The Pertinent Proceedings with Respect to Suburban Intervenors

    THE PERTINENT PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT TO SUBURBAN INTERVENORS

1. Complaint, appeals, lengthy trial'on issue of segregation: 
public notice of the trial, proof going beyond territorial limits 
of the City of Detroit; (June 25, 1971) state defendants motion 
to dismiss denied and . warning to state defendants during
trial to consider the broadest possible remedies.

2. Ritchie’s Metro motion made and held in abeyance by the 
Court because (la 215-216):

"In considering the motion to add the listed school districts 
we pause to note that the proposed action has to do with relief. 
Having determined that the circumstances of the case require 
judicial intervention and equitable relief, it would be 
improper for us to act on this motion until the other parties 
to the action have had an opportunity to submit their 
proposals for desegregation. Accordingly, we shall not rule 
on the motion to add parties at this time. Considered as 
a plan for desegregation, the motion is lacking in specificity 
and is framed in the broadest general terms. The moving party 
may wish to amend its proposal and resubmit it as a comprehensive 
plan of desegregation."

3. Order of Nov. 6 (and Colloquy of Oct. 4, 1971) to 
state defendants to submit a metropolitan plan of desegregation 
within 120 days, a shot heard around the State of Michigan and
surely throughout the tri-county area. A.Ia 217-221. Colloquy in
particular shows how District Court open to opportunity of
suburban districts to be heard on relief:

"With respect to remarks you gentlemen have made about other 
school districts, I am not going to make any definitive 
ruling at this time. We haven't come to that pass yet.
I don’t see much disagreement, Mr. Krasicky, between you 
and Mr. Lucas on that point. I don't think Mr. Lucas said 
they should not be heard. He is addressing himself to the 
matter of mechanics, how do you do it, and, of course, as you 
well know, it is overwhelming to consider joining 50, 60 or 
80 other parties to this lawsuit, each of which is composed 
of superintendents and boards.
On the other hand, I do not propose to stop the voice of 
anybody who is apt to be affected by the plan. So this is a 
matter of mechanics. When the time comes that action has 
to be taken in that regard, vie will give it further thought 
and make a decision that we believe will be a fair one and yet 
will permit us to proceed with some dispatch in achieving 
some remedial effects and perhaps putting into effect some 
plans for desegregation."

4. On ____________, 1972, 'f; Intervenors , Allen Park, et al.,
filed motions to intervene.

5. March 15, 1972, held in abeyance Ritchie's motion to join 
all districts in tri-county area "to await further developments in



this proceeding" and granted intervention motions of Allen Park, 
et al., representing all but 18 districts in the tri-county area, 
with reasonable conditions to permit orderly proceedings, for two 
purposes, both relating to relief, (1) to advise the Court, by 
brief, of the legal propriety or impropriety of considering a 
metropolitan plan and (2) to review any plan or plans for metro­
politan desegregation and submit objections, modifications or alterna­
tives. These actions showed that the Court concerned with remedy, 
would not stop the voice of anyone who wished to be heard on remedy 
who would be effected, and still concerned about mechanics of 
"opportunity to be heard."

6. March 14, 15, 16, 17 and 21, 1972 Hearings on Detroit 
only.

7. March 24, 1972. Ruling on Propriety of Considering Metro.

8. March 28, 1972. Findings and Conclusions on Detroit-only.

9. March 28-April 14. Hearing on Metropolitan Plans 
submitted. The District Court was entirely reasonable, allowing 
considerable leeway to suburban intervenors in cross examination, 
and presentation of evidence. Even offered to keep record open
to allow any offers of proof with respect to irrelevant educational 
data (Armor) and the history of the establishment of school 
district boundaries. Would have permitted any offer made by 
suburban intervenors: they limited what they wanted to introduce 
and only Grosse Pointe offered evidence with respect to school 
district boundaries and then only with respect to its own 
school district boundaries. A. Ia 489. The suburban intervenors 
have been given the same opportunity to be heard on relief as all 
the other parties; and the other 18 have not asked for the oppor­
tunity to be heard despite the certain knowledge it would be 
granted.

10. June 14, 1972 - the District Court issued its Ruling 
on Desegregation Area and Development of Plans and Findings and 
Conclusions in Support thereof. These Orders and Opinions made 
clear (1) the state defendants were the primary defendants;
(2) no actual plan of desegregation had yet been offered to 
or considered by the Court (A. Ia 500-536); (3) the metropolitan

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hearings and rulings concerned only relief not any new theories 
or proof of dejure acts by suburban districts or gerryraander in the 
establishment of suburban school district boundaires (A.la. 497-498); 
(4) in the absence of submission of such a complete plan (and 
ohe default by state defendants), the Court was required, in order 
to expedite and shape further planning to (a) settle upon an 
area for Pupil reassignment subject to change should the 
circumstances^require, (b)establish clear guidelines for further 
planning asad/school desegregation, and (c) permit all parties to 
proceed apace with the task of fashioning an effective plan for 
the desegregation of the Detroit public schools, including the 
addition or subtraction of any districts. (At the hearing, 
suburban intervenors offered no_ assistance in saying what the 
area of pupil reassignment should be). Surely, the District <bur~t- 
committed no error in advising a Court-appointed panel and_ the parties 
how further planning should proceed, especially as relief was orAShVhv/.
I 7 r < i } N

-contemplated in short order. It is a detailed planning order 
requiring considerable-, affirmative action only because of the 
exigencies of time and the prior default of the state defendants: 
delay is no longer tolerable and plaintiffs should no;longer be without 
remedy because of the state defendant^ despite invitation by
this Court to intervene below (formally joined in by letter of

. . h$ K W i U v
plaintiffs counsel), these jsuburban districts refused to intervene, 
ihese suburban districts, like their intervenor brethefrn, have 
only argued that there should be no_ desegregation involving schools 
outside the Detroit school district r tvjtoAu p«>U<

11. At such time as the panel submitted an actual plan, 
there would be an opportunity to allow any and all school districts 
actually affected bŷ  the plan the opportunity to be given another 4 < &!!

" W ; t  r '~ ~ ( p v . ' / r V ' j  . . .  ,
 ̂opportunity to be heard prior to implementation. For plannin
purposes, at a minimum, the District Court surely was proper in relying 
on the sanctions available to state defendants to secure necessary 
information and personnel and any other assistance; the Court was 
placed In the position of taking initiative to accomplish relief

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by the default of state defendants.
12. As the Sixth Circuit well knows, however, such proceedings 

to consider an actual plan of desegregation were stayed because 
of the desire of the panel to review the prior proceedings and 
the willingness of the District Court to have this important case 
reviewed before any otherwise final orders (i.e., a plan of desegre­
gation) were entered. Thus, no_ suburban district has been deprived 
of any procedural right under Rule 19 or the 14th Amendment. Indeed, 
in the absence of an actual plan of desegregation, it is difficult 
to know which districts are to be affected and, hence, which 
should be heard.
In summary, the District Court has not violated the Rule 19 view 
of the panel; therefore, the Fuling on Desegregation Area and 
Development of Plans, and Findings and Conclusions in Support 
thereof, should not be vacated, but should be affirmed.

In the alternative, as there is no final plan of desegregation, 
this Court could in its discretion, simply withhold its views ■ 
on this Ruling and Opinion pending the District Court’s authorization 
of an actual plan of desegregation. In any event, we/respectfully 
ask that the Sixth Circuit give the parties and the District 
Court guidance as to precisely when suburban districts are to be 
given the opportunity to be heard and of what that opportunity to 
be heard consists.

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