a s e , th e t r i a l
c o u r t ' s rea son s f o r denying a ju r y t r i a l
seem i n s u b s t a n t i a l . 7
No o th e r c i r c u i t p erm its th e use o f
c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l t o p re v e n t c o r r e c t i o n
on appea l o f an u n c o n s t i t u t io n a l d e n ia l o f
a ju r y t r i a l . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
7 In th e in s ta n t c a s e , th e Fourth
C i r c u i t n o t e d t h a t th e l e g a l c la im s
s t r i c k e n by th e d i s t r i c t ju d g e had lon g
b e f o r e been h e ld by th a t c o u r t o f ap p ea ls
t o s t a t e a cause o f a c t i o n . (P e t . App.
7a, n. 2 ) . The f i r s t Fourth C i r c u i t
o p in io n in R i t t e r , h o ld in g th a t th e l e g a l
c la im s in th a t ca se were n ot p r o p e r ly
d i s m i s s e d p r i o r t o t r i a l , i s n o t
p u b l i s h e d . (See App. 1 6 a ) .
21
Parklane H os iery embraced by th e Fourth
C i r c u i t in t h i s ca se and R i t t e r has tw ic e
been e x p r e s s ly r e j e c t e d by th e Seventh
C i r c u i t . Hussein v . Oshkosh Motor Truck
C o . . 816 F.2d 348 (7th C ir . 1987) ; V olk v .
C o l e r , 845 F. 2d 1422 (7th C ir . 1988) . The
p r o c e d u r a l p o s t u r e o f H u s s e i n was
p r e c i s e l y th e same as th a t in th e in s ta n t
c a s e ; a f t e r t h e t r i a l ju d g e t h e r e
e r r o n e o u s l y d i s m is s e d th e p l a i n t i f f ' s
l e g a l c la im s and then d e c id e d h im s e l f th e
u n d e r l y i n g f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n s , t h e
de fen d a n t i n s i s t e d on appeal th a t Parklane
H os ie ry p re c lu d e d an a p p e l la t e c o u r t from
c o r r e c t i n g s u c h a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
v i o l a t i o n . The Seventh C i r c u i t r e j e c t e d
t h i s in t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Parklane H o s ie r y :
Oshkosh Truck argues t h a t ,
d e s p i t e th e p r o h i b i t i o n s o f th e
s e v e n t h amendment and t h e
c o n c e r n s n o t e d i n B e a c o n
T h e a t r e s . the Supreme C o u r t 's
h o ld in g in Parklane H osiery . . .
r e q u ir e s us t o ap p ly c o l l a t e r a l
e s t o p p e l in t h i s c a s e . . . .
22
We b e l i e v e th a t th e p re s e n t
ca s e p re v e n ts a s u b s t a n t i a l l y
d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n than th a t
b e f o r e th e Supreme Court in
P a rk la n e . Here, th e r e i s no
e a r l i e r v a l i d ju d g m e n t . . . .
I t i s h a r d ly " n e e d l e s s
l i t i g a t i o n " t o r e v e r s e a
judgment on th e ground t h a t th e
p l a i n t i f f was d en ied h i s r i g h t
t o a ju r y t r i a l through no f a u l t
o f h i s own s o l e l y becau se o f th e
e r r o r o f th e t r i a l c o u r t . I t i s
i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o a p p l y
c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l t o p r e c lu d e
rev iew o f an is s u e on which the
a p p e l l a n t c o u l d n o t h a v e
p r e v i o u s l y s o u g h t r e v i e w . . . .
T h e b u r d e n o n j u d i c i a l
a d m in is t r a t io n i s no more than
in o th e r s i t u a t i o n s in which
l e g a l e r r o r i s committed and a
r e t r i a l i s r e q u i r e d . . . . We
cann ot s a n c t io n an a p p l i c a t i o n
o f c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l which
would perm it f in d in g s made by a
c o u r t . . . t o b a r f u r t h e r
l i t i g a t i o n o f a l e g a l i s s u e . . .
when th o s e f in d in g s were made
o n ly becau se th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
e r r o n e o u s l y d i s m i s s e d t h e
p l a i n t i f f ' s l e g a l c la im . To
perm it such an a p p l i c a t i o n would
a l l o w th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o
a ccom p lish by e r r o r what Beacon
T h eatres o th e rw ise p r o h i b i t s i t
from d o in g .
23
816 F .2d a t 35 5 -5 7 . Judge Posner n oted in
a c o n c u r r in g o p in io n th a t he "a g r e e [d ]
w ith e v e r y th in g in " th e m a jo r i t y o p in io n
r e g a r d i n g c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l . The
S e v e n th C i r c u i t r u l e th a t c o l l a t e r a l
e s t o p p e l cannot p rev en t d i r e c t a p p e l la t e
rev iew o f th e d e n ia l o f a ju r y t r i a l was
r e i t e r a t e d in V olk v . C o l e r , 845 F .2d a t
1437-38 . See a l s o id . a t 1439 (Manion,
J . , c o n c u r r i n g ) .
The re a so n in g and h o ld in g in R i t t e r
were a l s o e x p r e s s ly r e j e c t e d by th e Third
C i r c u i t in Roebuck v . D rexel U n iv e r s i t y .
(No. 8 7 -1 3 0 1 , J u ly 26, 19 88 ) . The
p l a i n t i f f in th a t ca se had sought r e l i e f
from r a c i a l d i s c r im in a t io n under both
s e c t i o n 1981 and T i t l e V I I . The d i s t r i c t
ju d ge i n i t i a l l y p e rm itted th e 1981 ca se t o
be heard by a ju r y , but when th e ju r y
re tu rn ed a v e r d i c t f o r th e p l a i n t i f f , the
t r i a l ju d g e gran ted judgment n . o . v . and
24
r u le d f o r th e de fen d a n t on th e T i t l e V II
c la im . On appeal th e T h ird C i r c u i t h e ld
th a t th e ju d g e had e r re d in o v e r tu rn in g
th e ju r y v e r d i c t , and o rd e re d a new ju r y
t r i a l o f t h e s e c t i o n 1981 c l a i m s . 8
R e ie c t in q th e R i t t e r d o c t r i n e th a t th e
ju d g e 's own d e c i s i o n on th e T i t l e V II
c la im c o n t r o l l e d , and thus p re c lu d e d , a
new ju r y t r i a l , th e T hird C i r c u i t adopted
th e o p p o s i t e r u l e , v a c a t in g th e j u d g e 's
d e c i s i o n on the T i t l e VII c la im , and
d i r e c t i n g him on remand t o a w a it , and
conform h is d i s p o s i t i o n o f th a t c la im t o ,
th e ju r y v e r d i c t on th e s e c t i o n 1981
c la im .
We acknowledge th a t in R i t t e r
. . . t h e c o u r t h e l d th a t a
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f in d in g s in a
T i t l e V II s u i t are p r e c l u s i v e in
a subsequent t r i a l t o a ju r y on
an ADEA c la im , even though th e
ADEA c la im i t s e l f was f i l e d
j o i n t l y w ith th e T i t l e V II c la im
8 A new t r i a l was re q u ire d f o r
o th e r r e a s o n s .
25
b u t h a d b e e n e r r o n e o u s l y
d i s m i s s e d b y t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t ........... [T ]o a v o id th e
problem s fa ce d by th e Fourth
C i r c u i t in R i t t e r . . . , we
b e l i e v e th a t th e b e t t e r c o u rs e
i s th a t fo l lo w e d by th e Seventh
C i r c u i t in V olk v . C o l e r . . . . In
V o lk , th e c o u r t h e ld th a t where
p l a i n t i f f h a d p r e s e n t e d
s u f f i c i e n t e v id e n ce on her §§
1983 and 1985(3) c la im s t o a l lo w
th e ca se t o go t o th e ju r y , but
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a d
im p rop er ly taken th e ca s e away
from th e ju r y , p l a i n t i f f was
" e n t i t l e [ d ] t o a ju r y t r i a l on
th e [ l e g a l ] c la im s b e f o r e th e
t r i a l c o u r t d e c id e s her T i t l e
V II e q u i t a b le c la i m s . " . . . .
Hence, th e c o u r t s e t a s id e th e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s premature T i t l e
V II judgment and we do l i k e w is e .
C f ♦ Hussein v . Oshkosh Motor
Trucks C o .^
The T h ird C i r c u i t e x p r e s s ly d isa p p rov ed
th e Fourth C i r c u i t ' s in t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
Parklane H o s ie r y , * 10 and n oted th a t R i t t e r
s S l i p o p i n i o n , p p . 5 1 - 5 3
( f o o t n o t e o m it te d ; emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) .
10 S l ip o p in io n , p . 52 n. 42 ("The
R i t t e r c o u r t r e l i e d h e a v i ly on Parklane
H os ie r Co. v . S h o r e . . . . We, how ever, f in d
P a r k la n e H o s ie r y i n a p p o s i t e b e c a u s e ,
u n l ik e Parklane p l a i n t i f f h ere brought h i s
T i t l e VII and § 1981 s u i t s t o g e th e r and
26
seemed " i n c o n s i s t e n t w ith t h [ e ] w eight o f
a u t h o r i t y . 1,11
T h e F o u r t h C i r c u i t r u l e i s
i n c o n s i s t e n t as w e l l w ith d e c i s i o n s o f th e
D i s t r i c t o f Columbia and Second C i r c u i t s . 11
hence i s e n t i t l e d t o a ju r y d e te rm in a t io n
o f a l l common is s u e s o f f a c t . " ) (emphasis
in o r i g i n a l ) .
11 S l ip o p in io n , p . 49 n. 39. The
Fourth C i r c u i t r u le in th e in s ta n t case.
— th a t a ju d g e 's d e c i s i o n re g a rd in g ju r y
i s s u e s must be a f f ir m e d , d e s p i t e th e
S e v e n t h A m endm ent, u n l e s s c l e a r l y
e rron eou s under Rule 52 — was summarily
r e j e c t e d by th e T hird C i r c u i t in EEOC v .
Corrv Jamestown C o r o . . 719 F .2d 1219,
1225-26 (3rd C ir . 1983) ("C o rry Jamestown
i s m istaken when i t argues th a t th e d e n ia l
o f a ju r y t r i a l i s harm less e r r o r u n le ss
th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f in d in g s o f f a c t can
be shown t o be c l e a r l y e r ro n e o u s . To the
c o n t r a r y , d e n ia l o f a ju r y t r i a l i s
r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r u n le ss a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t
would have been a p p r o p r ia te . . . . In t h i s
ca se . . . th e Com m ission 's e v id e n ce was
c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t t o w ith stan d a d i r e c t e d
v e r d i c t . . . . The o rd e r o f th e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t s t r i k i n g th e Com m ission 's demand f o r
a ju r y t r i a l w i l l be r e v e r s e d , and the
ca se remanded f o r a new t r i a l b e f o r e a
j u r y . " Compare App. 9a ( p e t i t i o n e r not
e n t i t l e d t o remand f o r ju r y t r i a l , d e s p i t e
im p r o p e r d e n i a l o f j u r y t r i a l , i f
in te r v e n in g d e c i s i o n on m e r its by t r i a l
ju d g e "was n ot c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s " ) .
27
In Bouchet v . N a tion a l Urban League. 730
F .2d 799 (D .C .C ir . 19 84 ) , th e p l a i n t i f f
com plained th a t th e d i s t r i c t ju d g e had
im p rop er ly d ism issed her l e g a l c la im s , and
then r e s o lv e d a g a in s t her th e s im i la r
is s u e s r a is e d by her e q u i t a b le c la im s .
The D i s t r i c t o f Columbia C i r c u i t con c lu d ed
th a t i t was o b l ig a t e d t o d e c id e whether
th e d is m is s a l o f the p l a i n t i f f ' s l e g a l
c la im s and th e r e s u l t in g d e n ia l o f a ju r y
t r i a l were p ro p e r , s in c e an e r r o r in th a t
regard would r e q u ir e not m erely a ju r y
t r i a l on th e l e g a l c la im s , but a l s o
r e v e r s a l o f th e ju d g e 's d e c i s i o n as t o the
e q u i t a b le c la im s . W ritin g f o r th e panel
in th a t c a s e , then Judge S c a l ia e x p la in e d :
[An] erron eou s d e n ia l o f her . . .
law c la im s and the consequent
d e n ia l o f her demand f o r ju r y
t r i a l w o u l d i n f e c t t h e
d i s p o s i t i o n o f her [ e q u it a b le ]
c la im as w e l l , s in c e most i f not
a l l o f i t s e lem ents would have
b een p resen ted t o th e wrong
t r i e r o f f a c t . Not on ly would a
ju r y t r i a l on her t o r t c la im s be
28
r e q u ir e d , but th e [ e q u i t a b le ]
judgment — even i f o th e rw ise
v a l i d — w ou ld have t o be
v a c a t e d , and th e whole ca se
r e t r i e d , g i v i n g p r e c l u s i v e
e f f e c t t o a l l f in d in g s o f f a c t
by th e j u r y .
730 F .2d a t 803 -04 . T his h o ld in g in
Bouchet was quoted and e x p r e s s ly endorsed
by th e Second C i r c u i t in Wade v . Orange * 13
County S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e . 844 F .2d 951,
954-55 (2d C ir . 1 9 8 8 ) .12 The Fourth
C ir c u i t in R i t t e r . on th e o th e r hand,
d is a p p r o v e d Judge S c a l i a ' s o p in io n in
Bouchet as in a d eq u a te ly r e a s o n e d .13
The Second C i r c u i t has a l s o
r e c o g n iz e d th e c o n f l i c t between th e Fourth
C i r c u i t d e c i s i o n in R i t t e r and th e Seventh
C i r c u i t d e c i s i o n in H u sse in . R ichardson
G reen sh ie ld s S e c u r i t i e s . In c , v . Lau, 825
F .2d 647, 651 n. 4 (2d C ir . 1987).
13 814 F .2d a t 991:
"The Bouchet p r o p o s i t i o n i s . . .
s e t f o r t h w ith ou t r e fe r e n c e t o
P a r k l a n e . d e s p i t e th e c l e a r
r e le v a n ce o f th a t ca se t o the
i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d . We f in d
t h [ i s ] low er c o u r t o p in io [ n ]
u n p e r s u a s iv e . . . . "
29
The d e c i s i o n s o f th e Fourth C i r c u i t
in th e in s ta n t ca se and R i t t e r are a l s o
sq u a re ly c o n tra ry t o th e p r a c t i c e o f n ine
o th e r c i r c u i t s , which in th e p e r io d s in c e
P a r k l a n e H o s ie r y have r e v e r s e d and
remanded f o r a ju r y t r i a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t
d e c i s i o n s th a t had im properly d en ied such
ju r y t r i a l s , d e s p i t e th e f a c t th a t in each
ca se th e t r i a l ju d g e , a f t e r denying th e
ju r y demand, had h im s e lf r e s o lv e d on the
m e r its th e i s s u e s on which a ju r y t r i a l
had been sou gh t.-1-4 14
14 Marshak v . T o n e t t i , 813 F .2d 13
(1 s t C ir . 1 9 8 7 ) ; H all v . Sharpe, 812 F .2d
644 (11th C ir . 1 9 8 7 ) ; Lewis v . T h ig p en .
767 F. 2d 252 (5th C ir . 1 9 8 5 ) ; Davis & Cox
v . Summa Corp. , 751 F .2d 1507 (9th C ir .
1 9 8 5 ) ; Amoco O il Co. v . T orcom ian . 722
F. 2d 1099 (3d C ir . 1 9 8 3 ) ; EEOC v . Corry
Jamestown C o r p . . 719 F .2d 1219 (3d C ir .
1 9 8 3 ) ; S ib le y v . F ulton DeKalb C o l l e c t i o n
S e r v i c e . 677 F .2d 830 (11th C ir . 1 9 8 2 ) ;
Bibbs v . Jim Lynch C a d i l la c , I n c . , 653
F.2d 316 (8th C ir . 1 9 8 1 ) ; Palmer v . U nited
S ta te s , 652 F .2d 893 (9th C ir . 19 81 ) ;
United S ta te s v . S ta te o f New M e x ico , 642
F . 2d 397 (10th C ir . 1 9 8 1 ) ; United S ta te s
v . One 197 6 Mercedes Benz, 618 F.2d 453
(7th C ir . 1980) ; H ildebrand v . Bd. o f
30
I I . THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH
EIGHT DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
J u d g e W id e n e r o b s e r v e d in h i s
d i s s e n t in g o p in io n in t h i s c a s e th a t the
d e c i s i o n o f th e c o u r t below " i s n ot
c o n s i s t e n t w ith th e broad c o n s t r u c t io n o f
th e Seventh Amendment r e c e n t l y g iv e n by
th e Supreme Court in T u ll v . U nited
S t a t e s . 55 U.S.L.W. 451 (U.S. A p r i l 28,
1 9 8 7 ) . " (App. 1 9 a ) . In f a c t th e p a n e l 's
o p in io n c o n f l i c t s w ith a t o t a l o f e ig h t
s e p a ra te d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s Court is su e d
o v e r th e co u rse o f more than a ce n tu ry .
The ju r y t r i a l is s u e a r i s e s in t h i s
c a s e in p r e c i s e l y th e same way i t has
a r i s e n i n in n u m e ra b le p a s t S ev e n th
Amendment a p p e a ls . The p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a
com p la in t c o n ta in in g a c la im w ith in the
s cop e o f th e Seventh Amendment, and made a
T ru s te e s o f M ichigan S ta te U n iv . . 607 F .2d
705 (6 th C ir . 1 9 7 9 ) ; M atter o f M e r r i l l .
594 F .2d 1064 (5th C ir . 1979).
31
t im e ly r e q u e s t f o r a t r i a l by ju r y . The
d i s t r i c t ju d g e , a f t e r i n c o r r e c t l y r u l in g
th a t no ju r y t r i a l was r e q u ir e d , p roceed ed
t o c o n s id e r h im s e l f th e f a c t u a l i s s u e s
r a is e d by th e com p la in t , and d e c id e d th e
ca se on th e m e r i t s . For o v e r 13 0 y ea rs
t h i s Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y re d re ss e d such
Seventh Amendment v i o l a t i o n s by d i r e c t i n g
th a t th e i s s u e s im properly heard by a
ju d g e be r e t r i e d b e fo r e a ju r y .
In T u ll v . United S t a t e s . 95 L .E d.2d
365 (1 9 8 7 ), d e c id e d on ly s ix t e e n months
ago, th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , a f t e r denying
T u l l ' s r e q u e s t f o r a ju r y t r i a l , condu cted
a 15 day bench t r i a l o f th e m e r its o f the
govern m en t 's c la im s under the Clean Water
A c t , r e s o l v e d t h e u n d e r ly in g fa c t u a l
d is p u te s in fa v o r o f th e government, and
imposed $70,000 in c i v i l p e n a l t i e s . 95
L .E d .2d a t 371. This C ourt, co n c lu d in g
th a t T u l l was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y e n t i t l e d t o
32
a ju r y t r i a l on th e l i a b i l i t y i s s u e s
d e c i d e d by t h e ju d g e , r e v e r s e d th e
d e c i s i o n below and remanded th e ca se f o r a
ju r y t r i a l . 95 L .E d.2d a t 3 7 8 -7 9 . On at
l e a s t seven p r i o r o c c a s i o n s , th e f i r s t in
1 8 5 0 , t h i s C o u rt has r e v e r s e d th e
e rron eou s d e n ia l o f a ju r y t r i a l and
remanded th e c la im s f o r t r i a l by ju r y ,
d e s p i t e an in te r v e n in g d e c i s i o n on the
m e r its by a t r i a l j u d g e .15
The p r o p r ie t y o f r e d r e s s in g Seventh
Amendment v i o l a t i o n s in t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l
manner was e x p r e s s ly upheld in Meeker O il
v . Ambassador O il C o r p . , 375 U.S. 160
(1963) (p er curiam) . In Meeker, as in
Beacon T h ea tres , In c . v . W estov er , 359
x P e r n e l l v . S o u th a l l R e a l t y , 416
U .S. 263 (1974) ; C u rt is v , L o e th e r , 415
U.S. 189 (1 9 7 4 ) ; Meeker v . Ambassador O il
C o r o . . 375 U.S. 160 (1 9 6 3 ) ; Sch oenthal v .
I r v in g T ru st C o , . 287 U.S. 92 (1 9 3 2 ) ;
B a y l is v . T r a v e le r s ' Insuran ce C o . , 113
U.S. 316 (1 8 8 5 ) ; Hodges v . E a ston . 106
U.S. 408 (1 8 8 2 ) ; Webster v . R e id . 52 U.S.
437 (1850) .
33
U.S. 500 (1 9 5 9 ), th e p le a d in g s r a is e d both
l e g a l and e q u it a b le i s s u e s , and a ju r y
t r i a l was du ly r e q u e s te d . In Beacon
T h ea tres , which came t o t h i s Court p r i o r
t o t r i a l on a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t o f
mandamus, th e Court h e ld th a t in such
ca s e s th e l e g a l c la im s must be t r i e d f i r s t
b e f o r e a ju r y , l e s t a premature n o n - ju ry
d e c i s i o n on th e e q u it a b le c la im s p re c lu d e
a ju r y t r i a l on th o s e l e g a l i s s u e s . 359
U.S. a t 50 8 -1 1 . In M eeker, th e t r i a l
ju d g e , in v i o l a t i o n o f Beacon T h e a t r e s ,
had d e c id e d th e e q u it a b le c la im s f i r s t ,
and then r e l i e d on h is own d e c i s i o n in
fa v o r o f de fen da n ts t o deny p l a i n t i f f s a
ju r y t r i a l , o r any o th e r r e l i e f , on t h e i r
l e g a l c la im s . The Tenth C i r c u i t , d e s p i t e
Beacon T h e a tr e s , h e ld th a t th e t r i a l
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n on the e q u it a b le c la im s
p re c lu d e d any ju r y t r i a l on the l e g a l
c la im , which a l le g e d s la n d e r t o t i t l e :
34
[W]e cannot say th a t h i s f in d in g
[on th e m e r its o f th e e q u i t a b le
i s s u e s ] . . . was e r ro n e o u s . The
Meekers would have been e n t i t l e d
t o a ju r y t r i a l o f any i s s u e s
rem aining f o r d e te rm in a t io n on
t h e i r [ l e g a l ] c la im . However,
th e t r i a l c o u r t , in th e e x e r c i s e
o f i t s e q u it y j u r i s d i c t i o n , had
determ ined . . . th a t th e Meekers
had no t i t l e . . . . S in ce th e
Meekers had no t i t l e th a t c o u ld
have been s la n d ered by th e a c t s
o f th e d e fen d a n ts , no i s s u e s
were l e f t t o be t r i e d on th e
M eekers' [ l e g a l ] c la im .
308 F . 2 d 8 7 5 , 884 (10th C ir . 1962)
(emphasis a d d e d ) . The p l a i n t i f f s sought
rev iew by t h i s Court t o c o r r e c t " [ t ] h e
e r r o r o f th e Court o f Appeals in h o ld in g
th a t th e p e t i t i o n e r s were in any way
estop p ed o r p r o h ib i t e d from c o n t e s t in g "
t h e i r l e g a l c l a i m s .16 This Court gran ted
c e r t i o r a r i , and a f t e r b r i e f i n g and
argument re v e rse d the Tenth C i r c u i t per
curiam , c i t i n g Beacon T heatres and Dairy
1 b P e t i t i o n f o r W r i t o f
C e r t i o r a r i , O ctob er Term 1963, No. 46, p.
5.
35
Queen , I n c , v . Wood. 369 U.S. 469 (1 9 6 2 ).
375 U.S. 469 (1963) .
T h is ca se p re s e n ts p r e c i s e l y th e
p r o b le m a n t i c i p a t e d in C h ie f J u s t i c e
R e h n q u is t 's d i s s e n t in g o p in io n in Parklane
H o s ie r y . The p ro ce d u ra l p o s tu re o f t h i s
ca se i s i d e n t i c a l t o th a t o f M eeker, and,
i f Meeker i s s t i l l good law, th e d e c i s i o n
below i s n e c e s s a r i l y wrong. The Fourth
C i r c u i t , however, b e l i e v e s th a t Beacon
T heatres and Dairy Queen, on which Meeker
was e x p r e s s ly based , have s in c e been
m o d i f ie d by Parklane H o s ie r y . 17 The
Fourth C i r c u i t ' s in t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the
1979 d e c i s i o n in Parklane H o s ie r y , as
Ju dge W iden er r e c o g n i z e d , i s s im p ly
i n c o n s i s t e n t w ith t h i s C o u r t 's 1987
d e c i s i o n in T u l l . The Fourth C i r c u i t ' s
i n s i s t e n c e t h a t S e v e n t h Amendment
1 ; R i t t e r v . Mount S a in t M ary's
c o l l e g e . 814 F .2d 986, 990 (4th C ir . 1987).
36
v i o l a t i o n s are rendered u n rev iew ab le by a
s u b s e q u e n t , a l b e i t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
t a in t e d , d e c i s i o n by th e t r i a l ju d g e ,
cann ot be r e c o n c i l e d w ith t h i s C o u r t 's
cen tu ry lon g p r a c t i c e o f r e v ie w in g and
o v e r tu rn in g such t r i a l ju d ge d e c i s i o n s .
37
I I I . THE DECISION BELOW POSES SERIOUS
PROBLEMS FOR EFFICIENT JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION_______________________
The c o n f l i c t s among th e c i r c u i t s , and
between th e d e c i s i o n below and th e p r i o r
d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s C ourt, are im portant f o r
th r e e d i s t i n c t re a son s . F i r s t , th e Fourth
C i r c u i t d e c i s i o n c r e a te s th e unprecedented
s i t u a t i o n in which an acknowledged and
p r e j u d i c i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n
s im p ly cannot be c o r r e c t e d on d i r e c t
a p p e a l ; in d e e d , as th e in s ta n t ca se
d e m o n s t r a t e s , t h e F o u r t h C i r c u i t ' s
approach p r e c lu d e s a p p e l la t e p a n e ls from
e v e n d e c i d i n g w h eth er t h e r e was a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n a t a l l . Any
p r o c e d u r a l d o c t r i n e p r e c lu d in g d i r e c t
a p p e l la t e rev iew o f an e n t i r e c l a s s o f
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c la im s would be s e r io u s in
and o f i t s e l f . In t h i s i n s t a n c e ,
m oreover, th e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v is i o n at
i s s u e i s d i r e c t e d , not a t p r iv a t e person s
38
o r o r d in a r y government o f f i c i a l s , but
s o l e l y a t f e d e r a l ju d g e s . I f th e Fourth
C i r c u i t p re c lu d e d a p p e l la t e rev iew o f
c l a i m s t h a t p r i s o n a u t h o r i t i e s had
v i o l a t e d th e E ig h th Amendment, th o s e
c l a i m s w o u ld s t i l l b e s u b j e c t t o
e v a l u a t i o n by an in depen dent f e d e r a l
d i s t r i c t ju d g e . But where an a p p e l la n t
a s s e r t s th a t a d i s t r i c t ju d ge h im s e l f
v i o l a t e d th e C o n s t i t u t io n , a d e n ia l o f
a p p e l l a t e rev iew means th e a p p e l la n ts
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c la im w i l l never be heard
by a d i s i n t e r e s t e d f e d e r a l ju d g e .
Second, i f th e d e n ia l o f a ju r y t r i a l
can no lo n g e r be l i t i g a t e d on d i r e c t
appeal f o l l o w in g an u n c o n s t i t u t io n a l non
ju r y t r i a l , th e on ly way th e a p p e l la t e
c o u r t s c o u ld e n fo r c e the Seventh Amendment
would be t o in te rv e n e p r i o r t o t r i a l . The
Fourth C i r c u i t bar t o d i r e c t appeal o f
such i s s u e s e l im in a te s any ground f o r
39
denying a w r i t o f mandamus t o rev iew a
t r i a l c o u r t o rd e r den y in g , o r g r a n t in g , a
ju r y t r i a l . M oreover, i f , as th e Fourth
C i r c u i t has h e ld , a d e n ia l o f a ju r y t r i a l
i s no lo n g e r s u b je c t t o d i r e c t a p p e l la t e
rev iew a f t e r judgment in th a t c i r c u i t ,
such d e n ia ls 'would n e c e s s a r i l y f a l l w ith in
th e c o l l a t e r a l o rd e r d o c t r in e o f Cohen v .
B e n e f i c i a l I n d u s t r ia l Loan C o r p . , 337 U.S.
541 (1 9 4 9 ) . U n ti l now, th e c o l l a t e r a l
o rd e r d o c t r in e has been h e ld in a p p l i c a b le
t o d e n i a l s o f j u r y t r i a l s p r e c i s e l y
becau se th e c i r c u i t c o u r ts b e l i e v e d th a t
c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l c o u ld not be used
a f t e r judgment t o preven t a p p e l la t e rev iew
o f , and r e d r e s s f o r , any Seventh Amendment
v i o l a t i o n . See e . g . , Western E le c . Co. v .
M ilgro E le c t r o n i c C orp . 573 F.2d 255, 256-
57 (5th C ir . 1978). In th e Fourth C ir c u i t
today i n t e r l o c u t o r y ap pea ls are not on ly a
t e c h n i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y but a p r a c t i c a l
40
n e c e s s i t y f o r any l i t i g a n t who w ish es t o
p r e s e rv e h i s o r her a s s e r te d r i g h t t o a
ju r y t r i a l . In th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s
th ro u g h o u t th a t c i r c u i t , any a t to rn e y
whose re q u e s t f o r a ju r y t r i a l i s r e fu s e d
has no c h o i c e but t o im m ediately take a
p r o t e c t i v e in t e r l o c u t o r y a p p ea l , s in c e he
o r she i s u n l ik e ly t o be a b le t o r a i s e
th a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c la im on appeal a t any
s ta g e l a t e r in th e p r o c e e d in g .18 Almost
f o r t y y e a rs ago in Morgantown v . Royal
I t would be an e x a g g e ra t io n t o
a s s e r t th a t th e cu rre n t s t a t e o f th e law
i n t h e F o u r th C i r c u i t i s e n t i r e l y
c o h e r e n t . R i t t e r was d e c id e d on A p r i l 2,
1987. Four months l a t e r , on August 26,
1987, a d i f f e r e n t panel in th a t c i r c u i t ,
w ith ou t r e f e r r i n g t o R i t t e r . a p p l ie d the
t r a d i t i o n a l r u le th a t ju r y t r i a l c la im s
may be rev iew ed d e s p i t e an in te r v e n in g
d e c i s i o n on th e i s s u e s by a t r i a l ju d g e .
K e l l e r v . P r in ce G e o r g e 's C ounty, 827 F .2d
952 (4th C ir . 1987). The in s ta n t ca se was
d e c id e d on O ctob er 20, 1987, and stamped
"u n p u b l is h e d ," a la b e l which, under Fourth
C i r c u i t r u le s , means th a t th e d e c i s i o n
i s n ot as a p r a c t i c a l m atter a v a i la b le t o
most a t t o r n e y s . On A p r i l 27, 1988, the
fo u r th c i r c u i t den ied re h e a r in g in the
in s ta n t ca se by a v o t e o f 8 t o 3.
41
Insuran ce Co. , 337 U.S. 264 (1 9 4 9 ), t h i s
C ourt, em phasizing th a t d e n ia ls o f ju r y
t r i a l s c o u ld be c o r r e c t e d on a p p ea l , h e ld
th a t such d e n ia ls c o u ld n ot o r d i n a r i l y be
made th e s u b je c t o f in t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a ls ;
J u s t i c e F ra n k fu rter emphasized th a t th a t
d e c i s i o n was n ecessa ry t o p r e s e rv e the
" d e e p - r o o t e d g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e " o f
" [n ]o n a p p e a la b i l i t y o f in te rm ed ia te o rd e rs
in th e f e d e r a l c o u r t s . " 337 U.S. a t 261
(c o n c u r r in g o p i n i o n ) . I f , however, as
C h ie f J u s t i c e Rehnquist fe a r e d , Parklane
H osiery has indeed o v e r ru le d Meeker, then
Morgantown t o o would be bad law.
T h ir d , th e F ou rth C i r c u i t r u l e
n e c e s s a r i l y extends not o n ly t o o rd e rs
re g a rd in g ju r y t r i a l s , but more b ro a d ly t o
any d e c i s i o n reg a rd in g who i s t o determ ine
the m e r i t s , o r any o th e r fa c t u a l a s p e c t ,
o f a c o n t r o v e r s y . I f , f o r example, a
t r i a l ju d ge im properly r e f e r r e d an is s u e
42
t o a m a g is t r a te , a s p e c ia l m aster , o r a
n o n - A r t i c l e I I I ju d g e , c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l
based on th e r e s u l t i n g d e c i s i o n would,
u n d er R i t t e r and th e o p in io n be low ,
p r e c lu d e v i n d i c a t i o n o f a l i t i g a n t ' s r i g h t
t o have h i s o r her c la im d e c id e d by an
A r t i c l e I I I f e d e r a l ju d g e . The Fourth
C i r c u i t ' s v iew o f c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l
w o u ld seem e q u a l l y e f f i c a c i o u s in
p r e v e n t in g d i r e c t rev iew o f many d is p u te s
re g a rd in g venue and forum n o n -co n v e n ie n s .
S i m i l a r l y , d i r e c t a p p e l la t e rev iew o f
q u e s t io n s c o n ce rn in g i f in th e in s ta n t
ca se th e d i s t r i c t ju d ge had gran ted a ju r y
t r i a l , but had then d i r e c t e d th a t th e ca se
be t r i e d by a ju r y c o n s i s t i n g o f on ly
r e s id e n t s o f some d i s t a n t s t a t e , o r o f
o n l y 2 j u r o r s , th a t method o f ju r y
co m p o s it io n would o f c o u rs e have been
p a t e n t ly i l l e g a l , but i t s v e r d i c t under
R i t t e r and th e d e c i s i o n below would s t i l l
43
c o l l a t e r a l l y e s to p p e t i t i o n e r from t r y in g
th e c la im s b e f o r e a ju r y s e l e c t e d in a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l manner.
A l l o f th e s e problem s a r i s e on a
r e g u la r b a s i s . S in ce c e r t i o r a r i was
den ied l e s s than a yea r ago in R i t t e r ,
th e re have been fo u r o th e r c i r c u i t c o u r t
o p in io n s on th e same i s s u e . Wade, Roebuck
and V olk in th e Second, Third and Seventh
C i r c u i t s , r e s p e c t i v e l y , have r e j e c t e d the
h o ld in g in R i t t e r , w h ile th e in s ta n t ca se
has a p p l ie d and extended R i t t e r .
IV. THE DECISION BELOW SHOULD BE
SUMMARILY REVERSED
In th e in s ta n t ca se th e s u b s ta n t iv e
l e g a l c la im f o r which p e t i t i o n e r sought a
j u r y t r i a l was an a l l e g a t i o n t h a t
respondent had v i o l a t e d 42 U .S .C . § 1981
by engaging in r a c i a l d i s c r im in a t io n in
employment. The a p p l i c a t io n o f s e c t i o n
1981 t o p r i v a t e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s , upheld by t h i s
44
Court in Runyon v . McCrary. 427 U.S. 160
( 1 9 7 6 ) , i s now th e s u b j e c t o f the
s c h e d u le d reargu m en t in P a tte rso n v .
McLean C r e d it U nion , No. 87 -10 7 . Under
o r d i n a r y c ir cu m sta n ces th e a p p r o p r ia te
d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h i s p r o c e e d in g would be t o
h o ld th e p e t i t i o n and d e f e r a c t i o n u n t i l
th e d e c i s i o n in P a t te r s o n . See R. Revesz
and P. K arlan, "N onm ajority Rules and the
Supreme C o u r t ," 136 U ,Pa, L .R ev . 1067,
1109-31 (1 9 8 8 ).
T h i s c a s e p r e s e n t s a p r o b le m ,
how ever, which w arrants a d ep a rtu re from
th a t p r a c t i c e . I f a c t i o n i s d e fe r r e d
pending th e d e c i s i o n in P a t t e r s o n , i t i s
l i k e l y th a t th e in s ta n t ca se c o u ld n ot be
heard u n t i l th e O ctob er 1989 term, and
would n ot be d e c id e d u n t i l th e s p r in g o f
1990. In th e in te r v e n in g y e a r s , the
d e c i s i o n b e lo w , in c o n j u n c t i o n w ith
R i t t e r , w i l l i n e x o r a b l y l e a d t o
45
c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n fu s io n and a s e r io u s
d i s s i p a t i o n o f j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s . Any-
in form ed a t to rn e y d e fen d in g on appeal th e
d e n ia l o f a ju r y t r i a l , e x c e p t in g perhaps
in th e Second, T h ird , Seventh and D i s t r i c t
o f Columbia C i r c u i t s , would tod a y argue
t h a t c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l p r e c l u d e s
a p p e l la t e c o n s id e r a t io n o f th a t i s s u e ;
s i m i l a r c o n t e n t i o n s would be e q u a l ly
p l a u s i b l e in ap pea ls reg a rd in g venue,
forum non con v en ien s , and any o th e r is s u e
co n ce rn in g th e i d e n t i t y o f the c o r r e c t
t r i e r o f f a c t . Any Fourth C i r c u i t
a t to rn e y whose req u e st f o r a ju r y t r i a l i s
den ied in a d i s t r i c t c o u r t must now pursue
an immediate in t e r l o c u t o r y a p p ea l, and any
a t to rn e y who th in k s a ju r y t r i a l was
im p rop erly gran ted undoubtedly must a l s o
appeal a t on ce , ra th e r than aw ait f i n a l
judgment. Cautious law yers may w e l l f e e l
o b l i g a t e d t o do th e same in o t h e r
46
c i r c u i t s , o r t o f i l e su ch a p p e a l s
r e g a rd in g o th e r ty p e s o f d is p u te s about
th e i d e n t i t y o f th e p ro p e r t r i e r o f f a c t .
A s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t io n o f a l l now pending
f e d e r a l c i v i l ca s e s c o u ld w e l l become
e m b r o i l e d in t h e e n s u in g t a n g l e o f
i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l s , m o t i o n s , and
argum ents.
The q u e s t io n s r a is e d by th e in s ta n t
c a s e , however th ey are t o be r e s o lv e d ,
ought be r e s o lv e d w ith d is p a t c h . I f , as
has been th e law in th e p a s t , ju r y t r i a l
and o th e r r e la t e d is s u e s can s t i l l be
ad dressed on d i r e c t appeal a f t e r f i n a l
judgm ent, th a t shou ld be r e a f f ir m e d b e fo r e
th e d e c i s i o n below and R i t t e r wreak havoc
in th e f e d e r a l a p p e l la t e c o u r t s . I f , on
th e o th e r hand, in t e r l o c u t o r y a p p ea ls w i l l
h e n c e fo r th be th e o n ly method o f r a i s in g
ju r y t r i a l and s im i la r t r i e r o f f a c t
i s s u e s in th e c i r c u i t c o u r t s , f e d e r a l
47
l i t i g a n t s throughout the n a t io n ought be
t o l d t h a t p r o m p t ly , b e f o r e co n t in u ed
r e l i a n c e on th e c o n tra ry m a jo r i t y r u le
c r e a t e s enormous problem s o f u n fa irn e s s
and r e t r o a c t i v i t y .
A prompt r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s q u e s t io n
might be a ch ieved by g ra n t in g c e r t i o r a r i
and a c c e l e r a t in g the tim e f o r b r i e f i n g and
arguments, o r by g ra n t in g c e r t i o r a r i and
summarily r e v e r s in g th e d e c i s i o n be low .
We b e l i e v e th a t summary r e v e r s a l would be
a p p r o p r i a t e . The F ou rth C i r c u i t ' s
d e c i s i o n i s sq u a re ly c o n tra ry t o th e
cen tu ry lon g p r a c t i c e , in t h i s Court and
t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s , o f
rev iew in g on appeal c la im s th a t a l i t i g a n t
was im p rop er ly den ied a ju r y t r i a l . The
d e c i s i o n below th a t c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l
p r e c lu d e s any a p p e l la t e c o n s id e r a t io n o f
such a c la im f l i e s in the fa c e o f t h i s
C o u r t 's d e c i s i o n in C ity o f Morgantown v .
48
Royal Insuran ce Co. . 337 U.S. 254, 258
( 1 9 4 9 ) , t h a t " [ t ] h e r u l i n g s o f th e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t g ra n t in g o r denying ju r y
t r i a l s are s u b je c t t o th e most e x a c t in g
s c r u t in y on a p p e a l . " D airy Queen, In c , v .
Wood. 369 U.S. 469 ( 1962) , h e ld th a t
[ 0 ]n l y under th e most im p era t iv e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c i r c u m s t a n c e s
which in v iew o f th e f l e x i b l e
p ro ce d u re s o f th e F edera l Rules
we cannot now a n t i c i p a t e , can
th e r ig h t t o a ju r y t r i a l o f
l e g a l i s s u e s be l o s t through
p r i o r d e term in a t ion o f e q u i t a b le
c la i m s .
369 U.S. a t 51 0 -1 1 . S u re ly th e Court d id
n ot in ten d th a t a t r i a l ju d g e 's own e r r o r
in r e fu s in g t o perm it a ju r y t r i a l , a
c i r c u m s t a n c e p r e s e n t in D a iry Queen
i t s e l f , c o u l d c o n s t i t u t e one o f the
" im p e ra t iv e c ir cu m sta n ce s " w arran tin g l o s s
o f th e r i g h t t o a ju r y t r i a l ; were th a t
th e r u l e , th e h o ld in g in Dairy Queen would
l i t e r a l l y be in a p p l i c a b le in any ca se in
which D airy Queen i t s e l f was v i o l a t e d .
49
P a rk la n e H o s ie r y em phasized th a t
c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l c o u ld on ly be invoked
w ith rega rd t o an e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n th a t
had been " f u l l y l i t i g a t e d . " 439 U.S. a t
327, 328. In th e in s ta n t c a s e , however,
th e m e r its o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s T i t l e V II
c la im s have n ot been f u l l y l i t i g a t e d ; on
the c o n t r a r y , the c o r r e c t n e s s o f th e t r i a l
ju d g e 's a c t i o n in d e c id in g h im s e l f th e
T i t l e V II c la im s i s one o f th e c e n t r a l
is s u e s in t h i s a p p ea l. Rather than g iv in g
c o l l a t e r a l e f f e c t t o a f u l l y l i t i g a t e d
i s s u e , t h e d e c i s i o n b e l o w in v o k e d
c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l in o rd e r t o p reven t
f u l l l i t i g a t i o n , indeed t o p rev en t any
a p p e l l a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t a i l , o f
p e t i t i o n e r ' s c la im th a t the t r i a l ju d ge
v i o l a t e d t h e S e v e n t h Amendment in
im properly p a ss in g on the m e r its o f the
T i t l e V II c la im s .
50
The a c t io n o f th e Fourth C i r c u i t
b esp ea k s , n o t s im ply a m isun derstan din g o f
t h i s C o u r t 's Seventh Amendment d e c i s i o n s ,
bu t a c o n s id e r e d d e te rm in a t io n t o ig n o re
th o s e p r e c e d e n ts . On A p r i l 2, 1987, the
Fourth C i r c u i t h e ld in R i t t e r th a t an
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t co u ld n ot c o r r e c t a
Seventh Amendment v i o l a t i o n by d i r e c t i n g
t h a t i s s u e s im p rop erly d e c id e d by a judge
be r e f e r r e d in s te a d t o a ju r y . On A p r i l
28, 1987, t h i s Court in T u ll v . United
S ta te s , unanimously is su e d p r e c i s e l y the
ty p e o f rem ed ia l o rd e r h e ld im p erm iss ib le
in R i t t e r . Yet on O ctob er 20, 1987, the
Fourth C i r c u i t panel in th e in s ta n t case
i n s i s t e d t h a t a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s were
p o w e r le s s t o p r o v id e th e v e ry remedy
awarded in T u ll l e s s than seven months
e a r l i e r . Judge Widener, in h i s d i s s e n t in g
o p in io n be low , c o r r e c t l y ob served th a t the
51
p a n e l 's a c t i o n " i s n ot c o n s i s t e n t w ith . . .
T u ll v . U nited S t a t e s . " (App. 19a n. 4 ) .
T h is Court does n ot l i g h t l y take
summary a c t i o n on th e b a s i s o f a
c e r t i o r a r i p e t i t i o n and op p os in g p a p ers ,
in p a r t becau se o f the p o s s i b i l i t y th a t
summary d i s p o s i t i o n may f a i l t o come t o
g r ip s w ith th e f u l l r a m i f i c a t io n s o f a
n ov e l i s s u e , in p a rt becau se o f th e r i s k
o f u n fa irn e s s t o the opp osin g p a r ty . The
q u e s t io n r a is e d by t h i s c a s e , however, i s
not new; i t has a r is e n in t h i s Court and
been r e s o lv e d in a manner c o n tra ry t o the
d e c i s i o n below on rep eated o c c a s io n s over
the co u rse o f more than a ce n tu ry . The
in s ta n t p e t i t i o n , by e x p r e s s ly su g g e s t in g
th a t t h i s i s an a p p ro p r ia te ca se f o r
summary d i s p o s i t i o n , a f f o r d s respondent a
rea so n a b le o p p o rtu n ity t o p re se n t in i t s
memorandum i n o p p o s i t i o n argum ents
su p p o r t in g th e d e c i s i o n below or u rg in g
52
t h a t t h e i s s u e s a r e o f s u f f i c i e n t
co m p le x ity t o warrant f u l l b r i e f i n g and
argument.
53
CONCLUSION
For th e above rea son s , c e r t i o r a r i
shou ld be gran ted t o rev iew the judgment
and o p in io n o f th e Fourth C i r c u i t , and th e
d e c i s i o n b e lo w s h o u ld be su m m arily
r e v e rs e d .
R e s p e c t f u l l y subm itted ,
JULIUS LeVONNE CHAMBERS
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON
RONALD L. ELLIS
JUDITH REED*
ERIC SCHNAPPER
NAACP Legal D efense and
E du cation a l Fund, In c .
99 Hudson S tr e e t
16th F lo o r
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
PENDA D. HAIR
S u ite 301
1275 K S t r e e t , N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-1300
A ttorn ey s f o r P e t i t i o n e r
*Counsel o f Record
APPENDICES
la
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 86-1097
John S. L y t le ,
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l la n t ,
v ersu s
Household M anufacturing , In c .
d / b / a S ch w itzer T urbochargers ,
Defendant - A p p e l le e .
Appeal from th e U nited S ta te s D i s t r i c t
Court f o r th e Western D i s t r i c t o f North
C a r o l i n a , a t A s h e v i l l e . D avid B.
S e n t e l l e , D i s t r i c t Ju dge .(C A -84-453 -A -C )
Argued: January 6, 1987
D ecided : O ctober 20, 1987
B e fo r e WIDENER and CHAPMAN, C i r c u i t
Judges, and SIMONS, D i s t r i c t Judge f o r
the D i s t r i c t o f South C a ro lin a , s i t t i n g
by d e s ig n a t io n .
Penda Denise H air (J u l iu s L. Chambers;
Ronald L. E l l i s ; Regan A. M i l l e r ; James,
2a
McElroy & D ieh l on b r i e f ) f o r a p p e l la n t ;
Alan Bruce C larke (H. Lane Dennard, J r . ;
O g le t r e e , D eakins, Nash, Smoak & Stew art
on b r i e f ) f o r a p p e l l e e .
CHAPMAN, C i r c u i t Judge:
The a p p e l l a n t 's a c t i o n f o r d i s
c r im in a to r y d is c h a rg e and r e t a l i a t i o n f o r
f i l i n g a charge o f d i s c r im in a t i o n 'w it h
th e Equal Employment O pp ortu n ity Commis
s io n was brought under both 42 U .S .C . §
1981 and under T i t l e V II o f th e C i v i l
R ig h ts A ct o f 1964, 42 U .S .C . § 2000e e t
s e q . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d ism isse d th e §
1981 a c t io n w ith a r u l in g th a t T i t l e VII
p r o v i d e d t h e e x c l u s i v e rem edy f o r
employment d i s c r im in a t i o n . A bench t r i a l
f o l lo w e d on th e T i t l e V II c la im . At the
c o n c lu s io n o f th e p l a i n t i f f ' s ca se the
t r i a l c o u r t under Fed. R. C iv . P. 41(b)
d ism isse d th e c la im f o r d is c r im in a to r y
d is c h a r g e , and a t th e c o n c lu s io n o f a l l
o f th e e v id en ce the c o u r t found f o r the
3a
defen dan t on th e r e t a l i a t i o n c la im . The
a p p e l la n t now argues th a t th e t r i a l c o u r t
e r re d in d ism is s in g h is § 1981 a c t i o n and
th a t he i s e n t i t l e d t o a ju r y t r i a l on
h is § 1981 a c t i o n . We h o ld th a t the
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f in d in g s in th e T i t l e
V II t r i a l c o l l a t e r a l l y e s to p th e a p p e l
la n t from r e l i t i g a t i n g th e se f in d in g s
b e f o r e a ju r y , and we a f f i r m th e r e s u l t
reached by th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .
I .
John S. L y t le had been employed as a
m a ch in ist f o r two and o n e - h a l f y ea rs in
Household M a n u fa ctu r in g 's North C a ro lin a
p la n t . Imm ediately p r i o r t o th e d i s
charge which gave r i s e t o t h i s s u i t , i t
appears th a t L y t le had been i l l , and had
a c c o r d in g ly planned t o see a p h y s ic ia n on
F riday , August 12, 1983. L y t le asked on
the day p r i o r t o August 12 i f he co u ld
take th e next day o f f as a v a c a t io n day.
4a
L y t l e ' s s u p e r v is o r in form ed him th a t he
c o u ld ta k e F riday o f f o n ly he worked on
Saturday [ s i c ] .
L y t le n ever in form ed h i s s u p e r v is o r
t h a t he would take F riday as a v a c a t io n
day in exchange f o r w orking on Saturday.
L y t le c la im s th a t he was e f f e c t i v e l y
p rev en ted from in form in g h is s u p e r v is o r
about h i s in t e n t i o n s by th e s u p e r v i s o r 's
a n g e r a t L y t l e , a r i s in g ou t o f an
u n re la te d in c i d e n t . For whatever reason ,
L y t le f a i l e d t o appear a t work e i t h e r on
F riday o r on Saturday. L y t le c la im s th a t
h i s m ed ica l c o n d i t i o n p rev en ted him from
w orking on Saturday, and th a t he in form ed
th e p l a n t ' s Human R esou rces C o u n se l lo r o f
t h a t problem .
The a p p e l l e e c l a s s i f i e d L y t l e ' s
a b s e n c e s as "u n ex cu sed ." A p p e l l e e 's
d is c h a rg e p o l i c y d i s t in g u i s h e s between
ex cu se d and unexcused a b sen ces . I f
5a
unexcused absences exceed e ig h t hours in
a tw e lv e month p e r io d i t i s grounds f o r
d i s m is s a l . A c c o r d in g ly , th e a p p e l le e
term in ated L y t l e ' s employment.
Subsequent t o h i s t e rm in a t io n , L y t le
f i l e d a charge o f d i s c r im in a t io n w ith the
Equal Employment O pportun ity Commission.
L y t le then began seek in g employment w ith
o th e r b u s in e s s e s in th e a rea , w ith ou t
s u c c e s s . L y t le a t t r i b u t e s t h i s f a i l u r e
t o th e a p p e l l e e 's r e fu s a l t o p r o v id e him
w ith a l e t t e r o f recommendation beyond a
mere acknowledgment th a t L y t le had been
employed by th e a p p e l l e e . I t appears
t h a t , in one in s ta n c e , th e a p p e l le e had
p rov id ed an oth er employee w ith an a c tu a l
l e t t e r o f recommendation, c o n tra ry t o
exp ress company p o l i c y .
L y t l e ' s f i r s t l e g a l a c t io n was a
c la im f o r f u l l unemployment b e n e f i t s
b e f o r e th e North C a ro lin a Employment
6a
S e c u r i ty Commission. The d e c i s i o n o f the
Commission was appealed t o and a f f ir m e d
by th e Buncombe County S u p e r io r C o u r t .1
The E m ploym ent C om m ission and th e
S u p e r io r Court found th a t L y t le was
e n t i t l e d o n ly t o reduced unemployment
b e n e f i t s becau se h i s " s u b s t a n t ia l f a u l t "
had c o n t r ib u t e d h is te rm in a t io n [ s i c ] .
L y t le f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n on December 7,
1984 a f t e r r e c e i v in g a r i g h t t o sue
l e t t e r from th e EEOC. L y t le sought
r e l i e f under T i t l e V II o f th e C i v i l
R ig h ts A ct o f 1964, 42 U .S .C . § 2000e e t
se q . . and th e C i v i l R igh ts A ct o f 1866,
42 U .S .C . § 1981, a l l e g i n g th a t the
a p p e l l e e had d isch a rg e d him becau se o f
h i s ra c e and r e t a l i a t e d a g a in s t him f o r
f i l i n g a charge o f d i s c r im in a t io n w ith
± L y t l e v . S c h w i t z e r
T u rboch argers and th e Employment S e c u r i ty
Commission o f North C a r o l in a , 84-CVS-1602
(S ep t . 10, 1984).
7a
th e EEOC. L y t le req u ested a ju r y t r i a l
on h i s c la im s under § 1981.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d ism issed the
a p p e l l e e 's m otion f o r summary judgment,
in which th e a p p e l le e had argued th a t th e
d e c i s i o n o f th e S ta te Employment Commis
s io n serv ed t o bar th e p r o c e e d in g s . The
d i s t r i c t c o u r t s ta te d th a t th e r e were
u n r e s o l v e d f a c t u a l i s s u e s p r e c lu d in g
summary judgment. On February 26, 1986,
th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d ism issed L y t l e ' s
c la im s under § 1981 on the grounds th a t
T i t l e V II p r o v id e s th e e x c lu s iv e remedy
f o r employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .2 L y t le
then p roceed ed t o t r y h i s T i t l e VII
c la im s b e f o r e th e bench. At the c l o s e o f
the p l a i n t i f f ' s e v id e n ce , th e d i s t r i c t
T h is r u l i n g was a p p a r e n t ly
e rron eou s . In Johnson v . Ryder__Truck
L in es . I n c . , 575 F .2d 471 (4th C ir .
1978), c e r t , d e n ie d , 440 U.S. 979 (1 9 7 9 ),
we found T i t l e VII and § 1981 rem edies t o
be s e p a ra te , independent and d i s t i n c t .
8a
c o u r t g ran ted th e d e fe n d a n t 's m otion
under Fed. R. C iv . P. 41 (b ) t o d ism iss
th e c la im o f d i s c r im in a to r y d is c h a rg e on
th e grounds th a t th e p l a i n t i f f had f a i l e d
t o e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e . At th e
c l o s e o f a l l th e e v id e n c e , th e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t en te re d a v e r d i c t f o r th e defen dan t
on th e r e t a l i a t i o n c la im .
I I .
T h is c o u r t h e ld in R i t t e r v . Mount
S a in t M ary 's C o l l e g e . No. 86-3015 (4th
C ir . f i l e d March 23, 1987), th a t the
f in d in g s o f th e t r i a l c o u r t made in a
T i t l e V II a c t i o n are e n t i t l e d t o c o l
l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l e f f e c t , thus p re v e n t in g
th e r e l i t i g a t i o n o f th o se f in d in g s b e fo r e
a ju r y under a " l e g a l " th e o ry a r i s in g out
o f th e same f a c t s . We found th a t
c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l would o b ta in even
where th e t r i a l c o u r t had e r ro n e o u s ly
d ism isse d th e p l a i n t i f f ' s l e g a l c la im s .
9a
As th e Supreme C ourt determ ined in
Parklane H os ie ry , In c , v . S h o re . 439 U.S.
322 (1 9 7 9 ) , th e j u d i c i a l i n t e r e s t in
economy o f r e s o u r ce s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o
o v e r r i d e th e l i t i g a n t ' s i n t e r e s t in
r e l i t i g a t i n g h is ca s e , even where the
consequence o f the f a i l u r e t o perm it
r e l i t i g a t i o n i s t o deny th e p l a i n t i f f h is
r i g h t t o a ju r y t r i a l .
W hether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t has
committed e r r o r in s t r ik in g the a p p e l
l a n t ' s c la im s under § 1981 i s not
c o n t r o l l i n g . I f th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
d e term in a t ion s a r r iv e d a t in the co u rse
o f th e bench t r i a l on th e T i t l e VII
th e o ry are n ot c l e a r l y e rron eou s , and i f
the f in d in g s made by the ju d g e , i f
upheld , e s to p th e a p p e l la n t from e s ta b
l i s h i n g a prima f a c i e ca se under § 1981,
then a p p e l la n t may not r e l i t i g a t e th ese
i s s u e s . We p roceed t o determ ine whether
10a
th e d i s t r i c t ju d ge e r re d in h i s f in d in g s
and c o n c lu s io n s in th e T i t l e V II law
s u i t .
We p e r c e iv e no reason t o r e v e r s e the
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e te rm in a t io n th a t the
a p p e l la n t f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h a prima
f a c i e ca se o f d is c r im in a to r y d is c h a r g e .
Rule 41 (b ) r e q u ir e s th e c o u r t t o weigh
a l l e v id e n ce p re s e n te d . The d i s t r i c t
c o u r t ' s f in d in g th a t th e p l a i n t i f f had
p re se n te d no e v id e n ce o f d i s c r im in a t io n
i s p r o t e c t e d by Rule 52 (a ) and may be s e t
a s id e o n ly i f c l e a r l y e r ro n e o u s . Holmes
v . B e v i la c a u a . 794 F .2d 142 (4th C ir .
1985) . In Moore v . C ity o f C h a r l o t t e .
754 F .2d 1100 (4th C i r . ) , c e r t . d e n ie d ,
472 U.S. 1021 (1 9 8 5 ), we d is c u s s e d the
n e ce ssa ry elem ents f o r th e es ta b lish m en t
o f a prima f a c i e ca se o f d is c r im in a to r y
d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n . "The . . . prima
f a c i e requirem ent i s . met upon a
11a
showing (1) th a t p l a i n t i f f engaged in
p r o h ib i t e d con du ct s im i la r t o th a t o f a
p e rs o n o f an oth er r a c e , c o l o r , s e x ,
r e l i g i o n , o r n a t io n a l o r i g i n , and (2)
t h a t d i s c i p l i n a r y m ea su res e n f o r c e d
a g a in s t th e p l a i n t i f f were more se v e re
than th o se e n fo r c e d a g a in s t th e o th e r
p e r s o n . " M oore. 754 F .2d a t 1105-06 .
L y t le has p ro v id e d no e v id e n ce o f o th e r
em ployees who had r e c e iv e d l e s s se v e re
d i s c i p l i n a r y measures as a r e s u l t o f
t h e i r unexcused a b sen ces . L y t le has
p re se n te d e v id e n ce showing th a t w h ite
em ployees who had exceeded th e company
l i m i t a t i o n on e x c u s e d a b s e n c e s had
r e c e iv e d r e l a t i v e l y l e n ie n t trea tm en t,
but th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was e n t i t l e d t o
f in d th a t the d i f f e r e n c e s between excused
and unexcused absences are s i g n i f i c a n t
e n o u g h t o r e n d e r t h o s e v i o l a t i o n s
12a
d i s s i m i l a r . ̂ Thus th e f i r s t prong o f the
Moore t e s t was n ot met. The d i s t r i c t
c o u r t was e n t i t l e d t o co n c lu d e th a t th e
com pany's trea tm en t o f em ployees e x ce e d
in g th e l i m i t a t i o n on unexcused absences
c o u l d d i f f e r from i t s trea tm en t o f
em ployees ex ce e d in g th e excused absence
l i m i t a t i o n , w ith ou t th a t d i f f e r e n c e in
trea tm en t b e in g d i s c r im in a t o r y . F a i l in g
t o p r e s e n t e v id e n ce o f s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d
em ployees e x p e r ie n c in g d i f f e r e n t t r e a t
m ent, th e a p p e l l a n t has f a i l e d to
e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e . We f in d
t h e o t h e r r e a s o n s p r o f f e r e d by the
a p p e l la n t t o r e v e r s e th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
judgment pursuant t o Rule 41 (b ) unper
s u a s iv e .
J Indeed , i t appears th a t the
a p p e l la n t h im s e l f was in v i o l a t i o n o f the
com p a n y l i m i t a t i o n s on p e r m i s s i b l e
excused a b sen ces .
13a
We a l s o d e c l i n e t o d i s t u r b th e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s ju d gm en t f o r t h e
a p p e l l e e on th e c la im th a t th e a p p e l l e e
had r e t a l i a t e d a g a in s t L y t le f o r h is
com p la in t t o th e EEOC. The a p p e l la n t
has o f f e r e d no reason s f o r t h i s c o u r t t o
f in d th a t th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s c o n c lu s io n
was c l e a r l y e r ro n e o u s , and we p e r c e iv e
none. We thus a f f i r m th e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t ' s treatm ent o f th e T i t l e VII c la im .
I I I .
The next is s u e t o r e s o l v e i s whether
th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s c o n c lu s io n s under
T i t l e V II , ca p a b le o f c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l
e f f e c t under R i t t e r and P a rk la n e . p reven t
th e a p p e l la n t from e s t a b l i s h in g a prima
f a c i e ca se under h is § 1981 th e o r y . i t
i s e s t a b l i s h e d beyond peradventure th a t
th e elem ents o f a prima f a c i e ca se o f
e m p lo y m e n t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a l l e g i n g
d is p a r a te treatm ent under T i t l e V II and §
14a
1981 a re i d e n t i c a l . S e e , e . q . . C a iro la
v . Commonwealth o f V i r g in ia Department o f
G eneral S e r v i c e s . 753 F .2d 1281, 1285
(4th C ir . 19 85 ) , and th e c a s e s c i t e d
t h e r e in . "The f a c t s h ere th a t p re c lu d e
r e l i e f under T i t l e VII a l s o p r e c lu d e a
S e c t io n 1981 c la i m ." G arcia v . G lo o r .
518 F .2d 264, 271 (5th C ir . 1 9 8 0 ) , c e r t ,
d e n ie d . 449 U.S. 1113 (1 9 8 1 ). Where the
elem ents o f two cau ses o f a c t i o n are the
same, th e f in d in g s by th e c o u r t in one
p r e c lu d e th e t r i a l o f th e o th e r , and we
so h o ld .
Because we base our a f f irm a n ce o f
th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t on th e a p p l i c a t i o n o f
c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l t o p r e c lu d e the
r e l i t i g a t i o n o f th e fa c t u a l i s s u e s in
t h i s c a s e , we do not need t o reach the
o th e r i s s u e s p re se n te d by t h i s ap p ea l .
AFFIRMED.
15a
WIDENER, C i r c u i t Judge, d i s s e n t i n g :
As th e Seventh C i r c u i t has p o in te d
o u t : " C o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l i s a ' j u d i
c i a l l y d e v e l o p e d d o c t r i n e ' , U nited
S ta te s v . Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158
(1984) , which , when p r o p e r ly a p p l ie d , can
' r e l i e v e p a r t i e s o f th e c o s t and v e x a t io n
o f m u lt ip le law s u i t s , c o n se rv e j u d i c i a l
r e s o u r c e s , and by p re v e n t in g in c o n s is t e n t
d e c i s i o n , encourage r e l ia n c e on a d ju d ic a
t i o n . ' A l le n v . McCurrv, 449 U.S. 90,
94 (1 9 8 0 ) . " Hussein v . Oshkosh Motor
Truck Co. . 816 F .2d 348, 355 (7th C ir .
1987) . The m a jo r i ty argues th a t our
d e c i s i o n in R i t t e r v . Mount S t . M ary 's
C o l l e g e . 814 F .2d 986 (4th C ir . 1987)
(R i t t e r I I I r e q u ir e s th e a p p l i c a t i o n o f
c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l in t h i s c a s e . I
d i s a g r e e and t h e r e f o r e r e s p e c t f u l l y
d i s s e n t .
16a
In t h i s c o u r t ' s R i t t e r d e c i s i o n s ,
th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had d ism isse d the
p l a i n t i f f ' s l e g a l c la im s under th e Age
D is c r im in a t io n in Employment A ct (ADEA),
29 U .S .C . § 621 e t seq . , and Equal Pay
A c t , 29 U .S .C . § 2 0 6 (d ) , on F i r s t
Amendment grounds. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t
then con du cted a bench t r i a l on the
e q u i t a b le c la im s under T i t l e V II o f the
1964 C i v i l R ig h ts A c t , 42 U .S .C . § 2000
e t s eq . At th e c l o s e o f th e bench t r i a l ,
th e low er c o u r t made f in d in g s o f f a c t
ad verse n ot o n ly t o th e p l a i n t i f f ' s T i t l e
VII c la im s but a l s o f in d in g s in c o n s is t e n t
w ith th e maintenance o f her ADEA and
Equal Pay Act c la im s . On a p p ea l , in an
u n p u b l is h e d o p i n i o n we a f f ir m e d the
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s T i t l e V II f a c t f in d in g
as n ot c l e a r l y e r ro n e o u s , see Fed. R.
C iv . P. 5 2 (a ) , but r e v e rs e d th e low er
c o u r t ' s d is m is s a l o f th e p l a i n t i f f ' s ADEA
17a
and EPA l e g a l c la im s and remanded th e
ca se f o r p ro ce e d in g s c o n s i s t e n t w ith our
o p in io n . R i t t e r v . s t . M ary 's C o l l e g e .
No. 81-1534 (4th C i r . , June 8, 1984)
(u npu blished) (R i t t e r T) .
On remand, th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
determ ined th a t i t s f in d in g s made in the
T i t l e V II e q u it a b le s u i t c o l l a t e r a l l y
estop p ed th e r e l i t i g a t i o n o f th o se same
f a c t s b e f o r e a ju r y on the remanded ADEA
and Equal Pay A ct l e g a l a c t i o n s . We
a f f ir m e d th a t low er c o u r t r u l in g . R i t t e r
II., 814 F .2d a t 992. I th in k i t most
s i g n i f i c a n t th a t no q u e s t io n was r a is e d
R i t t e r _I th a t th e erron eou s c o n c lu s io n
o f law o f th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t had d ep r iv ed
p l a i n t i f f o f her Seventh Amendment r ig h t
o f t r i a l by ju r y . That q u e s t io n was not
r a is e d u n t i l a f t e r remand in R i t t e r I I .
Having f a i l e d t o appeal the is s u e in the
f i r s t ap p ea l , i t would not seem to o
18a
u n rea son ab le t o ap p ly c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l
th e secon d tim e around. C f. H u sse in . 816
F .2d a t 359, Judge Posner c o n c u r r in g .
T his c a s e , however, i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y
d i f f e r e n t than R i t t e r I I . Here, the
low er c o u r t e r ro n e o u s ly co n c lu d ed th a t
th e § 1981 c la im s were p re c lu d e d by the
T i t l e V II c la im s . By i t s erron eou s
h o ld in g th a t T i t l e V II was th e e x c lu s iv e
remedy f o r employment d i s c r im in a t i o n , i t
s p e c i f i c a l l y den ied the p l a i n t i f f h is
r i g h t t o t r i a l by ju r y and th a t i s the
p o in t which i s ap pea led . In o th e r words,
th e s o l e reason th a t p l a i n t i f f has been
d en ied h i s r i g h t t o a ju r y t r i a l i s the
e rron eou s r u l in g o f the d i s t r i c t c o u r t
w h ich was a p p e a le d as soon as the
o p p o r tu n ity p resen ted i t s e l f . T his is
n o t , t h e r e f o r e , a ca se l i k e R i t t e r II
where th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s e r r o r was l e t
s l i d e u n t i l th e secon d a p p ea l . I f a
19a
l i t i g a n t can be den ied th e r i g h t t o a
ju r y t r i a l s im ply because a d i s t r i c t
c o u r t has come t o a j u s t i f i a b l e fa c t u a l
c o n c lu s io n in a t r i a l w ith ou t a ju r y , th e
Seventh Amendment means l e s s tod ay than
i t d id y e s t e r d a y .4
Furtherm ore, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t th a t
th e Seventh C i r c u i t , when fa ce d w ith
e x a c t ly t h i s i s s u e on in d is t in g u is h a b le
f a c t s , has determ ined th a t "an a p p l i c a
t i o n o f c o l l a t e r a l e s to p p e l does not
perm it f in d in g s made by a c o u r t in [a
T i t l e V II ] p ro ce e d in g t o bar fu r t h e r
l i t i g a t i o n o f [§ 1981] c la im th a t had
been p r o p e r ly j o i n e d . . . . " H u sse in , 816
F.2d a t 356.
4 The m a jo r i t y 's d e c i s i o n h e re , I
su g g est i s n ot c o n s i s t e n t w ith th e broad
c o n s t r u c t io n o f th e Seventh Amendment
r e c e n t l y g iv e n by th e Supreme Court in
T u ll v . U nited S t a t e s . 55 USLW 4571 (U.S.
A p r i l 28, 19 87 ) . In T u l l . th e Court
re v e rse d our narrow rea d in g o f th e r ig h t
t o t r i a l by ju r y .
20a
I am a l s o d is tu r b e d by th e j u s
t i f i c a t i o n o f th e d e n ia l o f a l i t i g a n t ' s
Seventh Amendment r ig h t t o a ju r y t r i a l
by reason o f j u d i c i a l i n t e r e s t in economy
o f r e s o u r c e s . T his reason undoubted ly
e x i s t e d a t th e tim e o f th e r a t i f i c a t i o n
o f th a t Amendment and has s in c e . In my
o p in io n , however, i t does n ot s u f f i c e as
a p o l i c y argum ent t o c i r c u m v e n t a
p o s i t i v e p r o v i s i o n o f our o r g a n ic law.
To my way o f th in k in g , in the even t o f a
p o l i c y c o n t e s t between j u d i c i a l economy
and th e Seventh Amendment, th e Amendment
sh ou ld p r e v a i l .
A c c o r d in g ly , I would v a ca te the
judgment o f th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and remand
t h i s ca se f o r t r i a l by ju r y on a l l the
is s u e s so t r i a b l e . See R i t t e r I I . 814
F .2d a t 990, c i t i n g Beacon T h ea tres . In c ,
v . W estov er . 359 U.S. 500 (1 9 5 9 ), and
2 Is. “
D airy Queen, In c , v . Wood, 369 U .S. 469
(1962) . 5
s Hussein o n ly remanded the §
1981 c la im , not th e whole ca s e , but f o r
p ro ce d u ra l re a son s . See the co n cu rr in g
o p in io n o f Judge Posner. 816 F .2d a t p .
359.
22a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 86 -
Apr. 27, 1988
John L y t le ,
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t ,
v .
Household M fg . , I n c . , I n c . ,
d / b / a / S ch w itzer Turbo Chargers,
D e fe n d a n t -A p p e l le e .
On P e t i t i o n f o r Rehearing and S u ggest ion
f o r Rehearing in Banc
The a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r
r e h e a r in g and s u g g e s t io n f o r re h e a r in g in
banc and a p p e l l e e 's answer t h e r e t o were
subm itted t o t h i s Court.
On th e q u e s t io n o f re h e a r in g b e fo r e
th e p a n e l , Judge Widener v o te d t o rehear
th e c a s e . Judge Chapman and D i s t r i c t
2 3s
Judge Simons, s i t t i n g by d e s ig n a t io n ,
v o te d t o deny.
In a re q u ested p o l l o f th e c o u r t on
th e s u g g e s t io n f o r re h e a r in g in banc,
Judges R u s s e l l , Widener and Murnaghan
v o te d t o reh ear th e ca se in ba n c ; C h ie f
Judge W inter and Judges H a ll , P h i l l i p s ,
Sprouse , E rv in , Chapman, W ilk in son and
W ilk in s v o te d a g a in s t in banc r e h e a r in g .
As th e panel c o n s id e r e d th e p e t i t i o n
f o r re h e a r in g and i s o f the o p in io n th a t
i t shou ld be d en ied , and as a m a jo r i ty o f
th e a c t i v e c i r c u i t ju d ges v o te d t o deny
re h e a r in g in banc,
IT IS ORDERED th a t the p e t i t i o n f o r
re h e a r in g and su g g e s t io n f o r re h e a r in g in
banc are d en ied .
24a
Entered a t th e d i r e c t i o n o f Judge
Chapman.
For th e Court
s / JOHN M. GREACEN
CLERK
* * * *
25a
DISTRICT COURT DECISION FROM THE BENCH
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT o f FEBRUARY 26, 1986
The a b o v e -e n t i t l e d m atter came on
f o r h ea rin g on Wednesday, February 26,
1 9 8 6 , a t A s h e v i l l e , North C a ro l in a ,
b e f o r e th e H onorable David B. S e n t e l l e ,
Judge P re s id in g .
The fo l l o w in g p ro ce e d in g s were had
and taken .
THE COURT: This i s th e ca se o f
John S. L y t le v ersu s Household Manufac
t u r i n g , I n c . d / b / a S ch w itzer Turbo
ch a r g e r s . The f i r s t q u e s t io n the Court
has i s i s th a t a ju r y ca se o r a non jury
ca s e ?
MR. MILLER: Your Honor, t h i s
i s a ju r y c a s e . As we s ta te d in our
b r i e f , both th e r e t a l i a t i o n is s u e and the
d i s c h a r g e is s u e are c o g n iz a b le under
S e c t io n 1981, and we have c i t e d ca s e s in
our b r i e f , th e G o f f c a s e , s p e c i f i c a l l y
26a
w ith r e s p e c t t o th e i s s u e o f r e t a l i a t i o n ,
and th e Johnson v . Railway Express case
w it h r e s p e c t t o th e Supreme Court
d e c i s i o n sa y in g th a t th e rem edies o f f e r e d
by S e c t i o n 1981 s im p ly augment the
rem edies o f f e r e d by T i t l e V II and do not
p r e c lu d e b r in g in g a ca se under 1981 and
havin g a ju r y t r i a l on th o s e i s s u e s .
* * * *
THE COURT: I w i l l f in d from
th e p le a d in g s in t h i s cause th a t th e r e is
no independent b a s is a l l e g e d in th e 1981
a c t i o n . I w i l l c o n c lu d e , based upon the
re a so n in g o f th e Tafoya c a s e , th a t T i t l e
V II p r o v id e s e x c lu s iv e remedy, and t h is
ca se w i l l be t r i e d by the Court w ith ou t a
ju r y , and th e 1981 c la im i s d ism issed .
Your e x c e p t io n i s noted f o r th e r e c o r d .
* * * *
As t o th e d is ch a rg e c la im , I w i l l
make th e f o l l o w in g f in d in g s :
27a
That th e defen dan t i s an em ployer
who employed — I d o n 't r e c a l l th e e x a c t
number o f p e o p le , but I w i l l make a
f in d in g th a t th ey employed a number o f
p e o p le f o r a number o f hours in e x c e s s o f
th e th r e s h o ld s e t ou t w ith r e fe r e n c e t o
T i t l e V II c a s e s ;
I w i l l fu r th e r f in d th a t John S.
L y t le was an employee o f the defen dan t
du ring th e r e le v a n t p e r io d ;
I w i l l f in d th a t he i s B lack ;
I w i l l f in d th a t th e company d id
have th e atten dan ce p o l i c y as s e t out in
E x h ib it 22, in th e paragraphs headed
"E x ce s s iv e Absence" w ith the subheading
"E x cu s e d A b s e n c e , Tardy, o r Leaving
E a r ly , " and "Unexcused Absence, Tardy, o r
Leaving E a r ly ; "
I w i l l f in d th a t p l a i n t i f f has shown
e v id e n ce o f fo u r w hite em ployees who
v i o l a t e d the excused absence p o l i c y and
28a
were g iv e n w arnings, and o f one w hite
em ployee who had s i x m inu tes , approxim
a t e l y s i x m inutes o f e x c e s s iv e unexcused
a b sen ce , t a r d in e s s , o r le a v in g e a r ly , and
th a t he was g iv e n a w arning;
I w i l l f in d by p l a i n t i f f ' s own
e v id e n ce p l a i n t i f f had e x c e s s unexcused
absence o f 9 .8 h ou rs , and t h a t , w ith
r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s unexcused a b sen ce , he
d id n ot f o l l o w th e company p o l i c y o f
c a l l i n g in ;
I w i l l f in d th a t th e con d u ct on the
p a r t o f th e w h ite em ployees i s not
s u b s t a n t i a l l y s im i la r in s e r io u s n e s s to
t h e con du ct f o r which p l a i n t i f f was
d is c h a rg e d .
I w i l l co n c lu d e as a m atter o f law
t h a t the Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h i s
m a t t e r , and t h a t the p l a i n t i f f has
e s t a b l i s h e d th a t he i s a member o f a
p r o t e c t e d c a te g o r y , and th a t he was
29a
d isch a rg e d f o r v i o l a t i o n o f th e com pany's
p o l i c y , but I w i l l c o n c lu d e as a m atter
o f law th a t he has n ot e s t a b l i s h e d a
prima f a c i e c a s e , s in c e he has not
e s t a b l i s h e d th a t B lacks were t r e a te d
d i f f e r e n t l y , and in f a c t com m itted
v i o l a t i o n s o f th e com pany's p o l i c y o f
s u f f i c i e n t s e r io u s n e s s ;
And I w i l l o rd e r th a t th e c la im as
t o th e d is c h a rg e be d ism isse d .
Again , I w i l l deny the m otion as t o
th e c la im o f r e t a l i a t i o n .
k k k k
THE COURT: The o n ly e v id e n ce
t o th e c o n t r a r y , o r th e e v id e n ce th a t
t h a t ' s th e p o l i c y i s one l e t t e r . And
th a t d o e s n 't make Mr. L y t l e ' s treatm ent
d i s p a r a t e , i t makes Mr. C a rp e n te r 's
trea tm en t d i s p a r a t e ; and I w i l l , a t the
c l o s e o f a l l th e e v id en ce r e a f f i r m by
p r i o r f in d in g s o f f a c t , add th e a d d i
30a
t i o n a l f in d in g o f f a c t th a t Mr. John S.
L y t le d id f i l e th e charge o f d i s c r im in a
t i o n a g a in s t S ch w itzer T u rboch argers w ith
th e EEOC on o r about August 23, 1983;
The fu r t h e r f in d in g o f f a c t th a t
when asked f o r r e fe r e n c e s from p r o s p e c
t i v e em ployers , th e de fen da n t p rov id ed
o n ly th e d a tes o f employment and th e jo b
t i t l e and, i f re q u e s te d , a d e s c r i p t i o n ;
Further f in d as f a c t th a t th a t was
b a s e d upon th e d e fe n d a n t 's c o r p o r a te
u n derstanding o f i t s l e g a l r i g h t and to
p r o t e c t i t from o b l i g a t i o n s th a t might be
in c u r r e d by th e r e le a s e o f n e g a t iv e
in fo r m a t io n ;
F urther f in d as f a c t th a t defendant
c o r p o r a t i o n , a c t in g through Lane Simpson,
d id on one o c c a s io n gran t a fa v o r a b le
r e f e r e n c e l e t t e r t o one t e r m in a t e d
em ployee ;
31a
F u r th e r f i n d as f a c t th a t the
g ra n t in g o f th a t one fa v o r a b le r e fe r e n c e
l e t t e r was done through in a d v e r te n c e ;
F urther f in d as f a c t th a t th e r e i s
no e v id e n ce o f d i s c r im in a t io n a g a in s t
John S. L y t le based upon h is having made
com p la in t t o EEOC.
Conclude as a m atter o f law th a t
th e r e i s no fou n d a tion in law f o r th e
r e t a l i a t i o n c la im . And th e c o n c lu s io n o f
law th a t I made in th e f i r s t c o n c lu s io n ,
th a t I have j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h i s a c t i o n ,
and I w i l l e n te r a judgment in fa v o r o f
th e defendant on a l l c la im s .
* * * *
[P roceed in g s c o n c lu d e d . ]
I c e r t i f y th a t the f o r e g o in g i s a
c o r r e c t t r a n s c r ip t from th e r e c o r d o f
p ro ce e d in g s in th e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m atter .
s / M ildred N. S h ie ld s J u ly 16, 1986
32a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CASE NO. A-C—84—453
D ecided Mar 12, 1986
John L y t le ,
P l a i n t i f f ,
v .
Household M fg . , In c . ,
d / b / a S ch w itzer Turbo Chargers,
Defendant.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
______ Jury V e r d i c t . This a c t i o n came
b e f o r e th e Court f o r a t r i a l by ju r y .
The is s u e s have been t r i e d and th e ju r y
has rendered i t s v e r d i c t .
X D e c is io n by C ourt. This a c t io n
came t o t r i a l o r h ea rin g b e f o r e the
33a
C ourt. The is s u e s have been t r i e d o r
heard and a d e c i s i o n has been ren d ered .
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED th a t th e
p l a i n t i f f take n oth in g by reason o f t h i s
a c t i o n . Each p a r ty s h a l l bea r t h e i r own
c o s t s .
Date: February 27, 1986 THOMAS J . McGRAW
C lerk
s / L isa A. Mather__________________
(By) Deputy C lerk
k k k k
34a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
Docket NO. A—C-84—453
D ecided Mar 12, 1986
John L y t le ,
P l a i n t i f f ,
v s .
H ousehold , M fg . , I n c . ,
d / b / a / S ch w itzer Turbo Chargers,
D efen dan t.
ORDER
THIS MATTER came t o be heard a t the
c l o s e o f th e p l a i n t i f f ' s e v id e n ce in t h i s
n o n - j u r y m a t t e r , on th e d e fe n d a n t 's
m otion t o d is m is s .
IT APPEARING t o th e Court th a t the
p l a i n t i f f has f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h a prima
35a
f a c i e ca se o f d is c r im in a to r y a c t s by the
de fen dan t as t o th e p l a i n t i f f ' s d i s
ch a rg e , t h i s m otion was a l low ed in open
c o u r t .
As t o th e r e t a l i a t i o n c la im a t th e
c l o s e o f a l l th e e v id e n c e , th e c o u r t
en tered v e r d i c t f o r the defen dan t f o r the
reason s s ta te d in open C ourt.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED th a t a l l
c la im s a g a in s t th e defen dan t in t h i s ca se
are d ism isse d .
This 27th day o f February, 1986.
David B. S e n t e l l e ________
DAVID B. SENTELLE
U nited S ta te s D i s t r i c t Judge
* * * *
Hamilton Graphics, Inc.—200 Hudson Street, New York, N.Y.—(212) 966-4177