Library of Congress v. Shaw Brief for Respondent
Public Court Documents
October 7, 1985
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Library of Congress v. Shaw Brief for Respondent, 1985. 2bfb0049-bb9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/f12fa5bf-b86b-46ac-972e-1743a984dd1e/library-of-congress-v-shaw-brief-for-respondent. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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No. 85-54
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October Term, 1985
L ibrary of Congress, et ah,
v.
Petitioners,
T ommy Shaw .
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEARS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
J ulius L eV qnne Chambers
Charles Stephen R alston
(Counsel of Record)
99 Hudson Street
16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
Attorneys for Respondent
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. whether pre-judgment adjustments
to compensate for delay in payment may be
part of the calculation of a reasonable
attorney's fee and other relief in a
Title vil case brought against the
federal aovernment under 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16(c) and (d).
2. Whether 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
constitutes a complete abrogation of
sovereign immunity so that the same full
relief available in a Title VII action
against private and state and local
aovernment employers is also available
against federal government agencies.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented ................. i
Table of Authorities............... iv
STATUTES INVOLVED .................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE C A S E ............... 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................. 10
ARGUMENT
I. THERE IS NO BAR TO A DELAY
IN PAYMENT ADJUSTMENT TO AN
ATTORNEYS' FEE AWARD
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES . 12
A ♦________ Ad j ustments____ for
Pre-Judgment Delays In
Payment May Be Included In
Awards Of Equitable Relief
Against The Federal
Government In The Absence
Of Specific Statutory
Authorization.. . . . . . 14
B .______ The Inclusion of A
Factor To Compensate For
Pre-judgment ''Delays In
Payment Is A Necessary
Component In Calculating A
Reasonable Attorney's Fee. . 24
II. SECTION 717 OF THE EQUAL EMPLOY
MENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 IS A
COMPLETE ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI
NATION C A S E S ................... 39
A. Congressional Intent Is
Determinative Of The Extent
Sovereign Immunity Is
Waived By A Particular
Statutory Scheme. . . . . .
B. Congress Intended To
Waive All Sovereign
Immunity Bars To The Award
of Complete .Relief In Title
VII Cases. ...............
Conclusion . . . . . ........... . .
APPENDICES
I. Statutes Involved
II. Calculation of Loss of
Value Through Inflation
III. Memorandum of Attorney
General Griffin B. Bell for
United States Attorneys and
Agency General Counsel
(Aug. 31, 1977)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ............ 37
Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S.
599 ( 1 9 4 7 ) .................. 17
Alyeska Pipeline Service v.
Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S.
240 ( 1 9 7 5 ) .................. 36
Blake v. Califano, 626 F.2d 891
(D.C. Cir. 1 9 8 0 ) ........... 8
Blum v. Stenson, U.S. , 79
L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) . . . . 25, 32
Boston Sand Co. v. United States,
278 U.S. 41 (1928) . . . . . 40
Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United
States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924) . 17
Brown v. General Services
Administration, 425 U.S. 820
( 1 9 7 6 ) ............... 46, 50, 51
Chambers v. United States, 451
F . 2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971) . • 49
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425
840 ( 19 7 6 ) ..........
U.S.
44, 46
Chisholm v. United States Postal
Service, 665 F.2d 482
(4th Cir. 1 9 8 1 ) ........... 33
iv
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d
880 (1980) . . . . . . 3,4,6,7,24
Franchise Tax Board of California
v. United States Postal
Service, U.S. ___, 81 L.Ed.
2d 446 ( 1984)............. 39
Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Company, 424 U.S. 747
( 1976) ........................ 54
Gautreaux v. Chicaqo Housinq
Authority, 690 F.2d 601
(7th Cir. 1 9 8 2 ) ........... 24
General Motors Corp. v. Devex
Corp., 461 U.S. 648
(1983). 15, 16, 17, 34, 35, 36, 37
Gnotta v. United States, 415
F. 2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969) 50
Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220
(5th Cir. 1983) . . . . . . 24
Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516
(11th Cir. 1985). 33
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424 (1983)...... 25
Holly v. Chasen, 639 F.2d 795
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 822
(1981) . ................. 8
Institutionalized Juveniles v.
Secretary of Public Welfare,
758 F.2d 897 (3rd Cir.
19 8 5 )............. . 24
v
James v. Stockham Valves &
Fitting Co., 559 F .2d 310
(5th Cir. 1977) ......... 34
Johnson v. University College of
the University of Alabama,
706 F .2d 1205 (11th Cir.
1983) ...................... 6, 24
Jorstad v. IDS Realty Trust, 643
F . 2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1981 ) . 24
Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161,
79 N.W. 327 ( 18 9 9 ) ......... 20
Liqgett & M. Tobacco v. United
States, 274 U.S. 215 (1927) 1 7
Nagy v. United States Postal
Service, 773 F.2d 1190 (11th
Cir. 1985) .................. 40
Nedd v. United Mine Workers of
America, 488 F. Supp. 1208
(M.D. Pa. 1 9 8 0 ) ......... 19, 20
Newman v. Piqaie Park Enterprises,
390 U.S. 490 (1968) . . . . 26, 38
Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320
(D.C. Cir. 19 7 7 ).......... 26
Parker v. Lewis, 670 F.2d 249
(D.C. Cir. 1 9 8 2 ) .......... 5
Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S.
341 (1927)................... 17
Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th
Cir. 19 8 3 )................. 24
vi
Saunders v. Claytor, 629 F.2d 596
(9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied,
450 U.S. 980 (1981 ) . . . . 9, 33
Seabord Air Line R. Co. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 299
( 19 2 3 )................... 17, 18
Shultz v. Palmer, (No. 85-50) 33
Smith v. Califano, 446 F. Supp.
530 (D.D.C. 1978) . . . . . 53
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209
( 1982)................... 10
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
267 U.S. 76 (1925) . . . . . 41
Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 ( 1977).......... 36
United States v. New York Tele
phone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) 10
United States v. North American
Transportation and Tradinq Co.,
253 U.S. 330 (1920) . . . . . . 18
United States v. Sherman, 98 U.S.
565 ( 1878)............... 21 , 22
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.
392 ( 1976)................. 49
Waite v. United States, 282 U.S.
508 ( 1931 ) ........... 16, 17, 36
vii
Statutes, orders, and regulations:
Equal Access to Justice Act . . . . 56
5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)............. 49
5 U.S.C. <? 7701 (g) (2) . . . . . 53
28 U.S.C. § 2516 . . . . 1, 10, 14, 23
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(q)......... 54, 55
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k ) ......... 44, 57
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 ........... Passim
P.L. 88-352, § 701(b)........... 48
P.L. 96-481 , § 206 ........... . 56
42 Stat. 1590, ch. 192 (5-15-22) . 40
Executive Order 11246 ........... 48
Executive Order 11478 ......... . 48
President's Reorganization Plan
No. 1 of 1978, 43 F.R. 28 71
( 1 9 7 8 ) ...................... 52
5 C.F.R. Part 713 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ......... 48
5 C.F.R. § 1201.37 ............... 53
29 C.F.R. Part 1613 .............. 48
29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(c)......... 53
viii
Other Authorities:
"Counsel Fees in Public Interest
Litigation", Report By the
Committee on Legal Assistance,
39 The Record of the Associa
tion of the Bar of the City of
New York 300 (1984) . . . . 25, 29
The Effect of Legal Fees on the
Adeauacv of Representation,
Hearings Before the Sub
committee on Representation
of Citizen Interests of the
Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) . . 27
Hearings Before the General
Subcommittee on Labor of
the House Committee on
Education And Labor on
H.R. 1746, March 3, 4, and
18, 1971 ................. 48, 51
Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Labor of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, on S. 2515, S.2617,
and H.R. 1746, Oct. 4, 6,
and 7, 1971 ............... 50, 51
Hohenstein, "Subtract Inflation
from Your Income, Prices and
Profits," Legal Economics 35
(ABA Section on Economics of
Law Practice, Summer 1978) 1b
H. Rep. No. 92-238 (92d Cong. 1st
Sess., 1971) ............... 43
IX
Letter from Irving Jaffe, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, to
Senator John V. Tunney, May 6,
. 1975, 2 CCH Employment Practices
Guide 5327 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ......... 57
Memorandum of Attorney General
Griffin B. Bell for United
States Attorneys and Agency
General Counsel (Aug. 31,
1977), 2 CCH Employment
Practices Guide 1f 5046
(1977), .................... 59, 60
Note, "Interest in Judgments
Against the Federal Government:
The Need for Full Compensation,"
91 Yale L.J. 297 (1981) . . . . 20
1 Op. Atty. Gen. 268 (1819) . . . . 21
2 Op. Atty. Gen. 390 (1830) . . . . 22
5 Op. Atty. Gen. 138 (1849) . . . . 22
5 Op. Atty. Gen. 227 (1850) . . • . 22
Ralston, "The Federal Government
as Employer: Problems and
Issues in Enforcing the Anti-
Discrimination Laws," 10 Ga. L.
Rev. 717 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ............. 57
3. Rep. No. 92-415 (92d Cong. 1st
Sess., 1 9 7 1 ) ......... 34, *3, 45
Ft. Rep. No. 94-1558 (94th Conq.
2d Sess. 1976) . . . . 27, 28, 34
x
S. Rep. No. 94-1011 (94th Cong. 2d
Sess. 1 9 7 6 )............. .. . 27
Schlei & Grossman, Employment
Discrimination Law, (2d Ed.
1 9 8 3 ) ...................... 36, 47
Subcommittee on Labor, Senate
Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, "Legislative History
of the Equal Employment Oppor
tunity Act
of 1972" . . . 45, 51, 52, 53, 55
United States Dept, of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Monthly
Labor Review, May, 1985 . . . 2b
xi
No. 85-54
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1985
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, et a.I. ,
Petitioners
v.
TOMMY SHAW
On Writ of Certiorari to The
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
STATUTES INVOLVED
In addition to those in petitioners'
brief, this case involves the following
statutes, the text of which are set out in
the appendix to this Brief:
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a )-(c )
28 U.S.C. § 2516(a).
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In general, petitioners' description
of the proceedings below is accurate.
Respondent does wish to emphasize a number
of points regarding the context in which
issue now before the Court arose.
This action began with the filing of
an administrative complaint charging
discrimination in employment against
respondent Tommy Shaw, an employee of the
Library of Congress. After respondent
retained counsel, a settlement of his
claim was negotiated. However, the
agency, on advice from the Comptroller
General, took the position that it could
not agree to an award of back pay. This
ruling, which the district court noted was
caused by the Library's failure to make it
clear that the claim arose under Title
VII, necessitated the filing of the
3
present action. Order and Judgment of the
District Court, Sept. 14, 1979; Pet. App.
p. 59a-60a. The government continued to
argue that an award of back pay was not
possible when a federal employee's claim
of discrimination was settled administra
tively, but the district court ruled for
the respondent and against the government
on cross-motions for summary judgment. As
a result of these proceedings, respondent
received a promotion and an appropriate
amount of back pay.
As petitioners note, at issue in this
case now are the fees remaining to be paid
to one of the respondent's attorneys for
work done as far back as 1978. The fee
award was not made by the district court
until 1980 since it decided to await the
en banc decision of the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia in Copeland v.
Marshall r 641 P.2d 880 (1980), which
4
established definitive standards for
awards of fees in Title VII cases in the
District, particularly in cases involving
the federal government. The government
made no objection to delaying the fee
1
disposition until Copeland was announced.
As the district court noted when it
made its award, the government neither
disputed respondent's entitlement to fees
2nor much of the amount to be awarded.
̂ The district court entered its judgment on
the merits on September 14, 1979. In that
order it announced its intention to await
the en banc decision in Copeland. See,
Order and Judgment of the District Court,
filed September 14, 1979. Copeland was
announced in September, 1980.
2 The government argued that a proper hourly
rate would be $60. It was not precise,
however, with regard to the number of
hours for which fees should be awarded,
but only suggested that the 103.75 hours
claimed should be reduced " significantly. "
See, Defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities In Opposition to Shalon
Ralph's Motion for Attorney's Fees, pp.
3-5; 7-8. The district court subtracted
only 4.75 hours, for time spent on an
issue on which respondent did not prevail,
and awarded fees for a total of 99 hours.
Pet. App. pp. 63a-64a. The government did
not dispute this result on appeal.
5
Nevertheless, in keeping with its long
standing practice, the government did not
offer to pay that part of the fee that was
undisputed. (Pet. App. p. 68a.) Indeed,
payment of the undisputed amount was not
made until the present appeal was pending
and, then, it was a consequence of a
decision of the court of appeals in
another case, Parker v. Lewis, 670 F . 2d
249 (D.C. Cir. 1982), requiring payment of
the undisputed portions of a fee award
pending appeal.^ The Parker rule was
premised on the need to avoid delays in
payment and consequent hardships to Title
VII plaintiffs and their attorneys.
The court of appeals did, as recited in
its opinion (Pet. App. p. 6a, n. 24),
order payment of $6,779.50, the undisputed
amount. However, the parties had pre
viously entered into a stipulation for
such payment in the district court based
on Parker v. Lewis, supra. See, Stipula
tion to The Entry of An Order to Enforce
In Part the Judgment Awarding Counsel Fees
and Costs.
Copeland squarely held that in
actions against the federal government
delay in payment must be factored in when
calculating a reasonable fee. 641 F.2d at
893. Thus, the district court followed
Copeland and used one of the methods set
out in that decision to arrive at an
4appropriate amount for the delay. As
petitioners note in their brief, the
correctness of the district court's
calculation is still in dispute, since the
court of appeals remanded for clarifi
cation whether the hourly rate awarded
already included compensation for delay.
Three methods to compensate for delay are:
(1) the use of hourly rates current at the
time the award is made; (2) adjusting the
rates by year by an appropriate amount so
as to adjust for inflation; (3) adjusting
the lodestar amount by an appropriate
factor. See Johnson v. University College
of the University of Alabama, 706 F.2d
1205, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 1983). The
district court used the third method.
7
In addition to the en banc decision in
Copeland, panels of the court of appeals
had held that fees in Title VII actions
against federal agencies fees should be
adjusted for delay in payment. Thus, when
the present case arrived in the court of
appeals, there was already an en banc
decision and at least three panel deci
sions of that court that squarely held
that the district court was correct in
including a delay factor. Counsel for
respondent in the court of appeals (who
are also counsel here) not surprisingly
relied on the clear law of the circuit to
support the judgment of the district
court. Since there was no need to go
beyond the settled law of the circuit,
they did not argue at length the issues of
The court below noted "the seemingly clear
applicability of these precedents" but
decided not to rest "on stare decisis
alone." Pet. App. p. 9a.
8
waiver of sovereign immunity and other
matters presented now. Thus, the argument
made was essentially that the calculation
of a reasonable attorney's fee necessarily
included compensation for delay in
payment, an argument accepted even by the
dissenting judge below.
Moreover, panel decisions of the court
of appeals had also held that cost of
living adjustments were not available on
6backpay awards against the government
and that interest qua interest could not
7be assessed on a fee award. Again, since
the state of the law in the circuit
established the correctness of the
district court's decision, counsel for
Blake v. Califano, 626 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir.
1980) .
Holly v. Chasen, 639 P.2d 795 {D.C. Cir.
1981) , cert, denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
7
- 9
respondent (appellee there) did not feel
it either necessary or desirable to raise
8these other issues.
If the government's suggestion to the
court of appeals for rehearing e_n banc in
the present case had been granted,
respondent would, of course, have raised
and relied upon all of the arguments made
herein to support the judgment of the
district court. Thus, the government's
attempt (Pet. Brief, p. 18) to make some
thing out of counsel’s decision not to
raise these questions before a panel of
the court below when such issues were
decided by its earlier decisions is
As we have already noted in our Brief in
Opposition to the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, we believe that the decisions
of lower courts holding that back pay
awards cannot be adjusted for inflation in
cases against the federal government are
incorrect. See infra at pp.35-38. Indeed,
that precise issue was presented to this
Court in Saunders v. Claytor, 629 F.2d 596
(9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S.
980 ( 1981 ), but this Court has not
resolved the issue to date.
10
without substance. Of course, respondent
may rely here on any ground in support of
the judgment below. United States v. New
York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166, n.
8 (1977); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
215, n. 6 (1982).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
A. There is no sovereign immunity or
statutory bar to awards of pre-judgment
interest, or its equivalent, against the
United States where it is necessary to
provide complete equitable relief. The
cases the government relies on, as well as
28 U.S.C. § 2516, involve post-j udgment
interest, the purpose of which is entirely
different. Decisions of this Court make
the distinction clear and hold that
pre-judgment interest may be made in the
absence of specific statutory authority.
- 11 -
B. In calculating a reasonable
attorneys' fee, factoring in amounts to
compensate for delays in payment is
essential. Without such an adjustment, a
prevailing plaintiff's attorney will in
fact be awarded less than a market rate.
The result will be that attorneys will be
discouraged from representing federal
employees who have Title VII claims.
Therefore, pre-judgment interest or its
eouivalent is appropriate in awards of
fees against the United States.
II.
A. The extent of a waiver of sov
ereign immunity is a matter of Congres
sional intent. Whether interest on awards
against the government is permissible must
be determined from the purpose of the
particular statutory scheme.
12
B. Both the language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16 and its legislative history
make it clear that Congress intended to
remove all sovereign immunity bars to the
granting of full relief to federal
employees who have equal employment
claims. The statute itself explicitly
provides that attorneys' fees are to be
awarded on the same basis as against "a
private person."
ARGUMENT
I.
THERE IS NO BAR TO A DELAY IN PAYMENT
ADJUSTMENT TO AN ATTORNEYS' FEE AWARD
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
This case, in the government's view,
involves no more than whether the word
t
"interest" can be found somewhere in the
provisions of Title VII that apply to the
United States. We will demonstrate that:
- 13
1 . A long line of decisions of this
Court establishes that, even in the
absence of specific statutory authoriza
tion, pre-j udgment adjustments that
compensate for delay in payment and/or
deprivation of the use of funds -— whether
denominated "pre-judgment interest" or
otherwise -- are available against the
government to provide full compensation as
part of equitable relief.
2. The inclusion of a delay in
payment factor, as in this case, is a
necessary component of a reasonable
attorney's fee. Since the adjustment is
necessary to provide full compensation, it
is available here as a matter of legis
lative intent, consistent with the Court's
precedents.
3. Alternatively, there is no
sovereign immunity bar to an award of
interest against the government in a Title
14
VII action because 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16 is
a complete abrogation of sovereign
immunity. Congress' clear intent was to
ensure that employees of the United States
will enjoy the same scope of protection
from employment discrimination as do all
other employees. Therefore, Title VII is_
a statute that authorizes interest as part
of complete relief.
A. Adjustments For Pre-judgment Delays
In Payment May Be Included In
Awards Of Equitable Relief Against
The Federal Government In The Absence
of Specific Statutory Authority.'
The petitioners argue that decisions
of this Court, as codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2516, stand as an absolute bar to any
inclusion of a delay in payment factor in
calculating the value of a fee award
because the word "interest" does not
appear in Title VII. However, a close
examination of the cases cited by the
15
government demonstrates that they do not
support this proposition. Rather,
precisely the opposite is true; the
government has been led into a fatal error
by its failure to distinguish between the
nature and purpose of pre-j udgment
interest, which is involved here, and
post-judgment interest, which is not.
In General Motors Corp. v. Devex
Corp. , 461 U.S. 648 ( 1983), the Court
explained that, in a patent infringement
case, an award of prejudgment interest
from the time that the royalty payments
would have been received to the time of
the judgment, "merely serves to make the
patent owner whole, since his damages
consist not only of the value of the
royalty payments but also of the forgone
use of the money between the time of
infringement and the date of the judg
16
ment." Therefore, prejudgment interest
should ordinarily be awarded. 461 U.S. at
655-56.
The Court went on:
This very principle was the
basis of the decision in Waite
v. United States, 282 U.S. 508
(1931), which involved a patent
infringement suit against the
United States. The patent owner
had been awarded unliquidated
damages in the form of lost
profits, but had been denied an
award of prejudgment interest.
This Court held that an award of
prejudgment interest to the
patent owner was necessary to
ensure "complete justice as
between the plaintiff and the
United States," id., at 509 ,
even though the statute govern
ing such suits did not expressly
provide for interest^
461 U.S. at 656 (emphasis added). In
Waite itself, Justice Holmes noted that
the statute at issue granted "'recovery of
[the plaintiff's] reasonable and entire
compensation for such use.' We are of
- 17
opinion that interest should be allowed in
order to make the compensation 'entire'".
282 U.S. at 509.9
Waite cites and relies upon a series
of decisions in eminent domain actions
holding that the Fifth Amendment's "just
compensation" clause includes compensation
for delay between the time of the determi
nation of market value of the property and
when the award is made. Seaboard Air Line
R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299
(1923); Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United
States, 265 U.S. 106, 126 (1924); Liggett
& M. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 274
U.S. 215 (1927); Phelps v. United States,
274 U.S. 341 (1927). See also Albrecht v.
United States, 329 U.S. 599 (1947), and
cases cited icLat 602, n. 4. As explained
in General Motors Co. v. Devex, supra,
q” ■Interestingly, in Waite the government
conceded that pre-judgment interest was
proper.
- 18 -
without such an adjustment the patent or
property owner will not in fact be fully
compensated for the value of his property
and the loss of its use. Thus, "no
specific command to include interest is
necessary when interest or its equivalent
is a part of [just] compensation." Seaboard
Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S.
at 306.10
The situation here is precisely
analogous. The government contends that
reimbursement for attorneys' fees is
limited to the dollar amount that was the
market value of the services at the time
In contrast, the rule is that interest is
not available in the absence of specific
statutory provision when land is taken
through purchase or a contract rather than
by an adverse condemnation proceeding.
See, e.g., United States v. North American
Transportation & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330
(1920). In the former case the interest
is on the established amount agreed upon
as proper compensation, and therefore has
the character of post-judgment interest.
In the latter case, the interest is
pre-judgment and is therefore part of the
calculation of just compensation.
- 19
they were rendered. As we will demonstrate
at length below, however, full compensa
tion can only be made through an adjust
ment of that dollar amount to reflect loss
of value because of the passage of time.
The inclusion of pre-judgment
interest as part of the award of full
relief is well established in federal law.
See Nedd v. United Mine Workers of
America, 488 F. Supp. 1208, 1216-25 (M.D.
Pa. 1980) for a scholarly and comprehen
sive survey of the cases. An award is
left to the court's sound discretion based
on the weighing of four factors: (1)
responsibility for delays in prosecuting
an action; (2) undoing unjust enrichment;
(3) compensation of the victim of a legal
wrong; and (4) other equitable considera
tions. Ld. at 1220-24. The key to
pre-judgment interest is that it is a part
of the calculation of the judgment itself,
20
and is included when it is necessary to
provide "reasonable", "entire", or "just"
compensation.
Post-j udgment interest, on the other
hand, rests on an entirely different
basis. The traditional rationale for
assessing post-judgment interest was to
punish a debtor for failing to repay a
loan or another certain obligation the
amount of which had become fixed, such as
a judgment of a court. Laycock v. Parker,
103 Wis. 161, 179, 79 N.W. 327, 332
(1899). See, Note, "Interest in Judgments
Against the Federal Government: The Need
for Full Compensation," 91 Yale L.J. 297,
1 1 As Nedd points out, the common law
distinction between liquidated and
unliquidated damages does not determine,
under federal law, whether pre-judgment
interest is available. 488 F. Supp. at
1217. The government's suggestion to the
contrary (Pet. Brief, p. 23, n. 13) is
both incorrect and inconsistent with its
position that fee and back pay awards
against private employers may be adjusted
for delay in payment.
21
300-1 (1981). The no-interest rule
developed when interest was thus viewed as
a penalty. Sovereign immunity barred an
award of interest since the government had
to give its specific consent to being
penalized. As this Court explained:
Whenever interest is allowed
either by statute or by common
law, except in cases where there
has been a contract to pay
interest, it is allowed for delay
or default of the debtor. But
delay or default cannot be
attributed to the government. It
is presumed to be always ready to
pay what it owes.
United States v. Sherman, 98 U.S. 565,
567-8 (1878).
Thus, the 1819 Attorney General's
opinion from which the no-interest rule
derives involved interest on a claim in a
pre-determined amount. The opinion notes,
"Interest is in the nature of damages for
withholding money which the party ought to
pay, and would not or could not." 1 Op.
22
Atty. Gen. 268 (1819). Indeed, even the
opinions of the attorney general upon
which the government relies recognize that
in some instances interest is recoverable
where it is necessary for full compensa-
t ion, e,g. , where a "claimant shall have
paid interest; in which case, indeed,
interest becomes strictly a portion of the
principal of his claim." 2 Op. Atty. Gen.
390, 392 (1830). See also, 5 Op. Atty.
Gen. 1 38 ( 1 849); 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 226
(1850). United States v. Sherman also
recognizes the distinction, noting, "the
interest is no part of of the amount
recovered. It accrues only after the
recovery has been had." 98 U.S. at 567.
Similarly, virtually all of the cases
cited by the petitioners at pages 13—15 of
their brief involved the award of ordinary
post-judgment interest. They simply
apply the rule that a penalty for failure
23
to pay an established debt could not be
imposed on the government without its
consent. And, as the government concedes
here, 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) and its prede
cessors, barring interest on "claims
against the United States" in the absence
of contract or specific statutory authori
zation, did no more than codify the rule
established by the attorney generals1
opinions and the post-judgment interest
cases.
Thus, it can be seen that the
Government has failed to recognize the
distinction between ordinary interest of
the pos t-j udgment kind contemplated by 28
U.S.C. § 2516, which serves as a penalty
or as income for the use of money fol
lowing a delay in the satisfaction of a
judgment, and prejudgment interest (or
other similar factors) which represents
part of the calculation of full relief in
24
the first instance. The cases upon which
the government relies involve the former
type of interest. This case involves the
latter.
B . The Inclusion Of A Factor To Compen-
sate For Pre-judgment Delays In
Payment Is A Necessary Component In
Calculating A Reasonable Attorney ' s
Fee.
Section 2000e-5(k) provides that the
court, in its discretion, shall award a
reasonable attorney's fee. The lower
courts have held, so far without excep
tion, that in civil rights cases compen
sation for delay in payment must be
1 2included in a reasonable fee. The
See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F. 2d
at 892-93; Institutionalized Juveniles v.
Secretary of~Public Welfare, 758 F.2d 897
( 3rd Cir. 1985) ; Graves v. Barnes, 700
F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1983); Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 690 F.2d
601, 612 (7th Cir. 1982);"Jorstad v. IDS
Realty Trust, 643 F.2d 1305, 1313 (8th
Cir. 1981); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 P.2d 546,
555 (10th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Univer-
sity College of the University of Alabama,
706 F.2d 1205, 1210-1 1 ( 1 1th Cir. 1983).
25
government has not directly challenged the
correctness of those decisions insofar as
fees are to be calculated against every
other employer except itself. Neverthe
less, it is essential to understand why
such an adjustment is a prerequisite to a
reasonable fee in order to demonstrate the
fallacy of the government’s mechanical
equation of all pre-judgment adjustments
with post-judgment interest.
The legislative purpose of the various
civil rights attorneys’ fees act statutes
have been explored at length by this Court
in recent decisions and need not be
13repeated in detail here. Suffice it to
say that a key concern of Congress was
See also "Counsel Fees in Public Interest
Litigation," Report By the Committee on
Legal Assistance, 39 The Record of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New
York 300, 318 ( 1984).
̂̂ Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U .S . 4 24
(1983); Blum v. Stenson, U.S.
79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).
f
26
that if the fees that were available were
insufficient to attract the private bar,
there would not be an adequate level of
private enforcement of Title VII and the
other civil rights acts. As this Court
noted in its seminal decision in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 490
(1968) the resources of the federal
government itself were simply insufficient
for the level of enforcement necessary to
end the problem of racial discrimination
in our society. Thus, the statute provided
fees to ensure that "private attorneys
general" would furnish the essential level
of private enforcement.
The problem is even more acute when
the government is a defendant in a Title
VII case for, as has been noted in another
context, there is no public attorney
qeneral to bring actions on discrimina
tion claims of federal employees. Parker
- 27 -
v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 331 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Only private parties may bring
such actions and, therefore, without the
full involvement of the private bar the
statute will not be enforced.
In the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Act of 1976
Congress expressed these concerns at
length. Thus, there is a consistent
theme that unless fees are sufficiently
attractive to attact the private bar there
will be insufficient enforcement.14 15
The legislative history of the Fees
Act is replete with comparisons between
the situations of plaintiff's attorneys
and defendant's attorneys in civil rights
1 5cases. Ordinarily a defendant, particu
14 See S. Rep. No. 94-1011 (94th Cong. 2d
Sess. , 1976), 2-5; H. Rep. No. 94-1558
(94th Cong. 2d Sess., 1976), 2-3).
15 H. Rep. No. 94-1558, supra at 7; The
Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of
Representation, Hearings" Before’ ""'the
Subcommittee ~oF~Ripre¥elTtaFIon~~oT~C I tTzerT
28
larly when it is a public agency, has
available far greater resources than the
1 6ordinary civil right litigant. Indeed,
this case is paradigmatic: a single
middle-class federal employee faced with
the full array of the legal and technical
resources of the Library of Congress and
the Department of Justice.
Such plaintiffs typically cannot pay
attorney's fees at all or, as here, only
a limited amount. Thus, the attorney must
look to the possible award of fees in the
future for compensation. If the eventual
award is not sufficiently equivalent to
fees the attorney could have obtained
through other types of practice at the
time the services are rendered, there will
be a "negative incentive to move away from 16
Interests of the Committee on the Judi
ciary, United States Senate, 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess. at 84; 834-36 (1973).
16 H. Rep. No. 94-1558, supra at 7.
29
civil rights litigation and to concentrate
efforts on more profitable aspects of the
1 7practice."
The disincentives are particularly
strono for the typical civil rights
lawyer, who tends to be a single practi
tioner or in a small firm. Given the
realities of paying off the massive loans
incurred to obtain a law degree and to set
up practice, paying rent, staff salaries,
and having enough left over to live on,
taking on a complex civil rights case must
be economically feasible for such a
lawyer.
To aive an example, assume an
attorney in 1975 with the choice of
accepting: (1 ) a fee-paying client whom
he could bill at his or her established
market rate of S 80 per hour, monthly; or
Counsel Fees In Public Interest Litiga
tion, op. cit. supra, n. 12, at 318,
325-26.
30
(2) a civil rights client for whose case
he or she would receive no fees until a
court award five years later in 1980. If,
in 1980, the lawyer received only the same
$80 per hour, he or she would have to be
extraordinarily altruistic to take on
client number two, wait five years, and
receive an $80 per hour devalued by
inflation and the loss of the use of that
money. There must be some basis to
encourage him or her to take the second
client over the first or Congress' intent
will be thwarted entirely.
In order for the lawyer to be paid
at a rate ecruivalent to the $80 market
rate in 1 975 he or she must be able to
receive $ 1 22.40 per hour in 1 9 8 0 . This
larger amount will do no more than
compensate the lawyer at the same effec-
18 A simple calculation based on the Consumer
Price Index is set out in detail in
appendix II to this Brief at pp. 2b-3b.
31
tive rate as he or she would have
received in 1975 dollars. Even that would
not cover the full value of the money, for
the lawyer (or fee-paying client) has lost
the value of the use of that money in the
interim, and has suffered attendant cash
1 qflow problems. ' Accordingly,, the 10%
adjustment per year ordered by the
district court on the basis of the rate
available on Treasury bonds, is the least
20that counsel was entitled to.
' For example, consider what counsel would
have had to spend to borrow sufficient
money to pay his or her 1975 bills in
reliance on a fee to be awarded in 1980.
With commercial interest rates in the 8 to
15% range, eighty 1975 dollars would have
cost about $155 by 1980.
2 0 Of course, the court should have compoun
ded the interest rather than simply
multiplying it by the number of years
passed. The court's mathematical error,
however, only results in a difference of
about $2.50 per hour in the government's
f avor.
32
Put in another way, paying the
attorney $80 per hour in 1980 would be the
same as if he or she had been paid $52 in
1975.21 Since the lesser amount is substan
tially below the established market rate,
it can not, a fortiori, be a reasonable
fee under this Court's decision in Blum v.
Stenson, ___ U.S. ___, 79 L.Ed. 2d 891
{ 1984).
Unfortunately, it is not unusual in
civil rights cases, particularly in Title
VII cases involving the federal govern
ment, for the entire process from the
beginning of the administrative process
through final decision in court on the
merits, to take many years. Many of
See Appendix II to this Brief at p. 3b.
For example, present counsel are involved
in one case against the Postal Service
begun by the filing by an administrative
complaint in 1971 and which was filed in
court in 1972. The case did not go to
trial until 1982, and a decision adverse
to plaintiffs was reversed by the court of
appeals in 1985. The case is now back in
33
these cases began in the mid-1970's and
the impact of the high rate of inflation
in the latter part of that period was
severe.
Congress was aware of the problem of
delay in payment when it enacted the 1976
Pees Act. Thus, it contemplated interim
fees in appropriate cases because civil
23rights litigation was often protracted. * 19
the trial court for further proceedings,
If plaintiffs were to win on the merits in
1986 there would be potential entitlement
to attorneys' fees going back as far as
1972. See, Griffin v. Carlin 755 F.2d
1516 ( 1 1 th Cir"I “9857: Griffin is not
unusual. See, Chisholm v~. United States
Postal Service, 765 F: 2d 482 (4th Cir.
19 81) (nine years from administrative
complaint to final disposition of merits) ;
Saunders v . Claytor, 629 F. 2d 596 (9th
C ir. 1 9 8 0) (six years between illegal
d i scharge and award of back pay and
attorneys' fees); Shultz v. Palmer (No.
85-50) (eight years between initial charge
and award of fees on that port ion of the
case that was settled).
H. Rep. No. 94-1558, supra at 8. The
legislative history of the Equal Employ
ment Opportunity Act of 1972 also reflects
Congress' awareness of the limited
resources of Title VII plaintiffs and the
problem of time delays attendant to such
34
As one court has noted, the risk of
financial drain will discourage the
bringing of Title VII suits and defendants
"may be tempted to seek victory through an
economic war of attrition against the
plaintiffs." James v. Stockham Valves &
Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358-59 (5th
Cir. 1977).
Thus, the reasons discussed supra at
pp. 15-20 that make pre-judgment interest
ordinarily available in patent cases apply
with full force to awards of attorneys'
fees, since the impact of delay is the
same. Full compensation cannot be
achieved unless the value of the "forgone
use of the money" between the time fees
are incurred "and the date of the judg
ment" (General Motors Corp. v. Devex, 461
litigation. Sen. Rep. No. 92-415 (92d
Cong. 1st Sess., 1971) p. 17.
35
U.S. at 656) is taken into account. Just
as in a patent infringement case, denying
pre-j udgroent interest to a prevailing
Title VII plaintiff "not only undercompen
sates [the employee] but also may grant a
windfall to the [discriminator] and create
an incentive to prolong litigation." 461
U.S. at 655 n. 10.
For similar reasons, the Court should
reject the government's contention that a
rule that fees may be adjusted for delay
in payment would be incongruous because
it is "settled law," that backpay awards
cannot be so adjusted. (Pet. Brief, pp.
20-21). There are three things wrong with
this argument. First, if anything is
24
This is the case whether the client has
paid the attorney as the case progressed,
or whether the fee was delayed in whole or
in part until the action was successfully
concluded. In the former instance, the
plaintiff will not be made whole unless
compensated for delay; in the latter, the
attorney will not otherwise receive a
reasonable fee.
36
"settled" it is that nothing is "settled
law" until this Court has spoken on the
2 5question. This Court has never deter
mined whether the lower courts have been
correct in holding that back pay awards
against the federal government cannot be
adjusted for delay in payment. See, Schlei
and Grossman, Employment Discrimination
Law, 1214 n. 175 (2d Ed. 1983).
Second, it is clear that the princi
ples enunciated in General Motors Corp. v.
Devex,(GMC) supra, and Waite v. United
States, supra, apply fully to back pay
awards. As GMC makes clear, "the standard
governing the award of prejudgment
interest . . . should be consistent with
Congress' overriding purpose of af-
_ _
See, e,g. , Alyeska Pipeline Service v.
Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 270, n. 46
(1975) (overruling thirteen lower court
decisions on attorneys' fees) and Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 378
n. 2 (1977) (overruling more than thirty
decisions by six courts of appeals).
37
fording . . . complete compensation." 461
U.S. at 655. That purpose is to place the
patent owner "in as good a position as he
would have been in" if there had not been
a violation. Ibid. This purpose is, of
course, precisely the same purpose
Congress had when it provided for equi
table make-whole relief in the form of
back pay in Title VII cases. Compare GMC
v. Devex, 461 U.S. at 655-656 (prejudgment
interest necessary to "make the patent
owner whole" and to ensure "complete
justice between the plaintiff and the
United States") with Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Woody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (back
pay an equitable remedy necessary to "make
persons whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimi
nation" and "to secure complete justice").
38
Third, as we will now demonstrate,
Congress intended by § 2000e-16 to
abrogate sovereign immunity in its
entirety in Title VII actions against the
government. Therefore, federal employees
are entitled the same full relief with
regard to both attorneys' fees and back
pay as are all other employees.^
The government's asserted dichotomy
between back pay as benefiting the
discriminated against employee and
attorneys' fees as benefiting the lawyer
is also simply wronq. The provision that
fees are to be paid by the defendant is
for the benefit of the prevailing civil
rights plaintiff just as much as is the
provision of back pay. Congress and this
Court recognize that without the possibil
ity of fee-shifting, attorneys would not
be available; without attorneys there will
be no civil rights plaintiffs to recover
back pay. See Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., supra. For those
clients who can pay fees, their recovery
is as much make whole relief as is the
recovery of back pay.
39
II.
SECTION 717 OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 IS A COMPLETE
ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES.
A. Congressional Intent Is Determinative
Of The Extent Sovereign Immunity Is
Waived By A Particular Statutory
Scheme.
The government relies mechanically on
cases decided at a time when sovereign
immunity was viewed as an absolute and
impenetrable bar to actions brought
against the federal government. More
recent decisions of this Court, on the
other hand, establish that sovereign
immunity is a disfavored doctrine and that
conaress ional waivers of it will be
construed liberally. Thus, in Franchise
Tax Board of California v. United States
Postal Service, _____ U.S. ____, 81 L.Ed. 2d
446 (1984) this Court reaffirmed a line of
cases that have interpreted liberally "sue
and be sued" language as constituting the
40
total abrogation of sovereign immunity.
81 L.Ed.2d at 451. The lower courts have
correctly held that such language encom
passes an abrogation of the bar to an
award of interest in a Title VII case.
See, Nagy v. United States Postal Service,
773 F .2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1985) .
To what extent the sovereign immunity
of the federal government has been waived
by a particular statutory scheme depends,
of course, on the intent of Congress.
Indeed, this proposition is firmly
established by the very cases relied upon
by petitioners. Thus, for example, in
Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U.S.
41 (1928), the Court did not simply rest
on the absence of the word "interest" from
27the private act in question. Rather, the
decision by Justice Holmes carefully
scrutinized the context of the statute. It
27 42 Stat. 1590, ch. 192 (5-15-22).
41 -
concluded that Congress did not intend to
"put the United States on the footing of a
private person in all respects." Id. at
47.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
267 U.S. 76 (1925), in contrast, the Court
did find the United States liable for
interest under a statute that again was
silent on the subject. There, the United
States acted as if it were a private
insurer; therefore, it had without more
consented to be treated as a private
insurer. Id . at 79. As a result,
interest could be obtained even though it
was not expressly provided for by statute.
Thus, the rule established by the deci
sions of this Court is that the presence
or absence of a particular phrase or word
is not dispositive. Rather, one must look
42
to the intent of Congress as evidenced by
both the language and purpose of the
particular statutory scheme involved.
As we have explained in our Brief in
Opposition to the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at pages 17-23, the decisions
embodying the no-interest rule dealt with
narrow and specific Acts, leases, and
contracts in regard to which the United
States was acting in its sovereign and
governmental capacity. By 42 U.S.C.
§ 200Oe- 1 6 ( § 717 of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972), in contrast,
Congress had the specific and clear intent
that governmental agencies, in their
capacities as providers of employment
opportunities, would have the same status
as all other employers, private, state and
local, covered under the broad and
comprehensive provisions of Title VII.
43
Indeed, Congress intended that the federal
government serve as a model for all other
employers because:
The Federal service is an area
where equal employment opportun
ity is of paramount signi
ficance . . . . Accordingly
there can exist no justification
for anything but a vigorous
effort to accord Federal
employees the same rights and
impartial treatment which the
law seeks to afford employees in
the private sector.
House Report No. 92-238 (92d Cong. 1st
Sess. , 1971), pp. 22-23; see also Sen.
Report No. 92-415 (92d Cong. 1st. Sess.
1971) pp. 12-13.
B . Congress Intended To Waive All
Sovereign Immunity Bars To The Award
Of Complete Relief In Title VII
Cases
In the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 Congress used, if anything,
even clearer language to evidence an
intent to abrogate sovereign immunity
44
totally than the phrase "sue and be sued."
Not only has it provided in the statute
that an action against the federal
government will be governed by precisely
the same relief provisions that govern
2 8actions against private employers, but it
has provided specifically that the
government will be liable for fees "the
same as a pr ivate 29person." It has,
moreover, stated explicitly in the
legislative history of the Act that
federal employees will "have the full
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) :
The provisions of section 200Qe-5(f)
through (k) of this title, as
applicable, shall govern civil
actions brought hereunder.
See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840,
8 4 6-~48 ( 1976) for the meaning of the
phrase "as applicable." For the reasons
stated there, the phrase cannot be
construed as limiting the clear language
of 2000e-5(k) .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), one of the
provisions incorporated by reference by
§ 2OO0e-16(d).
45
rights available in the courts as are
granted to individuals in the private
50sector under Title VII."
Strikingly absent from the govern
ment’s brief is any substantial discussion
. 31of the Act’s legislative history.
Similarly striking is the absence of any
reference whatsoever to the prior deci
sions of this Court discussing the history
and purpose of the Act. This Court has
held that § 2000e-16 provides federal
employees with a "careful blend of * 30
Sen. Rep. No. 92-415 (92d Cong., 1st
Sess., 1971), reprinted in Subcommittee on
Labor, Senate Commitee on Labor and Public
Welfare, "Legislative History of The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972"
(hereinafter "Legislative History") at
425.
The only citation in its brief, at p. 19,
to the legislative history is to the
entire lengthy compendium cited supra, n.
30. The government simply asserts that it
could find nothing in that substantial
book that casts any light on the issue
before the Court, presumedly because it
could not find the magic word "interest"
therein.
46
administrative and judicial enforcement
powers" intended "to accord federal
33employees the same right [s] " enjoyed by
other employees. This was accomplished by
providing that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)-(k},
the provisions relating to relief for
non-federal employees, govern the
provision of relief to federal employees.
Brown v. General Services Administration,
425 U.S. 820, (1976), squarely held that:
Sections 706(f) through (k), 42
U.S.C. §S 2000e-5(f ) through
2000e-5(k) . . . . which are
incorporated "as applicable" by
§ 717(d), govern such issues as
venue, the appointment of
attorneys, attorneys' fees, and
the scope of relief.
425 U.S. at 832 (emphasis added).
Brown v. General Services Administration,
425 U.S. 820, 833 ( 1976) .
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 848
(1976).
33
47
Crucial to an understanding of the
intent of Congress when it passed 42
U.S.C. §2000e-16 is the background of that
statute and the specific, underlying
problem it addressed. Existing sovereign
immunity doctrine had served as a bar both
to the recovery of full relief in the
administrative process and to the pursuit
34of such relief in court.' Congress passed
§ 2000e-16 to overcome that bar entirely.
When Congress enacted Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it did not
include the United States within the
definition of employer. However, it did
include a proviso that employment deci
sions of the government were to be free of
discrimination and entrusted to the
— — ..... “ “J
See Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discri
mination Law, Chap. 33, "Federal Employee
Litigation" ( 2d Ed. 1983) , for a summary
of the history of the 1964 and 1972 Acts
and of the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 as they relate to federal employee
discrimination claims.
48
President the power to implement that
35proviso. Subsequently, Executive Orders
1 1 246 and 1 1 478 were issued along with
implementing regulations enacted by the
3 6then Civil Service Commission.
The regulations provided administra
tive procedures and certain remedies to
federal employees for discrimination in
employment. However, the scope of relief
available was severely limited because of
an opinion of the Comptroller General that
back pay could be awarded for a discrimi
nation claim only insofar as it was
permitted under the Back Pay Act (5 U.S.C.
3 7§ 5596(b)). Thus, a federal employee who 35 * 37
35 P.L. 88-352, § 701(b).
3® 5 C.F.R. Part 713 (1967). These regula
tions, as amended, are now found at 29
C.F.R. Part 1613.
37 Testimony of Irving Kator, Hearings Before
the General Subcommittee on Labor of the
House Committee On Education And Labor on
H.R. 1746, March 3, 4, and 18, 1971, p.
365.
49
succeeded in challenging a discharge could
receive the back pay he had been denied
thereby, while an employee who successful
ly challenged the denial of a promotion on
3 8the ground of discrimination could not.
The underlying basis for the Comptroller
General 1s opinion was that without an
explicit waiver of sovereian immunity by
Congress, the only relief available for
discrimination claims was that available
under existing statutory authority.
With regard to the availability of a
judicial remedy, there was a split in the
courts. While the Court of Claims held
that there was a right to bring an action
. 39based on discrimination, the Eighth
See, United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392
(1976)“, for a discussion of the distinc
tion between discharge and promotion
claims under the Back Pay Act in a case
that does not involve a discrimination
claim.
Chambers v. United States, 451 P. 2d 1045
(Ct. Cl. 1971).
39
50
Circuit in Gnotta v. United States, 415
F. 2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), held that
sovereign immunity precluded such an
action and that the various statutes upon
which such a claim might be based did not
constitute a sufficient waiver of sov
ereign immunity.
Thus, as this court has already held
in Brown v. GSA, one of the central
concerns discussed in the hearings and
committee reports involving § 2000e-16
were sovereign immunity bars to relief for
federal employees asserting claims of
discrimination. Thus, witnesses urged
that Congress must act to ensure the
availability of complete relief.^ Repre
sentatives of the Civil Service Com-
See, e .g . , testimony of Hon. Walter E.
Fauntroy, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare on S.2515, S.2617, antd
H.R. 1746, Oct. 4, 6, and 7, 1971, at p.
206.
51
mission, while acknowledging limitations
on the relief they could grant because of
the Comptroller General's ruling, attemp
ted to assure Congress that there was no
sovereign immunity bar to judicial
, . , 41relief.
The Senate Committee, however, noted
that "the testimony of the Civil Service
Commission notwithstanding . . . [ijn many
cases the employee must overcome a U.S.
Government defense of sovereign immunity"
and that "the remedial authority of the
Commission and the courts has also been in
doubt."* 42 Thus, it was made explicit in
Testimony of Irving Kator, Hearings cited
supra, n . 37, pp. 319-20,* Testimony of
Irving Kator, Hearings cited supra, n. 40,
p. 296.
42 Leaislative History at 425. As noted by
the government in its brief in Brown v.
GSA, supra, "Ultimately, the Committees
concluded that judicial review was not
available at all or that access was
doubtful and that some forms of relief
were definitely foreclosed." Brief for
Respondents in No. 74-768, p . 24.
52
the legislative reports that a central
purpose of § 2000e-16 was specifically to
remove sovereign immunity bars to relief
for federal employees, both in the
43administrative process and in court.
With regard to the administrative
process, Congress specified that the Civil
Service Commission (now the Equal Employ-
44ment Opportunity Commission) could grant
45back pay and all other relief necessary.
Legislative History at 425.
Jurisdiction over federal equal employment
opportunity matters was transferred to the
EEOC by the President's Reorganization
Plan No. 1 of 1978. 43 F.R. 28971 ( 1978).
Section 2000e-16(b) provides that the
Commission may enforce 2000e-16(a)
"through appropriate remedies, including
reinstatement or hiring of employees with
or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this section . . . ." The
section-by-analysis accompanying the
conference report explained:
The Civil Service Commission would be
authorized to grant appropriate
remedies which may include, but are
not limited to, backpay for aggrieved
applicants or employees. Any remedy
5 3
The legislative history makes it clear
that there was no intent to limit the
relief available to that specified in the
statute. Rather, Congress recognized the
impossibility, in the context of Title
VII, of predetermining all the possible
types and scope of relief that might be
appropriate. Thus, at the same time
Congress was enacting § 2000e-16 it was
expanding the language of the relief
provisions of Title VII in 42 U.S.C.
needed to fully recompense the
employee for his loss, both financial
and professional, is considered
appropriate under this subsection.
Legislative History at 1851. {Emphasis
added.) The District Court for the
District of Columbia interpreted
§ 2000e-16(b) as authorizing the award of
attorneys’ fees administratively in an
employment discrimination case. Smith v.
Califano, 446 F. Supp. 530 (D.D.C. 1978).
Congress authorized the award of fees by
the Merit Systems Protection Board in EEO
cases in the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(2). Subse-
auently, both the MSPB and the EEOC
adopted regulations for the award of fees
in EEO cases. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.37; 29
C.F.R. § 1613.271(c).
54
§ 2000e-5(g). As held by this Court in
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company,,
424 U.S. 747, 763-66 (1976), the legis
lative history of the amendment to
§ 2000e-5(g) makes it clear that the
"'most complete relief possible'" was to
be available, unlimited by the enumeration
in the statute of certain particular
remedies. 424 U.S. at 764.
When Congress provided a judicial
remedy for federal employees, it seized on
the simple expedient of incorporating the
relief provisions that were applicable to
all other employers into § 2000e-16. Thus,
it first provided that federal employees
46could bring a civil action and then made
all of the relief provisions applicable to
private, state, and local government
employers applicable to actions brought by
46 42 U.S.C. § 2Q00e-16(c)
5 5
federal employees. Again, Congress'
intent to make precisely the same relief
available to federal employees as is
available to all other employees is
1 48clear.
Thus, the clear language of the
statute, the legislative history, and the
entire background and purpose of the
statute allow no other interpretation than
that Congress intended to enact a complete
waiver of sovereign immunity in cases
raising claims of discrimination in
employment against federal agencies. The
waiver includes allowing attorneys' fees
47
42 U.S.C. § 2Q00e-16(d).
The Senate Report states, "aggrieved
employees . . . will also have the full
rights available in the courts as are
granted to individuals in the private
sector under Title VII." Legislative
History at 425.
5 6
on the same basis, in the same amount, and
calculated in the same manner as fees
. 49against other parties.
The petitioners’ attempt to rely on lower
court decisions decided under the Equal
Access to Justice Act is misplaced for a
number of reasons. (1) The purpose of
the EAJA is entirely different. It deals
specifically with typical governmental
actions and is limited to awarding fees
only when the positions taken by the
government were not "substantially
justified." (2) The EAJA’s purpose is
not to encourage the bringing of litiga
tion, but rather is to provide some
measure of reimbursement to those who must
defend against unjust governmental
actions. (3) The EAJA limits fees to $75
per hour and thus does not purport to
provide full or just compensation for
expenditures of attorneys fees. There
fore, particularly with regard to the
inclusion of pre-j udgment interest, it has
no relevance whatsoever to the calculation
of a "reasonable," i.e , , fully compensa
tory, fee. (4) Congress explicitly
provided that the EAJA did not alter,
limit, modify, repeal, invalidate, or
supersede any other statute, including the
civil rights acts, which provided for fees
against the United States. P.L. 96-481,
§ 206. This language was inserted in the
statute precisely because of concerns that
the EAJA might be relied upon to restrict
fee awards in civil rights cases.
5 7
Despite the evidence of the clear
intent of § 2000e-16, following its
enactment the government persisted in
arguing that sovereign immunity limited
the relief available to federal employees,
including the recovery of attorneys' fees.
Indeed, the government's first argument
was that no fees were available against
the government whatsoever because of
sovereign immunity. In fact, the govern
ment made the same "fortuity" argument
that it now makes at p. 20 of its brief
here: that is, when Congress incorporated
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) into § 2000e-16 it
really had no intent to impose on the
United States liability for fees when a
government employee prevailed in a Title
VII action where a federal agency was the
5 0defendant.' The government eventually
Letter from Irving Jaffe, Acting Attorney
General, to Senator John V. Tunney, May 6,
1975, printed in 2 CCH Employment Prac
tices Guide 1(5327 ( 1976). See Ralston,
58
5 1abandoned this argument in 1975 and
finally, in 1977, the Attorney General of
the United States officially disavowed any
reliance on arguments based on sovereign
immunity. He stated:
In a similar vein, the
Department will not urge
arguments that rely upon the
unique role of the Federal
Government. For example, the
Department recognizes that the
same kinds of relief should be
available against the Federal
Government as courts have found
appropriate in private sector
cases, including imposition of
affirmative action plans, back
pay and attorney's fees. See
Copeland v. Usery, 13 EPD
1(11,434 (D.D.C. 1976); Day v.
Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Sperling v. United
States, 515 F.2d 465 " ( 3d cir.
1975). Thus, while the Depart
ment might oppose particular
remedies in a given case, it
will not urge that different
standards be applied in cases
"The Federal Government as Employer:
Problems and Issues in Enforcing the
Anti-Discrimination Laws", 10 Ga. L. Rev.
717, 719 n. 13 ( 1976) .
51 Ibid.
- 5 9 -
against the Federal Government
than are applied in other
cases.
Memorandum of Attorney General Griffin B.
Bell for United States Attorneys and
Aqency General Counsel (Aug. 31, 1977), p.
2 . 52
This directive was in effect when the
services at issue here were rendered and
when the district court entered its award;
to the knowledge of counsel for respon
dent, it has never been withdrawn. If the
position taken in the present case
constitutes a repudiation of that an
nounced in 1977, we urge that it is in
error. As we have shown, Congress
intended to and in fact did confer "upon
Federal employees . . . the same substan
tive . . . [and] procedural rights . . .
__
The memorandum was published in 2 CCH
Employment Practices Guide f 5046 (1977).
For the convenience of the Court, the
memorandum is reproduced in Appendix III
to this Brief at pp. 1c-3c.
60
as it has conferred upon employees . . .
in private industry and in state and local
governments." (Ibid.) This Court should
affirm that the United States has "no
lesser obligations with respect to equal
employment opportunities than those it
seeks to impose upon private and state and
local government employees." (Ibid.) The
rights afforded federal employees include
the recovery of attorneys' fees and back
pay in their entirety, including both pre-
and post-judgment interest and other
necessary components of full make whole
relief.
61
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the
decision of the court below should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JULIUS LeVONNE CHAMBERS
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON
(Counsel of Record)
99 Hudson Street,
16th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10013
(212) 219-1900
Attorneys for Respondent
APPENDIX I
Statutes Involved
1a
42 P.S.C. § 2000e-16
(a) All personnel actions
affecting employees or applicants for
employment (except with regard to aliens
employed outside the limits of the United
States) in military departments as defined
in section 102 of title 5, United States
Code, in executive agencies as defined in
section 105 of title 5, United States Code
(including employees and applicants for
employment who are paid from nonappro-
priated funds), in the United States
Postal Service and the Postal Rate
Commission, in those units of the Govern
ment of the District of Columbia having
positions in the competitive service, and
in those units of the legislative and
judicial branches of the Federal Govern
ment having positions in the competitive
service, and in the Library of Congress
shall be made free from any discrimination
2a
based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
(b) Except as otherwise
provided in this subsection, the Civil
Service Commission shall have authority to
enforce the provisions of subsection (a)
through appropriate remedies, including
reinstatement or hiring of employees with
or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this section, and shall
issue such rules, regulations, orders and
instructions as it deems necessary and
appropriate to carry out its responsibili
ties under this section. The Civil
Service Commission shall — -
(1) be responsible for the annual
review and approval of a
national and regional equal
employment opportunity plan
which each department and agency
and each appropriate unit
referred to in subsection (a) of
3 a
this section shall submit in
order to maintain an affirmative
program of equal employment
opportunity for all such
employees and applicants for
employment;
(2) be responsible for the review
and evaluation of the operation
of all agency equal employment
opportunity programs, perio
dically obtaining and publishing
(on at least a semi-annual
basis) progress reports from
each such department, agency, or
unit? and
(3) consult with and solicit the
recommendations of interested
individuals, groups, and
organizations relating to equal
employment opportunity.,
The head of each such department, agency,
or unit shall comply with such rules,
4 a
regulations, orders, and instructions
which shall include a provision that an
employee or applicant for employment shall
be notified of any final action taken on
any complaint of discrimination filed by
him thereunder. The plan submitted by
each department, agency, and unit shall
include, but not be limited to —
(1 ) provision for the establishment
of training and education
programs designed to provide a
maximum opportunity for employ
ees to advance so as to perform
at their highest potential; and
(2) a description of the qualifica
tions in terras of training and
experience relating to equal
employment opportunity for the
principal and operating
officials of each such depart
ment , agency or unit responsible
for carrying out the equal
5 a
employment opportunity program
and of the allocation of
personnel and resources proposed
by such department,, agency, or
unit to carry out its equal
employment opportunity program.
With respect to employment in the Library
of Congress, authorities granted in this
subsection to the Civil Service Commission
shall be exercised by the Librarian of
Congress.
(c ) Within thirty days of
receipt of notice of final action taken by
a department , a g e n c y , or unit referred to
in subsection 717(a), or by the Civil
Service Commission upon an appeal from a
decision or order of such department,
agency, or unit on a complaint of discri
mination based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, brought pursuant
to subsection (a) of this section,
Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding
6 a
executive orders? or after one hundred and
eighty days from the filing of the initial
charge with the department? agency? or
unit or with the Civil Service Commission
on appeal from a decision or order of such
department? agency? or unit? an employee
or applicant for employment? if aggrieved
by the final disposition of his complaint?
or by the failure to take final action on
his complaint? may file a civil action as
provided in section 706? in which civil
action the head of the department? agency?
or unit? as appropriate ? shall be the
defendant. (July 2? 1964 ? P.L. 88-352?
title VII? § 717? as added Mar. 24, 1972?
P.L. 92-261? S 11? 86 Stat. 111? as
amended, Feb. 15, 1980? P.L. 96-191?
§ 8(g) ? 94 Stat. 34. )
7 a
28 U.S.C. § 2516(a)
Interest on a claim against the
United States shall be allowed in a
judgment of the United States Claims Court
only under a contract or Act of Congress
expressly providing for payment thereof.
(Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed.,
§ 284 and section 226 of title 3, U.S.C. ,
1940 ed. , Money and Finance (Sept. 30 ,
1890, ch. 1126, § 1, 26 Stat. 537; Mar. 3,
1911, ch. 231, § 177, 36 Stat. 1141; Nov.
921 , ch . 136, § 1324(b) 9 42 Stat.
June 2, 1924, ch., 234, § 1020, 43
3 46; Feb. 13, 1925 , ch. 229,- S 3(c),
at. 939; Feb. 26, 1926, ch . 27, §§
1 1 1 7, 1 200, 44 Stat. 119, 125; May 29,
1928, ch. 852, § 615(a), 45 Stat. 877;
June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 808, 49 Stat.
1746) . )
APPENDIX II
Calculation of Loss of Value
Through Inflation
1b
A method for adjusting dollar
amounts for the effect of inflation is set
out in Hohenstein, "Subtract Inflation
from Your Income, Prices and Profits,"
Legal Economics 35 (ABA Section on
Economics of Law Practice, Summer 1978).
The method sets up a formula based on the
consumer price index (CPI), which uses
1967 as the base year. The following
table sets out the CPI for each year
through 1984.
2b
Table^
Year CPI
1967 100.0
1968 104.2
1969 109.8
1970 116.3
1971 121.3
1972 125.3
1973 .- 133.1
1974 147.7
1975 161.2
1976 170.5
1977 181.5
1978 195.3
1979 217.7
1980 247.0
1981 272.3
1982 288.6
1983 297.4
1984 307.6
Using the example in the text, to
convert 1975 dollars into their 1980
equivalent, the following ratio is used
1980 CPI/1975 CPI = 247.0/161.2 = 1.53.
The $80 per hour 1975 rate is then
multiplied by 1.53? $80 X 1.53 = $122.40.
Source: Consumer Price Index for Urban
Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, annual
averages and changes, 1967-84. United
States Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review.
May, 1985, p. 69.
3b
Therefore, fees awarded in 1980 would have
to be calculated at $122.40 per hour
simply to provide the same dollar equiva
lent as if the fees had been paid in 1975.
To convert the other way* i,e. , from
1980 dollars to their 1975 equivalent, the
converse ratio is used. 1975 CPI/1980 CPI
= 161.2/247.0 = .65. Therefore, an award
of $80 per hour in 1980 would be the same
as if fees had been paid at a rate of $52
per hour in 1975. ($80 X .65 = $52.).
APPENDIX III
Memorandum of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell
for United States Attorneys and Agency General
Counsel (Aug. 31, 1977)
MEMORANDUM FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
AND AGENCY GENERAL COUNSELS
Re: Tide VII Litigation
In 1972s as additional evidence of our Nation's deter
mination to guarantee equal rights to all citizens, Congress
amended Title VII ©f the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide
Federal employees and applicants for Federal employment with
judicially enforceable equal employment rights. The Department
of Justice, of course, has an important role in the affirmative
enforcement of rights under the Act, in both the private and
public sectors. To effectively discharge those responsibilities,
we must ensure that the Department of Justice conducts its
representational functions as defense attorneys for agencies
in suits under the Act in a way.that.will be supportive of and
consistent with the Department's broader obligations to
enforce equal opportunity laws. This memorandum is issued
as part of what will be a continuing effort by ’ the Department
to this end.
Congress, in amending Title VII, has conferred upon Federal
employees and applicants the same substantive right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion,
and national origin, and the same procedural rights to judicial
enforcement as it has conferred upon employees and applicants
in private industry and in state and local governments.
Morton v. Hancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Chandler v. Roudebush.
425 U7S. 840 (1976). And, as a matter ot policy, the Federal
Government should be willing to assume for its own agencies no
lesser obligations with respect to equal employment opportunities
than those it seeks to impose upon private and state and local
government employers.
.In furtherance of this policy, the Department, whenever
possible, will take the same position in interpreting Title VII
in defense _ of Federal employee cases as it has taken and will
take in private or state and local government employee cases.
For example, where Federal employees and applicants meet the
2
%•
criteria of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*
they are also entitled to the same class rights as are
private sector employees. Albemarle Paoer Co. Moody„
422 U.S. 405* 414 (1975). further, the Department of
Justice has acquiesced in the recent rulings of the
Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals that it is
unnecessary for unnamed class ©embers to exhaust their '
administrative remedies as a prerequisite to class
membership. Eastland v. TVA, 553 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1977);
Williams v. TVA, F.23 (6th Cir. 1977). Consequently,
we willno longer maintain that each class member in a
Title ¥11 suit must have exhausted his or her administrative
remedy.
In a similar vein, the Deparment will not urge
arguments that rely upon the unique role of the Federal
Government. For example» the Deparment recognizes that
the same kinds of relief should be available against the
Federal Government as courts have found appropriate in
private sector cases, including imposition of affirmative
action plans, back pay and attorney's fees. See Copeland
v. Userv, 13 EPD 111,434 (D.D.C. 1976.); Dav v._ Mathews,
5T0~F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Sperling v. United States,
515 F,2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975). Thus, waile the Department
might oppose particular remedies in a given case, it will
not urge that different standards be applied in cases against
the Federal Government than are applied in other cases.
The Department, in other respects, will also attempt
to promote the underlying purpose of Title VII. For example,
the ,,1972 amendments to Title VII do not give the Government
a right to file a civil action challenging an agency finding
of discrimination. Accordingly, to avoid any appearance on
the Government's part of unfairly hindering Title VII law
suits, the Government will not attempt to contest a final
agency or Civil Service Commission finding of discrimination
by seeking a trial de novo in those cases where an employee
who has been successful”in proving his or her claim before
either the agency or the Commission files a civil action
seeking only to expand upon the remedy proposed by such
final decision.
- 2c
The policy sec forth above does not reflect, and should
not be interpreted' as reflecting, any unwillingness on the
pare of the Department to vigorously defend, on the merits,
claims of discrimination against Federal agencies where
appropriate. It reflects only a concern that enforcement of
the equal opportunity laws as to all employees be uniform
and consistent.
In addition to the areas discussed above, the Department
of Justice is now undertaking a review of the consistency of
other legal positions advanced by the Civil Division in
defending Title VII cases with those advocated by the Civil
Rights Division in prosecuting Title VII cases. The objective of
this review is to ensure that, insofar as possible, they will
be consistent, irrespective of the Department's role as either
plaintiff or defendant under Title VII. As a pare of this
review, "the Equal Employment Opportunity Cases" section of
the Civil Division Practice Manual (§3-37), which contains
the Department's position on the defense of Title VII actions
brought against the Federal Government, is being revised.
When this revision is completed, the new section of the Civil
Division Practice Manual will be distributed to all
United States Attorneys5 Offices and-will replace the present
section. Each office should rely on the revised section of
the Manual for guidance on legal arguments to be made in Title VII
actions. In order to ensure consistency, any legal arguments
which are not treated- in the Manual should be referred to the
Civil Division for review prior to their being advocated to
the court.
This policy statement has been achieved through the
cooperation of Assistant Attorney General Barbara Babcock
of the Civil Division who is responsible for the defense of
these Federal employee cases, and Assistant Attorney General
Drew Days of the Civil Rights Division who is my principal
adviser on civil rights matters. They and their Divisions
will continue to work closely together to assure that this
policy is effectively implemented.
T O i r r m
August 31, 1977
J C
D O J-1977-09
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